

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Economic Studies



DISSERTATION

Three Essays on Financial Development

Author: Mgr. Jan Mareš

Supervisor: prof. Roman Horváth, Ph.D.

Year of defense: 2020

Declaration of Authorship

The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature, and the thesis has not been used to obtain any other academic title.

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Prague, July 22, 2020

Mgr. Jan Mareš

Abstract

The dissertation is a compilation of three empirical papers on the effects of financial development. In the first paper, we examine the effect of finance on long-term economic growth using Bayesian model averaging to address model uncertainty. The findings from our global sample indicate that the efficiency of financial intermediation is robustly related to long-term growth. The second and third paper investigate the determinants of wealth and income inequality capturing various economic, financial, political, institutional, and geographical factors. We reveal that finance plays considerable role in shaping both distributions.

JEL Classification C11, D31, E21, G10, 040

Keywords Finance, Growth, Wealth inequality, Income inequality, Bayesian Model Averaging

Thank you

Roman, I am very grateful for your patient encouragement and guidance throughout my Ph.D. studies. Your professionalism, work ethics, and life-view have been very inspirational to me.

Anna, thank you for helping me through the challenges in life and respectfully giving me the opportunity to pursue this and other endeavours alongside you.

To the rest of my family, thank you for your ever-present support.

Acknowledgments

Research presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation is part of a project that has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 681228. The author also acknowledges the support from Grant Agency of Charles University No. 768217.

Typeset in L^AT_EX using the IES Thesis Template.

Bibliographic Record

Mareš, Jan: *Three Essays on Financial Development*. DISSERTATION. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Prague. 2020, pages 180. Supervisor: prof. Roman Horváth, Ph.D.

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Acronyms

BIC	Bayesian Information Criterion
BIS	Bank for International Settlements
BMA	Bayesian Model Averaging
BRIC	Bayesian Risk Inflation Criterion
CBF	Conditional Bayes Factor
CSWD	Credit Suisse Wealth Databook
DINA	Distributional National Accounts
EFW	Economic Freedom of the World
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFDD	Global Financial Development Database
HBS	Household Balance Sheet
IID	Independent Identically Distributed
IVBMA	Instrumental Variable Bayesian Model Averaging
LIS	Luxembourg Income Study
MCMC	Markov-chain Monte Carlo
ML	Marginal Likelihood
OECD	Organisation for Co-operation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PIP	Posterior Inclusion Probability
PMP	Posterior Model Probability
PWT	Penn World Table
SWIID	Standardized World Income Inequality Database
UIP	Unit Information Prior
WALS	Weighted-average Least Squares
WB	World Bank
WID	World Inequality Database
WIID	World Income Inequality Database

Chapter 1

Summary of the dissertation

The Great Recession following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 reinvigorated the interest in the research of financial development and its impact on the real economy. Although it was a dominant view that more finance is good for economic growth and equalizes opportunities, the crisis spurred questions about the non-linearities in finance effects and the existence of a healthy threshold or the impact being conditional on the quality of institutions. New regulatory waves followed, focusing primarily on the stability of the individual financial intermediaries and the overall systemic risk.

The measurement of finance and financial development also came into question. Most of the researchers in the field relied on proxies capturing the size (depth) of finance. However, these are imperfect proxies of the functions ascribed to finance in the theoretical models (Levine, 2005). When I was about to begin my dissertation research, more detailed and sufficiently dense data on financial development were published by the World Bank. The information on the stability, efficiency, and access to financial intermediaries was not perfect, but it indicated better alternatives to size in accurately capturing the channels through which finance affects the real economic phenomena. Together with the carefully adopted methodological approach in BMA, which allows for a comparison of the relative importance of different financial proxies, it suggested a promising research path I decided to take. Economic growth was a straightforward first choice for the initial scientific paper, given the relevance of the question at the time. We prototyped the applicability of our approach and put forward novel evidence about the finance-growth nexus. I simultaneously followed the evolution of new and updated inequality measures as the Capital in the 21st Century (Piketty, 2014) became one of the best-sellers in the

decade. The literature on the inequality determinants seemed as ambiguous as the one on growth. Applying the proven toolkit to strenuously collected data on wealth inequality promised an entirely novel contribution to the literature. Together with co-authors, we uncovered particular aspects of finance as essential determinants of wealth inequality across countries. The paper became the second piece of research presented in this dissertation. A further spin-off to income inequality where we explore a potentially heterogeneous effect of financial development on income distribution then naturally followed to constitute the final chapter of the dissertation. Altogether, the dissertation is a composition of three papers related to financial development and its consequences.

By financial development, I refer to developing financial contracts, markets, and intermediaries that facilitate the screening of investment opportunities, the monitoring of investments, and the pooling, trading, and management of risk. I thus adopt Tobin's functional view of finance, which also mentions the facilitation of transactions by providing mechanisms and networks of payments, reflecting the financial industry's economic value (Tobin, 1984). Looking at the specific proxies of the functions mentioned above, I intend to explore how financial development increases social welfare rather than particular market agents' business efficiency. In other words, I take macroeconomic rather than a microeconomic exploratory path¹. It contrasts the dissertation from other branches of literature that very specifically look at the profitability and technical efficiency of financial intermediaries, such as stochastic frontier analysis in Bonin et al. (2005) or Cici et al. (2018) for stock market trading efficiency.

The financial development measures we employ are still indirect, albeit providing a closer approximation of functions ascribed to finance in economic theory. In the latter chapters, they become more sophisticated and multi-faceted by combining several underlying indicators related to the same function of finance. In their classification, we rely on Čihák et al. (2013) and Svirydzenka (2016) who pioneered the field. A repetitive pattern arises in the presented papers. We confirm the imperfection of typical size indicators of financial development and simultaneously identify access to finance and financial intermediation efficiency as informative in explaining differences in economic growth, wealth, and income inequality.

In selected chapters that follow, I often refer to the authorship as “we”,

¹It is essential to note that I deliberately switch between the efficiency of financial intermediaries and financial intermediation efficiency, always having in mind the presently stated functions and macroeconomic view of finance.

which reflects that some of the papers in this dissertation I wrote in collaboration with my supervisor professor Roman Horváth and professor Iftekhar Hasan from Fordham University. If I have to self-evaluate, my contribution to these papers was substantial in all research stages, from drafting the ideas, data collection, analysis, drafting the paper, and responding to referees during the publication process. I continue with the overviews of individual dissertation papers.

In *Chapter 2 - What Type of Finance Matters for Growth? Bayesian Model Averaging Evidence*, we examine the effect of finance on long-term economic growth. We consider the size proxies jointly with indicators that assess the stability and efficiency of financial markets. In the paper, we address the inconclusive finance-growth nexus literature. While some claim financial development has positive effect on economic growth (Atje & Jovanovic, 1993; R. G. King & Levine, 1993; Rajan & Zingales, 1998), others hold that financial sector removes scarce resources from the economy (Axelson & Bond, 2015; Bolton et al., 2016; Tobin, 1984) and underpins greater exposure and vulnerability to crises, severely burdening the real sector in during periods of instability (Minsky, 1991; Stiglitz, 2000). More recent papers also point towards decreasing returns to financial development and finance having negative consequences for growth when above a certain threshold (Arcand et al., 2015; Law & Singh, 2014; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2011).

We depart from the literature in two main features. First, we apply BMA to solve the model uncertainty problem in growth regressions. The variety of theories of economic growth suggests a large number of determinants and results in considerable uncertainty about the “true” growth model. Using the BMA, we can evaluate numerous regressors potentially relevant for economic growth and estimate their PIP, the probability that they are relevant in explaining the dependent variable, additionally to the weighted mean and variance of the respective coefficients. BMA essentially estimates varying combinations of explanatory variables and weights the coefficients using model fit. The methodology is solidly rooted in the statistical theory (Koop et al., 2007; Raftery et al., 1997) and indirectly also helps us to tackle the potential of omitted variables bias, from which empirical work on finance and growth typically abstracts.

Second, we augment previous research by examining several financial development indicators simultaneously to account for the multidimensionality of financial systems. By jointly examining whether depth, stability, or efficiency is relevant for long-term growth, we re-examine and unify previous literature.

The established functions of finance are difficult to operationalize in empirical research (Valickova et al., 2015), and there is no consensus on the measurement of financial development (R. G. King & Levine, 1993). The research dominantly uses depth of financial markets (credit / GDP ratio or stock market capitalization / GDP) as a measure of financial development. Employing the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) and the indicators provided therein, we can approximate the function of the financial system in much more detail. We can discriminate between banking and stock markets as well as evaluate the relative importance of depth versus the alternative proxies of efficiency, stability, and access to finance. We may also reflect the claims that excessive financial development and financial instability are harmful to growth. Even though the data coverage is still somewhat limited, we contribute to the literature by considering these additional dimensions of the financial sector in our regression analysis to provide a more exact picture of finance-growth nexus. We complement the data on financial development by the long-term growth dataset of Fernandez et al. (2001), which provides a rich set of possible explanatory variables capturing various economic, political, geographical, and institutional factors.

We find that efficiency of financial intermediation is the only indicator of financial development, which is robustly related to economic growth and consistently shows very high PIP. This result is consistent with the theoretical predictions sketched out by Pagano (1993), who shows how the increased efficiency of financial intermediaries affects the channel between savings and investment and therefore leads to higher real growth. On the other hand, the relevance of the traditionally employed variables, such as credit to the private sector or stock market capitalization, is weaker. Additionally, we find no evidence for a non-linear effect of financial development. We subject our results to further robustness checks by focusing on different sample periods, employing alternative priors, and basic techniques to address endogeneity with no substantial effect on our conclusions. The policy implications of the results highlight the essential importance of measuring financial development to precisely describe its consequences. The regulatory changes in the financial industry should appreciate the relevance of financial intermediaries for long-term growth. We published the paper in *The World Bank Economic Review*.

Chapter 3 - Finance and Wealth Inequality extends the idea of distinct features of financial systems to the distribution of wealth. Wealth inequality markedly varies across countries (Davies et al., 2017), and the interest of the

paper is to uncover the drivers of these differences. Is it different degrees of redistribution, financial development, globalization, technological progress, education, economic development, or something else? Although measurement of wealth inequality advanced significantly (Davies et al., 2017; Saez & Zucman, 2016), there is a lack of systematic evidence about the determinants of wealth inequality across countries.

The theoretical predictions of the wealth inequality drivers vary. Much discussed $r > g$ concept presented by Piketty (2014) suggests there is a natural tendency towards increasing wealth inequality unless exogenously amended by redistribution or wars. The framework is criticized on many fronts, though (Blume & Durlauf, 2015; J. E. King, 2017; Mankiw, 2015), and the cornerstone remains with distinct applications of dynamic quantitative models. The models² critically rely on the saving motives of the individuals, and this leads us to the hypothesis of financial development being crucially relevant for wealth distribution. Another prediction about the financial system and wealth inequality arises from Pástor and Veronesi (2016) in which inequality is driven, among other things, by the ability of entrepreneurs to diversify their idiosyncratic risk. The empirical evidence is scarce as the research papers on inequality mostly turn to the distribution of income due to better data availability. Nonetheless, wealth is much more unevenly distributed than income OECD (2013) and Zucman (2019), and income distribution is mostly used as an approximation of wealth distribution, while the latter would be more fitting given the theory (Bagchi & Svejnar, 2015).

The lack of encompassing theoretical framework informs our methodological framework similarly as in the paper on finance and growth. We rely on BMA in estimations to identify relevant determinants of wealth distribution. Moreover, we extend the analysis to address potential endogeneity more rigorously using the IVBMA. IVBMA mostly resembles the two-stage frequentist methods but accounts for model uncertainty in both stages. We further refresh and expand the set of regressors by constructing our original database, although conceptually, we similarly select the variables capturing economic, financial, institutional, regulatory, and political features of considered countries. We prefer the freedom about the choice of regressors over the comparability of our results with existing research as the paper is a pioneering work in this field. We also importantly update the indicators of financial development we employ. Rather than relying on single indicators capturing different dimensions of fi-

²Nardi and Fella (2017) provide thorough overview of the model implementations.

financial systems, we use complex indicators constructed from the GFDD that describe the characteristics of financial systems by extracting information from multiple indicators in each dimension through principal component analysis.

We find that the set of key determinants is small, and financial development exerts a complex effect on wealth inequality. Whereas countries with deeper financial systems (large financial markets and financial institutions) exhibit greater wealth inequality, more efficient intermediation and access to finance are associated with less wealth inequality. Our results thus support the idea that sound financial systems may contribute to lower wealth inequality. Alongside financial development, we discover that education, redistribution, globalization, and political instability affect wealth distributions within countries. Better educated societies and higher redistribution of income support the more egalitarian distribution of wealth, while globalization and political instability increase wealth inequality. The conclusions offer apparent policy alternatives of countermeasures to increasingly unequal distributions of wealth in inclusive and efficient financial systems alongside better education. The paper is forthcoming in the *Journal of International Money and Finance*.

Chapter 4 - Finance and Inequality - panel BMA approach is the last follow-up in the series of papers on financial development. The theoretical predictions and their ambiguity resemble the ones on wealth inequality and finance. In contrast with wealth, income inequality and the relation to finance are subject to research much more frequently, but with conflicting outcomes. A fundamental divide appears between financial development on the extensive and intensive margin. On the extensive margin, it might lead to more equal opportunities and outcomes as access to credit by previously disadvantaged groups allows human capital accumulation (Braun et al., 2019; Galor & Moav, 2004) and formation of new firms (Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Evans & Jovanovic, 1989). On the contrary, the intensive margin of financial development might inordinately benefit the rich incumbents who leverage financial services for their further benefit or to protect their existing rents (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Perotti & Volpin, 2007).

The paper re-examines the literature on finance and inequality by applying panel BMA techniques, once more identify the main determinants of income distribution within countries. I contribute to existing research by showing that: 1) finance has a significant role in shaping the distribution of income, 2) the complexity of the relationship arises from the characteristics of financial systems, and 3) the effect varies across different parts of the income distribution.

Reflecting the conclusions of the preceding chapter, efficiency and access to financial institutions appears to have the inequality reducing role. The depth of the financial system seemingly does not influence the overall measure of the income distribution (Gini index). However, when the focus is on the top income shares, the size of the financial markets and institutions coincide with a more concentrated distribution of income. Additionally, the paper also provides evidence on other popular hypotheses about increasing income inequality exploring the education (Goldin & Katz, 2009), globalization (Jaumotte et al., 2013), or technological progress (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). Interestingly, the results associate globalization proxied by the trade openness with a higher concentration of income at the top of the distribution, but its relevance diminishes when the measure of inequality is the Gini index. A higher level of education index tends to mitigate overall income inequality but remains irrelevant for the concentration of income among the top 1%. For the technological progress, indirect evidence using the investment into research and development and intellectual property suggests a positive relationship, supporting the idea of increasing inequality due to advancement in technology.

Alongside the income Gini index, the chapter employs inequality measures that have been recently scrutinized in the literature. Tax data used to compile the top income shares since Piketty and Saez (2003) is deemed superior to the survey data. However, it has its limitations as a significant part (up to 40% in the exemplary case of the US) of personal and national income is missing in the tax returns. It could be due to the government deliberately leaving some income untaxed (pension and other insurance benefits) or tax evasion by the tax filers (Alstadsæter et al., 2019; Johns & Slemrod, 2010). The studies attempt to assign this portion of missing income among the units used in the computation and vary in their methodological approaches. Additional differences may arise due to considered units of observation themselves (tax unit vs. individuals) and dynamically changing demographic structure. The resulting variation in the suggested concentration of income ranges from 2 to 12 percentage points across the studies (Auten & Splinter, 2019). If we want to set up the right policies to address inequality trends, I believe convergence in this issue is fundamental to draft appropriately scaled policies. Simultaneously, the differences do not disqualify the search for the channels through which the future policies could be targeted and executed. As long as the measurement issues are not dramatically heterogeneous across countries and time, consistently collected and constructed data may inform us of the causes and consequences of inequality irrespective

of the precise numbers put on various measures of inequality.

To summarize the dissertation's policy implications, I want to emphasize the importance of the financial system's functions in affecting long-term economic growth and the dynamics of income and wealth distributions. Above all, the efficiency of financial intermediation and inclusiveness of finance appear as significant determinants. Efficiency seems particularly vital for growth, while access to financial services associates with more equal distributional outcomes. Regulatory reforms often overlook the impact of the policies, especially in the case of inequalities. The policy-makers should put a substantial effort into impact assessment capabilities. In terms of efficiency, the efforts could concentrate on providing a competitive financial environment and support better allocation of savings through the financial industry. These may take forms of allowing foreign entities' entry, careful support of microcredit institutions with lending aimed at new business opportunities, and establishing the ground for new financial products expanding the real economic opportunities rather than leverage. Our estimates also show that high – 'excessive' – levels of financial depth lead to concentration of wealth and income at the top of the distribution. To a large extent, the question about the desirability of such an outcome is normative, but if the policy-makers decide to take action, the off-setting channels arise in expanding opportunities through education, financial inclusion, and mindful regulation.

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Chapter 2

What Aspect of Financial Intermediation Matters for Growth? Bayesian Model Averaging Evidence

Abstract

We examine the effect of finance on long-term economic growth using Bayesian model averaging to address model uncertainty in cross-country growth regressions. The literature largely focuses on financial indicators that assess the financial depth of banks and stock markets. We examine these indicators jointly with newly developed indicators that assess the stability and efficiency of financial markets. Once we subject the finance-growth regressions to model uncertainty, our results suggest that commonly used indicators of financial development are not robustly related to long-term growth. However, the findings from our global sample indicate that one newly developed indicator – the efficiency of financial intermediation – is robustly related to long-term growth.

This chapter was co-authored with Iftekhhar Hasan and Roman Horváth and large part of it published in *The World Bank Economic Review* as *What Type of Finance Matters for Growth? Bayesian Model Averaging Evidence*. We thank Martin Feldkircher and seminar participants at 19th ICMAIF conference (Rethymno, Greece), 32nd International Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance (Nice, France) and 1st World Congress for Comparative Economics (Rome, Italy) for helpful comments. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Czech Ministry of Finance or Bank of Finland.

2.1 Introduction

Numerous studies investigate the effect of financial development on economic growth and predominantly conclude that there is a positive causal relationship between the two (Atje & Jovanovic, 1993; King & Levine, 1993; Levine & Zervos, 1998). Nevertheless, some opposing views hold that the financial sector removes scarce resources from the rest of the economy (Bolton et al., 2011; Tobin, 1984) and encourages to greater exposure and vulnerability to crises, thus severely burdening the real sector during periods of instability (Kindelberger, 1978; Minsky, 1991; Stiglitz, 2000). The effect of financial development on growth drew greater attention again because of the financial crisis that began in 2007-2008. Moreover, conclusions referring to diminishing and eventually negative returns from financial development have become increasingly common in the literature (Arcand et al., 2015; Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012; Law & Singh, 2014). This highlights the importance of the financial sector for the functioning of the economy and has provoked extensive debate among policymakers.

This paper evaluates the finance-growth nexus but differs from existing research in two main respects. First, it employs BMA to overcome certain drawbacks of previous research approaches. BMA is well grounded in statistical theory (Raftery et al., 1997) and addresses the inherent regression model uncertainty, which is quite high in cross-country growth regressions (Durlauf et al., 2008; Fernandez et al., 2001; Sala-I-Martin et al., 2004). The control variables in finance-growth regressions are often selected in a somewhat *ad hoc* manner with reference to certain relevant theories while ignoring other relevant theories.

BMA essentially allows us to control for dozens of potentially relevant determinants of growth within a unifying framework. The variety of theories of economic growth has given rise to a large number of determinants and resulted in substantial uncertainty concerning the true growth model. In essence, the BMA procedure estimates different combinations of explanatory variables and subsequently weights the coefficients using various measures of model fit. As a consequence, BMA also conveniently limits concerns regarding omitted variable bias and its adverse consequences of inconsistently estimated coefficients, an issue that is typically abstracted from in the empirical work on finance and growth. BMA is capable of evaluating numerous possible regressors and estimating their PIP, i.e., the probability that they are relevant in explaining the

dependent variable, in addition to the weighted mean and variance of their corresponding coefficients. While model averaging has become standard in the empirical growth literature (Durlauf et al., 2008; Sala-I-Martin et al., 2004), it has not been applied to study the finance–growth nexus.

Second, we differ from previous research by examining additional financial indicators to appreciate the multidimensionality of financial systems. Importantly, previous research, including recent studies implying that excessive financial development harms growth (Arcand et al., 2015; Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012; Law & Singh, 2014), largely focuses on measures of the depth of financial development such as the credit to GDP ratio. We depart from existing literature in jointly examining whether the depth, stability or efficiency of financial markets (or all of them) is crucial for long-term growth. In doing so, we can unify and re-examine previous studies on the finance-growth nexus that show that a) financial development is conducive to growth, b) excessive financial development is not, and c) financial instability has negative consequences for growth.

The theoretical concepts regarding the functions of the financial industry are difficult to operationalize in empirical research, and there is no universal consensus regarding the measurement of financial development (King & Levine, 1993). Although measuring financial development is complex, researchers typically consider only those variables capturing financial depth, such as the credit to GDP ratio or stock market capitalization, to assess the degree of financial development. Financial indicators assessing the degree of financial access, financial stability or the efficiency of the financial industry have largely been ignored in cross-country studies due to data limitations. The newly developed GFDD represents a significant improvement in this respect and provides a comprehensive set of financial indicators that reflect various functions and characteristics of the financial sector. In addition to financial depth, the GFDD provides measures of the efficiency and stability of and access to financial markets. Although data availability remains somewhat limited, we extend the existing literature by including these additional dimensions of the financial sector in our regression analysis to more completely evaluate the effect of finance on growth. Specifically, the indicators we use represent the depth, stability, and efficiency of the banking sector and stock markets as defined by Čihák et al. (2013).¹ In addition to the GFDD, we employ the widely used dataset

¹We did not include financial access indicators because of data unavailability. In our sample, the data on the proxy variable recommended for financial access by Čihák et al. (2013),

on the determinants of long-term growth developed by Fernandez et al. (2001), which encompasses over 40 explanatory variables capturing various economic, political, geographical, and institutional indicators.

While it is commonly assumed that causality goes from financial development to economic growth, some scholars argue that a growing financial sector merely follows the increasing needs of the real economy or may be determined simultaneously with growth due to other factors. The quantitative survey of the finance and growth literature by Valickova et al. (2015), for example, indicates that those studies ignoring endogeneity are more likely to report a stronger positive effect of financial development on growth. Although it is likely that a part of endogeneity in finance–growth nexus can be addressed by model averaging procedure (reducing omitted variable bias), we also examine the robustness of our results through specifications that employ the lagged explanatory variables. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to combine various characteristics of the financial sector, a rich dataset on growth, and an approach that addresses model uncertainty and endogeneity. As a result, our study addresses two main issues in finance–growth literature: 1) causality issues and 2) measurement of financial development.

Using data on real economic growth in 60 countries between 1960 and 2011, we find that intermediation efficiency of banks is robustly related to long-term growth and exhibits very high PIP. This finding corresponds to the predictions of theoretical model by Pagano (1993), who shows that the efficiency of financial intermediaries is crucial for funneling savings to investment and therefore, for increasing real growth. The relevance of traditional variables, such as credit provided to the private sector or stock market capitalization, is weaker. In addition, we also fail to find a non-linear effect of financial development on growth. Our results are robust to a series of checks such as employing a different sample period, different parameter priors or addressing endogeneity. Therefore, our results highlight that the approach to measuring financial development is crucial for the estimated effect of finance on growth. Our policy implication is that those managing the regulatory changes in the financial industry should not underestimate the importance of the efficiency of financial intermediation

bank accounts per 1,000 adults, are missing for 36 out of 60 countries. Including financial access in the analysis would therefore severely limit our cross-section of countries resulting in the non-negligible loss in the degrees of freedom. Nevertheless, we have examined alternative (less than ideal) financial access indicators from the GFDD database (bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 adults), which are available for almost all countries in our sample. However, we fail to find these indicators to be decisive for the long-term growth.

for long-term growth. Policy efforts could concentrate on providing a competitive financial environment and support better allocation of savings through the financial industry. These may take forms of allowing foreign entities' entry, careful support of microcredit institutions with lending aimed at new business opportunities, and establishing the ground for new financial products expanding the real economic opportunities rather than leverage.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature review on finance and growth. Section 2.3 presents the data. We describe Bayesian model averaging in Section 2.4. We provide the regression results in Section 2.5. The conclusions are presented in Section 2.6. An appendix with additional results follows.

2.2 Empirical Literature on Finance and Growth

We briefly survey the empirical literature on the effect of financial development on growth. In addition, we discuss certain issues regarding the measurement of financial development. We refer readers to Levine (2005), Ang (2008) and Valickova et al. (2015) for more comprehensive surveys of this literature.²

2.2.1 Empirical Evidence

Focusing on the period between 1960 and 1989, King and Levine (1993) show how the initial levels of various financial indicators, such as the liabilities to the financial sector, bank ratios, credit to nonfinancial private sector/total domestic credit, and credit to the private sector to GDP, explain the real growth of GDP per capita, capital accumulation, and efficiency of capital utilization in the following period. Atje and Jovanovic (1993) examine the stock market's effects on economic growth and find that more active stock markets induce growth. The conclusion regarding stock market activity is subsequently confirmed by Levine and Zervos (1998). In addition to providing evidence on stock market effects, Levine and Zervos (1998) simultaneously control for banking sector development by including credit to the private sector. Interestingly, both the banking sector and stock markets are significant in fostering growth. This leads the authors to conclude that each of the sectors has a different function in the economy and a different financial function. Furthermore, they add that

²There is also literature on the determinants of financial development, see Ang (2013), and Ang and Kumar (2014).

the mere size of the stock market as measured by total capitalization is irrelevant to growth and that the relevant factor is the activity of the stock market. Nevertheless, this link may be an outcome of an unobserved third factor that stimulates both trading activity and economic growth. For instance, information regarding new technology may spur trading activity due to conflicting opinions on the future benefits of the innovation. The subsequent economic growth is a result of technological advancement rather than greater trading volumes (Levine, 2005). This is one of the reasons why we apply the BMA, which is designed to address these issues.

Rajan and Zingales (1998) initiate the research on the finance-growth nexus using industry-level data. They show that more developed financial markets decrease firms' cost of external capital. They also find evidence that industries that are relatively more dependent on external finance grow faster in countries with better developed financial intermediaries. Building on this methodology, Claessens and Laeven (2005) arrive at a similar conclusion using measures of bank competitiveness. They find that more competitive banking systems benefit financially dependent industries. Next, Beck et al. (2005) show that industries typically composed of small firms enjoy relatively superior growth rates in countries with developed financial sectors. This is consistent with theory positing that financial development is a crucial factor in alleviating financial constraints. Also, Hasan et al. (2009) examine the effect of financial development on regional growth in Europe and find that the efficiency of financial intermediaries (measured by bank efficiency) is substantially more important for growth than financial depth (measured by outstanding credit). Berger et al. (2004) also provide international evidence on the importance of bank efficiency for growth. Similarly, using German data, Koetter and Wedow (2010) find that bank efficiency is positively related to growth. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) report that the relaxation of bank branch restrictions in the United States improves growth. Interestingly, they find that the relaxation of restrictions does not increase the volume of bank lending but improves loan quality. In addition, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) extensively examine the mechanism how financial development affect growth and find that more competition among local U.S. banks improves firms' performance.

Panel and time-series analyses predominantly claim that the relationship goes from financial development to growth rather than in the reverse direction, essentially moderating endogeneity concerns. Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), Fink et al. (2003) and Peia and Roszbach (2015) observe positive long-

run growth effects of financial development using cointegration techniques. Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) argue in favor of long-run causality from financial development to growth and dismisses the backward channel. Fink et al. (2003) is one of the few papers investigating the relationship by considering private bond markets. Peia and Roszbach (2015) investigate the causality of the finance-growth relationship and demonstrate that the causality depends on the measurement employed and the level of financial development. Recently, Thumrongvit et al. (2013) revisit the question and compare the impact of bond markets while also accounting for the role of the banking sector. They report that the importance of bank credit in determining growth declines as alternative debt financing options become increasingly available. Although studies positing “finance-lead” growth prevail, there are opposing views that stress finance’s irrelevance in this respect. Garretsen et al. (2004), for example, document that the causal link reported by Rajan and Zingales (1998) disappears after accounting for societal and legal factors. It may be that the development of financial markets simply follows growth, reflecting the needs of a more developed economy. Ultimately, accounting for time- and country-specific effects does not entirely eliminate the caveats applicable to such analyses. Time coverage is often short, and utilizing more frequent observations, such as quarterly data, does not properly address hypotheses concerning the long-term nature of the relationship (Ang, 2008).

Researchers have devoted greater attention to the finance and growth literature following the economic crisis of 2007-2008. They raise questions regarding possible non-linearities in the relationship between finance and growth, specifically, whether excessive financial development is harmful to growth. Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) report that a positive correlation between the development of the financial sector and economic growth is typical for the period before 1990. The effect diminishes when subsequent years are considered. Additional studies report evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship suggesting financial development is conducive to growth only up to a certain threshold. Thereafter, it acts as a drag on economic growth (Arcand et al., 2015; Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012; Law & Singh, 2014). Some research advances explanations to justify these findings. One is the comparatively large amount of credit going to households in the later stages of financial development. These loans generally tend to be less productive than loans to enterprises (Beck et al., 2012). Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2013) emphasize that a larger financial sector leads to lower total factor productivity through relatively larger benefits

for high-collateral/low-productivity projects, primarily in construction. Other lines of reasoning rely on Tobin's early work discussing how finance lures talent from other sectors (Bolton et al., 2011; Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012; Kneer, 2013). Yilmazkuday (2011) shows that growth enhancing effect of finance depends on a number of factors such as price stability, economic development or trade openness. Overall, these recent empirical studies find that the growth-enhancing effects of financial development are not guaranteed and suggest that the relationship is more complex than originally thought.

2.2.2 Measurement of Financial Development

Levine (2005) argues that it is difficult to link empirical and theoretical research on finance and growth. Concepts such as information asymmetry, improved corporate governance, risk management, pooling savings, and easing exchange are in reality difficult to measure accurately.

The most common indicators of financial development address financial depth, primarily because of their widespread availability. Conventional variables used as proxies for the depth of the financial sector are total liquid liabilities of the financial sector, credit to the private sector, and various measures of monetary aggregates. The aforementioned variables depict the development of the banking sector, in stock market studies, broadly employed proxies include the ratio of total market capitalization to GDP, the total value traded to GDP (stock market activity ratio), and the total value traded to the total value of listed shares (turnover ratio).

The extent to which these traditional measurements reflect the ability of financial intermediaries to serve the functions assigned to them in theory remains unclear. For instance, Čihák et al. (2013) illustrate that private bond market capitalization represents a substantial share of the total securities market capitalization within a country. However, when addressing the question of depth, private bond markets are often ignored. In addition, total credit data do not include trade credit, where firms *de facto* act as financial intermediaries (Petersen & Rajan, 1997). In addition, Levine (2005) notes that this factor may be particularly important in countries with poor legal environments or overly regulated financial systems. Ultimately, there is no general consensus among researchers regarding the appropriate approach to measure financial development. Generally, studies consider several potential indicators to assess

the robustness of their results, but these indicators are typically only proxies for the level of financial depth (Valickova et al., 2015).

Finally, some financial development measures such as the (rarely used) bank efficiency can be conceptually much more closely related to the theory (Pagano, 1993) than the traditional quantity measures such as the volume of credit granted. Bank efficiency is also less likely to be prone to causality issues because technical efficiency of banks responds less to the business cycle in comparison to, for example, the volume of credit (Koetter & Wedow, 2010).

2.3 Data

We use the dataset from a seminal paper on long-term economic growth determinants and BMA by Fernandez et al. (2001). The dataset contains 41 explanatory variables that might be important for growth in 72 countries. We update the dependent variable (average real economic growth per capita in 1960-2011). The regressors in the dataset comprise various measures of economic, political, geographic, demographic, social, and cultural factors. As many of these factors may be determined simultaneously with growth, the regressors typically come from 1960 or even before to alleviate endogeneity concerns. We describe this dataset in greater detail in the appendix.

To this dataset, we add selected financial indicators from the World Bank's GFDD (September 2013 version), which collects information on various aspects of financial sectors around the globe. Čihák et al. (2013) describe this dataset's content in detail and offer a 4x2 dimensional classification of financial indicators that reflects their utility in representing the depth, breadth, efficiency, and stability (4) of both the banking sector and the stock market (2). We choose to employ several indicators for which the database provides the richest data. Specifically, we select five different indicators representing various aspects of the financial system:

- **Private sector credit to GDP:** domestic private credit to the real sector to GDP; a measure of the depth of the banking sector.
- **Stock market capitalization to GDP:** value of listed shares to GDP; a measure of the depth of stock markets.
- **Net interest margin:** accounting value of banks' net interest revenue as

a share of average interest-bearing assets; a measure of the intermediation efficiency of the banking sector.

- **Stock market turnover ratio:** stock market value traded to total market capitalization; a measure of the efficiency of stock markets.
- **Bank Z-score:** return on banks' assets plus the ratio of banks' equity and assets, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets $\left(\frac{ROA + \frac{equity}{assets}}{sd(ROA)}\right)$; a measure of the stability of the banking sector.

The aforementioned dimensional distinction allows us to differentiate and compare the effects of the banking sector and the stock market on economic growth. In addition, unlike the previous literature, we simultaneously examine whether the depth, efficiency and stability of a financial system are important for growth.

The time and cross-country coverage of financial variables varies. Private credit to the real sector is available for the majority of the countries in the dataset since 1960. However, the remaining variables are typically available only from the 1980s onward. We average the indicator values corresponding to a selected period (i.e., 1960-2011) and to their data availability. This is a standard procedure in estimating empirical long-term growth models, despite the risk of introducing endogeneity into the model and information loss introduced by averaging over extended time periods. The benefit of averaging is a focus on long-term trends while abstracting from short-term fluctuations. But in our robustness checks, we also use the initial values of financial indicators instead of their average. Given the data availability and the construction of the dataset, all the financial variables could be endogenous. We address endogeneity concerns through our BMA approach using lagged variables. Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics on the individual financial indicators. Overall, the combined dataset of Fernandez et al. (2001) and private credit and new financial indicators leads to 68 and 60 observations, respectively.

2.4 Bayesian Model Averaging

To illustrate the application of BMA, we begin with a traditional linear model structure:

$$y = \alpha + X\beta + \varepsilon \quad \varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I) \quad (2.1)$$

Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics, financial indicators

	Min	Max	Mean	Std.dev
Net interest margin	0.59	13.31	4.52	3.25
Bank Z-score	-1.61	42.35	15.00	9.62
Private credit	5.16	146.66	46.58	35.29
Market capitalization	0.67	303.77	51.28	52.98
Market turnover	0.96	197.50	48.22	47.13

where y is a dependent variable, α is a constant, X is the matrix of explanatory variables, β represents the corresponding coefficients, and ε is a vector of normally distributed IID error terms with variance σ^2 . In many applications, the list of potentially relevant regressors can be large. In the typical case in which the true regression model is unknown, its construction often begins by including all the variables in the model. However, this strategy is likely to yield imprecise estimates, as the large number of regressors inflates standard errors. Empirical research typically addresses this issue by sequentially eliminating the least significant explanatory variables on the basis of statistical tests to arrive at the single best model with all the irrelevant regressors omitted.

The process described above entails the risk of the researcher retaining an irrelevant variable or dropping an important variable. Koop (2003) emphasizes that the probability of making such mistakes increases rapidly with the number of sequences performed. The various iteration paths may also lead to different regression model specifications. In addition, even if we assume that this procedure identifies the 'best' model, it is rarely acceptable to present only the results from the single 'best' model and disregard the results of 'second-best' models. In summary, then, this model-selection approach ignores the model uncertainty that the researcher faces when she or he defines the model. BMA allows the researcher to account for such uncertainty and presents a rigorous method for treating multiple models.

BMA considers all possible combinations of X from equation 2.1 and takes a weighted average of the coefficients (see also the remarks on the MCMC sampler below). The substructure of the model can be captured as follows:

$$y = \alpha_i + X_i\beta_i + \varepsilon \quad \varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I) \quad (2.2)$$

Here, X_i is a subset of X and α_i and β_i are the corresponding coefficients. Assuming that the total number of possible explanatory variables is K , the

total number of models is equal to 2^K and $i \in [1, 2^K]$.

Researchers are interested in describing coefficients based on observed data. It follows from Bayes' rule that

$$p(\beta|y, X) = \frac{p(y, X|\beta)p(\beta)}{p(y, X)} \quad (2.3)$$

where $p(\beta|y, X)$ is the posterior density, $p(y, X|\beta)$ is the marginal likelihood (ML), also known as the data generating process, $p(\beta)$ is the prior density, and $p(y, X)$ is the probability of the data. In the BMA, we essentially compare numerous different models M_1, \dots, M_i . Assuming K possible regressors as discussed above, we have M_1, \dots, M_i , where $i \in [1, 2^K]$. Given the Bayesian logic whereby we formally define the model using a likelihood function and a prior density, M_i depends on the parameters β_i , and their posterior probability can be derived as follows:

$$p(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) = \frac{p(y|\beta_i, M_i, X)p(\beta_i|M_i)}{p(y|M_i, X)} \quad (2.4)$$

The following subsections describe the averaging principle of BMA and individual components of equation 2.4.

2.4.1 Posterior Model Probability

The Posterior Model Probability (PMP) is fundamental to the BMA framework, as it provides the weights for averaging model coefficients across submodels. PMP also arises from Bayes' theorem:

$$p(M_i|y, X) = \frac{p(y|M_i, X)p(M_i)}{p(y|X)} \quad (2.5)$$

where $p(y|M_i, X)$ is the Marginal Likelihood (ML) of the model (i.e., the probability of the data given the model M_i), $p(M_i)$ is the prior model probability, and $p(y|X)$ is the integrated likelihood. The term in the denominator is typically disregarded, as it is constant across all models under consideration. The PMP is then directly proportional to ML and the prior probability. A popular practice is to set the prior probability $p(M_i \propto 1)$ to reflect the lack of knowledge regarding the true model.

$$p(M_i|y, X) \propto p(y|M_i, X)p(M_i) \quad (2.6)$$

We discuss the calculation of ML in detail in Subsection 2.4.4. The model prior needs to be elicited by the researcher and reflects the initial beliefs before inspecting the data.

2.4.2 Posterior Mean

Point estimates of the model parameters are often the focus of research, and it is possible to derive them within the Bayesian framework. Zeugner (2011) and Moral-Benito (2012) assert that the weighted posterior distribution of any statistic (most notably the β coefficients) is obtained using the following:

$$p(\beta|y, X) = \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} p(\beta_i|M_i, y, X)p(M_i|y, X) \quad (2.7)$$

where $p(M_i|y, X)$ is the PMP of the corresponding model M_i from equation 2.5. The point estimates can be acquired by taking expectations across the equation:

$$E(\beta|y, X) = \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} E(\beta_i|M_i, y, X)p(M_i|y, X) \quad (2.8)$$

Here, $E(\beta|y, X)$ is the averaged coefficient and $E(\beta|M_i, y, X)$ is the estimate of the β_i coefficients from model M_i . The posterior distribution of the coefficients is dependent on the choice of the prior g . Zeugner (2011) expresses the expected value of the parameter in M_i as follows:

$$E(\beta_i|y, X, g, M_i) = \frac{g}{1+g} \hat{\beta}_i \quad (2.9)$$

with $\hat{\beta}_i$ representing the standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate.

2.4.3 Posterior Variance

Moral-Benito (2012) presents a formula for variance corresponding to the expected values of coefficients derived in the previous section:

$$\begin{aligned} Var(\beta|y, X) = & \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} p(M_i|y, X)Var(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) + \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} p(M_i|y, X)(E(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) - E(\beta|y, X))^2 \end{aligned} \quad (2.10)$$

The variance consists of the weighted average of variance estimates across different regression models $Var(\beta_i|M_i, y, X)$ and the weighted variance across different models captured in the second component $E(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) - E(\beta|y, X))^2$. $E(\beta|y, X)$ is the posterior mean from equation 2.8. As a consequence, this may result in uncertainty regarding the parameter estimates due to the substantial differences across models even if the estimates of individual models are highly precise. Zeugner (2011) shows how the value of the prior g affects the posterior variance of the parameters:

$$Cov(\beta_i|y, X, g, M_i) = \frac{(y - \bar{y})'(y - \bar{y})}{N - 3} \frac{g}{1 + g} \left(1 - \frac{g}{1 + g} R_i^2 \right) (X_i' X_i)^{-1} \quad (2.11)$$

where \bar{y} is the mean of vector y , N is the sample size and R_i^2 is the R-squared of model i .

2.4.4 Marginal Likelihood

ML can be calculated using equation 2.4 for each M_i . We need to integrate both sides of the equation with respect to β_i , employ $\int_{\beta} p(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) d\beta_i = 1$, and rearrange to arrive at

$$p(y|M_i, X) = \int_{\beta} p(y|\beta_i, M_i, X) p(\beta_i|M_i, X) d\beta_i \quad (2.12)$$

The above equation illustrates the general textbook derivation, but the computation depends on the elicited priors. Zeugner (2011) employs the ‘‘Zellner’s g prior’’ structure, which we utilize in this paper. The ML for a single model can then be expressed using the prior as in Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009):

$$p(y|M_i, X, g) = \int_0^{\infty} \int_{\beta} p(y|\beta_i, \sigma^2, M_i) p(\beta_i, \sigma^2|g) d\beta d\sigma \quad (2.13)$$

Furthermore, the authors assert that ML is in this case simply proportional to

$$p(y|M_i, X, g) \propto (y - \bar{y})'(y - \bar{y})^{-\frac{N-1}{2}} (1 + g)^{-\frac{k_i}{2}} \left(1 - \frac{g}{1 + g} R_i^2 \right)^{-\frac{N-1}{2}} \quad (2.14)$$

In this equation, R_i^2 is the R-squared of model M_i , and k_i is the number of explanatory variables in model i introduced to include a size penalty for the model. N and \bar{y} are the same as in equation 2.11, the number of observations and the mean of vector y , respectively.

2.4.5 Posterior Inclusion Probability

The standard BMA framework reports the PIP, which reflects the probability that a particular regressor is included in the “true” model. PIP is the sum of the PMPs of the models including the variable k in question:

$$PIP = p(\beta_k \neq 0|y, X) = \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} p(M_i|\beta_k \neq 0, y, X) \quad (2.15)$$

2.4.6 Priors

The BMA methodology requires determining two types of priors: g on the parameter space and $p(M_i)$ on the model space. The priors are crucial in determining the posterior probabilities (Ciccone & Jarocinski, 2010; Feldkircher & Zeugner, 2009; Liang et al., 2008). In the following subsections, we present the prior framework and support our choices.

Parameter Priors

As noted previously, we use the Zellner’s g prior structure, which is a common approach in the literature. It assumes that the priors on the constant and error variance from equation 2.2 are evenly distributed, $p(\alpha_i) \propto 1$ and $p(\sigma) \propto \sigma^{-1}$. Zeugner (2011) notes that this is very similar to the normal-gamma-conjugate model accounting for proper model priors on α and σ described in Koop (2003), for example, with practically identical posterior statistics.

We assume that the β_i coefficients follow the normal distribution, and we have to formulate beliefs regarding their mean and variance before examining the data. Conventionally, researchers assume a conservative mean of 0 to reflect the lack of prior knowledge regarding the coefficients. Zellner’s g defines their variance structure $\sigma^2(g(X_i'X_i)^{-1})$. Together, we have the coefficient distribution dependent on prior g :

$$\beta_i|g \sim N(0, \sigma^2(g(X_i'X_i)^{-1})) \quad (2.16)$$

The prior variance of the coefficients is proportional to the posterior variance $(X_i'X_i)^{-1}$ estimated from the sample. Parameter g denotes how much weight we attribute to the prior variance as opposed to the variance observed in the data (Feldkircher & Zeugner, 2009). Selecting a small g results in low variance in the prior coefficients and thus reduces the coefficients to zero. Conversely,

a large g attributes higher importance to the data and expresses researchers' uncertainty regarding zero β_i coefficients (Zeugner, 2011). Note that with $g \rightarrow \infty$, $\beta_i \rightarrow \beta_i^{OLS}$. Popular choices include the following:

- UIP; $g = N$.
- Bayesian Risk Inflation Criterion (BRIC); $g = \max\{N, K^2\}$.
- hyper-g; $\frac{g}{1+g} \sim \text{Beta}(1, \frac{a}{2} - 1)$, where $a \in (2, 4]$, which is a Beta distribution with mean $\frac{2}{a}$.

While the first two are known as “fixed-g” priors for the parameter prior set for all the models under consideration, hyper-g allows the researcher to update the prior for individual models in a Bayesian nature and therefore limits the unintended consequences of prior selection based on posterior results. Note that setting $a = 4$ corresponds to the UIP, whereas $a = 2$ concentrates the prior mass close to unity, corresponding to $g \rightarrow \infty$. For details on hyper-g, see Liang et al. (2008).

We employ the so-called hyper-g prior to estimate the baseline models, following Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009), who suggest that using model-specific priors leads to a more stable posterior structure. We then check the robustness of the results by applying the UIP parameter prior.

Model Priors

Moral-Benito (2012) notes that the most popular setting in the BMA literature is the binomial distribution, where each of the covariates is included in the model with a probability of success θ . The prior probability of model M_i with k_i regressors given θ is then

$$p(M_i) = \theta^{k_i} (1 - \theta)^{K - k_i} \quad (2.17)$$

A standard setting is $\theta = \frac{1}{2}$, which assigns equal probability $p(M_i) = 2^{-K}$ to all the models under consideration. This model prior is also known as the uniform model prior. Assuming different values of θ can shift the prior model distribution to either smaller or larger sizes (see Zeugner (2011)).

We focus on models using the uniform model prior following Fernandez et al. (2001), as it allows us to compare our results to those of their study. However, the uniform model prior tends to assign greater weight to intermediate

model sizes. For illustration, consider our dataset of 42 regressors. The expected model size is $\frac{K}{2} = 21$, but there is clearly a larger number of possible models of size 21 than 1. Specifically, there are 42 possible models of size 1, whereas $\binom{42}{21}$ combinations (more than half a trillion) exist for a model size of 21. Therefore, Ley and Steel (2009b) propose an alternative model prior that is less restrictive regarding the expected model size, drawing parameter θ from the Beta distribution. Their argument is that this alternative better reflects the lack of *a priori* knowledge concerning the model. We use this “random” beta-binomial prior in the specifications designed to check the robustness of our baseline estimations.

A few other model priors may be found in the literature and we also use them for sensitivity checks of our results. In particular, we employ the collinearity adjusted dilution model prior described by George (2010). While the uniform and beta-binomial model priors assume that the probability of inclusion of one regressor is independent from an inclusion of another one, some regressors are usually correlated. A simple way of addressing the dilution property is to account for such collinearity and adjust the model probabilities by weighting them with the determinant of the correlation matrix, $|R_i| = |X_i X_i'|$. In practice, the collinearity adjusted dilution model prior takes the following form:

$$p(M_i) = |R_i| \theta^{k_i} (1 - \theta)^{K - k_i} \quad (2.18)$$

where R_i is the correlation matrix of model i under consideration. If the variables in the examined model are orthogonal, the determinant $|R_i|$ goes to 1. On the other hand, if the variables are highly collinear, it goes to 0 and consequently down-weights the models with redundant regressors.³

Finally, the strong heredity principle suggested by Chipman (1996) has been used in the literature to assess the posterior inclusion probability of quadratic and interaction terms in the BMA framework. Following this convention, we rely on this principle whenever we consider quadratic or interaction terms in the analysis. It relates to the model prior probabilities in a sense that it essentially assigns zero model probability to the models violating preset conditions. In practice, the principle relies on MC³ sampler, which ensures that whenever the

³We also run an estimation using the tessellation defined dilution prior, which assigns uniform probabilities to the neighborhoods of models. This construction of model prior reflects the idea of dilution more closely as it dilutes the probability across all, not only some, neighborhood models. For the detailed discussion we refer to George (2010). The resulting PIPs are in general slightly lower compared to the baseline, but the conclusions about our financial indicators remain unchanged. The results are available upon request.

square or interaction term is included in the model, the corresponding linear variables are included as well. Such algorithm ensures that the interaction or square term does not potentially mask any influence of the linear terms and therefore guarantees interpretation of the results.⁴

2.4.7 MCMC Sampler

One of the limitations of the BMA is its computational difficulty when the number of potential explanatory variables K is very large. Historically, this was the primary factor preventing researchers from employing Bayesian methods. Zeugner (2011) notes that for small models, it is possible to enumerate all variable combinations. When $K > 25$, it becomes impossible to evaluate the entire model space within a reasonable time frame. In such cases, BMA utilizes MC³ samplers to approximate the crucial part of the posterior model distribution containing the most likely models. BMA applies the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, which is outlined in Zeugner (2011), in following way:

At any step i , the sampler is currently at model M_i , having PMP $p(M_i|y, X)$. In the next step $i+1$, model M_j is proposed to replace M_i . The sampler accepts the new model M_j with the following probability:

$$p_{i,j} = \min \left(1, \frac{p(M_j|y, X)}{p(M_i|y, X)} \right) \quad (2.19)$$

If model M_j is rejected, the next model M_k is suggested and compared with M_i . With the growing number of iterations, the number of times each model is retained converges to the distribution of posterior model probabilities. Typically, one of the following MC³ samplers is used to draw the models:

- Birth-death sampler - randomly chooses one of the explanatory variables, which is included if it is not already part of the current model M_i or dropped if it is already in M_i .
- Reversible-jump sampler - with 50% probability, the Birth-death sampler is used to determine the next candidate model. With 50% probability, the sampler randomly swaps one of the covariates in M_i for a covariate previously excluded from M_i .

Because the sampler can begin with a “poor” model with low PMP, the pre-defined number of initial draws, the so-called burn-ins, are usually dropped.

⁴The appendix in Cuaresma et al. (2014) illustrates the mechanism in detail.

The quality of the approximation can be evaluated on the basis of the correlation between the PMP derived from an analytical approach and those obtained from the MC³ sampler. It depends on the number of iterations (draws) and the likelihood of the initially selected model. Zeugner (2011) notes that a PMP correlation of approximately 0.9 indicates a “good degree of convergence”. In the event that the correlation is lower, the number of sampler iterations should be increased.

2.5 Results

This section presents two sets of our main results. The first set examines the effect of private credit to GDP on long-term growth. Our results suggest that this standard measure of financial development - *financial depth* - is not a robust determinant of growth once we account for model uncertainty.

The second set investigates the importance of new financial indicators that capture not only depth, but also stability and efficiency. We present three subsets of results, with the financial indicators averaged over examined period, using the lagged values of indicators, to examine how current financial development is related to future growth, and two-stage procedure where we instrument financial development by the historical record of financial crises. We use the latter two approaches to address potential endogeneity in the finance-growth relationship.


The third set examines the effect of finance on growth is non-linear and whether some interaction effects among financial indicators matter for growth. Overall, our results suggest that the efficiency of financial intermediaries is robustly related to long-term growth but we fail to find any non-linearities and interaction effects.

2.5.1 Private Credit

Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between private credit and economic growth. Linear and quadratic fit, the latter with 95% confidence intervals, is also included. In a preliminary examination of the data, we observe a weak and possibly diminishing relationship between credit and growth.

Table 2.2 presents our baseline results for private credit. We sort the explanatory variables according to their PIPs. We find that the initial level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1960, the dummy variable for Sub-Sahara,

Figure 2.1: Private credit and growth, 1960-2011



the share of GDP in mining, the fraction of Confucian population, equipment investment, distortions in the exchange rate, and covariates capturing black market characteristics exhibit the highest PIPs. These findings are broadly in accord with the specification from Fernandez et al. (2001) despite the choice of an alternative parameter prior and the consideration of an extended period.

Although private credit ranks near the middle of the list of explanatory variables and its mean value of the coefficient is positive, the PIP is only 7%. This result indicates that credit is unlikely included as the explanatory variable in the “true” growth model. Overall, we find very limited support for the notion that financial depth is important for long-term economic growth.

In the baseline estimation, we follow Fernandez et al. (2001) and use a uniform model prior. However, we depart from that study in the selection of the parameter prior. Instead of using the BRIC prior, we employ the hyper- g prior, as the literature now considers it superior. The essential disadvantage of employing the BRIC prior is documented by Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009). They describe a phenomenon of a “supermodel effect”, arguing that with a high fixed prior g , the shrinkage-factor $\frac{g}{1+g}$ in equation 2.14 increases, thus increasing the size penalty, and may skew the posterior model distribution to smaller models. This choice of a large g under fixed priors can result in a preference for overly simplistic models. According to Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009), the phenomenon is characteristic of BMA applications to growth regressions with numerous covariates. They further claim that using a model-specific hyper- g

Table 2.2: Private credit and growth, baseline results
Bayesian model averaging

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Life expectancy	1.00	0.00078	0.00023
GDP level in 1960	1.00	-0.01330	0.00234
Fraction GDP in mining	1.00	0.05972	0.01369
Fraction Confucian	1.00	0.04527	0.01146
Black market premium	1.00	-0.01040	0.00327
Exchange rate distortions	0.99	-0.00009	0.00003
Sub-Sahara dummy	0.99	-0.01377	0.00539
SD of black market premium	0.98	0.00003	0.00001
Equipment investment	0.97	0.11111	0.04474
Fraction Buddhist	0.84	0.00968	0.00653
Size of labor force	0.75	7.1e-08	6.4e-08
French colony dummy	0.64	0.00405	0.00402
Fraction Muslim	0.53	0.00445	0.00529
Fraction of pop. speaking English	0.48	-0.00335	0.00445
Non-equipment investment	0.38	0.01197	0.01942
Latin America dummy	0.28	-0.00152	0.00299
Rule of law	0.24	0.00169	0.00388
Fraction Hindu	0.16	-0.00349	0.01138
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	0.16	0.00090	0.00268
Absolute latitude	0.13	0.00002	0.00005
Fraction speaking foreign language	0.11	0.00038	0.00144
Fraction Catholic	0.10	0.00041	0.00180
British colony dummy	0.09	0.00026	0.00133
Ratio of workers to population	0.08	0.00059	0.00295
Public education share	0.08	0.00754	0.03897
Private credit	0.07	0.00025	0.00138
Number of years of open economy	0.06	-0.00030	0.00179
Spanish colony dummy	0.06	-0.00016	0.00115
Fraction Jewish	0.05	0.00045	0.00319
Primary school enrollment	0.05	0.00027	0.00214
Fraction Protestant	0.04	-0.00006	0.00108
Degree of capitalism	0.04	0.00002	0.00018
Age	0.03	-5.5e-07	0.00001
Outward orientation	0.03	-0.00004	0.00043
High school enrollment	0.03	-0.00029	0.00572
Area	0.03	4.9e-09	9.7e-08
Revolutions and coups	0.03	-0.00005	0.00083
Civil liberties	0.03	-0.00001	0.00019
War dummy	0.03	-0.00001	0.00036
Primary exports	0.03	-0.00001	0.00083
Population growth	0.02	0.00032	0.02622
Political rights	0.02	-2.2e-06	0.00014

prior leads to more robust estimates. This is why we abstain from employing the BRIC prior and focus on alternative options for parameter priors in our robustness checks.

The birth-death MC³ sampler described in Subsection 2.4.7 is our preferred

approach for approximating the PMP distribution. To ensure sufficient convergence of the sampler, we specify 15 million iterations with 3 million initial burn-ins. The full estimation diagnostics is available upon request. The average number of regressors included in the model is 19.09, and the correlation between analytical and sampler PMP stands at 0.56. We realize that this PMP correlation is far from ideal, but estimation with higher iteration counts and subsequently higher PMP correlation yields nearly identical results.⁵ Note that below, we employ different parameters and model prior structures and achieve a PMP close to 1, while the PIPs remain largely unchanged.


Next, we examine whether the baseline results are robust to different parameter priors. Ciccone and Jarocinski (2010) posit that BMA results are sensitive to data revisions under certain prior structures. Eicher et al. (2011) find that the PIPs of some growth determinants depend on the chosen parameter prior. Therefore, we perform the estimation using UIP. We also check the robustness of the MC³ sampler using the “reverse-jump” algorithm and the model prior by employing a random binomial model prior (see Zeugner (2011) for details).

The model comparison for different parameter priors and MC³ algorithms is depicted in Figure 2.2. Model 1 includes the PIPs under our baseline specification. Model 2 employs the same priors but applies the “reverse-jump” MC³ algorithm. Models 3 and 4 yield the results when we use UIP under the birth-death and reverse-jump samplers, respectively. Though employing the reverse-jump sampler only marginally alters the PIPs, switching to the UIP prior leads to slightly lower inclusion probabilities and model size. Overall, these findings indicate that our baseline results are robust.

The beta-binomial (“random”) model prior offers meaningful insights. This setting allows for a less restrictive selection of model priors around the prior expected model size and limits the risk of imposing any particular one (Ley & Steel, 2009b). Thus, if the true model size is lower than that expected by the prior (21), we should expect the mean model size to decline in this setting. We present the results of the estimation using this model prior in Figure 2.5 in the Appendix. In the first setting with a hyper-g prior, the mean size declines to 15.05 and the PMP correlation between analytical and MC³ sampler likelihood achieves a satisfactory value of 0.96. The most important variables according to their PIPs remain nearly unchanged, although their relative positions adjust.

⁵Specifically, we ran the estimation using 50 million iterations and 5 000 000 burn-ins to arrive at a PMP correlation of 0.82. Characteristics in terms of mean model size and PIPs remain virtually the same.

Figure 2.2: Model comparison with private credit



Note: Model 1=hyper-g, birth-death; Model 2=hyper-g, reverse-jump; Model 3=UIP, birth-death; Model 4=UIP, reverse-jump

One significant change is the decline in the PIP of the volatility of the black market premium to 14%. Finally, the inclusion probability of private credit increases marginally to 9%.

We also limit the period under consideration to 1960-1990 and examine whether the effect of financial development is stronger for this time period, as suggested by Rousseau and Wachtel (2011). We find that none of these modifications substantially affects our primary results concerning the relationship between private credit and economic growth. The PIP of private credit estimated on the subsample before 1990 does not appear to differ from that obtained for the full period up to 2011. As a robustness check of our results, we also use the values of private credit from the beginning of the observed period instead of the averages, but we find that the coding change has a negligible effect. These results are available upon request.

2.5.2 New Financial Development Indicators

We examine the effect of new financial indicators on long-term growth in this subsection. Specifically, we additionally include the following variables in our estimation: bank Z-score, net interest margin, stock market turnover, and stock market capitalization. Čihák et al. (2013) identify these as proxies for different aspects of the financial sector. Specifically, they propose using bank

Z-score to assess the stability of the banking sector, the net interest margin to proxy for the efficiency of the banking sector, stock market turnover as a proxy for the efficiency of the stock market, and stock market capitalization to measure the depth of stock markets. These measures, particularly the first two, are rarely used in growth regressions (Berger et al. (2004) and Hasan et al. (2009) being the exceptions), despite the fact that they might better depict the relationships outlined by theory than traditionally employed variables. As we discuss in Section 2.3, the main issue lies in their availability. However, the GFDD provides a significant improvement in this regard, and many series are available since the late 1980s. In addition, we retain domestic credit to the private sector among the covariates to account for the overall size of the banking sector. Given the data limitations, our sample is reduced to 60 countries. For eight countries from our original sample used for private credit, at least one value of the new financial indicators is missing.


Figure 2.3 provides an initial examination of the interaction between individual financial indicators and economic growth. First, we observe a distinct inverse relationship between the net interest margin and economic growth. Second, bank Z-score and growth display only a marginally positive relationship. Third, market capitalization and market turnover appear to be positively related to growth, which is in line with Levine and Zervos (1998). In addition, Table 2.3 provides the correlations among the financial indicators. The correlations are typically far from one, thus providing additional impetus to examine further measures of financial development in the growth regressions. In addition, we present the jointness statistics in the Appendix 2.B.

Table 2.3: Correlation matrix of new financial indicators

Net interest margin	1.00				
Bank Z-score	-0.14	1.00			
Private credit	-0.71	0.03	1.00		
Market capitalization	-0.44	0.08	0.71	1.00	
Market turnover	-0.54	0.02	0.47	0.33	1.00

We report the results of the estimation in a similar fashion as we did for private credit. We retain the baseline specification with the hyper-g parameter prior, uniform model prior, and birth-death MC³ sampler. The number of iterations remains at 15 million, and we specify 3 million burn-ins. The full estimation diagnostics is available upon request. As in the previous subsection, running more iterations does not affect the resulting PIPs and posterior means,

Figure 2.3: Financial indicators and growth



although it leads to a higher convergence of the sampler. We primarily focus on the interpretation of the results concerning financial indicators, as the other explanatory variables' PIPs remain broadly similar to those of specification for private credit.

We present the posterior statistics of the explanatory variables in Table 2.4. Interestingly, the variable proxying for bank efficiency exhibits a comparatively higher PIP than that reflecting its depth. Net interest margin ranks high among the explanatory variables with a 97% inclusion probability. The posterior mean of the coefficient is negative, in accordance with our expectations. A lower interest margin stems from a smaller discrepancy between banks' borrowing and lending rates. Thus, if banks are able to channel resources at a lower margin, this appears to positively affect long-term economic growth (Rousseau, 1998). Additionally, the posterior mean of bank Z-score is positive, implying that stable banking systems are beneficial for economic growth, although the

Table 2.4: New financial indicators and growth 1960-2011, baseline results

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
GDP level in 1960	1.00	-0.01075	0.00234
Fraction GDP in mining	1.00	0.04669	0.01338
Exchange rate distortions	1.00	-0.00009	0.00003
Fraction Confucian	1.00	0.03896	0.01093
Life expectancy	1.00	0.00057	0.00019
Fraction Buddhist	0.98	0.01255	0.00497
Net interest margin	0.97	-0.00115	0.00045
Equipment investment	0.85	0.07432	0.04648
Fraction Protestant	0.33	-0.00225	0.00402
Ratio of workers to population	0.33	0.00382	0.00671
Bank Z-score	0.25	0.00004	0.00009
French colony dummy	0.24	0.00183	0.00411
SD of black market premium	0.22	3.1e-06	0.00001
Rule of law	0.19	0.00139	0.00363
Outward orientation	0.19	-0.00050	0.00133
Market turnover	0.17	0.00001	0.00002
Size of labor force	0.12	6.6e-09	2.6e-08
Spanish colony dummy	0.12	0.00054	0.00192
Fraction of pop. speaking English	0.11	-0.00044	0.00168
Fraction Jewish	0.08	0.00093	0.00423
Fraction Muslim	0.08	0.00033	0.00158
Private credit	0.07	0.00028	0.00145
Fraction Catholic	0.07	-0.00025	0.00139
Primary exports	0.06	0.00020	0.00135
Absolute latitude	0.05	4.2e-06	0.00003
Fraction Hindu	0.05	-0.00048	0.00435
Fraction speaking foreign language	0.05	0.00009	0.00068
Population growth	0.04	-0.00554	0.04705
Number of years of open economy	0.04	0.00011	0.00093
Age	0.04	-6.6e-07	0.00001
War dummy	0.04	-0.00005	0.00047
High school enrollment	0.04	-0.00061	0.00575
Latin America dummy	0.04	-0.00006	0.00079
Black market premium	0.04	0.00010	0.00101
Non-equipment investment	0.04	-0.00040	0.00408
Political rights	0.04	0.00002	0.00018
British colony dummy	0.04	-0.00001	0.00045
Area	0.03	7.9e-09	8.9e-08
Degree of capitalism	0.03	0.00002	0.00019
Public education share	0.03	0.00078	0.01915
Revolutions and coups	0.03	-0.00005	0.00076
Sub-Sahara dummy	0.03	-0.00001	0.00087
Primary school enrollment	0.03	-0.00007	0.00129
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	0.03	-0.00001	0.00064
Market capitalization	0.02	1.1e-07	3.3e-06
Civil liberties	0.02	0.00001	0.00016

PIP at 25% does not offer much confidence that the Z-score is a crucial determinant of long-term growth. Stock market turnover is also accorded little importance, with a PIP of 17%. The positive sign of the mean is in line with our expectations regarding an efficient resource allocation being beneficial for growth. Moreover, it supports the conclusion of Levine and Zervos (1998) that an active stock market contributes to economic growth. However, we wish to note that this indicator might not coherently capture the efficiency of the markets. A high turnover ratio could reflect low friction in trading and the spread of information (Levine, 2005). On the other hand, other research finds that more trading does not necessarily prevent asset price misalignments and its corrections (Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2004). Strikingly, the measures capturing the depth of both the banking sector and stock markets exhibit very small PIPs. Overall, our results indicate that the approach used to measure financial development is crucial in determining the estimated effect of finance on growth.


To provide robustness checks, we again perform the estimation with alternative priors.⁶ Figure 2.4 illustrates the comparison. The implications of different priors are similar to those experienced in the estimation regarding private credit. The UIP parameter prior subtly alters the PIP of the covariates without having a major effect on the interpretation. Providing greater flexibility in selecting model size by assuming a random model prior reduces the posterior mean model size and the PIP of several variables, but the set of top-ranked regressors remains largely unchanged. The relative importance of financial indicators changes to some extent. Net interest margin remains among the most important variables with an 86% PIP. All the remaining indicators exhibit low PIP below 10%. This is due to the smaller size induced by the random model prior. The results using dilution prior which accounts for correlation among covariates decreases the PIP of nearly all variables. However, the importance of net interest margin still remains high with the PIP at 87%.

2.5.3 Addressing endogeneity

Our dataset is constructed such that most regressors are exogenous except for certain financial indicators. While we efficiently tackle the potential for omitted variable bias by allowing for many potential regressors by using BMA, the issue of reverse causality of the relationship remains a challenge. In particular,

⁶We also perform estimations using an alternative MC³ sampler, but the differences in posterior statistics are marginal.

Figure 2.4: Model comparison with all financial indicators 1960-2011



Note: Parameter and model prior comparison. Model 1=hyper-g, uniform model prior; Model 2=UIP, uniform model prior, Model 3=hyper-g, dilution model prior

the class of endogenous growth models points towards the reciprocal relation between growth and financial development. In these models, the demand for financial services grows with an increased level of economic development. The higher demand for financial services boosts competition and improves the efficiency of financial intermediation. Simultaneously, the finance's better efficiency enhances the screening and capital allocation of investment, accelerating capital accumulation, and consequently, economic growth (Ang, 2008). In the short run, economic development affects financial sector and some of the indicators we use to proxy for financial development. Credit provision traditionally decreases in recessions, so does the stock market capitalization. Apart from interdependence between economic growth and finance put forward in theory, some empirical studies thus document the dynamics between financial crises (Cerra & Saxena, 2008; Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008) or financial liberalization (Ranciere et al., 2006) and parallel changes of output. By focusing on the long-run relationship, we abstract from these dynamics.

To address the potential endogeneity of financial indicators, we apply the methodology developed by Durlauf et al. (2008). The endogenous financial variables are regressed on a set of instruments in the first stage, and their fitted values are used in the second stage, which is a standard BMA procedure. We acknowledge that the first stage is not fully Bayesian, but it is important

to note that the number of endogenous variables and instruments is rather low. In addition, Durlauf et al. (2008) performs Monte Carlo simulations and shows that this two-stage least squares BMA approach (2SLS-BMA) approximates the data generating process accurately. In the estimations, we build on the baseline results and address mainly the potential endogeneity of the net interest margin.

We use the data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) on the history of financial crises as the instruments. We have tried different alternatives as instruments, such as the data on financial reform compiled by Abiad et al. (2010). This choice is popular in the literature, but we found that the data on financial crises have much better explanatory power.

Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) recognize several types of financial distress: currency, inflation, debt, bank crises and stock market crashes. Furthermore, they distinguish between domestic and external debt crises. For each year, they assign a value of 1 if a particular type of crisis occurs. The total crisis tally in a year can therefore take values from 0 to 6. We believe that the legacy of troubled financial systems may be deeply rooted in the economy and have a long-term impact on financial development. For example, Guiso et al. (2008) show how a lack of trust leads to lower stock market participation. Specifically, we consider the average crisis tally (average number of crises per year) in the countries over the period of their independence. The relationship between financial crises and economic growth is likely to be only temporary, with the effect eventually diminishing (Ranciere et al., 2006). Therefore, their occurrence is likely unrelated to long-term growth⁷. To the instrument, which ensures the identification of the two-stage model, we add the rule of law and the years for which the country has had an open economy as additional regressors. Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Baltagi et al. (2009) identify these two variables as determinants of financial development. In addition, these two variables exhibit high correlation with most of our financial indicators. Furthermore, absolute latitude is included to control for the geographical endowment of individual countries. Latitude is exogenous to growth and is shown to correlate with financial development (Beck et al., 2003a, 2003b).

Crises data are not available for all countries. To prevent reducing our sample, in exceptional cases, we use the regional averages for missing data.

⁷Additionally, we also estimate the 2SLS-BMA with the crises values only considering the data before 1960 to strengthen the exogeneity argument. The PIP of the net interest margin decreases slightly to 0.8, but generally the results remain the same.

The regions are defined as follows: Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world⁸.

Table 2.5 reports the results using 2SLS-BMA estimation. The results from the first-stage regression is presented in the appendix in Table 2.12. Among the top regressors, there are no apparent qualitative differences between the baseline and 2SLS-BMA results. The posterior inclusion probability of net interest margin remains high at 92%. The PIP for bank Z-score and market capitalization decline to very low levels. Private credit and stock market capitalization, the traditional financial development proxies, continue to display low inclusion probabilities.

Our baseline and 2SLS-BMA estimations suggest that bank intermediation efficiency is crucial for growth. We perform an additional estimation to check the robustness of this finding and estimate BMA with lagged covariates. For reasons of data availability, we use real growth in GDP per capita over the period 2000–2011 and take the values of the financial indicators in the year 2000. The advantage of this approach is that we examine how past values of financial indicators influence current growth. Clearly, the disadvantage is that the time coverage for the dependent variable is restricted to just over a decade. Implicitly, this may also be regarded as robustness check of the sensitivity of our results to the variable coding. We present the results in Table 2.6. Interestingly, the results remain largely unchanged. Net interest margin remains among the covariates with the highest PIP. The posterior mean of the coefficient is negative. The PIP of private credit is 49%, but the mean is negative. We hypothesize that the negative mean is a consequence of our sample period including the current global financial crisis, which has been characterized by deleveraging in many developed countries. The PIP of the other financial indicators is low.

We alternate between different approaches towards endogeneity as each of them has its limits. The use of lagged variables and limiting the sample for a relatively short and specific period of the 2000s may not well capture the relationship's long-run nature and may be affected by the business cycle dynamics. On the other hand, the instrumental variable approach relies heavily on good instrument choice, and their qualification may almost universally be disputed⁹. The choice of weak instruments may also generate more biased estimates than

⁸The countries for which we are missing data are Botswana, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Malawi, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda.

⁹See Deaton (2010) for a critical overview of the use of instruments in economics and further references

Table 2.5: New financial indicators and growth 1960-2011,
2SLS-BMA

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
GDP level in 1960	1.00	-0.01171	0.00252
Fraction GDP in mining	1.00	0.04670	0.01290
Exchange rate distortions	1.00	-0.00009	0.00003
Life expectancy	1.00	0.00059	0.00020
Fraction Confucian	0.99	0.04077	0.01183
Fraction Buddhist	0.94	0.01143	0.00558
Net interest margin	0.92	-0.00148	0.00072
Equipment investment	0.87	0.08065	0.04660
Fraction Protestants	0.62	-0.00482	0.00505
Size of labour force	0.39	0.00000	0.00000
Outward orientation	0.38	-0.00121	0.00191
Ratio of workers to population	0.28	0.00303	0.00596
Fraction Jewish	0.26	0.00381	0.00821
Fraction of pop. speaking English	0.24	-0.00128	0.00287
Bank Z-score	0.22	0.00004	0.00009
Rule of law	0.20	0.00175	0.00432
Primary exports	0.19	0.00143	0.00377
Market turnover	0.18	0.00001	0.00002
Fraction Hindu	0.18	-0.00455	0.01298
SD of black market premium	0.15	0.00000	0.00001
French colony dummy	0.15	0.00101	0.00319
Private credit	0.13	0.00001	0.00002
Fraction speaking foreign language	0.11	0.00031	0.00127
Spanish colony dummy	0.11	0.00052	0.00200
Political rights	0.10	0.00010	0.00042
Fraction Catholic	0.10	-0.00035	0.00160
Population growth	0.09	-0.02058	0.08788
High school enrolment	0.08	-0.00210	0.01155
Age	0.07	-0.00000	0.00001
Public education share	0.06	0.00493	0.03187
Sub-Sahara dummy	0.06	0.00006	0.00153
Civil liberties	0.06	0.00003	0.00032
Fraction Muslim	0.05	0.00007	0.00142
Absolute latitude	0.05	0.00000	0.00003
Latin America dummy	0.05	-0.00012	0.00115
Degree of capitalism	0.05	0.00003	0.00023
Number of years of open economy	0.04	0.00010	0.00107
Market capitalization	0.04	0.00000	0.00000
British colony dummy	0.04	-0.00004	0.00051
War dummy	0.03	0.00001	0.00037
Area	0.03	0.00000	0.00000
Black market premium	0.03	0.00007	0.00087
Revolutions and coups	0.03	-0.00001	0.00073
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	0.03	0.00002	0.00068
Primary school enrolment	0.03	-0.00005	0.00134
Non-equipment investment	0.02	0.00006	0.00284

the elementary approaches, such as OLS (Bazzi & Clemens, 2013). The alternative estimation strategies we employ provide additional evidence for our baseline results and support the finance-led hypothesis.

2.5.4 Non-linearities in Finance and Growth Nexus

Finally, we examine the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between financial indicators and growth. Several recent studies on financial development and economic growth devote substantial attention to nonlinearities in the relationship between financial development and economic growth (see, for example, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and Law and Singh (2014)). In addition, we also examine several possible interaction effects in finance–growth nexus such as whether private credit is conducive to growth only when financial system is stable.

When considering the quadratic and interaction terms, we rely on the strong heredity principle to adjust prior model probabilities. This approach has been suggested in the literature to ensure appropriate interpretation of the results. In essence, the quadratic and interaction terms may only be evaluated when their linear counterparts are included in the model. Therefore, they cannot mask potential effects of linear terms.

The results of the specification focused only on private credit do not alter our conclusions from the basic linear setup. The posterior inclusion probabilities of private credit and its quadratic term are 8% and 1%, respectively.¹⁰ Next, we present the results with all financial indicators in Table 2.7. The PIPs on the linear terms are similar to the ones in the baseline linear specification from the previous subsection. The PIP on the net interest margin remains high at 88%. At the same time, we find very low posterior inclusion probabilities for all the quadratic terms with the exception of the net interest margin, which stands at 38%. While this value is not higher than sometimes suggested cut-off threshold of 50%, it provides some weak evidence for decreasing marginal returns of our efficiency indicator.

Finally, we report the results on the interaction terms. In the estimation we take the baseline scenario with all financial indicators and augment it with the interactions between private credit (depth), bank Z-score (stability), and net interest margin (efficiency). Table 2.8 summarizes the results. While the

¹⁰In this subsection we report only the posterior statistics of the financial variables. The full results including the other variables are available upon request.

Table 2.6: New financial indicators and growth 2000-2011, baseline results

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Exchange rate distortions	1.00	0.00022	0.00004
War dummy	1.00	0.01149	0.00290
Net interest margin	1.00	-0.00212	0.00055
Primary exports	1.00	0.01699	0.00496
Fraction Confucian	1.00	0.04151	0.01130
Non-equipment investment	1.00	-0.09469	0.02661
Political rights	1.00	0.00641	0.00152
Latin America dummy	1.00	0.01679	0.00470
Fraction GDP in mining	1.00	0.08843	0.01789
Ratio of workers to population	1.00	0.04116	0.00919
Revolutions and coups	1.00	-0.03279	0.00649
Outward orientation	1.00	0.00900	0.00261
Sub-Sahara dummy	1.00	-0.03589	0.00910
Fraction Hindu	0.94	0.03725	0.01387
SD of black market premium	0.88	0.00003	0.00002
Private credit	0.53	-0.00003	0.00004
Life expectancy	0.31	0.00011	0.00021
High school enrolment	0.25	-0.00932	0.02257
Bank Z-score	0.21	-0.00004	0.00010
Rule of law	0.16	0.00106	0.00369
French colony dummy	0.15	-0.00091	0.00311
Degree of capitalism	0.14	0.00014	0.00055
Size of labour force	0.13	1.3e-08	5.0e-08
Black market premium	0.12	0.00084	0.00375
Spanish colony dummy	0.11	-0.00046	0.00250
Civil liberties	0.10	-0.00018	0.00096
Number of years of open economy	0.09	0.00034	0.00206
Age	0.09	1.1e-06	0.00001
GDP level in 2000	0.09	0.00009	0.00076
British colony dummy	0.08	0.00004	0.00079
Public education share	0.08	0.00470	0.03815
Absolute latitude	0.08	4.3e-06	0.00003
Fraction Muslim	0.08	0.00035	0.00215
Population growth	0.08	-0.00603	0.07020
Market capitalization	0.07	3.8e-07	4.7e-06
Fraction Buddhist	0.07	-0.00021	0.00167
Fraction Catholic	0.07	-0.00012	0.00102
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	0.07	0.00028	0.00171
Primary school enrolment	0.07	0.00026	0.00278
Market turnover	0.07	4.5e-07	3.7e-06
Fraction Jewish	0.07	0.00017	0.00230
Area	0.07	1.3e-08	1.3e-07
Fraction speaking foreign language	0.07	0.00011	0.00089
Fraction Protestants	0.06	0.00007	0.00107
Fraction of pop. speaking English	0.05	-0.00011	0.00103
Equipment investment	0.04	0.00026	0.00815

Table 2.7: New financial indicators and quadratic terms
Bayesian model averaging

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Net interest margin	0.88	-0.00192	0.00155
Net interest margin sq.	0.38	0.00006	0.00010
Market turnover	0.20	0.00003	0.00009
Bank Z-score	0.19	0.00003	0.00009
Market turnover sq.	0.12	-1.3e-07	4.0e-07
Private credit	0.09	0.00001	0.00005
Private credit sq.	0.03	-4.4e-08	2.7e-07
Market capitalization	0.01	-2.1e-07	4.7e-06
Bank Z-score sq.	0.01	1.3e-07	1.4e-06
Market capitalization sq.	0.00	6.6e-10	1.7e-08

Table 2.8: New financial indicators and interaction terms
Bayesian model averaging

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Net interest margin	0.95	-0.00110	0.00050
Bank Z-score	0.29	0.00005	0.00010
Market turnover	0.18	0.00001	0.00002
Private credit	0.08	2.8e-06	0.00002
Market capitalization	0.03	2.1e-07	4.8e-06
Bank Z-score*Net interest margin	0.02	5.8e-07	5.9e-06
Net interest margin*Private credit	0.00	3.8e-08	1.4e-06
Bank Z-score*Private credit	0.00	-5.4e-10	6.9e-08

PIPs for the linear terms of financial indicators remain largely unchanged, the PIPs for the examined interaction terms are close to zero.

2.6 Conclusions

We contribute to the voluminous finance and economic growth literature in two ways. First, we use Bayesian model averaging (Raftery et al., 1997). This methodology is firmly grounded in statistical theory and allows the researcher to jointly evaluate a large number of potential covariates considered in the literature. This is important because we know that regression model uncertainty in growth regressions is high (Durlauf et al., 2008; Sala-I-Martin et al., 2004) and there are numerous potential determinants of growth that could be included. Without considering model uncertainty, researchers examining the finance-growth nexus risk omitted variable bias and inconsistently estimated parameters.

Second, the previous literature examining the finance-growth nexus largely employs measures of financial depth (for both the banking sector and stock markets) but rarely examines measures of the efficiency of financial intermediaries in channeling resources and facilitating transactions or financial stability. For this reason, we use newly developed financial indicators from the World Bank's GFDD. These indicators capture not only depth but also efficiency and stability. It is vital to revisit the finance and growth literature because recent studies report that excessive financial development harms growth (Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012).

Using the updated well-known cross-country growth dataset by Fernandez et al. (2001), we find that traditional indicators of financial depth are not robustly related to long-term economic growth. The measures of financial depth and financial stability exhibit posterior inclusion probabilities well below 50%. However, our results suggest that bank intermediation efficiency, as proxied by the net interest margin, is crucial for long-term growth. The corresponding posterior inclusion probability is on average around 90%. This result is in line with theory, which indicates that the financial sector is essential in channeling resources from savers to borrowers Pagano (1993). These results are robust to different parameter and model priors in Bayesian model averaging. The results are also robust once we address the endogeneity of financial indicators. In addition, we do not find non-linearities and various interaction effects (such

as the effect of the interaction of credit and financial stability) important for finance–growth nexus.

Overall, we find that the measurement of financial development is crucial in determining the estimated effect of finance on growth. Based on our global sample, the results attribute a greater role to the banking sector and its efficiency in fostering economic growth. Therefore, our results suggest that the quality of financial intermediation rather than the quantity of finance matters for growth. Our results thus stand in contrast to the recent papers suggesting that too much finance harms growth. We show that once we distinguish between quality and quantity of finance, we find that quality matters and quantity is largely irrelevant for long–term real growth. In terms of policy implications, our results indicate that the regulatory changes intended to safeguard financial stability should carefully analyze the consequences for the efficiency of financial intermediation.

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Appendix

2.A Description of the Dataset

We use a commonly employed dataset on the determinants of growth developed by Fernandez et al. (2001). The dataset contains 41 explanatory variables that are potentially important for growth in 72 countries. Here, we describe the variables that do not assess financial development. Financial indicators, which we add to this dataset, are described in the main text.

We update the dataset by incorporating economic growth from new Penn World Table (PWT), extending the time period considered from the former 1960-1992 to 1960-2011. Our dependent variable is the average growth of real output-based GDP per capita. The mean value of the growth rate across the dataset is 2.27% with a standard deviation of 1.45%. The regressors in the dataset comprise various measures of economic, political, geographic, demographic, social, and cultural factors. As many of the variables are endogenous with respect to growth, the data typically come from 1960 or before.

The economic variables primarily capture established factors from neoclassical growth theories. The initial level of GDP is included to capture conditional convergence, such that lower starting levels imply higher growth rates (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Additionally, physical capital investment is considered, distinguishing between equipment investment (machinery) and non-equipment investment (other). This follows Long and Summers (1991), who find that the impact of the former is a stronger driver of long-term economic growth. Human capital enters through primary school enrollment, higher education enrollment and public education share from Barro (1996). Life expectancy is often assumed to capture human capital other than education; therefore, it is also included among the regressors. Exchange rate fluctuations, the black market premium, and the volatility of the black market premium account for the degree of economic uncertainty. Exchange rates can affect a country's foreign direct investments and net exports, subsequently influencing economic growth. The black market premium then reflects the surplus on the exchange rate over the official foreign exchange market. High discrepancy mirrors greater uncertainty, and in addition to high volatility, we expect it to decelerate growth. Moreover, a set of variables accounts for economic policies. Outward orientation based on an import-export structure reflects the potential impact of international competition on domestic production efficiency. Economic organization

captures the degree of capitalism, using the classification developed by Hall and Jones (1999). The characteristic is measured on a six-degree scale ranging from “statist” to “capitalist” that depends on how much control the national government exerts over the economy. Finally, the degree of openness enters through the length of period that the country has experienced an open economy. All policy variables are assumed to be positively correlated with economic growth.

Geographic controls include dummy variables for Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America, total area, and absolute latitude. Spatial differences in economic growth have been established in the literature. The location of a country may influence growth through differences in transportation costs, disease burdens, or agricultural productivity (Gallup et al., 1999). A location farther from the equator should have a positive impact on growth.

The explanatory variables measuring political conditions within countries are colonial heritage, rule of law, indices for political rights, civil rights, and revolutions and coups. Political instability is further captured by war dummy, which equals 1 if the country suffered from war during 1960-1992. Acemoglu et al. (2001) note that colonial heritage is related to lower trust and malfunctioning institutions; therefore, former colonial status depresses growth. The rule of law is an established control in growth regressions, proxying for security, property rights, democratic government, and corruption (Haggard & Tiede, 2011). Civil liberties further accounts for the level of democracy and its relationship with income redistribution. If a large share of income is in the hands of a few, this may have consequences for economic agents’ production incentives. Intuitively, revolutions and coups negatively affect growth by decreasing stability and infrastructure destruction.

The demographic characteristics of countries we use in our estimation are average age, religion, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, population growth, total labor force, ratio of workers in population, and language skills. Religion is found to be relevant to economic growth in Barro (1996). Population growth accounts for the neoclassical implication of a, *ceteris paribus*, decline in per capita growth with an increasing population. Language skills are approximated by the fraction of persons speaking English within a country and the fraction of persons speaking a foreign language. Hall and Jones (1999) demonstrate how better language skills are positively reflected in economic growth. They argue that this arises from facilitated internalization and the benefits of globalization. The full list of variable names and their abbreviations is presented below.

Additionally, PWT is missing observations on Algeria, Haiti, and Nicaragua.


Therefore, we have to drop them from the sample. Furthermore, the GFDD does not include data on Taiwan. Ultimately, we have 68 observations, encompassing both developed and developing countries. The list of countries is as follows: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo Dem. Rep (Kinshasa), Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Honduras, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kenya, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Madagascar, Mexico, Malawi, Malaysia, Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Paraguay, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

We use the following list of variables (the details on the construction of variables are available in Fernandez et al. (2001)): Absolute latitude, Age, Area, Black market premium, British colony dummy, Fraction Buddhist, Fraction Catholic, Civil liberties, Fraction Confucian, Degree of capitalism, Fraction of population speaking English, Equipment investment, Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, Fraction speaking foreign language, French colony dummy, GDP level in 1960, High school enrollment, Fraction Hindu, Fraction Jewish, Size of labor force, Latin America dummy, Life expectancy, Fraction GDP in mining, Fraction Muslim, Non-equipment investment, Outward orientation, Political rights, Population growth, Primary exports, Fraction Protestant, Primary school enrollment, Public education share, Revolutions and coups, Exchange rate distortions, Rule of law, Spanish colony dummy, SD of black market premium, Sub-Sahara dummy, War dummy, Ratio of workers to population, Number of years of open economy, Bank Z-score, Net interest margin, Stock market capitalization to GDP, Stock market turnover ratio, and Domestic credit to private sector.

2.B Jointness of financial indicators

To check the dependence between our financial variables, we compute the so-called jointness measure, which is based on the posterior distributions of explanatory variables over the model space. The goal of this exercise is to determine whether the different financial variables capture different sources of information in explaining the dependent variable (jointness) or if they represent

Figure 2.5: Model comparison with private credit



Note: Model 1=hyper-g, random model prior; Model 2=UIP, random model prior

similar factors and should not be considered jointly in the model (disjointness) (Ley & Steel, 2007).

Jointness statistics for our financial indicators are available in Tables 2.9–2.11 with each table representing a different approach to jointness computation. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 show that none of the numbers exceeds the threshold suggested by Ley and Steel (2007) (LS) for decisive (dis)jointness. Nevertheless, jointness statistics for some of the pairs suggest very strong jointness (e.g. market capitalization and private credit). Another way of constructing jointness statistic has been developed by Doppelhofer and Weeks (2009) (DW). Regarding DW statistic, we find strong substitutability for private credit and net interest margin. However, as has been stressed by Ley and Steel (2009a), DW jointness statistic may become very sensitive and volatile if one of the variables has high PIP and the other has a very low one. This is indeed the situation we encounter in our analysis. In addition, if the net interest margin and private credit were to be strong substitutes in a sense they would represent very similar factors and thus be mutually replaceable in the estimation process, they should also exhibit the same importance regarding economic growth if considered separately. These findings make us believe that the LS statistics are more appropriate to judge the interdependence between financial indicators.

Table 2.9: Financial indicators, jointness statistics according to Ley and Steel (2007)

Net interest margin	.			
Bank Z-score	0.335	.		
Private credit	0.058	0.025	.	
Market capitalization	0.025	0.014	0.011	.
Market turnover	0.224	0.158	0.041	0.027 .

Table 2.10: Financial indicators, jointness statistic according to Ley and Steel (2007), alternative

Net interest margin	.			
Bank Z-score	0.251	.		
Private credit	0.055	0.024	.	
Market capitalization	0.024	0.013	0.011	.
Market turnover	0.183	0.136	0.039	0.027 .

Table 2.11: Financial indicators, jointness statistic according to Doppelhofer and Weeks (2009)

Net interest margin	.			
Bank Z-score	-0.372	.		
Private credit	-2.373	-1.025	.	
Market capitalization	0.028	-0.645	-0.521	.
Market turnover	-0.829	0.165	-0.331	0.256 .

Table 2.12: First-stage regression, 2SLS–BMA

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Net interest margin
Latitude	−0.054*** (0.017)
Years open	−1.851* (1.012)
Rule of law	−2.086** (1.036)
Crises tally	3.290*** (0.769)
Observations	60
R ²	0.730
Adjusted R ²	0.711
Residual Std. Error	1.748 (df = 55)
F Statistic	37.206*** (df = 4; 55)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Chapter 3

Finance and Wealth Inequality

Abstract

Using a global sample, this paper investigates the determinants of wealth inequality capturing various economic, financial, political, institutional, and geographical indicators. Using instrumental variable Bayesian model averaging, it reveals that only a handful of indicators robustly matters and finance plays a key role. It reports that while financial depth increases wealth inequality, efficiency and access to finance reduce inequality. In addition, redistribution and education are associated with lower inequality whereas wars and openness to international trade contribute to greater wealth inequality.

This chapter was co-authored with Iftekhar Hasan and Roman Horváth and published in the *Journal of International Money and Finance*. We thank Joshua Aizenman, Trinil Arimurti, Nauro Campos, Alex Cukierman, Michael Koetter, Lubos Pastor, Fabien Rondeau and Dimitrios Tsomocos for helpful discussions and seminar participants at the Annual International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance, European Public Choice Annual Conference, Financial Engineering and Banking Society Annual Conference, Multinational Finance Society Annual Conference, Charles University, Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies and University of Economics, Prague for helpful comments. Mares acknowledges the hospitality of Columbia University, where he stayed as visiting researcher in January-April 2018 thanks to the support by the H2020-MSCA-RISE project GEMCLIME-2020 GA No. 681228, and support from Grant Agency of Charles University No. 768217

3.1 Introduction

Wealth inequality differs markedly across countries (Davies et al., 2017; Davies et al., 2011; Milanovic, 2016). The wealth share of the top 1% in the US is currently approximately 40%, and it is even higher in Russia. On the other hand, the wealth share of the top 1% is approximately 20% in France and even lower in the UK (Zucman, 2019). What accounts for these (dramatic) differences in wealth inequality across countries? Is it different degrees of redistribution, financial development, globalization, technological progress or economic development? Alternatively, are there possibly some other factors? Although extensive progress has been made regarding the measurement of wealth inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2013; Davies et al., 2017; Davies et al., 2011; Piketty & Zucman, 2014; Saez & Zucman, 2016), we still lack systematic evidence about the determinants of wealth inequality across countries.

The theoretical models of wealth inequality suggest that several factors affect wealth inequality. The theoretical principles of the $r > g$ concept¹ laid out in Piketty (2014) predict that there is a natural tendency of wealth inequality to increase in capitalist economies, which can be overcome only by redistribution or wars. This concept has received criticism from the theoretical point of view (Blume & Durlauf, 2015; Mankiw, 2015).²

Dynamic quantitative models represent another approach to understand wealth inequality and focus on the heterogeneity of returns, preferences, transmission of human capital, and bequests. Nardi and Fella (2017) provide an overview of these models and their ability to mirror empirical wealth distributions. One of the conclusions is that all of the models critically rely on the saving motives of individuals. The theoretical predictions regarding wealth inequality arise from the model by Pástor and Veronesi (2016), in which inequality depends on the skill and risk aversion of entrepreneurs, taxation, and the development of financial markets.³ Overall, the theoretical models postulate that several factors may matter for wealth inequality but do not provide a single theoretical framework to guide the exact regression model specifications.

In this paper, we study the potential determinants of wealth distribution by relying on a global sample of countries and examining a wide array of possible determinants. Given that there is no encompassing theoretical framework,

¹This means that the rate of return on capital, r , exceeds economic growth, g .

²See King (2017) for a review of the literature about the topic.

³More specifically, it depends on the ability of entrepreneurs to diversify away their idiosyncratic risk, which can be interpreted as a measure of financial development.

we propose to employ BMA as our methodological framework. BMA is a well-established approach within statistical theory and addresses the inherent regression model uncertainty in a unifying framework (Koop et al., 2007; Raftery et al., 1997).⁴

In essence, the BMA procedure evaluates different combinations of explanatory variables and weights the corresponding coefficients using the measure of model fit. In addition, BMA is the perfect tool for the evaluation of numerous regressors and estimating their PIP, the probability that a given regressor should be in the ‘optimal’ model of wealth inequality. We address potential endogeneity within the estimation by using lagged values of explanatory variables and, more rigorously, by relying on the IVBMA approach by Karl and Lenkoski (2012).

Using our BMA approach, we examine how 37 different factors explain the differences in cross-country wealth inequality among 73 countries. We focus on a number of economic, financial, institutional, regulatory, political and policy factors, such as education, financial development, government policies, technological progress, entrepreneurship and macroeconomic stability. To capture wealth inequality, we use the wealth Gini coefficient from CSWD, constructed using the methodology of Davies et al. (2017). The CSWD is the only available dataset with sufficient country coverage. We also add a set of indicators for financial development by Svirydzhenka (2016), which employ the most densely available series from GFDD to capture various characteristics of financial systems. We include these measures to reflect the assumptions made by the theory, in which savings, which depend on financial markets, and financial development are the main drivers of wealth inequality.

Examining our global sample, we find that several factors are robustly related to wealth inequality. We find that financial development is an especially important determinant of wealth inequality across countries. Our results suggest that finance exerts a complex effect on wealth inequality. Whereas countries with more finance (i.e., large financial markets and financial institutions) exhibit greater wealth inequality, more efficiency and greater access to finance is associated with less wealth inequality. In general, this evidence supports the notion that sound financial systems contribute to lower wealth inequality. Ac-

⁴BMA has been applied to examine various issues in economics and finance, such as to study economic growth (Durlauf et al., 2008; Fernandez et al., 2001), stock market predictability (Avramov, 2002; Cremers, 2002), intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Havranek et al., 2015), exchange rate forecasting (Wright, 2008) and interactions between credit spreads and economic activity (Faust et al., 2013).

According to our results, the empirical importance of finance for wealth inequality suggests that theoretical models should more thoroughly examine the complex links between finance and wealth.

Our results also suggest that education reduces wealth inequality. Education decreases the gap between the wealthy and poor, corresponding to the findings by Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) regarding the determinants of income inequality.⁵ Wealth inequality is also lower in countries with more redistribution, as measured by the difference between the market and after-tax income Gini coefficients. Finally, globalization, as proxied by trade openness, and the extreme form of political instability, as proxied by the number of wars, tend to increase wealth inequality.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on wealth inequality. Section 3.3 presents the data, and 3.4 introduces the BMA. We provide the results in Section 3.5 and conclude in Section 3.6. Additional robustness checks are available in the Appendix 3.A.

3.2 Related literature

Wealth inequality is typically analyzed within the theoretical framework of Bewley (1977) and Aiyagari (1994). This framework relaxes the assumption of efficient economies and allows for, among other aspects, incomplete markets. The agents within the economy face a stochastic process of labor earnings and optimize consumption-saving behavior in incomplete markets. Additional specifications include restrictions on saving assets or borrowing constraints. Among other macroeconomic phenomena, the models can help us to understand the dynamics of the equilibrium distributions of consumption, savings, and wealth (Benhabib et al., 2015).

The basic mechanism in the Bewley model relies on the environment in which agents save to self-insure against idiosyncratic labor-earning shocks. This precautionary motive to save is the primary driver of wealth accumulation. The basic version of the model has severe limitations. The ability to self-insure increases with the wealth/earnings ratio. The saving rate thus decreases and eventually turns negative if individual wealth is sufficiently greater than labor

⁵However, note that the theoretical effect of education on inequality is ambiguous. Scheidel (2017) discusses the channels via which education – primarily through assortative mating and the elite school system being disproportionately less accessible to children from poor families – amplifies inequality.

earnings. In other words, the basic setup implies negative saving rates for the rich. It also overstates the fraction of the population that does not save at all. These features of the model are in contrast with the data in the US, in which we observe high saving rates for the rich, and the share of agents without savings is very small (Nardi & Fella, 2017).


For this reason, the saving motives are extended to account more accurately for the actual dynamics of wealth accumulation and distribution. Some of the extensions introduce bequests and the transmission of human capital across generations (De Nardi, 2004; De Nardi & Yang, 2014), heterogeneity in both time preferences and risk aversion (Hendricks, 2007), earnings risk (Castañeda et al., 2003), saving for out-of-pocket medical expenses (Kopecky & Koreshkova, 2014), heterogeneity in rates of return (Benhabib et al., 2015; Lusardi et al., 2017), or entrepreneurship motives for saving (Cagetti & De Nardi, 2006). The extensions generally help the model fit actual data. The various forces that we mention above have been primarily studied separately, which makes it difficult to evaluate their relative importance. Therefore, Nardi and Fella (2017) call for complex models that account jointly for varying saving motives.

Empirical analysis of wealth inequality has received much less attention compared with income. Even though this may seem surprising given the quantitative importance of wealth, it is largely because the measurement of wealth is more complicated than the measurement of income (Zucman, 2019).

Private wealth is of utmost importance for individual decisions regarding investment, especially in an environment with asymmetric information and binding credit constraints. The consequences of the distribution of wealth are important in theories explaining the different speeds of development across countries (Roine & Waldenström, 2015). Researchers sometimes substitute wealth patterns with income distributions, but such replacements are far from perfect given that wealth and income distributions are typically very different (Bagchi & Svejnar, 2015). One of the stylized facts is that the wealth distribution is much more concentrated than the income distribution. Figure 3.1 illustrates this difference for some of the Organisation for Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries with the most unequally distributed income. The individual subfigures display the difference between Gini indices based on either income or wealth and the concentration of income and wealth among the top 10% of their holders. We observe countries with relatively high income inequality and low wealth inequality, and *vice versa*.

The lack of empirical literature regarding wealth inequality is primarily

Figure 3.1: Comparison of wealth and income gini indices and concentration



Note: Gini indices correspond to data in our sample - CSWD or Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). The data for top shares come from OECD income and wealth distribution database. Both consider after-tax income and net private wealth.

caused by data limitations, although some recent attempts to map both historical and current wealth patterns have emerged. The main sources of wealth data include household surveys, wealth tax returns, estate tax returns, the investment income method (jointly examining capital income and the net rate of return), and the *rich lists* assembled by various journals (Davies & Shorrocks, 2000).

In their survey, Roine and Waldenström (2015) combine different sources of data and provide a long-run perspective on wealth inequality in advanced economies for which data are available.⁶ The data for these countries are typically available for the 20th century (and sometimes even earlier) but often at a frequency lower than yearly and with some missing data. Typically, the data indicate that wealth inequality has decreased since World War I, continued on a downward trend (or stagnated) and then increased somewhat since the 1980s. However, the increase in wealth inequality after the 1980s is most dramatic for some countries, such as the US, where it nearly reverted the top wealth shares to their values from before the Great Depression (Piketty, 2014).

The existing single case studies of countries include, among others, Saez and Zucman (2016) and Kopczuk and Saez (2004), who document the dynamics

⁶ Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US.

of wealth inequality in the US since 1913 based on capitalized income data and estate tax returns, respectively. Dell et al. (2007) examine the evolution of wealth shares in Switzerland. Roine and Waldenström (2009) document the Swedish case, and Katic and Leigh (2016) cover the wealth patterns in Australia. For a thorough overview, we refer to Roine and Waldenström (2015).

Davies et al. (2017) and Davies et al. (2011), Davies and Shorrocks (2000) are important contributions in terms of measuring wealth inequality. In order to examine global wealth inequality, they provide wealth inequality measures (Gini coefficients) for a large number of countries. They explore a shorter time span, only examining the changes in global wealth patterns since 2000, and find that global wealth inequality decreased between 2000 and 2007, but then the trend reversed, and inequality has since been steadily rising. They also show that the share of financial assets strongly affects the changes in wealth inequality (Davies et al., 2017). We provide more details of their work, especially regarding the wealth inequality levels in individual countries, in the section about data below.

3.3 Data

We construct a rich dataset of 73 countries and 37 explanatory variables to study the determinants of the wealth distribution. The selection is based on the aforementioned theoretical models and the empirical studies examining income inequality. Our methodological choice allows us to be generous with the inclusion of regressors, and therefore, we can capture a variety of different country characteristics.

Our dependent variable is the Gini index based on the wealth distribution coming from the CSWD based on the methodology of Davies et al. (2017), Davies et al. (2011)⁷. They use the methodology to estimate the world distribution of wealth and consequently provide estimates for single countries. The CSWD is provided at a yearly frequency from 2010 onwards. We take the average of available observations of the index (2010-2016) to reduce possible year-on-year stock market capitalization swings or significant changes in the valuation of nonfinancial assets. We describe this dataset more thoroughly in subsection 3.3.1.

⁷This dataset has been recently used by Anand and Segal (2017) to document recent trends in wealth inequality and by Islam (2018) to examine the effect of wealth inequality on economic freedom and democracy.

We supplement the data about wealth with a large number of potential variables that could be driving inequality. These cover economic, financial, institutional, political, social and cultural aspects of the countries in our sample. It is difficult to rely on similar studies in the choice of regressors, since only a few papers on the same topic exist. To certain extent, we motivate the selection of our explanatory variables based on the studies investigating the determinants of income inequality and discussing the possible links between income inequality and wealth inequality (de Haan & Sturm, 2017; Roine & Waldenström, 2015). We average the data over the period of their availability, which is typically from 1980 to 2009. The complete list of the explanatory variables along with their description and sources is available in Table 3.17 in the Appendix.

We focus on financial development and its effect on the distribution of wealth within the economy. There are more than 100 indicators available in GFDD by the World Bank (WB), capturing specific features of financial development. Building on the framework by Čihák et al. (2013), who describe four main dimensions of financial systems – depth, efficiency, stability, and access – Svirydzenka (2016) constructs aggregate indexes representing these dimensions using the most densely available series in the database. Furthermore, GFDD allows for not only distinguishing between the different dimensions of financial development but also ascribing these dimensions to the banking sector and financial markets separately. Except for stability and access, for which we only control for variables representing the banking industry due to data limitations, we take advantage of this distinction in our analysis.

Table 3.1 lists the components of our financial indexes. Their construction follows standard procedures. The series are normalized and then aggregated into the index using a weighted linear average. The weights come from principle components analysis, and they are thus proportional to the relative importance of the underlying series in explaining the variance of the index. We limit the index data to a period for which at least one of the underlying series used for construction of the index is available.⁸ We follow the same procedure as with other explanatory variables, i.e., take averages of the series before 2009. Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the wealth inequality and

⁸Originally, Svirydzenka (2016) imputes the value of the indices using other available data to provide complete time series for all of the indices since 1980. Due to missing data for some components in the early periods, she imputes some of the indices. As an example, she approximates access to financial institutions by the series capturing efficiency or depth. In order not to mix up these concepts, we must impose conditions on the raw data availability.

Table 3.1: Underlying Components of Financial Development Indexes

INDICATOR	MEASURE
Financial institutions	
Access	Bank branches per 100,000 adults
	ATMs per 100,000 adults
Efficiency	Net interest margin
	Lending-deposits spread
	Noninterest income to total income
	Overhead costs to total assets
	Return on assets
	Return on equity
Depth	Domestic private credit to the real sector to the GDP
	Pension fund assets/GDP
	Mutual fund assets/GDP
	Insurance premiums life and nonlife/GDP
Financial markets	
Depth	Stock market capitalization/GDP
	Stocks traded/GDP
	International debt securities of government/GDP
	Total debt securities of financial corporations/GDP
	Total debt securities of nonfinancial corporations/GDP
Efficiency	Stock market turnover ratio (stocks traded/capitalization)

financial development indicators, whereas Table 3.3 reports a correlation matrix for the financial variables and wealth inequality. It is important to realize that contrary to common perception, the correlations between financial variables are far from unity, with the only exception of access and depth, suggesting that different variables convey different information. Wealth inequality is correlated with financial variables, positively with depth and negatively with access and efficiency.

Table 3.2: Finance and Wealth Inequality: Descriptive Statistics

	Min	Max	Mean	Std. dev
Wealth inequality	53.9	88.6	72.94	6.54
Access (FI)	0.015	0.964	0.336	0.259
Efficiency (FI)	0.280	0.765	0.584	0.123
Depth (FI)	0.022	0.861	0.306	0.239
Depth (FM)	0.004	0.732	0.220	0.203
Efficiency (FM)	0.012	0.953	0.348	0.260

Note: FI - financial institutions, FM - financial markets.

Table 3.3: Finance and Wealth Inequality: Correlations

Wealth inequality	.				
Access (FI)	-0.20	.			
Efficiency (FI)	-0.18	0.29	.		
Depth (FI)	0.08	0.73	0.48	.	
Depth (FM)	0.19	0.62	0.45	0.91	.
Efficiency (FM)	0.02	0.47	0.12	0.51	0.58

Note: FI - financial institutions, FM - financial markets.

3.3.1 CSWD

There are several sources for wealth data, with varying country and time coverage. World Inequality Database (WID) provides longer time series regarding wealth distribution for the US, Russia, the UK, and France. The coverage significantly improves⁹ for aggregate stocks of wealth and wealth-income ratios, but these variables themselves do not provide information about the wealth distribution. The OECD also systematically collects data regarding household wealth and its distribution since 2009. Information about the wealth share of the top decile and top percentile of the distribution is available for other metrics. However, the sample is constrained to the OECD member countries, and the resulting country-period sample does not allow for thorough analysis at the global level. Finally, the CSWD is a global yearly dataset regarding wealth and its distribution. In addition to the mean wealth levels for individual countries and different world regions, it provides data about the distribution in terms of Gini coefficients and top wealth shares.

The wealth distributions in the CSWD result from the methodology by Davies et al. (2017). The authors work with the definition of net worth — the sum of the marketable value of financial and nonfinancial assets (housing and land), from which debts are subtracted. Financial assets include private pensions, but this quantity does not consider entitlements for public pensions. Whereas there is uncertainty related to future pension payments, Bönke et al. (2017) document that under no policy change, wealth inequalities decrease if they account for private, occupational, and public pensions. The CSWD focuses on the wealth of individuals aged 20+ years. Several arguments for addressing individuals rather than households exist. First, personal assets and liabilities are usually attached to individuals, and their commitment does not depend on

⁹WID currently (2018) provides time series of varying length for 21 countries.

household membership. Second, even when some assets are shared, household members neither have equal roles in management of these assets nor benefit from their eventual sale. Third, the *de facto* composition of the household might not correspond to the survey questionnaires; older children might live away from home, which also relates to the different household structures across countries. Finally, in contrast with the number of adults, the exact number of households in many countries is unknown. Generally, the implications of this choice of unit of comparison are uncertain. Although household wealth appears to be distributed more equally than that of individuals Atkinson (2007), some contributions show there are no important differences in Sweden and the US (Kopczuk & Saez, 2004; Roine & Waldenström, 2009).

The construction of wealth distributions in the CSWD follows three steps. Initially, the average level of wealth is established for individual countries. Household Balance Sheet (HBS) data are the primary source for wealth levels.¹⁰ The second step addresses the wealth pattern within countries. Based on the wealth distribution in countries for which the data are directly available (31 countries), Davies et al. (2017) establish a relationship between wealth and income distribution to provide an estimate of the wealth pattern in the remaining countries for which they observe the distribution of income. Finally, they augment the resulting wealth distribution by using the lists of billionaires by Forbes. The common sources of wealth distribution likely underestimate the wealth holdings of the very rich, and this results in a distorted top-tail of wealth spectrum. Therefore, CSWD employs Forbes data to adjust the top-tail of the distribution.

3.4 Bayesian Model Averaging

We describe BMA in this section. One of major benefits of BMA is the possibility to deal with the regression model uncertainty. This uncertainty arises in cases of competing theories, which suggest different regression specifications. In addition, Koop (2003) warns about risks related to general-to-specific modeling, i.e., starting with a more general regression model and narrowing down the specification by sequentially dropping the least significant regressors in order

¹⁰HBS data are available for 47 countries. For many countries, data regarding nonfinancial wealth are missing, and thus, the basic data must be supplemented by econometric estimations. For more details about the estimated regressions for financial assets, nonfinancial assets, and liabilities, we refer to Davies et al. (2017).

to obtain the “true” model. Koop (2003) shows that the risk of arriving at a model different from “true” model increases with the number of sequences of eliminating the least significant variables. On the other hand, BMA does not select the “true” model but rather averages all possible regression models, assigning greater weight to “better” models based on their likelihood. Therefore, the BMA addresses the regression model uncertainty inherent in many economic theories.

We provide a detailed description of standard BMA model in the Appendix. In what follows, we present the reasoning for the choices of our parameter and model priors as well as the reasoning how we address potential endogeneity concerns.

Priors

The BMA methodology requires determining two types of priors: g on the parameter space and $p(M_i)$ on the model space. The priors are crucial in determining the posterior probabilities (Cicccone & Jarocinski, 2010; Feldkircher & Zeugner, 2009; Liang et al., 2008).

Parameter Priors

We use Zellner’s g prior structure, which is a common approach in the literature. The prior structure assumes that the priors on the constant and error variance from equation 3.9 are evenly distributed, $p(\alpha_i) \propto 1$ and $p(\sigma) \propto \sigma^{-1}$. Zeugner (2011) notes that this is very similar to the normal-gamma-conjugate model accounting for proper model priors on α and σ described, for example, in Koop (2003), with practically identical posterior statistics.

We assume that the β_i coefficients follow the normal distribution, and we must formulate beliefs regarding their mean and variance before examining the data. We follow standard practice and assume a conservative mean of 0 to reflect the lack of prior knowledge regarding the coefficients. Zellner’s g defines their variance structure $\sigma^2(g(X_i'X_i)^{-1})$. Together, we have the coefficient distribution, which depends on the prior g :

$$\beta_i|g \sim N(0, \sigma^2(g(X_i'X_i)^{-1})) \quad (3.1)$$

The prior variance of the coefficients is proportional to the posterior variance $(X_i'X_i)^{-1}$ estimated from the sample. The parameter g denotes how much

weight we attribute to the prior variance, as opposed to the variance observed in the data (Feldkircher & Zeugner, 2009). Selecting a small g results in low variance in the prior coefficients and thus pushes the coefficients to zero. Conversely, a large g attributes higher importance to the data and expresses researchers' uncertainty regarding zero β_i coefficients (Zeugner, 2011). Note that with $g \rightarrow \infty$, $\beta_i \rightarrow \beta_i^{OLS}$. Popular choices include UIP, BRIC¹¹, and hyper-g¹² parameter prior.

Whereas the first two are known as “fixed-g” priors for the parameter prior set for all the models under consideration, hyper-g allows the researcher to update the prior for individual models in a Bayesian nature and therefore limits the unintended consequences of prior selection based on posterior results. Note that setting $a = 4$ corresponds to the UIP, whereas $a = 2$ concentrates the prior mass close to unity, corresponding to $g \rightarrow \infty$. For more details about hyper-g, see Liang et al. (2008).

We employ the so-called hyper-g prior to estimate the baseline models, following Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009), who suggest that using model-specific priors leads to a more stable posterior structure. We then check the robustness of the results by applying the UIP parameter prior.

Model Priors

Moral-Benito (2012) states that the most popular setting in the BMA literature is the binomial distribution, where each of the covariates is included in the model with a probability of success θ . The prior probability of model M_i with k_i regressors given θ is then

$$p(M_i) = \theta^{k_i} (1 - \theta)^{K - k_i} \quad (3.2)$$

A standard setting is $\theta = \frac{1}{2}$, which assigns equal probability $p(M_i) = 2^{-K}$ to all of the models under consideration. This model prior is also known as the uniform model prior. Assuming that different values of θ can shift the prior model distribution to either smaller or larger sizes (see Zeugner (2011)), we focus on models using the uniform model prior, which is typically employed in BMA applications Fernandez et al. (2001).

A few other model priors can be found in the literature, and we also use them for sensitivity checks of our results. In particular, we employ the collinearity-

¹¹ $g = \max(N, K^2)$

¹² $\frac{g}{1+g} \sim \text{Beta}(1, \frac{a}{2} - 1)$, where $a \in (2, 4]$, i.e. Beta distribution with mean $\frac{2}{a}$

adjusted dilution model prior described by George (2010). Whereas the uniform model prior assumes that the probability of inclusion of one regressor is independent of the inclusion of another one, some regressors are usually correlated. A simple method for addressing the dilution property is to account for such collinearity and adjust the model probabilities by weighting them with the determinant of the correlation matrix, $|R_i| = |X_i X_i'|$. In practice, the collinearity-adjusted dilution model prior takes the following form:

$$p(M_i) = |R_i| \theta^{k_i} (1 - \theta)^{K - k_i} \quad (3.3)$$

where R_i is the correlation matrix of model i under consideration. If the variables in the examined model are orthogonal, the determinant $|R_i|$ goes to 1. On the other hand, if the variables are highly collinear, it goes to 0 and consequently down-weights models with redundant regressors.

IVBMA

Karl and Lenkoski (2012) present an approach to address model uncertainty in the instrumental variable framework. In their paper, they use Conditional Bayes Factors (CBFs) to compare models within the Gibbs sampling algorithm to efficiently compute the posteriors. In contrast with Lenkoski et al. (2014), who rely on approximation of model probabilities using Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), IVBMA allows for a rigorous and fully Bayesian approach. The solution by Koop et al. (2012) offers an alternative approach to simultaneously account for endogeneity and model uncertainty. Their method allows for more flexibility in the choice of prior distributions, and it is suitable for testing the identification of the estimated system. This flexibility complicates the estimation process by introducing an extremely large model space and complexity of the algorithm, which may manifest as difficulties in mixing. The authors are forced to introduce a tweak using a system of “hot”, “cold”, and “super-hot” models to improve on the mixing properties, which makes the method much more difficult to implement.

We follow Karl and Lenkoski (2012) in the concise exposition of the IVBMA framework. They start from a classical two-stage model:

$$Y = X\beta + W\gamma + \epsilon \quad (3.4)$$

$$X = Z\delta + W\tau + \eta \quad (3.5)$$

where

$$\begin{pmatrix} \epsilon_i \\ \eta_i \end{pmatrix} \sim \mathcal{N}_2(0, \Sigma) \quad (3.6)$$

and

$$\Sigma = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_{11} & \sigma_{12} \\ \sigma_{21} & \sigma_{22} \end{pmatrix}; \sigma_{12} = \sigma_{21} \neq 0 \quad (3.7)$$

In this system of equations, Y is the response variable, X is the endogenous factor, and W represents a matrix of other explanatory variables. Z is a matrix of instrumental variables, whereas δ , γ and τ are the corresponding parameter matrices, and β is a scalar. For ease of exposition of the model, we include only one endogenous variable, but extension to multiple endogenous variables can be readily performed.

The IVBMA algorithm works by sequentially updating the first- and second-stage models by drawing from their respective neighborhood models and comparing the conditional probabilities of the candidate models. In a manner resembling the comparison of model probabilities within the MC³ sampler presented in Appendix 3.C, the models are accepted and parameters updated if and only if the conditional probability of the suggested model is greater than the conditional probability of the current one. The error matrix Σ is updated after each round of considering new candidate models in both stages. For more details about the algorithm and algebraic exposition of CBFs, we refer to the original paper by Karl and Lenkoski (2012).

3.5 Results


In this section, we first present several scatter plots to visualize the relations between financial development indicators and wealth inequality. Second, we present BMA results regarding the determinants of wealth inequality, third, we present the results for restricted samples of high- / low- income countries, and fourth, we address endogeneity issues using IVBMA.

3.5.1 Baseline estimation

Figure 3.2 offers an initial insight into the relationship between financial indexes and wealth inequality. The scatter plots show an expected pattern. We observe

efficiency of intermediation and access to financial services to be negatively correlated with inequality. On the other hand, Figure 3.2 suggests that the depth of financial markets is higher in countries with higher wealth inequality. The depth of financial institutions exhibits a slightly weaker but still positive relationship. Overall, the scatter plots suggest that there is some relation between financial development indicators and wealth inequality and that this relation is complex, i.e., some aspects of financial development may contribute to greater wealth inequality, whereas other aspects exert an opposite effect.

Figure 3.2: Finance and Wealth Inequality



Note: Selected financial development indicators.

Table 3.4 presents our BMA results regarding the determinants of wealth inequality. We present the explanatory variables sorted by their PIP values and interpret the results in accordance with Kass and Raftery (1995), who present a conventional rule of thumb to evaluate the PIP. When the PIP is lower than 50%, there is evidence against the effect, PIP between 50% and 75% suggest a weak evidence for the effect, PIP over 75%, but less than 95% means a ‘positive’

evidence for the effect, in case of PIP higher than 95%, but less than 99% there is strong evidence for the effect, and PIP over 99% provides decisive evidence for the effect.

According to our results, only a handful regressors robustly determines the cross-country variation in wealth inequality and exhibit PIPs greater than 0.5. Financial development indicators represent nearly half of these regressors, suggesting that finance is a crucial factor for understanding wealth inequality. Examining our global sample, our results suggest that cross-country differences in wealth inequality are a combination of effects stemming from finance, globalization, education, advances in agriculture and redistribution. But quantitatively, how important is this set of regressors in explaining wealth inequality? If we estimate the simple OLS regression with regressors included in the mode with the highest PMP, we find the corresponding value of R-squared to be 0.57 (adjusted R-squared to be 0.52). This result suggests that we can explain approximately half of the variation in the cross-country differences in wealth inequality using only the eight most relevant regressors.¹³ We discuss the effects of individual regressors in detail below.

The variables with high PIPs exhibit the expected qualitative effects on wealth distribution. The greater efficiency of financial intermediation and better access to the financial institutions results in a more uniform distribution of wealth. This finding is broadly in line with the conclusion of Claessens and Perotti (2007) regarding the determinants of income inequality, who assert that access to financial resources is a key driver in reducing income inequality rather than the depth of the financial market. The result of Claessens and Perotti (2007) also accords with the lower PIP of financial institutions depth in our model.

According to our results, large financial markets (i.e., more capitalized stock markets and greater debt securities markets) propagate differences in wealth. Stock price booms are likely to increase wealth inequality because of the composition of household wealth, as stocks are typically owned by rich households. Kuhn et al. (2017) provide new estimates of wealth inequality in the US from 1949–2016 based on archival data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and

¹³All regressors are statistically significant at the 1 or 10 percent level and exhibit signs of the coefficient estimates identical to those reported in Table 3.4. Alternatively, we estimate the model by OLS using the regressors with PIPs greater than 0.5 in the baseline BMA. The results again correspond to the BMA estimate. We report the output of both regressions in Table 3.13 in the Appendix.

examine the evolution of wealth over time. Their results are in accordance with ours: stock price booms indeed contribute to greater wealth inequality.

In addition, one could argue that our result regarding the effect of the size of financial markets on wealth inequality corresponds to recent findings suggesting that too much finance is harmful to growth (Arcand et al., 2015; Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012; Law & Singh, 2014) and that it is important to disentangle quantity and quality of finance when examining the effect of finance on growth (Hasan et al., 2018). However, this analogy is only partially valid because whereas we typically think of greater economic performance as a positive phenomenon, there is a uncertainty about what is the ‘optimal’ level of wealth inequality.

Outward orientation capturing the openness of the economy leads to higher levels of wealth inequality. Large importance and qualitative effect correspond to the earlier findings, such as those of Dabla-Norris et al. (2015), which claim that globalization and increasing exposure to the outside world contributes to greater within-country inequality. If globalization increases growth, then this result implies that the globalization benefits some economic agents more than others. For example, Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) and Milanovic (2016) mention the skill premium related to technological progress, which leads to excessive earnings and widens inequality. Nevertheless, our results provide little evidence that technological progress increases wealth inequality. We use a comprehensive index of technological progress developed by Comin and Hobijn (2010), but as we can observe from Table 3.4, its PIP is very low. We attribute our result regarding the effect of technological progress on wealth inequality to the sample that we use. Our global sample covers countries with different degrees of economic development and technological progress, and it is likely that technological progress may play a greater role specifically in the most advanced countries.

Redistribution, which we define as the difference between the market and after-tax income Gini indexes, contributes to lower wealth inequality. This result can be interpreted as evidence indicating that government policies may in fact affect inequality despite the well-known difficulties regarding the taxation of top earners. Our results are broadly in line with those of Jakobsen et al. (2018), who find that the abolition of the Danish wealth tax in 1997 contributed to more wealth inequality by increasing the wealth of top earners. Interestingly, the political orientation of the government (as captured by the variable ‘left wing orientation’) is not robustly related to wealth inequality. This result

suggests that deeds (i.e., the actual level of redistribution) rather than words (i.e., stated political orientation) matter.¹⁴

Although the variable ‘number of war years’ exhibits an inclusion probability of slightly less than 0.5, we find wars to be associated with higher wealth inequality. This result is at odds with previous evidence arguing that wars reduce inequality because of enormous capital destruction, inflation and sizable redistributive government programs (to finance the war); see, for example, (Milanovic, 2016; Piketty, 2014) and the references therein. However, this evidence focuses on the effect of war on inequality over time and focuses on substantial and long-lasting conflicts, such as World War I or II. Our regressions explain cross-sectional variation in wealth inequality, i.e., why inequality is higher in some countries than in others. In addition, our dataset regarding wars is based on the period after World War II, i.e., typically internal conflicts (civil wars) or conflicts involving a single or small number of countries. These conflicts have adverse macroeconomic effects, undermine the rule of law, cause violent confiscation of private property by militias and reduce trust in society, especially if these conflicts occur repeatedly (Bircan et al., 2017). Bircan et al. (2017) study the effect of internal violent conflicts on income inequality and also find inequality increases, but this effect is temporary, and later on, inequality falls slowly back to the steady state.


¹⁴In one of the robustness checks, we also consider the relative redistribution (percentage reduction in market-income inequality due to taxes and transfers) Employing the alternative indicator of redistribution does not have any substantial impact on the other explanatory variables. The output of the estimation is available in Table 3.9.

Table 3.4: Determinants of Wealth Inequality, BMA Estimation

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Financial institutions efficiency	1.00	-0.33651	0.11350
Value added in agriculture	1.00	-0.51800	0.16188
Access to financial institutions	1.00	-0.38266	0.15020
Outward orientation	0.87	0.20663	0.12371
Education index (UN)	0.79	-0.26055	0.20440
Financial market development	0.77	0.34023	0.23533
Redistribution	0.51	-0.10670	0.13963
Number of war years	0.48	0.06956	0.09701
Net national savings	0.42	0.08447	0.13021
Economic freedom index (adjusted)	0.35	-0.08233	0.15183
Financial institutions development	0.33	0.14210	0.24598
Natural resource rents	0.29	0.04572	0.09402
Net foreign direct investment	0.25	-0.03291	0.07552
Average GDP growth	0.22	-0.02607	0.06759
Labor market regulation	0.16	0.01630	0.05386
Leftwing orientation	0.15	-0.01239	0.04533
Population density	0.14	-0.01540	0.05521
Inflation	0.12	0.01036	0.04442
Government expenditures	0.12	0.01311	0.05717
Latin America dummy	0.10	0.00987	0.04762
Financial markets efficiency	0.09	-0.00706	0.04026
Banking diversification	0.09	-0.00579	0.03217
Rule of law	0.09	0.01368	0.08087
Active banking restrictions	0.09	-0.00612	0.03667
Financial development index (EFW)	0.07	-0.00364	0.04464
Public education expenditures	0.07	0.00363	0.02903
Revolutions and coups	0.07	0.00250	0.02705
Population growth	0.07	0.00394	0.04154
Bank capital regulations	0.07	-0.00323	0.02589
GDP level in 1990	0.07	-0.00809	0.07483
Civ. liberties and pol. rights	0.06	-0.00322	0.04104
Technological progress	0.06	-0.00596	0.06110
Life expectancy	0.05	0.00043	0.04581
Financial openness (Chinn-Ito)	0.05	0.00150	0.03218
Business conditions	0.05	-0.00196	0.02568
Value added in industry	0.05	-0.00030	0.02710
Labor force participation	0.04	0.00054	0.01815

Note: Dependent variable - average Gini index (wealth) 2010-2016, 73 observations, baseline (hyper-g parameter prior)

Figure 3.3: Robustness Check: Different Prior Structure



Note: Parameter and model prior comparison - compound indicators. Model 1: hyper-g, uniform; Model 2: UIP, uniform; Model 3: hyper-g, dilution; Model 4: UIP, dilution.

We report the baseline results, in which we employ the uniform model prior and hyper-g parameter prior, as described in Section 3.4. To provide robustness checks, we also use alternative parameter and model priors. Figure 3.3 presents a graphical illustration of our robustness checks. We estimate alternative specifications of the model using UIP and the dilution model prior described earlier. Overall, the results are similar. The optional priors slightly decrease PIP across the set of regressors, with the combined effect of UIP and dilution model prior having the largest effect. This slight overall decrease in inclusion probabilities is related to the smaller models dictated by the alternative prior structures, but the ordering of the variables in terms of PIP remains quite stable. The only exception to marginal decreases in the PIP is the effect of education, which decreases to less than 0.5 when we apply the dilution model prior in the estimation. This result could be partially explained by the design of this particular prior, which should down-weight variables that are highly correlated with others. We also tried other specifications with quadratic terms of financial indexes, interactions between the rule of law and financial indexes, and others.¹⁵ None

¹⁵For example, we investigate cases where we drop groups of variables as defined in Table 3.15. Interestingly, when we drop a group of low PIP variables, the results are stable. On the other hand, if we drop a group which contains variables with high PIPs, the results deviate from the baseline estimates. This could be due to the introduction of omitted variable bias

of these additional regressors exhibited significant relevance in our model.¹⁶

Next, we argue that the effect of finance on wealth inequality is complex and whereas some financial indicators decrease the inequality, other financial indicators increase it. But what is the overall effect of finance on wealth inequality? We take the estimated posterior means from Table 3.4 for the finance variables with PIP values greater than 0.5 (these are access to financial institutions (FIA), their efficiency (FIE), and the depth of stock market (FMD)) and multiply them by the corresponding country-specific values. Given the manner in which our explanatory variables are normalized, this multiplication is identical to examining the change in wealth inequality as a result of one-standard-deviation increases in FIA, FIE, and FMD.

We present the results of overall effect of finance on wealth inequality in Figure 3.4. Even though we do not want to overemphasize the precision of our results, the estimated effect is negative for all countries in our sample, i.e., our results suggest that greater financial development reduces wealth inequality. Nevertheless, we observe some heterogeneity in the estimated effect across the countries. Interestingly, we observe the weakest decreasing effect of finance on wealth inequality for the US.¹⁷

3.5.2 High vs. low-income countries

We explore the non-linearity of the estimated effects by splitting our sample into two halves according to the level of GDP in 1990. Such an exercise, however, presents an issue for the estimation with the full set of explanatory variables as only 36 observations remain in each sample. To overcome this, we consider nine explanatory variables which occur in the top three models by their PMP which gives us enough degrees of freedom for the estimation.


We present the results in Table 3.5. The estimated coefficients of explanatory variables have their expected signs. We observe some heterogeneity in terms of PIPs. We find that technological advancement in agriculture (value added in agriculture) and openness of the economy (outward orientation) are dominant factors for low-income countries, while they are less relevant for the group of high-income countries. This is expected result given the prominence

in the latter case as dropping important regressors may severely affect coefficients on the remaining variables.

¹⁶These additional estimation results are available upon request.

¹⁷Alternatively, we assessed the overall effect of finance on wealth inequality based on the estimation of the OLS model. We selected the explanatory variables that had PIP values in Table 3.4 greater than 0.5. The results are largely the same and are available upon request.

Figure 3.4: Effects of individual financial development components on inequality



of agriculture sector in developing countries. Wars matter both for low-income and high-income countries. Regarding the financial variables, depth of the financial market increases wealth inequality both in low-income and high-income countries. Other financial variables (access to finance and efficiency of financial intermediaries) reduce wealth inequality especially in high-income countries. This suggests that the role of finance for wealth inequality rises with economic development.

Table 3.5: Estimates using the variables from the model with the highest posterior model probability and sample split into high- / low- income countries (based on GDP90)

	High-income		Low-income	
	PIP	Post. Mean	PIP	Post. Mean
Financial market depth	0.97	0.55171	0.66	0.21279
Average GDP growth	0.83	-0.31499	0.23	0.00877
Access to FI	0.76	-0.30279	0.27	0.04851
Number of war years	0.72	0.36526	0.62	0.09226
FI efficiency	0.60	-0.22569	0.24	-0.00668
Redistribution	0.56	-0.16593	0.27	-0.02704
Outward orientation	0.50	0.11034	1.00	0.36512
Education index (UN)	0.38	-0.10648	0.32	-0.04479
Value added in agriculture	0.29	0.03537	0.94	-0.33730

3.5.3 Endogeneity issues

In our baseline results, we address endogeneity issues by estimating the effect of lagged regressors on wealth inequality. While wealth inequality is based on the data between 2010-2016, the regressors are based on data prior 2010 and often cover the 1980s, 1990s or 2000s. Therefore, we followed the procedure typical for BMA literature (Christofides et al., 2016; Feldkircher et al., 2014; Hasan et al., 2018).

The question of endogeneity is, however, deeply ingrained in the finance-inequality nexus, and we want to provide additional evidence that the estimated effect of finance on wealth distribution is causal. There are reasons for caution. First, a wealth distribution that is more concentrated at the top may result in more power of incumbents, who lobby for funding of their projects using their political connections and thereby distort the market. Perotti and Volpin (2007) develop an argument along this line. They present a framework where politi-

cians require higher bribe from the lobbyist the greater is their accountability for policy decisions. Thus, with increasing accountability, investor protection strengthens and spurs market entry and competition. The authors examine their prediction in a cross-section and show that better investor protection correlates with larger entry rates and higher firm density in more financially intensive sectors. Similar mechanism is hypothesized to explain in the results in Van der Weide and Milanovic (2018) link inequality and future income growth of the rich and poor.

Second, making the distribution of wealth more equal may lead to increased demand for financial services as more individuals seek to invest their savings or take up loans when their wealth provides a satisfactory collateral. If such development leads to increased supply of financial services through, for example, newly installed ATMs and opened institutions, it may manifest as better access to financial services (Beck et al., 2007). To the contrary, Kumhof et al. (2015) discuss how higher income inequality may lead to increasing loan volumes due to increased supply (savings of the rich) and stronger demand (by the poor). Consequentially, this may lead all the way up to financial (and real) crises. Empirical studies on the relationship between financial crises and inequality seems inconclusive so far, but the concern about the two-way relationship is warranted (Bazillier & Hericourt, 2017; de Haan & Sturm, 2017).

To address the potential endogeneity of the relationship between wealth distribution and financial development, we apply IVBMA. This methodology suggested by Karl and Lenkoski (2012) implements the idea of instrumental variables in a Bayesian framework. It is essentially a two-stage estimation in which model uncertainty is considered in both stages. In the robustness check, we set the depth of financial institutions and access to financial institutions endogenous, as we believe that from our set of financial indicators, these are most the ones most likely affected by the reverse causality issues presented previously.

We employ genetic distance from the United States (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009) along with a measure of financial liberalization as instruments. The financial liberalization proxy we construct relies on the components of Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index by (Gwartney et al., 2017). More specifically, we average the areas 3D, 4C, 4D, and 5A of the EFW. These represent freedom to own foreign currency accounts, black-market exchange rate premium, controls on the movement of capital and people, and credit market regulations. We refer to the authors of EFW for the details of individual com-

ponents. Although the search for good instruments is a nontrivial exercise, we believe our choice satisfies the basic conditions. Genetic distance should be unrelated to wealth distribution¹⁸. Even if the primary cause of migration is more/less equal distribution of wealth, it would most likely not be sufficiently substantial to affect the genetic pattern in a particular country. Additionally, the components of our financial liberalization measure are exogenous to the wealth inequality as the change in wealth distribution is improbably to have direct effect on any of them. We follow Estevadeordal and Taylor (2013) here, who treat foreign trade liberalization as exogenous.

We check the strength of our instruments by examining the correlations and running simple OLS regressions of our endogenous variable on the instruments. The correlations of the instruments are greater than 0.5 in absolute terms, with the only exception being FID and genetic distance, for which it is -0.37. The regressions reveal strong significance of the instruments and the F-test statistics of the regressions are 35.43 and 19.95 for FIA and FID, respectively. Both values are well above 10, the rule of thumb proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). We have compared several additional instruments often used in the literature, including the ubiquitously used financial reform index by Abiad et al. (2010) and the legal origin of the countries, but the EFW measure turned out to be the strongest of the instruments. Our main IVBMA results rely on the just-identified case where we have two potential instruments for two potentially endogenous variables. We check the overidentification with Sargan test as introduced in Lenkoski et al. (2014), where the Sargan p-value is an weighted average of p-values from individual combinations of first and second stage models weighted by their model probabilities. The values are only available for potentially overidentified cases, where the number of instruments considered in the first stage is higher than the number of assumed endogenous variables. The averaged p-value from these cases confirms the validity of instruments.

Table 3.6 presents the results of the IVBMA estimation. The PIPs of instrumented variables somewhat decrease, in the case of access to financial institutions slightly below 0.5, but it still remains among the most important regressors. We also confirm the positive effect of financial markets depth along with the high inclusion probability. The PIPs cannot be directly compared with the baseline results due to differences in the estimation procedure. Whereas for the standard BMA we report the inclusion probabilities based on the analytical posterior probabilities of the top models, IVBMA reports the probabilities based

¹⁸In our sample, the correlation is 0.06.

on the sampler. The latter approach tends to downweigh the PIP for the top and upweight it for the bottom regressors.¹⁹ Overall, the IVBMA estimation largely supports our baseline findings.

Table 3.6: Determinants of Wealth Inequality, IVBMA Estimation

	PIP	Post. Mean	Post. SD
Financial institutions efficiency	0.85826	-0.32431	0.18276
Value added in agriculture	0.78741	-0.39918	0.27546
Financial market depth	0.62200	0.29196	0.32026
Financial institutions depth	0.55682	0.24718	0.39989
Outward orientation	0.52022	0.13647	0.15901
Economic freedom index (adjusted)	0.50242	-0.18778	0.24043
Education index (UN)	0.46915	-0.16719	0.23034
Access to financial institutions	0.45168	-0.19051	0.31849
Net national savings	0.42093	0.11213	0.16687
Redistribution	0.39198	-0.10184	0.15932
Natural resource rents	0.36756	0.08280	0.13856
Number of war years	0.36660	0.07267	0.11648
GDP level in 1990	0.29348	-0.03476	0.21811
Latin America dummy	0.25851	0.05039	0.11744
Net foreign direct investment	0.24740	-0.04159	0.09389
Technological progress	0.24198	-0.02756	0.15284
Rule of law	0.22111	0.00025	0.13277
Life expectancy	0.21608	-0.02082	0.12509
Value added in industry	0.20523	0.03081	0.09693
Civ. liberties and pol. rights	0.17607	0.00152	0.08731
Population growth	0.17297	0.01557	0.08178
Inflation	0.17219	0.02180	0.07214
Average GDP growth	0.16884	-0.01947	0.06804
Population density	0.15698	-0.01672	0.06680
Government expenditures	0.15095	0.01087	0.06574
Labor market regulation	0.14337	0.01307	0.05424
Financial openness (Chinn-Ito)	0.13893	-0.00881	0.06817
Leftwing orientation	0.13809	-0.01337	0.04972
Business conditions	0.12686	-0.00665	0.05531
Financial markets efficiency	0.12605	-0.00358	0.05153
Revolutions and coups	0.12206	0.00728	0.04631
Active banking restrictions	0.11903	-0.00620	0.04858
Banking diversification	0.11722	-0.00860	0.04230
Public education expenditures	0.10759	0.00368	0.03795
Bank capital regulations	0.09251	-0.00155	0.03023
Labor force participation	0.09011	-0.00148	0.02810

Note: Dependent variable - average Gini index (wealth) 2010-2016, 73 observations. Financial depth of and access to financial institutions as endogenous. Instruments: genetic distance, financial development index from Economic Freedom of the World.

¹⁹If we compare IVBMA output with the MC³ PIPs from the baseline BMA, we obtain very similar values for both approaches.

3.6 Concluding Remarks

This paper makes a new contribution to the burgeoning literature about wealth inequality. Whereas the existing literature focuses largely on measurement of wealth inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2013; Davies et al., 2011; Piketty & Zucman, 2014; Saez & Zucman, 2016), we examine a wide array of possible determinants of wealth inequality.

Building the large cross-country dataset, we employ BMA to study the determinants of wealth inequality in order to address the regression model uncertainty. This uncertainty arises from the lack of an encompassing model of wealth inequality, which would dictate the exact regression specification to be estimated. As a side effect, using BMA, we can examine a large number of possible determinants of wealth inequality within a unifying framework. Therefore, we examine how different economic, financial, regulatory, political, social, and institutional variables affect wealth inequality.

Using our global sample, addressing endogeneity issues and subjecting our results to a number of robustness checks, we find that only a handful variables are robustly related to wealth inequality. Our results suggest that cross-country differences in wealth inequality arise due to a combination of the effects stemming from the financial sector, globalization, education, advances in agriculture and government redistribution. More specifically, our baseline estimation shows that there are seven regressors with PIP values greater than 50%, and they explain approximately half of the cross-country differences in wealth inequality.

We find that finance plays an important role in wealth inequality. Out of seven aforementioned variables that are robustly related to wealth inequality, three of them capture the level of financial development. According to our results, finance exerts a complex effect on wealth inequality. Some financial characteristics increase inequality, whereas other financial characteristics, to the contrary, decrease it.

Our results show that large financial markets (as proxied by the stock market capitalization and size of debt securities market type of variables) are associated with greater wealth inequality. This result follows from the composition effect, as it is typically rich households that participate in the stock markets (Kuhn et al., 2017). On the other hand, our findings show that countries with better access to finance and more efficient financial intermediaries exhibit lower wealth inequality. Therefore, there is no natural tendency that financial development results into greater wealth inequality. On the contrary, when we

take the average values of financial development measures, the overall effect of finance development on wealth inequality is negative (i.e., more financially developed countries associated with lower level of wealth inequality).

In addition, our results show that more education and greater income redistribution are associated with lower level of wealth inequality. Therefore, this result broadly suggest that governments can affect the inequality within their countries (either via education or taxation). In addition, we also find that (the lack of) political stability influences wealth inequality, as our results show that countries with war experience exhibit greater inequality. Finally, our results suggest that globalization but not technological development is likely to contribute to greater wealth inequality.

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Appendix

3.A Additional results and robustness checks

Table 3.7: Dependent variable - average Gini index (wealth) 2010-2016, 73 observations, UIP parameter prior

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Financial institutions efficiency	0.99	-0.36999	0.12386
Value added in agriculture	0.99	-0.56485	0.18154
Access to financial institutions	0.98	-0.44382	0.16204
Financial market development	0.84	0.44193	0.23922
Outward orientation	0.78	0.21853	0.14535
Education index (UN)	0.58	-0.23984	0.24290
Redistribution	0.38	-0.10095	0.15101
Economic freedom index (adjusted)	0.32	-0.10501	0.18144
Net national savings	0.30	0.07686	0.13764
Number of war years	0.23	0.03833	0.08335
Natural resource rents	0.22	0.04549	0.10083
Financial institutions development	0.20	0.10354	0.23661
Net foreign direct investment	0.19	-0.03276	0.08044
Latin America dummy	0.09	0.01404	0.05849
Population density	0.08	-0.01162	0.05108
Average GDP growth	0.08	-0.00950	0.04338
Labor market regulation	0.06	0.00671	0.03585
Population growth	0.06	0.00788	0.04715
Inflation	0.06	0.00568	0.03341
GDP level in 1990	0.06	-0.01404	0.08467
Technological progress	0.05	-0.01188	0.07248
Financial development index (EFW)	0.05	-0.00641	0.04430
Financial markets efficiency	0.05	-0.00499	0.03332
Leftwing orientation	0.05	-0.00400	0.02612
Government expenditures	0.05	0.00463	0.03646
Banking diversification	0.04	-0.00316	0.02370
Value added in industry	0.04	0.00229	0.03279
Life expectancy	0.03	-0.00160	0.03867
Active banking restrictions	0.03	-0.00213	0.02262
Revolutions and coups	0.03	0.00178	0.02012
Financial openness (Chinn-Ito)	0.03	-0.00137	0.02553
Rule of law	0.03	0.00093	0.03789
Civ. liberties and pol. rights	0.03	-0.00131	0.02953
Bank capital regulations	0.03	-0.00131	0.01725
Public education expenditures	0.03	0.00113	0.01817
Business conditions	0.03	-0.00000	0.01732
Labor force participation	0.02	0.00028	0.01376

Table 3.8: Dependent variable - average Gini index (wealth) 2010-2016, 73 observations, dilution model prior

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Financial institutions efficiency	0.93	-0.29559	0.14058
Access to financial institutions	0.88	-0.35265	0.19165
Financial market development	0.85	0.38321	0.21129
Value added in agriculture	0.81	-0.37066	0.23301
Outward orientation	0.66	0.15971	0.14225
Number of war years	0.41	0.06813	0.10412
Net national savings	0.40	0.10489	0.15200
Net foreign direct investment	0.40	-0.06582	0.10158
Education index (UN)	0.33	-0.12682	0.20519
Natural resource rents	0.32	0.06267	0.11045
Redistribution	0.32	-0.08372	0.14239
Latin America dummy	0.25	0.04844	0.10292
Average GDP growth	0.20	-0.02656	0.07126
Value added in industry	0.15	0.03229	0.09069
Financial institutions development	0.14	0.06411	0.17325
Labor market regulation	0.12	0.01228	0.04752
Leftwing orientation	0.11	-0.00800	0.03714
Economic freedom index (adjusted)	0.11	-0.03180	0.10542
Inflation	0.10	0.01006	0.04385
Population density	0.09	-0.00999	0.04676
Banking diversification	0.09	-0.00557	0.03201
Financial development index (EFW)	0.08	-0.01339	0.05852
Bank capital regulations	0.06	-0.00114	0.02308
Labor force participation	0.06	-0.00002	0.02089
Public education expenditures	0.05	0.00208	0.02499
Revolutions and coups	0.05	0.00270	0.02436
Government expenditures	0.04	0.00506	0.03702
Financial markets efficiency	0.04	-0.00350	0.02844
Population growth	0.04	0.00542	0.04010
Active banking restrictions	0.03	-0.00191	0.02272
Financial openness (Chinn-Ito)	0.03	-0.00266	0.02558
Business conditions	0.03	0.00043	0.01735
Civ. liberties and pol. rights	0.01	0.00054	0.01473
Life expectancy	0.00	-0.00069	0.01508
Technological progress	0.00	-0.00099	0.02030
GDP level in 1990	0.00	-0.00102	0.02294
Rule of law	0.00	-0.00013	0.00744

Table 3.9: Dependent variable - average Gini index (wealth) 2010-2016, 73 observations, relative redistribution measure

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Value added in agriculture	1.00	-0.51152	0.15591
Financial institutions efficiency	0.99	-0.28741	0.11147
Access to financial institutions	0.98	-0.34837	0.15459
Redistribution (rel.)	0.95	-0.27535	0.14043
Outward orientation	0.94	0.23308	0.11250
Financial market depth	0.81	0.34002	0.21938
Education index (UN)	0.72	-0.22528	0.20282
Number of war years	0.59	0.08973	0.10332
Economic freedom index (adjusted)	0.36	-0.08389	0.15606
Labour market regulation	0.32	0.03829	0.07734
Natural resources rents	0.28	0.04065	0.08833
Financial institutions depth	0.28	0.10702	0.21832
Average GDP growth	0.28	-0.03598	0.07976
Rule of law	0.26	0.07442	0.17734
Leftwing orientation	0.22	-0.02359	0.06261
Net foreign direct investment	0.20	-0.02042	0.05956
Net national savings	0.20	0.02747	0.08091
Government expenditures	0.16	0.01994	0.06646
Bank capital regulations	0.11	-0.00826	0.03810
Population density	0.10	-0.00737	0.03893
Civ. liberties and Pol. rights	0.09	-0.00684	0.05487
Business conditions	0.09	-0.00679	0.03889
GDP level in 1990	0.09	-0.00754	0.08113
Public education expenditures	0.09	0.00452	0.03209
Financial openness (Chinn-Ito)	0.08	0.00371	0.04077
Banking diversification	0.08	-0.00453	0.02891
Financial liberalization (EFW)	0.08	-0.00225	0.04299
Active banking restrictions	0.08	-0.00396	0.03201
Latin America dummy	0.07	0.00613	0.08853
Technological progress	0.07	-0.00810	0.06770
Financial markets efficiency	0.06	-0.00027	0.03059
Inflation	0.06	0.00238	0.02706
Labour force participation	0.06	0.00036	0.02077
Life expectancy	0.06	0.00055	0.04579
Population growth	0.06	0.00076	0.03609
Value added in industry	0.05	-0.00063	0.02761
Revolutions and coups	0.05	0.00069	0.02121

Table 3.10: Dependent variable - average Gini index (wealth) 2010-2016, specific financial indicators as proxies for financial development, 73 observations, dilution model prior

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Outward orientation	1.00	0.30288	0.09493
Value added in agriculture	1.00	-0.46969	0.16524
Number of war years	1.00	0.23140	0.09211
Bank branches/1000 inh.	0.99	-0.23286	0.10392
Redistribution	0.96	-0.27204	0.13368
Private credit	0.80	0.26709	0.20234
Average GDP growth	0.72	-0.12719	0.11806
Net interest margin	0.71	0.26047	0.23046
Business conditions	0.63	-0.16526	0.17583
Inflation	0.52	0.08140	0.10963
Education index (UN)	0.43	-0.09997	0.16364
Economic freedom index (adjusted)	0.38	-0.11007	0.18830
Leftwing orientation	0.26	-0.02542	0.06428
Labor market regulation	0.17	0.01351	0.04931
Rule of law	0.17	0.02859	0.11191
Net national savings	0.16	0.01665	0.06290
Natural resource rents	0.16	0.01609	0.06250
Bank Z-score	0.15	0.01193	0.04857
Latin America dummy	0.13	0.01040	0.05422
Banking diversification	0.12	-0.00670	0.03591
Market capitalization	0.11	0.00106	0.04334
Market turnover	0.11	0.00559	0.03372
Civ. liberties and pol. rights	0.11	0.00419	0.05246
Value added in industry	0.11	0.00610	0.04528
Population growth	0.11	0.00659	0.05385
Life expectancy	0.10	-0.00578	0.06521
Technological progress	0.10	0.00530	0.08492
Financial development index (EFW)	0.10	0.00203	0.05079
Net foreign direct investment	0.10	-0.00504	0.03344
GDP level in 1990	0.10	0.00277	0.08595
Financial openness (Chinn-Ito)	0.09	0.00422	0.04314
Public education expenditures	0.09	0.00437	0.03492
Government expenditures	0.09	0.00648	0.04413
Loan-to-deposits	0.09	0.00400	0.03650
Revolutions and coups	0.09	0.00307	0.03130
Active banking restrictions	0.08	0.00076	0.03139
Bank capital regulations	0.08	-0.00113	0.02484
Population density	0.07	0.00112	0.02579
Labor force participation	0.07	-0.00105	0.02323

Table 3.11: Top 3 models according to their posterior mode probabilities

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Access to financial institutions	1	1	1
Value added in agriculture	1	1	1
Financial institutions efficiency	1	1	1
Outward orientation	1	1	1
Financial market depth	1	1	1
Education index (UN)	1	1	1
War years	1	1	1
Redistribution	1	0	1
Average GDP growth	0	0	1

Note: 1 marks inclusion of the variable in the model, whereas 0 suggests otherwise. The variables not listed were not included in neither of the models.

Table 3.12: Group posterior inclusion probabilities

Group	PIP
Financial	1.00
Economic	1.00
Political	0.85
Institutional	0.70
Geographical	0.65
Regulatory	0.34

Table 3.13: Output of the ordinary least squares specifications, dependent variable GiniWealth

	(1)	(2)
Access to financial institutions	−0.376*** (0.140)	−0.411*** (0.140)
Value added in agriculture	−0.637*** (0.141)	−0.626*** (0.143)
Financial institutions efficiency	−0.356*** (0.100)	−0.377*** (0.100)
Outward orientation	0.319*** (0.086)	0.320*** (0.087)
Financial markets depth	0.470*** (0.124)	0.522*** (0.121)
Education index	−0.388** (0.157)	−0.413** (0.158)
Number of war years	0.146 (0.091)	
Redistribution	−0.213* (0.114)	−0.230* (0.115)
Observations	73	73
R ²	0.574	0.556
Adjusted R ²	0.520	0.509
Residual Std. Error	0.693 (df = 64)	0.701 (df = 65)
F Statistic	10.761*** (df = 8; 64)	11.645*** (df = 7; 65)

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. The specification of the model (1) corresponds to the model with the highest posterior model probability, whereas the model (2) contains the regressors with $PIP > 0.5$ in the baseline BMA estimation.

3.B Data description

Table 3.14: List of countries

Argentina	India	Peru
Armenia	Ireland	Philippines
Australia	Israel	Poland
Austria	Italy	Portugal
Bangladesh	Jordan	Russia
Bolivia	Kenya	Singapore
Botswana	Korea, South	Slovakia
Brazil	Kyrgyzstan	Slovenia
Bulgaria	Latvia	South Africa
Canada	Lithuania	Spain
Colombia	Macedonia	Sri Lanka
Costa Rica	Malawi	Sweden
Croatia	Malaysia	Switzerland
Czech Republic	Mauritius	Tanzania
Ecuador	Mexico	Thailand
Egypt	Moldova	Tunisia
Estonia	Morocco	Turkey
Finland	Nepal	Uganda
France	Netherlands	Ukraine
Germany	New Zealand	United Kingdom
Ghana	Nigeria	United States
Greece	Norway	Uruguay
Hungary	Pakistan	Venezuela
Chile	Panama	
Iceland	Paraguay	

Table 3.15: Explanatory Variables Sorted into Groups

GROUP	VARIABLES
Economic	Value added in agriculture Value added in industry Outward orientation Redistribution Net national savings Net foreign direct investment Average GDP growth GDP level in 1990 Inflation Government expenditures Public education expenditures Technological progress Labor force participation
Financial	Financial institutions efficiency Access to financial institutions Financial market development Financial institutions development Financial markets efficiency
Political	Number of war years Leftwing orientation Revolutions and coups Civ. liberties and pol. rights
Institutional	Education index (UN) Economic freedom index (adjusted) Rule of law
Regulatory	Labor market regulation Banking diversification Active banking restrictions Bank capital regulations Financial openness (Chinn-Ito) Business conditions Financial liberalization index (EFW)
Geographical / natural	Natural resource rents Population density Latin America dummy Population growth Life expectancy

Table 3.16: Descriptive statistics

	Min.	Mean	Max.	Std.dev.
Access to financial institutions	0.02	0.36	0.96	0.26
Active banking restrictions	3.75	7.20	11.00	1.59
Average GDP growth	-0.02	0.02	0.06	0.01
Bank capital regulations	2.00	6.64	10.00	1.61
Banking diversification	0.00	1.32	2.00	0.46
Business conditions	-0.66	-0.28	1.53	0.36
Civ. liberties and Pol. rights	1.00	2.88	5.41	1.42
Economic freedom index (adjusted)	0.48	0.70	0.89	0.10
Education index (UN)	0.27	0.63	0.89	0.15
Financial institutions depth	0.02	0.31	0.86	0.24
Financial institutions efficiency	0.28	0.58	0.76	0.12
Financial liberalization (EFW)	4.01	7.34	9.49	1.52
Financial market depth	0.00	0.22	0.73	0.20
Financial markets efficiency	0.01	0.35	0.95	0.26
Financial openness (Chinn-Ito)	-1.47	0.41	2.39	1.26
GDP level in 1990	6.69	9.00	10.57	1.02
Government expenditures	4.75	16.14	27.48	4.63
Inflation	1.93	46.70	466.21	101.75
Labour force participation	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Labour market regulation	0.46	1.67	2.78	0.51
Latin America dummy	0.00	0.18	1.00	0.39
Leftwing orientation	0.00	8.81	30.00	8.37
Life expectancy	45.51	68.88	78.04	7.86
Natural resources rents	0.00	3.49	31.66	5.30
Net foreign direct investment	0.09	2.95	12.56	2.42
Net national savings	-8.54	8.85	30.00	6.51
Number of war years	0.00	2.38	21.00	4.57
Outward orientation	-0.33	-0.03	0.19	0.08
Population density	2.22	164.99	4547.96	536.87
Population growth	-0.57	1.24	3.62	1.04
Public education expenditures	1.24	4.27	11.18	1.54
Redistribution	-3.40	9.41	22.37	7.07
Revolutions and coups	0.00	2.40	23.00	4.51
Rule of law	-1.23	0.39	1.96	0.95
Technological progress	-1.32	0.37	1.29	0.66
Value added in agriculture	0.41	12.26	45.27	11.79
Value added in industry	16.15	30.71	51.29	6.79

Table 3.17: List of variables

Variable	Definition (+ optional comments)	Source
GiniWealth	Gini index based on the distribution of wealth from Credit Suisse Wealth Reports 2010-2016	Credit Suisse
FIA	Access to financial institutions	Svirydzenka (2016)
FID	Financial institutions depth	Svirydzenka (2016)
FIE	Financial institutions efficiency	Svirydzenka (2016)
FMD	Financial markets depth	Svirydzenka (2016)
FME	Financial markets efficiency	Svirydzenka (2016)
GDP90	Level of GDP per capita in 1990	PWT (9.0)
NatRes	Total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. Average 1980-2009	WB
PopGrowth	Annual population growth 1980-2009	WB
GovExp	General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption). Average 1980-2009	WB
NNSavings	Net national savings (gross national savings less the value of consumption of fixed capital, % GNI). Average 1980-2009	WB
EducExp	Education expenditure refers to the current operating expenditures in education, including wages and salaries and excluding capital investments in buildings and equipment. Average 1980-2009.	WB
Infl	Inflation as measured by the consumer price index. Average 1980-2009.	WB
VAA	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing value added (% GDP). Average 1980-2009.	WB
VAI	Industry value added (% GDP). Average 1980-2009.	WB
StartBussC	Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita). Average 1980-2009	WB
StartBussT	Time required to start a business (days). Average 1980-2009	WB
GFCF	Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP). Average 1980-2009	WB
NetFDI	Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). Average 1980-2009	WB
Ygrowth	Annual growth of GDP. Average 1980-2009	PWT 9.0
LifeExp90	Life expectancy at birth in 1990	WB

LabForce90	Total labor force comprises people ages 15 and older who meet the International Labor Organization definition of the economically active population: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. Labor force total, 1990. Not available before 1990.	WB
PopDens90	Population density (people per sq. km of land area) in 1990.	WB
RevCoups	Revolutions and coups, total instances between 1950 and 2010	Powell and Thyne (2011)
EthnoLfrac	Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The most detailed/disaggregated fractionalization measure (ELF.15 in the original paper) is assumed as it is found most relevant to growth and has highest correlation with other fractionalization measure by Alesina et al. (2003)	Desmet et al. (2009)
WarYears	Number of war years (including civil wars) between 1946-2009 as defined in the UCDP dataset (more than 1000 casualties within a year)	UCDP/PRIO data
RuleOfLaw	Rule of law 1970-2009 (<i>alternatively WB has data 1996-2014</i>)	Fraser institute
CivLib	Civil liberties 1973-2009	Freedom House
PolRights	Political rights 1973-2009	Freedom House
OutwardO	Measure of outward orientation derived as Net exports/GDP (<i>previously based on data 1950-1983</i>)	PWT 9.0
LatAm	1 for Latin American countries	
ChinnIto	Chinn-Ito index of financial openness. Average 1980-2010.	Chinn-Ito
LeftWing	Number of years between 1980 and 2009 when left oriented party lead the country.	DPI
ActivRestrict	Activity restrictions. Regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce.	Barth et al. (2013)
CapitalReg	Capital Regulatory index.	Barth et al. (2013)
DiversIndex	Whether there are explicit, verifiable, quantifiable guidelines for asset diversification and banks are allowed to make loans abroad.	Barth et al. (2013)
LAMRIG	Index capturing the rigidity of employment protection legislation	Campos & Nugent (2012)
Tech	Index on the level of technological development based on CHAT dataset	Comin & Hobijn (2009)

EducIndex	Calculated using mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling	UN
NetInterestMargin	Accounting value of banks' net interest revenue as a share of average interest-bearing assets; a measure of the efficiency of the banking sector.	GFDD
BankZScore	return on banks' assets plus the ratio of banks' equity and assets, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets $(ROA+equity/assets)/sd(ROA)$; a measure of stability of the banking sector	GFDD
Privatecredit	Domestic private credit to the real sector to GDP; a measure of the depth of the banking sector	GFDD
MarketCap	Value of listed shares to GDP; a measure of the depth of stock markets.	GFDD
MarketTurn	Stock market value traded to total market capitalization; a measure of the efficiency of stock markets.	GFDD
BankBranches	Number of bank branches per 100,000 adults	GFDD
Loan2Deposits	Loan-to-deposit ratio.	GFDD
Redist	Difference between market (pre-tax) and net (after-tax) Gini index based on distribution of income (The Standardized World Income Inequality Database).	Solt (2016)
FST	Genetic distance data (distance from the US)	Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009)
FinReform	Financial reform index by Abiad (2010)	Abiad et al. (2010)
FinLib	Averaged components of Economic Freedom of the World index 3D (freedom to own foreign currency accounts), 4C (black-market exchange rates), 4D (controls of the movement of capital and people), and 5A (credit market regulations).	Gwartney et al. (2017)

3.C Full detail on the BMA

First, consider the following linear model:

$$y = \alpha + X\beta + \varepsilon \quad \varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I) \quad (3.8)$$

where y represents a dependent variable, α is a constant, X is the matrix of explanatory variables, β represents the corresponding coefficients, and ε is a vector of normally distributed Independent Identically Distributed (IID) error terms with variance σ^2 .

BMA takes into consideration all possible combinations of X from equation 3.8 and takes a weighted average of the estimated coefficients. Even with a modest-sized regression model, the number of combinations rises dramatically, and even with current computers, it is impossible to estimate all regression models. For this reason, a subset of models is considered, and an MCMC sampler is employed (we discuss the sampler in detail below). The substructure of the model is as follows:

$$y = \alpha_i + X_i\beta_i + \varepsilon \quad \varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I) \quad (3.9)$$

X_i corresponds to a subset of X , and α_i and β_i are the corresponding coefficients. If the number of regressors is K , the total number of models equals 2^K , and $i \in [1, 2^K]$.

Bayes' rule implies that

$$p(\beta|y, X) = \frac{p(y, X|\beta)p(\beta)}{p(y, X)} \quad (3.10)$$

where $p(\beta|y, X)$ is the posterior density, $p(y, X|\beta)$ is the marginal likelihood (ML), $p(\beta)$ is the prior density, and $p(y, X)$ is the probability of the data.

The individual regression models are denoted as M_1, \dots, M_i . In the case of K regressors, there are M_1, \dots, M_i regression models, where $i \in [1, 2^K]$. The model is formed using a likelihood function and a prior density, where M_i depends on the parameters β_i , with a posterior probability to be derived in the following manner:

$$p(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) = \frac{p(y|\beta_i, M_i, X)p(\beta_i|M_i)}{p(y|M_i, X)} \quad (3.11)$$

Next, we describe the averaging principle of BMA and individual components of equation 3.10.

Posterior Model Probability

The PMP provides the weights for averaging model parameters across the individual models. The PMP also arises from Bayes' theorem:

$$p(M_i|y, X) = \frac{p(y|M_i, X)p(M_i)}{p(y|X)} \quad (3.12)$$

where $p(y|M_i, X)$ is the ML of the model (i.e., the probability of the data given the model M_i), $p(M_i)$ is the prior model probability, and $p(y|X)$ is the integrated likelihood. The term in the denominator is typically disregarded because it is constant across all models under consideration. The PMP then becomes directly proportional to ML and the prior probability. The prior probability $p(M_i \propto 1)$ is typically set to acknowledge that the 'true' model is unknown.

$$p(M_i|y, X) \propto p(y|M_i, X)p(M_i) \quad (3.13)$$

We discuss the calculation of ML in detail in Subsection 3.C. Researchers must set the model prior to reflect the beliefs regarding the data before inspecting them.

Posterior Mean

The parameter point estimates are derived within the Bayesian framework as follows. Zeugner (2011) and Moral-Benito (2012) show that the weighted posterior distribution of any statistic (most notably the β coefficients) is obtained as follows:

$$p(\beta|y, X) = \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} p(\beta_i|M_i, y, X)p(M_i|y, X) \quad (3.14)$$

where $p(M_i|y, X)$ is the PMP of the corresponding model M_i from equation 3.12. The point estimates are obtained by taking expectations:

$$E(\beta|y, X) = \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} E(\beta_i|M_i, y, X)p(M_i|y, X) \quad (3.15)$$

$E(\beta|y, X)$ represents the average coefficient, and $E(\beta|M_i, y, X)$ is the estimate of the β_i coefficients from model M_i . The posterior distribution of the coefficients depends on the choice of the prior g . Zeugner (2011) expresses the expected value of the parameter in M_i as follows:

$$E(\beta_i|y, X, g, M_i) = \frac{g}{1+g} \hat{\beta}_i \quad (3.16)$$

with $\hat{\beta}_i$ corresponding to the standard OLS estimate.

Posterior Variance

Moral-Benito (2012) provides a formula for the variance corresponding to the expected values of the coefficients derived in the previous subsection:

$$\begin{aligned} Var(\beta|y, X) &= \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} p(M_i|y, X) Var(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) \\ &+ \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} p(M_i|y, X) (E(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) - E(\beta|y, X))^2 \end{aligned} \quad (3.17)$$

The variance consists of two terms: the weighted average of variance estimates across different models $Var(\beta_i|M_i, y, X)$ and the weighted variance across different models in the second component $E(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) - E(\beta|y, X)$. $E(\beta|y, X)$ represents the posterior mean from equation 3.15. As a result, BMA accounts for uncertainty regarding the parameter estimates that arise due to differences across models in addition to the uncertainty of individual models. Zeugner (2011) derives how the value of the prior g affects the posterior variance of the parameters:

$$Cov(\beta_i|y, X, g, M_i) = \frac{(y - \bar{y})'(y - \bar{y})}{N - 3} \frac{g}{1 + g} \left(1 - \frac{g}{1 + g} R_i^2 \right) (X_i' X_i)^{-1} \quad (3.18)$$

where \bar{y} denotes the mean of vector y , N is the sample size, and R_i^2 is the R-squared value corresponding to the model i .

Marginal Likelihood

ML can be calculated using equation 3.11 for each model M_i . Both sides of the equation must be integrated with respect to β_i . Employing $\int_{\beta} p(\beta_i|M_i, y, X) d\beta_i = 1$, it follows that

$$p(y|M_i, X) = \int_{\beta} p(y|\beta_i, M_i, X) p(\beta_i|M_i, X) d\beta_i \quad (3.19)$$

The above equation illustrates the general textbook derivation, but the computation depends on the elicited priors. Zeugner (2011) employs the ‘‘Zellner’s g prior’’ structure, which we also utilize in this paper. The ML for a single model

can then be expressed using the prior as in Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009):

$$p(y|M_i, X, g) = \int_0^\infty \int_\beta p(y|\beta_i, \sigma^2, M_i) p(\beta_i, \sigma^2|g) d\beta d\sigma \quad (3.20)$$

Furthermore, Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009) show that ML is in this case simply proportional to

$$p(y|M_i, X, g) \propto (y - \bar{y})'(y - \bar{y})^{-\frac{N-1}{2}} (1+g)^{-\frac{k_i}{2}} \left(1 - \frac{g}{1+g} R_i^2\right)^{-\frac{N-1}{2}} \quad (3.21)$$

In this equation, R_i^2 is the R-squared of model M_i , and k_i is the number of explanatory variables in model i introduced to include a size penalty for the model. N and \bar{y} are the same as in equation 3.18, i.e., the number of observations and the mean of vector y , respectively.

Posterior Inclusion Probability

The standard BMA framework provides the PIP, which indicates the probability that a particular regressor is included in the “true” model. The PIP is the sum of the PMPs of the models including the variable k :

$$PIP = p(\beta_k \neq 0|y, X) = \sum_{i=1}^{2^K} p(M_i|\beta_k \neq 0, y, X) \quad (3.22)$$

MCMC Sampler

One of the limitations of BMA is its computational difficulty when the number of potential regressors K becomes very large. Historically, the computational burden has been the primary factor preventing researchers from employing Bayesian methods. Zeugner (2011) notes that for small models, it is possible to enumerate all variable combinations. However, when $K > 25$, it becomes impossible to evaluate the entire model space within a reasonable time frame. In such cases, BMA utilizes MC³ samplers to approximate the crucial part of the posterior model distribution containing the most likely models. BMA applies the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, which is outlined in Zeugner (2011) as follows:

At any step i , the sampler is currently at model M_i , having PMP $p(M_i|y, X)$. In the next step $i+1$, model M_j is proposed to replace M_i . The sampler accepts

the new model M_j with the following probability:

$$p_{i,j} = \min \left(1, \frac{p(M_j|y, X)}{p(M_i|y, X)} \right) \quad (3.23)$$

If model M_j is rejected, the next model M_k is suggested and compared with M_i . With an increasing number of iterations, the number of times each model is retained converges to the distribution of posterior model probabilities. Typically, one of the following MC³ samplers is used to construct the models:

- Birth-death sampler - randomly chooses one of the explanatory variables, which is included if it is not already part of the current model M_i or dropped if it is already in M_i .
- Reversible-jump sampler - with 50% probability, the birth-death sampler is used to determine the next candidate model. With 50% probability, the sampler randomly swaps one of the covariates in M_i for a covariate previously excluded from M_i .

Because the sampler can begin with a “poor” model with low PMP, the pre-defined number of initial draws, the so-called burn-ins, are usually dropped. The quality of the approximation can be evaluated on the basis of the correlation between the PMP derived from an analytical approach and those obtained from the MC³ sampler. It depends on the number of iterations (draws) and the likelihood of the initially selected model. Zeugner (2011) notes that a PMP correlation of approximately 0.9 indicates a “good degree of convergence”. In the event that the correlation is lower, the number of sampler iterations should be increased.

Chapter 4

Finance and Inequality - panel BMA approach

Abstract

We investigate the impact of financial development on income inequality differentiating between depth, efficiency and access to financial markets and institutions. We apply panel Bayesian model averaging framework to address model uncertainty to reveal that financial development has a complex relationship with the income distribution within countries. The access to and efficiency of banking decrease income inequality. The size of the markets has no relevance for overall income inequality but relates to the higher top income shares. Moreover, unemployment, along with investment into non-tangible assets increase income inequality while more redistribution implies lower levels of inequality.

4.1 Introduction

Financial development alters how much the economic opportunities depend on the individual skills, family endowments, social status or political connections as individual may depend on financial system to provide loans to start new business, attain education, or temporarily fund their consumption. The research in the area of financial development and income inequality is well established. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009), Claessens and Perotti (2007), and more recently de Haan and Sturm (2017) provide broad reviews of the topic. A similar theme emerges, noting that the implications from theoretical contributions provide conflicting predictions about the relationship. The empirical results then bring evidence for both positive and negative effect. Although the majority of the research points towards finance tightening the distribution of income, this result is not universal with some papers suggesting the opposite while other stress potential non-linearities.

A fundamental divide appears between the effect of financial development on the extensive and intensive margin. The extensive margin captures the extent to which individuals, who had not been using financial services before, gain access. On the other hand, the intensive margin describes the growing use of finance by the agents who had already been using it before (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2009). Financial development on the extensive margin might lead to more equal opportunities and outcomes. Access to credit by previously disadvantaged groups allows human capital accumulation (Braun et al., 2019; Galor & Moav, 2004; Galor & Zeira, 1993) as well as formation and growth of new firms (Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Evans & Jovanovic, 1989), with more evenly distributed economic opportunities as a result¹.

On the contrary, the intensive margin of financial development might disproportionately benefit the rich who may leverage financial services for their further benefit or to protect their existing rents. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) present a model where the finance is the key driver of inequality and the welfare gains accrued by the incumbents - primarily the rich - in the initial development stage. With time, more agents meet the fixed costs of joining the financial intermediaries, and they enjoy higher returns. Consequently, the efficiency of resource allocation also increases, which enhances growth and reduces

¹Having similar economic opportunities might decrease the cross-generational inequality, by diminishing the effect of, e.g. parental wealth. Depending on the innate abilities and talents of the individuals, however, it may increase the inequality of income within every generation at the same time.

inequality. Perotti and Volpin (2007) present a framework based on political economy. Their argument depends on a lobby for lower investor protection to prevent entrance of the new competitors. The politicians require higher bribe from the lobbyist the greater is their accountability for policy decisions. Thus, with increasing accountability, investor protection strengthens and spurs market entry and competition. The authors examine their prediction in a cross-section and show that better investor protection correlates with larger entry rates and higher firm density in more financially intensive sectors².

Financial development may also have an indirect effect on income inequality through economic growth. Townsend and Ueda (2006) model how finance interacts with production and allocation of credit. If increased use of finance increases the demand for low- relatively to the high-skilled workers, then it may have equalizing consequences for income distribution. Empirical evidence by Beck et al. (2010) shows that bank deregulation and increased competition in loan provision in the US primarily benefited the workers with income below the median. Similarly, Delis et al. (2014) provide evidence of bank deregulation and liberalization tightening the income distribution, although this effect is only present in countries with high-quality institutions. They attribute the effect to the changes in labour market conditions and relatively higher wages and working hours of the low-skilled workers following the reforms.

A set of distinct papers explores the relationship between inequality and growth while stressing financial market imperfections in driving the outcomes. Income inequality and growth may intersect through varying channels. Accumulation of savings, unobservable effort, and investment project size favour the prediction of growth-inducing inequality. The negative impact of inequality on human capital accumulation and entrepreneurial activity provides an argument for the opposing view. Van der Weide and Milanovic (2018) report how income inequality in the US has different implications for the future income growth of the rich and the poor. High inequality seems to hurt the prospects of the poor while the top of the distribution is unaffected. The rich thus disproportionately benefit from higher inequality as their subsequent income exhibits faster growth. The authors attribute this effect to the political channel where the rich use to lobby in favor of the policies which support their economic interests. Preferences of the rich are ultimately more likely to determine public

²In addition, they demonstrate that the most important factor of accountability is not the formal measure of democratic institutions, but newspaper readership which they interpret as broad awareness of policy choices and their outcomes.

policy than the preferences of the majority (Gilens & Page, 2014). High inequality together with a credit constraint and rich driving the political process results in low government spending and lasting inequality.

The literature does not converge on the conclusions even in the empirical cross-country and panel data studies. The papers link higher levels of financial development with lower levels of inequality (Beck et al., 2007; Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot, 2011; Hamori & Hashiguchi, 2012; Kunieda et al., 2014)³. On the other hand, several other estimate an inequality inducing effect of finance (de Haan & Sturm, 2017; Jauch & Watzka, 2016; Jaumotte et al., 2013). Finally, some authors claim that the relationship might be non-linear, conditional on a threshold value of financial development (Kim & Lin, 2011; Tan & Law, 2012) or institutional quality (Delis et al., 2014; Law & Singh, 2014).

The contribution of the paper is fourfold. First, we efficiently account for model uncertainty relying on the panel BMA framework. Second, we use the WID data on the top income shares, collected based on the tax collection data. Arguably, the data is superior to the income surveys as it amends issues of underrepresentation of high-income individuals and underreporting income. Third, we simultaneously consider different proxies of financial development to identify the most relevant channels through which finance affects inequality and. Fourth, we examine multiple measures of income inequality to distinguish the diverse effects of finance across the income distribution.

Three papers are the closest to ours, each in a different respects. First, de Haan and Sturm (2017) examine different dimensions of finance on income inequality. Their results suggest that financial development, financial liberalization, and banking crises all increase pre-tax income inequality within countries. Additionally, they show that the effect of financial liberalization is conditional on democratic accountability. Higher accountability mitigates the impact of liberalization on inequality. On the contrary, the financial development, proxied by the credit to GDP ratio, has inequality increasing effect irrespective of the institutional background. Second, Naceur and Zhang (2016) take a similar approach in considering multiple dimensions — the access, efficiency, and stability — of the financial sector when studying determinants of inequality and poverty, but they do not attempt to consider the indicators simultaneously. Third, Furceri and Ostry (2019) apply Weighted-average Least Squares (WALS) to identify robust determinants of income inequality. Their approach mirrors ours in accounting for model uncertainty in the estimation, but their focus is

³For an extended list, we refer to de Haan and Sturm (2017).

more general rather than focused primarily on finance. We provide a synthesis and a natural extension to these papers by offering more detail on how finance in shapes income inequality. On top of that, we examine multiple measures of inequality while specifically identifying the determinants of top income shares along with the determinants of the overall income distribution.

The chapter continues with a description of the data and methodology in Section 4.2. We then provide two sets of results in Section 4.3. We employ the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality in one and income shares of top decile and percentile in the other. Section 4.4 provides robustness checks of the results and Section 4.5 concludes.

4.2 Data and methodology

The key variable in the paper is the measure of income inequality. We want to examine how financial development affects income inequality and whether the effect might be different at the top quantiles of the income distribution. As the overall measure of income inequality, we rely upon the after-tax Gini coefficient from SWIID by Solt (2019), which is a standard resource in the literature⁴. Its critical advantage lies in the widespread coverage across countries and time and a unified methodology which provides a reasonable level of comparability. It typically takes values in the interval between 0 and 100 where the former suggests perfect equality (everyone in the economy enjoys the same income) and the latter perfect inequality (all the income goes to only a single unit). We depart from existing papers slightly in considering the after-tax rather than the before-tax income distribution as the dependent variable. We choose the after-tax income Gini coefficient as we also include the proxy of redistribution among the regressors to account for taxation and transfers indirectly. Since we define redistribution as a difference between before-tax and after-tax Gini coefficients, the estimate is not substantially influenced by using either of the two as the dependent variable⁵. In our case, using after-tax allows for convenient interpretation.

⁴There are alternative sources of for Gini coefficient, e.g. World Income Inequality Database (WIID) or Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), but each of them brings limitations in terms of comparability or coverage.

⁵Furceri and Ostry (2019) make a similar argument that unless redistribution is systematically correlated with other regressors, their effect on the net and gross inequality should be same. As a robustness check, we also ran the estimation with before-tax Gini coefficient, and the single qualitative difference is only the sign of the posterior mean of redistribution coefficient.

To explore the relationship in the top part of the distribution, we choose top income shares from the WID⁶. The surveys suffer from well-known issues of underrepresentation of the top income earners and the distortions resulting from the self-reported character of the data. This can influence not only the top income shares originating from the survey data, but it may also distort the overall measures of inequality. The data in WID make use of income tax records in individual countries and the derived shares obtained using the consistent methodology of Distributional National Accounts (DINA) are arguably more reliable relative to the survey-based measures which are the primary source of majority estimates of income distributions.

The data spans from 2000 to 2014. We follow the literature (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; de Haan & Sturm, 2017) and average both the inequality measure (dependent variable) and the potential determinants (independent variables) across 3-year intervals. There are important reasons for looking at the averages than observation in individual years. Annual macroeconomic data are subject to fluctuations, and the data on income inequality is noisy (Delis et al., 2014). Averaging should diminish the level of noise. On the top of that, the variables at the centre of our analysis, e.g. stock market capitalization or credit to GDP, are likely to be affected by the business cycles and volatile on a yearly basis. A similar argument holds for top income shares, as they depend, among other things, on the bonuses paid out each year as well as capital income. We want to explore the long-term rather than the short-term relationship and that guides the choice of averaged data. Faced against the trade-off between the length of the averaging periods and available observations in the time dimension, we take a compromise of three years in contrast to the literature, where the 5-year intervals generally apply. The availability of financial development indicators limits the analysis to a period from 2000 onward, and we prefer to keep at least five unique time periods to just three under the case of 5-year average⁷. Two reasons further support this decision. First, the 3-year models display much better convergence which we grant to more available observations and higher variation in the 3-year averaged data. Second, more periods allow for a more robust estimate when we lag the explanatory variables in order to address endogeneity in one of the robustness checks.

⁶The methodology and guidelines to database are provided by Alvaredo et al. (2016).

⁷Nevertheless, we run the estimation with 5-year averages of data as a robustness check and find no critical qualitative differences compared to the baseline. The results are available in the Appendix of the paper

Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics of the income inequality variables and financial development indicators.

Table 4.1: Summary statistics of selected variables

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
After-tax Gini index	36.38	8.12	22.88	61.16
Top 10% income share	0.42	0.12	0.24	0.71
Top 1% income share	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.38
FIA	0.42	0.32	0.01	1.00
FIE	0.60	0.13	0.11	0.81
FID	0.37	0.30	0.01	1.00
FMD	0.33	0.32	0.00	0.99

Table 4.2: Correlation matrix of selected variables


After-tax Gini index	.						
Top 10% income share	0.47	.					
Top 1% income share	0.39	0.84	.				
FIA	-0.14	-0.09	-0.12	.			
FIE	-0.14	-0.10	-0.06	0.28	.		
FID	-0.07	0.12	0.06	0.60	0.24	.	
FMD	0.03	0.2	0.13	0.36	0.1	0.40	.

We obtain the financial development indicators from GFDD. The database offers detailed indicators along four dimensions of financial systems and allows to estimate the effect of changes in access, size, efficiency, and stability of financial markets. Furthermore, we can distinguish between the banking sector and financial markets in all these dimensions. The data for access and stability of stock markets remains sparse in the concerned period we must leave them out of the analysis. We use the version of financial indicators from Svirydzenka (2016). The authors make use of principal component analysis in order to construct aggregate indicators in each characteristic of the financial sector. In summary, we have indicators of financial institutions depth (FID), financial markets depth (FMD), access to financial institutions (FIA), the efficiency of financial markets (FME), and institutions (FIE)⁸. We report the composition of each indicator in Table 4.9.

We base the choice of other explanatory variables on the reviews of income inequality drivers (Nolan et al., 2019; Roine et al., 2009), a related study of

⁸Svirydzenka (2016) extrapolate the indicators from top to bottom if the original variables are unavailable, we make sure that at least one variable is available for the construction of the index and no artificial correlation introduced to the data.

Figure 4.1: Gini Coefficient and top shares



finance-inequality nexus (de Haan & Sturm, 2017), and a more general inquiry into the robust determinants of income inequality (Furceri & Ostry, 2019). The potential regressors could be categorized into several groups. They control for economic and financial development, demographics, globalization, and institutional background. Table 4.10 reports all the control variables and their sources.

Methodologically, we rely on the BMA approach, which conveniently addresses the issue of model uncertainty with a large number of potential regressors. The advantages and statistical properties of the BMA have been described in Koop (2003). In application to the panel data, we make use of Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem and demean all the variables using time averages for individual observations. Using the time-demeaned observations in the estimation is equivalent to the estimate using the dummy variables for individual cross-sectional units. The key assumptions in BMA are on parameter and model priors. For the parameter prior, we turn to so-called hyper- g prior. The prior provides more robust results than some other traditionally applied g priors such as UIP, BRIC (Feldkircher & Zeugner, 2012). As for the model priors, the baseline estimate relies on the uniform model prior. We choose the model before to remain agnostic about the prior probability of each examined model. While uniform prior assigns the same prior probability to each model, the distribution of the prior model space is concentrated around $k/2$, where k is the number of potential covariates, and it may consequentially gravitate towards larger model sizes and a higher number of covariates⁹.

⁹See Ley and Steel (2009) for details.

4.3 Results

We examine the determinants of inequality in the panel BMA framework and present the results in the following sections. We start with a model where we capture the overall inequality by Gini index in Subsection 4.3.1. We then continue to estimations where we consider the shares of income going to the top 10% and top 1% of the income distribution as our dependent variable. We check the robustness of our estimates by employing alternative model and parameter priors throughout the analysis.


4.3.1 Gini index of income distribution

We focus the analysis on the relationship between the indicators representing various aspects of financial development and income inequality. Figure 4.2 outlines the expected link after we have demeaned the variables using the cross-sectional averages. The relationship is not particularly strong, but we observe a negative correlation between Gini index and indicators of access and efficiency of financial institutions, as suggested by a linear estimate. For size indicators of financial market and institutions, the link appears much weaker.

Table 4.3 reports the baseline results. Overall, we have 16 variables with PIP above 0.8. The number of unique relevant regressors effectively shrinks by two if we abstract from the quadratic terms of the GDP per capita and the education index. Most of the estimated posterior means exhibit expected signs.

The only financial indicators which occur among the top regressors are access and efficiency of financial institutions with PIPs of 1 and 0.88, respectively. The posterior mean on the coefficients in both dimensions is negative, so higher levels of access and efficiency are associated with lower levels of income inequality. The inequality decreasing effect of access to finance on inequality mirrors Hasan et al. (2020) for wealth inequality, and partially also Furceri and Ostry (2019) and Naceur and Zhang (2016) who document similar effect. The observation on inequality decreasing effect of access to finance also supports Claessens and Perotti (2007) who suggest that access may equalize economic opportunities and lead to a more evenly distributed income as well as with theoretical predictions (Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Braun et al., 2019; Galor & Moav, 2004). The efficiency of financial intermediation putting downward pressure on income inequality also has a precedent in Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot

Figure 4.2: Gini Coefficient and Financial Development Indicators



(2011)¹⁰. We fail to confirm that the efficiency of financial institutions is a robust determinant of inequality; however, as the PIP markedly decreases under alternative model priors. None of the size indicators of financial institutions or markets has a high probability of inclusion.

Education expenditures (% share of GDP) along with the education index calculated using mean and expected years of schooling show inequality decreasing effect. It is in line with the prediction of Deaton (2013) and Goldin and Katz (2009) who claim that the skill-biased technological change should be mitigated by education. OECD (2011) finds similar evidence for a panel of advanced countries while Furceri and Ostry (2019) also suggest a negative relationship, although it is not entirely robust to variable and sample selection. The effect of education diminishes at the higher levels of schooling as the quadratic term has also high PIP and positive posterior mean.

¹⁰The authors measure the efficiency of the banking sector by the difference between the lending rate and the deposit rate (spread). They argue that higher spread reflects low competition and high transaction costs. The imperfections in the credit market can skew the credit to high-income, rich households who can provide significant collateral, reinforcing the existing inequality.

Table 4.3: BMA, baseline results. Dependent variable after-tax Gini index, 394 observations.

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Education expenditures	1.00	-0.14506	0.05042
GDP per capita	1.00	1.62811	0.56870
Unemployment	1.00	0.23629	0.05907
Non-equipment investment	1.00	0.14977	0.05285
Access to financial institutions	1.00	-0.24629	0.06342
Education index (UN)	1.00	-0.58853	0.23865
Redistribution	1.00	-0.22055	0.05051
Education index sq.	1.00	0.82252	0.22008
GDP per capita sq.	1.00	-1.44906	0.57565
Life expectancy	0.99	-0.22879	0.09750
Economic freedom	0.99	0.18518	0.06941
Value added in agriculture	0.97	-0.12361	0.05947
Government expenditures	0.95	0.12259	0.05743
Total population	0.95	-0.15378	0.08478
Financial institutions efficiency	0.88	-0.08374	0.05599
Inflation	0.86	0.16879	0.12487
Inflation sq.	0.66	-0.11127	0.11201
Value added in industry	0.62	-0.05825	0.06407
Equipment investment	0.44	-0.03383	0.05359
Financial markets depth	0.27	0.01554	0.03673
Gross domestic savings	0.27	-0.02022	0.04597
Social globalization	0.23	0.02365	0.06279
Restrictions on globalization	0.15	0.00874	0.03214
Trade openness	0.13	0.00615	0.02589
Left-wing orientation	0.11	0.00339	0.01720
Rule of law	0.10	-0.00333	0.01812
Net FDI (% GDP)	0.10	-0.00283	0.01575
Natural resources rents	0.08	-0.00223	0.01583
Chinn-Ito index	0.07	-0.00205	0.01780
Financial globalization	0.06	-0.00134	0.01466
Civil liberties & political rights	0.06	0.00075	0.01131
Financial institutions depth	0.05	0.00060	0.01316
GDP growth	0.05	0.00016	0.01255
Population growth	0.05	0.00055	0.01052
Political globalization	0.05	0.00000	0.01432

We find evidence for the Kuznets' hypothesis about inequality and economic development. We include three regressors which primarily capture the level of development - GDP per capita along with its square term, the share of value-added in agriculture, and share of value-added in industry. Exploring the results of the baseline, We find evidence for an inverted-U curve for GDP per capita and baseline PIPs for the linear and square component. This suggests that inequality tends to be lower at the initial stages of economic development, then increases as the economic output grows, and only starts decreasing after

reaching a threshold. The PIP of 0.97 for value-added in agriculture along with a negative posterior mean for its coefficient supports this idea further. The economies at lower stages of development generally report higher shares of the agricultural sector which is also more labour intensive, i.e. not exacerbating the inequalities that stem from an unequal distribution of capital. The level of unemployment is associated with elevated income inequality. The mechanism is direct through the lower share of income going to labour in case of high unemployment rates. The effect of unemployment is also documented on cross-section by Furceri and Ostry (2019). We also explore the effect of non-equipment investment¹¹, which we believe could proxy for the technological progress and skill-biased technological change. The PIP suggests positive correlation with income inequality as Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) and Goldin and Katz (2009).

We rely on redistribution to capture the effect of taxes and social expenditure on income inequality. Our measure is the difference between before-tax and after-tax Gini coefficient from the SWIID database. Therefore, we concentrate on the direct effects of policies on household income. Given the global nature of our data and its limitations, we cannot estimate the potential indirect effects on the pre-tax distribution of income using, for example, top marginal tax rates (Alvaredo et al., 2013) nor corporate tax rates (Fuest et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the PIP of our indicator is very high and it negatively relates to income inequality as expected. The government expenditures, an often used regressor in the literature, also has a perfect inclusion probability, but with positive posterior mean. The intuitive first-order effect of government expenditure should be through reduction of inequality through general social spending on transfers, education, and health. We account for these explicitly, however, with redistribution and education expenditures of the government. Anderson et al. (2017) introduce a meta-analysis where they show how the examined relationship depends on the type of spending considered and the measure of income inequality. Additionally, they suggest that the redistributive impact has not extended over the entire distribution, but has mostly centred towards middle-income groups. In line with their conclusions, our results suggest the effect of government spending might run in a positive direction when the key

¹¹We construct the indicator using the detail on capital investment from PWT and split the overall investment into non-equipment (structures, transportation, and other assets - software / intellectual property products) and equipment investment (machinery, computers + communication equipment).

equalizing function have been accounted for or perhaps point towards reverse causality.

Life expectancy should proxy for changing demographics. We find a negative link between life expectancy and income inequality. Goldstein and Lee (2014) examine the channels between population ageing and inequality and argue that stretching the economic life-cycle is associated with larger within-group variance as cohort ages. They claim this should pronounce inequality in older populations. On the other hand, if we consider retirement age, pension structure in many countries equalize income flows and therefore the older populations may report lower levels of inequality. The posterior mean of our estimated coefficient indicates the latter scenario.

Inflation is the only variable which could proxy for monetary policy and its influence on income inequality. It is among the relevant regressors with PIP of 0.86 and shows inequality inducing association. The interest in the effects of monetary policy, and macroprudential tools in particular, on inequality is relatively recent, following the introduction of unconventional measures following the Great Recession (Frost & van Stralen, 2018). Theoretically, the effect is ambiguous as high inflation of asset prices might benefit high-income households more as they receive higher shares of financial income. Also, the assets held by low-income households tend to be much more liquid; thus inflation hurts them more relatively to the high-income ones. On the contrary, cut in rates usually benefits the borrowers and increased economic activity benefits the bottom-part of income distribution (Furceri & Ostry, 2019). Our evidence supports the view of inflation enhancing income inequality, at least up to a threshold, as its square term is borderline on the inclusion, but negative in terms of posterior mean of its coefficient. This would suggest that the above-mentioned theoretical effects interact and manifest with different strength at varying inflation levels.

The index of the economic freedom of the world describes the overall business conditions by considering the regulatory and legal environment. More economic freedom to trade and run daily business makes it easier to exploit economic opportunities and the high PIP with positive posterior mean of the coefficient point to economic freedom making the distribution of income less equal. We consider many other potential explanatory variables, but in the case of the Gini index, they show low PIPs. We do not find any measure of globalization, institutions, or trade openness relevant to the overall distribution of income. In the next section, we concentrate on the top income shares and

whether the top part of the distribution where we observe partially distinct results.

4.3.2 Top income shares

Financial development may influence various parts of the income distribution differently. We therefore follow by baseline estimates with the top income shares as dependent variables. Table 4.4 reports the results for top 10% share and Table 4.5 for the top 1% share. There is large overlap of the most important determinants for the top 10% income share and Gini coefficient. GDP per capita, life expectancy, government expenditures, education index (but not expenditures), and inflation remain among the relevant regressors and their posterior means are consistent with the estimation for the overall income distribution. However, PIPs of some of the variables decline significantly and some other become relevant. Figure 4.3 provides a visual comparison of the inclusion probabilities.

In the case of the Top 10% share, education expenditures, non-equipment investment, unemployment, redistribution, and an index of economic freedom drop out. With the exception of economic freedom, there are good reasons to believe these factors mainly drive lower and middle part of the income distribution, rather than the very top. While education expenditures may support the public education system and allow for human capital accumulation in low-income households, such an effect might not be as relevant for the concentration at the top. We have discussed previously how redistribution policies mostly affect the middle quantiles of the distribution and high unemployment rates traditionally do not concern the well educated high-income households. Also, the share of value-added in agriculture now has a low PIP. The inclusion of non-equipment investment also decreases, while it retains the positive posterior mean. Most importantly, depth of financial markets and financial institutions now exhibit perfect PIPs and they seem to be associated with income distributions more concentrated at the top. Access to financial institutions remains relevant and negatively correlated with inequality. Among other variables with higher PIPs, we have natural resources rents, the rule of law, equipment investment, and trade openness. For the natural resources rents, we get a negative posterior mean. The evidence is in line with Goderis and Malone (2011), who describe a mechanism of income equalizing natural resource booms through the benefits for unskilled workers in labour-intensive sector. A positive link be-


Table 4.4: BMA, baseline results. Dependent variable Top 10% share, 394 observations.

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Natural resources rents	1.00	-0.15595	0.04773
GDP per capita	1.00	2.13915	0.54791
Life expectancy	1.00	-0.53327	0.09806
Financial institutions depth	1.00	0.20288	0.05638
Access to financial institutions	1.00	-0.25218	0.06712
Financial markets depth	1.00	0.19376	0.04976
GDP per capita sq.	1.00	-1.80042	0.55408
Government expenditures	1.00	0.15638	0.05565
Rule of law	1.00	-0.12607	0.04665
Education index (UN)	1.00	-0.49573	0.22152
Education index sq.	1.00	0.58180	0.20423
Equipment investment	1.00	-0.13953	0.05578
Trade openness	0.98	0.12632	0.05604
Inflation	0.80	0.06758	0.05407
Gross domestic savings	0.65	0.06566	0.06764
Left-wing orientation	0.63	0.04567	0.04858
Total population	0.57	0.07224	0.08621
Financial institutions efficiency	0.55	-0.04309	0.05278
Non-equipment investment	0.49	0.03864	0.05320
Value added in industry	0.31	-0.02652	0.05253
Financial globalization	0.22	-0.01390	0.03673
Value added in agriculture	0.18	-0.01163	0.03405
Unemployment	0.18	-0.01019	0.03113
Restrictions on globalization	0.13	0.00637	0.02398
Civil liberties & political rights	0.12	0.00529	0.02137
GDP growth	0.12	0.00608	0.02464
Net FDI (% GDP)	0.07	-0.00217	0.01377
Redistribution	0.07	-0.00243	0.01571
Chinn-Ito index	0.06	0.00170	0.01373
Population growth	0.05	0.00097	0.01043
Economic freedom	0.04	0.00055	0.01416
Education expenditures	0.04	-0.00062	0.01030
Social globalization	0.04	-0.00004	0.01918
Political globalization	0.04	0.00060	0.01279
Inflation sq.	0.03	-0.00045	0.01581

tween inequality and trade openness has been suggested by Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) and Jaumotte et al. (2013) for the cross-sectional datasets and by Van der Weide and Milanovic (2018) in the case of the US. The negative posterior coefficient on the rule of law is in line with the prediction by Perotti and Volpin (2007) and is a sole variable indicating the importance of institutions posited in Acemoglu (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2015). Equipment investment (machinery) may channel the resources to the bottom part of the income distribution through increase long-term growth rates and upward pressure on

wages.


Figure 4.3: PIPs with different inequality measures



Note: The comparison only shows variables which show PIP > 0.9 in at least one of the models.

The results using the Top 1% share for top regressors differs in the drop of PIPs for natural resource rents, and education attainment. We hypothesize that natural resource rents might redistribute the share of income from the top decile to the rest of the distribution without actually affecting the share of the income going to the very top. The top 1% income earners might well be among the ones enjoying capital rents from the country resources. While education appears to have an equalizing income effect for the lower part of the distribution, it is reasonable that it wears out for the very top income earners in the distribution. Figure 4.4 depicts comparison of inclusion probabilities of all variables considered in the estimation for the Top 10% share and Top 1% share.

Figure 4.4: PIPs for different top income shares with baseline priors



4.4 Robustness checks

We perform robustness checks for all three specifications employing alternative model priors¹². We choose random and dilution priors to address prior model size concentrated around the mean number of potential regressors and correlation among them by each of the model priors, respectively.

The alternative priors influence the results similarly in all three specifications. The random model prior decreases the PIPs for the regressors as it generally prefers smaller models. Nevertheless, the results are only marginally effected for Gini coefficient as well as the top income shares with a few exceptions of education index in the case of Top 10% share and trade openness for both top income shares. When we apply a dilution prior which penalizes the models with highly correlated regressors, we see more significant differences. Above all, the quadratic terms show very low inclusion probabilities. That is not surprising since they are correlated with their original values. This irrelevance of quadratic terms is universal across inequality measures and we may argue that it is due to the construction of the concerned variables. While the PIPs for other regressors remain similar to the baseline in the case of top in-

¹²We also perform robustness checks using alternative hyperparameter g and Markov-chain samplers, but these do not affect our results.

Table 4.5: BMA, baseline results. Dependent variable Top 1% share, 394 observations.

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Rule of law	1.00	-0.17039	0.04688
GDP per capita	1.00	0.48163	0.29090
Life expectancy	1.00	-0.45605	0.06980
Equipment investment	1.00	-0.19727	0.05526
Financial institutions depth	1.00	0.16380	0.05689
Access to financial institutions	1.00	-0.25945	0.06419
Financial markets depth	1.00	0.15454	0.04989
Government expenditures	0.99	0.11633	0.04718
Inflation	0.99	0.11773	0.04922
Trade openness	0.93	0.10374	0.05711
Restrictions on globalization	0.47	0.03804	0.05418
Non-equipment investment	0.42	0.03197	0.05001
Natural resources rents	0.34	-0.02182	0.04037
Financial globalization	0.28	-0.02001	0.04269
Value added in industry	0.21	-0.01389	0.03634
Value added in agriculture	0.17	-0.00969	0.03053
Net FDI (% GDP)	0.16	-0.00730	0.02401
Chinn-Ito index	0.15	0.00828	0.02797
GDP per capita sq.	0.15	-0.08401	0.28484
Economic freedom	0.12	-0.00945	0.03762
Gross domestic savings	0.11	0.00634	0.02688
Redistribution	0.11	0.00495	0.02085
GDP growth	0.11	-0.00504	0.02208
Social globalization	0.09	-0.00626	0.03233
Education index (UN)	0.09	-0.01003	0.07309
Unemployment	0.05	0.00131	0.01287
Political globalization	0.05	0.00137	0.01473
Financial institutions efficiency	0.04	-0.00070	0.01024
Education index sq.	0.04	0.01380	0.07857
Total population	0.04	-0.00060	0.01484
Inflation sq.	0.04	0.00053	0.01828
Population growth	0.04	0.00020	0.00844
Education expenditures	0.04	-0.00002	0.00935
Left-wing orientation	0.04	-0.00028	0.00843
Civil liberties & political rights	0.04	0.00009	0.00846

come shares, for the Gini index of overall income inequality, we observe some regressors which are now penalized by the dilution prior. Taking the set of the important regressors in the baseline specification, we observe drop in the inclusion probability for education index, life expectancy, and economic freedom. Given high correlations among the set of regressors, this is not surprising and allows us to narrow down further the number of regressors robustly associated with income inequality.

Figure 4.5: Robustness checks with alternative model priors, Gini coefficient




Figure 4.6: Robustness checks with alternative model priors, Top 10% share





Figure 4.7: Robustness checks with alternative model priors, Top 1% share



4.5 Conclusions

In the paper, we explore the robust determinants of income inequality with special attention given to indicators of financial development. We choose financial indicators that reflect the access, efficiency, and size of financial markets and institutions. We believe that the detailed indicators provide better proxies for the functions of finance - screen investment opportunities, monitor the debtors who were provided funding, as well as pooling and management of risk. We allow for model uncertainty by employing BMA and examine a number of other potential determinants of income inequality.

We show that financial development has a complex relationship with income distribution. While access to finance has a universal inequality decreasing effect, the larger size of financial markets and financial institutions associates with higher top income shares. The depth measures are, however, irrelevant for the Gini coefficient of the income distribution. This finding suggests that the size of financial markets may likely equalize the income among the first nine deciles.

We find a few other important covariates for income inequality. Education, redistribution, and changing demographic structure seem to be linked with

lower income inequality. On the contrary, unemployment, investment other than machinery, economic freedom - ease of pursuing economic opportunities measured by an index of economic freedom, and inflation are all positively related to income inequality. As in the case of financial indicators, we find that the link could be more complicated. When looking at the top income shares, some of the covariates (education, unemployment, redistribution, and economic freedom) cease to be relevant, while some other (trade openness, the rule of law, and machinery investment) seem to matter.

The results we present warrant caution in drawing quick conclusions on the matter of income inequality determinants. While finance, technology, and trade likely affect the distributional outcomes, it can have varying influence on different parts of the income distribution.

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Appendix

4.A Robustness checks

Table 4.6: BMA, results using 5-year averages. Dependent variable after-tax Gini index, 237 observations.

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Education expenditures	1.00	-0.20717	0.06349
Value added in agriculture	1.00	-0.21937	0.07488
GDP per capita	1.00	1.82050	0.67271
Life expectancy	1.00	-0.40392	0.12755
Unemployment	1.00	0.20341	0.06811
Non-equipment investment	1.00	0.20972	0.06696
Access to financial institutions	1.00	-0.24817	0.08502
Redistribution	1.00	-0.24501	0.06560
Equipment investment	1.00	-0.17577	0.07223
Education index (UN)	1.00	0.23121	0.22046
GDP per capita sq.	1.00	-1.62965	0.69937
Value added in industry	0.98	-0.16154	0.07777
Total population	0.91	-0.23792	0.13311
Period 2	0.85	0.22049	0.14295
Period 3	0.83	0.33874	0.23232
Financial institutions efficiency	0.72	-0.07259	0.07062
Financial markets depth	0.53	0.04762	0.06528
Government expenditures	0.45	0.03445	0.05634
Trade openness	0.32	0.02846	0.05972
Net FDI (% GDP)	0.30	-0.01797	0.04012
Education index sq.	0.23	0.07123	0.20006
Median age	0.22	-0.03112	0.09112
Economic freedom	0.18	0.01209	0.04296
Financial institutions depth	0.14	0.00671	0.03208
Gross domestic savings	0.11	0.00457	0.02938
Political globalization	0.10	0.00380	0.02894
Natural resources rents	0.10	-0.00290	0.02291
Restrictions on globalization	0.09	0.00222	0.02066
Financial globalization	0.09	0.00226	0.02209
Rule of law	0.08	-0.00214	0.01901
Chinn-Ito index	0.08	0.00164	0.01868
Inflation	0.08	-0.00003	0.02409
Social globalization	0.08	0.00238	0.03812
Population growth	0.08	0.00144	0.01775
GDP growth	0.08	0.00144	0.02068
Left-wing orientation	0.08	0.00099	0.01578
Civil liberties & political rights	0.07	0.00046	0.01448
Inflation sq.	0.00	0.00044	0.01696

Table 4.7: BMA, results using 5-year averages. Dependent variable Top 10% share, 248 observations.

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
GDP per capita	1.00	2.43240	0.72823
Life expectancy	1.00	-0.71435	0.12493
Financial institutions depth	1.00	0.22910	0.06928
Financial markets depth	1.00	0.20245	0.05987
Natural resources rents	1.00	-0.16995	0.06525
GDP per capita sq.	1.00	-2.00889	0.74540
Equipment investment	1.00	-0.19131	0.07268
Government expenditures	1.00	0.16863	0.06649
Trade openness	1.00	0.17805	0.07117
Access to financial institutions	0.99	-0.21177	0.08756
Left-wing orientation	0.93	0.10136	0.05834
Total population	0.91	0.19759	0.11773
Rule of law	0.85	-0.09518	0.06703
Education index (UN)	0.80	-0.46592	0.34614
Education index sq.	0.79	0.49719	0.34504
Gross domestic savings	0.66	0.08137	0.08271
Value added in agriculture	0.56	-0.07408	0.08899
Financial institutions efficiency	0.52	-0.04852	0.06384
Value added in industry	0.43	-0.05450	0.08111
Political globalization	0.21	0.01674	0.04917
Unemployment	0.17	-0.01028	0.03389
Inflation	0.14	0.02605	0.11365
Financial globalization	0.13	-0.00795	0.03274
Population growth	0.13	-0.00590	0.02584
Period 3	0.12	0.00818	0.03851
Net FDI (% GDP)	0.12	-0.00492	0.02292
Social globalization	0.10	-0.00759	0.04529
Non-equipment investment	0.10	0.00374	0.02229
Period 2	0.09	-0.00305	0.02088
Chinn-Ito index	0.08	0.00262	0.01973
Economic freedom	0.08	-0.00195	0.02455
Education expenditures	0.08	-0.00162	0.01938
Inflation sq.	0.07	-0.02586	0.11169
Civil liberties & political rights	0.07	0.00149	0.01628
GDP growth	0.07	0.00119	0.01756
Restrictions on globalization	0.06	0.00071	0.01643
Redistribution	0.06	-0.00049	0.01509

Table 4.8: BMA, results using 5-year averages. Dependent variable
Top 1% share, 248 observations.

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
GDP per capita	1.00	0.62260	0.35454
Life expectancy	1.00	-0.57281	0.08981
Equipment investment	1.00	-0.24601	0.07297
Access to financial institutions	1.00	-0.29347	0.08101
Financial institutions depth	1.00	0.18949	0.07033
Financial markets depth	1.00	0.18562	0.06481
Rule of law	0.98	-0.14120	0.06108
Government expenditures	0.82	0.08860	0.06512
Trade openness	0.77	0.09529	0.07711
Value added in agriculture	0.54	-0.05397	0.06806
Net FDI (% GDP)	0.34	-0.02701	0.04919
GDP growth	0.33	-0.02864	0.05416
Inflation	0.27	0.12719	0.26014
Financial globalization	0.24	-0.02019	0.04855
Inflation sq.	0.24	-0.12342	0.25456
Chinn-Ito index	0.23	0.02064	0.04977
GDP per capita sq.	0.19	-0.12032	0.35046
Political globalization	0.14	0.01158	0.04063
Period 2	0.13	-0.00828	0.03020
Economic freedom	0.12	-0.01092	0.04185
Financial institutions efficiency	0.11	-0.00656	0.02705
Period 3	0.10	0.00749	0.03410
Redistribution	0.10	0.00532	0.02408
Social globalization	0.09	-0.00936	0.04582
Total population	0.08	0.00639	0.03494
Non-equipment investment	0.07	0.00317	0.02029
Left-wing orientation	0.06	0.00221	0.01583
Restrictions on globalization	0.06	0.00240	0.01962
Value added in industry	0.05	-0.00204	0.01842
Gross domestic savings	0.05	-0.00117	0.01651
Unemployment	0.04	-0.00091	0.01415
Education index (UN)	0.04	-0.00015	0.03208
Civil liberties & political rights	0.04	-0.00073	0.01128
Natural resources rents	0.03	0.00008	0.01104
Population growth	0.03	0.00047	0.00973
Education expenditures	0.03	-0.00006	0.01103
Education index sq.	0.00	0.00141	0.02697

4.B The composition of financial indicators

Table 4.9: Underlying Components of Financial Development Indicators

INDICATOR	MEASURE
Financial institutions	
Access	Bank branches per 100,000 adults
	ATMs per 100,000 adults
Efficiency	Net interest margin
	Lending-deposits spread
	Noninterest income to total income
	Overhead costs to total assets
	Return on assets
	Return on equity
Depth	Domestic private credit to the real sector to the GDP
	Pension fund assets/GDP
	Mutual fund assets/GDP
	Insurance premiums life and nonlife/GDP
Financial markets	
Depth	Stock market capitalization/GDP
	Stocks traded/GDP
	International debt securities of government/GDP
	Total debt securities of financial corporations/GDP
	Total debt securities of nonfinancial corporations/GDP

4.C Dataset description

Table 4.10: List of variables

Variable	Definition (+ optional comments)	Source
GiniNet	Aftertax Gini index based on distribution of income (The Standardized World Income Inequality Database).	Solt (2019)
GiniMarket	Before-tax Gini index based on distribution of income (The Standardized World Income Inequality Database).	Solt (2019)
Top10share	Share of income going top decile of the distribution.	WID
Top1share	Share of income going top percentile of the distribution.	WID
FIA	Access to financial institutions	Svirydzenka (2016)
FID	Financial institutions depth	Svirydzenka (2016)
FIE	Financial institutions efficiency	Svirydzenka (2016)
FMD	Financial markets depth	Svirydzenka (2016)
FME	Financial markets efficiency	Svirydzenka (2016)
GDPpc	Level of GDP per capita	WB
NatRes	Total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents.	WB
PopGrowth	Annual population growth 1980-2009	WB
GovExp	General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption).	WB
NNSavings	Net national savings (gross national savings less the value of consumption of fixed capital, % GNI).	WB
EducExp	Education expenditure refers to the current operating expenditures in education, including wages and salaries and excluding capital investments in buildings and equipment..	WB
Infl	Inflation as measured by the consumer price index.	WB
VAA	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing value added (% GDP).	WB
VAI	Industry value added (% GDP).	WB
GFCF	Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP).	WB
NetFDI	Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP).	WB
GDPgrowth	Annual growth of GDP.	WB

LifeExp	Life expectancy at birth.	WB
LabForce	Total labor force comprises people ages 15 and older who meet the International Labor Organization definition of the economically active population: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. Labor force total.	WB
RuleOfLaw	Rule of law estimate	WB
CLandPR	Average of index for civil liberties and political rights	Freedom House
ChinnIto	Chinn-Ito index of financial openness.	Chinn-Ito
LeftWing	Dummy equal to 1 when left oriented party lead the country.	DPI
ActivRestrict	Activity restrictions. Regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce.	Barth et al. (2013)
CapitalReg	Capital Regulatory index.	Barth et al. (2013)
DiversIndex	Whether there are explicit, verifiable, quantifiable guidelines for asset diversification and banks are allowed to make loans abroad.	Barth et al. (2013)
EducIndex	Calculated using mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling	UN
NetInterestMargin	Accounting value of banks' net interest revenue as a share of average interest-bearing assets; a measure of the efficiency of the banking sector.	GFDD
BankZScore	return on banks' assets plus the ratio of banks' equity and assets, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets $(ROA+equity/assets)/sd(ROA)$; a measure of stability of the banking sector	GFDD
Privatecredit	Domestic private credit to the real sector to GDP; a measure of the depth of the banking sector	GFDD
MarketCap	Value of listed shares to GDP; a measure of the depth of stock markets.	GFDD
MarketTurn	Stock market value traded to total market capitalization; a measure of the efficiency of stock markets.	GFDD
BankBranches	Number of bank branches per 100,000 adults	GFDD
Loan2Deposits	Loan-to-deposit ratio.	GFDD

Redist	Difference between market (pre-tax) and net (after-tax) Gini index based on distribution of income (The Standardized World Income Inequality Database).	Solt (2016)
FinLib	Averaged components of Economic Freedom of the World index 3D (freedom to own foreign currency accounts), 4C (black-market exchange rates), 4D (controls of the movement of capital and people), and 5A (credit market regulations).	Gwartney et al. (2017)

Appendix A

Response to the referees

I would like to thank all three referees for their valuable insights and help to refine the dissertation. Please be sure I carefully addressed all your comments, even those I have decided not to integrate into the final version fully.

A.1 Doc. PhDr. Adam Geršl Ph.D.

Comments to the first paper on “What Type of Finance Matters for Growth? Bayesian Model Averaging Evidence”

1. *The title is confusing - the paper does not explore what type of finance (bank versus market; bond versus stocks; banks versus non-bank institutions; short-term versus long-term; concentrated versus unconcentrated banking sector etc.) matters for growth, but what aspect of financial intermediation (financial depth; activity on markets; efficiency of banks; resilience of banks) matter. I propose to adjust the title accordingly.*

Thank you for the valid point and a suggestion of an alternative. I changed the title of the first paper to *What Aspect of Financial Intermediation Matters for Growth: Bayesian Model Averaging Evidence*. I adjusted the footnote referring to the chapter's publication so that it reflects the title of the published paper.

2. *The endogeneity problem (briefly mentioned on p. 11) is much more serious than the author thinks as the variables get averaged over 50 years! The studies focusing on the dynamics of development between the real and financial sector (macrofinancial linkages, such as in Crowe et al. 2010) emphasize the two-way interactions and feedbacks that develop over time.*

As the methodology does not take into account the time dynamics, the thesis should at least acknowledge that endogeneity could be an issue and devote a paragraph or so to this shortcoming, adding a few references on the (omitted) dynamic interactions.

The point is well taken. Although the issue of endogeneity gets mentioned throughout the paper, it might come out as underappreciated. I have explicitly added a subsection discussing potential endogeneity and the limitations of our attempts to address it. While we can efficiently deal with the potential omitted variable bias by applying BMA, the risk lies mainly in the reverse causality. To estimate where we use the lagged financial indicators and look at the shorter growth period, I added the results on the two-stage least squares BMA that previously appeared in one of the footnotes and available upon request. Since finding the right instruments for our financial variables is a challenge, we focused this robustness exercise on the net interest margin to measure financial intermediation efficiency. Using the history of financial crises as an instrumental variable, we obtain results that support the baseline finding that intermediation efficiency is conducive to long-run growth.

3. *Throughout the paper, the net interest margin (NIM) is interpreted as a measure of “efficiency of financial intermediaries”, but this is incorrect! It is a measure of (in)efficiencies in financial intermediation, not an indicator of bank (cost) efficiency! Large NIMs are typical for underdeveloped markets in which risks (of default), vulnerabilities, and legal uncertainties (of collateral realization etc.) are large, increasing information asymmetries and creating frictions to (efficient) financial intermediation. Thus, the NIM is actually an additional (indirect) measure of the institutional (legal) framework within which financial intermediation takes place rather than “an aspect” of financial activity.*

Thank you for elaborating on this issue. I have partially adjusted the wording throughout the first paper and I have added an introductory part in the summary of the dissertation about different approaches to the 'efficiency' in finance and how we understand it to be able to use efficiency of financial intermediaries interchangeably with the efficiency of financial intermediation.

4. *Given the previous point, the author should be much more careful in draw-*

ing conclusions from the analysis. The fact that his measure of efficiency has a large PIP might be to a large extent related to the endogeneity bias: as an economy develops, the overall risks and vulnerabilities decline, contributing to a decline of the margin, which goes hand in hand with expansion in lending, further supporting economic development. This link should be mentioned in the paper.

I partly address this comment in one of the related above. I have extended the section devoted to discussing endogeneity. Although in a crude way, I tackle it in robustness check with lagged values of financial indicators similar to the approach in the second paper on finance and wealth. The time span is shorter (10 years) and admittedly involves the aftermath of the financial crisis, but nevertheless, the conclusions are consistent with the baseline, and it limits the mentioned risks to some extent. I agree that by averaging variables over long time spans, we lose information on the short-run dynamics, and net interest margin may potentially mask the effect of another variable. We attempt to avoid that by accounting for a large volume of potential institutional factors explicitly in BMA (rule of law, political rights, degree of capitalism, or openness of economy). In the 2SLS–BMA estimation, we include these potentially confounding factors in the first-stage regression.

5. *The review of literature mentions the criticism of traditional finance-growth nexus papers in neglecting the private bond markets (and other non-bank or non-stock-market sources of finance), but the paper again uses only the two traditional measures of financial depth – bank credit and stock market (p. 10). Could the private credit to GDP be based on the BIS statistics of total credit (i.e. a sum of bank credit, non-bank intermediaries credit, bonds issues, and cross-border finance to private sector)? This has become available recently for a large number of countries (and years) and could better capture the debt of the private sector intermediated by all intermediaries and markets.*

Thank you for pointing me to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data. Unfortunately, the coverage is insufficient to allow for using the data as-is. Simply merging the data with our dataset reduces the number of observations to 33 and renders the baseline approach infeasible. Nevertheless, for the available data point, the correlation between total credit and bank credit data reaches nearly 0.7 (see also Figure A.1). I

have thus re-estimated the model with partially modified total credit data from BIS. I used the bank credit to non-financial sector data from GFDD to estimate the total credit volumes for the countries with missing data. Next, I applied the BMA using total credit instead of bank credit (and dropping the later from the set of covariates). Total credit shows low PIP, and none of the other relevant regressors is affected. Using the fitted values of total credit for all observations instead of only the missing values does not alter the results in any way. In Table A.1, I only report PIPs along with the moments of the top covariates and total credit.

Figure A.1: Total vs. bank credit to non-financial sector




Table A.1: Results total credit to non-financial institutions.

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
GDP level in 1960	1.00	-0.01075	0.00241
Fraction GDP in mining	1.00	0.04705	0.01344
Exchange rate distortions	1.00	-0.00009	0.00003
Fraction Confucian	1.00	0.03898	0.01117
Life expectancy	1.00	0.00058	0.00020
Fraction Buddhist	0.99	0.01265	0.00495
Net interest margin	0.96	-0.00114	0.00047
Equipment investment	0.83	0.07263	0.04768
⋮			
Total private credit	0.04	8.6345e-08	0.00001
⋮			

Comments to the second paper on “Finance and Wealth Inequality”

6. *In comparison to the previous paper, this one tackles well a possible endogeneity bias (section 3.5.3) by lagging the explanatory variables (average of 1980-2009) compared to the dependent variable (average of 2010-2016), although I would be less concerned about the reverse link between inequality and financial development (compared to GDP growth and financial development). While a paragraph explaining through which channels would wealth inequality influence financial development is included on p. 66 (with reference to Beck et al. 2007), I am not too persuaded by (the two) explanations. Could 1-2 additional references be provided if, as the author states, “the question of endogeneity is deeply ingrained in the finance-inequality nexus”? (Some additional arguments are included in the third paper and could be re-used here).*

The firm wording is due to the universally present concerns about endogeneity in the finance-inequality literature¹. I have included additional references on the issue in the endogeneity section of the paper, including the previously omitted inequality and financial crises branch of studies.

7. *In this paper, an overall index of efficiency is used, combining the net interest margin with variables such as overhead costs or profitability. I would still propose that this index is not called Financial Institutions Efficiency (but perhaps Financial Intermediation Efficiency) because it combines institutions’ (cost) efficiency and efficiency (frictions) of financial intermediation influenced by overall risks. As this indicator has a 100% PIP, it would be worth exploring further what drives the efficiency index – is it more the NIM/spread as a measure of inefficiencies in financial intermediation (risks) or (overhead) costs as a measure of financial institutions’ efficiency?*

I took two different approaches to explore the details of the FIE measure. First, the methodological paper to the financial development data by the IMF (Svirydzenka, 2016) provides the weights applied to the observed series to construct the indicator of financial intermediation efficiency. These are the loading factors in the principal component analysis, which capture the common variation in the data related to the same category. This

¹To name a few: Bazillier and Hericourt (2017), Čihák and Sahay (2020), de Haan and Sturm (2017), Goda et al. (2017), Kumhof et al. (2015), and Mookerjee and Kalipioni (2010)

approach helps to correct for the overlapping information among multiple efficiency indicators and provides the basis for their aggregation. In the case of FIE, the largest weight is on the overhead costs (25%), net interest margin (20%), lending-deposit spread, and non-interest income (both roughly 17%). ROA and ROE both enter with relatively lower weights slightly above 10%.

The second approach relies on BMA estimation with the underlying series of the FIE. I mirror the baseline methodological procedure using the individual indicators and report the results in Table A.2. The most important characteristics, according to the PIP are the overhead costs and net interest margin, both attaining values above 0.5. Both variables exhibit the expected positive posterior mean. The higher net interest margin and overhead costs associate with higher levels of wealth inequality as measured by Gini index. Unfortunately, I had to drop lending-deposit spread since the data was missing on the part of the observations. The remaining components of intermediation efficiency show low inclusion probabilities. The IMF's procedure and the estimate presented here thus show consistent results putting net interest margin and overhead costs upfront in capturing intermediation efficiency and its accompanying effects. Somewhat lower PIPs relative to the combined efficiency measure may arise from the collinearity between the individual indicators.

Comments to the third paper on “Finance and Inequality — Panel BMA Approach”

8. *The paper could better formulate what is the value added compared to available literature. There are a few hints in the last paragraph on page 99, but this could be better structured and start with “The value added of this paper is in . . .”. Using the after-tax rather than before-tax measure of income distribution should also be mentioned here (and explained why).*

Thank you for pointing this out. I have included a paragraph on the value-added of the paper. I make four different points. First, we efficiently account for model uncertainty relying on the panel BMA framework. Second, we use the WID data on the top income shares, collected based on the tax collection data. Arguably, this data is superior to the survey data as it amends issues of underrepresentation of high-income individuals and underreporting income. Third, we simultaneously consider

Table A.2: Results using the individual components of financial intermediaries' efficiency

Variable	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Value added in agriculture	1.00	-0.53450	0.17265
Access to financial institutions	0.99	-0.38380	0.16285
Number of war years	0.95	0.19154	0.10297
Outward orientation	0.69	0.12387	0.11848
Economic freedom index (adjusted)	0.66	-0.22199	0.22503
Financial market depth	0.60	0.25546	0.25381
Net interest margin	0.57	0.22508	0.25392
Overhead costs / Assets	0.56	0.16033	0.18376
Business conditions	0.55	-0.11950	0.14897
Financial institutions depth	0.52	0.29136	0.33501
Inflation	0.52	0.08456	0.10874
Education index (UN)	0.51	-0.15375	0.20071
Redistribution	0.45	-0.09356	0.13734
Net national savings	0.30	0.04713	0.09898
Natural resources rents	0.28	0.04244	0.09185
Labour market regulation	0.26	0.03507	0.08022
Pre-tax ROA	0.24	-0.04709	0.12282
Net foreign direct investment	0.23	-0.02525	0.06581
Latin America dummy	0.20	0.06632	0.20283
Financial openness (Chinn-Ito)	0.14	0.01615	0.06855
Population density	0.14	-0.01313	0.05141
Rule of law	0.13	0.02374	0.10437
Leftwing orientation	0.12	-0.00996	0.04222
Pre-tax ROE	0.12	0.01714	0.07991
Banking diversification	0.12	-0.00837	0.03859
Public education expenditures	0.12	0.00914	0.04335
Revolutions and coups	0.11	0.00894	0.04639
Civ. liberties and Pol. rights	0.10	-0.01329	0.06491
Financial markets efficiency	0.10	0.00863	0.04648
Financial liberalization (EFW)	0.08	0.00169	0.05097
Life expectancy	0.08	-0.00032	0.06619
GDP level in 1990	0.08	0.00768	0.09478
Population growth	0.08	0.00413	0.04553
Active banking restrictions	0.07	-0.00337	0.03223
Average GDP growth	0.07	-0.00390	0.03385
Bank capital regulations	0.07	-0.00426	0.02943
Non-interest income	0.07	0.00133	0.03183
Technological progress	0.06	-0.00170	0.06215
Government expenditures	0.06	0.00280	0.03468
Labour force participation	0.06	-0.00219	0.08291
Value added in industry	0.05	0.00102	0.02998

different proxies of financial development to identify the most relevant channels through which finance affects inequality and. Fourth, we examine multiple measures of income inequality to distinguish the diverse effects of finance across the income distribution.

We rely on the after-tax income Gini coefficient as we also include the redistribution variable among the regressors to indirectly account for taxation and transfers, as coverage of exact data on the two is scarce. Since we define it as a difference between before-tax and after-tax Gini coefficients, the estimate is not substantially influenced by using either of the two as the dependent variable. The switch changes only the sign of the posterior mean of redistribution. This supports the point by Furceri and Ostry (2019) that unless redistribution is systematically correlated with other regressors, their effect on the net and gross inequality should be the same. In our case, using after-tax allows for more intuitive interpretation. In Table A.3, I provide the estimation with the before-tax Gini coefficient as the dependent variable. I report only the regressors with PIP above 0.7 as the results are nearly identical to the baseline estimate.

Table A.3: Results with before-tax income Gini coefficient as dependent variable

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Unemployment	1.00	0.22926	0.05717
Non-equipment investment	1.00	0.14580	0.05064
Access to financial institutions	1.00	-0.24226	0.06077
Education index (UN)	1.00	-0.57258	0.23138
Redistribution	1.00	0.21473	0.04871
Education index sq.	1.00	0.80725	0.21188
GDP per capita	1.00	1.62403	0.55557
Education expenditures	1.00	-0.14092	0.04896
GDP per capita sq.	1.00	-1.44382	0.56148
Economic freedom	0.99	0.17956	0.06767
Life expectancy	0.98	-0.22629	0.09737
Value added in agriculture	0.92	-0.11102	0.06240
Government expenditures	0.90	0.11397	0.06028
Total population	0.90	-0.14643	0.08616
Financial institutions efficiency	0.85	-0.08345	0.05623
Inflation	0.74	0.13437	0.12365
⋮			

9. *Averaging the data across 3-year spans to produce the panel (over 2000-2014) is a standard method to get rid of short-term volatility in the data say from markets, but given that this coincides with the largest economic pre-crisis boom 2000-2007 and the crisis and post-crisis decline associated with balance-sheet recessions in many countries (2008/2009-2014), it will not get rid of the business cycle. The more traditional 5-year averaging would be better. As this was done as a robustness check (with similar*

results), I would propose to use the 5-year averaging as a baseline and the 3-year averaging as a robustness check.

I understand the preference for 5-year averaging. Nevertheless, I have decided to stay with the 3-year averages. Several reasons support this decision. First, the 3-year models display much better convergence, which I grant to more available observations and the higher variation in the 3-year averaged data. Second, more time periods allow for a more robust estimate when I lag the explanatory variables in order to address endogeneity. Third, I am not convinced that in the case of the concerned period 2000-2014, 5-year averages notably superior in getting rid of the one long business cycle we observed. I expanded the discussion on the choice by preceding arguments and added the 5-year results to the paper's Appendix. I also contrast the estimate under different averages and for alternative inequality measures here in the response (figures A.2, A.3, A.4). The largest differences occur with the Gini index as the dependent variable. Note the large increase of time period dummies in case of 5-year averages. They might mask some of the explicitly captured effects before, e.g., changes in economic freedom index, government expenditures, or inflation. Nothing substantially changes our conclusions about financial indicators. The results for top income share appear to be even more stable, except for volatile PIP of inflation.

Figure A.2: Comparison of results between 3-year and 5-year averaged data, after-tax Gini index




Figure A.3: Comparison of results between 3-year and 5-year averaged data, top 10% share





Figure A.4: Comparison of results between 3-year and 5-year averaged data, top 1% share



10. *Another robustness check could be to split the sample into two periods only, pre-crisis 2000-2007 and post-crisis 2008-2014, creating two 7-year averages. Instead of a panel, two cross-sections would be run and results could be interpreted as regime-specific (pre-crisis versus post-crisis regimes).*

Thank you for the suggestion. Relying on the cross-section disregards the time variation of the data and makes the comparison to the baseline estimations difficult. Instead, I have split the sample as you outlined, but kept still relied on fixed effects BMA. I present here only the regime comparisons of pre- / post- crisis estimates for all income inequality indicators. There is a lot of variation in terms of inclusion probability under the two alternatives, partially because I a switch to yearly panel data to make the estimation feasible. I focus here only on the interpretation of financial indicators. Access to finance appears robustly across specifications. In comparison with the baseline results, the efficiency of intermediation has very high PIP in the post-crisis sample for the overall distribution and top 10% share. Similarly, FID displays much higher PIP after 2007 in the estimation with the Gini index estimation. Both suggest that financial institutions had a mitigating effect on the post-crisis development of inequality. On the other hand, the share of the very top percentile of the income distribution was driven, among other things, by the depth of financial markets and institutions. The fact that the effect of finance on the economy differs across the business cycle is established (Braun & Larrain, 2005; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008) and may manifest further in income inequality. Given the regimes’ overall differences, I caution against putting too much weight on these results though.

11. *Is endogeneity a potential problem here (similarly to the second paper) and how is it dealt with?*

Based on similar arguments as in the second paper, endogeneity could be an issue. Moreover, financial indicators are not the only variables that could be potentially endogenous. Finding good instruments in the panel setting is, however, even more challenging than for the cross-section and Bayesian framework does offer directly applicable approaches such as system GMM, traditionally used in the literature. We limit the concerns here by relying on the lagged values of the explanatory variables in the estimation. This approach works well for the panel setting and

Figure A.5: Pre- / post- 2007 crisis comparison, after-tax Gini index






Figure A.6: Pre- / post- 2007 crisis comparison, top 10% share



largely confirms our findings from the baseline. Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6 report the results for Gini index, top 10%, and top 1% share of income. I only report the variables with PIP above 0.7. There are only minor changes in the inclusion probabilities of the top variables in case of income shares. More heterogeneity occurs with the estimation using the

Figure A.7: Pre- / post- 2007 crisis comparison, top 1% share



Gini index, where the effect of access and efficiency diminishes, but we see a substantial increase in the inclusion of FMD. This again warrants for caution in the interpretation of the latter set of results.

Table A.4: Results using lagged explanatory variables, after-tax Gini index

Variable	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Education expenditures	1.00	-0.17932	0.06039
Value added in industry	1.00	-0.20504	0.06333
GDP per capita	1.00	1.38484	0.66842
Education index (UN)	1.00	-0.52691	0.24553
Education index sq.	1.00	0.68706	0.23271
Inflation	1.00	0.36481	0.12373
Inflation sq.	1.00	-0.30380	0.11861
GDP per capita sq.	1.00	-1.70125	0.67566
Value added in agriculture	1.00	-0.16241	0.06386
Trade openness	0.99	0.12535	0.05969
Restrictions on globalization	0.98	0.16508	0.07073
Government expenditures	0.93	0.10571	0.06467
Financial markets depth	0.77	0.07140	0.06409

Table A.5: Results using lagged explanatory variables, top 10% share

Variable	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Government expenditures	1.00	0.22475	0.05339
GDP per capita	1.00	2.20847	0.65929
Life expectancy	1.00	-0.57960	0.11207
Financial institutions depth	1.00	0.21777	0.06570
Access to financial institutions	1.00	-0.23724	0.07999
Financial markets depth	1.00	0.19877	0.05737
Education index (UN)	1.00	-0.67050	0.24141
GDP per capita sq.	1.00	-2.09554	0.67662
Education index sq.	1.00	0.86813	0.22677
Financial globalization	1.00	-0.16380	0.06638
Left-wing orientation	0.95	0.09576	0.05192
Trade openness	0.88	0.10511	0.06732
Total population	0.88	0.16140	0.10576
Net FDI (% GDP)	0.76	-0.06376	0.05479
Equipment investment	0.72	-0.07970	0.07383

Table A.6: Results using lagged explanatory variables, top 1% share

Variable	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Government expenditures	1.00	0.16178	0.05386
GDP per capita	1.00	2.75765	0.66596
Life expectancy	1.00	-0.45941	0.09336
Access to financial institutions	1.00	-0.25288	0.07635
Financial markets depth	1.00	0.15898	0.05719
Education index (UN)	1.00	-0.56127	0.22118
GDP per capita sq.	1.00	-2.64854	0.68373
Education index sq.	1.00	0.73680	0.21445
Equipment investment	1.00	-0.16873	0.06436
Financial institutions depth	1.00	0.15950	0.06642
Net FDI (% GDP)	0.96	-0.09628	0.05042
Trade openness	0.92	0.10741	0.06330
Financial globalization	0.88	-0.11499	0.07535

A.2 Prof. Dr. Ansgar H. Belke

1. *A main issue to cope with in at least two of the papers (if not all) is endogeneity. The author should explain the strengths and weaknesses of the solutions found and applied in his papers to deal with this issue as, for instance, the use of lagged regressors etc. Are there some tasks and open issues left for future research in that respect?*

In the first two chapters, we work with cross-sectional data in the estimations. There, we rely on several options to address endogeneity. The simplest approach uses the lagged values of the exogenous variables so that the potential for reverse effect is limited. As a second option, we apply 2SLS–BMA procedure and IVBMA, and make use of instrumental variables. Our baseline findings are largely confirmed by the estimations that deal with endogeneity and we present the results in the respective chapters. In the fourth chapter’s panel setting, we come back to using the lagged values of explanatory variables since finding good instruments in a panel is challenging and methods, such as system GMM not directly applicable in the Bayesian framework. Again, the results dominantly confirm the baseline findings. Nevertheless, especially the first chapter could be extended by updating the whole dataset and also making use of time variation in the data and using lagged values of explanatory variables. It could be a fruitful exercise in the near future as longer time spans of financial indicators will become available.

2. *A linear functional form which is implicitly often assumed in the literature is fairly specific and, in some cases, even restrictive. It is important to distinguish specifications which can be examined in the framework of a linear regression from those which cannot. It is nice that the author thus checked for functional form beforehand and also implemented and estimated non-linear specifications. The author could comment a bit more on the chosen tests for non-linearity.*

In general, we apply two approaches to capturing non-linearity. One lies in directly including the non-linear terms in the set of regressors. These are usually squared values of explanatory variables or interaction between variables, looking for a joint effect of, for example, institutions and financial development. The second approach is adjusting the sample and estimating the relationships in different periods (before and after

crisis for in Chapter 4, before 1990 and after 1990 in Chapter 2), or for a different set of countries (high- vs. low- income in Chapter 3). We then compare the inclusion probabilities under these different settings. Due to the Bayesian nature of our estimation and in contrast to the frequentist approaches, we do not test for the differences in the alternative models (Chow test).

3. *What about (further) robustness checks? Does the author exploit all usual possibilities to conduct robustness checks (changes of the lag structure, explicit parameter restriction tests, preliminary sample split tests according to different policy regimes also beyond the financial crisis, changes of the criteria which serve as the basis for selecting the final presented empirical models such as information criteria) in the framework of his analysis? If not, please complement or at least be more explicit on what has been done.*

I have extensively checked for robustness under varying priors, which is the key factor in the Bayesian analysis. I have also explored possible nonlinearities (answer the previous comment notes some of the robustness checks to regimes switches). On top of that, I have put great effort into specifications that limit the endogeneity concerns. Although the set of potential checks often seems unbounded, I have looked thoroughly for both the methodologically critical and intellectually informative.

4. *At certain stages of his dissertation, the author applies cross-sectional data analysis. The author should be explicit about why he is not using panel data at these stages of analysis and what the trade-offs and sacrifices of this way of proceeding are.*

We use the cross-sections mostly due to the limitations and unavailability of relevant data over time. This is the case of wealth inequality and for some financial development indicators. In the case of Chapter 2 on finance and growth, the unavailability reason applies combined with the desire to have the results directly comparable to the previous studies by Fernandez et al. (2001) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). On the one hand, cross-sectional data allows us to make relatively general conclusions about the estimated relationship (in comparison with individual country studies based on time-series analysis), but at the same time, we abstract from any time variation of the data. This might not be big wrongdoing in terms

of wealth inequality, which does not systematically change much in the short run. With some qualifications, we can also make a similar case for the long-run economic growth. However, we extend the analysis to panel data when possible in Chapter 4 to strengthen our analysis, especially with the substantially larger number of data points for the estimation.

5. *So, is there any relevance of the paper for policy issues beyond that briefly and partly implicitly mentioned in the conclusions? I would appreciate if the authors would not only come up with testable hypotheses and the respective empirical results using readily available data but bring the very useful discussion of why and how finance matters for growth and inequality closer to the realm that is applicable to policymakers.*

Thank you for pointing this out. I have included extended general policy implications discussed in the summary chapter of the dissertation.

6. *However, the summary of the dissertation is missing which should have given an overview of the dissertation and the research questions tackled therein. In this sense, it would have been quite useful as a guide for the reader.*

I have amended the dissertation's summary, where I also elaborate on the policy implications of the thesis findings.

A.3 Martin Čihák Ph.D.

a) Contribution *Combined, the essays compiled in this thesis offer useful and original contributions to the considerable and expanding empirical literature on the intersection of finance, growth, and inequality. On a personal note, I have appreciated the ingenious use of the GFDD database that I spearheaded when I was at the World Bank. I find that this type of rigorous empirical approach can truly improve our understanding of the role of finance in the economy.*

I have three comments/suggestions for clarifications on the thesis contribution:

1. *The document unfortunately appears to be incomplete, because Chapter 1 is missing/blank. The thesis would benefit from a well-crafted introductory chapter.*

Thank you. Indeed, I have thoroughly amended the summary chapter of the dissertation.

2. *Given that chapters 2 and 3 are both joint with two coauthors (Mr. Mares being listed as the last of the three), it may be useful to clarify Mr. Mares's contribution. I presume that Mr. Mares has contributed significantly, but there is no way for me to ascertain the precise extent of Mr. Mares's involvement. It would be helpful for the thesis to contain an upfront disclosure/statement about the nature and scope of Mr. Mares's contribution to each of the co-authored essays (perhaps on the same page as the "declaration of authorship"), indicating what are the contributions of Mr. Mares, and what are those of his coauthors.*

Thank you for pointing this out. I comment on my contribution in the introductory chapter of the dissertation. My contribution is well appraised in the supervisor's report.

3. *Chapter 4 seems an extension of chapter 3, using the same Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach to the finance-inequality nexus, the difference being that chapter 4 looks at income instead of wealth proxies. If there are other notable differences or contributions, it may be useful to flag any novel contributions upfront (perhaps in the forthcoming chapter 1).*

Well taken point and similar to Mr. Geršl's observation. I have adjusted the part on the value-added of the paper. I make four different points: 1) we efficiently account for model uncertainty as with the previous papers, 2) we use the WID data on the top income shares, 3) we simultaneously consider different proxies of financial development to identify the most important ones, and 4) we do not merely examine multiple measures of income inequality for robustness checks, but we can to some extent distinguish diverse effects across the income distribution. I have reflected this also in the summary chapter of the dissertation.

e) Comments

1. *In chapter 2, the finding that quality of finance matters is intellectually appealing, but I would caution that the measure of net interest margin is only a partial proxy for "efficiency". In particular, net interest margin captures factors such as asset composition of financial intermediaries. To truly evaluate efficiency of financial intermediaries, one needs to look also at other measures, such as cost-to-income ratios or overhead costs to total assets (which are also in the GFDD). Following up on the earlier general*

point, having a solid conceptual/theoretical discussion of “efficiency of financial intermediaries” may be helpful before diving into the BMA and using it on the net interest margin as a proxy.

Thank you for the suggestion. I agree that the careful definition of what we understand behind the efficiency of financial institutions is critical for the discussion throughout the dissertation chapters. We may have used it too heedlessly in the paper on finance-growth nexus. I used the summary chapter to shed some light upon this issue and included a part where I attempt to conceptualize what we refer to as efficiency of finance and stress the limitations presented by the use of proxies. We use the other indicators (overhead costs, return on assets/equity) in the later papers. The choice of net interest margin in the first paper was dictated dominantly by the country-coverage at the time of writing.

2. *In chapter 2, the discussion on nonlinearity (section 2.5.3) comes across as an afterthought. Given the massive attention in the recent literature on nonlinearities in the relationship between finance and growth, it is surprising to see this aspect to receive only a relatively scant attention. Nonlinearity in the finance-growth nexus (and finance-inequality nexus) may well be a part of the reason why linear relationships (examined in much of this paper) can come out insignificant.*

I understand the concern, but we note the non-linearity already in the paper’s introduction and thoroughly examine it later in the devoted section (now 2.5.4). We do not find relevance for the non-linear terms, either quadratic transformations or interactions between the financial development indicators, under any scenario. This is why we also present the results as a robustness check rather than as a baseline for the paper.

3. *In chapters 3 and 4, it would be helpful to clarify the different concepts of inequality, how they are measured, and how they relate to each other. It is important to flag that the precision of some commonly used inequality indicators has become a subject of major public controversy and discussion (Auten and Splinter 2019; Bhalla 2017; Economist 2019) In light of these important debates, a fuller discussion of weaknesses of existing inequality measures seems important. Please consider adding (and discussing) the following references:*

- Auten, Gerald, and David Splinter. 2019. “Top 1 Percent Income

Shares: Comparing Estimates Using Tax Data.” AEA Papers and Proceedings 109:307–311.

- Bhalla, Surjit S. 2017. *The New Wealth of Nations*. Simon and Schuster
- Economist. 2019. “Inequality Illusions: Why Wealth and Income Gaps Are Not What They Appear.” November 30

Thank you for directing me towards additional resources. I am aware of the current contests about inequality measurement in the literature. I have devoted part of the summary chapter to measurement issues, including discussion of selected references. In setting up the right policies to address inequality trends, I believe the issue is fundamental. At the same time, as long as the measurement issues are not dramatically heterogeneous across countries and time (which we, unfortunately, cannot completely rule out), consistently collected and constructed data may inform us on the causes and consequences of inequality irrespective of the precise numbers put on various measures of inequality. Lastly, the discussion on the wealth/income inequality differences is part of Chapter 3, and I cover the measurement of inequality measures employed in the respective chapters.

4. *Chapter 3: given the importance of instruments for the BMA estimation, please consider a more specific discussion of the instruments. For example, why is the average of areas 3D, 4C, 4D, and 5A of the EFW a suitable instrument? The authors claim that “components of our financial liberalization measure are exogenous to the wealth inequality as the change in wealth distribution is improbably to have direct effect on any of them“. It is unclear where this assertion comes from, so if there is evidence for it, I suggest adding it. There is some evidence to the contrary, at least for income inequality (see for example Sylwester, Kevin, 2010, *Journal of Applied Economics*), finding strong evidence of links between inequality and the black market premium (which is one of the EFW areas, namely 4C).*

The instrumental variable approach relies heavily on good instrument choice, and their qualification may almost universally be disputed (Deaton, 2010). Nevertheless, we found the genetic distance and selected components of EFW (also used as financial liberalization proxy by de Haan and

Sturm (2017)), to be reasonable instruments empirically and conceptually. I have read Sylwester (2003) with interest. He associates the black market premium with income inequality, but the focus is on the link from black market premium to inequality rather than the other way around. Moreover, he is not definite on the mechanism through which the association works and as one of the promising routes, he marks interest rate differential (from LIBOR). Such a mechanism, in fact, largely supports our choice of black-market premium as an instrument for financial development indicators, provided that the effect goes *only* through financial channels.

5. *Chapter 4 departs from much of existing literature by considering the after-tax rather than the before-tax income distribution as a dependent variable. However, the rationale for this choice is not well explained. In fact, one could make the case for considering before-tax income distribution, because that's the one where financial sector's role is likely to be more prominent/visible (and more separable from the effects of other policies, including fiscal).*

I agree with the practical note. We rely on the after-tax income Gini coefficient as we also include the redistribution variable among the regressors to indirectly account for taxation and transfers, as coverage of exact data on the two is scarce. Since we define it as a difference between before-tax and after-tax Gini coefficients, the estimate is not substantially influenced by using either of the two as the dependent variable. The switch changes only the sign of the posterior mean of redistribution. This supports the point by Furceri and Ostry (2019) that unless redistribution is systematically correlated with other regressors, their effect on the net and gross inequality should be the same. In our case, using after-tax allows for more intuitive interpretation. I address this issue also in the earlier response above. Please refer to Table A.3, where I provide the estimation with the before-tax Gini coefficient as the dependent variable. I report only the regressors with PIP above 0.7 as the results are nearly identical to the baseline estimate.

6. *The thesis — across the chapters — would benefit from strengthening the discussion on policy implications. For example, chapter 2 says that “the current wave of regulatory changes intended to safeguard financial stability should carefully analyze the consequences for the efficiency of*

financial intermediaries,” which would benefit from clarification. Are the authors suggesting to reorient micro- and macro-prudential supervisors from safeguarding financial stability to targeting efficiency of financial intermediaries? (I presume not, but the text could be misread that way.) Also, the reference to “the current wave of regulatory changes” seems outdated and misleading, given that the post-crisis regulatory wave has already taken place (and we are now in the stage where some countries are considering regulatory roll-backs.)

This point is well taken. I have reworded part of the policy conclusions included and extended the discussion on overall policy implications in the summary chapter of the dissertation.

7. *Chapter 2, page 20: the regression includes various dummy variables, such as the one for Sub-Saharan Africa and the “fraction of Confucian population” (which is close to a proxy for China). Given the importance of these regions, I worry that the estimated coefficients on those dummy variables are just proxies for our ignorance about the underlying drivers of the finance-growth relationship. It would be useful to include a solid discussion on these dummy variables.*

Your concern is valid. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America dummies, along with a fraction of the Confucian population, may distort not only the effect of financial variables, but perhaps further regressors. Sub-Saharan dummy also shows a high correlation with other variables. It is one of the reasons we dropped it in the second paper on finance and wealth inequality. Note that the effect of Sub-Saharan countries diminishes when we consider other financial indicators additionally to private credit, so this could be some evidence it is masking effects related to financial development (although in a shorter period of 2000’s its PIP jumps up again, perhaps driven by specific time period assumed). The fraction of the Confucian population likely captures the extraordinary growth rate of particular countries for the large part of the period we explore, but China is not among them as it is not present in our sample. The countries with the highest fraction of the Confucian population are South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Hopefully, as the data collection progresses, future research will be able to fully abstract from these variables.

8. *Chapter 2, front page footnote: “the The World Bank Econonmic Review” should read “The World Bank Economic Review”.*

Corrected. Thank you for pointing it out.

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