

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

Institute of International Studies

Department of Russian and East European Studies

**ARISTOTLE UNIVERSITY OF**

**THESSALONIKI**

**FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY**

School of History and Archaeology

**Dissertation Thesis**

**2021**

**Nikola Karasová**

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**  
**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
Institute of International Studies  
Department of Russian and East European Studies

**ARISTOTLE UNIVERSITY OF  
THESSALONIKI**  
**FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY**  
School of History and Archaeology

**Nikola Karasová**

**Parakratos in Post-Civil War Greece:  
Reality and Interpretation**

*Dissertation Thesis*

Prague; Thessaloniki 2021

Author: **Mgr. Nikola Karasová**

Supervisors: **Doc. Kateřina Králová, Ph.D.; Prof. Basil Gounaris**

Year of the defence: 2021

## References

KARASOVÁ, Nikola. *Parakratos in Post-Civil War Greece: Reality and Interpretation*. Prague; Thessaloniki, 2021. 278 pages. Dissertation thesis (PhD.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of International Studies. Department of Russian and East European Studies; Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Faculty of Philosophy, School of History and Archaeology. Supervisors Doc. Kateřina Králová, Ph.D., Prof. Basil Gounaris.

## Abstract

Based on a historiographical, archival and media analysis, this doctoral thesis explores the phenomenon of *parakratos* (translated as *deep state* or *parastate*) in post-civil war Greece (1949-1967). Research perspectives are fourfold: Firstly, *parakratos* is discussed in the context of academic debates on *parapolitics* and the concepts of the *dual state*, the *security state* and the *deep state*; and presented as a Cold War parallel power mechanism, analogical to Italy and Turkey. Secondly, *parakratos* is analysed as part of domestic political reality through the prism of the historical events documented in Greek historiography. In this sense, the thesis concentrates on the emergence and operation of clandestine military groups and *parastate* ultra-nationalist organisations against the backdrop of the Greek political, legal and social environment. Both phenomena are elaborated on through the lens of the inefficient Greek political and administrative system, a deeply divided society, the politicisation of the public space, and the persistence of clientelist networks constructed upon political loyalties. Third, the *parakratos* is examined on an interpretative level as a term and concept employed in Greek historiography. Focusing on its presumed roots, actors, purposes and relations with the state, three dominant images of the *parakratos* (paramilitary, military, and conspiratorial) are outlined. Fourth, the thesis indicates that the *parakratos*-related conspiratorial discourse was linked with the anti-Right political speech, which subsequently influenced the left-wing historiography on post-civil war Greece. In compliance with conceptual history, the case study of the *parakratos* shows that to take a fresh look at post-civil war Greek history, a major revision of used terms is needed. Not only do concepts such as the *parakratos* stem from the respective period, but they also define it, thus determining which angle of interpretation we will take.

## Abstrakt

Na základě historiografické analýzy, archivního výzkumu a dobového tisku zpracovává tato disertační práce problematiku *parastátu* (řec. *parakratos*, ang. *deep state* nebo *parastate*) v Řecku v období po občanské válce (1949-1967). K problému přistupuje ze čtyř perspektiv: zaprvé, *parastát* diskutuje v kontextu akademických debat o *parapolitice* a konceptech *duálního státu*, *bezpečnostního státu* a *hlubokého státu*; a prezentuje ho jako studenoválečný paralelní mocenský mechanismus, analogický k podobným případům v Itálii a Turecku. Zadruhé, *parastát* analyzuje jako součást řecké politické reality prismatickým dějinným událostí tak, jak je zdokumentovala řecká historiografie. V tomto smyslu se disertace soustředí na vznik a činnost tajných vojenských skupin a *parastátních* ultranacionalistických organizací, které zkoumá ve vztahu s řeckým politickým, právním a sociálním prostředím. Na oba jevy nahlíží

optickou neefektivního řeckého politického a administrativního systému, hluboce rozdělené společnosti, zpolitizovaného veřejného prostoru a přetrvávajících klientelistických sítí založených na principu politické loajality. Zatřetí, *parastát* je probádán na úrovni interpretace jako termín a koncept užívaný řeckou historiografií. S ohledem na předpokládané kořeny parastátu, jeho aktéry, cíle a vztah vůči státu jsou vymezeny jeho tři hlavní podoby (polovojenský, vojenský, a konspirační). Začtvrté, se tato disertace věnuje konspiračnímu diskursu o parastátu, který spojuje s protiprávicovou politickou rétorikou, a potažmo s řeckou levicovou historiografií. V souladu s konceptuální historií tato případová studie parastátu ukazuje, že k získání nového pohledu na období po řecké občanské válce je třeba zásadně revidovat užívané termíny. Nejenže koncepty, jakým je i *parastát*, z tohoto období ideologicky vycházejí, ale rovněž je i definují, čímž také určují úhel interpretace, který volíme.

## Περίληψη

Βασισμένη στην ιστοριογραφική και αρχειακή ανάλυση και στην ανάλυση των μέσων ενημέρωσης, η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή διερευνά το φαινόμενο του *παρακράτους* στη μετεμφυλιακή Ελλάδα (1949-1967). Οι ερευνητικές προοπτικές είναι οι εξής τέσσερις: Πρώτον, το *παρακράτος* συζητείται στο πλαίσιο της ακαδημαϊκής αντιπαράθεσης αναφορικά με την *παραπολιτική* και τις έννοιες του *διπλού κράτους* (*dual state*), του *κράτους ασφάλειας* (*security state*) και του *βαθύ κράτους* (*deep state*) και παρουσιάζεται ως ένας ψυχροπολεμικός παράλληλος μηχανισμός εξουσίας, ανάλογος με αυτούς σε Ιταλία και Τουρκία. Δεύτερον, το *παρακράτος* αναλύεται ως μέρος της εγχώριας πολιτικής πραγματικότητας υπό το πρίσμα των ιστορικών γεγονότων τα οποία τεκμηριώνει η ελληνική ιστοριογραφία. Με αυτή την έννοια, η παρούσα διατριβή επικεντρώνεται στην ανάδυση και λειτουργία μυστικών στρατιωτικών ομάδων και *παρακρατικών* ακραίως εθνικιστικών οργανώσεων με φόντο το ελληνικό πολιτικό, νομικό και κοινωνικό περιβάλλον. Και τα δύο φαινόμενα επεξεργάζονται μέσα από το ανεπαρκές ελληνικό πολιτικό και διοικητικό σύστημα, μία βαθιά διχασμένη κοινωνία, την πολιτικοποίηση του δημόσιου χώρου και την επίμονη λειτουργία πελατειακών δικτύων οικοδομημένα γύρω από πολιτικές συνδέσεις. Τρίτον, το *παρακράτος* ερευνάται σε ένα ερμηνευτικό επίπεδο ως όρος και έννοια που χρησιμοποιείται από την ελληνική ιστοριογραφία. Εστιάζοντας στις εικαζόμενες ρίζες, τους δρώντες, τους σκοπούς και τις συνδέσεις του με το κράτος, σκιαγραφούνται τρεις κύριες εικόνες του *παρακράτους* (παραστρατιωτική, στρατιωτική και συνωμοτική). Τέταρτον, η παρούσα διατριβή υποδεικνύει ότι ο συνωμοτικός λόγος που σχετίζεται με το *παρακράτος* συνδέεται με τον αντί-δεξιό πολιτικό λόγο, ο οποίος με τη σειρά του επηρέασε την αριστερή ιστοριογραφία αναφορικά με την μετεμφυλιακή Ελλάδα. Σε συμφωνία με την εννοιολογική ιστορία, η μελέτη περίπτωσης του *παρακράτους* υποδεικνύει ότι για να δοθεί μια νέα οπτική στην μετεμφυλιακή ελληνική ιστορία, μια ουσιαστική αναθεώρηση των χρησιμοποιούμενων όρων είναι αναγκαία. Έννοιες όπως το *παρακράτος* όχι μόνον πηγάζουν από την αντίστοιχη εποχή αλλά την ορίζουν επίσης, καθορίζοντας επομένως ποια ερμηνευτική οπτική γωνία θα ακολουθήσουμε.

## **Keywords**

Greece; Cold War; Greek Civil War (1946-1949); anti-communism; paramilitarism; parapolitics; parakratos; deep state; conspiracy theories; conceptual history; historiography

## **Klíčová slova**

Řecko; Studená válka; Řecká občanská válka (1946-1949); antikomunismus; paramilitarismus; parapolitika; parastát; hluboký stát; konspirační teorie; konceptuální historie; historiografie

## **Λέξεις-κλειδιά**

Ελλάδα; Ψυχρός Πόλεμος; Ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος (1946-1949); αντικομμουνισμός; παραμιλιταρισμός; παραπολιτική; παρακράτος; βαθύ κράτος; θεωρίες συνωμοσίας; εννοιολογική ιστορία; ιστοριογραφία

**Length of the work: 275 pages**

## **Declaration**

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 29 April 2021

Nikola Karasová

## Acknowledgement

This thesis results from several long years of effort, supported by numerous scholarships, colleagues and friends. It would hardly have come into existence without the unconditional support of my supervisors, Doc. Kateřina Králová (Charles University, Prague) and Prof. Basil C. Gounaris (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki). Thanks to Kateřina Králová, I discovered my passion for modern Greek history in the first place, which ultimately led to the pursuit of my PhD studies under her guidance and the development of this project. She always offered her friendly advice and pushed me to hold tight more than anyone else when I started questioning my work. I am immensely thankful for everything she taught me, both professionally and personally. Secondly, I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Gounaris for his support and extraordinary efforts in facilitating a cotutelle between the two universities, which enabled my closer connection with Greek academia.

Besides these two influential scholars, I was fortunate enough to discuss my PhD project with many outstanding scholars whose comments and reflections became a great inspiration. First and foremost, I would like to thank to Stratos Dordanas, Eleni Paschaloudi, Nikos Marantzidis, Ioannis Armakolas, Dimitris Livanios, Theodosios Tsironis, Philip Carabott, Thanos Veremis, Sotiris Rizas, Ioannis Stefanidis, Antonis Klapsis, Nikiforos Diamandouros, Sotiris Sotiropoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassileiou and Haris Tzimitras, all of whom I had the pleasure to talk with during my research stays in Greece and Cyprus.

Furthermore, I am enormously grateful to Prof. Christian Voss for providing his guidance during my research stay at Humboldt University in Berlin and to Nikolas Pissis for his assistance and advice. While working on the conceptualisation of the *parakratos*, I also genuinely appreciated the help of Türkay Salim Nefes, Doğan Gürpınar, Burak Bilgehan Özpek and Nebojša Blanuša, who each provided their perceptions of the *deep state* in non-Greek contexts.

I would not have been able to carry out my research and academic development to such an extent without the support of Charles University, whose Grant Agency (GA UK) kindly provided me with a generous grant (project no. 32217). Furthermore, Charles University enabled me to participate in other projects, focusing on research,



academic mobility and networking, as part of the university's PRIMUS program and the Mobility Fund, the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, the inter-university mobility program CENTRAL, the EU's COST ACTION and the Erasmus student mobility program.

I need to thank all lecturers at the Institute of International Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University, especially to Doc. Ota Konrad as the guarantor of my PhD study programme. I would also like to express my immense thanks to Dr Kostas Tsivos for his kind advice and friendliness.

Finally, I would like to thank my wonderful family, Mehmet Hakan and all my friends, for their love, support and endless understanding.



# Table of Contents

<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>1. THE <i>PARAKRATOS</i>: THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM AND ITS POSITIONING IN THE SCIENTIFIC DEBATE</b> .....	<b>20</b>
1.1 <i>The Parastate and the Debate on Parapolitics</i> .....	23
1.2 <i>The NATO's Stay-Behind Armies</i> .....	28
1.2.1 <i>The Operation Gladio in Italy</i> .....	29
1.2.2 <i>The Operation Sheepskin in Greece</i> .....	32
1.2.3 <i>The Counter-Guerilla in Turkey</i> .....	38
1.3 <i>The Rise of the Deep State as a Concept</i> .....	41
1.4 <i>The Deep State as a Conspiratorial Discourse</i> .....	46
<b>2. GREEK ANTI-COMMUNISM (1914–1967): THE ANTI-COMMUNIST LEGISLATION AND THE “PARA-CONSTITUTION”</b> .....	<b>51</b>
2.1 <i>The Emergence of the KKE</i> .....	54
2.2 <i>The Interwar Anti-Communist Legislation</i> .....	59
2.3 <i>Towards the Civil War</i> .....	65
2.4 <i>Civil War-Related Anti-Communist Rhetoric</i> .....	69
2.5 <i>Anti-Communist Legislation in Civil War Greece</i> .....	72
2.6 <i>The Continuation of Anti-Communist Legislation in Post-Civil War Greece</i> .....	76
<b>3. THE “RIGHT-WING ESTABLISHMENT” (1949–1967): AUTHORITARIAN OR DEMOCRATIC?</b> .....	<b>83</b>
3.1 <i>The Post-Civil War Division of Political Power</i> .....	85
3.2 <i>Foreign Involvement</i> .....	92
3.3 <i>The Political Opposition</i> .....	98
3.4 <i>The Character of the Post-Civil War Regime</i> .....	106
<b>4. THE POST-CIVIL WAR <i>PARAKRATOS</i> IN THE GREEK HISTORIOGRAPHY: HISTORICAL REALITY AND INTERPRETATION</b> .....	<b>114</b>
4.1 <i>The Interwar Roots of the Parakratos</i> .....	117
4.2 <i>The Parakratos of Wartime Collaborators</i> .....	122
4.3 <i>The Parakratos in the Post-War Power Vacuum</i> .....	125
4.4 <i>The Parakratos in the Civil War</i> .....	131
4.5 <i>The Agents of the Post-Civil War Parakratos</i> .....	135
4.5.1 <i>The Military Parakratos</i> .....	136
4.5.2 <i>The Paramilitary Parakratos</i> .....	139
4.5.3 <i>The Parakratos as a Broad Conspiracy</i> .....	146
4.6 <i>The Position of the Parakratos Towards the State</i> .....	152
4.7 <i>The Purpose of the Parakratos</i> .....	155
<b>5. THE “PARALLEL STRUCTURES” IN THE GREEK MILITARY</b> .....	<b>161</b>
5.1 <i>Wartime Ideological Struggles Inside the Greek Army</i> .....	164
5.2 <i>The Emergence of Anti-Communist “Secret” Organisations</i> .....	170
5.3 <i>The IDEA on the Rise</i> .....	172
5.4 <i>The 1951 Coup and Its Aftermath</i> .....	174
5.5 <i>IDEA in Decline</i> .....	177
5.6 <i>The Establishment of the EENA</i> .....	180
5.7 <i>The Pericles Plan</i> .....	182
5.8 <i>The ASPIDA Scandal</i> .....	189
5.9 <i>The 1967 coup</i> .....	194

<b>6. THE PARAKRATOS OF CITIZENS' ORGANISATIONS .....</b>	<b>199</b>
6.1 <i>The Mobilisation of the Youth Movement.....</i>	201
6.2 <i>The Parakratos of the Youth .....</i>	205
6.3 <i>The Parakratos of the Indignant "Patriotic" Citizens .....</i>	218
6.4 <i>The Case of Xenophon Giosmas.....</i>	225
6.5 <i>The Assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis .....</i>	229
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>240</b>
<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>252</b>
<b>LIST OF REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>254</b>

## List of Abbreviations

ACC	Allied Clandestine Committee
AKP	Justice and Development Party ( <i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i> )
AMAG	American Mission for Aid to Greece
AMFOGE	American Mission to Observe Greek Elections
ANEL	Independent Greeks ( <i>Anexartitoi Ellines</i> )
ASE	Anti-Communist Crusade of Greece ( <i>Antikommunistiki Stavroforia Ellados</i> )
ASO	Antifascist Military Organisation ( <i>Antifasistiki Stratiotiki Organosi</i> )
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPC	Clandestine Planning Committee
DNL	Lambrakis Democratic Youth ( <i>Dimokratiki Neolaia Lambraki</i> )
DSE	Democratic Army of Greece ( <i>Dimokratikos Stratos tis Ellados</i> )
EAM/ELAS	National Liberation Front/Greek People's Liberation Army ( <i>Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo/Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos</i> )
EAO	National Anti-communist Organisation of Katerini, Pieria and Olympos ( <i>Ethniki Antikommounistiki Organosis Katerinis, Pierion kai Olympou</i> )
EAT-ESA	Special Investigation Department of the Greek Military Police ( <i>Eidiko Anakritiko Tmima tis Ellinikis Stratiotikis Astynomias</i> )
EDA	United Democratic Left ( <i>Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera</i> )
EDES	National Republican Greek League ( <i>Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos</i> )
EEC	European Economic Community
EEDYE	Greek Committee for International Détente and Peace ( <i>Elliniki Epitropi dia tin Diethni Yfesi kai Eirini</i> )
EEE	Union of Nationally Minded ELAS Fighters ( <i>Enosis Ethnikofronon Elasion</i> )
EEE	National Union of Greece ( <i>Ethniki Enosis Ellas</i> )
EES	National Greek Army (a paramilitary organisation; <i>Ethnikos Ellinikos Stratos</i> )
EENA	Union of Young Greek Officers ( <i>Ethniki Enosis Neon Axiomatikon</i> )
EFEE	National Student Union of Greece ( <i>Ethniki Foititiki Enosis Ellados</i> )
ENA	Union of Young Officers ( <i>Enosis Neon Axiomatikon</i> )
EK	Centre Union ( <i>Enosis Kendrou</i> )
EKA	National Social Change ( <i>Ethniki Koinoniki Allagi</i> )
EKD	National Social Action ( <i>Ethniki Koinoniki Drasis</i> )
EKE	National Social Assault ( <i>Ethniki Koinoniki Exormisis</i> )
EKKA	National and Social Liberation ( <i>Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosis</i> )
EKOF	National Social Organisation of Students ( <i>Ethniki Koinoniki Organosi Foititon</i> )
EON	National Youth Organisation ( <i>Ethniki Organosis Neolaias</i> )

EPON	United Panhellenic Organisation of Youth ( <i>Eniaia Panelladiki Organosi Neon</i> )
ERE	National Radical Union ( <i>Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis</i> )
EREN	National Radical Union's Youth ( <i>Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi Neon</i> )
ERP	European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan)
ES	Greek Rally ( <i>Ellinikos Synagermos</i> )
EVON	National Royalist Youth Organisation ( <i>Ethniki Vasiliki Organosi Neolaias</i> )
FIDE	Liberal Democratic Union ( <i>Fileleftheri Dimokratiki Enosi</i> )
FPEP	Piraeus Spiritual Home for Students ( <i>Foititiki Pnevmatiki Estia Peiraios</i> )
GDEA	General Directorate of National Security ( <i>Geniki Diefthynsi Ethnikis Asfaleias</i> )
GDTP	General Directorate of Press and Information ( <i>Geniki Dievthynsis Typou kai Pliroforion</i> )
GEA	General Staff of the Air Force ( <i>Geniko epiteleio aeroporias</i> )
GEETHA	Hellenic National Defence General Staff ( <i>Geniko Epiteleio Ethnikis Alynas</i> )
GES	Hellenic Army General Staff ( <i>Geniko Epiteleio Stratou</i> )
GSEE	General Confederation of Greek Workers ( <i>Geniki synomospondia ergaton Ellados</i> )
IDEA	Holy Bond of Greek Officers ( <i>Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon</i> )
JUSMAPG	Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group
K4A	4 <sup>th</sup> August Party ( <i>Komma 4is Avgoustou</i> )
KKE	Communist Party of Greece ( <i>Kommounistiko Komma tis Ellados</i> )
KKE/ETKD	Communist Party of Greece/Greek Section of the Communist International ( <i>Kommounistiko komma Ellados/Elliniko tmima tis Kommounistikis Diethnous</i> )
KYP	Central Intelligence Service ( <i>Kendriki Ypiresia Pliroforion</i> )
LOK	Mountain Raider Companies ( <i>Lochoi Oreion Katadromon</i> )
MAD	Municipal Security Units ( <i>Monades Asfaleias Dimosyndiritoi</i> )
MAH	Organisation for National Security Affairs ( <i>Milli Amele Hizmet</i> )
MAY	Country Security Units ( <i>Monades Asfaleias Ypaithrou</i> )
MEA	Units of National Defence ( <i>Monades Ethnofylakis Alynis</i> )
MIT	National Intelligence Organisation ( <i>Milli Istihbaarat Teskilati</i> )
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ND	New Democracy ( <i>Nea Dimokratia</i> )
NDS	Nuclei for Defence of the State ( <i>Nuclei di Difesa della Stato</i> )
NED	Youth of National Action ( <i>Neolaia Ethnikis Draseos</i> )
NEDA	EDA Youth ( <i>Neolaia tis EDA</i> )
NOA	Nazi Organisation of Athens ( <i>Nazistiki Organosi Athinon</i> )
OAAEE	Organisation of Unseen Fighters of the Greek Nation ( <i>Organosis Aoraton Agoniston Ellinikou Ethnous</i> )
OEA	Association for the National Renaissance ( <i>Omilos Ethnikis Anagenniseos</i> )
OEA	Organisation of National Resistance ( <i>Organosis Ethnikis Antistaseos</i> )

OEFI	Organisation of Nationally-Minded Medical Students ( <i>Organosi Ethnikofronon Foititon Iatrikis</i> )
OEN-SEN	Organisation of National Youth – Corps of Hopeful Youth ( <i>Organosis Ethnikis Neolaias – Soma Elpidoforon Neon</i> )
OHD	Special Warfare Department ( <i>Özel Harp Dairesi</i> )
ONEK	Centre Union’s Youth Organisation ( <i>Organosi Neon Enoseos Kendrou</i> )
OSEN	Student Organisation of National Youth ( <i>Organosi Spoudaston Ethnikis Neolaias</i> )
PAME	All-Democratic Greek Agricultural Front ( <i>Pandimokratiko Agrotiko Metopo Ellados</i> )
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement ( <i>Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima</i> )
PEEA	Political Committee of National Liberation ( <i>Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis</i> )
PEKEN	Panhellenic National Social Union of Youth ( <i>Panellinia Ethniki Koinoniki Enosi Neon</i> )
PEN	Progressive Union of Youth ( <i>Proodeftiki Enosi Neon</i> )
PES	Panhellenic National Crusade ( <i>Panellinios Ethniki Stavroforia</i> )
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party ( <i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê</i> )
PSE	Panhellenic Association of Reservists ( <i>Panellinios Syndesmos Efedron</i> )
SAN	Association of Young Officers ( <i>Syndesmos Aksiomatikon Neon</i> )
SEA	Corps of Valiant Greeks ( <i>Soma Ellinon Alkimon</i> )
SEKE	Socialist Labour Party ( <i>Socialistiko ergatiko komma Ellados</i> )
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SID	Defence Information Service ( <i>Servizio Informazioni Difesa</i> )
SIFAR	Armed Forces Information Service ( <i>Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate</i> )
SISMI	Military Intelligence and Security Service ( <i>Servizio Informazioni Sicurezza Militare</i> )
SIS (MI6)	Secret Intelligence Service
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SPEAN	Association for the Spiritual and Cultural Development of the Youth of Vyronas ( <i>Sylogos Pnevmatikis kai Ekpolitistikis Anaptyxeos Neon Vyronos</i> )
STK	Tactical Mobilisation Group ( <i>Seferberlik Taktik Kurulu</i> )
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left ( <i>Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras</i> )
TEA	Battalions of National Defence ( <i>Tagmata Ethnofylakis Amynis</i> )
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
US	United States of America
USIA/USIS	United States Information Agency/United States Information Service
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VESMA	Royal Hellenic Army of the Middle East ( <i>Vasilikos Ellinikos Stratos Mesis Anatólis</i> )
XA	Golden Dawn ( <i>Chrysi Avgi</i> )

## Introduction

When we study political developments in post-civil war Greece (1949–1967), we frequently encounter the term *parakratos* in the works of historians, political scientists, sociologists and political analysts whether they are from Greece or another country. The *parakratos* can also be referred to as the *parastate* or *deep state*, but it can most simply be defined as a parallel system of political power. Most authors mention it only briefly, and do not provide a detailed explanation of its origins, its component parts, how it functioned, or what it represented. Scholars who do analyse the *parakratos* more thoroughly often take entirely different approaches to it, which has caused great confusion about the nature of the *parakratos* and the many ways it manifested itself in the domestic political reality of Greece. Because of the lack of comprehensive research, the literature is full of mutually conflicting interpretations of the *parakratos*. Scholars place its origins and its operation in various historical periods and in diverse geographical areas, social environments and institutional settings. There is no consensus about which actors constituted the *parakratos*, nor is there any certainty about their aims. The *parakratos* is ill-defined, and its meaning has been stretched in both academic and popular literature to cover a large array of very heterogeneous historical and political phenomena.

The term *parakratos* implies a hidden power mechanism of a political, military and paramilitary character, which presumably operates behind the scenes and aims to direct political developments.<sup>1</sup> While the historiographical focus lies on the post-civil war Greece, some authors trace its origins back to the Balkan Wars (1912–1913).<sup>2</sup> Others see it continuing to exist in Greece well after 1974, when the country began to democratise after the fall of the junta, and still today.<sup>3</sup> The literature on the post-civil

---

<sup>1</sup> Georgios Babiniotis, *Lexiko tis neas ellinikis glossas [Dictionary of Modern Greek Language]* (Kentro lexikologias, 2002), 1328.

<sup>2</sup> Spyros Tsoutsoumpis, “‘Political Bandits’”: Nation-Building, Patronage and the Making of the Greek Deep State’, *Balkanistica* 30, no. 1 (2017): 37–64.

<sup>3</sup> Dimitris Psarras, ‘O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou. Apo ton Maniadaki ston Michaloliako. [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party. From Maniadaakis Until Michaloliakos]’, *Archeiotaxio*, no. 16 (2014): 47–68; Tasos Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis: to “vathy kratos” kai i anodos tis Chrysis Avgis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture: The “Deep State” and the Rise of the Golden Dawn]’, *Archeiotaxio* 16 (2014): 69–88; Dimitris Christopoulos, ed., *To ‘vathy kratos’ sti simerini Ellada kai i Akrodexia: astynomia, dikaiosyni, stratos, ekklesia [The ‘Deep State’ in Today’s Greece and the Far-Right: Police, Justice, State, Church]* (Athina: Nisos, 2014).



war *parakratos* mostly discusses rural and urban paramilitaries and conspiratorial groupings within the national military. The paramilitaries committed various forms of political violence such as murders, physical attacks, and intimidation of political opponents, and combined them with propaganda and illegal economic activity. Military conspiracies stemmed from the politicisation and fractionalisation of the Greek army, and manifested themselves in interference by army officers in political affairs, coups, and military dictatorship. The historiography of Greece tends to portray the post-civil war *parakratos* as a large-scale conspiracy, which involved powerful political, military, security, economic and legal actors who all plotted together against their political adversaries. Used that way, the term *parakratos* explains certain historic political events in a conspiratorial manner and bolsters the ideological prejudices of the scholars who study them.

The conspiratorial image of the *parakratos* reflects the atmosphere of Greece during the Cold War. Following the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), and with the encouragement of the United States,<sup>4</sup> Greece turned itself into a bulwark of anti-communism, preoccupied with a combined external and internal communist threat that was presumably striving to subvert its political and social order. Greece entered NATO together with Turkey in 1952. Its membership was meant to resist the “red peril” from the North, at a time when its neighbouring countries had recently turned communist.<sup>5</sup> The Greek government persecuted the left-wing sympathisers who had been defeated in the civil war and excluded them from politics thereafter. It regarded them as a “fifth column” that was acting in the interest of the USSR against the Greek nation.<sup>6</sup>

The *parakratos* arose in a deeply divided society suffering from profound political polarisation, which had existed long before the civil war. The National Schism

---

<sup>4</sup> Lars Bærentzen and John O. Iatrides, *Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945-1949* (Museum Tusulanum Press, 1987); David H. Close, ed., *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1993); Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); André Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War: Greece 1943-1949* (New Haven - London: Yale University Press, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006); Dimitrios A. Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]* (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2014).

<sup>6</sup> Andreas Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, in *Jahrbuch Für Historische Kommunismusforschung* (Aufbau Verlag, 2011), 101–18; Stratis Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon: antikommounistikos logos kai praktikes [The State of Nationally-Minded: Anti-Communist Speech and Practice]’, *Archeiotaxio* 16 (November 2014): 9–49.

(*Ethnikos Dichasmos*, 1915–1917), was essentially another civil war, fought over Greece’s participation in the First World War, that escalated the disputes between republicans and monarchists.<sup>7</sup> Ongoing political instability throughout the interwar period led to the imposition of an ultra-conservative, monarchist dictatorship under Ioannis Metaxas (1936–1941).<sup>8</sup> The third party in this internal political conflict – the communists – emerged as a significant power only after their successful left-wing resistance against the Axis occupation (1941–1944).<sup>9</sup>

In post-civil war Greece, the domestic political scene featured three main blocs, each of which championed their own distorted and mutually conflicting histories of the Second World War, the civil war, and the post-civil period.<sup>10</sup> They were the victorious political “Right,” the defeated “Left,” and the disunited “Centre.”<sup>11</sup> Each of them used their historical narratives as tools for mobilising their voters. The blocs roughly correspond to the strongest parties of the Greek political spectrum of the time: the right-wing Greek Rally (*Ellinikos Synagermos*, ES) – later replaced by the National Radical Union (*Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis*, ERE); the United Democratic Left (*Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera*, EDA); and the Centre Union (*Enosis Kendrou*, EK). The EK was established only in the early 1960s, on the ruins of several feeble centrist political parties. I decided to use these left-right distinctions because they are typically characterised as such in post-civil war political speech and in the historiography of the

---

<sup>7</sup> George Th. Mavrogordatos, *1915: O ethnikos dichasmos [1915: The National Schism]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Pataki, 2016); Thanasis Diamantopoulos, *I dekaetia tou 1910. Ethnikos Dichasmos (Io tevchos) [The Decade of 1910. National Schism (1st volume)]*, 10 kai mia dekaeties politikou diaireseon: oi diairetikos tomes stin Ellada tin periodo 1910-2017 [Ten Plus One Decades of Political Divisions: The Dividing Sections in Greece Between 1910-2017] (Athina: Epikentro, 2017).

<sup>8</sup> For example, S. Victor Papacosma, ‘Ioannis Metaxas and the “Fourth of August” Dictatorship in Greece’, in *Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe*, ed. Bernd Jürgen Fischer (West Lafayette, Ind: Purdue University Press, 2007), 165–98.

<sup>9</sup> See Richard Clogg, *Greece, 1940-1949. Occupation, Resistance, Civil War: A Documentary History* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Spyros Tsoutsoumpis, *A History of the Greek Resistance in the Second World War: The People’s Armies*, Cultural History of Modern War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Eleni Paschaloudi, *Enas polemos choris telos: I dekaetia tou 1940 ston politiko logo, 1950-1967 [A War Without an End: The Decade of the 1940s in the Political Speech, 1950-1967]* (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2010).

<sup>11</sup> For details, see Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolutions, Current Trends’, in *Greece in the 1980’s*, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan Press, n.d.), 52; David H. Close, *Greece since 1945* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2002), 100–103; Takis S. Pappas, ‘Depolarization, Cleavage Liquidation, and Two-Partyism: The Declining Role of Ideology in Postwar Greek Politics’ (Cleavage Development: Causes and Consequences, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, United Kingdom, 2003), 1–37; Giannis Voulgaris, *I metapoliteftiki Ellada, 1974-2009 [Greece after the Regime Change, 1974-2009]* (Athina: Polis, 2013), 34–36.

post-civil war period. They are also useful in analysing the *parakratos* as it appears in the anti-Right discourse of the Left and the Centre.

The strongly ideological discourse of the civil war and the post-civil war period persisted in Greek society in the period of democratisation after 1974. It influenced the manner in which historians and political analysts approached these political developments. The fall of the junta became a milestone, after which long-suppressed left-wing narratives began to prevail over conservative right-wing discourse. In Greece and abroad, scholars have recently produced a number of outstanding analyses of the civil war. Offering a revised and more balanced interpretation of history, they contest the predominantly left-leaning historiography of the previous decades and seek to heal the longstanding rift in Greek society.<sup>12</sup> Despite their efforts, stereotypes on the role of the three blocs – the Right, the Centre and the Left – in the civil war and post-civil war events linger on in the public debate. They are drawn from earlier academic works and political statements that were based on biased presumptions. There is, on the one hand, a tendency to idealise the left-wing Second World War resistance and the communist struggle in the civil war, while downplaying the social and political threat posed by communism. On the other hand, the conservative approach supports an uncritical assessment of the post-civil war anti-communist governments and even justifies undemocratic measures by referring to the communist danger. Finally, many Greeks of whatever political leanings excuse the deficiencies of the political actors of the time by referring to conspiracies. Political responsibility is thus often minimised in the public debate by playing up the infamous “foreign factor” (*xenos paragontas*).<sup>13</sup> This term

---

<sup>12</sup> See especially Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Nikos Marantzidis, *Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas (DSE): 1946-1949 [The Democratic Army of Greece (DSE): 1946-1949]*, Themata Istorias 2 (Athens: Ekdotis Alexandria, 2010); Nikos Demertzis, Eleni Paschaloudi, and Giorgos Antoniou, eds., *Emfylios: Politistiko travma [The Civil War: Cultural Trauma]* (Athina: Alexandria, 2013). For a commentary, see Nikos Marantzidis and Giorgos Antoniou, ‘The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941-2002’, *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 2 (2004): 223–31; Dimitris Paivanas, ‘Un-Framing the Greek Civil War’, *Modern Greek Studies* 18 (2017): 107–22; Spyridon Plakoudas, *The Greek Civil War: Strategy, Counterinsurgency and the Monarchy*, International Library of War Studies 21 (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 2–5; John Sakkas, ‘Old Interpretations and New Approaches in the Historiography of the Greek Civil War’, *Thetis*, no. 20 (2013): 425–39.

<sup>13</sup> Heinz Richter, ‘Zwischen Tradition und Moderne: Die politische Kultur Griechenlands [Between Tradition and Modernity: Political Culture in Greece]’, in *Politische Kultur in Westeuropa [Political Culture in Western Europe]*, ed. Peter Reichel (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1984), 148; Pavlos Tzermias, *Politik in neuen Hellas: Strukturen, Theorien und Parteien im Wandel [Politics in New Hellas: Structures, Theories and Parties in Transition]* (Tübingen: Francke, 1997), 13; Kateřina Králová, ‘Between Tradition and Modernity: Greek-German Relations in Retrospect’, *Acta Universitatis Carolinae - Studia Territorialia* 4 (2009): 101.

signified the continuous involvement of Great Powers in Greece's domestic affairs ever since the modern Greek state emerged in the 1820s. The "foreign factor" forms part of broader discourses of "crypto-colonialism," as formulated by Michael Herzfeld, according to which Greece as a country was not directly colonised in its past but experienced a long-term dependence on colonial powers that prevented it from obtaining full sovereignty and recognition.<sup>14</sup> In Cold War Greece this role was attributed to the United States. According to many, the United States was behind most of the conspiratorial events of the civil war and the post-civil war period.<sup>15</sup>

The political leanings of researchers of the history of civil war and post-civil war Greece inevitably impacted their writings on the *parakratos*. The term is mostly used in left-wing and centrist discourses and is practically absent from right-wing discourse. This fact motivated me to study the phenomenon from a broader perspective, with the understanding that it relates not only to the historical events and actors that are usually discussed. First of all, I decided to investigate the use of the term *parakratos* as a social scientific concept and embed it in the larger international academic debate about similar phenomena in other countries. Secondly, using the cases of Italy and Turkey, I framed the *parakratos* within the wider context of the Cold War, abandoning a purely Greek focus. Thirdly, I explored the *parakratos* as a politically biased term and interpreted it with a focus on the dominant discourse of the post-civil war period. Finally, I analysed the diverse interpretations of the term that I found in the historiography of Greece. By doing so, I gained further insight into the practical uses of the term, its symbolic meaning, and the effect the term has had on assessments of the post-civil war era. In this way, I could better understand the multi-faceted character of the *parakratos*, considering it from the viewpoint of changing historical and political realities and the metamorphosis of its interpretation.

I was inspired by conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*), as formulated by the German historian Reinhart Koselleck. In his work, Koselleck focuses on the use of value-laden concepts as political tools: "concepts whose semantic 'carrying capacity'

---

<sup>14</sup> Michael Herzfeld, 'The Absent Presence: Discourses of Crypto-Colonialism', *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, no. 4 (2002): 899–926.

<sup>15</sup> For a discussion, see for example John L. Hondros, 'Greece and the German Occupation', in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London ; New York: Routledge, 1993), 32; Nikos Alivizatos, 'The Executive in the Post-Liberation Period, 1944-1949', in *Greece at the Crossroads. The Civil War and Its Legacy*, ed. John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 166–67.

extends further than the ‘mere’ words employed in the sociopolitical domain.”<sup>16</sup> I argue that the *parakratos* is one such concept because in Greece it historically has played an essential role in political campaigns for mobilising voters and legitimating political leaders. Koselleck emphasises “the autonomous power of words, without whose use human actions and passions could hardly be experienced, and certainly not made intelligible to others.” Furthermore, he notes that concepts have both the ability to change society and, at the same time, to transform themselves as society evolves.<sup>17</sup> In this understanding, the *parakratos* was not only a characteristic feature of the post-civil war political regime, but as a concept it has also influenced the optics through which that regime, and later ones, have been studied, analysed and categorised. It is a term we must understand better in order to enhance our overall understanding of the post-civil war period.

Like the concepts Koselleck writes about, the term *parakratos* has lived a life of its own, gradually changing its meaning as the political and historical context changed around it. The term was originally exploited by the Left and the Centre, whose representatives challenged the legality and legitimacy of right-wing rule and demanded that the regime respect democracy. Soon enough, the term became a tool for mobilising voters, a shorthand for accusing political adversaries (regardless of their political orientation) of secretly acting to direct political developments in Greece. I argue that political actors use the term *parakratos* to demonise each other and to emphasise their victimhood. The conspiratorial nature of the concept continues to play a fundamental role in analysis of the parallel system of political power and the post-civil war political regime as such. Thus, when we refer to the *parakratos*, we need to acknowledge that the term emerged in the post-civil war period and was an intrinsic part of the political discourse of that time. It developed within the confines of a restricted political and legal regime and was embedded in the Cold War setting, which in Greece was characterised by intense anti-communist propaganda and an atmosphere of mutual mistrust. The continued use of the term *parakratos* strengthened Right-Left antagonism and broadened the rift in Greek society.

---

<sup>16</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Times* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1985), 76.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 82–83. See also Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002).

The ongoing application of the term *parakratos* to contemporary Greece is also problematic. Despite some deficiencies Greece undoubtedly is a democratic state. Yet, the *parakratos* presumes the involvement of the authorities and political representatives of the state (*kratos*) in its operation.<sup>18</sup> The *parakratos* has been described by scholars as a semi-independent entity that defined its role not only with regard to what the state wanted but also according to its own particular interests.<sup>19</sup> The functioning of the *parakratos* relied heavily on networks of clientelism, patronage and the related distribution of power, that constituted a typical feature in modern Greek society. The *parakratos* manifested itself in the abuse of power and exceeding of constitutional and legal authority.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the presumption that the *parakratos* still exists today in Greece tends to undermine trust in the current Greek political system. For these reasons and given the ideologically loaded and conspiratorial nature of the term, I do not consider it a reliable academic concept. I would also refrain from applying it to analysis of historical and political situations other than of post-civil war Greece.

In terms of sources and methodology, my research is predominantly based on historiographic analysis. Therefore, my primary sources consisted of a wide range of literature written mostly in Greek, English and German. These works mainly related to the civil war and post-civil war periods in Greece. They usually speak of the phenomenon of the *parakratos* in broad terms. Secondly, I used archival sources, such as statutes and other administrative documents related to the operations of *parastate* organisations, which I gathered from archives in Greece, specifically from the Contemporary Social History Archives (ASKI), General State Archives (GAK) and the

---

<sup>18</sup> For example, Nikos P. Mouzelis and George Pagoulatos, 'Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece', September 2002, 3–4, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203311462>.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Giannis Gianoulopoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos kai i makra istoria tou, to foititiko kinima ton archon tis dekaetias tou 1960: i dolofonia tou Grigori Lampraki [The Greek Parakratos and its Long History, the Student Movement of the Early 1960s: The Assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis]', in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton koinovouleftismo kai ti dimokratia, 2016), 140.

<sup>20</sup> Stratos Dordanas, "'I organosi tis karfitsas": kratos kai parakratos sti Thessaloniki ti dekaetia tou 1960 ["The Pin Organisation": The State and the Parastate in Thessaloniki in the 1960s]', in *I 'syntomi' dekaetia tou '60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The 'Short' 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, ed. Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008), 126–42. On clientelism, see Sotiris Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo: koinovouleftismos kai diktatoria [Greek Politics after the Civil War: Parliamentarism and Dictatorship]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008), 38; Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967* (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 21.

Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive Society (ELIA) in Athens, and the Historical Archive of Macedonia (IAM) in Thessaloniki. For an external view of post-civil war Greek domestic developments, I researched archival material of the British diplomatic mission in Greece in the National Archives (NA) in London. The United Kingdom naturally sided with the anti-communist regime in Athens. Yet, being less involved in the policy making than the US representatives in Greece, the British diplomats located in Athens and Thessaloniki often made great observers, providing critical reports of the political situation. Furthermore, I used legislative acts, included in the Official Gazette of the Government of the Kingdom of Greece (FEK) and the Official Journal of the European Communities (EUR-Lex). I also cited international treaties available in the US Library of Congress (LoC) and records of parliamentary debates in the Hellenic Parliament Minutes (*Praktika Voulis*). Besides those sources, I drew from press accounts published in newspapers that espoused views on various manifestations of the *parakratos* in the Greek history, ranging from left-wing to right-wing. Historically, newspapers served as the main communication platform for political parties in Greece.<sup>21</sup> I further relied on electronic media for reports of contemporary debates about the *parakratos* and the *deep state*.

I cited material written in Greek according to the transcription standards introduced by the ISO 843 and UN (ELOT 743) romanisation systems for modern Greek. Furthermore, I supplied English translations of the titles of all non-English works. As for the names of Greek institutions and organisations, I prioritised the use of institutional translations to English over literal ones.

I opened my research with an overview of international academic debates over the existence and functioning of various power structures that have acted in parallel to official authorities. I first attempt to compare the concept of the *parakratos* with similar concepts which have appeared in the social sciences literature, such as *parapolitics* and the *parastate*, the *parallel state*, the *state within a state*, the *dual state*, the *security state* and the *deep state*. For that purpose, I mainly rely on two authors: Ula Tunander, who introduced the theory of the *security state*<sup>22</sup> and Mehtap Söyler, who analysed the

---

<sup>21</sup> For a discussion on the post-civil war media landscape, see Paschaloudi, *Enas polemos choris telos [A War Without the End]*, 35.

<sup>22</sup> Ula Tunander, 'Democratic State vs. Deep State: Approaching the Dual State of the West', in *Government of the Shadows. Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty.*, ed. Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey (Pluto Press, 2009), 56–72.

Turkish *deep state*.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, I discuss the *parakratos* with respect to the ongoing debate about whether or not the *deep state* is a conspiracy theory.<sup>24</sup> Second, I contextualise the *parakratos* by comparing it with parallel security mechanisms that have existed in Cold War Greece, Italy and Turkey, the so-called NATO’s stay-behind armies in Europe. The most comprehensive work written on that subject thus far is a book by Daniele Ganser, who dedicated an entire chapter to Greece’s “Operation Sheepskin.”<sup>25</sup> The topic has also been tackled by Greek historians Alexis Papachelas and Stratis Bournazos.<sup>26</sup> The commonalities between the stay-behind armies in individual NATO states in Europe are recognised facts. However, the Greek domestic understanding of the *parakratos* considers it phenomenon that is unique to Greece and not the same as for instance, Turkey’s *deep state*.<sup>27</sup> I would argue that Greece’s Operation Sheepskin and the *parakratos* were two sides of the same anti-communist coin, in that Operation Sheepskin was intended to defend against a potential Soviet invasion from abroad while the *parakratos* sought to suppress an internal pro-communist “enemy.”<sup>28</sup>

The term *parakratos* has mainly been employed by left-wing historians, who intended it to mean the tool of the unofficial anti-communist campaigns instigated by the post-civil war state, in parallel with open, official legal persecution. Therefore, in the second chapter, I investigate another term common in left-wing political speech – “the para-constitution” (*parasyntagma*). The “para-constitution” encompasses a set of emergency laws that were enacted during the civil war to counter communist sympathisers, which continued to be used in the post-civil war period despite their unconstitutionality. While historians tend to see the *parakratos* as a power system parallel to the official state, they generally understand the “para-constitution” as a

<sup>23</sup> Mehtap Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics 73 (London New York: Routledge, 2015).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Nebojša Blanuša, ‘The Deep State between the (Un)Warranted Conspiracy Theory and Structural Element of Political Regimes?’, *Critique and Humanism* 49, no. 1 (2018): 369–84; Türkay Salim Nefes, ‘The Conspiratorial Style in Turkish Politics: Discussing the Deep State in the Parliament’, in *Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them*, ed. Joseph E. Uscinski (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 385–94; Doğan Gürpınar, ‘Deep State: Reality, Discourse, Conspiracy Theory’, in *Conspiracy Theories in Turkey* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2020), 61–73.

<sup>25</sup> Daniele Ganser, *NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2005).

<sup>26</sup> Alexis Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias: o amerikanikos paragon 1947-1967 [The Rape of Greek Democracy: The American Factor, 1947–1967]* (Athina: Estia, 2002); Bournazos, ‘To kraton ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’.

<sup>27</sup> See Gianouloupoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 139–78.

<sup>28</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 25–26.



parallel legal system that delimited the space within which the *parakratos* operated. By putting the anti-communism of the post-civil war Greek state into a wider historical perspective, I emphasise its continuity with previous periods dating back to the Balkan Wars. The tutelage of the United States in the Cold War added a further twist to Greece's anti-communist policies. However, the United States did not influence a radical deviation from the political course that had already been set by the time it became involved in Greece. A better understanding of the government's anti-communist policies, as well as the way it justified and used them in domestic politics, is needed to properly contextualise the *parakratos*. In fact, the *parakratos* gained strength after the abolishment of the "para-constitution" under pressure from the European Economic Community (EEC), with which Greece concluded its association agreement in September 1961.

In left-wing historiography, the post-civil war *parakratos* was a product of a political regime that was authoritarian by nature. Moreover, leftist scholars referred to the "right-wing establishment" (*dexio katestimeno*) or the "right-wing state/state of the Right" (*dexio kratos/kratos tis dexias*) to emphasise the unchallengeable dominance of the Right, especially in the first years after the civil war. In the third chapter, I investigate whether the political regime of that time was democratic or authoritarian, a matter about which scholars differ. The character of the regime played a significant role in the relationship between the state and the *parakratos*. Relying on the definition of authoritarian regimes by Juan Linz, I question whether the existence of parallel power structures in a state necessarily negates its democratic character. I also question whether an authoritarian regime actually needs a parallel power structure.

In the fourth chapter, I scrutinise the *parakratos* as it appears in historiography of Greece. I focus on its presumed roots and actors, its relationship to the state, and its reason for being. Historians disagree about when, how, and why the *parakratos* developed. There is also no consensus about the actors who were its members, whose interests it represented, and the aims it pursued. I outline three major conceptions of the *parakratos* — a paramilitary, a military and a conspiratorial type. Furthermore, I show that the idea of a conspiratorial *parakratos* was inspired by the post-civil war anti-Right rhetoric of the Left and the Centre.

The paramilitary *parakratos* was based in the activities of rural armed bands and urban *parastate* organisations composed of ultra-nationalist citizens. The history of

paramilitaries in Greece has been researched by numerous authors, who have concentrated on various eras in Greek history. In my research, I reviewed works that attempted to trace the roots of the post-civil war *parakratos* back to previous periods. Spyros Tsoutsoumpis reached as far back as the Balkan Wars to explain the relevance of paramilitarism and what he calls the *deep state* to the process of building the Greek nation.<sup>29</sup> Other authors, among them Georgios Mavrogordatos, Despoina Papadimitriou, Stratos Dordanas, Dimitris Kousouris, Nikos Marantzidis, Vaios Kalogrias, and (among non-Greek authors) David H. Close, analysed the role of paramilitaries in the First World War, interwar, Second World War, and civil war periods.<sup>30</sup> As for post-civil war Greece, *parastate* organisations have usually been discussed with reference to their members' collaboration during the Second World War and their far-right political tendencies. Already in the 1960s, Andreas Lendakis scrutinised this issue,<sup>31</sup> later followed by Stratos Dordanas, Dimitris Psarras and Tasos Kostopoulos.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, “Political Bandits”, 37–64.

<sup>30</sup> George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Ethnikos dichasmos kai maziki organosi. Oi Epistratoi tou 1916 [National Schism and Mass Organisation. The 1916 Reservists]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Alexandria, 1996); Despina Papadimitriou, ‘Oi Epistratoi sta chronia tou protou polemou. Politiki via kai “akrodexies symperifores” [Epistratoi During the First World War. Political Violence and ‘Far-Right Behaviours’]’, *Archeiotaxio* 16 (2014): 13–22; Stratos Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodechia: Apo ton A’ Pagkosmio Polemo stin Ellada tis krisis [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right: From the First World War until Greece in Crisis]’, *Archeiotaxio*, no. 16 (2014): 31–46; Dimitris Kousouris, ‘O fasismos stin Ellada: Synecheies kai asynecheies kata ton evropaiko 20. aiona [Fascism in Greece: Continuities and Discontinuities During the European 20th Century]’, in *To ‘vathy kratos’ sti simerini Ellada kai i Akrodechia: astynomia, dikaiosyni, stratos, ekklesia [The ‘Deep State’ in Today’s Greece and the Far-Right: Police, Justice, State, Church]*, ed. Dimitris Christopoulos (Athina: Nisos, 2014), 33–81; Nikos Marantzidis, ‘Ethnotikes diastaseis tou Emfyliou Polemou: I periptosi ton tourkofonon pontion kapetanaion tis Makedonias [The Ethnic Dimensions of the Civil War: The Case of the Turkish Speaking Captains of Macedonia]’, in *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949) [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)]*, ed. Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos, and Grigoris Psallidas (Athina: Themelio, 2002), 208–21; Vaios Kalogrias, ‘Enoples omades anexartiton oplarchigon kai ethnikiston axiomatikon stin periochi metaxy Strymona kai Axiou (1941-1944) [The Armed Groups of Independent Chieftains and Nationalist Officers in the Area Between the Strymonas and the Axios Rivers (1941-1944)]’, in *Oi alloi Kapetanioi: antikomounistes enoploi sta chronia tis Katochis kai tou Emfyliou [The Other Captains: Anti-Communist Gunmen During the Occupation and the Civil War]*, ed. Nikos Marantzidis (Athina: Estia, 2005), 127–200; David H. Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 156–89.

<sup>31</sup> Andreas Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]* (Athina: Ekdoti D.K.N. Grigoris Lambrakis, 1963).

<sup>32</sup> Dordanas, “I organosi tis karfitsas” [“The Pin Organisation”]; Stratos Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini: epivioseis tou dosilogismou sti Makedonia, 1945-1974 [The German Uniform in Mothballs: The Survival of Collaborationism in Macedonia, 1945-1974]* (Athina: Estia, 2012); Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodechia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’; Psarras, ‘O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]’; Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’. The topic was also elaborated on by the unpublished MA thesis, written by the student of Stratos Dordanas: Athanasios D. Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos sti metapolemiki Ellada, 1949-1967

The military *parakratos* represents an axis of research in which scholars have focused on politicisation, autonomisation and conspiracies in the Greek army. The post-civil war role of the army in Greek politics was outstandingly well elaborated in both joint and individual publications by Thanos Veremis and André Gerolymatos,<sup>33</sup> and in a well-researched book by Dimitrios Papadiamantis.<sup>34</sup> I also made great use of older works on clandestine military organisations written by Georgios Zaharopoulos, Nikolaos Stavrou, and Dimitrios Paralikas.<sup>35</sup> The works of Antonis Kakaras on the officer corps of the Greek army and Panos Krikis on the long-term status of the army in the Greek state were other resources. Military conspiracies have been addressed by numerous authors researching the domestic and international aspects of the post-civil war era. Books by Sotiris Rizas, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, and Alexis Papachelas were particularly useful for providing necessary context.<sup>36</sup>

Approaching the *parakratos* as a military or paramilitary phenomenon is common in the historiography of Greece, but I wanted to advance the discussion with a perspective that understands the *parakratos* as a broader conspiracy involving more elements of the Greek state and society. The discourse of conspiracy in the literature about the *parakratos* has been influenced by the political speech of the Left and the Centre in the 1960s, a crucial decade for the formation of the left-wing historiography. The understanding of the *parakratos* as a conspiracy is characteristic of an older generation of authors who were often affiliated with left-wing and centrist political

---

[Far-Right Organisations and the Parastate in Post-War Greece, 1949-1967]' (MA Thesis, Thessaloniki, University of Macedonia, 2016).

<sup>33</sup> Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy* (London: Hurst & Company, 1997); Thanos Veremis and André Gerolymatos, 'The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949', *Journal of Hellenic Dispota* 17, no. 1 (1991): 103–28; André Gerolymatos, 'The Road to Authoritarianism: The Greek Army in Politics, 1935-1949', *Journal of Hellenic Dispota* 35, no. 1 (2009): 7–26.

<sup>34</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)*].

<sup>35</sup> George Zaharopoulos, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece', in *Greece under Military Rule*, ed. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (London: Secker & Warburg, 1972); Nikolaos A. Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions: The Political Role of the Greek Military* (Athens: Papazissis Publishers, 1976); Dimitrios K. Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974* [*Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974*] (Athina: Vaskedis, 1982).

<sup>36</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo* [*The Greek Politics after the Civil War*]; Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*; Ilias Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia: kommata kai ekloges, 1946-1967* [*Cachectic Democracy: Parties and Elections, 1946-1967*], 1. ekd, Neoteri kai synchroni istoria 4 (Athina: Patakis, 2014); Papachelas, *O viasmós tis ellinikis dimokratias* [*The Rape of Greek Democracy*].

parties and organisations.<sup>37</sup> One exception is Evi Gkotzaridis, a historian who belongs to a younger generation of authors. Her discourse demonstrates that left-wing political attitudes persist in the scholarly interpretation of the *parakratos* to this day.<sup>38</sup>

The central event that shaped today's understanding of the *parakratos* was the assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis, an international peace movement activist and a parliamentary deputy affiliated with the left-wing EDA. He was killed in Thessaloniki in May 1963. Lambrakis' murder has commonly been blamed by left-wing politicians, media, and subsequently by scholars on members of the *parastate*. The investigation of his death brought to light much of what is now known about the operation of *parastate* groups and the complicity of judicial and security authorities, and local political representatives. I benefited from several scholarly works on the Lambrakis case. First and foremost were recent books by Evi Gkotzaridis<sup>39</sup> and Christos Chalazias (co-authored with Grigoris Lambrakis, the son of the assassinated deputy)<sup>40</sup> and an older anthology of documents with a commentary by Pavlos Petridis.<sup>41</sup> On the fiftieth anniversary of Lambrakis's death, a volume with a dozen co-authors (among them Stratos Dordanas, Giannis Gianouloupoulos, Giannis Tzannetakos, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Sotiris Rizas, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Ioanna Papathanasiou, Giorgos Romaios and Leonidas Kallivretakis), all of whom I cite in my thesis, gave general consideration to

---

<sup>37</sup> Potis Paraskevopoulos, *Georgios Papandreou. Ta dramatika gegonota 1961-1967 [Georgios Papandreou. The Dramatical Events 1961-1967]* (Athina: Fytrakis/Typos A.E., 1988); Tasos Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas: apo ta prota metemthyliopolemika chronia os tin imera tou stratiotikou praxikopimatos ton syntagmatarchon [History of Contemporary Greece: From the First Post-Civil War Years to the Day of the Military Coup of the Colonels]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Pataki, 1998); Makis Maïlis, *To astiko politiko systema stin Ellada apo to 1950 eos to 1967 [The Bourgeois Political System in Greece from 1950 to 1967]* (Athina: Synchroni Epochi, 2014); Babis Georgoulas, *To parakratos stin Ellada [The Parastate in Greece]* (Athina: Skaravaïos, 1975); Giannis P. Tzannetakos, 'Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]', in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzytisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton koinovouleftismo kai ti dimokratia, 2016), 127–38; Gianouloupoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]'.

<sup>38</sup> Evi Gkotzaridis, "'Who Really Rules This Country?'" Collusion between State and Deep State in Post-Civil War Greece and the Murder of Independent MP Grigorios Lambrakis, 1958–1963', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 28, no. 4 (2017): 646–73, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1386458>.

<sup>39</sup> Evi Gkotzaridis, *The Life and Death of a Pacifist: Grigorios Lambrakis and Greece in the Long Shadow of Civil War* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016).

<sup>40</sup> Christos I. Chalazias and Grigoris Gr. Lamprakis, *I dolofonia tou Lampraki kai to parakratos [The Assassination of Lambrakis and the Parakratos]* (Athina: Papazisis, 2019).

<sup>41</sup> Pavlos V. Petridis, *Dolofonia Lampraki: anekdota dokoumenda, 1963-1966 [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Unpublished Documents, 1963-1966]*, ed. Angelos Sideratos (Chalandri: Proskinio, 1995).

the historical importance of the Lambrakis assassination as it relates to political developments and the concept of the *parakratos*.<sup>42</sup>

In the fifth and the sixth chapter, I dedicate attention to conspiratorial military groups and civilian *parastate* organisations. Both phenomena were debated intensively in post-civil war Greece, conducted in the Cold War atmosphere of distrust. I argue that the reality of the *parakratos* was in many ways much less sophisticated than its political reputation suggests. Greek society has traditionally relied on clientelism and patronage based on political loyalties. One's personal political orientation had direct impact on one's social status and opportunities for professional development, especially in the state administration, the army, and the security forces.<sup>43</sup> In post-civil war Greece, political allegiances were crucial. Both "genuine" and "presumed" communists became subject to political and economic exclusion, surveillance and control by the security services, and legal persecution. Anti-communists received professional, economic and social benefits.<sup>44</sup> From that perspective, instead of being a shadow government and directing political developments, the structures of the *parakratos* served as a vehicle for the social and professional reintegration of Greek citizens who found themselves, for various reasons, at the margins of society. Be they former Nazi collaborators, far-right extremists, criminals, or simply socially disadvantaged, economically precarious citizens, the members of the *parakratos* fostered political connections in order to improve their social status. The military *parakratos* in particular was an interest group that aimed at advancing its members' personal interests, professional standing, and access to political power. The rank and file of the *parastate* structures were, however, exploited by the political, military, and security leaderships, which abused the *parakratos* while pursuing their own particular interests and will to power.

---

<sup>42</sup> Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, eds., *Dolofonia Lampraki: I istoriki syzitis 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]* (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Despina Papadimitriou, *Apo ton lao ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon: I syntiritiki skepsi stin Ellada, 1922-1967 [From the Law-Abiding People to the Nation of the Nationally Minded: Conservative Thought in Greece, 1922–1967]* (Athina: Savvalas, 2006).

<sup>44</sup> Minas Samatas, 'Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-McCarthy Era', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 13, no. 3–4 (1986): 5–75; Polymeris Voglis, *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners in the Greek Civil War* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002); Stergiou, 'Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]'; Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]'; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*.

## 1. The *Parakratos*: The Definition of the Term and Its Positioning in the Scientific Debate

The term *parakratos*, powerful and inciting as it is, has made a significant imprint on modern Greek history as well as on political speech in Greece. Despite its indisputable historical significance and continuous use in public discourse, the term has so far evaded a detailed scholarly analysis. As a point of departure, the Georgios Babiniotis' Dictionary of Modern Greek, a popular reference source in Greece, can offer us a basic definition of *parakratos* as a “power mechanism of a politico-military character with strong interconnections and access to the mechanisms of the official state power, parallel to which it develops arbitrary, secret and illegal actions.”<sup>45</sup> Additionally, as the dictionary states, these actions can be either complementary with regard to state power, leading primarily to the repression of political dissidents and opposition parties, or can prevent the implementation of the official policy, especially in the case of unstable and newly established democratic regimes. Furthermore, it directly refers to post-civil war Greece (1949–1967) and the phenomenon of political murders of leftist opponents of the regime. Along with this, the dictionary also provides the definition for a member of the *parakratos* (a so-called *parakratikos*), who is described as “every person who participates in the *parakratos* or serves its purposes.”<sup>46</sup>

In the scholarly literature, the term *parakratos* usually relates to the period of the post-civil war right-wing conservative regime in Greece, which was characterised by strongly anti-communist policies and the suppression of the leftist political opposition. The term became especially prominent in the leftist and centrist discourse throughout the 1960s and onwards, appearing both in political speech and media.<sup>47</sup> At the same time, it earned the attention of foreign actors and can be found, for example, in materials of the British Embassy in Athens and the Foreign Office (as *para-state*).<sup>48</sup> It constituted

---

<sup>45</sup> Babiniotis, *Lexiko tis neas ellinikis glossas [Dictionary of Modern Greek Language]*, 1328.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, ‘To Stavrodromi tou 1963 [The Crossroads of 1963]’, in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitiisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 227–28; Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 647.

<sup>48</sup> NA FO 371/169055 (25 May 1963); NA FO 371/180008 (5 January 1964); NA FCO 9/117 (4 January 1967).

an attempt to accuse multiple actors, mainly the Right, the Royal Palace, the army, the security forces and foreign powers, such as the US, of complicity in pursuing non-democratic practices and of violations of human and political rights in the country. Moreover, particularly following the introduction of the junta (1967–1974), the term served as an explanation for alleged informal, clandestine alliances between the leadership of the Greek armed forces, foreign intelligence services and various political and economic interest groups.<sup>49</sup> As such, the term strived to embrace a number of historical phenomena with a similar, though not entirely identical, political background. Moreover, *parakratos* evolved as a highly ideologically loaded term which in itself condensely conveyed the tense post-civil war political settings as well as the escalated atmosphere of the Cold War era, all of which can be attributed to its derogatory character.<sup>50</sup>

From the epistemological perspective, the use of the term *parakratos* in scholarly works is therefore rather problematic, despite the fact that the expression even found its place in historiography outside of Greece.<sup>51</sup> Besides being politically biased and created to serve political purposes, the concept has a clearly conspiratorial character that may – without the provision of solid historical evidence – degrade into a mere conspiracy theory. Moreover, reliable literature on the topic is relatively scarce, access to relevant archival material limited, and a generally recognised definition of the phenomenon absent. On top of that, the term continues to be used in contemporary Greek public and political discourse as well to describe rather less analogical political situations without respecting the historical context in which the term emerged. As a consequence, its original meaning has significantly changed over time; one could argue that the term nowadays suffers from the symptoms of “concept stretching,” as described

---

<sup>49</sup> For example see Gianoulopoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 139–42.

<sup>50</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, “Political Bandits”, 39–40.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Heinz Richter, ‘The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War’, in *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, ed. John O. Iatrides, Modern Greek Studies Association Series 4 (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981); Hagen Fleischer, ‘Authoritarian Rule in Greece and Its Heritage’, in *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and Lessons from the Twentieth Century*, J. W. Borejsza, K. Ziemer (Berghahn, 2006); Pavel Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka [The History of Greece]* (Praha: NLN, 2009), 458, 463, 505; Alexander Strassner, *Militärdiktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert: Motivation, Herrschaftstechnik und Modernisierung im Vergleich [The 20th Century Military Dictatorships: Motivation, Governance Techniques and Modernisation Compared]* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013), 142.

by Giovanni Sartori.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, even today, it bears some very negative implications and serves as a condemnation or accusation of those against whom it is employed, regardless of their actual political orientation.

In this chapter, I am going to focus on the notion of *parapolitics* and will introduce similar concepts to the one of *parakratos*, namely the *parastate*, the *dual state* and the *deep state* (which is sometimes referred to as a *security state*, a *shadow state* or a *state within a state*). Furthermore, I will elaborate on the matter of NATO's stay-behind armies (meaning the clandestine alliances between NATO command and the US and UK intelligence services as well as their covert military operations in Cold War Europe) as these have often been perceived as being interconnected with the activities of the *deep state*. In general, the issue appears to be fundamental for the understanding of the Cold War context of these parallel power structures. In this way, I will attempt to place the term *parakratos* in a broader socio-scientific debate and show how it overlaps with these concepts.

Moreover, besides Greece, special attention will be paid to the cases of Italy and Turkey since these can help contextualise the case of Greece, especially because the existing literature on *parakratos* is still relatively scarce and the concept, as such, is minimally developed theoretically. All three countries were specific for their geographical and strategic position at the border between the capitalist West and the communist Eastern Bloc. With Turkey and, to some extent, Italy, Greece shares the common historical experience of military interventions in its political life. Another important aspect was the strong post-war political position of the Left in Italy and in Greece, as well as the extensive attempts for its suppression by the ruling regimes and their international allies. With Turkey, Greece had in common the traditionally strong presence of paramilitarism (or banditry), which oftentimes substituted the state's political, economic and security role in remote areas, isolated from the power of the central authorities. Thus, this chapter attempts to provide a general framework for the analysis of *parakratos* by setting it within the proper historical, political and cultural context.

---

<sup>52</sup> Giovanni Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033–53.



## 1.1 The *Parastate* and the Debate on *Parapolitics*

Etymologically, the term *parakratos* likely emerged as a loan translation of the English term *parastate*.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, some studies were employing these terms synonymically; nevertheless, as we will see, the *parastate* can be considered a rather unsatisfactory and unreliable substitute.<sup>54</sup> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, *parastate* (adj. *parastatal*) is either “[a]n institution or body which takes on some of the roles of civil government or political authority” or “an agency through which the state works indirectly.”<sup>55</sup> Unfortunately, this definition is too vague to give us an idea of the origin, structure and aims of such a parastatal entity. Secondly, it enables a parallel coexistence of opposing interpretations of what the role of the state is with regard to the *parastate*. In other words, the state can – but does not necessarily have to – assume the position of the originator of *parastatal* activities. In reality, the term is used to describe rather less similar phenomena rooted in different historical, political and cultural contexts. Thus, we can encounter *parastate* in the academic literature on situations as diverse as the modes of operation and functions of the Sicilian mafia,<sup>56</sup> the civil war, paramilitarism and drug trafficking in Colombia,<sup>57</sup> or post-colonialist forms of government in Black Africa, where non-state power centres take over a part of the state’s sovereign rights.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, some authors used the term to characterise the situation of various separatist quasi-states, or more precisely, internationally unrecognised states that emerged within non-functioning states or states under threat, such as the case of the Republic of Serbian

---

<sup>53</sup> Babiniotis, *Lexiko tis neas ellinikis glossas [Dictionary of Modern Greek Language]*, 1328.

<sup>54</sup> For a critique see e.g. Gianouloupoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 166.

<sup>55</sup> *The Oxford English Dictionary*, XI (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 209..

<sup>56</sup> Henner Hess, ‘The Sicilian Mafia: Parastate and Adventure Capitalism’, in *Government of the Shadows. Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty*, ed. Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey (Pluto Press, 2009), 153–72.

<sup>57</sup> Lesley Gill, ‘Durable Disorder: Parapolitics in Barrancabermeja’, *NACLA Report on the Americas* 42, no. 4 (2009): 20–24; Lesley Gill, ‘The Parastate in Colombia: Political Violence and the Restructuring of Barrancabermeja’, *Anthropologica* 51, no. 2 (2009): 313–25; Fernando Estrada G., ‘The Logic of the Violence in the Civil War: The Armed Conflict in Colombia’, *Perfil de Coyuntura Económica*, no. 17 (2011): 165–94; Isaac Morales Pérez, ‘Córdoba: paraestado, clientelismo y agentes de la violencia [Córdoba: Parastate, Clientelism and the Agents of Violence]’, in *Trans-pasando Fronteras*, 6 (Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios, Jurídicos, Sociales y Humanistas (CIES), Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias sociales, Universidad Icesi, 2014), 37–54.

<sup>58</sup> Trutz von Trotha, ‘Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika. Vom Zerfall des Staates, von der Vorherrschaft der konzentrischen Ordnung und vom Aufstieg der Parastaatlichkeit [The Future Lies in Africa: On the Disintegration of States, the Dominance of Concentric Order and the Rise of Para-Statehood]’, *Leviathan*, no. 28 (2000): 253–79; Trutz von Trotha and Georg Klute, ‘Von der Postkolonie zur Parastaatlichkeit - das Beispiel Schwarzafrika [From the Post-Colony to the Para-Statehood - The Example of Black Africa]’, in *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2001* (Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, 2001).

Krajina, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia or even the Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.<sup>59</sup> However, none of these meanings can be used to outline the Greek *parakratos*.

Closer to the Greek understanding of *parakratos*, notably when providing an example from Greece, brings us to the approach towards *parastate* by Robert Cribb. He defines the term as “a range of institutions which do not, at first glance, resemble states but which nonetheless possess some of the important characteristics of states.”<sup>60</sup> Typologically, among others, Cribb refers to various covert entities “which seek to control or manipulate state violence independently from within,” such as semi-autonomous intelligence agencies or elite power groups. Specifically, he mentions the case of the Greek Central Intelligence Service (*Kendriki Ypiresia Pliroforion*, KYP).<sup>61</sup> Indeed, during the Cold War era, the KYP evolved in close cooperation with the CIA into a powerful and, to a great extent, politically unaccountable actor with a far-reaching impact on the domestic political life in Greece. Moreover, the KYP has been perceived by many historians as an inseparable element in the wider picture of the *parakratos*, or even its main instigator.<sup>62</sup> The problem is that the general understanding of who acts within the *parakratos* is much wider, as illustrated in detail in chapter 4.

In Cribb’s study, the use of the term *parastate* is closely connected to the scholarly debate over *parapolitics*. By *parapolitics*, he means a phenomenon of “a strange, powerful, clandestine and apparently structural relationship between state security-intelligence apparatuses, terrorist organisations and transnational organised

---

<sup>59</sup> For a detailed analysis see the Special Issue of *Nationalities Papers* on the “Emergence and Resilience of Parastates,” including Michael Rossi and Jaume Castan Pinos, ‘Introduction to Inconvenient Realities: The Emergence and Resilience of Parastates’, *Nationalities Papers* 48, no. 1 (January 2020): 12–23. Also cf. P.H. Liotta, ‘Balkan Fragmentation and the Rise of the Parastate’, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 61–81; Eva von Gerharz, ‘Zwischen Krieg und Frieden - Die Tamil Tigers und ihre Diaspora als Konfliktpartei und Entwicklungsakteur [Between the War and Peace - The Tamil Tigers and their Diaspora as a Conflict Party and a Development Actor]’, *Sociologus* 59, no. 1 (2009): 33–49; Rafał Czachor, ‘Elity polityczne Osetii Południowej wobec idei niepodległości [Political Elites of South Ossetia Towards the Idea of Independence]’, *Nowa Polityka Wschodnia* 6, no. 1 (2014): 52–66; Zofia Studzińska, ‘How Russia, Step by Step, Wants to Regain an Imperial Role in the Global and European Security System’, *Connections* 14, no. 4 (2015): 21–42; Vjeran Pavlaković, ‘Simboli i kultura sjećanja u Republici Srpskoj Krajini [Symbols and Culture of Remembrance in the Republika Srpska Krajina]’, *Politička Misao / Croatian Political Science Review* 53, no. 3 (2016): 26–49.

<sup>60</sup> Robert Cribb, ‘Introduction: Parapolitics, Shadow Governance and Criminal Sovereignty’, in *Government of the Shadows. Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty.*, ed. Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey (Pluto Press, 2009), 4.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> For example see Tsoutsoumpis, “‘Political Bandits’”, 55; Gianouloupoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 140–41; David H. Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War* (London; New York: Longman, 1995), 155.

criminal syndicates.”<sup>63</sup> To paraphrase Scott, *parapolitics* can be defined in this way as a political system or practice of covert politics where accountability is consciously diminished and where irresponsible agencies or para-structures, such as intelligence agencies, are politically exploited.<sup>64</sup> Scholarly debates over *parapolitics* originated in the early 1990s, sparked by the public’s revelations concerning the existence of NATO’s stay-behind armies in Europe. Yet even more important perhaps was the fact that the US and UK intelligence services were actively yet covertly interfering in the domestic politics of Western European states during the Cold War era. However, the debate was intellectually rooted in the 1960s and related to the international political practice of the Cold War period. As Cribb explains, until the 1960s, scholars considered the clandestine nature of *parapolitics* as a way to preserve forces that stood in opposition to the state order, such as criminals or rebels. By contrast, from the later scholarly perspective, the clandestine activity started to be seen as being carried out either by state institutions themselves or by institutions linked to the ruling elite. *Parapolitics* has thus aimed to sustain the existing formally democratic regimes, which were, nevertheless, bearing some non-democratic, illiberal features.<sup>65</sup>

Various scholars have addressed certain phenomena that fall into the category of *parapolitics* from multiple perspectives. First of all, the issue of NATO’s stay-behind armies and their intelligence and security operations in Cold War Europe, which will be analysed in more detail below, enjoyed great public attention in the 1990s and onwards. Until today, Daniele Ganser’s book remains the most well-known and comprehensive inquiry into the problem, uncovering alliances between the US and West European intelligence services, far-right paramilitaries and criminal gangs, providing a thorough overview of the development across Europe.<sup>66</sup> Secondly, several authors investigated the involvement of the CIA in drug-related organised crime and the undermining of democratic processes in third world countries. In his book, Alfred McCoy focused on the cooperation between the CIA and the French intelligence services in the opium and

---

<sup>63</sup> Cribb, ‘Introduction’, 1. See also Eric M. Wilson, ed., *The Dual State: Parapolitics, Carl Schmitt and the National Security Complex*, International and Comparative Criminal Justice (Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012).

<sup>64</sup> Peter Dale Scott, *The War Conspiracy: The Secret Road to the Second Indochina War* (Indianapolis, 1972), 171.

<sup>65</sup> Cribb, ‘Introduction’, 1–2, 5–6.

<sup>66</sup> Ganser, *NATO’s Secret Armies*.

heroin production and trade in Indochina.<sup>67</sup> Peter Dale Scott took a similar path when analysing the interconnections between drug trafficking, the oil industry, intelligence networks and US interventionism in countries like Afghanistan, Colombia and Indochina.<sup>68</sup> More recently, Ryan Gingeras explored the role of organised crime and opium and heroin production on the development of modern Turkish politics, including the USA's involvement, predominantly through the CIA, during the Cold War era.<sup>69</sup> In the Greek case, the relation between paramilitarism, organised crime, drugs trafficking and anti-communist intelligence during the civil war was analysed by Spyros Tsoutsoumpis.<sup>70</sup>

In his outstanding 2009 analysis, Ola Tunander achieved to link the *parapolitics* to the 1955 concept of the *dual state* by Hans Morgenthau.<sup>71</sup> Unlike Ernst Fraenkel, who modelled the *dual state* on the example of totalitarian Nazi Germany in 1941,<sup>72</sup> Morgenthau's approach is particularly valuable for providing a new perspective for the study of democratic regimes with certain non-democratic features. In the example of the US administration, Morgenthau presumed a parallel coexistence of, on the one hand, a state hierarchy which was compliant with the rule of law and endowed by the power of making political decisions and, on the other hand, of a different entity which was more authoritarian by nature and able to exert effective vetoes over these decisions.<sup>73</sup> Tunander decided to call the latter entity a *security state* (or a *deep state*). He claims that the task of the *democratic state* is to provide legitimacy to security politics, while the *security state* intervenes to place limits on democratic politics when necessary, exactly in line with Carl Schmitt's concept of the *state of emergency*. Thus, Tunander claims, "While the 'democratic state' deals with political alternatives, the 'security

---

<sup>67</sup> Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1973).

<sup>68</sup> Scott, *The War Conspiracy*; Peter Dale Scott, *Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina*, War and Peace Library (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Peter Dale Scott, *The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Peter Dale Scott, *American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection, and the Road to Afghanistan*, War and Peace Library (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010).

<sup>69</sup> Ryan Gingeras, *Heroin, Organized Crime and the Making of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

<sup>70</sup> Spyridon Tsoutsoumpis, 'Paramilitarism, Politics and Organized Crime during the Greek Civil War (1945–1949)', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 43, no. 2 (2019): 262–86.

<sup>71</sup> Tunander, 'Democratic State vs. Deep State'.

<sup>72</sup> Ernst Fraenkel, *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship*, First edition (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017).

<sup>73</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Decline of Democratic Politics* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 400, 405. Morgenthau first published on the matter already in 1955.

state' enters the scene when 'no alternative exists,' when particular activities are 'securitised' – in the event of an 'emergency.' In fact, the security state is the very apparatus that defines when and whether a 'state of emergency' will emerge."<sup>74</sup> Tunander's approach perfectly correlates with the case of post-civil war Greece, which needed to present itself to the outside as a democratic regime, yet certain state entities, termed as *parakratos*, meanwhile assumed the role of a *security state* in order to direct Greece's political development or to effectively suspend the democratic state and launch a *state of emergency*, as was executed by the 1967 coup d'état.

Moreover, Tunander argues that, when it comes to actual political practice, the powers of the *security state* (or *deep state*) exceed the mere capacity to veto democratic measures but also include what he calls "fine tuning of democracy." In fact, he attempts to explain why certain otherwise democratic states are occasionally acting outside the law (that is, pursuing *parapolitics*); for example, this could occur by leading a war, supporting terrorism or instigating violence with the aim of stirring up popular concern over security and the need for increased protection. According to him, the US helped establish *security states* in some West European countries during the Cold War era, including Greece; these *security states* were then responsible for military coups.<sup>75</sup> On top of this, it was probably not just the concern over internal security but also the institutional weaknesses of these formally democratic states of the Cold War era that created the need to form the informal structures of the *security state* or the *deep state*.<sup>76</sup> Here again, Greece can stand as a great example since not only the presumed internal and external communist threat but also the growing tension within the post-civil war right-wing regime, the decreasing cohesion between its individual guarantors – the Right, the Palace and the Army – and the weakening support of the US in the early 1960s led to the expansion of Greece's *security state*.

In her 2015 analysis of the Turkish *deep state*, Söyler criticised the *parapolitics* approaches for failing in "systematically capturing the deep state's characteristics in different polities" varying from consolidated democracies to authoritarian regimes, or even in clearly distinguishing between the *deep state* and another situation when the

---

<sup>74</sup> Tunander, 'Democratic State vs. Deep State', 56–57.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 57, 66–67.

<sup>76</sup> Ryan Gingeras, 'Last Rites for a "Pure Bandit": Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish "Deep State"', *Past & Present* 206, no. 1 (2010): 155.

*deep state* becomes the state itself.<sup>77</sup> Furthermore, she intensively delved into the issue of the *deep state*'s emergence, rise and possible demise, connecting the *deep state* with the process of state consolidation as well as the specific character of civil-military relations in modern Turkey. Söyler underlines that the validity and function of formal democratic institutions are decisive for differentiating between democracy and autocracy. Similarly, the *deep state* "is defined as a type of formal and informal, or dual modality of domination, which results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings."<sup>78</sup> First looking into the role of banditry in the state consolidation of Ottoman Turkey, Söyler perceives the *deep state* (together with its connections to organised crime) as a manifestation of "modern banditry," which once again contributed to the consolidation of the Cold War and even post-Cold War Turkish state.<sup>79</sup> For that matter, the establishment and deployment of covert NATO security structures in Turkey (and other countries, Greece notwithstanding) provided a strong incentive for the development and expansion of the *deep state*.

## 1.2 The NATO's Stay-Behind Armies

The operation "Gladio" (meaning *Sword*) was a code name for a clandestine military network set up in Italy after the end of the Second World War. It was part of a wider security initiative of NATO's stay-behind armies that were established under different code names in most of the West European countries with the status of NATO member states, including Greece and Turkey.<sup>80</sup> The principal aim of these secret armies, out of which the Italian Gladio enjoyed the greatest public attention, was to fight communism in Europe and, in case of a Soviet invasion, to operate in the enemy-held territory, organising anti-Soviet resistance and sabotage activities. The secret armies were set up

---

<sup>77</sup> Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 1–9.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 55–88.

<sup>80</sup> For example see: Michael Wala, 'Stay-behind Operations, Former Members of SS and Wehrmacht, and American Intelligence Services in Early Cold War Germany', *Journal of Intelligence History* 15, no. 2 (2 July 2016): 71–79, <https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2016.1181400>; Daniele Ganser, 'The British Secret Service in Neutral Switzerland: An Unfinished Debate on NATO's Cold War Stay-behind Armies', *Intelligence and National Security* 20, no. 4 (December 2005): 553–80, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520500425083>; Dick Engelen, 'Lessons Learned: The Dutch "Stay-Behind" Organization 1945–1992', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 6 (December 2007): 981–96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390701676519>; Thomas Riegler, 'Gladio - Myth and Reality: The Origins and the Function of Stay Behind in the Case of Post-War Austria', in *Terrorism in the Cold War (Vol. 2): State Support in the West, Middle East and Latin America*, ed. Adrian Hänni, Thomas Riegler, and Przemyslaw Gasztold (London; New York: I.B. Tauris; Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021), 15–42.

by the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly known as MI6) in cooperation with military secret services in individual countries. On the international level, they were coordinated by a special body of NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC), as well as its sub-branch, the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC). The headquarters was located first in Paris and then later in Brussels.<sup>81</sup> The CIA and MI6 supplied the secret armies with military equipment, arms and information systems while also provided them with training. Across Europe, caches of weapons and explosives were deployed underground, in forests and in the countryside, ready to be used by the "secret soldiers" to launch paramilitary operations.<sup>82</sup>

### 1.2.1 The Operation Gladio in Italy

The existence of the Gladio network in Europe remained unknown to the public and also to a great part of the political representation of West European countries until the end of the Cold War. It was first uncovered in Italy in 1990 and immediately provoked a public outcry. Large investigations of prominent political personalities were initiated, including Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti.<sup>83</sup> The unprecedented political scandal then spread across the continent, receiving a great deal of publicity. In three countries – Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland – parliamentary commissions were established to investigate the case, with the Italian one speaking of the existence of a *dual state* (*il Doppio Stato*) in the country.<sup>84</sup> The EEC reacted by issuing a common resolution on 22 November 1990, condemning the creation of the secret stay-behind armies, calling for the disbanding of their units and launching a large-scale investigation.<sup>85</sup> Subsequently,

---

<sup>81</sup> Leopoldo Nuti, 'The Italian "Stay-Behind" Network – The Origins of Operation "Gladio"', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 6 (December 2007): 963–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390701676501>; Daniele Ganser, 'The Ghost of Machiavelli: An Approach to Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Cold War Italy', *Crime, Law and Social Change* 45, no. 2 (March 2006): 122–23, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-006-9015-7>; Simone Selva, 'Gladio Network (1945-Early 1990s)', in *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies*, ed. Jan Goldman (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 157–58.

<sup>82</sup> Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 1–4, 12–13.

<sup>83</sup> Paul L. Williams, *Operation Gladio: The Unholy Alliance between the Vatican, the CIA, and the Mafia* (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2015), 265. Andreotti was accused of the cooperation with mafia, the manipulation of political institutions and of ordering the assassination of his political opponents. In 2002, Andreotti was sentenced for 24 years in prison, but already a year later the verdict was overruled and he was released.

<sup>84</sup> Tunander, 'Democratic State vs. Deep State', 61.

<sup>85</sup> Resolution on the Gladio affair. Joint resolution replacing B3-2021, 2058, 2068, 2078 and 2087/90, *Official Journal of the European Communities* (No C 324/186), 24 December 1990, <https://eur->

many details on the activities of the clandestine network and its functioning were revealed, including the involvement of NATO and the military secret services in the US and the UK, as well as the engagement of political leaders in individual countries, mostly through the position of president, prime minister, minister of interior and minister of defence. Furthermore, the case pointed to the problem of limited sovereignty in West European states as well as to NATO's restricted level of trust regarding their capabilities to challenge a "communist threat."<sup>86</sup>

Until today, the knowledge on how the Gladio network, and the NATO's stay-behind armies in general, operated in practice has remained limited due to a lack of support of investigations from the side of NATO and the CIA.<sup>87</sup> Based on the gathered information, these secret armies were involved in staging deadly terrorist attacks and, in certain countries like Greece, Turkey and to some extent in Italy, even in organising military coups d'état during the Cold War era. The internal political situation in these three countries was particularly fragile: first, given their geographical and strategic position on the border between the West and the communist Eastern Bloc and; second, given the strong position of the Left in post-war Greece and Italy. In cooperation with far-right and paramilitary groups, including some elements of the defeated fascist or pro-Nazi forces, the stay-behind armies targeted the political forces of the Left and participated in the elimination of political opposition. The aforementioned terrorist attacks aimed, in the short run, to destabilise the political situation (using the so-called Strategy of Tension) and, more generally, to manipulating the public's opinion to favouring a conservative, right-wing state, the introduction of stricter security measures and the repression of leftist political tendencies throughout society.<sup>88</sup>

In Italy, the stay-behind army operated under the guidance of the CIA, parallel to the armed forces and in cooperation with the Italian military secret service (the Armed Forces Information Service – *Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate*, SIFAR; since 1966

---

lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOC\_1990\_324\_R\_0186\_01&from=EN, 16-17 (accessed 12 August 2020).

<sup>86</sup> Leo A. Müller, *Gladio - das Erbe des Kalten Krieges [Gladio - The Cold War Heritage]* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1991), 41–48; Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 26–27.

<sup>87</sup> For example see Jonathan Kwitny, 'The C.I.A.'s Secret Armies in Europe', *The Nation*, 6 April 1992, 444–48; Adrian Hänni, 'Introduction: State Support for Terrorist Actors in the Cold War - Myths and Reality (Part 2)', in *Terrorism in the Cold War (Vol. 2): State Support in the West, Middle East and Latin America*, ed. Adrian Hänni, Thomas Riegler, and Przemyslaw Gasztold (London; New York: I.B. Tauris; Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021), 2.

<sup>88</sup> Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 7.



known as the Defence Information Service – *Servizio Informazioni Difesa*, SID; and since 1978 as the Military Intelligence and Security Service – *Servizio Informazioni Sicurezza Militare*, SISMI). It was closely connected with neo-fascist organisations, such as New Order (*Ordine Nuovo*) and National Vanguard (*Avanguardia Nazionale*).<sup>89</sup> Through action squads known as Nuclei for Defence of the State (*Nuclei di Difesa dello Stato*, NDS), it executed a series of massacres, such as the 1969 bombings in Rome and Milan or the 1972 bombings targeting trains. These terrorist attacks were staged, and the subsequent police investigations manipulated with the intention of putting the blame on the leftist terrorist organisation Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*), or respectively on the Left as such. The real perpetrators mostly escaped justice as they enjoyed the protection of the secret service. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Red Brigades were responsible for the murders of high-ranking officials whom its members saw as obstacles of a radical social change. However, unlike the far right, the far left did not attempt to target wider masses of the population in its terrorist attacks.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, the 1978 kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, the prominent politician of the Christian Democrats, by the Red Brigades was most probably orchestrated by SISMI to put an end to Moro's policy of *Historic Compromise* with the Left and the integration of the Communists into the coalition government of the Christian Democrats and the Socialists.<sup>91</sup> Thus, the reasons that stood behind the Gladio operation were to discredit the Left and prevent it from assuming power, even at the cost of casualties and state terrorism and under the threat of coups and the introduction of a state of emergency.

The previous efforts of Moro as a prime minister with aspirations for governmental cooperation with the Socialists, who ceased their alliance with the Communists following the 1956 Hungarian revolution, created considerable tension. In June 1964, the Italian stay-behind network, under the leadership of General Giovanni De Lorenzo (the former head of SIFAR and chief of the Italian paramilitary police – the Carabinieri – at the time), orchestrated a silent coup d'état. The aim of the operation, which was coordinated with the CIA and code-named Piano Solo according to the NATO military plan originally designed for counter-insurgency purposes, the Italian

---

<sup>89</sup> Ganser, 'The Ghost of Machiavelli', 129. See also Giacomo Pacini, *Le altre Gladio: la lotta segreta anticomunista in Italia: 1943-1991 [The Other Gladios: The Secret Anti-Communist Struggle in Italy: 1943-1991]*, Einaudi storia 53 (Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 2014).

<sup>90</sup> Müller, *Gladio*, 38–39; Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 4–5; Williams, *Operation Gladio*, 95–110.

<sup>91</sup> Tunander, 'Democratic State vs. Deep State', 58.

military intelligence service and the Carabinieri, was to eliminate the Socialists from the incumbent Moro cabinet.<sup>92</sup> Both the Communists and the Socialists saw a remarkable increase in popularity in the 1963 elections. On the other hand, the winning Christian Democrats suffered a considerable loss compared to their past electoral results. Following the elections, the Socialists, unlike the Communists, were offered several posts in the government, a move that was also endorsed by US President John F. Kennedy. After Kennedy's assassination, the conspirators of the coup first attempted to discredit the Communists and the Socialists through a series of terror attacks publicly presented as actions carried out by the Italian Left. Subsequently, they enhanced pressure on the government by launching a coup, during which the fully armed troops of General De Lorenzo entered Rome on tanks.<sup>93</sup> Under this military threat, the Italian government was forced to comply with the demands of the conspirators: its Socialist ministers were replaced by their more moderate colleagues. The 1964 silent coup in Italy was followed by three more failed coup attempts carried out by General Vito Miceli in 1970 (*Golpe Borghese*), General Magi Braschi in 1973 (*Rosa dei Venti*) and Count Edgardo Sogno in 1974 (*Golpe Bianco*), all under CIA guidance.<sup>94</sup>

### 1.2.2 The Operation Sheepskin in Greece

Compared to Italy, the coups d'état carried out by the army in Greece and Turkey had more serious effects on the internal political and social developments of the countries. In the case of Greece, the first attempts to establish a stay-behind army on the Greek territory date back to the times of the Second World War and took place under the guidance of the United Kingdom. Through its Special Operations Executive (SOE), the UK supported the anti-Axis resistance in occupied Greece, including the National Liberation Front/Greek People's Liberation Army (*Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo/Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos*, EAM/ELAS) with the participation of Communists. The SOE engaged in intelligence and sabotage operations and provided resistance with military equipment and training.<sup>95</sup> The UK's Prime Minister Winston

---

<sup>92</sup> Williams, *Operation Gladio*, 74–75.

<sup>93</sup> Ganser, 'The Ghost of Machiavelli', 133–34.

<sup>94</sup> Tunander, "Democratic State vs. Deep State: Approaching the Dual State of the West," 61–62; see also Mirco Dondi, *L'eco Del Boato: Storia Della Strategia Della Tensione, 1965-1974*, Prima edizione, Storia E Società (Roma: GLF editori Laterza, 2015).

<sup>95</sup> Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War*, 40–43. For more on the activities of the SOE in Greece, see Richard Clogg, *Anglo-Greek Attitudes: Studies in History* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Antonis Klapsis, 'I vretaniki politiki kai to elliniko antistasiako kinima: i

Churchill feared the extraordinary military results of the communist resistance against the Axis occupiers and the potential power that the Greek Left could obtain in the post-war political arrangement; therefore, he decided to cease aid to the EAM/ELAS in March 1943. Since October 1943, the SOE launched a campaign against the left-wing resistance and motivated various anti-communist bands to attack ELAS fighters.<sup>96</sup> Eventually in December 1946, already in the midst of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), special warfare units called the Mountain Raider Companies (*Lochoi Oreionon Katadromon*, LOK), also known as the Hellenic Raiding Force, was formed by the order of the Hellenic Army General Staff (*Geniko Epiteleio Stratou*; GES).<sup>97</sup> The LOK units remained active after the defeat of communist forces in August 1949 and later became the core of NATO's stay-behind army in Greece.

After the declaration of the Truman doctrine (1947), the paternalistic role of the UK towards Greece was taken over by the USA. Relying on the political and economic support of its ally, the Greek anti-communist regime officially aligned with the US containment strategy, and together with Turkey it joined NATO in 1952. Greece also played a significant role in the CIA's intelligence planning since it served as a base for paramilitary and propagandistic operations in the countries of the Eastern bloc, especially in the Balkans, and the Middle East. One of the first operations of the CIA took place in Greece in 1948. It consisted of the execution of psychological war to challenge the propaganda of the Communist Party of Greece (*Kommounistiko Komma tis Ellados*, KKE). Moreover, the CIA station in Athens was the third largest in the world in terms of the number of employees, speaking to the importance Greece played in the US' security interests.<sup>98</sup> The establishment and structure of the Greek intelligence agency KYP in May 1953 were largely inspired by the CIA, which provided its Greek counterpart with professional training as well as technical and military equipment. Both agencies executed common intelligence operations (mostly in Albania and Bulgaria),

---

apostoli tis SOE stin Ellada (1943-1944) [The British Politics and the Greek Resistance Movement: The SOE Mission in Greece (1943-1944)]', in *Afigiseis gia ti dekaetia tou 1940. Apo to logo tou katochikou kratous sti metaneoteriki istoriografia [The Narratives about the 1940s. From the Speech of the Occupation State to the Post-Modern Historiography]*, ed. Vassilis K. Dalkavoukis et al. (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2012), 91–108; Geoffrey Chandler, *The Divided Land: An Anglo-Greek Tragedy*, Rev ed (Wilby, Norwich: M. Russell (Pub.), 1994).

<sup>96</sup> Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 212–14. See also C. M. Woodhouse, 'EAM and the British Connection', in *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis.*, ed. John O. Iatrides (Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981), 81–101.

<sup>97</sup> Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]', 40.

<sup>98</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 21.

shared information on the subversive activities of the political opposition in Greece and monitored, in cooperation with the Hellenic Police's Aliens Service (*Ypiresia allodapon*), the movement of refugees from the Eastern Bloc to Greece.<sup>99</sup>

The CIA department in Athens, in collaboration with the Greek army and led by Field Marshall Alexandros Papagos, contributed to the emergence of the stay-behind mechanism in Greece. Papagos, a staunch anti-communist and a charismatic leader, served as Greek Prime Minister between 1952 and 1955. He became the emblematic figure of the right-wing monarchist camp and a major advocate of the US' engagement in Greece. During the crucial period from 1951 to 1953, the CIA in Athens was represented by a Greek American named Thomas Karamessines, who was a significant personality and an officer with a remarkable career. From his position as Chief of Station, Karamessines was considered responsible for the operation of the stay-behind network.<sup>100</sup> Other sources speak of the involvement of a CIA operative named Steven Milton,<sup>101</sup> and Andreas Kallinskis, the brother-in-law of Alexandros Papagos, was put in charge of the LOK units. The official agreement on collaboration between Alexandros Papagos (on the part of the Greek government), Konstantinos Dovas (Chief of Staff of the Hellenic Army) and General Lucian Truscott (on the part of the CIA) was signed – without the authorisation of the Hellenic Parliament – on 25 March 1955 and reconfirmed on 3 May 1960.<sup>102</sup>

The LOK units were shaped as a strictly monarchist organisation and were mostly composed of military and civic intelligence officers alongside civilian volunteers

---

<sup>99</sup> Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]', 39; Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 23–34.

<sup>100</sup> Karamessines, a former officer of the wartime US intelligence service, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), arrived in Athens in January 1946 to work at the US embassy under cover as a military attaché. Following the establishment of the CIA in September 1947 he became its main representative in Greece. In 1958, he relocated to Rome to oversee the Gladio network. As of 1962, he became the chief of the CIA covert actions on the global level. Makarios Drousiotis, *EOKA B & CIA: to ellinotourkiko parakratos stin Kypro [EOKA B & CIA: The Greek-Turkish Parastate in Cyprus]* (Lefkosia: Alfadi, 2002), 24–26; Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 132.

<sup>101</sup> David Binder, "U.S. Said to Order C.I.A. to Curtail Role in Greece", *The New York Times*, 2 August 1974, <https://www.nytimes.com/1974/08/02/archives/us-said-to-order-cia-to-curtail-role-in-greece-u-s-reported-to.html> (accessed 10 March 2020); see also Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 24.

<sup>102</sup> Müller, *Gladio*, 54; Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 215; Jacques F. Baud, *Encyclopédie du renseignement et des services secrets [The Encyclopedia of Espionage and Secret Services]* (Panzol: Lavauzelle, 1997), 546.

of far-right orientations.<sup>103</sup> They were trained in cooperation with the CIA and the KYP in two US-funded military camps near the city of Volos and Mount Olympus as well as in isolated mountainous areas, such as in the Pindos range and near the city of Florina. They allegedly numbered approximately 1,500 officers, with the possibility of further increasing this amount to 3,500 officers in the event of an armed conflict; in this process, they dispatched 800 caches of arms and military equipment across the countryside.<sup>104</sup> Their task was to prepare for the possibility of a Soviet invasion, in which case they would serve as the coordination centre of the domestic resistance. In the eventuality of a leftist coup, the LOK units were ready to strike at and assist in the suppression of political opposition.<sup>105</sup>

The stay-behind mechanism was further bolstered by paramilitary groups known as the Battalions of National Defence (*Tagmata Ethnofylakis Amynis*, TEA). These units emerged during the civil war in September 1948 and were used to preserve the Athens regime in formerly communist-dominated areas. The legal status and military activities of the TEA were highly controversial, be it the fact that many former Nazi collaborators joined its ranks or the involvement of TEA members in illegal (or *parastate*) activities and the oppression of political opposition. Furthermore, the TEA served as the iron hand of the civil war and post-civil war anti-communist regime, reaching out into the countryside and thus channelling political power and surveillance measures from the central institutions to local communities.<sup>106</sup> As part of the Greek “Gladio,” known as Operation Sheepskin, the TEA was supposed to back up the regular military forces through the “execution of unorthodox war operations.”<sup>107</sup> According to Hatzivassiliou, in 1958, the US estimated the strength of the TEA at 84,000 men; yet, these units were lightly-armed and considered unreliable to be deployed in a full-scale war.<sup>108</sup>

The stay-behind network was allegedly involved in the political terror that accompanied the rigged 1961 legislative elections. The upsurge of violence mainly targeted the Left, but it eventually affected also the candidates and supporters of the

---

<sup>103</sup> Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 215–16; Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 40.

<sup>104</sup> “Spinne unterm Schafsfell,” *Der Spiegel*, 26 November 1990, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13502661.html> (accessed 27 February 2020); cf. Müller, *Gladio*, 55; Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 216–17.

<sup>105</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmōs tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 25–26.

<sup>106</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 40–42, 114–17, 128–32.

<sup>107</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmōs tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 25–26.

<sup>108</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 70.

Centre, which had united shortly before the elections under the leadership of Georgios Papandreou with the declared support of the Kennedy administration.<sup>109</sup> The terror was primarily instigated in the countryside with the active assistance of the TEA, but it also impacted the urban areas through the activities of far-right paramilitaries affiliated with so-called *parastate* organisations (*parakratikes organoseis*), such as the Pan-Hellenic National Crusade (*Panellinia Ethniki Stavroforia*, PES), or the Anti-Communist Crusade of Greece (*Antikommounistiki Stavroforia tis Ellados*, ASE).<sup>110</sup>

When serving as Greece's Prime Minister (1963, 1964–1965), Georgios Papandreou – who was, incidentally, Aldo Moro's political contemporary – posed a threat through his reform attempts to the previously set-up politico-military and clientelist networks of the right-wing regime. Through his liberally republican (though anti-communist) political stance, Papandreou challenged the conservative monarchist establishment, and his relationship with the Palace continued to be tarnished during his time in office. Representatives of the military were particularly disconcerted by his plans to reorganise the army and reassess Greece's role in NATO.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, Papandreou contributed to the mitigation of the post-civil war political persecution of left-wing sympathisers and the reduction of the number of political prisoners in the country. Due to his strong anti-communism, he did not proceed towards the rehabilitation of the EAM/ELAS resistance; yet he took a more moderate stance towards the issue.<sup>112</sup>

The period of Papandreou's government was marked by significant mistrust of the ultra-conservative circles towards the centrist politics and by considerable political tension, even accompanied by several terrorist attacks. In November 1964, one month after Papandreou's re-election as prime minister, during the first-ever joint commemoration held by the representatives of the right-wing and left-wing Second World War resistance at the Gorgopotamos bridge, an explosion killed thirteen people and injured forty-five.<sup>113</sup> Although allegations about the involvement of the CIA and the

---

<sup>109</sup> Jean Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]* (Lausanne: Études de science politique, n° 10, 1965), 110.

<sup>110</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 161; Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 295–96.

<sup>111</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 155; Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 126.

<sup>112</sup> Stergiou, 'Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]', 114–16.

<sup>113</sup> For the 1944 destruction of the Gorgopotamos bridge see, for example, Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War*, 73–83. For the 1964 terrorist attack, see "1964: Dolofoniki ekrixi sto Gorgopotamo [1964: The

KYP quickly spread, former representatives of the left-wing resistance were put to trial and one of them even sentenced to prison. In 1965, Papandreou was forced to resign after a dispute with Constantine II., the King of Greece, over the right to appoint high-ranking military officers. This event was followed by a rebellion in his Centre Union (EK) and opened the way for a prolonged political crisis.

The major project of the Greek “Gladio,” however, supposedly was the 1967 coup, which marked the beginning of a seven-year-long military dictatorship. Not only was the NATO stay-behind army in Greece directly involved in the organisation of the coup, but the military operation itself was – similar to the case of the Italian Piano Solo – based on a NATO contingency plan code-named “Prometheus.” The plan originally aimed to fight a potential communist insurgency by enacting extensive preventive arrests.<sup>114</sup> The coup, which took place on 21 April 1967, forestalled the upcoming legislative elections, planned for May. In this way, the EK’s anticipated victory was thwarted.<sup>115</sup> The Greek junta was first supported by the US, but later it became a political burden. According to Tunander, this event showed that the coup d’état was never supposed to constitute the goal of the *security state* or the *deep state* but rather an instrument to create fear and gain legitimacy through the need for greater protection.<sup>116</sup>

On 30 October 1990, after the Gladio was revealed in Italy, former socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (1981–1989; and again 1993–1996), the son of Georgios Papandreou, disclosed in a newspaper interview for the *Ta Nea* daily that, back in 1984, he uncovered a clandestine military network in Greece and ordered its dissolution.<sup>117</sup> Former Deputy Minister of National Defence Nikos Kouris, active in the same political party – the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (*Panellinio Sosialistiko*

---

Murderous Explosion at Gorgopotamos],” *Imerodromos.gr*, 29 November 2014, <https://www.imerodromos.gr/gorgopotamos/>. Cf. Pavlos V. Petridis, ed., *I dikes tou Gorgopotamos, 1964-66: agnosta dokoumenta apo tin polykroti ypothesi [The Trials of Gorgopotamos, 1964-66: Unknown Documents from the Noted Case]* (Chalandri: Ekdodeis Proskinio, 1998); Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 215–17; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 347.

<sup>114</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 171–72.

<sup>115</sup> Müller, *Gladio*, 54–55; Tunander, ‘Democratic State vs. Deep State’, 62, 67.

<sup>116</sup> Tunander, ‘Democratic State vs. Deep State’, 67.

<sup>117</sup> Throughout the 1960s, Andreas Papandreou was an inconvenient personality both for the right-wing regime in Greece and US interests, and he became the target of surveillance. In 1964, when serving as a minister in his father's government, he found out that his office was wiretapped. In the mid-1960s, he became the central figure in the case of an alleged military conspiracy, known as the Aspida scandal. Following the 1967 coup, Andreas and Georgios Papandreou were among the first persons to be arrested. Jon V. Kofas, *Under the Eagle’s Claw: Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S.-Greek Relations* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003), 79.

*Kinima*, PASOK) – confirmed the existence of the Greek “Gladio.”<sup>118</sup> Following the demand of the Greek Socialists to launch investigations into the activities of the stay-behind army in Greece and its possible involvement in the 1967 coup, Ioannis Varvitsiotis, the Defence Minister in the government of conservative New Democracy (*Nea Dimokratia*, ND) headed by Konstantinos Mitsotakis, informed the public on how the organisation was allegedly dismantled in 1988; yet, the government did not prove its willingness to enforce a thorough inquiry.<sup>119</sup>

### 1.2.3 The Counter-Guerilla in Turkey

While the 1974 fall of the Greek junta and the subsequent democratisation of Greece posed a limit to the greater development of *deep state* structures, Turkey offers a very different image of the *deep state* that eventually survived past the end of the Cold War. The Turkish Gladio, the so-called Counterguerrilla (*Kontrgerilla*), emerged in the post-war, Kemalist, secular Turkish state as a power that was supposed to protect the ruling regime from both alleged internal and external threats. In reality, the organisation aimed not solely at the stabilisation of the regime; it frequently attempted to achieve the very opposite when further destabilisation gave it an advantage and proved its political power. As a consequence, the activities of the Counterguerrilla led to three military takeovers in 1960, 1971 and 1980. The Counterguerrilla was operated by the CIA-sponsored Tactical Mobilisation Group (*Seferberlik Taktik Kurulu*, STK), later renamed the Special Warfare Department (*Özel Harp Dairesi*, OHD) located in Ankara.<sup>120</sup> The Counterguerrilla was ideologically linked to the movement of Pan-Turkism, a concept that emerged in the nineteenth century aiming for the political, cultural and ethnic unification of all Turkic peoples.<sup>121</sup> The core personality who established a NATO stay-behind army in post-war Turkey was Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, a charismatic and anti-communist military officer working closely with the CIA. The Counterguerrilla often recruited its members from among the collaborators of the Turkish military secret service (Organisation for National Security Affairs – *Milli Amele Hizmet*, MAH; since

---

<sup>118</sup> Müller, *Gladio*, 54; Jean-François Brozzu-Gentile, *L'affaire Gladio: les réseaux secrets américains au cœur du terrorisme en Europe [Gladio Affair: The US Secret Network in the Heart of Terrorism in Europe]* (Paris: A. Michel, 1994), 137.

<sup>119</sup> Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 15–16, 223.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 226; Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 96–106; Nur Bolat, ‘L’Affaire Ergenekon: Quels enjeux pour la Démocratie turque? [Ergenekon Affair: What is at stake for the Turkish Democracy?]’, *Politique étrangère* 75, no. 1 (2010): 49–50.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism* (London: Hurst, 1981).



1965, the National Intelligence Organisation – *Milli İstihbarat Teskilati*, MIT) and the supporters of the Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtlar*), a pan-Turkist neo-fascist paramilitary organisation founded by Türkeş in 1968.<sup>122</sup>

During the Cold War era, the Counter guerrilla got engaged in a vast range of criminal activities, including terrorism, assassinations, kidnappings, torture and the spread of disinformation and propaganda. It was involved in the 1955 bomb attack at the Mustafa Kemal Museum in Thessaloniki, Greece, which aimed to provoke anti-Greece resentment in Turkey. Indeed, the event instigated violent attacks against members of the Greek minority in Izmir and Istanbul in practically no time (the so-called Istanbul Pogrom or *Septemvriana*). A comparable strategy was used in Cyprus to stir up hatred between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. As part of its operations, for example, the Counter guerrilla allegedly destroyed a mosque in an attempt to put the blame on the Greek Cypriot community.<sup>123</sup> In the 1970s, the Counter guerrilla triggered a mass terror campaign against the Turkish Left and minority groups, leaving behind a great number of casualties that included the 1977 Taksim Square massacre in Istanbul and the 1978 massacre of Alevi civilians in Kahramanmaraş.<sup>124</sup> The upsurge of terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, PKK) since the mid-1980s provided the Counter guerrilla with a strong incentive for its active involvement in counter-insurgency operations against the Kurdish separatist movement in southeast Turkey. During these years, the Counter guerrilla became involved in drugs-trafficking through some of its collaborators, such as the notorious gangsters and contract killers Abdullah Çatlı, Mehmet Ali Ağca, Alparslan Arslan and Mahmut Yıldırım, with the aim to affect the businesses of the PKK.<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>122</sup> Williams, *Operation Gladio*, 172–73, 201–3, 270–71.

<sup>123</sup> Tülay Şubatlı, “Kıbrıs’ta cami bile yaktık [We even burned a mosque in Cyprus]”, Habertürk, 23 September 2010, <https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/554417-kibrista-cami-bile-yaktik> (accessed 27 March 2020); cf. Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 90–99; Drousiotis, *EOKA B & CIA*; Fatih Demiroz and Naim Kapucu, ‘Anatomy of a Dark Network: The Case of the Turkish Ergenekon Terrorist Organization’, *Trends in Organized Crime* 15, no. 4 (December 2012): 279, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-012-9151-7>; Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 102.

<sup>124</sup> Müller, *Gladio*, 56–57; Demiroz and Kapucu, ‘Anatomy of a Dark Network’, 279.

<sup>125</sup> Mahmut Yıldırım was known under the nickname Yeşil, meaning Green, and Abdullah Çatlı as Reis, meaning Chief, for more see Ryan Gingeras, ‘In the Hunt for the “Sultans of Smack:” Dope, Gangsters and the Construction of the Turkish Deep State’, *Middle East Journal* 65, no. 3 (2011): 436–39; Soner Yalçın and Doğan Yurdakul, *Reis: Gladio'nun Türk tetikçisi [Reis: Gladio's Turkish Hitman]* (Istanbul: Kirmizikedici, 2016); Vedat Demiröz, *Reis Abdullah Çatlı* (Istanbul: Kriminal Kitaplar, 2017); Murat Yıldırım and Cemalettin Emeç, *Savaşçı Yeşil [Warrior Green]* (Istanbul: Yakın Plan, 2017).

The persistence of the Counterterrorism structures following 1989 makes Turkey an exception if compared to the countries of Western Europe. From the perspective of the general public, however, the turning point came in 1996. A mysterious traffic accident, which became known as the Susurluk scandal, revealed the close interconnection between the former Counterterrorism, some political elites, security forces and the mafia, provoking public outrage and attracting international media attention. A report of the parliamentary committee investigating the incident was published in April 1997, confirming the existence of ties between the state authorities and organised crime as well as the Grey Wolves organisation.<sup>126</sup> Two more events, the 2005 bombing of a bookstore in Şemdinli and the 2007 assassination of Hrant Dink, a Turkish-Armenian journalist, were often considered to support such claims.<sup>127</sup>

The Susurluk scandal subsequently exposed the alleged existence of another clandestine terrorist organisation, Ergenekon, which was claimed to stem from similar roots and used methods comparable to the Counterterrorism. The Ergenekon conspiracy was said to have infiltrated different levels of Turkish society, including the military, intelligence agencies, politics, the judiciary, the state sector, the media, academia and civil society. The Ergenekon trials began in 2008 on suspicions that the group of conspirators was preparing a military coup with the aim of toppling the Islamist government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Five years later, the court hearings resulted in long prison sentences for the majority of the several hundred that were accused. The proceedings were heavily criticised for their lengthiness and for putative attempts by the ruling Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) to use the court case against its political opposition and, mainly, against the powerful secular

---

<sup>126</sup> In this incident, the wanted assassin, the former Counterterrorism member and drug-trafficker Çatlı was found dead in a wrecked car near the town of Susurluk in north-western Turkey, alongside his mistress Gonca Us, a Turkish model, and Hüseyin Kocadağ, the Istanbul's deputy chief of police and a commander of counter-insurgency units against the Kurds. The car was owned by Sedat Bucak, a right-wing deputy of the Turkish parliament, who was the only survivor of the accident. Bucak was also the head of a Kurdish tribe from the Urfa region and from this position he was receiving military equipment from the Turkish state to combat the PKK. Weapons were found on the car, as well as several passports of Çatlı issued on different names. The passports were personally signed by the Minister of Interior as they were reserved for special employees of the state. Moreover, the head of the parliamentary investigation committee himself died under suspicious circumstances in a car accident. In detail, Gingeras, *Heroin, Organized Crime and the Making of Modern Turkey*, 247; M. Kavakci, 'Turkey's Test with Its Deep State', *Mediterranean Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (1 October 2009): 87; Bill Park, 'Turkey's Deep State: Ergenekon and the Threat to Democratisation in the Republic', *The RUSI Journal* 153, no. 5 (October 2008): 54, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840802521937>.

<sup>127</sup> Nefes, 'The Conspiratorial Style in Turkish Politics'.

military.<sup>128</sup> In 2016, Turkey's Supreme Court of Appeals overruled the previous convictions by stating that there was not enough evidence about the actual existence of such an organisation. Moreover, Turkish authorities claimed that the Ergenekon investigations and court proceedings were manipulated by the Islamic social movement founded by Fethullah Gülen. What is important for my analysis, the Gülen movement has been accused by the AKP government of infiltrating the state bureaucracy at its various levels and creating a politically unaccountable *parallel state* with the eventual aim of seizing power, which it allegedly attempted through the defeated 2016 coup d'état. The Gülenists were labelled by the Turkish government as the "Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation" (*Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü*, FETÖ) or the "Parallel State Structure" (*Paralel Devlet Yapılanması*, PDY).<sup>129</sup> Such rhetoric was nothing unknown in Turkish politics as it was based on the earlier notion of the *deep state* (*derin devlet*).

### 1.3 The Rise of the Deep State as a Concept

The idea of the *deep state*, firmly rooted in Turkish culture and history, resembles in certain aspects the Greek *parakratos*. As a political concept with an apparent tinge of conspiracy theory, it represents a shadow system of governance formed by the clandestine coalitions of unofficial, unacknowledged, and unaccountable individuals with direct access to political power or acting parallel to the state. Relying both on legal and illegal practices, the Cold-War Turkish *deep state* has been characterised as ultra-nationalist, ultra-statist and authoritarian by nature, aiming at the preservation of the Kemalist secular state and, especially, the strong position of the Turkish military as its principal guarantor.<sup>130</sup> Therefore, state security has been of the utmost importance for

---

<sup>128</sup> İhsan Bal, 'Ergenekon: The Turkish Gladio?', *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, no. 2 (2009): 383–86; Markar Esayan, 'Ergenekon: An Illegitimate Form of Government', *Insight Turkey* 15, no. 4 (2013): 36–37.

<sup>129</sup> "Turkey's Ergenekon plot case overturned by top court of appeals," *Hurriyet Daily News*, 21 April 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-ergenekon-plot-case-overturned-by-top-court-of-appeals—98113> (accessed 22 March 2019); "Turkish prosecutors say 'no concrete evidence of Ergenekon's presence,'" *Hurriyet Daily News*, 1 December 2018, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-prosecutors-say-no-concrete-evidence-of-ergenekons-presence-139353> (accessed 22 March 2019). On the disputed role of the Gülen movement as one of the most powerful political and economic forces in Turkey see e.g. M. Hakan Yavuz, *Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Lucie Tungul, 'The Lost Opportunity Window of the Gülen Movement in Turkey', *Slovak Journal of Political Sciences* 18, no. 2 (2018): 141–54; Gürpınar, 'Deep State: Reality, Discourse, Conspiracy Theory', 66–68.

<sup>130</sup> Park, 'Turkey's Deep State', 54; Esayan, 'Ergenekon: An Illegitimate Form of Government', 33; Hakki Taş, 'Turkey's Ergenekon Imbroglia and Academia's Apathy', *Insight Turkey* 16, no. 1 (2014): 163–64.

the *deep state* as well as for the military, which repeatedly instigated coups d'état as a tool to divert the political development of Turkey in the direction that it desired. Besides the military, which has been determined to be the main pillar of the *deep state*, other actors, mostly public figures, were involved, such as the judiciary, civil servants, journalists or businessmen. Furthermore, paramilitaries, terrorists and organised crime were said to have participated in the activities of the *deep state*.<sup>131</sup> Similar perceptions appear in the historiographical discussion about *parakratos*, which I broadly analyse in chapter 4.

During the Cold War era, the *deep state* had been given responsibility for countless cases of massacres, murders, deaths, kidnappings and disappearances that took place in Turkey in the recent decades, many of which were previously ascribed to the activities of the PKK. Their victims mostly belonged to the critics of the ruling regime and ranged from leftist journalists, businessmen and politicians to intellectuals as well as members of ethnic and religious minorities.<sup>132</sup> The Greek *parakratos* targeted leftist and liberal opponents of the ultra-conservative monarchist camp as well as minority groups in the country's ethnically heterogeneous borderland.<sup>133</sup> In connection to this, one of the characteristic features ascribed to the *deep state* (as well as the *parakratos*) has been the principle of the perpetrators' impunity such that, given their political connections, they typically avoided punishment for their deeds.<sup>134</sup> Moreover, the *deep state*, equally as the *parakratos*, has also been viewed as a sign of the inherent weaknesses of the state to exercise its legal authority.<sup>135</sup> Unlike its Turkish counterpart, the potential of *parakratos* to develop further fell short due to the 1974 regime change in Greece. As its consequences, the Turkish *deep state* thus had a far more brutal impact on domestic development.

The *deep state* as a term was first publicly used in 1974 by then-Turkey's Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit when referring to the activities of the Counterguerilla.<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>131</sup> Gingeras, 'Last Rites for a "Pure Bandit"'; Gingeras, 'In the Hunt for the "Sultans of Smack"'; Gingeras, *Heroin, Organized Crime and the Making of Modern Turkey*, 260–61.

<sup>132</sup> Kavakci, 'Turkey's Test with Its Deep State', 85, 88–89; Park, 'Turkey's Deep State', 54.

<sup>133</sup> Konstantinos Katsanos, «Orkisthisan pistin eis tin patria» Orkimosies slavofonon sti Dytiki Makedonia (kalokairi 1959) ["They Swore Allegiance to Their Homeland." Oaths of the Slavophone Population in the Western Macedonia (Summer 1959)], *Kleio* 5 (September 2009): 41–63; Dordanas, 'Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]', 31–46.

<sup>134</sup> Park, 'Turkey's Deep State', 58.

<sup>135</sup> Gingeras, 'Last Rites for a "Pure Bandit"', 155.

<sup>136</sup> Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 1, 119; Demiroz and Kapucu, 'Anatomy of a Dark Network', 279.

However, it became part of the public discourse after the Susurluk affair when used by Ertuğrul Özkök, editor of the *Hürriyet* newspaper.<sup>137</sup> Former President and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel emphasised the role of the military in the *deep state* and the unclear frontiers between the state and the *deep state* by stating that “the deep state is the military. The deep state is the state itself.”<sup>138</sup> In 2007, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed his conviction that the foundations of the *deep state* structures stem from the Ottoman tradition.<sup>139</sup> While some authors identify the rise of the *deep state* mainly with the violent decade of the 1970s and, therefore, frame it by the Cold War context, many others, indeed, go in their analyses long before the establishment of the Turkish republic.<sup>140</sup> Among other approaches, the *deep state* can be interpreted as a result of the failure of the Kemalist regime, and the Turkish military as its main driving force, to meet the demands of Turkish society in terms of democratisation and modernisation of the country. In such a case, the *deep state* strives to prevent any substantial social change and preserve the *status quo*. This argumentation pattern has also been used in the case of *parakratos*.<sup>141</sup> In doing so, the *deep state* targets opponents of the regime to ensure political stability or, in contrast, instigates political instability to confirm its power. It stirs up fears in the population over alleged threats to Turkey’s territorial sovereignty, internal security or the rise of radical Islam.<sup>142</sup>

Using the words of Doğan Gürpınar, the *deep state* was later “exported from Turkey to the international arena, both as a serious analytic concept and as a

---

<sup>137</sup> Gürpınar, ‘Deep State: Reality, Discourse, Conspiracy Theory’, 63.

<sup>138</sup> Belma Akçura, *Derin devlet oldu devlet [The Deep State Became the State]* (Istanbul: Guncel Yayıncılık, 2006), 16.

<sup>139</sup> Mehmet Barlas, “Osmanlı’da Oyun Bitmez’ [The Ottoman Game Does Not End],” *Sabah*, 29 January 2007, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/01/29/yaz09-40-105.html> (accessed 23 March 2019).

<sup>140</sup> Many authors perceive the establishment of the clandestine Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, CUP) in Istanbul in 1889 as the beginning of the *deep state* in Turkey. This secret revolutionary organisation never turned into a proper political party; nevertheless, it succeeded to enforce a change of the political regime through the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. Furthermore, the CUP instigated a violent coup in 1913 and thus provided a precedent for future military interventions in Turkish political life. Cf. Serdar Kaya, ‘The Rise and Decline of the Turkish “Deep State”: The Ergenekon Case’, *Insight Turkey* 11, no. 4 (2009): 99–113; Gingeras, ‘Last Rites for a “Pure Bandit”’, 152; Bolat, ‘L’Affaire Ergenekon’; Demiroz and Kapucu, ‘Anatomy of a Dark Network’; Taş, ‘Turkey’s Ergenekon Imbroglia and Academia’s Apathy’, 172; Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 58–88.

<sup>141</sup> Nicholas Doumanis, *A History of Greece*, Palgrave Essential Histories (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 209–10.

<sup>142</sup> Kavakci, ‘Turkey’s Test with Its Deep State’, 85–86; Esayan, ‘Ergenekon: An Illegitimate Form of Government’, 34.

conspiratorial buzzword.”<sup>143</sup> The term enjoyed great attention in the regions of the Middle East and North Africa. In countries like Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq or Yemen, the *deep state* – in this case, the armed forces, intelligence agencies and paramilitaries – was said to stand behind the ruining of the democratisation protests of the Arab Spring. Besides terrorising the political opposition of autocratic regimes, the *deep state* allegedly contributed to the rise of Islamists, including the Islamic State (ISIL).<sup>144</sup> Interestingly, some authors claim that, whereas, in Turkey, the *deep state* operated independently and uncontrolled by politicians and high-ranking military officers such that it established the parameters for the operation of the government, the *deep state* represented “an extension of the regime” through which it ruled in MENA countries.<sup>145</sup> The *parakratos* alike was sometimes perceived as the “state’s long arm in the political repression.”<sup>146</sup> Yet, the discussion on the *deep state* is far from stopping in the MENA region. Recent accounts have shown scholarly interest in the topic in countries like Thailand or Pakistan, making it a global phenomenon reaching out beyond the Mediterranean.<sup>147</sup>

What is more, in recent years, the *deep state* became an inherent part of the political debate in the US. In contrast to Peter Dale Scott’s and Alfred McCoy’s aforementioned academic inquiries into the interests of specific military, political and economic circles in leading wars against terrorism and promoting military interventions in foreign countries, there has been an inflation of the use of the term in the US domestic politics for an entirely different reason. First and foremost, it was related to the attempts of Donald Trump’s administration and its sympathisers to discredit its critics through the use of conspiracy theories rather than proving the actual existence of such hidden power structures in the country.<sup>148</sup> This fact once again proved the fragility and

---

<sup>143</sup> Gürpınar, ‘Deep State: Reality, Discourse, Conspiracy Theory’, 68.

<sup>144</sup> Jean-Pierre Filiu, *From Deep State to Islamic State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and Its Jihadi Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

<sup>145</sup> Robert Springborg, ‘Deep States in MENA’, *Middle East Policy* 25, no. 1 (2018): 136–57; Charles Tripp, ‘Iraq’s Dual State: Product of the Past, Very Present’, Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs, Brown University, 22 October 2010, <https://watson.brown.edu/news/2010/iraqs-dual-state-product-past-very-present>.

<sup>146</sup> Nikos P. Mouzelis and George Pagoulatos, “Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece,” September 2002, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203311462>, 3-4.

<sup>147</sup> Eugénie Mérieau, ‘Thailand’s Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court (1997–2015)’, *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 46, no. 3 (2016): 445–66; Muzaffar K. Awan, ‘Pakistan’s Future and Its Deep State’, *Defence Journal* 16, no. 8 (2013): 33–36.

<sup>148</sup> For example see Alana Abramson, “President Trump’s Allies Keep Talking About the ‘Deep State.’ What’s That?”, *Time*, March 8, 2017, <http://time.com/4692178/donald-trump-deep-state-breitbart-barack->

epistemological limits of the *deep state* as a concept since, similar to *parakratos*, it can be easily utilised to discredit political opponents rather than to contribute to a deliberate political debate.

To come back to my case study, the term *deep state* has of late entered the academic debate in Greece and about Greece, although the term *parakratos* continues to dominate, especially in less recent scientific accounts or those written in Greek.<sup>149</sup> In the case of some older publications written in English, German or French, we can encounter the terms *parastate* (or *para-state*), *Parastaat* or *para-état*.<sup>150</sup> In certain cases, the *deep state* thus appears to be a more modern variant of the *parakratos* (although there has been a disagreement whether the two terms can be considered synonymous).<sup>151</sup> Characteristically, those few authors who have been working with this term (or its Greek translation *vathy kratos*) took quite dissimilar paths. Spyros Tsoutsoumpis, for example, sought the origins of the Greek *deep state* in the era of the post-Balkan War's banditry and its effect on the state's consolidation and mediation of political power in a way evoking the work of Söyler on Ottoman banditry as the source for the evolution of the Turkish *deep state*.<sup>152</sup> Another researcher, Evi Gkotzaridis, illustrated the

---

obama/ (accessed 24 April 2019); Julian E. Barnes, Adam Goldman and Charlie Savage, "Blaming the Deep State: Officials Accused of Wrongdoing Adopt Trump's Response", *The New York Times*, December 18, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/deep-state-trump-classified-information.html> (accessed 24 April 2019). The US magazine *The National Interest* organised a symposium on the US *deep state* in February 2018 and dedicated its March/April 2018 print issue to the individual contributions which were either in favour or against the idea of the existence of such a clandestine entity. For the full list of contributions see "Is There a Deep State? A symposium on the "deep state" in today's Washington", *The National Interest*, February 11, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/there-deep-state-24453> (accessed 24 April 2019).

<sup>149</sup> Stergiou, 'Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]'; George Kaloudis, *Modern Greece: A Partner or Still a Client?* (Lanham, Md: Univ. Press of America, 2002); Sappho Xenakis, 'A New Dawn? Change and Continuity in Political Violence in Greece', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 3 (July 2012): 437–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.633133>; Doumanis, *A History of Greece; Close, Greece since 1945*.

<sup>150</sup> Nikos Alivizatos, 'The "Emergency Regime" and Civil Liberties, 1946-1949', in *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis*, ed. John O. Iatrides (Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981), 220–28; Richter, 'The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War'; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 'Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece'; Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*; Fleischer, 'Authoritarian Rule in Greece and Its Heritage', 250; Evi Gkotzaridis, "'Who Will Help Me to Get Rid of This Man?": Grigoris Lambrakis and the Non-Aligned Peace Movement in Post-Civil War Greece: 1951-1964', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 30, no. 2 (2012): 303; Aristotelis Agridopoulos, 'Die Rückkehr des A(nta)gonismus? [The Return of the Antagonism?]', in *Griechenland im europäischen Kontext [Greece in the European Context]*, ed. Aristotelis Agridopoulos and Ilias Papagiannopoulos (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2016), 275–95, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07240-7\\_14](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07240-7_14); Roderick Beaton, *Greece. Biography of a Modern Nation* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2019), 327.

<sup>151</sup> See Gianouloupoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]', 139–78.

<sup>152</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, "'Political Bandits"'. See also Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 55–88.

functioning of the Greek *deep state* on the example of the 1963 murder of Grigoris Lambrakis, an EDA's deputy and peace movement activist, which has been widely recognised to be a terrorist act carried out by the *parakratos*.<sup>153</sup> Dimitris Psarras has also been using the term for post-civil war Greece.<sup>154</sup> Yet other authors attempted to apply the concept to contemporary political developments.

Among them, Dimitris Christopoulos et al. were dealing with the penetration of the Greek far-right in the state apparatus, judicial system, security forces and the Orthodox Church in today's Greece. Interestingly, the authors defended the usage of the term *deep state* by their endeavour to avoid the historical connotations that *parakratos* bears with regard to twentieth-century Greek history.<sup>155</sup> Yet, the very opposite was suggested in the study of Tasos Kostopoulos, who set some parallels between the post-civil war Greece and Greece ridden by the economic crisis, speaking both about the *deep state* of the 1950s and the 1960s and the *deep state* tied together with Greece's far-right Golden Dawn (*Chrysi Avgi*, XA). Here, he once again pointed to its interconnection and complicity with local organised crime networks and even the state security forces, justice and media.<sup>156</sup> Similar analogies can be found in reflections by Stratos Dordanas and Giannis Tzannetakos.<sup>157</sup>

#### 1.4 The Deep State as a Conspiratorial Discourse

Another problem arises from the fact that the *deep state* as a concept is not unequivocal. Not only that it allows for various interpretations and perspectives of the issue, but – similarly to the *parakratos* – the *deep state* is also a layered term that may encompass both the actual power mechanism of covert alliances as well as the conspiratorial discourse which has been built around it. Because of that, some scholars dismissed the

---

<sup>153</sup> Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge Concise Histories (Cambridge; New York; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 157; Gkotzaridis, *The Life and Death of a Pacifist*, 317–48.

<sup>154</sup> Dimitris Psarras, “Erga ke imeres tou theoretikou tou «gypsou» [The work and days of the theoretician of the “plaster”],” Efsyn.gr, 29 December 2016, [https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/94747\\_erga-kai-imeres-toy-theoritikoy-toy-gypsoy](https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/94747_erga-kai-imeres-toy-theoritikoy-toy-gypsoy) (accessed 17 July 2020).

<sup>155</sup> Christopoulos, *To 'vathy kratos' sti simerini Ellada [The 'Deep State' in Today's Greece]*.

<sup>156</sup> Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegesis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’.

<sup>157</sup> Tzannetakos, ‘Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]’; Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodechia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’; Stratos Dordanas, ‘To trikyklo, ena “atychima” kai i adekasti dikaiosyni [The Tricycle Truck, One “Accident” and the Incorruptible Justice]’, in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitiisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton koinovouleftismo kai ti dimokratia, 2016), 41–54.



concept for being a conspiracy theory while others investigated it for that exact reason. According to Blanuša,

The 'deep state' is considered as a sort of systemic, political arch-conspiracy, or the parapolitical structure organized for permanent conspiratorial enterprises. In that sense, it functions as a metaphorical umbrella for state conspiracies and includes many contested singular conspiracy theories.<sup>158</sup>

Under a conspiracy theory, we understand “attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and political events and circumstances with claims of secret plots by two or more powerful actors.”<sup>159</sup> Until today, the approach to the study of conspiracy theories has been essentially two-fold: either conspiracy theories have been seen as products of a 'paranoid style' in politics, political extremism or an irrational, distorted or biased interpretation of the social and political reality which leads to its misunderstanding;<sup>160</sup> on the contrary, conspiracy theories were interpreted as rather rational or, at least instrumental, attempts to understand such reality.<sup>161</sup> What is also important, conspiracy theories are able to provide broader explanations that can therefore satisfy people's need for subjective certainty and some form of internally consistent understanding.<sup>162</sup>

We could argue that the Cold War political environment was excessively susceptible to conspiratorial tendencies and that the expansion of activities of clandestine, politically unaccountable power actors could, in many cases, bolster people's penchant toward buying into conspiracies. In Turkey, as shown above, the belief of covert entities acting from behind the scenes seems to have survived the end of

---

<sup>158</sup> Blanuša, 'The Deep State between the (Un)Warranted Conspiracy Theory and Structural Element of Political Regimes?', 369. According to Cribb, also the term parapolitics struggled for a long time to distinguish itself sharply from the grand conspiracy theory, meaning a belief that a powerful conspiracy of political, economic or religious groups is aiming to create a disguised world government. Cribb, 'Introduction', 2–3.

<sup>159</sup> Karen M. Douglas et al., 'Understanding Conspiracy Theories', *Advances in Political Psychology* 40, no. Suppl. 1 (2019): 3–35.

<sup>160</sup> Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964); Daniel Pipes, *Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From* (New York: Free Press, 1997); Jovan Byford, *Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).

<sup>161</sup> Peter Knight, *Conspiracy Culture: From the Kennedy Assassination to The X-Files* (London; New York: Routledge, 2000); Clare Birchall, *Knowledge Goes Pop: From Conspiracy Theory to Gossip* (s.l.: Berg Publishers, 2006); Charles Pigden, 'Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom', *Episteme* 4, no. 2 (2007): 219–32.

<sup>162</sup> Karen M. Douglas, Robbie M. Sutton, and Aleksandra Cichočka, 'The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories', *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 26, no. 6 (n.d.): 538.

the Cold War. In his study on the *deep state* discussion in the Turkish parliament, Nefes takes a rather sceptical approach, claiming that the *deep state* has become one of the most important themes of the conspiratorial rhetoric in post-1980s Turkish politics. He argues that the issue has been debated by various political actors without having a clear understanding of what or who the *deep state* represents.<sup>163</sup> Furthermore, he suggests that the concept of the *deep state* has been used to explain significant events which have not been satisfactorily clarified by the official narrative, e.g., unresolved political murders, massacres, bombings and other extraordinary incidents such as the Susurluk scandal. Moreover, he assumes that the *deep state* debate could be perceived as a manifestation of the so-called "Sèvres syndrome" (*Sevr Sendromu*), a popular conspiracy belief blaming foreign actors for malevolent actions against Turkey. The syndrome is said to originate from the sense of anxiety about the dismemberment of the country, similar to the fate of the Ottoman Empire following the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). In this way, the *deep state* is allegedly formed by a "disguised official clique" operating secretly and using illegal means to avoid the further collapse of the state.<sup>164</sup> Here we can find a parallel to the Greek traumatic historical experience of the National Schism (1915–1917) and the Asia Minor Catastrophe (1922), which some authors consider to be a source of the uptick of paramilitarism in the country and the origin of *parastate* networks.<sup>165</sup>

In comparison to this, Gürpınar does not contest the existence of the *deep state* as a historical fact. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the *deep state* in Turkey is not only a reflection of a certain political reality but also a distinct type of conspiratorial discourse with which Turkey contributed to the global conspiracy community. He notices that although originally the *deep state* primarily became part of leftist discourse, it has increasingly been associated with the rhetoric of supporters of progressive and democratic Islam since the rise of the Gülen movement and, generally, liberals.<sup>166</sup> This

---

<sup>163</sup> Nefes, 'The Conspiratorial Style in Turkish Politics', 385–94.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> For example see Dordanas, 'Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodeixia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]'; Spyros Tsoutsoumpis, 'Land of the Kapedani: Brigandage, Paramilitarism and Nation-Building in 20th Century Greece', *Balkan Studies* 51 (2016): 35–67; Tsoutsoumpis, "Political Bandits".

<sup>166</sup> The Gülenists themselves infiltrated many levels of the state administration, including the judiciary and security forces. Most importantly, they became rooted in the military, thus undermining the traditionally strong role of secular army officers. The Ergenekon trials were, according to Gürpınar, an expression of this growing power of Gülenists. Under the pretext of eradicating the deep state, the Gülenists allegedly manipulated the police investigations and lawsuits aiming to crack down on their political adversaries and critics and even to take over power. Gürpınar believes that the extent of the

finding can once again be transposed into the Greek political life, where the notion of *parakratos* has not been exclusively applied by the political Centre and the Left against the Right, but also the other way round. Thus, the centrist EK was accused of acting as the *parakratos* in mid-1960s amidst the ASPIDA scandal, which pointed to the EK's presumed infiltration in the armed forces.<sup>167</sup> In post-1974 Greece, the conservative ND used the term “left-wing parastate” (*aristero parakratos*) to denounce the ruling PASOK (1981–1989).<sup>168</sup> In the context of the post-2009 economic crisis, various adversaries of the Left, including right-wing populists and the extreme right, embraced the term to discredit the Coalition of the Radical Left (*Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras*, SYRIZA) after its electoral victory of in 2015.<sup>169</sup>

Therefore, to conclude, it might be difficult to decide where the border lies between the *deep state* as a way to capture a certain political reality and the *deep state* as a way to interpret the underlying factors of how this reality was constructed and presented. With full respect to the historical events that the term *parakratos* has attempted to encompass, I argue that there is an additional need to understand the concept as a conspiratorial belief implying that a powerful alliance of various covert entities of a political, military, security and economic character has been involved in clandestine activities aimed at the enforcement of their presumed interests, the suppression of political opposition and the manipulation of the general public by creating an atmosphere of intimidation and tension. While such discussion has been apparently opened for the case of the Turkish *deep state*, a comparable initiative for the *parakratos* has so far been missing. To what extent such conspiratorial beliefs may have been justifiable will be subject to the subsequent analysis as well as the motivations that

---

infiltration of the state by the Gülenists was so vast that they gradually evolved into a deep state and became a “conspiracy within a conspiracy,” eventually losing power following the 2016 failed coup d'état Gürpınar, ‘Deep State: Reality, Discourse, Conspiracy Theory’, 61–69.

<sup>167</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 164–65; Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 167–68.

<sup>168</sup> Isaias I. Konstantinidis, *To aristero parakratos tis metapolitefsis [The Leftist Parakratos of the Metapolitefsis]* (Athina: Ilektron, 2018).

<sup>169</sup> For example see “Kasidiaris: Parakratos i Aristera – Mono emeis mporoume na feroume eirini sti chora [Kasidiaris: Left is Parakratos – Only us can bring peace in our country],” iefimerida.gr, 26 November 2012, <https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/78492/κασιδιάρης-παρακράτος-η-αριστερά—μόνο-εμείς-μπορούμε-να-φέρουμε-ειρήνη-στη-χώρα> (accessed 11 March 2020); “Danellis (Potami): O SYRIZA flertarei meto aristero parakratos [Danellis (Potami): SYRIZA is flirting with a left-wing deep state],” iefimerida.gr, 11 November 2015, <https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/235229/danellis-potami-o-syriza-flertarei-me-aristero-parakratos> (accessed 11 March 2020).

stood behind them, be it the need for political mobilisation or the provision of broader explanations for certain phenomena that were eluding simple clarification.

## 2. Greek Anti-Communism (1914–1967): The Anti-Communist Legislation and the “Para-Constitution”

If post-civil war Greece (1949–1967) were to be described in a single word, “anti-communist” would probably be the most fitting. The anti-communist campaign of the 1950s and 1960s was induced by the Greek Civil War and was further stirred up by the ongoing Cold War, including the US’s engagement in Greece. It pervaded all spheres of public life, such as state administration, the judiciary, the welfare system, education, culture, religion and the media.<sup>170</sup> Besides its ideological and propagandist form, Greek anti-communism took the shape of being a harsh fight against presumed communist sympathisers, waged by Greek security and military forces as well as the KYP.<sup>171</sup> Screening the population’s political convictions became a common practice, considerably impacting one’s social status and professional career. The political persecution of left-wing suspects took many forms; it could lead to their legal prosecution as well as political, social or economic discrimination.<sup>172</sup>

Nonetheless, Greek anti-communism cannot merely be perceived as the product of traumatic civil experiences. Nor should it simply be attributed to US interventionism in Greek security politics, particularly in the era of McCarthyism, nor as to the outcome of Greece’s new political orientation via its changing foreign policy dictated by the Cold War.<sup>173</sup> The intrinsic fear shared by the Greek political elites concerning the existence of a domestic communist threat had been inherited from the interwar period, at least dating back to the foundation of the Socialist Labour Party (*Sosialistiko ergatiko komma Ellados*; SEKE), the first openly Marxist political party in the country, in 1918.<sup>174</sup> Amidst great political and economic instability and social radicalisation, the Greek authorities showed increasing animosity towards the emerging labour movement.

---

<sup>170</sup> Cf. Anastasia I. Mitsopoulou, *O ellinikos antikommounismos ston ‘syntomo 20o aiona’: opseis tou dimosiou logou stin politiki, stin ekpaideusi kai sti logotechnia [Greek Anti-Communism in the ‘Short 20th Century’: Aspects of the Public Speech in Politics, Education and Literature]* (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2014), 201–316.

<sup>171</sup> For example, see Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’.

<sup>172</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’.

<sup>173</sup> Regarding the US-Greek cooperation in anti-communist strategies, see Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’.

<sup>174</sup> Matthias Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949 [The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949]* (München; Wien: Oldenbourg, 1982), 28–29.

Soon afterwards, the SEKE's successor party, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), became the target of continuous patterns of state persecution and suspicion given its pro-Soviet orientation and boundless loyalty to the directives of the Communist International (Comintern).<sup>175</sup> The Metaxas dictatorship represented an important moment in the development of the anti-communist struggle. Inspired by then-fascist regimes in Europe, Metaxas expanded the use of surveillance and political persecution against the opposition, heavily relying on cooperation with his Minister of Public Order, Konstantinos Maniadakis. These measures were partially revived during the civil war and post-civil war period.<sup>176</sup> Further incentive for the anti-communist camp's growing dissent came with the rise of the EAM/ELAS during the Axis occupation of Greece and continued into the early stages of the civil war.<sup>177</sup>

An evaluation of anti-communism in Greece, not necessarily limited to the post-civil war period, is fundamental for understanding *parakratos*. Alongside the official organs of state security, such as the military, the KYP, the police and the gendarmerie, all of whom formally represented the anti-communist policies of the Greek state, the *parakratos* has been widely perceived as an informal network of agents unofficially engaged in an anti-communist struggle.<sup>178</sup> This narrative of a parallel power mechanism seems to be complementary with another concept, whereby post-civil war Greece also featured a "parallel" constitutional (or rather legal) system, the so-called "para-constitution" (*parasynagma*). This term, just like *parakratos*, is rooted in the left-wing political tradition and thus cannot be considered unbiased. Its political objective was, yet again, to publicly denounce the Right, to accuse it of grave violations of the constitutional order as well as human and civil rights and to mobilise the left-wing opposition. Nevertheless, the term has subsequently been elaborated on by various

---

<sup>175</sup> Giannis Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel from the 1821 to the Present* (London: Hurst, 2002), 110–111.

<sup>176</sup> Cf. Marina Petrakis, *The Metaxas Myth: Dictatorship and Propaganda in Greece*, International Library of War Studies 6 (London ; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006).

<sup>177</sup> For example, see Tsoutsoumpis, *A History of the Greek Resistance*; Iasonas Chandrinos, *Ethniki antitasti. I alithini istoria tou ellinikou antartikou [The Greek Resistance. The True History of the Greek Guerilla War]* (Athina: Periskopio, 2007); Iasonas Chandrinos, *To timoro cheri tou laou: i drasi tou ELAS kai tis OPLA stiin katechomeni protevousa, 1942-1944 [The People's Punishing Arm: The history of ELAS and OPLA in occupied Athens 1942-1944]* (Athina: Themelio, 2017).

<sup>178</sup> Close, 'The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State', 159–60; Close, *Greece since 1945*, 85; Seraphim Seferiades, 'Polarization and Nonproportionality: The Greek Party System in the Postwar Era', *Comparative Politics* 19, no. 1 (October 1986): 74–75; Stergiou, 'Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]', 109; Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 260–61; E. M. Pantelouris, *Greece: An Introduction* (Glasgow: Blueacre Books, 1980), 79.

scholars and was eventually appropriated by mainstream Greek historiography, even found in the most recent publications.<sup>179</sup> In the context of the 2009 economic crisis, it was further transposed into a new political reality when the term “modern para-constitution” was used to describe the legislation announcing austerity measures.<sup>180</sup>

The “para-constitution” became an umbrella term for extraordinary anti-communist legislation introduced during the civil war under a state of emergency, imposing harsh punishments on political deeds. These measures continued to be employed long after the civil war, even though they were effectively in breach of the democratic constitution then in force. The issue of post-civil war anti-communist legislation is of great importance for analysing *parakratos* because it illustrates the extent of the Greek state’s efforts to contain the perceived “communist threat.” The “para-constitution” equipped Greek authorities with additional legal mechanisms whose use in a mature, consolidated democracy would have been unacceptable given their unconstitutionality. Moreover, it follows a similar logic as the *parakratos*: the left-wing opposition claimed that the ruling right-wing regime was willing to use both legal and illegal tools for its suppression. In other words, despite the enormous magnitude of political persecution and surveillance carried out by official state institutions and under a valid constitution, there seemed to be a subjective need, supposedly shared by certain political and military actors, for the enforcement of unofficial means against the anti-communist struggle, taking the shape of the *parakratos* and the “para-constitution.”

---

<sup>179</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 182; Nikos Alivizatos, *Oi politikoí thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974. Opseis tis ellinikis embirias [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974. Perspectives of the Greek Experience]* (Athina: Themelio, 1983), 525–26; David H. Close, ‘The Legacy’, in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 214–19; Takis S. Pappas, *Making Party Democracy in Greece* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 14; Polymeris Voglis, *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners in the Greek Civil War* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 224; Michalis Tsapogas and Dimitris Christopoulos, eds., *Ta dikaiomata stin Ellada 1953-2003. Apo to telos tu emfyliou sto telos tis metapolitefsis [The Right in Greece 1953-2003. From the End of the Civil War until the End of the Metapolitefsi]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2004), 36; Nico Carpentier and Erik Spinoy, eds., *Discourse Theory and Cultural Analysis: Media, Arts and Literature*, The Hampton Press Communication Series (Cresskill, N.J: Hampton Press, 2008), 121–27; Riki van Boeschoten, ‘Enemies of the Nation – A Nation of Enemies: The Long Greek Civil War’, in *After Civil War: Division Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Contemporary Europe*, Bill Kissane (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 101; Sotiris Rizas, ‘Dekaetia tou 1960: To politevma se dokimasia [The 1960s: The Regime on Trial]’, in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitis 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 35–37; Gonda Van Steen, *Adoption, Memory, and Cold War Greece: Kid pro Quo?* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 241.

<sup>180</sup> Cf. Anna Triantafyllidou and Hara Kouki, *The Greek Crisis and European Modernity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

I open this chapter with a brief introduction to the emergence of Greece's communist movement. More specifically, I focus on the origins of Greek anti-communism, which are rooted in the 1910s. I approach the topic through three distinctive periods – the interwar years, the time of the civil war and the post-civil war era – and from the perspective of the aforementioned anti-communist legislation in addition to the narratives used for its ideological framing. Over the respective period, a number of legislative acts were introduced to criminalise leftist political activities. While certain anti-communist measures during the Cold War era were inspired by the US, others proved to have considerable legal continuity with previous governments since they often drew on earlier adopted legal acts and precedents.<sup>181</sup> Reinforced by ubiquitous state propaganda, this legislation aimed to persecute organisations and individuals perceived by the ruling regime to be a menace to the existing political order and the territorial integrity of the country. From the regime's perspective, the alleged proponents of communism included active members and supporters of the KKE, those involved in the EAM/ELAS and those who fought in the civil war on the side of the DSE. In many cases, the persecuted did not adhere to communism; moreover, the political repression targeted the relatives of those accused of sympathising with communism, regardless of their political convictions. Importantly, the goal of the anti-communist campaign in Greece was thus not only to prevent leftist subjects and individuals from seizing political power and exercising control over state institutions but also, as Couloumbis puts it, the “permanent exclusion of communism from the life of the Greek nation.”<sup>182</sup>

## 2.1 The Emergence of the KKE

The evolution of the Greek communist movement was considerably delayed in comparison to Western Europe. Among the main reasons were the overwhelmingly rural character of the country and the limited number of industrial workers who could form a proletariat with a distinct class awareness. The first socialist groups only started to be organised in the industrial areas of Athens, Piraeus, Volos and Patras at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Thessaloniki, the city with a substantial Jewish population and often

---

<sup>181</sup> See Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 474–87; Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 7–9; Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 15.

<sup>182</sup> Theodore A. Couloumbis, ‘Post World War II Greece: A Political Review’, *East European Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (1973): 292.



called the “Jerusalem of the Balkans,”<sup>183</sup> held a special place for socialism in Greece. The local Jewish community played a major role in the establishment of the Socialist Worker’s Federation (*Sosialistiki Ergatiki Omospondia*), the so-called *Fenderasion*, which was active between 1908 and 1918. The organisation’s plan to proclaim the autonomous federative state of Macedonia, including Aegean Macedonia, possessed by Greece, provoked the suspicions of the Greek authorities after 1912 (i.e., after the annexation of Ottoman Salonica to Greece) and eventually led to the persecution of its members.<sup>184</sup> The activities of the Thessalonian socialists presaged some of the future problems of the Greek communist movement; besides rising antisemitism throughout Greek society, it was chiefly their incapability to take a pragmatic stance towards the Macedonian issue.

The foundation of the General Confederation of Greek Workers (*Geniki synomospondia ergaton Ellados*; GSEE) and the abovementioned Socialist Labour Party of Greece (SEKE) followed in November 1918.<sup>185</sup> The establishment of the SEKE was undoubtedly inspired by the 1917 October Revolution in Russia; however, during that time, Greece itself was suffering from long-term political instability and economic exhaustion caused by its continuous engagement in military conflicts, first the Balkan Wars and later the First World War. The participation of the country in the Greek-Turkish War (1919–1922) and its subsequent defeat led to the radicalisation of the worker’s movement and the gradual takeover of the SEKE and the GSEE by Bolshevik sympathisers.<sup>186</sup> Already in April 1920, the SEKE officially joined the Comintern and only added the term “Communist” to the party’s name in 1922. In 1924, under the new policy of bolshevisation (*bolsevikopoiisi*), the SEKE adopted the title Communist Party of Greece/Greek Section of the Communist International (*Kommounistiko komma Ellados/Elliniko tmima tis Kommounistikis Diethnous*; KKE/ETKD). Following the

---

<sup>183</sup> Devin E. Naar, *Jewish Salonica: Between the Ottoman Empire and Modern Greece* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).

<sup>184</sup> Mitsopoulou, *O ellinikos antikommounismos ston ‘syntomo 20o aiona’* [Greek Anti-Communism in the ‘Short 20th Century’], 87.

<sup>185</sup> Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949* [The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949], 28–29; Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, 110.

<sup>186</sup> Lito Apostolakou, “Greek” Workers or Communist “Others”: The Contending Identities of Organized Labour in Greece, c. 1914-36’, *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 3 (1997): 413–14; Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 15–16; Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Axe: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944-1949*, 1st English language ed (New Rochelle, N.Y: Caratzas Brothers, 1978), 7–9.

1926 elections, KKE representatives entered the Hellenic Parliament for the first time.<sup>187</sup>

Many scholars treated the KKE as a party with an exceptional historical trajectory. For example, classic contemporary authors of Greek historiography Koliopoulos and Veremis referred to the party as the “KKE, a party like no other.”<sup>188</sup> Stergiou came to a similar conclusion; to paraphrase him, within the first three decades of its existence, the KKE developed from a “political sect” into a mass political party, only to return again to its inferior position after its defeat in the civil war.<sup>189</sup> Yet, the uniqueness of the KKE’s position is questionable, especially within the South-East European context. In this region, local communist parties were established in the aftermath of the First World War, the only exception being Albanian Communists, who lacked domestic political representation until 1941 and were organised as part of the Comintern in the USSR. In a way that can be compared to the Greek Communists, their comrades in Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania were subject to political oppression by the state authorities, and their parties were outlawed one by one during the 1920s and 1930s. Among them, the KKE was the last one to be banned: disregarding the ban during the years of dictatorship under Theodoros Pangalos (1925–1926), it only occurred in 1936 during the Metaxas dictatorship.<sup>190</sup> The outbreak of the Second World War, and especially the German attack against the USSR, provided local Communists, who were used to subversion and clandestine work by this point, the opportunity to form mass resistance movements and organise their supporters for a post-war takeover of power. The Greek and Yugoslav Communists were especially successful in turning large parts of their country’s territory into their own.<sup>191</sup> The fact that the political deadlock in Greece developed into a civil war and the eventual loss of Greek Communists was less a sign of the KKE’s exceptionalism and more a result of

---

<sup>187</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 172–73; Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949 [The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949]*, 29–30, 36. For the interwar history of see also Angelos G. Elefandis, *I epangelia tis adynatis epanastasis. K.K.E. kai astismos ston mesopolemo [The Promise of an Impossible Revolution. The KKE and the Bourgeoisie in the Interwar Period]* (Athina: Themelio, 1979).

<sup>188</sup> Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, 110–125.

<sup>189</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 101.

<sup>190</sup> Mark Biondich, *The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violence since 1878*, Zones of Violence (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 96–98.

<sup>191</sup> Tchavdar Marinov and Alexander Vezekov, ‘Communism and Nationalism in the Balkans: Marriage of Convenience or Mutual Attraction?’, in *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, ed. Rumen Daskalov and Tchavdar Marinov, Balkan Studies Library (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2013), 469–555.

geopolitics. The narrative of the defeated Left who first liberated Greece from Nazi-occupation only to be betrayed by the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in the so-called percentage agreement, negotiated with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, bolstered the idea of the left-wing martyrdom as well the sense of its uniqueness.<sup>192</sup>

Coming back to the KKE and its political position throughout the interwar period, its electoral results were rather low, ranging between 1-2 per cent in the 1920s and 4-6 per cent in the 1930s, with the exception of the 1936 election when the party received nearly 10 per cent of the vote as part of an electoral coalition.<sup>193</sup> Its limited influence stemmed from, among other things, a lack of any significant tradition of political radicalism with an emphasis on the social dimension. In large part, most of the population was formed by peasants, but relatively few of them were landless. They could barely provide the KKE with sufficient support.<sup>194</sup> The party also found supporters among tobacco factory workers, Slav Macedonian as well as Muslim minorities, Asia Minor and Pontus refugees who reached Greece following the 1922 military defeat as well as the subsequent population exchange with Turkey and urban intellectuals. During the interwar period, the party membership counted only several thousand people, while at the height of its powers, in 1936, it had 15,000 members.<sup>195</sup>

Although the KKE could mobilise its supporters and even produce some strong leaders, first and foremost being its General Secretary Nikos Zachariadis, the party could hardly represent a real threat to the interwar political regime. Many political personalities of the period were aware that the possibility of a communist overthrow in Greece was low.<sup>196</sup> Nevertheless, the mere existence of the party essentially challenged the role of the Greek political and economic elites. The communist ideology questioned the traditional social structures, clientelist networks and power relations in Greece by creating new bonds between groups and individuals and determining their new public

---

<sup>192</sup> For more on the percentage agreement, see Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven [Conn.] ; London: Yale University Press, 2006), 217–25.

<sup>193</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 379; Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Axe*, 13–14.

<sup>194</sup> Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, 111.

<sup>195</sup> Mitsopoulou, *O ellinikos antikommounismos ston 'syntomo 20o aiona' [Greek Anti-Communism in the 'Short 20th Century']*, 94. See also Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949 [The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949]*, 30–31; Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 1430-1950*, 1st American ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 351–55.

<sup>196</sup> Mitsopoulou, *O ellinikos antikommounismos ston 'syntomo 20o aiona' [Greek Anti-Communism in the 'Short 20th Century']*, 94.

identity.<sup>197</sup> Besides this, the KKE also programmatically aimed to undermine the existing political and social order by carrying out subversive activities against the Greek state. In the first half of the 1920s, the Greek Communists were actively preparing for a takeover of power, with two military coups (1922, 1923) and the introduction of the Hellenic Republic (1924), convincing them of the inevitable collapse of the constitutionally unstable state system.<sup>198</sup> Finally, by unconditionally following the directives of the Comintern, the KKE was seen as an agent of the Soviet political interests by the political establishment, thus making them perceived as anti-national and disloyal to Greek authorities. Given its devotion to Moscow, the KKE was forced to adopt certain policies that were often perceived as contradictory to those of the Greek state. For example, Greek Communists were opposed to the post-First World War political order and the Greek nationalist military campaign in Asia Minor, which was otherwise endorsed by the main political parties and official state politics.<sup>199</sup>

Certain communist policies not only provoked the unwanted attention of the Greek authorities and stirred up an aversion for many voters, but they also created internal pressure within the KKE. In 1924, the party included a demand for the establishment of an autonomous Soviet Republic of Macedonia and Thrace as part of the communist Balkan federation in its program. These territories, which Greece annexed after the Balkan Wars and the First World War, were home to an ethnically and linguistically diverse population. The Communists accused the Greek government of attempts to change the region's ethnic composition in favour of the Greeks by populating it with Asia Minor and Pontic refugees, who were ethnically Greek, from the 1923 population exchange with Turkey.<sup>200</sup> The Macedonian issue became extremely sensitive as a result of previous armed struggles between Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs over the territory. For the decades to come, Athens had to defend Greece's possession of Aegean Macedonia and Western Thrace against Bulgarian revisionism and Yugoslav

---

<sup>197</sup> Apostolakou, “Greek” Workers or Communist “Others”, 409–10, 416–17. Furthermore, see Vasilis K. Gounaris, ‘Bonds Made Power: Clientelism, Nationalism, and Party Strategies in Greek Macedonia (1900-1950)’, ed. Mark Mazower (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), 109–28.

<sup>198</sup> Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Axe*, 7–12.

<sup>199</sup> Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, 110–13.

<sup>200</sup> For more see Philip Carabott, ‘Aspects of the Hellenization of Greek Macedonia, ca. 1912-ca. 1959’, *Καμπος: Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek* 13 (2005): 21–61; Ireneusz Adam Ślupkov, *The Communist Party of Greece and the Macedonian National Problem, 1918-1940* (Szczecin, Poland: Ireneusz A. Ślupkov, 2006), 31–48.

political and economic ambitions, more so because the country's northern border, crossing vast mountainous areas, was difficult to protect.<sup>201</sup>

The communist plan to create an autonomous Macedonian state was interpreted by Greek governments as an endorsement of separatism; furthermore, local Greek populations were unable to comprehend this strategy. In the proposed Macedonian state, the Greeks would be recognised alongside the Slavs, the Vlachs, the Albanians and the Muslims as individual "peoples" but would be excluded from using the term "Macedonians," which was reserved only for the Slavs in communist terminology.<sup>202</sup> Finally, since the Asia Minor and Pontic refugees (besides the Slav Macedonians)<sup>203</sup> represented an important support base for the Greek Communists, the issue inevitably provoked tensions inside the KKE itself. Throughout the 1920s, the party suffered from continuous internal disputes, which were mostly related to the impossibility of reconciling the needs of domestic politics with the necessity of implementing Soviet directives. These tensions led to occasional party fragmentations, the creation of various splinter groups and, at some point, even dissension with the GSEE. In fact, the conflicts were only surmounted following the 1931 intervention of the Comintern, which appointed a new, fully bolshevised Politburo of the KKE and, thus, opened a way to power for fresh cadres trained in Moscow, including Zachariadis.<sup>204</sup>

## 2.2 The Interwar Anti-Communist Legislation

Initially, the Greek political elites were not entirely hostile to the demands of the emerging socialist movement. During his first term as prime minister (1910–1915), liberal politician Eleftherios Venizelos (1864–1936) attempted to endorse some of their calls. Between 1910 and 1914, he enforced several legislative acts ameliorating the social situation of workers and regulating the labour market as well as the activities of

---

<sup>201</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 5–8; Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 19, 39.

<sup>202</sup> Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, 112–14.

<sup>203</sup> The Slavophone population of Greek Macedonia has historically been treated by the Greek state as a linguistic group rather than a national minority. Officially until today, Greece recognises only religious minorities living on its territory. The Slav Macedonians, unlike the Muslims of the Thrace, share a common Christian Orthodox identity with the Greek majority. Cf. Christian Voss, 'Language Ideology between Self-Identification and Ascription among the Slavic-Speakers in Greek Macedonia and Thrace', in *The Pomaks in Greece and Bulgaria: A Model Case for Borderland Minorities in the Balkans*, ed. Christian Voss and Klaus Steinke, Südosteuropa-Studien (Munich: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft; Verlag Otto Sagner, 2007).

<sup>204</sup> Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949 [The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949]*, 32–33; Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 20.

labour unions. In this way, Venizelos was trying to gain the political support of the labour movement and forestall its further radicalisation.<sup>205</sup> Not only the representatives of his Liberal Party (*Komma Fileleftheron*) but also Conservatives from the country's second major political party, the People's Party (*Laiko Komma*), made an effort to improve the conditions of the working class; however, their attempts were mostly driven by self-seeking purposes and their inherent paternalism.<sup>206</sup> Amidst great political instability caused by the Balkan Wars, the First World War and, especially, the impression of the National Schism, the representatives of both Liberals and Conservatives were not only increasingly suspicious towards each other but also gradually started perceiving communism as a threat. The Liberal critique focused on the condemnation of communism for its hostility towards parliamentarianism, democracy and freedom along with its presumed cultural inferiority; for the Conservatives, communism represented a menace for the traditional values of the fatherland, religion and family. For both political camps, communism constituted a sign of Slavic expansionism.<sup>207</sup>

The first socialists and trade unionists were prosecuted based on Law 415/1871 on the suppression of banditry, enabling the banishment of relatives of bandits, which was further expanded by Law 121/1913.<sup>208</sup> The latter act imposed the same penalty on those convicted of the disturbance of public security.<sup>209</sup> Following the rise of Liberals to power in 1917, Venizelos purged the state administration, army, security forces and judicial officials from royalists and substituted them with his supporters. Furthermore, he launched more systematic repression against political opposition. Law 755/1917

---

<sup>205</sup> Apostolakou, “Greek” Workers or Communist “Others”, 410–12; Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949* [*The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949*], 29.

<sup>206</sup> Meletis I. Meletopoulos, *Ideologia tou dexiou kratous, 1949-1967: episimos politikos logos kai kyriarchi ideologia stin metemphyliaki Ellada* [*Ideology of the Right-Wing State, 1949-1967: Official Political Speech and the Dominant Ideology in the post-Civil War Greece*] (Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1993), 64; Mitsopoulou, *O ellinikos antikommounismos ston 'syntomo 20o aiona'* [*Greek Anti-Communism in the 'Short 20th Century'*], 90–91.

<sup>207</sup> Mitsopoulou, *O ellinikos antikommounismos ston 'syntomo 20o aiona'* [*Greek Anti-Communism in the 'Short 20th Century'*], 99–108.

<sup>208</sup> Law 415/1871 “On the Amendment of the Articles of the Law on the Prosecution of Banditry,” FEK 21/1871 (Nomos yp’ arith. 415 Peri tropopoiiseos arthron tinon tou peri katadioxeos tis listeias Nomou, 29/05/1871).

<sup>209</sup> Law 121/1914 “On the Extension in the Annexed Territories of the Laws 374 of 27 February 1871, 415 of 19 May 1871 and 868 of 27 November 1880 On the Persecution of Banditry,” FEK 1/1914 (Nomos yp’ arith. 121 Peri epektaseos en tais prosartomenais chorais ton nomon 374 tis 27 Fevrouariou 1871, 415 tis 29 Maiou 1871 kai 868 tis 27 Noemvriou 1880 peri katadioxeos tis listeias, 31/12/1913). See also Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974* [*Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974*], 342.

targeted those who would endanger Greek military participation in the First World War and those who would represent a threat to public security.<sup>210</sup> It introduced the legal institution of judicial banishment, that is, the imposition of forced internal exile by the courts, specifically as a tool for political persecution. With such an aim, the law served subsequent governments of both Venizelist and anti-Venizelist orientations throughout the interwar period as a pretext to oppress the Left.<sup>211</sup>

The fiercely anti-communist Pangalos dictatorship, which for the first time outlawed the KKE, expanded the aforementioned legal practice by launching the so-called Public Security Committees (*Epitropes dimosias asfalias*). Under the legislative decree of May 5, 1926, these committees had the right to impose administrative banishment without a previous court decision, based solely on the proposition of the police and, thus, practically as a “preventive measure.”<sup>212</sup> The banishment, whose maximum duration was one year, was designed to suppress not only communist activities, especially related to the Macedonian issue, but principally all political opponents of the dictatorship. The committees continued to be active throughout the interwar and post-war period. Set up in every prefecture and composed of the prefect, the chief of gendarmerie and the public prosecutor, they served as a tool for persecuting the Left as well as mutual revenge between monarchists and the republicans.<sup>213</sup> Furthermore, under Pangalos, a specialised police unit for the suppression of the communist subversion, the Department of Special Security (*Ypiresia Eidikis Asfaleias*), was established; for the same reason, the Greek army ran the Kalpaki disciplinary military camp (1924–1934), where it placed politically “unreliable” conscripts.<sup>214</sup>

Following Pangalos’ deposition, the KKE operated in semi-legality, struggling to maintain its political activities and to participate in elections. Parallel to this, the strike and protest activities of workers were on the rise, especially with the impression

---

<sup>210</sup> Law 755/1917 “On Crimes Against the Security of the Country and Public Peace,” FEK 172/1917 (Nomos yp’ arith. 755 Peri adikimaton tinon kata tis asfaleias tis choras kai tis koinis isichias, 23/08/1917).

<sup>211</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 33.

<sup>212</sup> Legislative Decree “On the Amendment of the Legislative Decree on the Introduction of the Public Security Commissions and the Addition of a Provision on the Superiority”, FEK 178/1926 (Nomothetiko diatagma Peri tropopoiiseos Nomothetikou diatagmatos peri systaseos Epitropon Dimotikis Asfaleias kai prosthikis diataxeos peri yperorias, 05/05/1926). See also Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 342–46; Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, 115.

<sup>213</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 33–34.

<sup>214</sup> Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 25–26; Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 380–81.

of growing domestic political tensions in 1924 and 1936 and as a result of the economic crisis of the early 1930s.<sup>215</sup> Such a situation motivated the Venizelos government to adopt Law 4229/1929, also known as *Idionymo*, a *sui generis* law dealing with special criminal offences that were not treated by the penal code.<sup>216</sup> The law criminalised the communist – or “similar” – ideology and activities leading to the violent subversion of the existing social order or to the secession of Greek territory, even if merely in intent. Although it did not outlaw the KKE as such, it penalised the public expression of support towards and the proselytisation of communism. Furthermore, it allowed for the dissolution of all communist associations. The *Idionymo* also prohibited military personnel and public employees from entering such organisations. The individuals convicted based on this law were punished by imprisonment or banishment for up to 24 months.<sup>217</sup> Paradoxically, the *Idionymo* attempted to revise the clearly unconstitutional practice of administrative banishment by introducing judicial banishments that were imposed by the decision of courts. Still, the law continued to be in breach of the 1929 constitution, more precisely with the guarantee of personal freedom and freedom of expression. Nevertheless, already in 1931, the administrative banishment ordered by Public Security Committees were reintroduced. The judicial banishment proved to be less efficient: the court proceedings were slower, and the judges less willing to punish political opponents of the regime without solid evidence.<sup>218</sup> The *Idionymo* remained in force until the Metaxas dictatorship replaced it in 1936 with even stricter legal provisions.

Despite the harsh provisions of the *Idionymo* and its severe implementation, the electoral basis of the KKE increased throughout the 1930s. In the atmosphere of the rising far-right, both within Greece and in the larger European context, the KKE adopted the policy of being a popular front against fascism at its 6th Congress in December 1935, a position previously endorsed by the 7th Congress of the Comintern during the summer of that year. Thanks to this new strategy as well as to the new image

---

<sup>215</sup> Mitsopoulou, *O ellinikos antikommounismos ston 'syntomo 20o aiona'* [*Greek Anti-Communism in the 'Short 20th Century'*], 99–108.

<sup>216</sup> Law 4229/1929 “On Security Measures of the Social Regime and on the Protection of Citizens' Liberties,” FEK 245/1929 (Nomos yp' arith. 4229 Peri metron asfaleias tou koinonikou kathestotos kai prostasias ton eleftherion ton politon, 25/07/1929).

<sup>217</sup> See also Apostolakou, ““Greek” Workers or Communist “Others””, 419; Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 102.

<sup>218</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoï thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974* [*Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974*], 347–74.



of the Greek Communists as anti-fascist fighters and political martyrs, the party managed to gain public sympathies and launched short-term cooperation with the Liberals.<sup>219</sup> The KKE's strategic position further strengthened following the 1936 elections, when its 15 newly-elected deputies played a major role in the subsequent negotiations. This ended with a deadlock as neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives were able to form a majority government; at the same time, both parties excluded the option of their mutual cooperation.<sup>220</sup> Alongside the increased strike activity and the alleged communist infiltration of the armed forces, the pledge of the Communists to support a liberal cabinet in exchange for the abolition of the anti-communist legislation provided a pretext for the instalment of the far-right and ultra-conservative Metaxas dictatorship.

The Metaxas regime, inspired by the practices of then-contemporaneous authoritarian regimes, brought the surveillance and persecution practices against leftist and liberal opposition to a qualitatively new level in terms of efficiency and harshness. These methods included compiling personal secret files, mass banishment, political re-education and the coercion of detainees using both psychological pressure and torture.<sup>221</sup> In place of *Idionymo*, even stricter provisions were introduced based on the Compulsory Law of 117/1936 (or, in other words, “necessity laws”).<sup>222</sup> However, another legislative act, the Compulsory Law 1075/1938, deserves special attention since it introduced certain elements of the anti-communist policies that survived until the post-civil war period.<sup>223</sup> Firstly, it officially legalised the existence of internment camps, which served as the incarceration point for banished persons. Furthermore, the institution of civic-mindedness certificates (*pistopoiitika koinonikon fronimaton*) was adopted, which served as proof of loyalty to the regime and a prerequisite for employees in the public sector, specifically in large, state-owned or security-related companies.

---

<sup>219</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 102; Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Axe*, 27.

<sup>220</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 173; Hondros, ‘Greece and the German Occupation’, 39.

<sup>221</sup> Papacosma, ‘Ioannis Metaxas and the “Fourth of August” Dictatorship in Greece’, 183; Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 26–27.

<sup>222</sup> Compulsory Law 117/1936 “On Measures to Combat Communism and its Consequences,” FEK 402/1936 (Anagkastikos Nomos yp’ arith. 117 Peri metron pros katapolemisin tou kommounismou kai ton ek toutou synepeion, 18/09/1936). The more explanatory term “necessity laws” is used by Alivizatos, see Alivizatos, ‘The Executive in the Post-Liberation Period, 1944-1949’.

<sup>223</sup> Compulsory Law 1075/1938 “On Security Measures of the Social System and Citizen’s Protection,” FEK 45/1938 (Anagkastikos Nomos yp’ arith. 1075 Peri metron asfaleias tou koinonikou kathestotos kai prostasias ton politon, 11/02/1938).

The same logic has been applied in the case of the declarations of repentance (*diloseis metanoias*) that originally constituted a requirement for the release of political prisoners or the reduction of their punishment. Gradually, the use of the declarations expanded; they served as a tool for psychological pressure against communist suspects. In these documents, which were typically published by the local press, signatories were forced to renounce communism and express loyalty to the Metaxas regime.<sup>224</sup>

During the Metaxas dictatorship, the KKE structures were infiltrated by the secret police, and their activities disrupted. Some 2,000 of the most prominent party cadres were arrested, including the entire Central Committee.<sup>225</sup> At the outbreak of the Second World War, the party leadership was thus in jail. Due to isolation, the KKE did not first find consensus over the 1939 Soviet-Nazi pact nor the 1940 Italian invasion of Greece. A part of the leadership even temporarily supported the war efforts of the Greek government. They were not aware of the Comintern directive interpreting the war as a “conflict of two opposing imperialist blocs.”<sup>226</sup> The Axis occupation of Greece started in April 1941. The KKE called upon its supporters to resist the foreign aggressors only after the German attack against the USSR two months later, this time in full compliance with the stance of the Comintern. While the Greek political representatives left the country and reinstated its activities in exile, a collaborationist government was formed in Athens. The Greek Communists, in contrast, got engaged in the creation of a mass resistance movement, the EAM/ELAS. At the end of the occupation, in October 1944, the EAM/ELAS controlled most Greek territory, with the EAM attracting between 0.5–1.5 million members, whereas the KKE increased its membership to about 400,000.<sup>227</sup>

---

<sup>224</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 420–22, 436–39.

<sup>225</sup> Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, 119–20; Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949 [The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949]*, 37–38; Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War*, 32.

<sup>226</sup> Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949 [The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949]*, 39.

<sup>227</sup> Konstantinos Tsoukalas, ‘The Ideological Impact of the Civil War’, in *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis*, ed. John O. Iatrides (Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981), 327; Ole L. Smith, ‘“The First Round” - Civil War during Occupation’, in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 60; Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 103. On the rise of EAM see Giannis Skalidakis, *I Eleftheri Ellada. I exousia tou EAM sta chronia tis Katochis (1943-1944) [Free Greece: The Power of EAM in the Occupation Years (1943-1944)]* (Athens: Ekdoseis Asini, 2015).

## 2.3 Towards the Civil War

The ambitions of the EAM to participate in post-war political arrangements met with opposition from the government-in-exile, which returned to Greece in mid-October 1944, along with its foreign supporters, the UK and later mainly the US. At that point, the EAM/ELAS possessed political power over Greece, and its indisputable contribution to the country's liberation provided it with full legitimacy. In comparison to this, the exile government represented the pre-war political institutions and practices, which were no longer relevant in the new post-war conditions.<sup>228</sup> Yet, approval for domestic political representation and its allies was not the only obstacle for the EAM's rule. The organisation was not homogeneous enough to offer a plausible political solution. It derived support from various social groups, out of which only a small proportion identified with the communist program and its principles of class struggle.<sup>229</sup> Furthermore, a significant part of Greek society viewed the EAM/ELAS with great hostility due to its activities during the Axis occupation.

In its anti-Axis resistance, the EAM/ELAS did not limit itself to the task of Greece's liberation from the Axis occupation. Its primary target was to become the dominant political force in Greece, which would enable it to take over power after the war. The EAM/ELAS was thus fighting both with the collaborationist units, especially the Security Battalions (*Tagmata asfalias*), and with a variety of anti-communist resistance groups, such as the British-supported National Republican Greek League (*Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos*, EDES), the National and Social Liberation (*Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosis*, EKKA) or the minor, but fiercely anti-communist, X (*Chi*), known for its cooperation with Security Battalions and its later active involvement in the so-called *Dekemvriana* events in December 1944.<sup>230</sup> Furthermore, the EAM/ELAS was involved in the killing of many civilians. It proved adamant in following the strategies of partisan warfare, disregarding the consequences for a civilian population that was suffering from the retaliations of occupiers.<sup>231</sup>

---

<sup>228</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 52.

<sup>229</sup> David H. Close, 'Introduction', in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London ; New York: Routledge, 1993), 17.

<sup>230</sup> Smith, "'The First Round' - Civil War during Occupation', 61–69; Stratos Dordanas, *Ellines Enantion Ellinon: o kosmos ton Tagmaton asfalias stin katochiki Thessaloniki 1941-1944 [Greeks against Greeks: The World of Security Battalions in Occupied Thessaloniki 1941-1944]* (Athens: Epikentro, 2006).

<sup>231</sup> For more on the Greek resistance see Polymeris Voglis, *I elliniki koinonia stin Katochi: 1941-1944 [The Greek Society During Occupation: 1941-1944]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Alexandria, 2010), 81–95; John

In addition, many civilians died directly from the terror instigated by the radical elements inside the EAM/ELAS. On the one hand, the organisation significantly improved the welfare of the population in some of the most underdeveloped areas, abandoned by the central authorities, by setting up the necessary infrastructure. On the other hand, it demanded absolute loyalty from those residing in the territories under its control. The radical members of the EAM/ELAS, such as Aris Velouchiotis, acted with unprecedented cruelty against anyone suspected of treason.<sup>232</sup> Such treatment caused great resentment among a considerable part of the population. Under such pressure, people were forced to take sides; many of them – driven by their anti-communist convictions and experienced grievances – even opted to collaborate with the occupiers. Furthermore, as Kalyvas shows, the animosity caused by adherence to one side or the other often interplayed with strictly personal disputes at the local level.<sup>233</sup>

Another issue that became an obstacle to a peaceful transition was the post-war Greek authorities' lenient treatment of wartime collaborators. In early 1945, the Plastiras government passed new legislation concerning the prosecution of collaborators. In reality, the state apparatus continued to work without a major purge; only a few collaborators were put on trial and punished, and even then, the majority were released as a result of the 1948 amnesty.<sup>234</sup> As for the Security Battalions, after a short period of imprisonment, thousands of their members entered the newly formed National Guard (*Ethnofylaki*) while many officers served in the restored national army.<sup>235</sup> The ones convicted of collaboration tended to use anti-communism as an argument for their defence. Not only did they often avoid punishment, but later they even occupied prominent positions in the public sector or armed forces. In stark contrast, any participation in wartime resistance made people suspicious of

---

L. Hondros, 'The Greek Resistance, 1941-1944. A Reevaluation', in *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis.*, ed. John O. Iatrides (Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981), 37–47.

<sup>232</sup> Keith Lowe, *Zdivočelý kontinent: Evropa po druhé světové válce [Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II]*, 2015, 270–75.

<sup>233</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, 'Red Terror: Leftist Violence during the Occupation', in *After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943-1960*, ed. Mark Mazower, Princeton Modern Greek Studies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 171–75.

<sup>234</sup> For more, see Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*; Gabriella Etmektsoglou, 'Collaborators and Partisans on Trial: Political Justice in Postwar Greece 1944-1949', in *Keine "Abrechnung": NS-Verbrechen, Justiz und Gesellschaft in Europa Nach 1945*, ed. Claudia Kuretsidis-Haider (Leipzig; Wien: AVA - DÖW, 1988), 231–56.

<sup>235</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 55–56. According to Veremis and Gerolymatos, by March 1945 all Security Battalionists have been released from detention, and about 12,000 of them entered the National Guard. Veremis and Gerolymatos, 'The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949', 113–14.

sympathising with communism regardless of their actual political orientation. Thus, the number of leftists in prisons soon far outnumbered the number of collaborators.<sup>236</sup>

The initial negotiations between the EAM and the government of Georgios Papandreou, composed mainly of Venizelists, turned into a deadlock after a disagreement on the conditions of the ELAS demobilisation. In late 1944, armed clashes (known as *Dekemvriana*, or the Battle of Athens) broke out between EAM sympathisers and the Greek government; the latter were supported by British and Greek military units, the police, the National Guard, anti-communist resistance fighters and wartime collaborationist bands.<sup>237</sup> Subsequently, periods of anarchic violence followed during the “red terror” (1944/1945) and, after the failure of the Varkiza agreement, the “white terror” (1945–1946).<sup>238</sup> The legislative elections of March 1946, boycotted by the Left, took place in an atmosphere of intimidation and ended with a landslide victory for the monarchists. A bloody attack by a left-wing armed group against the gendarmerie station in Litchoro on election day is widely recognised as the beginning of the civil war.<sup>239</sup> The constitutional referendum of September 1946 provided for the return of King George II.<sup>240</sup> The re-installment of the monarchy and, above all, the personality of the monarch, who discredited himself with his support of the Metaxas dictatorship, were unacceptable for the leftist camp.

In the three-year civil conflict, the DSE, established as a military wing of the KKE in December 1946, clashed with the Greek army, backed by the UK and, later on,

---

<sup>236</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 19; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 55–56; Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, 164–65.

<sup>237</sup> Lars Baerentzen and David H. Close, ‘The British Defeat of EAM, 1944–1945’, in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 84–89; Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War*, 99–142; Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Axe*, 109–35. According to Voglis, about 7,000 died in the Dekemvriana fights, 12,000 left-wingers were arrested (and 8,000 of them deported to internment camps in the Middle East); on the other hand, the ELAS took approximately 15,000 hostages. Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 53.

<sup>238</sup> The Varkiza agreement of February 1945 (alongside the Lebanon agreement of May 1944 and the Caserta agreement of September 1944, represented – to use Maurice Duverger’s term – a “pre-constitution.” These documents were setting the basic legal and political framework of the period, previous to the adoption of the 1952 Constitution. The Varkiza agreement was supposed to settle the political crisis following the *Dekemvriana* events, but, eventually, its only clause that was at least partially fulfilled was the ELAS demobilisation. As a result, the disarmed ELAS/EAM supporters were particularly vulnerable to face subsequent persecution. Many were prosecuted despite the pronounced amnesty on political crimes as they were instead accused of common-law crimes. According to Voglis, there were approximately ten thousand left-wing political prisoners in 1945, and their imprisonment was primarily meant to terrorise rather than punish them. Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 53–57. See also Lowe, *Zdivočelý kontinent [Savage Continent]*, 275–77.

<sup>239</sup> Giorgos Margaritis, *Istoria tou ellinikou emfyliou polemou 1946-1949. Tomos 1 [The History of the Greek Civil War 1946-1949. Volume 1]* (Athina: Bibliorama, 2001), 150–52.

<sup>240</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 59.

by the US following the declaration of Truman doctrine in February 1947. The latter provided Athens with massive military aid and, pursuing the “strategy of non-reconciliation,” strived for the absolute defeat of communist powers.<sup>241</sup> The fights took place in the countryside, mostly in the north, while cities were controlled by the government in Athens. Only in the second half of 1947 did this turn into a full-scale civil war. In March 1948, the DSE was at the peak of its power, but throughout 1948, it started suffering greater losses as a result of the US’s massive military support. The US intervention and, generally, the unfavourable international situation alongside the increasingly faulty strategy of the DSE military leadership, the continuous popular distrust towards the KKE’s policy of autonomous Macedonia and the inherent anti-communist sentiment held by a great portion of society eventually dealt a heavy blow to the struggle of Greek Communists.<sup>242</sup> The final battle took place in August 1949 at Mount Grammos, close to the Albanian border. Afterwards, the remaining DSE forces retreated to Albania.

The military part of the conflict resulted in immense human and material losses. The total mortality is difficult to determine since the first victims of the civil war cannot be fully separated from those of the Axis occupation. Moreover, both sides of the conflict tended to manipulate the numbers. Between the years 1940 and 1944, approximately 550,000 persons died as a result of the Axis occupation. The estimated number of fatalities during the civil war years (1946–1949) varies from 60,000 to 150,000.<sup>243</sup> About 136,000 people were affected by forced migration, be it for political reasons or as a result of the persecution of representatives of Greece’s ethnic minorities;<sup>244</sup> around 55,000 people took refuge in Eastern Bloc countries<sup>245</sup>; tens of

---

<sup>241</sup> Between 1947 and 1949, Greece received approximately 345.5 million USD in military aid. See *Ibid.*, 60–61.

<sup>242</sup> David H. Close and Thanos Veremis, ‘The Military Struggle, 1945-9’, in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 108–12, 121–22; Ole L. Smith, ‘The Greek Communist Party, 1945-1949’, in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 149–50.

<sup>243</sup> For example see Close, ‘Introduction’, 7–9; Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 9; Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 104; Beaton, *Greece*, 302.

<sup>244</sup> Close, ‘Introduction’, 9–11.

<sup>245</sup> Ioanna Papathanasiou, “‘To oplo para poda’”: Lektiki polemiki i politiki anasygkrotisis [“Ground Arms”: Verbal Warfare or Reconstruction Politics], in *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949) [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)]*, ed. Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos, and Grigoris Psallidas (Athina: Themelio, 2002), 147. For more, see Katerina Tsekou, *Ellines politikoi prosfyges stin Anatoliki Evropi, 1945-1989 [Greek Political Refugees in the Eastern Europe, 1945-1989]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Alexandreia, 2013); Kostas Tsivos, ‘O megalos kaymos tis xeniteias...’: *Ellines politikoi prosfyges stin Tsechoslovakia, 1948-1989 [“The Great*

thousands were imprisoned, banished or incarcerated in concentration camps due to their participation in the DSE or simply for their political convictions.<sup>246</sup> The level of destruction of public infrastructure and private property from the occupation was further increased by the sabotages and attacks of communist guerrillas, all of which caused enormous material damage.<sup>247</sup>

## 2.4 Civil War-Related Anti-Communist Rhetoric

Parallel to these military operations, the anti-communist struggle was waged by the Greek government on an ideological level. Face-to-face with the enemy, the Right and the Centre started their political cooperation, and Centre-Right coalitions became frequent throughout most of the period. The traditional nationalist concept of “Hellenic Christianity” (*ellinochristianismos*),<sup>248</sup> which attempted to translate the cultural heritage of Ancient Greece and Byzantium into a modern Greek identity, provided the anti-communist forces with a common theoretical denominator. Although being connected with a conservative reaction to the ideas of the Enlightenment in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, its development intensified during the Metaxas dictatorship, which attempted to build the “New State” (*Neon kratos*) as the manifestation of the so-called Third Hellenic Civilisation.<sup>249</sup> The concept further expanded as a result of the civil war and was even incorporated into the 1952 Constitution as general guidelines for ideological instruction at elementary and secondary schools.<sup>250</sup> Lalaki argues that the original ideal of Hellenism was strongly influenced by the Enlightenment, Romanticism, a search for modernity and the endeavour of Greeks to construct their national identity; during the

---

*Sorrow of Exile...”: Greek Political Refugees in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989*] (Athina: Alexandria, 2019).

<sup>246</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 63; Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka [The History of Greece]*, 477; Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 104; Kateřina Králová, ‘“Being Traitors”: Post-War Greece in the Experience of Jewish Partisans’, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 17, no. 2 (2017): 263–80.

<sup>247</sup> Boeschoten, ‘Enemies of the Nation’, 98–99.

<sup>248</sup> Meletopoulos, *Ideologia tou dexiou kratous, 1949-1967 [Ideology of the Right-Wing State, 1949-1967]*, 26–29.

<sup>249</sup> The Metaxas dictatorship identified itself with the heritage of ancient Sparta and Byzantium and presented itself as their successor. Cf. Constantine Sarandis, ‘The Ideology and Character of the Metaxas Regime’, in *The Metaxas Dictatorship: Aspects of Greece, 1936-1940*, ed. Robin Higham and Thanos Veremis (Athens: The Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism, 1993), 149–51; P. J. Vatikiotis, *Popular Autocracy in Greece, 1936-41: A Political Biography of General Ioannis Metaxas* (London; Portland, Or: Frank Cass, 1998), 185. See also “The Third Hellenic Civilization,” Metaxas Project. Inside Fascist Greece (1936-1941), 15 December 2012, <https://metaxas-project.com/third-hellenic-civilization/> (accessed 31 July 2020).

<sup>250</sup> Constitution of Greece, 1 January 1952 (FEK 1/1952), Art. 15, Par. 2; see also Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, 32.

Cold War, the Hellenist concept further evolved – for purely political and strategic reasons – to correspond with the US visions of modernity, democracy and development. Furthermore, it was employed to satisfy the need to attribute anti-communism to the ideologised categories of “Greekness” and the “Greek identity.”<sup>251</sup>

Besides that, the civil war and post-civil war governments relied on principles of the so-called national mindedness (*ethnikofrosyni*); as Close quite comprehensibly suggests, this was “patriotic soundness,”<sup>252</sup> or as Stefanidis explains, a “national way of thinking or loyalty to the nation.”<sup>253</sup> The term *ethnikofrosyni* was already in use in Greek politics in the time of the National Schism, practically functioning as a synonym for monarchism. Subsequently, as Gounaris suggests, the meaning of the term further developed in the form of patriotism, revived after the Asia Minor Catastrophe, which stood in opposition to, especially, the KKE’s claims in the Macedonian issue.<sup>254</sup> Thus, according to Paschaloudi, it symbolised the “urban consciousness and the opposition against communism” of the monarchists and the republicans alike.<sup>255</sup> In the period between *dekemvriana* and the 1946 elections, it represented a loose coalition of the opponents of the EAM, monarchists and even collaborators who were supporters of anti-communist patriotism and irredentism.<sup>256</sup> With the outbreak of the Cold War and the rising US influence in Greece, the *ethnikofrosyni* emerged as a blend, in many senses contradictory, of Greek nationalism and Western anti-totalitarianism.<sup>257</sup> The civil war contributed to its institutionalisation as “a measure of loyalty to national integrity

---

<sup>251</sup> Despina Lalaki, ‘On the Social Construction of Hellenism Cold War Narratives of Modernity, Development and Democracy for Greece’, *Journal of Historical Sociology* 25, no. 4 (December 2012): 552–77, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6443.2012.01432.x>.

<sup>252</sup> Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, 158.

<sup>253</sup> Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, 29.

<sup>254</sup> Vasilis K. Gounaris, *Egnosmenon Koinonikon Fronimaton: Koinonikes Kai Alles Opseis Tou Antikomounismou Sti Makedonia Tou Emfyliou Polemou, 1945-1949 [Incontestable Political Convictions: Social and Other Aspects of Anti-Communism in Macedonia During the Civil War (1945-1949)]* (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 2002), 38.

<sup>255</sup> Paschaloudi, *Enas polemos choris telos [A War Without the End]*, 42.

<sup>256</sup> Spyros Marchetos, ‘A Slav Macedonian Greek Fascist? Deciphering the Ethnicophrosyne of Sotirios Gotzamanis’, in *Spotlights on Russian and Balkan Slavic Cultural History*, ed. Alexandra Ioannidou and Christian Voss (München, Berlin: Peter Lang Verlag, 2009), 67–96; Ilias Nikolakopoulos, ‘Amfisvittontas ta oria tis “ethnikofrosynis”’: Oi synergasies tis EDA me ton revsto choro tis kentrosisteras’, in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitis 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 121–22.

<sup>257</sup> Zinovia Lialiouti, ‘Contesting the Anti-Totalitarian Consensus: The Concept of National Independence, the Memory of the Second World War and the Ideological Cleavages in Post-War Greece’, *National Identities* 18, no. 2 (2016): 108–9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2014.987659>.



and the ‘prevailing social order.’”<sup>258</sup> In compliance with the principles of *ethnikofrosyni*, the Greek population was divided into those loyal to the conservative values of the fatherland, family and Orthodoxy, as well as to the rules of the traditional social hierarchy, with an emphasis on political patronage and private ownership (*ethnikofrones*), and non-nationally-minded citizens (*mi-ethnikofrones*). According to Tsoucalas, *ethnikofrosyni* “had as a first, legal function the internalisation of the normative standards of social behaviour, thus opening the way to all forms of repression” and “was the main criterion for the legitimisation of the total exclusion of dissidents from the ‘healthy and integral’ national body.”<sup>259</sup> In this bodily representation of the nation, the non-nationally minded were perceived as harmful to society (*miasmata*).<sup>260</sup>

The ongoing conflict was a civil war, yet this fact was systematically concealed from the population. Even the term as such was banned and framed as a rebellion, often quoted as a “war of gangsters” (*symmoritopolemos*) or a “war of rebels” (*antartopolemos*). All communists were presented as pursuing anti-Greek and anti-national interests, or even as completely alien to the nation; they were not approached as political opponents but as the nation’s enemies plotting against Greek territorial integrity in cooperation with countries of the Eastern Bloc. Importantly, the determination of all communists as national traitors not only provided for the denial of the civil war’s existence but also of the presence of political prisoners.<sup>261</sup> Communism was identified with Soviet or Slavic expansionism as well as with other attributes which enabled its symbolic positioning as opposed to the Greek nation. Communists were labelled as “Slavs,” “slavocommunists,” “Bulgarian supporters of the EAM” (*Eamovoulgaroi*), “criminals,” and “infidel barbarians” (the latter taking advantage of the fact that Greek Orthodoxy represents an essential feature of the modern Greek identity).<sup>262</sup> The traditional understanding of the civil war as a three-round contest

---

<sup>258</sup> Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, 30.

<sup>259</sup> Tsoukalas, ‘The Ideological Impact of the Civil War’, 330.

<sup>260</sup> Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, 29; Peter Siani-Davies and Stefanos Katsikas, ‘National Reconciliation After Civil War: The Case of Greece’, *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 4 (2009): 564.

<sup>261</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 63. For an older work on political prisoners in Greece, see Roussos S. Koundouros, *I asfaleia tou kathestotos. Politikoi kratoumenoi. Ektopiseis kai taxeis stin Ellada 1924-1974 [The Security of the Regime. Political Prisoners. Deportations and Order in Greece 1924-1974]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 1978).

<sup>262</sup> For example, see Vasilis K. Gounaris, “‘Eamovoulgaroi’ kai Makedonomachoi: Ideologikes kai alles vendetes sti Makedonia tou Emfyliou Poleμου [The “EAM-Bulgarians” and the Macedonian Fighters: Ideological and Other Vendettas in the Civil War Macedonia]’, in *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto*

stemmed from the imagination that the communist engagement during the resistance, the *dekemvriana* and the civil war represented three distinct attempts to secure power.<sup>263</sup> Such an interpretation of the conflict, as well as the principles of loyalty and national mindedness, left an imprint on the character of the approved anti-communist legislation.

## 2.5 Anti-Communist Legislation in Civil War Greece

The shared aversion to communism helped the Liberal Party and the People's Party temporarily overcome their political disputes. Centre-Right governments were typical for most of the period; both the cabinets of the conservative Konstantinos Tsaldaris (1946–1947) and the liberal Themistoklis Sofoulis (Liberal Party, 1945–1946, 1947–1949) can serve as an example. Already in July 1945, only several months after the Varkiza agreement, the practice of administrative banishment was reintroduced based on the Compulsory Law 453/1945, which re-enacted the 1871 law for the suppression of banditry. Although it was not explicitly aimed at punishing political deeds, its provisions were applied to those leftists who were supposed to be protected by the amnesty proclaimed by the Varkiza agreement.<sup>264</sup> Without the approval of parliament, the Tsaldaris government then reactivated the operation of Public Security Committees, which were authorised to impose on political suspects administrative banishment of up to 24 months, using the Legislative Decree of 4 May 1946. However, in August 1948, the Sofoulis government provided the possibility of extension beyond the limit of 24 months as long as the “rebellion” continues. In reality, this legislation was only

---

*Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949) [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)]*, ed. Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos, and Grigoris Psallidas (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2002), 233–45; Papadimitriou, *Apo ton lao ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon [From the Law-Abiding People to the Nation of the Nationally Minded]*, 178–87; Paschaloudi, *Enas polemos choris telos [A War Without the End]*, 43–44; Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 17–19; Lialiouti, ‘Contesting the Anti-Totalitarian Consensus’, 108.

<sup>263</sup> See also Tsoukalas, ‘The Ideological Impact of the Civil War’, 330; Tasoula Vervenioti, ‘The Children of the Greek Civil War. Saved or Kidnapped?’, *Acta Universitatis Carolinae - Studia Territorialia Supplementum I*, no. 1 (2010): 124–25.

<sup>264</sup> Compulsory Law 453/1945 “On Measures for the Consolidation of the Public Security and Order” (Anagkastikos nomos yp' arith. 453 Peri lipseos metron pros embedosin tis Dimosias Asfaleias kai taxeos, 09/07/1945). See also Alivizatos, *Oi politikoï thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 460; Polymeris Voglis, *I empeiria tis fylakis kai tis exorias: i politikoï kratoumenoi ston Emphylio Polemo [The Experience of Prison and Exile: The Political Prisoners in the Civil War]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Alexandraia, 2004), 96–97; Theodoros Lagaris, *Innerer Feind, Nation und Demokratie: zum Legitimationprozess in Griechenland nach dem Bürgerkrieg [Inner Enemy, Nation, and Democracy: On the Legitimation Process in post-Civil War Greece]*, Nomos Universitätsschriften, Bd. 108 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 77–79.

abolished in 1962, thereby enabling the long-term exile of possibly thousands of people for periods as long as 10 to 15 years.<sup>265</sup>

Under the Tsaldaris government, the Third Resolution of 18 June 1946 introduced extraordinary courts-martial and imposed the death penalty for various subversive activities against the Greek state and the integrity of its territory.<sup>266</sup> The law, which mainly targeted sympathisers of the KKE, restricted certain civil liberties, including the right to protest, the liberty of movement and the inviolability of one's premises. The courts-martial first emerged in the regions of Northern and Central Greece and later expanded to the rest of the country. From 1946 to 1949, some 36,920 people were tried by court-martial, and at least 8,000 were sentenced to death.<sup>267</sup> In December 1947, the Sofulis government outlawed the KKE, the EAM and the National Solidarity (*Ethniki Allilengii*), a welfare organisation of the EAM dating back to the time of the Axis occupation, with Compulsory Law 509/1947 due to their involvement in the preparation and operation of "the treacherous rebellion against the integrity of the country."<sup>268</sup> Under the provisions of the law, their offices were to be closed and property and archives confiscated by the prosecutor's office. The law also provided for the dissolution of any political party or organisation that would attempt to cooperate with these subjects or promote ideas aimed at the overthrow of the state constitution, the existing social order or the secession of part of the country's territory. Moreover, public demonstrations were prohibited, support of the "rebellion" by civil servants was punished with their dismissal and the direct participation of military personnel penalised

---

<sup>265</sup> Legislative Decree of 4 May 1946 "On the Amendment and the Supplement of the Existing Laws on the Establishment of the Committees of Public Security" (Nomothetiko diatagma Peri tropopoiiseos kai symbliroseos ton ischyonton Nomon peri systaseos en ekasto Nomo Epitropon epi tis Dimosias Asfaleias, 04/05/1946). See also Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 463–65; Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]', 13–15.

<sup>266</sup> Third Resolution of 18 June 1946 on "Extraordinary Measures Concerning Public Order and Security" (G' Psifisma Peri ektakton metron aforonton stin dimosian taxin kai asfaleian, 18/06/1946). See also Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 502–11; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 64–65.

<sup>267</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 520; Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 61–62.

<sup>268</sup> Compulsory Law 509/1947 on "Security Measures of the State, the Polity, the Social System, and of the Protection of Civil Liberties," FEK 293/1947 (Anagkastikos Nomos yp' arith. 509 Peri metron asfaleias tou Kratous, tou politevmatos, tou koinonikou kathestotos kai prostasias ton eletherion ton politon, 27/12/1947).

by the banishment of their relatives. The jurisdiction over these offences was attributed to the extraordinary courts-martial.<sup>269</sup>

An expansive purge of the state sector was launched in 1946, affecting central as well as local administrations, judicial officials, university education and all state-subsidised organisations, including three major domestic banks. The politically “unreliable” employees were dismissed or forced to resign; in 1947 alone, this covered 12 per cent of all state employees.<sup>270</sup> Under the influence of the US, the principle of “loyalty” (*nomimofrosyni*) was implemented in the Greek legal system for the first time. Compulsory Law 516/1948 introduced the practice of loyalty commissions (*symvoulia nomimofrosynis*) and required the signature of loyalty oaths (*diloseis nomimofrosynis*) from employees in the state sector, in which they denounced communism and expressed their support for the regime.<sup>271</sup> Compulsory Law 512/1948 introduced the same approach for public utility companies.<sup>272</sup> Although a similar practice had already taken place under the Metaxas regime, Greek lawmakers were inspired by similar US legislation, specifically the so-called Hatch Act of 2 August 1939. The US representatives in Greece even took part in the respective sessions of the Hellenic Parliament to look over the approval of the bills.<sup>273</sup> A register of the “disloyal” employees was kept by the Ministry of Public Order.

From the end of 1946 to mid-1948, a number of exceptional legislative decrees were adopted by the government without authorisation from parliament. Their adoption was already a controversial step, and their content was often in breach of the valid constitution. The decrees, for example, imposed a ban on the leftist press and on strikes (the latter being removed following international criticism) or stripped of one’s citizenship and confiscated their property when they were linked to KKE sympathisers, acted “anti-nationally,” supported the “rebellion” during the civil war or were,

---

<sup>269</sup> Ibid. See also Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 174–75; Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 511–23; Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 61.

<sup>270</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 473.

<sup>271</sup> Compulsory Law 516/1948 on the “Control of National Mindedness of Civil Servants and Services” (Anagkastikos Nomos 516/1948 peri elegchou nomimofrosynis ton dimotikon ypallilon kai ypiresion, 26/03/1948). See also Dimitrios Sotiropoulos, *Populism and Bureaucracy: The Case of Greece under PASOK, 1981-1989* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 28.

<sup>272</sup> Compulsory Law 512/1948 on the “Security of Public Utilities Companies” (Anagkastikos Nomos 512/1948 peri asfaleias ton etairion ofeleias).

<sup>273</sup> Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 14–15; Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 17–18, 22–23.

temporarily or permanently, residing abroad.<sup>274</sup> The validity of this particular measure on the revocation of citizenship, similar to other exceptional law, was originally limited to the timeframe of the civil war. In reality, it only started to be massively used throughout the 1950s and early 1960s to persecute Greek political emigration to countries of the Eastern Bloc. The decree was applied in 22,266 cases between 1948 and 1963, out of which only 124 cases took place during the civil war. The majority of cases were thus decided under the 1952 Constitution. The revocation of citizenship was often followed by the confiscation of personal property.<sup>275</sup>

Through another exceptional legislative decree, the internment camp for political detainees on Makronissos (*Organismos Anamorfortirion Makronisou*) was established in 1949.<sup>276</sup> From 1947, a facility for conscripts suspected of leftist political leanings was run by the Greek state in the same place. Since the number of banished people was quickly on the rise at the turn of 1947/1948, the camp was extended with a civilian section. As of the summer of 1949, there were already more than 20,000 civilian prisoners, subjected to both physical and psychological pressure, re-education and repentance. Following international criticism, the civilian part of the camp was abolished by the centrist government of Nikolaos Plastiras in 1950/1951, but its military wing continued to be used until 1953/1954. Despite the termination of the Makronissos camp, the practice of administrative banishment to smaller facilities on islands such as Agios Efstratios, Ikaria, Leros, Kimolos, Samothraki or Zakynthos continued until 1962.<sup>277</sup> The overall number of political prisoners is not known; it was estimated at 49,400 in September 1949, shortly before the end of the civil war.<sup>278</sup>

---

<sup>274</sup> Resolution LZ/1947 on the “Revocation of the Greek citizenship From Persons That Are Acting in an Anti-National Way Abroad” (Psifisma LZ’ Peri aposteriseos tis Ellinikis ithageneias prosopon antethnikos dronton eis to exoterikon, 07/12/1947).

<sup>275</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 488–91. See also Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 41.

<sup>276</sup> Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 14–15. For more on the Civil War practice of exceptional legislation of the Government see Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 173–74, 178–79.

<sup>277</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 465–70, 579.

<sup>278</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 63; Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 16.

## 2.6 The Continuation of Anti-Communist Legislation in Post-Civil War Greece

The exceptional legislation, adopted for the period of the civil war, continued to be used by Greek judicial officials long after the fights had ended. The ongoing political persecution of the Left was enabled by the concept of permanent civil war (*theoria tou diarkous emfyliou poleμου*).<sup>279</sup> This principle, developed by Greek theorists of anti-communism, became one of the characteristic ideological features of the post-civil war regime. In fact, the civil war was not officially terminated through any legislative act, nor by an official treaty between the opponents. The Greek Communists did not come to terms with their defeat: at its Seventh Plenum in October 1949, the Central Committee of the KKE decided to suspend military operations and to continue the struggle in the form of guerrilla warfare.<sup>280</sup> Even after their evacuation from Greek territory, they planned – under the slogan “Ground Arms” (*to oplo para poda*) – to resume the fight in the future.<sup>281</sup> Their hopes eventually turned out to be in vain; the KKE was weak and disunited, and it had to limit itself to influencing political development in Greece from a distance and to rely on the newly established (i.e., since 1951) leftist political party, the United Democratic Left (EDA), as its instrument.

Despite these moves, the governments of the Greek Rally (ES) and, from 1956 onwards, of the National Radical Union (ERE) continued to perceive the Left as an imminent threat to the political order. The probability of a renewed communist offensive from neighbouring states, who not only turned communist but also supported the DSE in the civil war, was perceived as high.<sup>282</sup> The potential overestimation of the “menace from the North” was not only a result of the Cold War but also of decades of antagonism in the Balkans, Greece’s inherited mistrust towards the Slavic element in the region and its desire for superiority.<sup>283</sup> At the same time, anti-communism was beneficial for the Right in many respects, be it for its legitimisation and mobilisation

---

<sup>279</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 536–42.

<sup>280</sup> Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949 [The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949]*, 340; Close and Veremis, ‘The Military Struggle, 1945-9’, 123; Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 104.

<sup>281</sup> See Papatthanasiou, “‘To oplo para poda’ [Ground Arms]’.

<sup>282</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 47.

<sup>283</sup> Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, 178; Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 5–9.

potential, for serving as a pretext to crack down on the labour movement or for provisions when accessing US aid on the basis of common ideological orientation.<sup>284</sup> Following the declaration of the Truman doctrine, the US became the main guarantor of the right-wing regime in Greece, continuing to exert considerable political, economic and military influence long after the end of the civil war. With US support, Greece joined NATO in 1952 and thus officially aligned with the US strategy of containing communism.<sup>285</sup>

Another reason why the civil war continued to cast a shadow over Greece's quotidian life long after its end was the fact that it had a major psychological and moral impact on society. The conflict was a highly traumatic experience, and so was returning to everyday community life where former enemies had to coexist. Not only communities but also many families were internally divided by the civil war.<sup>286</sup> As Kalyvas emphasises, the situation caused great resentment and influenced a long-term political self-identification of the population: "Real or distorted experiences of victimisation during the Civil War became the foundation of reconstituted political identities that were transmitted down to the following generations, often shaping political attitudes for decades to come."<sup>287</sup> Indeed, the experience of the civil war shaped not only the profoundly ideologised character of the post-civil war regime, including its party and legal system, but also the personal ideological preferences of Greek citizens, regardless of them being directly involved in the civil war or not.

The existing divide was further deepened by the professionalisation and systematisation of anti-communist propaganda. On the state level, propagandist activities had been directed by the General Directorate of Press and Information (*Geniki Dievthyntsis Typou kai Pliroforion*; GDTP) of the Ministry of the Presidency (*Ypourgeio Proedrias*) since 1951. Other institutions were involved, too, including the armed forces and, especially, the KYP, which closely collaborated with the CIA and the US

---

<sup>284</sup> Lagaris, *Innerer Feind, Nation und Demokratie [Inner Enemy, Nation, and Democracy]*; Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 184.

<sup>285</sup> John O. Iatrides, 'Britain, the United States, and Greece, 1945-9', in *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, ed. David H. Close (London ; New York: Routledge, 1993), 201-3.

<sup>286</sup> Siani-Davies and Katsikas, 'National Reconciliation After Civil War: The Case of Greece', 563.

<sup>287</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, *Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 96-97.

Information Agency (USIA; in Europe known as the US Information Service, USIS).<sup>288</sup> The anti-communist propaganda strongly affected the major trials with alleged Soviet spies: with the communist cadres Nikos Belogiannis (1952), Nikos Ploumbidis (1954) and their collaborators, who were sentenced to death; with Navy officers (1944–1948; *Diki tou Naftikou*) and Air Force officers (1952; *Diki ton Aeroporon*). Based on Law 375/1936 on espionage, which was reactivated at the turn of 1951/1952 with the aim of imposing capital punishment on Belogiannis, eight people were executed in breach of the 1952 Constitution during the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>289</sup> As Meynaud noted, certain cases of espionage most probably occurred, especially in the Greek borderlands neighbouring communist countries; nevertheless, the main objective of accusations of espionage was to discredit political opposition. Among such cases, the 1959 trial with leftist activist Manolis Glezos resonated both domestically and internationally.<sup>290</sup>

Such extensive anti-communist persecution was mainly feasible due to the contribution of the KYP. The Greek intelligence agency coordinated large-scale surveillance of the population, including wiretapping, mail-opening and black-listing. The agency was financed and equipped by the US and consisted of army and police officers who had received training from CIA officials. A central information register was created under the Ministry of Public Order to monitor the political convictions of each inhabitant. With the help of tens of thousands of police informers,<sup>291</sup> the security forces gathered files (*fakeloi*) that included all available information on a large segment of the population in terms of their personal and professional life, family and other associations. The police were responsible for maintaining personal records of the civilian population; meanwhile, the army was gathering data for screening and controlling servicemen and conscripts. Files were also kept by Greek embassies in

---

<sup>288</sup> Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]', 36–37. Regarding the US propagandist policies towards Greece, see Ioannis D. Stefanidis, 'Telling America's Story: US Propaganda Operations and Greek Public Relations', *Journal of Hellenic Diaspora* 30, no. 1 (2004): 39–96.

<sup>289</sup> Compulsory Law 375/1936 "On the Punishment of the Crimes of Espionage and Criminal Acts Threatening the External Security of the Country," FEK 546/1936 (Anagkastikos Nomos yp' arith. 375 Peri timorias ton egklimatou kataskopeias kai ton egklimatikon energion ton apilouson tin exoterikin asfalian tis choras, 14/12/1936). See also Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 569–72; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 156–57, 181; Rizas, 'Dekaetia tou 1960 [The 1960s]', 180.

<sup>290</sup> NA FO 371/136221 (10 December 1958); NA FO 371/152963 (2 April 1960; 26 April 1960); see also Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 178.

<sup>291</sup> According to Tsoucalas, in 1962, there were approximately 60,000 people on the payroll of the secret police. Tsoucalas, 'The Ideological Impact of the Civil War', 328.



countries with a strong Greek diaspora, such as the US, Canada, Australia and some European countries, with a special focus on political opponents of the regime.<sup>292</sup>

The practice of loyalty certificates also gradually expanded. Typically, they were not only required from job candidates in the public sector; the certificates also entitled their holders to state benefits and subsidies, professional permissions, drivers licenses, university education and scholarships.<sup>293</sup> The loyalty status depended not only on the personal deeds of individuals but also on the reputation of their family and friends. It was often denied, especially to those associated with the DSE and, in many cases, even to those involved in the EAM.<sup>294</sup> The certificates primarily distinguished between the nationally-minded and the non-nationally minded; further sub-categories were outlined that were partially permeable due to the existence of the “decolourisation process” (*apochromatismos*) that required the rejection of the communist ideology and a declaration of loyalty towards the ruling regime.<sup>295</sup> Given the troublesome economic situation in post-war Greece, the population was often forced to trade their political loyalty for the state’s support or the chance to get a job. Such an arrangement was also profitable for the upper class of wealthy entrepreneurs who, in exchange for their loyalty, obtained access to state funding and business opportunities.

Aside from these developments, the ruling regime strived to intervene in the electoral process using various means. In the aftermath of the civil war, approximately 20,000 leftist voters were disenfranchised; most of them fled from the countryside to find work or greater anonymity in cities.<sup>296</sup> Voting in rural areas was affected by a considerable level of intimidation, directed towards both leftist candidates and voters either by the police, the gendarmerie (*chorofylaki*) or right-wing bands (with the infamous example of the 1961 legislative elections). The Left was able to push through

---

<sup>292</sup> Minas Samatas, ‘Studying Surveillance in Greece: Methodological and Other Problems Related to an Authoritarian Surveillance Culture’, *Surveillance & Society* 3, no. 2/3 (2005): 182–84; Close, ‘The Legacy’, 214–15; Close, *Greece since 1945*, 85; Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 20–21.

<sup>293</sup> Samatas, ‘Studying Surveillance in Greece’, 183; Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 9–18, 31–33.

<sup>294</sup> The purpose of loyalty boards was to implement the principles of *ethnikofrosyni* in the public service. Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 591; Close, ‘The Legacy’, 214–15; Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 107–8.

<sup>295</sup> The nationally minded citizens were divided into two groups, the *ethnikofrones* of the first and second grade (labelled as E1 and E2). The rest of the categories were leftists (A), cryptocommunists (B), dangerous communists (G), and unknown (X). Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 179–80; Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 30–35; Samatas, ‘Studying Surveillance in Greece’, 183.

<sup>296</sup> Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, 182.

its candidates, but many of them were subsequently removed from office by the state administration, such as in the case of the 1951 local elections. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the electoral results were further twisted by disproportionately pro-majority electoral reforms or the deliberate allocation of parliamentary seats on the basis of the outdated 1940 census instead of the one from 1951. Such a distribution of mandates did not reflect changes in the country's demographic situation that took place as a result of the Second World War and the civil war. Some regions were depopulated while large cities were growing; in consequence, the number of votes that were sufficient to receive a mandate differed significantly in individual constituencies. Since the ERE held stronger positions in the over-represented regions while cities became a haven for leftists and liberals, this measure was once again favouring the right-wing forces.<sup>297</sup>

Concerning the legal situation, martial law was lifted between December 1949 and February 1950; nevertheless, the executions of political opponents by courts-martial continued until 1951, enabled by Law 1612/1950 (once again inspired by US legislation).<sup>298</sup> The validity of this exceptional civil war legislation, in compliance with the above-described concept of “permanent civil war,” was extended by the Resolution of 29 April 1952 under the condition that it could be abolished in the future by ordinary laws.<sup>299</sup> Thus, for example, Law 509/1947 continued to be used to pursue subversive or separatist activities and to persecute the Left; and Law 516/1948 formed a legal basis for monitoring the political convictions of society. The anti-communist legislation served as a mechanism of political repression. It punished intents rather than particular acts and thus had the character of “preventive” law. These precautionary measures included administrative banishment and detentions, the revocation of citizenship accompanied with the confiscation of property, exclusion from a certain type of employment or the denial of university education. Relatives of convicted persons were often affected by preventive punishments as well.<sup>300</sup>

---

<sup>297</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 51–55, 141–47.

<sup>298</sup> Law 1612/1950 “On the Enforcement of the Compulsory Law 375/1936 On the Punishment of the Crimes of Espionage and Criminal Acts Threatening the External Security of the Country” (Nomos yp' arith. 1612 Peri diatiriseos en ischyi tou An. Nomou 375/1936 peri timorias ton egklimatikon energeon ton apeilouson tin exoterikin asfalian tis Choras, 31/12/1950.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, 536–42; Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 41–43.

<sup>300</sup> Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 10.

Many communist convicts served long, sometimes indefinite terms in deplorable conditions of prisons and internment camps, subjected to torture and psychological pressure. Between 1952 and 1967, 1,722 persons were banished to internal exile, out of which 1,310 people were tried based on a decision from the Public Security Committees (which was a preventive measure entailing the restriction of one's personal freedom) and only 412 based on court decisions.<sup>301</sup> Parallel to this, the number of political prisoners was steadily declining. There were reportedly 17,089 political prisoners in January 1952, while in March 1962, the number had dropped to 1,655.<sup>302</sup> From this perspective, the situation of civil war and post-civil war detainees was gradually improving. The practice of declarations of repentance continued to be employed as a precondition for release from prison, the avoidance of harsh punishment or torture and prevention from further persecution.<sup>303</sup> Voglis drew parallels between the repentance of communist suspects and repentance in religious terms, pointing to the strong influence of the Orthodox Church in the shaping of the Greek nationalist ideology. In such a case, the repentant was perceived as acting without harmful intention and principally misled by leadership; for that reason, his or her repentance could be accepted and the person forgiven. For repentants, the practice had serious social consequences as it often led to exclusion from their community; moreover, it entailed a self-negation and a renouncement of their fellows, which inevitably caused them psychological distress.<sup>304</sup>

Although widespread and formally legalised by the 1952 Resolution, the continuous use of exceptional anti-communist legislation was nevertheless in breach of the valid constitution. It was only officially cancelled in 1962 by legislative decree 4334/1962, on the occasion of Greece's association with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961. Afterwards, the political persecution was executed with the help of ordinary penal laws and on a much smaller scale. Despite this, political prisoners and banished persons continued to exist in the country.<sup>305</sup> To highlight the controversial and authoritarian nature of the anti-communist measures in force and their application parallel to the democratic legal order, the term "para-constitution" has been introduced

---

<sup>301</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoï thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 581–82.

<sup>302</sup> Close, 'The Legacy', 217–18.

<sup>303</sup> Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]', 15; Samatas, 'Greek McCarthyism', 11.

<sup>304</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 77–78.

<sup>305</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 295–96; Close, 'The Legacy', 214–15; Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka [The History of Greece]*, 478–80.

by left-wing intellectual circles. Ilias Iliou, a lawyer and one of the EDA's top representatives, employed this term in May 1962 while analysing the Greek legal system at a judicial assembly in Paris. Later, it was adopted by multiple authors, including French political scientist Jean Meynaud and Greek constitutional lawyer Nikos Alivizatos; the term has been in use until today.<sup>306</sup> Furthermore, Alivizatos characterised the overall legal system as “constitutional dualism,” pointing to the selective use of the 1952 Constitution protecting only politically loyal and nationally minded citizens; meanwhile, politically unreliable citizens were subject to the regulations of the “para-constitution.”<sup>307</sup> Such criticism was originally and primarily expressed by the Left, but following the 1961 elections, centrist politicians raised the issue as well.<sup>308</sup>

The term “para-constitution” served as a critique of unconstitutional legal practices in post-civil war Greece, which at the same time attempted to preserve the image of a democratic state. Compared to this, the term *parakratos* had a similar function as it denounced the political violence that was taking place seemingly outside state institutions. Both terms have been used in a public speech to “explain the inexplicable,” allowing for the mythification of political oppression in terms of its absoluteness, ever-presence and high efficiency. Along with this, the reproduction of the conspiratorial beliefs, which emerged from a civil war-related mutual mistrust, flourished. From this perspective, the semantic contrast between the constitution and the “para-constitution” is comparable to the relation between the state and the “para-state.” I argue that both phenomena shall be interpreted as consequences of certain deficiencies of the Greek state in terms of facilitating public security, democratic order and the rule of law. They were more probably outcomes of the overall corruption and decay of the political space and legal system following the civil war rather than an actual shadow power mechanism imposed by the ruling political class and its foreign allies upon the divided society.

---

<sup>306</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 182; Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 525–54. For more, see the footnote no. 10.

<sup>307</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 525–26.

<sup>308</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 182.

### 3. The “Right-Wing Establishment” (1949–1967): Authoritarian or Democratic?

The character of the political regime that emerged in Greece following the civil war was conditioned by the results of this three-year bloody conflict and dictated by its winners. The post-civil war governments not only failed to overcome the existing deep ideological divisions in Greek society; eventually, they even provided for the institutionalisation of political repression against the defeated Left. The anti-communist campaign was endorsed by several powerful actors – the Right, the palace, the army, and the Church – who also became symbolical guarantors of the post-civil war political order. The regime has been known under various ideologised expressions, such as the “right-wing establishment” (*dexio katestimeno*) or the “right-wing state” (*dexio kratos/kratos tis dexias*).<sup>309</sup> As shown in the previous chapter, the large-scale persecution of political opposition was carried out based on exceptional legislation adopted during the civil war under conditions of martial law. It continued to be used until the early 1960s, despite being in breach of the constitution. As shown in the records of the British Embassy in Athens, also by Western standards, the respective legislation was considered as “anti-democratic.”<sup>310</sup> The overall quality of the Greek democracy was perceived as low, characterised by the lack of independence of the judiciary, ineffective system of checks and balances, insufficient observance of human rights, limited freedom of the press and further thwarted by widespread corruption and bureaucratic clientelism.<sup>311</sup> Thus, the question stands as to how this situation was made possible or, in other words, what the true nature of the post-civil war political regime actually was: democratic or authoritarian.

Indeed, there has been a lot of disagreement about the character of the political regime in post-civil war Greece. Unlike the Metaxas regime (1936–1941) or the dictatorship of the colonels (1967–1974), which have been classified as authoritarian

---

<sup>309</sup> For example, see Close, *Greece since 1945*, 83; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 43; Georgoulas, *To parakratos stin Ellada [The Parastate in Greece]*, 6; Paraskevopoulos, *Georgios Papandreou [Georgios Papandreou]*, 8.

<sup>310</sup> NA FO 371/130015 (19 August 1957).

<sup>311</sup> NA FO 371/169057 (9 August 1963).

regimes without many doubts, opinions on the post-civil war regime vary.<sup>312</sup> As I will show, for some authors, the regime was inherently authoritarian; for others, Greece was a democratic state during this period. Many scholars would place themselves somewhere in between. The ambiguity of the regime stems from its *dual* character. On the one hand, after the civil war, Greece attempted to democratise its institutions gradually; there were relative political plurality and an alternation of power. On the other hand, the civil rights of certain political groups were seriously compromised, which, as an example, led Nikolakopoulos to label the regime an “exclusivist democracy.”<sup>313</sup> According to others, the Greek democracy of the period was “controlled” or “guided,” pointing to the extraconstitutional interventions of the above-listed actors and, especially in its early stages, of US representatives acting in domestic political developments.<sup>314</sup> I will argue that Greece was a democracy; however, it was a weak and dysfunctional one, mostly because the alternation of power was not effective since it inevitably led to political crises.

The character of the post-civil war political regime holds direct implications for the assessment of the *parakratos*. The concept presumes that the “official” agents of state anti-communism (such as various state organs) were acting and taking political decisions within the limits of the legal order such that the state could preserve its formally democratic image. By contrast, the agents of the *parakratos* have been characterised as a semi-independent and politically unaccountable instrument of the state assisting in the pursuit of its anti-communist campaign that went beyond legal limits: by acting in an unofficial, clandestine and more authoritarian manner but, at times, completely evading the control of the state.<sup>315</sup> Such an arrangement could only function in a political regime that resembled a *dual state* as put forward by Morgenthau<sup>316</sup> or a *security state* (e.g., *deep state*) as conceptualised by Tunander.<sup>317</sup> In

---

<sup>312</sup> Compare the contrasting approaches by Tsoukalas, ‘The Ideological Impact of the Civil War’, 320; Stathis Kalyvas, *Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 97–98. For a detailed analysis see below.

<sup>313</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*.

<sup>314</sup> Nikos P. Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), 105–15; Christos Lyrintzis, ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of ‘Bureaucratic Clientelism’?’, *West European Politics* 7, no. 2 (1984): 101–3; Close, *Greece since 1945*, 83, 88; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, ‘Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece’, 3.

<sup>315</sup> For example see Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 260–61; Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, 159–60; Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”

<sup>316</sup> Morgenthau, *The Decline of Democratic Politics*, 400.

essence, under the *dual state*, we understand the parallel coexistence of a democratic state with another entity (*security state/deep state*) which is non-democratic by nature and is endowed with the power to influence or even veto the political decisions of the state in situations when state security is presumably threatened. For that reason, the regime type matters: while the existence of such parallel politico-military structures would be impossible in a consolidated democracy, in an authoritarian regime, it would become redundant (there, the *deep state* becomes the state itself). Therefore, the concept of the *deep state* cannot exist without a state; it is associated with the state and, thus, derives its legitimacy from the political regime. In her analysis, Söyler underlined this excellently:

Deep state is associated with authoritarian, criminal, and corrupt segments of the state that function in a democratic regime by exploiting and reproducing its deficiencies. At the same time, the deep state derives legitimacy from that political regime in exerting a coup threat, instigating military interventions, and committing organized crime and extrajudicial killings within the boundaries of the formal security apparatus.<sup>318</sup>

Within this chapter, I seek to conceptualise the post-civil war, anti-communist Greek state. I will focus first on the division of political power after the civil war and will explain the roles of dominant actors from the right-wing regime. Second, I will consider the impact of foreign interventionism on Greek politics; third, I will examine the position of the political opposition. Finally, I will present various scholarly attitudes on the nature of the post-civil war regime and attempt to outline its general characteristics. By doing so, I aim to delimit the political space within which the *parakratos* was supposed to operate and to depict the “state” in contradiction to the “parastate.”

### **3.1 The Post-Civil War Division of Political Power**

The situation of the Greek political scene remained unstable for several years as the continuous social crisis, unable to overcome the heritage of the civil war, was evident. Two dominant powers of the interwar period, the Liberal Party and the People’s Party, regularly alternated in forming governments during the civil war and after it (until 1952); however, they did not manage to maintain the same strategic position. The

---

<sup>317</sup> Tunander, ‘Democratic State vs. Deep State’.

<sup>318</sup> Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 1.

Liberals only represented one subject among six other political parties of the highly fragmented centrist camp, divided into pro-right-wing royalist and pro-left-wing republican streams that were incapable of finding common ground for the first post-civil war legislative elections in 1950 and 1951.<sup>319</sup> The People's Party had poor showings in these elections, too, as it became fairly unpopular for allowing right-wing terror and its engagement during the civil war, as well as for its extensive political incompetence and corruption scandals.<sup>320</sup> Moreover, right-wing and centrist politicians did not share a unified approach to the defeated Left. While the Right preserved its aggressive anti-communist orientation, the centrist camp was more willing to compromise and reconcile. As a result, the two parties were rather uneasy partners, and the governments of this period tended to be unstable and short-lived. Such was the case of the minority government of Nikolaos Plastiras (1951–1952) with the participation of the National Progressive Centre Union (*Ethniki Proodeftiki Enosis Kendrou*, EPEK). Plastiras, a respected personality for his military and political accomplishments but a staunch republican, aimed at Greek national reconciliation (*eirinevsi*). Yet, his government eventually collapsed due to political disputes over the future of political prisoners.<sup>321</sup>

The 1951 elections were marked by the extraordinary success of the new right-wing ES, which was strong enough to build a government relying on an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament following the 1952 elections. Under the leadership of Alexandros Papagos, a charismatic leader who resigned as the army's commander-in-chief's to pursue his political ambitions, Greece entered a new phase of development. This period of severe state anti-communism and unchallenged dominance of the conservative, royalist Right lasted for more than a decade. The Left, on the other hand, remained without political representation for a certain period. The KKE was outlawed in 1947, and the EDA, factually controlled by the KKE from its exile in Bucharest and thus perceived by the Right as composed of "crypto-communists" (*kryptokommounistes*), was only established in 1951. The British Embassy in Athens

---

<sup>319</sup> Seferiades, 'Polarization and Nonproportionality', 73; Takis S. Pappas, 'The Transformation of the Greek Party System Since 1951', *West European Politics* 26, no. 2 (2003): 96–97.

<sup>320</sup> David H. Close, 'The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950', in *Greece at the Crossroads. The Civil War and Its Legacy*, ed. John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 122–56.

<sup>321</sup> Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]', 10–11; Seferiades, 'Polarization and Nonproportionality', 76; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 156–58; Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 102–3.



and the Foreign Office hold the same opinion on EDA. The latter confidentially stated in June 1958:

In fact, E.D.A. is Communist in all but name. It boasts “national” façade which includes a number of non-Communist politicians, but there is not the slightest doubt that its policies are wholly controlled by the Communists and that it is the cover party for the KKE [...].<sup>322</sup>

Thus, the Greek Right insisted on the persistence of the communist threat in the country and feared both the possible renewal of the civil war and the potential political strengthening of the Left. These fears were further boosted by the ongoing Cold War and the Greek governments’ strong suspicion of all neighbouring states, most of which turned communist in the post-war years. Moreover, the Right was troubled by the relentless conspiratorial efforts of the exiled KKE. The Greek Communists, undoubtedly with the help of the EDA, continued spreading anti-state propaganda from abroad, organising illegal activities or sabotages and simultaneously deploying intelligence agents on Greek territory.<sup>323</sup>

The post-civil war, anti-communist state symbolically relied on several pillars, that is, the Right, the palace, the army, and the Church,<sup>324</sup> which embodied the conservative, nationalist and Orthodox values of the victors. The governments of the ES or the ERE, as its successor, were in power between 1952 and 1963. Their rule has often

---

<sup>322</sup> NA FO 371/136220 (30 June 1958; also 3 April 1958; 25 September 1958; 10 December 1958); NA FO 371/152963 (26 April 1960) and many others; for the relationship between the KKE and the EDA see Alexandros Dangas, ‘To Kommounistiko Komma Elladas, ena komma ektos kommatikou systimatos [The Communist Party of Greece, A Party Outside the Party System]’, in *I ‘syntomi’ dekaetia tou ’60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The ‘Short’ 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, ed. Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008), 204–19.

<sup>323</sup> Pappas, ‘The Transformation of the Greek Party System Since 1951’, 100–101; Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka [The History of Greece]*, 480–81; Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 107–12.

<sup>324</sup> A deeper analysis of the role of the Orthodox Church of Greece in the post-civil war political landscape is beyond the scope of this thesis. It should be at least noted that the Church made a significant contribution to the Greek anti-communist campaign as well as to the legitimisation of the post-civil war regime. The Church acted as a guarantor of the regime’s conservative, royalist and anti-communist values, and an advocate of obedience to political and social authorities, which formed an indispensable part of the Orthodox faith. Yet, according to Voglis, compared to the case of the Spanish Civil War, the role of the Church in Greece was less decisive for the success of the political establishment. See Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 77; Close, *Greece since 1945*, 97–99; Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 27–33. For a wider context, cf. Theodosios A. Tsironis, *Ekklisia politevomeni: O politikos logos kai rolos tis Ekklisias tis Ellados, 1913-1941 [Church in Politics: The Political Speech and the Role of the Church of Greece, 1913-1941]* (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2010).

been labelled as a “right-wing establishment” or a “right-wing state.”<sup>325</sup> These terms – just like *parakratos* and the “para-constitution” – have been intentionally used for their great potential to mobilise. They aim to emphasise the pervasive role of the Right, which allegedly penetrated all levels of state administration. The dominance of the Right has frequently been presented as unfaltering, and its coalition with the palace and the army as unanimous and smooth. Furthermore, the terms tended to presume the involvement of other actors who were seen as unofficially operating “from behind the scenes,” influencing public affairs or even diverting the decision-making process, be it the US embassy or even the forces of the *parakratos*. The supposed shared interest of these actors was to preserve the political *status quo* as well as their power.

However, the reality of the situation was usually more complicated. The relationship between the actors of the right-wing regime was firmer under Papagos (1952–1955), who enjoyed the army’s full support and was trusted by US representatives since he was former commander-in-chief and a proponent of Greece’s close alignment with the anti-communist West and NATO. For his conservative values, Papagos was a natural ally for the palace, too, and was even attached to the royal family by his own family ties. Nevertheless, the mutual relationship was stained by the political ambitions of the king and the queen, who saw a strong political competitor in Papagos.<sup>326</sup> The successor of Papagos, Konstantinos Karamanlis (1955–1963), was a professional politician, and, although being a powerful and charismatic figure as well, his position was slightly weaker with respect to all three aforementioned actors. Under Karamanlis, US influence in Greece gradually faded as Greece gave priority to its integration into the European Economic Community (EEC).<sup>327</sup> However, the palace eventually appeared to be the problematic element that opened the way for the destabilisation of the right-wing regime when it inflicted the fall of the Karamanlis government in 1963.<sup>328</sup>

---

<sup>325</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 83; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 43.

<sup>326</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 17–19; Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 132, 152; Kateřina Králová, *Das Vermächtnis der Besatzung: deutsch-griechische Beziehungen seit 1940 [The Legacy of Occupation. German-Greek Relations since 1940]* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2016), 120–21.

<sup>327</sup> Pappas, ‘The Transformation of the Greek Party System Since 1951’, 92–93; Close, *Greece since 1945*, 84–87.

<sup>328</sup> C. M. Woodhouse, *Karamanlis: Anorthotis tis Ellinikis Dimokratias [Karamanlis: The Restorer of Greek Democracy]* (Morfofotiki Estia A.E., 1982), 187–203.

According to the 1952 Constitution, which was designed during the civil war and represented a more authoritarian version of the 1911 monarchic constitution,<sup>329</sup> Greece was a “crowned democracy” (*vasilevomeni dimokratia*). The executive power formally belonged to the king, who also had the right to appoint and dismiss ministers of the government. Nevertheless, only the ministers, who were politically accountable and responsible for their specialised agendas, were authorised to perform executive powers.<sup>330</sup> Furthermore, the king had the right to dissolve parliament, which represented the legislative power. Although the 1952 Constitution had a democratic character and guaranteed basic civil rights, in reality, it failed to avert the unconstitutional behaviour of the executive and terminate the practice of extraordinary legislative decrees, which continued to be introduced by governments without approval from parliament. Governments were granted the right to execute legislative power only under specific circumstances: literally, “To regulate exceptionally urgent issues.”<sup>331</sup> Nevertheless, between 1952 and 1966, the overall number of approved extraordinary legislative decrees exceeded the amount of regular legislative acts. Therefore, the “extraordinary urgency” of these decrees, which were used by both the right-wing and centrist governments, was debatable. Moreover, the decrees were applied in cases of such significance and even for controversial issues, as was the case with the establishment of the KYP (Law 2421/1953), the conclusion of bilateral agreements between Greece and the US on foreign investment (Law 2687/1953), the foundation of US military bases on Greek territory and the legal status of US personnel (Laws 733/1953 and 3715/1957).<sup>332</sup>

Greek monarchs of the period, King Paul I. (1947–1964) and his successor Constantine II. (1964–1973), played a significant role in Greek political life. Although defined by the constitution as politically unaccountable and inviolable,<sup>333</sup> in political practice, they were endowed with extensive legislative and executive powers that either exceeded or even contradicted constitutional provisions. On multiple occasions, they intervened in the internal affairs of the government as well as those of political parties.

---

<sup>329</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoï thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 203. See also Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 155.

<sup>330</sup> Constitution of Greece, 1 January 1952 (FEK 1/1952): Art. 27, 31.

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.*, Art. 35.

<sup>332</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 15–24; Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Asymmetroi etairoi: Oi Inomenes Politeies kai i Ellada ston Psychro Polemo, 1953-1961 [Asymmetric Partners: The USA and Greece in the Cold War]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Pataki, 2002), 191–234; Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 40–41.

<sup>333</sup> Constitution of Greece, 1 January 1952 (FEK 1/1952): Art. 29.

As such, in October 1955, King Paul I. appointed Konstantinos Karamanlis as prime minister and thus favoured him to Stefanos Stefanopoulos, who was chosen by Papagos as his successor.<sup>334</sup> The situation repeated in June 1963, when Karamanlis was forced to resign following a dispute with Paul I. and, based on the king's decision, was replaced by another right-wing politician, Panagiotis Pipinelis. In July 1965, a conflict between the centrist Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou and Constantine II. not only led to the collapse of the government but also to a long-term political crisis that, as a consequence, opened the way for the 1967 military coup.<sup>335</sup>

In the case of Papandreou's resignation, the bone of contention was the ambition of the king, formally the highest authority for the armed forces, in deciding on the promotions and appointments of senior army officers (and not only being consulted by the government). Such political arrangement, as well as other legally questionable activities of the king, were tolerated by the Right (and, to some extent, by the Centre too) and perceived as subject to an unspoken agreement.<sup>336</sup> The position of the two monarchs was particularly strong given their close alliances with the military leadership, the politicians of the Right, US representatives and, generally, prominent personalities in the state administration and business sectors. On the other hand, the relationship between the palace and the centrist opposition was stained by the royal family's suspicion of certain centrist politicians and their presumably republican convictions.<sup>337</sup> The palace provoked many controversies by failing to act as a non-party arbiter and pursuing its private political agenda. For that purpose, the monarchs were making use of the Crown Council (*Symvoulío tou Stemmátos*), an irregular advisory organ that was assembled by the king to provide solutions to significant domestic and foreign political crises. The council formally stood outside the legal system and, although its decisions were not binding, it helped the king to construct his political strategy and influence the

---

<sup>334</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *I anodos tou Konstantinou Karamanli stin exousia, 1954-1956 [The Rise of Konstantinos Karamanlis to Power, 1954-1956]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Patakis, 2001), 223.

<sup>335</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 104–5; Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 242–54; Meletopoulos, *Ideologia tou dexiou kratous, 1949-1967 [Ideology of the Right-Wing State, 1949-1967]*, 56; Rizas, 'Dekaetia tou 1960 [The 1960s]', 182–83.

<sup>336</sup> Close, 'The Legacy', 216; Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 265–67.

<sup>337</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 87–88; Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]', 24–25. For more see Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 327–38.

course of political events.<sup>338</sup> Further controversies were related to the enormous expenditures of the palace on the charitable activities of Paul I. and his spouse Queen Frederica, which were not only costly but also seeking to fulfil the personal political ambitions of the royal couple, clearly having an anti-communist subtext.<sup>339</sup>

Especially in the early years of right-wing dominance, the palace enjoyed great support from the Greek military that turned increasingly royalist, ultra-conservative and anti-communist during the Second World War and the civil war. Besides the police and the gendarmerie, it was mainly the army that operated in the persecution of leftist opposition.<sup>340</sup> The position of the army in public affairs had traditionally been strong; however, since the beginning of the 20th century, the army was becoming more and more politicised. Throughout the interwar period, certain factions within the army intervened in political developments on a number of occasions, and, aside from several coups, Greece also experienced periods of military dictatorship.<sup>341</sup> The civil war represented a turning point for the army's development; on the one hand, the conflict bolstered the prestige and authority of the officer corps to the extent that, in its aftermath, the army became more autonomous, nearly evading civilian control. According to Papadiamantis, the army was widely recognised and treated as the "saviour of the fatherland, a saviour above criticism."<sup>342</sup> As part of the anti-communist campaign, the army assumed the role of a defender against a potential invasion from the Eastern Bloc, a protector against the internal enemy and an irreplaceable propagandist.<sup>343</sup> On the other hand, the transition from war to peace exposed the army's hypertrophy and, generally, the weaknesses of its internal organisation. The excessive ideologisation of the army's mission and its self-perception as guardian of the Greek nation combined with the personal frustration of officers over their limited carrier

---

<sup>338</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 255–60.

<sup>339</sup> Cf. Vervenioti, 'The Children of the Greek Civil War. Saved or Kidnapped?'; Loring M. Danforth and Riki van Boeschoten, *Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

<sup>340</sup> Mitsopoulou, *O ellinikos antikommounismos ston 'syntomo 20o aiona' [Greek Anti-Communism in the 'Short 20th Century']*, 90; Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 505–6.

<sup>341</sup> For example see Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*.

<sup>342</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 47.

<sup>343</sup> For more on the role of the army as the defender from communism see Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*.

opportunities contributed to the rise of conspiracies in the army.<sup>344</sup> The emergence of the so-called secret officers' organisations will be analysed later on, alongside the alleged parallel military structures.

### 3.2 Foreign Involvement

Given the long history of foreign interventionism in Greek internal affairs, Greece has often been labelled as a semi-dependent state with a regime of limited sovereignty, or even a semi-colony, as certain authors argue.<sup>345</sup> If we consider the period under investigation, the UK had played a crucial role in the Greek economy and security issues since the late 1930s, when this task was taken over by the US following the Truman doctrine. As Iatrides shows, British officials saw their mission in post-war Greece as “basically supportive and temporary,” and as such, they even perceived the British military's involvement in the *dekemvriana* events in this way.<sup>346</sup> The UK was prepared to fully pass the administration of public affairs to the Greeks as soon as the inner political situation stabilised and an elected government established. Nevertheless, they found themselves caught up in the inefficiency of the Greek state's administration and its turbulent political situation, which subsequently evolved into an armed civil conflict that forced the UK into even greater engagement in the country. In February 1947, while facing its own domestic problems, the British government decided to cease aid for Greece by the end of the next month.<sup>347</sup> This step marked the beginning of full US involvement.

Unlike the UK, which had a long tradition of close relations with Greece, reaching back to the War of Independence (1821–1829), the active engagement of the US in Greek public affairs, at least within the framework of the Truman doctrine, was a

---

<sup>344</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 86; Couloumbis, ‘Post World War II Greece’, 295–96.

<sup>345</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 34–38; Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 71–72; Herzfeld, ‘The Absent Presence: Discourses of Crypto-Colonialism’; Kaloudis, *Modern Greece*; Close, *Greece since 1945*, 85–87; Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 39.

<sup>346</sup> Iatrides, ‘Britain, the United States, and Greece, 1945-9’, 194–96.

<sup>347</sup> For more see, Heinz Richter, *British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War. February 1945 to August 1946* (London: Merlin Press, 1986); John Sakkas, *Britain and the Greek Civil War 1944 - 1949: British Imperialism, Public Opinion and the Coming of the Cold War*, 55 (Mainz: Rutzen, 2013).

new phenomenon.<sup>348</sup> US representatives were already assisting the UK in Greece in the aftermath of the country's liberation, taking part in monitoring communist activities and supervising the 1946 legislative elections. Nevertheless, Washington still principally perceived Greece as an area of British interest.<sup>349</sup> Only following British appeal to the US to assist in Greece, due to the UK's inability to sustain their engagement, did the Truman administration, endorsed by US intervention stipulated in the Truman doctrine, enter the scene during the Greek Civil War. From a geopolitical perspective, Greece as a "frontline state"<sup>350</sup> was of strategic importance for both countries, located at the borders of East and West, which could help form a barrier to Soviet expansionism in Europe. Furthermore, the preservation of the anti-communist regime in Athens was deemed necessary for the maintenance of stability in neighbouring Turkey.<sup>351</sup> The Truman doctrine interpreted the Greek Civil War as an immediate consequence of the Cold War and a sign of Soviet aggression. The US's intervention in Greece thus became an inherent part of the containment strategy.<sup>352</sup>

The American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) was officially established through a bilateral agreement on 20 June 1947. It allowed the US to supervise the use of financial aid and to deploy US advisors in the ministries and other state agencies.<sup>353</sup> The AMAG chief served as a representative of the US government on issues relating to the assistance provided under the aid agreement and was responsible for most of the economic policies of the Greek government during the civil war. Alongside the US ambassador in Athens and the Chief of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), which dealt with the military affairs, the AMAG Chief belonged to the most powerful figures in Greece and retained much of their power even

---

<sup>348</sup> For a review of US-Greek relations in a greater perspective, see John O. Iatrides, 'The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century', in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 69–109.

<sup>349</sup> Robert Frazier, *Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-47*, Studies in Military and Strategic History (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991), 3–4.

<sup>350</sup> See Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*; Thomas W. Gallant, *Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present* (London; Oxford; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 255.

<sup>351</sup> See the Address of the President to Congress, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey, *Harry S. Truman Administration*, 12 March 1947, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/address-president-congress-recommending-assistance-greece-and-turkey> (accessed 12 August 2020), 4; see also Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War*, 19.

<sup>352</sup> Iatrides, 'Britain, the United States, and Greece, 1945-9', 201–3.

<sup>353</sup> Agreement on Aid to Greece, 61 Stat. 2907; Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1625, Library of Congress, 20 June 1947, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/b-gr-ust000008-0403.pdf> (accessed 26 August 2019).

after the end of the conflict.<sup>354</sup> The US-Greek relationship was further defined by bilateral economic agreements in 1948 and 1953, which facilitated greater US investment in the country by adjusting the Greek economy to US economic interests.<sup>355</sup> The military cooperation deepened as a result of the participation of Greek troops in the Korean War (1950–1953), Greece’s accession to NATO (1952), the approval of agreements on the establishment of US military bases on Greek territory (1953) and the legal status of US military personnel (1957).<sup>356</sup>

In exchange for its loyalty, Greece was admitted to the European Recovery Plan in 1948 (ERP; also known as the Marshall Plan) and received massive economic and military aid, which had reached 14 billion dollars by 1952.<sup>357</sup> The US’ financial assistance to Greece continued far beyond the end of the ERP (1951) and was only terminated in 1961, thus pointing to the importance of Greece in the US’ geostrategic interests.<sup>358</sup> According to Close, between 1947 and 1957, US aid “accounted for over half of the state investment expenditure.”<sup>359</sup> It was conditioned by economic cooperation with the US, and its aim was apparently political, attempting to tie Greece to the West and reduce the Soviet influence.<sup>360</sup> A great share of the financial aid was directed to efforts to defeat communist forces in the civil war and subsequently to maintain the inflated Greek army in a state of operational readiness and fighting efficiency against a potential Soviet invasion. Moreover, a part of the US aid had been

---

<sup>354</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Apo ton Emfylion ston Psychro Polemo: I Ellada kai o symmachikos paragontas, 1949-52 [From the Civil War to the Cold War: Greece and the Allied Factor, 1949-1952]* (Chalandri: Ekdoseis Proskinio, 1999), 191–200; Drousiotis, *EOKA B & CIA*, 20–21.

<sup>355</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 85–87.

<sup>356</sup> Legislative decree 2733/1953 “Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the United States of America Concerning Military Facilities” (Nomothetiko diatagma 2733/1953 – Symfonia metaxi tou Vasiliou tis Ellados kai ton Inomenon Polition tis Amerikis); Legislative decree 3715/1957 “On the Legal Status of the US Armed Forces in Greece” (Nomothetiko diatagma 3715/1957 peri tou nomikou kathestotos ton en Elladi enoplon Dynameon ton Inomenon Polition Amerikis). For more see Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 223; Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 29–33.

<sup>357</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 104. See also Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 39.

<sup>358</sup> Konstantina Botsiou, ‘New Policies, Old Politics: American Concepts of Reform in Marshall Plan Greece’, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 27 (2009): 212; Thanos P. Dokos, ‘Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting’, in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 42–46.

<sup>359</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 44.

<sup>360</sup> Lowe, *Zdivočelý kontinent [Savage Continent]*, 278–79; Mogens Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949-1974*, *Studies in 20th & 21st Century European History*, v. 5 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2006).



claimed to be lost to state corruption and inefficiency.<sup>361</sup> For that reason, many scholars assessed the contribution of Greece's participation in the ERP to the actual post-war economic reconstruction critically.<sup>362</sup> Yet, according to Botsiou, it would be a misconception to determine the economic reconstruction as the sole or predominant objective of the ERP, as Europe played an irreplaceable role in the US containment policy. The level of the country's industrial development and modernisation shall thus not be the only criteria of the ERP's evaluation.<sup>363</sup> In reality, US aid contributed to the overall political and economic stabilisation of Greece, the provision of domestic security and the country's integration into NATO's international security system, and – according to some scholars<sup>364</sup> – also to the Westernisation and modernisation of the country. US support also facilitated the ongoing growth of the Greek economy, which stood at six per cent annually in the first post-civil war decade.<sup>365</sup>

The fact of Greece's dependence on US aid put the successive Greek governments in a somewhat subordinate stance to the policy objectives of the US administration. Such a situation enabled the US administration to enforce numerous political and economic reforms as well as to control the carried-out investments by threatening the Greek governments with an early cancellation of the aid. Within the initial years, the US practically took over responsibility for all major decisions in the economic, financial, and military spheres. The US representatives in Greece even dictated the composition of the cabinets; later on, they managed to retain great control over the appointments in the state sector and the deployment of its staff in the ministries or government agencies, even directing Greece's foreign, security and economic

---

<sup>361</sup> Botsiou, 'New Policies, Old Politics', 228.

<sup>362</sup> Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Jon V. Kofas, *Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece during the Cold War* (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989); Giorgos Stathakis, *To Dogma Trouman kai to Schedio Marsal. I istoria tis amerikanikis voitheias stin Ellada [The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The History of American Aid in Greece]* (Athina: Vivliorama, 2004); Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*.

<sup>363</sup> Botsiou, 'New Policies, Old Politics', 209–10. For a detailed assessment of the early US economic policies in the post-civil war Greece, see George Stathakis, 'U.S. Economic Policies in Post Civil War Greece, 1949-1953: Stabilization and Monetary Reform', *Journal of European Economic History* 24, no. 2 (1995): 375–404.

<sup>364</sup> See Stelios Zachariou, 'Implementing the Marshall Plan in Greece: Balancing Reconstruction and Geopolitical Security', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 27, no. 2 (2009): 303–18, <https://doi.org/10.1353/mgs.0.0072>; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 'Shallow Waves and Deeper Currents: The U.S. Experience of Greece, 1947–1961. Policies, Historicity, and the Cultural Dimension', *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 1 (2014): 83–110.

<sup>365</sup> Botsiou, 'New Policies, Old Politics', 228–29.

policy.<sup>366</sup> The US helped shape the reform of the police, of the electoral system and of the labour market. Furthermore, it exerted influence on the adoption of anti-communist legislation and encouraged purges of communist sympathisers in the state sector.<sup>367</sup> The “Americanisation” of Greece gradually expanded from the political, economic and security spheres into the public sphere and the cultural environment.<sup>368</sup> As a result, some scholars assessed the position of Greece as “a client state to the United States.”<sup>369</sup>

The relation of the US administration towards Greek political actors was subject to a progressive change. The traditionally anti-monarchist US political orientation was initially manifested in the US’ mistrust of the palace. That nevertheless changed with greater US involvement in the Greek anti-communist campaign when the palace became a natural ally of US representatives.<sup>370</sup> Throughout the civil war and the post-civil war period, the US insisted on the preservation of a democratic regime (although strictly excluding Greek communists) and continuously objected to any tendencies leading to the instalment of a military dictatorship. This attitude had to do with the US endeavour to present itself as an advocate of democracy worldwide in contrast to the totalitarian regimes defeated in the Second World War as well as with regard to the Soviet Union.<sup>371</sup> In the civil war years, the US supported the creation of a broad anti-communist coalition that would prevent the radicalism of the Right from prevailing, as was the case of the previously mentioned Sofoulis government.<sup>372</sup> Yet, since the centrist cabinets failed to bring the much coveted political stability, the US administration gave preference to the ES of Alexandros Papagos, whom they fully trusted. Its electoral victory was ensured by the enforcement of electoral reform that disproportionately favoured majority governments and, eventually, secured the unshakable position of the ES between 1952 and 1955.<sup>373</sup>

---

<sup>366</sup> Close, ‘The Legacy’, 217; Close, *Greece since 1945*, 85–87.

<sup>367</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 73; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 98.

<sup>368</sup> Zinovia Lialiouti, ‘American Cultural Diplomacy in Greece, 1953–1968’, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 15, no. 3 (3 July 2017): 229–50, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2017.1337676>.

<sup>369</sup> Jon V. Kofas, *Under the Eagle’s Claw: Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S.-Greek Relations* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003), 13–58; Kostas Kostis, *History’s Spoiled Children: The Story of Modern Greece* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 331; Roderick Beaton, *Greece. Biography of a Modern Nation* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2019), 306.

<sup>370</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmós tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 19–20.

<sup>371</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 60.

<sup>372</sup> Iatrides, ‘Britain, the United States, and Greece, 1945–9’, 205.

<sup>373</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 51, 141–47; Christos Kassimeris, ‘United States Intervention in Post-War Greek Elections: From Civil War to Dictatorship’,

When it comes to the relationship between Greek political leadership and the US administration, the latter was continuously facing obstacles in terms of the local political culture, defiant due to the past experience of foreign interventionism. The issue of US aid was nevertheless heavily exploited by domestic political actors, and the endeavours of US representation in Greece often collided with the particular interests of the palace and the political as well as military leadership, all of whom attempted to use the bestowed financial support to satisfy their own partisan aims.<sup>374</sup> The termination of US aid under the Kennedy administration was then strongly reflected in the 1961 pre-election campaign. By some contemporaries, the US move to cease financing of the Greek budget was interpreted as the US' attempt to prevent Karamanlis from being re-elected. The centrist forces based their campaign, among other things, on criticism of the Right's dependence on the US.<sup>375</sup>

The intense US involvement in Greece provoked strong counterreactions among the Greek public. As Lialiouti suggests, the anti-American sentiments were manifested in several stages. First, they mainly stemmed from the outcome of the civil war, and the interrelated critique focused on the rejection of the ongoing restriction of Greek national independence and sovereignty along with the prioritisation of the anti-communist agenda under US leadership.<sup>376</sup> The US' refusal to support the first Greek appeal to the United Nations regarding the Cyprus issue in December 1954 represented a turning point, whereby the anti-American movement became more closely associated with Greek nationalism.<sup>377</sup> Parallel to this, the anti-Americanism of the left-wing and centrist forces was linked to the democratisation movement, which peaked in the first half of the 1960s. Further driven by the US backing of the 1967 putschists, anti-Americanism continued to be present in post-1974 Greek society. The last rise in such sentiments took

---

*Diplomacy & Statecraft* 20, no. 4 (10 December 2009): 679–96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290903455790>; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 159–60.

<sup>374</sup> James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950–1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 23–25.

<sup>375</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 91.

<sup>376</sup> Zinovia Lialiouti, 'Greek Cold War Anti-Americanism in Perspective, 1947–1989', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 13, no. 1 (2 January 2015): 40–55, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.990735>.

<sup>377</sup> Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, 191–215; Jan Koura, *Rozdělený ostrov: Studená válka a „kyperská otázka“ v letech 1960–1974 [Divided Island: Cold War and the 'Cyprus Issue' Between 1960–1974]* (Praha: Epoque, 2019).

place in the mid-1980s, which marked the end of the PASOK government and the beginning of the end of the Cold War.<sup>378</sup>

While it is necessary to consider the importance of US influence on the country's political reality, it should also not be overestimated. As Hondros observed, a perception that "the hand of the foreigner is behind all major Greek political developments" has been fairly popular in Greek society. At the same time, foreign interventions were also taking place in modern Greek history because they suited the interests of the domestic actors or even happened as a result of them.<sup>379</sup> Similarly, Alivizatos stressed that US involvement in Greece during and after the civil war was welcomed by the Greek right-wing political circles. He assumed that "the instrument of foreign pressure was official and institutionalized" based on the series of abovementioned US-Greek bilateral agreements.<sup>380</sup>

### 3.3 The Political Opposition

Throughout the 1950s, the only real opposition to the right-wing regime was the Left, represented by the pro-communist EDA. Initially, until the establishment of the Centre Union (EK) of Georgios Papandreou in 1961, the Centre did not essentially differ from the Right in terms of political goals or even the social composition of their supporters. This circumstance was already described by Meynaud, who distinguished between the liberal conservatism of the Centre and the traditional conservatism of the Right.<sup>381</sup> Furthermore, as I have shown in the previous chapter, the Centrists were equally involved in the setting of the post-civil war legal framework, including the anti-communist measures. The EDA was allowed to participate in political competition, despite the fact that its connections to the exiled and banned KKE were a widely recognised fact. The EDA members were continuously exposed to political pressure and persecution, but the party as such was not outlawed by the Right, possibly for its ability to electorally weaken the Centre and especially because, in such a way, the political activities of the Left were more visible to the authorities and thus easier to control.<sup>382</sup>

---

<sup>378</sup> Lialiouti, 'Greek Cold War Anti-Americanism in Perspective, 1947–1989', 42–44.

<sup>379</sup> Hondros, 'Greece and the German Occupation', 32.

<sup>380</sup> Alivizatos, 'The Executive in the Post-Liberation Period, 1944-1949', 166–67.

<sup>381</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 313–14.

<sup>382</sup> Close, 'The Legacy', 218.

The EDA resembled the EAM both from a political and organisational perspective and was thus more acceptable for Greek voters than the rigid and Stalinist KKE.<sup>383</sup> The unsatisfactory economic and social conditions in post-war Greece provided the EDA with considerable popular support. In the 1954 local elections, the party secured strong representation in the municipal councils of most towns.<sup>384</sup> It reached its highest result (24.4 per cent, 79 mandates) in the 1958 legislative elections, becoming the second strongest party in parliament.<sup>385</sup> Even before these outstanding results, the EDA had a considerable “intimidation potential,” as its results typically ranged between 10 and 14 per cent.<sup>386</sup> The 1958 electoral success of the EDA could only partly be attributed to the appeal of its political program; it was rather an outcome of the deepening crisis of the Centre as well as of popular disappointment from the approach of the West, especially the US, towards the Cyprus issue (while the USSR stance was supportive towards the Greek claims).<sup>387</sup> While the US embassy in Athens attributed the high scores of the EDA to Greece’s ongoing economic problems,<sup>388</sup> the UK embassy suggested that dissatisfaction with internal issues as well as “the disillusionment of the Greeks with their allies” stood behind its success.<sup>389</sup> The 1958 strengthening of the EDA inflicted a shock to the ruling regime, which subsequently mobilised its powers against an anti-communist backlash. The activation of both official and unofficial agents of the struggle against the Left, especially during the 1961 electoral campaign, was perceived by many scholars as to the rise of the *parakratos*, topped off with the 1963 assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis.<sup>390</sup>

---

<sup>383</sup> The highlights of the EDA’s program were expressed by the slogan “Peace – Democracy – Amnesty” (*Eirini – Dimokratia – Amnisteia*), whose abbreviation EDA corresponded with the party’s name. For more on its political aims, see Tasos Trikkas, *EDA 1951-1967. To neo prosopo tis aristeras. Tomos B - I dekaetia ton akron [EDA 1951-1967: The New Face of the Left. Volume 2: The Decade of Extremes]* (Athina: Themelio, 2009), 133–1399; Ioanna Papatthanasiou, ‘I aristera antimetopi me ti dolofonia Lambraki: Politiko cheirismo kai stratigikes epidioxeis [The Left Faces the Assassination of Lambrakis: Political Usage and Strategic Aspirations]’, in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitiisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 99.

<sup>384</sup> Close, ‘The Legacy’, 220.

<sup>385</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 192–206.

<sup>386</sup> See Seferiades, ‘Polarization and Nonproportionality’, 77; Pappas, ‘The Transformation of the Greek Party System Since 1951’, 94–96; Lyrantzis, ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece’, 100–101.

<sup>387</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 63; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 230.

<sup>388</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 62.p

<sup>389</sup> NA FO 371/136220 (12 May 1958).

<sup>390</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 115; Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 40; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 256; Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 646.

The 1961 elections were – as a result of the fiery rhetoric of Georgios Papandreou – inscribed in history as the “election of fraud and violence” (*ekloges vias kai notheias*), reconfirming the ERE’s rule via “an electoral coup.”<sup>391</sup> The EK’s leader blamed the caretaker government of General Doxas for allowing a broad conspiracy of the ERE, the armed and security forces, and the KYP, and even made the king responsible for the electoral terror.<sup>392</sup> He accused the ERE of severely manipulating the electoral results, claiming that 100,000 voters were illegally registered in Athens alone.<sup>393</sup> Both the EK and the EDA summarised their accusations in their “black books” of the 1961 elections,<sup>394</sup> and their deputies boycotted the first assembly of the newly-elected parliament, which they joined only after having denounced the electoral events.<sup>395</sup> Not just the political parties, but mainly many judicial officials, the lawyers appointed by the Supreme Court (*Areios Pagos*) at each election to ensure fair play, called the fairness of the election into question by passing a joint resolution.<sup>396</sup> The Right fired back with an intensified anti-communist campaign and the introduction of harsher security measures. Several trials directed towards the opposition took place, resulting in the imprisonment of Manolis Glezos and other left-wing activists.<sup>397</sup>

Despite these practices, the centrist and leftist powers secured considerable shares of the vote, but due to the used electoral system, only a comparatively lesser number of mandates. The EK ended up second with about 33.7 per cent and 100 seats behind the winning ERE (50.8 per cent, 176 seats), which presented itself as the only non-communist solution.<sup>398</sup> The EDA, which participated in the election as part of a wider leftist platform by the name of the All-Democratic Agricultural Front

---

<sup>391</sup> “To Kentron katingeile chtes to eklogikon apotelesma os proion vias kai notheias [Yesterday the Centre Denounced the Electoral Result as a Product of Violence and Fraud],” *Eleftheria*, 1 November 1961, 1.

<sup>392</sup> Richard Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy* (London: Hurst, 1987), 42–43.

<sup>393</sup> Enosis Kentrou (EK), *I dimokratia tha nikisi. Mavri vivlos tou eklogikou praxikopimatos tis 29is Oktovriou 1961 [Democracy Will Win. The Black Book of the Electoral Coup of the 29 October 1961]* (Athina: Ekdosis Enoseos Kentrou, 1962), 72–74, 128. See also Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA), *Mavri vivlos. To eklogiko praxikopima tis 29is Oktovriou 1961 [Black Book. The Electoral Coup of the 29 October 1961]* (Athina: Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, 1962), 121–53.

<sup>394</sup> Enosis Kentrou (EK), *I dimokratia tha nikisi [The Democracy Will Win]*; Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA), *Mavri vivlos [Black Book]*.

<sup>395</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 162–64.

<sup>396</sup> Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, 42.

<sup>397</sup> Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka [The History of Greece]*, 498; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 256.

<sup>398</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 225.

(*Pandimokratiko Agrotiko Metopo Ellados*, PAME), took third with 14.6 per cent (24 seats).<sup>399</sup>

Some experts observed the extraordinary fluctuation in voting patterns in certain provinces. According to Nikolakopoulos, if compared to the 1958 and 1963 elections, the 1961 electoral results show that constituencies that before and after 1961 tended to vote for the Left astonishingly opted for the Right. Thus, he estimated that about five per cent of all rural voters, approximately 140,000 people, were forced to switch their vote.<sup>400</sup> The army votes possibly caused further distortion on the local level, as 85 per cent went to the ERE.<sup>401</sup> According to estimates, the ERE would thus have won the election without the use of “violence and fraud,” but its share might not have exceeded 46 per cent and would thus provide it with only a marginal majority.<sup>402</sup>

Compared to 1958, the Left suffered a decrease from 24.4 per cent to 14.6 per cent, which was also a result of the growing appeal of the Centre.<sup>403</sup> The EDA’s loss should also be seen in the context of worsening diplomatic relations with the USSR and neighbouring Bulgaria. Shortly before, Khrushchev threatened Athens with a nuclear attack. Furthermore, a wireless station, operated by an EDA member and transmitting military information to Bulgaria, was discovered.<sup>404</sup> The 1961 elections generally took place during a period of growing popular dissatisfaction over socio-economic conditions in the country and the negative development in the Cyprus issue.

As part of its “relentless struggle,” Georgios Papandreou continued stirring up public outrage with his provocative speeches. He denounced Greece’s political regime by stating that “the crowned democracy ceased to be a democracy and remained only crowned” and exploited national sentiments connected with the Axis occupation and the civil war era; on top of this, he labelled the Greek state a “gang” (*symmoría*), the ERE’s rule an “inner occupation” (*esoteriki katochi*) and the opposition’s campaign as

---

<sup>399</sup> Giannis Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, *Modern Greece: A History since 1821*, A New History of Modern Europe (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 137.

<sup>400</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 278–81.

<sup>401</sup> “O k. Karamanlis efygomachisen apo tin syzitisin [Karamanlis Escaped from the Debate],” *Eleftheria*, 23 January 1962, 7.

<sup>402</sup> See also Fleischer, ‘Authoritarian Rule in Greece and Its Heritage’, 250; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 171; Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 656.

<sup>403</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis, ‘I dimokratia dyscheris? I anaptyxi ton michanismon tou “antikommounistikou agonos” 1958-1961 [Democracy Under Strain? The Development of Mechanisms of “Anti-Communist Struggle” 1958-1961]’, *Mnimon* 29 (2008): 236.

<sup>404</sup> NA FO 371/160407 (23 September 1961); see also Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 97.

“national resistance” (*ethniki antistasi*).<sup>405</sup> His efforts became fruitful in the 1963 and 1964 legislative elections, which brought his EK to power. Among other reasons, Papandreou managed to redefine the existing cleavage between the nationally and non-nationally minded (*ethnikofrones* vs *mi-ethnikofrones*) into a duel between the right and the anti-right, which facilitated him an even greater electorate.<sup>406</sup>

Unlike the EDA, the EK eventually managed to challenge the “right-wing establishment,” and it formed a government following the 1963 and 1964 legislative elections. There were several factors behind its success: first of all, its confrontational electoral campaign against the Karamanlis rule, known as a “relentless struggle” (*anendotos agon*), in which Papandreou managed to change his image from of a “failed politician” to “a symbol of democratic solidarity.”<sup>407</sup> The EK needed to distinguish itself from the ERE by its liberal approach and from the EDA by its anti-communism. For that reason, the EK refused to cooperate with any of these parties (the so-called “bilateral struggle,” *dimetopos agon*).<sup>408</sup> Notably, the EK represented a political alternative for middle and lower classes, dissatisfied with their economic status, and nationalists that objected to the pro-US foreign political orientation of the Karamanlis government. These social groups were ready to shift their political allegiance. The EK, especially its leftist fraction led by Andreas Papandreou as the son of Georgios Papandreou, was also capable of appealing to many left-leaning voters.<sup>409</sup>

As prime minister, Papandreou provided for the reduction of the number of political prisoners, decreasing political discrimination and selectively permitting the repatriation of political emigrants – something that was not previously possible – including children displaced as a result of the civil war in countries of the Eastern Bloc. The growing number of Greeks returning from communist countries was, however, causing concerns among the Right as well as Greece’s allies who saw it as a threat to the country’s internal stability and public order, pointing to the lack of control over their choosing and subsequent police surveillance.<sup>410</sup> Papandreou enforced certain social

---

<sup>405</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 170–71.

<sup>406</sup> Cf. Lialiouti, ‘Contesting the Anti-Totalitarian Consensus’, 105; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 271–72, 293.

<sup>407</sup> Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Modern Greece*, 137.

<sup>408</sup> For example see Pappas, ‘The Transformation of the Greek Party System Since 1951’, 96–97; Seferiades, ‘Polarization and Nonproportionality’, 78–79.

<sup>409</sup> Lyrintzis, ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece’, 103; Close, ‘The Legacy’, 220–21.

<sup>410</sup> FO NA 371/180008 (27 September 1965).



reforms, aiming at greater social justice and income redistribution (such as subsidising staple products, supporting trade unions' independence and raising farmers' pensions). He also attempted to change the management of the state economy by increasing state interventionism. Most importantly, the EK government prolonged compulsory schooling from six to nine years and introduced university education free of charge.<sup>411</sup> In terms of foreign policy, Papandreou attempted to restore balance in the relationship between Greece and both the West and the East. Nevertheless, he refused to cooperate with the Left or to rehabilitate the EAM.<sup>412</sup>

The strategy of this “bilateral struggle” eventually caused troubles for the Papandreou government as the EK lacked political partners. Both the Right and the Left held grudges against Papandreou and capitalised on rumours that he covertly favoured the other side.<sup>413</sup> Furthermore, the EK functioned as a loose coalition of different political groups, experiencing problems with inner cohesion. These troubles peaked in 1965 when a conflict between King Constantine II and Papandreou over the authority to appoint senior army officers brought the second Papandreou government to its end.<sup>414</sup> Subsequently, a new cabinet was formed from the representatives of a right-wing faction of the EK (the so-called *apostates*, or defectors) who expressed their loyalty to the king. Since the EK still possessed a parliamentary majority, the creation of a new government, dependent on the support of the Right, gave way to a prolonged political crisis.<sup>415</sup>

Papandreou was a thorn in the side of the king because he challenged the tacit agreement according to which the king had the right to decide about major military issues, especially the promotions and appointments of high-ranking officers. The army representatives feared Papandreou's reform plan for the military, which they interpreted as an attempt to replace the army's leadership with Papandreou sympathisers. Finally, Papandreou questioned the foreign policy of the ERE, including the existing pro-NATO orientation of Greece. A potential departure of Greece from NATO would principally

---

<sup>411</sup> Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Modern Greece*, 138.

<sup>412</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 114–16.

<sup>413</sup> Seferiades, ‘Polarization and Nonproportionality’, 79.

<sup>414</sup> For the correspondence between Prime Minister Papandreou and King Constantine II in the critical period, see Pavlos V. Petridis, *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967: aporrta dokoumenta [Power and Para-Power in Greece: Secret Documents]* (Chalandri: Proskinio, 2000), 388–402.

<sup>415</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoï thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 242–54; Lyrintzis, ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece’, 100; Seferiades, ‘Polarization and Nonproportionality’, 79; Close, ‘The Legacy’, 222; Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 126.

endanger the established ties between Greek and US military officials. Compared to his predecessors, Papagos and Karamanlis, neither Papandreou nor his party ever really managed to assume full control over public affairs.<sup>416</sup>

The 1960s in Greece, sometimes termed as the “Greek Spring” or the “short sixties,”<sup>417</sup> brought a great politicisation of Greek society and the mobilisation of both the leftist and the nationalist camps. According to Close, the “right-wing establishment” became more vulnerable as a result of certain external issues, such as the Cyprus dispute, but also due to several domestic factors. Among them were the gradual decline of anti-communist paranoia, the rise of student and social movements (parallel to the activation of youth in Western Europe) and, finally, the unprecedented economic growth which improved the living conditions and the level of education in the country while also stimulating the depopulation of the countryside. In consequence, it was increasingly difficult for the Right to control the population through intimidation and patronage.<sup>418</sup> This is also the reason why most *parastate* organisations, that is, urban paramilitaries, emerged in this period, reacting to strikes and public demonstrations. The latter were growing in frequency and size, responding to the turbulent political development of the first half of the 1960s – the 1961 rigged legislative elections, the 1963 assassination of Lambrakis as well as the subsequent snap legislative elections, the 1965 *Iouliana* events and the subsequent political crisis.

Among the emerging social protest groups, the peace movement enjoyed particular attention from Greek authorities. Promoted by the later assassinated Lambrakis, the peace movement was perceived as a threat to the ruling regime for its connections with the Left. Its activities were interpreted as a sign of the growing power of communism.<sup>419</sup> The second type of protest groups, the so-called “democratic” organisations, informed the public about constitutional violations and irregularities within the Greek legal system and in political life more generally. For instance, the

---

<sup>416</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 265–67; Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 155; Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, 113; Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 126.

<sup>417</sup> Alkis Rigos, Serapheim I. Sepheriadis, and Evanthis Chatzivasileiou, eds., *I ‘syntomi’ dekaetia tou ‘60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The ‘Short’ 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008).

<sup>418</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 103–7; Meletopoulos, *Ideologia tou dexiou kratous, 1949-1967 [Ideology of the Right-Wing State, 1949-1967]*, 92.

<sup>419</sup> Alexandros Makris, ‘The Greek Peace Movement and the Vietnam War, 1964–1967’, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 38 (2020): 160–61.

Committee for the Restoration of Democratic Institutions specialised in monitoring the activities of the *parakratos* and secret military organisations; the Panhellenic Struggle for the Defence of Democracy and the Constitution further investigated the 1965 fall of the Papandreou government and the formation of the government of *apostates*.<sup>420</sup> Various associations of resistance fighters were additionally commemorating the EAM/ELAS and its contribution to the defeat of the Axis occupation, comprising the third type of the arising organisations. Otherwise, the merits of the left-wing resistance were ignored by the state for obvious ideological reasons.<sup>421</sup> Besides all of these factors, various labour, agricultural, youth and women associations emerged. The activation of the population was rejected by the regime as undesirable – it was fought against it under the pretext of defying the alleged communist menace. It has to be said that these organisations were not necessarily leftist; nevertheless, they openly challenged the official state narratives.

The Papandreou's EK was widely expected to win the planned 1967 legislative elections. However, they never took place. Instead, a military coup installed a seven-year-long dictatorship. The coup was carried out by a group of conspirators within the army without the authorisation of army leadership. Its initiators, who were trained during the Metaxas regime, took part in the civil war on the side of Athens and later closely collaborated with the US, justifying the coup with the alleged threat of communist subversion and expressed their mistrust in politics.<sup>422</sup> The coup inflicted a blow to all political forces across the spectrum, ranging from Left to Right, forcing them to leave for exile or, in the worst-case scenario, making them the targets of political persecution. Unlike the pre-coup situation, the 1967 conspirators sought neither the support of political parties nor of the Greek monarch, who eventually fled the country after he led an unsuccessful countercoup in December 1967. Ultimately decisive of the junta's survival was support from inside the army, especially among the lower and middle ranks for whom the dictatorship represented an opportunity for professional development or career advancement. The silent backing by the US provided the Greek

---

<sup>420</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 177–78.

<sup>421</sup> *Ibid.*, 179.

<sup>422</sup> Close, 'The Legacy', 223.

colonels with legitimacy, which they otherwise lacked, and helped stabilise the country's international position.<sup>423</sup>

### 3.4 The Character of the Post-Civil War Regime

The nature of the political regime in post-civil war Greece has been perceived by different scholars rather ambiguously. Among the main reasons, the gradual change of setting on the domestic political scene as well as the shifting relations between various actors of the “right-wing establishment” (1952–1963), or even of the whole post-civil war period (1949–1967), have proven uneasy to be captured and classified using a generally recognisable term. The core of the problem lies in the imaginary positioning of the regime on the scale between democracy and authoritarianism. Many authors have emphasised that the regime was grounded on democratic political institutions and processes; however, in political practice, it was characterised by a lack of democracy. To begin with at least a few examples, according to Kalyvas, Greece of that period was “a functioning parliamentary regime,” although “ambiguous, mixing democratic and exclusionary features.” Furthermore, Kalyvas claims that the regime was not authoritarian but should rather be understood within the specific historical context as “an anticommunist or Cold War democracy.”<sup>424</sup> Nikolakopoulos describes it as a “cachectic democracy” or as:

[...] an idiosyncratic coupling of authoritarianism and democracy, exclusion and welfare, ideological regression and cultural spring. A regime that functioned as a parliamentary system and had as a proclaimed aim the economic development and the European orientation, but simultaneously considered, as a necessary condition for its survival, the conservation of the civil war memory and the ideological dominance of the “Greek-Christian national-mindedness.”<sup>425</sup>

---

<sup>423</sup> Out of the numerous publications on the Greek junta and its various aspects, see for example Gianna Athanasatou, Alkis Rigos, and Seraphim Seferiades, eds., *I diktatoria, 1967-1974: politikes praktikes, ideologikos logos, antistasi [The Dictatorship, 1967-1974: Political Practices, Ideological Speech, Resistance]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 1999); Christos Kassimeris, ‘Causes of the 1967 Greek Coup’, *Democracy and Security* 2, no. 1 (July 2006): 61–72, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419160600623459>; C. M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (London; New York: Granada, 1985); Kofas, *Under the Eagle's Claw*, 87–125; Aristotelia Peloni, *Ideologia kata realismou: I amerikaniki politiki apenanti stin Ellada, 1963-1976 [Ideology Against the Realism: The US Politics Towards Greece, 1963-1976]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Polis, 2010), 216–53.

<sup>424</sup> Kalyvas, *Modern Greece*, 97–98. Kalyvas states that the Greek population could enjoy more freedom than for example in Franco's Spain or in Yugoslavia.

<sup>425</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 9.

Furthermore, Nikolakopoulos labels the post-civil war regime using terms such as “difficult,” “intolerant,” “restricted,” “dubious,” “controlled,” “disciplined,” “selective,” and “patronising.”<sup>426</sup> Similarly, Seferiades claims that Greece was experiencing a situation between “quasi-pluralism” and “quasi-authoritarianism,” respectively “quasi-” or “limited parliamentarism.”<sup>427</sup> He was specifically pointing to the functioning party system, which could serve as an indication that the political regime in Greece was not authoritarian. According to Stavrou, the post-civil war democracy was superficial or practically absent because it did not “entail more than the simple act of voting.”<sup>428</sup>

On the other hand, certain authors took a different stand, claiming that the post-civil war regime was authoritarian or at least was characterised by typically authoritarian features. For example, Mouzelis and Pagoulatos stated that while the post-civil war regime was “authoritarian-leaning”, the subsequent junta (1967–1974) was clearly authoritarian.<sup>429</sup> Mouzelis then claimed that political power was not vested in parliament but rather in the hands of conspiratorial anti-communist army officers.<sup>430</sup> Fleischer was even more critical about the nature of the regime when he assumed that between 1936 and 1974 (since the rise of Metaxas until the junta’s fall), “There was almost uninterrupted authoritarian, at times dictatorial rule by conservative elites who used the threat of communist danger [...] to consolidate and legitimise their control”.<sup>431</sup> Tsoucalas spoke of “the deeply original phenomenon of an authoritarian regime during and after the civil war built under the auspices of a democratically organized parliamentary state.”<sup>432</sup> He was claiming that “the ‘extraordinary’ authoritarian power system” was deriving legitimacy from the democratic tradition in which Greek institutions were rooted and functioned; thus, the Greek state was only democratic formally. This motive was emphasised by Samatas as well, according to whom the democratic constitutional order “was simply a facade for an authoritarian police state.”<sup>433</sup> Both authors were speaking of Greece as the political, ideological and juridical

---

<sup>426</sup> Ibid.

<sup>427</sup> Seferiades, ‘Polarization and Nonproportionality’, 74–75.

<sup>428</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 175–76.

<sup>429</sup> Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, ‘Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece’, 4.

<sup>430</sup> Nikos P. Mouzelis, ‘Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece’, *New Left Review*, 1 March 1976, 58.

<sup>431</sup> Fleischer, ‘Authoritarian Rule in Greece and Its Heritage’, 237.

<sup>432</sup> Tsoukalas, ‘The Ideological Impact of the Civil War’, 320.

<sup>433</sup> Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 35.

“apartheid” state against the Left; Kornetis used the term “semi-apartheid.”<sup>434</sup> Alivizatos suggested that such tactics were already in use during the civil war when the regime made “a persistent effort to preserve at least the appearance of some basic rules of democratic legality” and presented itself as “a democratic liberal order” in contradiction to the “foreign-inspired totalitarianism” of the communist movement.<sup>435</sup>

The above-cited scholars seemed to be unable to find a common approach to the study of the post-civil war regime. However, a comparison of their differing stances can offer a good overview of the existing ambiguities and dualities in its nature. Can the regime thus be characterised as authoritarian? Which actors were in charge, and how was political power exercised? Considering the widely acknowledged definition of authoritarianism by the prominent political scientist Juan Linz, we need to conclude that the post-civil war regime does not fully fit into his conception. According to Linz, authoritarian regimes are “political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.”<sup>436</sup> Let us have a look at the problem in some detail.

First of all, in the Greek case, political pluralism was not principally limited; despite the fact that the KKE had been outlawed since 1947, the party system remained intact during the civil war and the first post-civil war years, reduced to the Right and the Centre, both of which were disunited and unable to form a stable government. With the emergence of the ES and the EDA in 1951 and with the later formation of the EK in 1961, Greece obtained a functioning party system. Despite the privileged position of the Right and indisputable discrimination against the opposition, the EDA was able to operate and, what is more, vocalise its critique of the political establishment.<sup>437</sup> In 1958, it managed to become the second strongest party in parliament, winning about one-

---

<sup>434</sup> Tsoukalas, ‘The Ideological Impact of the Civil War’, 328; Kostis Kornetis, “‘Cuban Europe’? Greek and Iberian Tiersmondisme in the “Long 1960s””, *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (July 2015): 487, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009414556663>.

<sup>435</sup> Nikos C. Alivizatos, „The ‘Emergency Regime’ and Civil Liberties, 1946-1949“, in J. O. Iatrides (ed.), *Greece in the 1940's. A Nation in Crisis*. Hanover, London: University Press of New England, 1981, 220.

<sup>436</sup> Juan Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 159. Originally published in 1964, p. 225.

<sup>437</sup> See Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 183.

fourth of the vote. As the leading party of the centrist opposition, the EK even took over power between 1963 and 1965, gaining 42 per cent of the vote in the 1963 elections and 52.7 per cent in the 1964 elections.<sup>438</sup>

Going back to the definition of authoritarianism, Linz – inspired by the writings of the German sociologist Theodor Geiger – introduced the term “authoritarian mentality” as opposed to the “totalitarian ideology.” The notion of mentality is defined here as “a way of thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational, that provide[s] noncodified ways of reacting to different situations”; a mentality tends to be shallower and less developed than an ideology, and it is less binding and more difficult to diffuse among people in practice.<sup>439</sup> Undoubtedly, the post-civil war regime had a clearly anti-communist and nationalist orientation and put a great emphasis on the conservative values of the Orthodoxy, the fatherland and the family. Together with this, the concept of national mindedness (*ethnikofrosyni*) provided citizens with a more or less consistent ideological basis to follow. A true, universalistic ideology of the regime was nevertheless missing.<sup>440</sup> Lialiouti commented on the function of *ethnikofrosyni* as follows:

Despite its philosophical grounding and apart from its appeal to the political and cultural elites, national-mindedness had a mass appeal as well and expressed a powerful grass-roots anti-communism that nurtured the myth of a communist/Slavic conspiracy against Greece based on the double construction of the enemy [external and internal/national and ideological].<sup>441</sup>

If we admit that the concept of *ethnikofrosyni* bore some elements of an authoritarian mentality, then we should pay attention to another remark by Linz. He notices that while ideologies, by their very nature, tend to be utopian (that is, future-oriented), the mentalities are usually attached to the past or the present.<sup>442</sup> It is true that the post-civil war regime was clearly deriving its legitimacy from the past victory in the civil war. The civil war trauma, the hostile attitude of the right-wing regime towards the

---

<sup>438</sup> For more see Pappas, ‘The Transformation of the Greek Party System Since 1951’, 92; Lyrantzis, ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece’, 100; Seferiades, ‘Polarization and Nonproportionality’, 74–75.

<sup>439</sup> Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, 162–64.

<sup>440</sup> Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 9–11; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 35–36.

<sup>441</sup> Lialiouti, ‘Contesting the Anti-Totalitarian Consensus’, 108–9. See also Papadimitriou, *Apo ton lao ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon [From the Law-Abiding People to the Nation of the Nationally Minded]*, 178–87.

<sup>442</sup> Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, 162–64.

defeated Left and the permanent (real or feigned) concern of the conservative political and military elites over possible political instability and the re-emergence of the Left were pervasive features of everyday politics of the time. On the other hand, the regime did not react with any effective political mobilisation, nor with a complete depoliticisation of society as happened during the junta. The regime was rather trying to enforce the loyalty of the population, both through intimidation and the distribution of economic benefits. If Linz thus claims that “the authoritarian regimes that emerge after a period of competitive democratic participation that created an unsolvable conflict in the society opt for depoliticization and apathy, which is felt by many citizens as a relief from the tensions of the previous period,”<sup>443</sup> then it is possible to suggest that – despite the unsolvable conflict taking place in Greek society – the right-wing regime could not really be authoritarian.

As much as Greek politics have traditionally been strongly personalised and the preference for charismatic leaders evident, it would be misleading to claim that political power in post-civil war Greece was concentrated in the hands of a single leader, nor even a small group of elites. According to the 1952 Constitution, political power was distributed between the government, parliament, and the king. As I illustrated above and in the previous chapter, the government, the king and even parliament, through their complicity, were often acting in breach of the constitution. The Greek legal system allowed for the parallel coexistence of the constitution and unconstitutional exceptional measures from the time of the civil war, known as the “para-constitution.” Moreover, the executive relied on the extensive use of legislative decrees approved by the government without a vote from parliament. Such a practice weakened parliament’s role and its capacity to control and prevent irregularities. Also, the Greek political system enabled the factual splitting of political power between constitutional and unconstitutional actors on several occasions, such as the army and US representatives. These facts, however, tell us more about the weaknesses of Greek democracy at the time rather than of its presumably authoritarian character.

When it comes to the issue of political persecution and discrimination, the situation of the Left was undoubtedly grave, and many leftists were subject to harsh punishments or “preventive” measures. Nevertheless, the political and even social

---

<sup>443</sup> Ibid., 167.



conditions were gradually improving; the regime also provided for certain (no matter how morally doubtful) instruments enabling them to avoid social and economic exclusion based on political convictions. Close shows that in comparison with other countries going through a civil war (such as Spain or Yugoslavia), Greece experienced relatively fewer executions of political prisoners and was able to return to a state of normality rather quickly. According to him, there were several main reasons: first being the US insistence on the instalment of a democratic order; second, being that the communists mostly fled the country and, therefore, did not represent a direct obstacle to building an anti-communist state; third being the absence of the brutal persecution of leftists; finally, the relative homogeneity of the population in which communists did not differ from the rest by religion, class or ethnicity.<sup>444</sup> Kalyvas also notices that the repression of political prisoners and discrimination of leftists were gradually reduced. In this respect, he emphasises the role family networks and personal contacts played in how people were integrated into society despite their political profile. Also, Kalyvas claims that the Left was partially rehabilitated in the public sphere due to its cultural importance. He sums the latter idea as follows: “As a result, communism acquired an aura of nobility, transfused with a romanticized sense of pure commitment and unconditional suffering. This is how communist influence came to exceed actual political support for the communist cause.”<sup>445</sup>

After we exclude the option of the post-civil war regime being authoritarian, it is necessary to acknowledge that we cannot speak of a full-fledged democracy nor pluralism. The electoral competition was not fair, and any attempt towards the alteration of power was condemned to failure. It was not possible for the political system to overcome such changes without sinking into a deep political crisis. As Couloumbis argues, the Right was not willing nor able to assume the role of “loyal opposition”; its primary aim was to get rid of any kind of political opposition.<sup>446</sup> The Right attempted to prevent the opposition from assuming power by both legal and illegal means, e.g., electoral engineering, the rigging of elections, anti-communist indoctrination, political discrimination, surveillance and covering up the terrorism of paramilitaries or, if we want, the so-called *parakratos*. The existence of the EDA was tolerated, but the chances

---

<sup>444</sup> Close, ‘The Legacy’, 26–27.

<sup>445</sup> Kalyvas, *Modern Greece*, 97–98.

<sup>446</sup> Couloumbis, ‘Post World War II Greece’, 298; Lyrintzis, ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece’, 101, 103.

of the Left for achieving power were inconceivable. In comparison, the EK represented a real threat to the right-wing regime just because it was able to win elections and thereby endangered the dominance of the Right, including its clientelist network.

Certain authors have thus started applying terms such as guided democracy, restrictive parliamentarism or controlled democracy on the post-civil war regime. For example, Mouzelis employs the term “guided democracy” in order to stress the importance of the political role of both the palace and the army in “setting, in a clearly unconstitutional manner, strict limits to what was and what was not allowed to happen on the level of parliamentary politics.”<sup>447</sup> Close uses the term “controlled democracy” to describe the Greek political landscape as “an interlocking system of power centres” where the government was obliged to share power with other groups of the establishment, such as the palace, the army and US representatives. This system was further characterised by their cooperation “on the basis of mutual confidence” and, at the same time, by their permanent struggle for greater power.<sup>448</sup> The terms “guided democracy” and “restrictive parliamentarism” are used by Lyrintzis, who – apart from the bleak political atmosphere following the civil war, the antagonism of political parties and the exclusion of certain political and social groups – is emphasising the problem of political clientelism. He claims that clientelism – at least on the level of organisation – served the ERE and the EK as the main instrument for mobilising popular support and communicating with the voters.<sup>449</sup>

The concept of “guided democracy” (which emerged in the 1920s in the works of Walter Lippmann<sup>450</sup> and Edward Bernays<sup>451</sup>), the newer concept of “illiberal democracy” (developed by Fareed Zakaria<sup>452</sup>) or even the most recent category of hybrid regimes<sup>453</sup> all deal with such regimes that can either be placed somewhere between democratic and non-democratic regimes or that act as democracies only formally while in their effects can manifest authoritarian tendencies. The political regime of post-civil war Greece fluctuated within these boundaries. This circumstance

---

<sup>447</sup> Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, 105–15; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, ‘Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece’, 3.

<sup>448</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 83, 88.

<sup>449</sup> Lyrintzis, ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece’, 101–3.

<sup>450</sup> Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922).

<sup>451</sup> Edward Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1923).

<sup>452</sup> Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (December 1997): 22–43.

<sup>453</sup> For the case of Greece, see for example Boeschoten, ‘Enemies of the Nation’, 99–100.

was crucial for the evolution and expansion of parallel structures inside Greek public institutions, the legal system and the armed forces, which were later accused of serious misconduct in office and political manipulation. Under the label of *parakratos*, these unofficial power actors were able to develop their activities alongside the official power of state institutions.

The feeble character of Greek democracy constituted an important prerequisite of the *parakratos*. If Greece during this period had been a consolidated democracy, no such phenomenon would have evolved in the country. Additionally, if Greece had been a full-fledged authoritarian regime, then there would not have been any need to cover up certain constitutional and institutional violations and irregularities with the aim of preserving the outer image of democracy. The specificities of the post-civil war regime generated space for the illegal or clandestine activities that were subsequently attributed to the *parakratos*. Moreover, they also created fertile ground for the spread of conspiracism on both sides of the political spectrum. While the Right fostered fears of a potential communist threat, the Left, traumatised by their defeat in the civil war and their subsequent political persecution, produced the image of a powerful “right-wing establishment” whose faces, both the public one as well as the hidden, darker one, act uniformly against the interests of the Left, aiming at its absolute elimination. The Centre, originally disunited and acting in compliance with the parameters of the political regime set by the Right, exploited the left-wing narratives of martyrdom and victimisation within its political campaign in an attempt to take over power in the early 1960s.

## 4. The Post-Civil War *Parakratos* in the Greek Historiography: Historical Reality and Interpretation

In compliance with Koselleck's approach to conceptual history, the ways in which the *parakratos* as a concept has been approached, perceived, understood and constituted in the works of historians, social scientists and political analysts have developed over time. Besides reacting to the evolving political reality, the image of what the *parakratos* represents, what it is composed of and which practical and symbolic meanings it acquires has become subject to generational changes. The first group of authors to ever deal with the issue of the *parakratos* was formed from those who were the first-hand witnesses of the internal political developments in Greece during the 1950s–1960s and became harsh critics of the misconduct and political persecution by the post-civil war regime as well as the junta.<sup>454</sup>

The political convictions of these authors, either purely leftist or essentially liberal, put them in direct opposition to the actions and principles of the “right-wing establishment.” Their accounts mapped the evidence of the regime's serious wrongdoings and served as an intellectually grounded accusation of former political elites. Furthermore, their conclusions constituted a conceptual defence of the newly democratised and Europeanised Greece that emerged after 1974, known as *metapolitefsi*, which contrasted with the previous political order. These authors often represented a view that in Greece after the regime change, there was no room for the persecution and intimidation of political opposition nor for diverting the development of democracy through hidden parallel networks and shadow alliances, as it was typical in the preceding periods.

---

<sup>454</sup> For liberal critique see Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*; Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*. For the left-wing historiographical interpretations see Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*; Konstantinos Tsoukalas, *The Greek Tragedy* (Harmondsworth Penguin Books, 1969); Mouzelis, ‘Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece’; Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*; Andreas Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]* (Chalandri: Proskinio, 2000); Mailis, *To astiko politiko systema stin Ellada apo to 1950 eos to 1967 [The Bourgeois Political System in Greece from 1950 to 1967]*; Georgoulas, *To parakratos stin Ellada [The Parastate in Greece]*; Paraskevopoulos, *Georgios Papandreou [Georgios Papandreou]*.

The critical reflections of the *parakratos* by these authors were, nevertheless, not yet capable of opening a debate on the concept and the overall political system that would lead to the necessary national reconciliation, which could bring the leftist and right-leaning interpretations of the civil war and post-civil war history closer together. This rapprochement reached the political level only in 1989, and just to a limited extent, through the formation of an interim left-right coalition government. Although the short-lived cabinet headed by Tzannis Tzannetakis (July–October 1989) declared its readiness to overcome Greece’s burdened past, the government’s controversial and much-disputed decision to destroy secret police files held on Greek citizens during the post-civil war period left many doubts behind.<sup>455</sup> To a great degree, this move prevented a thorough investigation of the methods used by the post-civil war regime to deal with opposition, including the maintenance of parallel power structures.<sup>456</sup>

The generational changes brought a major shift in the historiography of the civil war and post-civil war history, which thus also impacted the analysis of the *parakratos*. While right-wing narratives prevailed in the Greek public sphere in the first twenty-five years after the civil war’s end, they were edged out by left-leaning perspectives in the post-1974 era, only to reach a greater balance as of the 2000s.<sup>457</sup> The term *parakratos* (or *parastate*, or even the *deep state*) has been strikingly often present in the works of left-leaning and liberal scholars in Greece and was also widely employed in Greek historiography abroad; at the same time, the domestic authors of conservative and right-wing orientations has extensively avoided it. Such an indirect rejection of the term, whether deliberate or unconscious, may be a result of a disagreement with the left-wing historiographical approach as well as a sign of awareness that the term is not reliable enough to be used in academic accounts.

The disputed character of the *parakratos* might stem from the persistence of political radicalism in post-1974 Greece. Although the fall of the junta opened the way for democratic plurality, the political scene remained prone to polarisation rather than

---

<sup>455</sup> For the heated debate on the respective law see the Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament (*Praktika Voulis*), 27 August 1989, 664-669; 30 August 1989, 688-712

<sup>456</sup> See Vangelis D. Karamanolakis, *Anepithymito parelthon: I fakeloi koinonikon fronimaton ston 20o ai. kai i katastrofi tous [The Undesirable Past: The Files of Political Convictions in the 20th Century and their Destruction]* (Athina: Themelio, 2019); Stefanidis, ‘I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]’, 209; Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka [The History of Greece]*, 559.

<sup>457</sup> Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Marantzidis, *Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas*; Demertzis, Paschaloudi, and Antoniou, *Emfylios: Politistiko travma [The Civil War: Cultural Trauma]*.

open to a general reconciliation. The post-junta decades were marked by a rise in violent, at times lethal, far-left and far-right terrorism that Greek authorities largely failed to suppress and which recorded a new upswing during the post-2009 Greek crisis.<sup>458</sup> Besides these dynamics, the political discourse in the country has been strongly influenced by a culture of populism and conspiracism,<sup>459</sup> which skews the understanding of both present and past political realities. The image of the *parakratos* as a shadow conspiracy of clandestine, powerful actors who are affecting major political events from behind the scenes fits into the atmosphere of mistrust and division; more specifically, it corresponds with the significant tendency to interpret political realities in a conspiratorial manner. As shown in this chapter, such an approach to the *parakratos* has been reflected in scholarly work, both domestic and foreign, and was particularly prominent among left-wing authors.

The continuous usage of the term *parakratos* (and its other variants)<sup>460</sup> as a tool for criticising the post-1974 political developments and even more recent political events does not seem justifiable unless we admit that, over the past decades, Greece has been a malfunctional democracy allowing for the evolution of parallel power and security mechanisms. I argue that a more substantiated approach towards the use of the term would lead to a greater de-ideologisation of how the post-civil war history of Greece is reproduced in scholarly work. All the phenomena that fall under the term in its contemporary usage shall be studied separately from the concept, which itself is the

---

<sup>458</sup> Cf. Georgios Karyotis, ‘Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the “Revolutionary Organization November 17”’, *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 3 (2007): 271–93; Dimitris Psarras, ‘Tyfles Vomves, Aommates Arches [Blind Bombings, Indifferent Authorities]’, *Archeiotalaxio*, no. 15 (2013): 24–28; Psarras, ‘O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]’; Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egeheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’; Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’; George Kassimeris, ‘Greece’s New Generation of Terrorists, Part 2: The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF)’, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35 (2012): 634–49; George Kassimeris, ‘Greece’s Terrorism Problem: A Reassessment’, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39, no. 9 (September 2016): 862–70, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1129820>.

<sup>459</sup> Takis S. Pappas and Paris Aslanidis, ‘Greek Populism: A Political Drama in Five Acts’, in *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession*, ed. Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas, Studies in European Political Science / ECPR (Colchester, United Kingdom: ECPR Press, 2016), 175–92; Athena Skoulariki, ‘Conspiracy Theories Before and After the Greek Crisis: Discursive Patterns and Political Use of the “Enemy” Theme’, *Epistimi Kai Koinonia* 37 (2018): 73–108; Giorgos Katsambekis, ‘The Populist Radical Left in Greece: Syriza in Opposition and in Power’, in *The Populist Radical Left in Europe*, ed. Giorgos Katsambekis and Alexandros Kioupkiolis (London; New York: Routledge, 2019), 21–46.

<sup>460</sup> Cf. Christopoulos, *To ‘vathy kratos’ sti simerini Ellada [The ‘Deep State’ in Today’s Greece]*; Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egeheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’.

product of political conflicts and ideological campaigns, and therefore should be academically treated in this manner.

Within this chapter, I compare diverse scholarly approaches towards the *parakratos*. First, I inquire into its presumed roots, which various authors tracked to different periods, starting from the Balkan Wars and continuing until the civil war. By doing so, I illustrate that there is a lack of consensus on the origins of the phenomenon. Subsequently, I investigate the considerations of these authors about who were the agents of the *parakratos*, what was the relation of the *parakratos* towards the state and its purpose. Overall, the analysis shows that the resulting image of the *parakratos* is heterogeneous and can barely be characterised using a single definition. Thus, the question arises of whether the concept's usage up to now has been grounded solely on historical facts or also driven by specific ideological assumptions, which increasingly became mainstream. Despite the disparity of scholarly approaches, this chapter strives to shed light on the meanings of the *parakratos* at different stages of Greece's historical development.

#### **4.1 The Interwar Roots of the *Parakratos***

A vast majority of scholars dealing with the topic of the *parakratos* set its roots in the civil war period and its aftermath, connecting it to a wide range of phenomena, including but not limited to far-right paramilitarism, secret military organisations and extensive anti-communist conspiracies pertaining to various levels of state administration and the public sphere.<sup>461</sup> Others tracked the origins of the *parakratos* in the expansion and increasing importance of anti-communist militant bands in the early and preliminary stages of the civil war, be it during the Axis occupation, the *dekemvriana* or the “white terror.”<sup>462</sup> In some rare cases, authors were tracking the elements of the *parakratos* back to the interwar period, even to the times of the Balkan Wars, the National Schism and the Asia Minor Catastrophe, thus succeeding to

---

<sup>461</sup> As an example see, John O. Iatrides, ‘Civil War, 1945-1949. National and International Aspects’, in *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis*, ed. John O. Iatrides (Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981); Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 37–39; Doumanis, *A History of Greece*; Xenakis, ‘A New Dawn?'; Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”

<sup>462</sup> Cf. Richter, ‘The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War’, 175; Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West*, 44.

investigate the impact of these events on the upsurge of paramilitarism and its subsequent institutionalisation in the politically unstable Greek state.<sup>463</sup>

The latter approach has been particularly developed by Spyros Tsoutsoumpis, who identified the origins of the *parakratos* (or, in his wording, the *deep state*) in the process “of post-imperial state building that was initiated during the Balkan Wars.”<sup>464</sup> He argues that back then, in some peripheral regions, such as Epirus, a close clientelist relationship evolved between politicians and paramilitaries. Paramilitary leaders, among them militant nationalists and even criminals, often acted as mediators between state power and the local populations. Protected by their political patrons and enjoying practical impunity, the paramilitaries were assigned tasks that could not have been fulfilled by the state, officially or legally. Thus, some paramilitary groups continued to benefit from their criminal activities, such as blackmailing, extortion or kidnapping, while being involved in politically motivated and unlawful wrongdoing, such as electoral fraud.<sup>465</sup>

Amidst the National Schism, various paramilitary organisations of both royalist and Venizelist orientations emerged. The royalist paramilitary organisation of “reservists” (*Epistratoi*) that, for instance, prominently features in historical works of Giorgos Mavrogordatos and Despina Papadimitriou, represents a prime example. Composed of army veterans and reservists, it was established in June 1916 as a reaction to the intervention of the Entente in Greece and the demobilisation of the Greek army.<sup>466</sup> Numerous armed groups emerged and operated across the country, in Epirus and some other regions of Greece; they also cooperated with local bandits. Soon the *Epistratoi* united within the Panhellenic Association of Reservists (*Panellinos Syndesmos Efedron*, PSE) and became the unofficial military instrument of power in the hands of royalist politicians and officers affiliated with the palace, first and foremost

---

<sup>463</sup> Mavrogordatos, *Ethnikos dichasmos kai maziki organosi. Oi Epistratoi tou 1916 [National Schism and Mass Organisation. The 1916 Reservists]*; Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’; Boeschoten, ‘Enemies of the Nation’, 101; Gianouloupoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’; Tsoutsoumpis, “‘Political Bandits’”.

<sup>464</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, “‘Political Bandits’”, 37–64. See also Tsoutsoumpis, ‘Land of the Kapedani’.

<sup>465</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, “‘Political Bandits’”, 40–45. More on paramilitarism in the post-First World War Balkans see John Paul Newman, ‘Paramilitärische Gewalt auf dem Balkan. Ursprünge und Vermächtnisse [Paramilitary Violence in the Balkans. Origins and Legacies]’, in *Krieg im Frieden. Paramilitärische Gewalt in Europa nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013), 226–49.

<sup>466</sup> Dordanas, ‘To trikyklo, ena “atychima” kai i adekasti dikaiosyni [The Tricycle Truck, One “Accident” and the Incorruptible Justice]’, 41–42.



with the later dictator Ioannis Metaxas.<sup>467</sup> Besides their support for the monarchic constitution, the *Epistratoi* were influenced by the emerging fascist movement. They opposed the foreign political orientation of Prime Minister Venizelos that favoured the Entente and contradicted his aim to drag Greece into the war against the Central Powers. The *Epistratoi* launched terror against Venizelists, liberal militias and even the Entente representatives and officers.<sup>468</sup> The violence peaked during the so-called *noemvriana* in November 1916 and lasted until the resignation of King Konstantinos I. in June 1917. Yet, the PSE had already been disbanded in January 1917 after a request was made by the Entente the month before.<sup>469</sup>

The Greek defeat in Asia Minor, as for example, Spyros Tsoutsoumpis or Dimitris Livanios show, served as another incentive for the upsurge in paramilitarism. Alongside military counterintelligence, the right-wing paramilitaries played a significant role in the combat against “foreign subversion and propaganda”: they targeted the Slav Macedonian and Muslim populations as well as communist sympathisers with the aim to “nationalise” the borderlands.<sup>470</sup> Northern Greece, especially the recently annexed regions of Macedonia and Thrace, was particularly socially vulnerable: the already nationally, linguistically and religiously heterogeneous population was further mixed with Asia Minor refugees. The borderland areas were susceptible to political and economic instability, confronted with the emerging communist movement and exposed to tense Greek nationalism. Local Slav Macedonian and Muslim minorities were challenged with state policies of forcible Hellenisation, property expropriation, resettlement, foreign exile or emigration based on population exchanges with Turkey and Bulgaria.<sup>471</sup> According to Gianouloupoulos, such socio-

---

<sup>467</sup> Kousouris, ‘O fasismos stin Ellada [Fascism in Greece]’, 38–41; Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’, 12–14. See also Giannis Kordatos, *Megali Istoría tis Elladas (1900-1924) [Great History of Greece (1900-1924)]*, vol. 13 (Athina: Ekdoseis Eikostos Aionas, 1955), 462.

<sup>468</sup> Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodechia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’, 31–32. For a detailed analysis see Mavrogordatos, *Ethnikos dichasmos kai maziki organosi. Oi Epistratoi tou 1916 [National Schism and Mass Organisation. The 1916 Reservists]*.

<sup>469</sup> Papadimitriou, ‘Oi Epistratoi sta chronia tou protou poleμου [Epistratoi during the First World War]’, 15.

<sup>470</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, “Political Bandits”, 46–48. On the issue of homogenisation and ethnic cleansing see Ulf Brunnbauer, ‘The Perception of Muslims in Bulgaria and Greece: Between the “Self” and the “Other”’, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 21, no. 1 (April 2001): 41–42.

<sup>471</sup> For more, see Dimitris Livanios, “Conquering the Souls”: Nationalism and Greek Guerilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904-1908’, *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 23 (1999): 195–221; Renee Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between*

political settings served as a prerequisite for the emergence of *parastate* organisations, among which he also counted the far-right, anti-communist and anti-Semitic National Union of Greece (*Ethniki Enosis Ellas*, known as EEE).<sup>472</sup> Founded in Thessaloniki in 1927, the EEE was largely responsible for the 1931 anti-Jewish pogrom in the Campbell neighbourhood, which was stirred up in complicity with the nationalist newspaper *Makedonia*.<sup>473</sup>

Besides emerging fascist-inspired organisations, the *parakratos* of the interwar period would also be understood as paramilitaries affiliated with local politicians, as illustrated by Giannis Gianoulopoulos, Dimitris Kousouris and others. These groups were mainly monarchist but also included Venizelist ones. They were largely dominated by former army officers and occasionally fulfilled the role of private armies. For instance, Georgios Kondylis, as Minister of the Army (March–July 1924), established paramilitary organisations composed of nationalist republicans of working-class origins, among them the Hunters' Battalions (*Tagmata Kynigon*). Their units aimed at the suppression of communist influences in the labour movement, once again with a focus on Northern Greece.<sup>474</sup> In 1924, provocations of *parastate* organisations contributed to the outburst of violence between labour associations and nationalists in Kavala and Drama, providing the state with a pretext for blaming the workers instead and proceeding towards harsher persecution of the Left.<sup>475</sup> Under the Pangalos dictatorship (1925–1926), the terror of paramilitaries, united with the Democratic Battalions (*Dimokratika Tagmata*), expanded into the countryside, targeting opponents of the regime among local peasants.<sup>476</sup> The widespread violence during the 1928 elections prompted the state towards stricter supervision over paramilitaries, aiming at the political deradicalisation of the Greek society. Nevertheless, such groups continued to be deployed for special operations in the borderlands, be it during the Greco-Italian War

---

*Greece and Turkey* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003); Carabott, 'Aspects of the Hellenization of Greek Macedonia, ca. 1912-ca. 1959'.

<sup>472</sup> Gianoulopoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]', 144–49. The issue is also discussed by Gounaris; yet, without referring to the term *parakratos*. Gounaris, *Egnosmenon Koinonikon Fronimaton [Incontestable Political Convictions]*, 45–48.

<sup>473</sup> ELIA, Archive of Dimitrios Sfaellos (118, 366, 506), f. 2.1 (*Organotika*); see also Králová, *Das Vermächtnis der Besatzung [The Legacy of Occupation]*, 62.

<sup>474</sup> Gianoulopoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]', 144.

<sup>475</sup> Dordanas, 'Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]', 31–32.

<sup>476</sup> Kousouris, 'O fasismos stin Ellada [Fascism in Greece]', 44.

(1940/1941), as part of the anti-communist resistance under the Axis occupation, during the civil war or beyond these conflicts.<sup>477</sup>

As indicated by Romaios, for example, the complicity between politicians, representatives of state security organs and paramilitaries, which was often emphasised in the case of the post-civil war *parakratos*, was present already in the interwar period. It was prominently demonstrated by the second assassination attempt against Eleftherios Venizelos in June 1933. Surviving the first attempt carried out by two Greek monarchists in Paris in July 1920,<sup>478</sup> the life of Venizelos was once again threatened three months after the 1933 legislative election. The voting results confirmed the ongoing dominance of the People's Party (opposing Venizelos), already manifested in the previous legislative election of September 1932. The electoral outcome triggered an unsuccessful pro-Venizelist coup, aiming to prevent the formation of the anti-Venizelist government of Panagis Tsaldaris.<sup>479</sup>

Amidst an escalated anti-Venizelist campaign, a car with Venizelos and his wife came under heavy fire from unknown attackers. They chased the politician across several Athenian neighbourhoods and eventually killed a member of his police escort, who was seated in the car accompanying the Venizelos; Venizelos' wife and his driver were also injured.<sup>480</sup> Despite political interventions, the subsequent investigation resulted in the arrest of the Chief of the General Security of Athens Ioannis Polychronopoulos, his brother Nikolaos, a merchant who acted as an arms provider and a driver of the attackers' car; two policemen and a bandit known as Karathanasis, who was later pardoned, were further implicated. Two politicians of the People's Party were suspected of being "morally responsible" for the attack, yet both of them were protected by political immunity: first was the Interior Minister Ioannis Rallis, known especially as Greece's Second World War collaborationist prime minister, and second was the party's

---

<sup>477</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, "Political Bandits", 48–54.

<sup>478</sup> The assassination attempt against Venizelos took place amidst an ongoing dispute between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists. The day after the attack, Ion Dragoumis, a leading critic of Venizelos, was assassinated in Athens by members of the Venizelist Democratic Security Battalions (*Dimokratika Tagmata Asfaleias*). Dragoumis, a diplomat and representative of romantic nationalism, stood against Venizelos not because of his pro-Entente orientation but due to Dragoumis' disapproval with the division of the country during the National Schism. Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Modern Greece*, 86.

<sup>479</sup> Gallant, *Modern Greece*, 216.

<sup>480</sup> Giorgos Romaios, 'Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]', in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzytisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 22–23.

deputy Petros Mavromichalis.<sup>481</sup> As shown below, the latter was involved in the organisation of the far-right *parastate* in the post-liberation period. In 1935, a trial with 18 suspects was launched, only to be interrupted by another unsuccessful Venizelist coup; the ensuing result was the widespread persecution of Venizelists and political purges from the state sector. The suppression of Venizelist and communist opponents by royalists further increased during the Metaxas dictatorship.

## 4.2 The *Parakratos* of Wartime Collaborators

Proceeding now towards the Second World War period and the Axis invasion of Greece (1941), another group of authors, among them Stratos Dordanas, Giannis Tzannetakos, Mogens Pelt and Heinz Richter, linked the emergence of *parakratos* with the phenomenon of wartime collaboration with the occupation authorities.<sup>482</sup> Richter assumes that the *parakratos* emerged from the Second World War's anti-communist resistance organisations, some of which were in contact with the occupying authorities or cooperating with collaborationist Security Battalions, such as the "X" (Chi) of Colonel Georgios Grivas, established in 1941. In combination with ultra-conservative secret organisations within the exiled Greek army, these far-right groups, as Richter claims, gradually evolved into "an independent power apparatus of the extreme right which successfully competed with the authority of the state"; they subsequently "controlled large parts of the state" at the end of 1945 (in reference to the "white terror") because the state was "no longer controlled by its constitutional authorities."<sup>483</sup> For Tzannetakos, the turning point in the evolution of the parallel power mechanism was specifically the 1943 establishment of the Security Battalions, which stimulated the emergence of various anti-communist groups that possessed the characteristics of the *parakratos*.<sup>484</sup>

---

<sup>481</sup> "I defteri apo peira dolofonias kata tou Eleftheriou Venizelou [The Second Assassination Attempt against Eleftherios Venizelos]," Sansimera.gr, <https://www.sansimera.gr/articles/149> (accessed 24 August 2020).

<sup>482</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*; Richter, 'The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War', 175; Tzannetakos, 'Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]', 129; Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West*, 44.

<sup>483</sup> Richter, 'The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War', 173, 175.

<sup>484</sup> Tzannetakos, 'Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]', 129.

During 1943 and 1944, a wide range of anti-communist collaborationist units was active under the control of the occupying German authorities. The aim of these groups, which were – as Kostopoulos shows – often collectively called Security Battalions, was to paralyse the EAM/ELAS without risking the lives of German soldiers.<sup>485</sup> In Central Greece and Peloponnesus, more hierarchical, militarised and ideologically defined (anti-communist) collaborationist organisations were active, such as those uniformed as the traditional Evzones or the actual Security Battalions (founded in June and September 1943, respectively).<sup>486</sup> In nationally heterogeneous Northern Greece, as Tsoutsoumpis indicates, voluntary and semi-autonomous nationalist groups prevailed, motivated by the need of local ethnic communities like the Slav Macedonians, the Vlachs, the Turkophone Pontic Greeks and the Muslim Albanians to protect themselves against the actions of communist guerrillas.<sup>487</sup> Armed and equipped by Wehrmacht and the Greek occupation authorities, the collaborationist organisations of wartime Greece were, according to Kalyvas, joined by approximately 25,000 to 30,000 men.<sup>488</sup>

While the anti-communist (and anti-EAM/ELAS) spirit was characteristic for most collaborationist organisations, only a few groups acted out of genuine sympathies for Nazi Germany and the ideology of national socialism. For instance, in 1941, the EEE was restored under the leadership of Colonel Georgios Poulos, an anti-Semite and an enthusiastic supporter of Nazism. Shortly afterwards, the activities of the EEE were outwardly suppressed by the occupying authorities, which did not wish to provoke defiance from the Greek public by the aggressive style of Poulos and his followers. Instead, in 1943, Poulos set up the paramilitary Poulos Band, which in about a year counted approximately eight hundred men. Its units composed of one hundred men each (*Ekatondarchi*) operating in Thessaloniki and the surrounding areas. They acted with

---

<sup>485</sup> Tasos Kostopoulos, *I autologokrimeri mnimi. Ta Tagmata Asphaleias kai i metapolemiki ethnikophrosyni [The Self-Censored Memory: The Security Battalions and the Post-War National-mindedness]*, *Morphes koinonikis kritikis* 5 (Athina: Philistor, 2005), 15–26.

<sup>486</sup> Unlike Kostopoulos, Dimitrakis claims that the first four Security Battalions of Evzones assembled already in April, while the actual Security Battalions were operational since November that year. See Panagiotis Dimitrakis, *Oi germanikes mystikes yporiesies stin Ellada tou Mesopolemou kai tis Katochis (1937-1945) [The German Secret Services in Interwar Greece (1937-1945)]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Enalios, 2009), 107.

<sup>487</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, *A History of the Greek Resistance*, 221–23.

<sup>488</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, ‘Armed Collaboration in Greece, 1941–1944’, *European Review of History: Revue Europeenne d’histoire* 15, no. 2 (2008): 131–32, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507480801931051>.

unusual cruelty and showed full loyalty to the occupiers.<sup>489</sup> The Turkophone Pontic paramilitaries in Macedonia, united within an organisation called the National Greek Army (*Ethnikos Ellinikos Stratos*, EES) under the leadership of Michail Papadopoulos (Michalagas), Kyriakos Papadopoulos (Kitsa Batzak) and Konstantinos Papadopoulos, also veered towards an openly pro-German orientation, motivated by their resistance against Bulgarian expansionism among other influences.<sup>490</sup>

If not for inclinations towards Nazism, the reasons to become a member of a collaboration group were diverse, ranging from anti-communist ideological preferences, specific political aims as well as nationalist or patriotic sentiments, various strategies of survival, satisfying one's personal and economic needs or acts of personal vengeance.<sup>491</sup> Last but not least, collaboration units were joined by criminals, such as in the case of Antonios Dangoulas, nicknamed as the Dragon of Thessaloniki, who headed the National Greek Security of Thessaloniki (*Ethniki Elliniki Asfaleia Poleos Thessalonikis*); with his approximately one hundred men, he was responsible for numerous murders and the execution of civilians in 1944, only a few months before the end of the city's occupation by the German troops.<sup>492</sup>

---

<sup>489</sup> Dimitrakis, *Oi Germanikes Mystikes Ypiresies [The German Secret Services]*, 108–9; Králová, *Das Vermächtnis der Besatzung [The Legacy of Occupation]*, 40.

<sup>490</sup> Giannis Koliopoulos, *Plundered Loyalties: Axis Occupation and Civil Strife in Greek West Macedonia, 1941-1949* (London: C. Hurst, 1999), 80–81; Kostopoulos, *I autologokrimeri mnimi [The self-censored memory]*, 23–24. For a detailed analysis, see Nikos Marantzidis, *Giasasin millet. Zito to ethnos. Prosfygia, katochi kai emfylios [Long Live the Nation. Refugeesom, Occupation and Civil War]* (Irakleio: Panepisthimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2001); Kalogrias, 'Enoples omades anexartiton oplarchigon kai ethnikiston axiomatikon stin periochi metaxy Strymona kai Axiou (1941-1944) [The Armed Groups of Independent Chieftains and Nationalist Officers in the Area Between the Strymonas and the Axios Rivers (1941-1944)]'; Stratos Dordanas, 'Antikomounistes oplarchigoi sti germanokratoumeni Kentriki Makedonia [Anti-Communist Chieftains in German-Occupied Central Macedonia]', in *Oi alloi Kapetanioi: antikomounistes enoploi sta chronia tis Katochis kai tou Emfyliou [The Other Captains: Anti-Communist Gunmen During the Occupation and the Civil War]*, ed. Nikos Marantzidis (Athina: Estia, 2005), 63–126. For collaborationism of the local Slavophone population with Bulgarian authorities, see Tasos Hatzianastasiou, 'Dosilogo i apeleftheromenos plithysmos? Slavofono i synergates ton voulgarikon archon katochis sti voulgarokratoumeni Anatoliki Makedonia kai Thraki [Collaborators or Liberated Population? Slavophone Helpers of the Bulgarian Authorities in the Bulgarian-Occupied Eastern Macedonia and Thrace]', in *'Echthros' endos ton Teichon: Opseis tou Dosiologismou stin Elladas tis Katochis [The 'Enemy' Inside the Walls: The Perspectives of Collaborationism in Occupied Greece]*, ed. Iakovos Michailidis, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, and Hagen Fleischer (Athina: Ellinika Grammata, 2006), 271–89.

<sup>491</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, *A History of the Greek Resistance*, 221–23.

<sup>492</sup> See especially, Dordanas, *Ellines enantion Ellinon [Greeks against Greeks]*, 288–345; Andreas Venianakis, *Dangoulas, o 'drakos' tis Thessalonikis: symvoli stin istoria ton Tagmaton Asfaleias epi Katochis (1941-1944) [Dangoulas, the 'Dragon' of Thessaloniki: A Contribution to the History of Security Battalions during Occupation (1941-1944)]* (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2016).

### 4.3 The *Parakratos* in the Post-War Power Vacuum

Soon after its liberation, Greece plunged into renewed violence during the *dekemvriana* as well as the “red” and the “white terror.” Concerning right-wing aggressions, Kalyvas distinguishes between a period of *parastate* violence (1945–1947) by paramilitary organisations as opposed to a period of *state* violence (1947–1949) carried out in a more impersonal and bureaucratic manner by courts-martial.<sup>493</sup> In the early stages of *parastate* violence, the above-mentioned X-ites of Colonel Grivas played a significant role in the “battle of Athens” against the EAM/ELAS, alongside the British, Greek royalist armed forces and other paramilitaries. They were thus perceived by some scholars, besides Kalyvas, for example, by Papadimitriou, Katsoudas or Richter, as the *parakratos* of the period.

Based in the neighbourhood of Thiseio, close to the Acropolis, the “X” organisation emerged during the last year of the occupation to challenge the influence of the left-wing resistance in the wider region of southern and western Greece. For that reason, Grivas maintained close ties with the Security Battalions and other groups of collaborators, offering services to Wehrmacht.<sup>494</sup> In the post-war period, the X-ites established their reputation on their armed engagement in the *dekemvriana*, presenting themselves as a major anti-communist paramilitary force active in the area.<sup>495</sup> Gradually, the organisation developed a separate political branch, the National Party of X-ites (*Ethniko Komma Chiton*). Nevertheless, in the 1946 legislative elections, the party received fewer than 2,000 votes, less than the size of its membership.<sup>496</sup> In contrast, its paramilitary structures grew as a result of the post-Varkiza developments. Richter highlights that according to the estimates of British intelligence, the military

---

<sup>493</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, ‘Morfes, diastaseis kai praktikes tis vias ston Emfylio (1943-1949): Mia proti prosengisi [Forms, Dimensions and Practices of Violence in the Civil War (1943-1949): A Preliminary Approach]’, in *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949) [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)]*, ed. Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos, and Grigoris Psallidas (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2002), 203–5.

<sup>494</sup> Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War*, 109–10.

<sup>495</sup> For the ideological background of the “X” see for example Despina Papadimitriou, ‘To akrodeixio kinima stin Ellada, 1936-1949 - Katavoles, synecheies kai asynecheies [Far-Right Movement in Greece, 1936-1949 - Offsets, Continuities and Discontinuities]’, in *I Ellada '36-'49. Apo ti diktatoria ston Emfylio [Greece 1936-1949. From Dictatorship to Civil War]*, ed. Hagen Fleischer (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2003), 143–46.

<sup>496</sup> Kostas Katsoudas, ‘Ethnikistes kai Ethnikofrones. Merikes paratiriseis gia tin akra dexia sti dekaetia tou '40 [Nationalists and Nationally-Minded. Some Remarks on the Far-Right in the 1940s]’, *Archeiotaxio* 16 (November 14): 27.

branch counted 50,000 men in March 1946, half of which was armed.<sup>497</sup> This corresponds with the view of Tsoutsoumpis, who found the number striking if compared to occupation times when “X” only had less than two hundred members.<sup>498</sup>

Besides the X-ites, hundreds of paramilitary organisations with lower membership operated across Greece during this critical period. In this sense, Tsoutsoumpis distinguishes between “vanguard organisations” such as the “X,” which were urban-based, centralised and with a political program, and “parochial groups,” which were locally-based with an undetermined internal structure and whose violence was more personal, closely intertwined with the local environment and social interactions.<sup>499</sup> As Close, Marantzidis or Kalyvas show, some of the urban-based bands operated under eloquent, exalted names with a clearly nationalist appeal,<sup>500</sup> while the regional ones usually bore the names of their leaders.<sup>501</sup>

The more powerful organisations became professionalised and were able to control large territories in the provinces; some of them operated as criminal organisations involved in murders, torture, blackmailing, and targeting the facilities of the EAM/ELAS. Parallel to these, in towns and villages in the rural areas of Epirus, Thessaly, southern Peloponnesus and western Macedonia, groups of right-wing vigilantes motivated by economic interests, a quest for revenge or simply security concerns spontaneously emerged.<sup>502</sup> Yet, according to Kalyvas, the violence carried out by local paramilitaries was often more brutal and emotionally charged, producing more victims in comparison to the actions of regional organisations; since victims and their

---

<sup>497</sup> Richter, *British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War. February 1945 to August 1946*, 378.

<sup>498</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, ‘Paramilitarism, Politics and Organized Crime’, 269.

<sup>499</sup> *Ibid.*, 267–69.

<sup>500</sup> For example, the Patriotic Organisation of National Regeneration seated in Thessaloniki, the League of Nationalist Youth in Veroia or the Union of Royalist Nationalist Youth and the Battalion of King George II in Trikala. See Close, ‘The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950’, 132–33.

<sup>501</sup> For example, the band of Sourlas in Thessaly, the band of Paulakos in Laconia, the band of Manganas in Messenia and Argolida, the band of Katsareas in Kalamata, the band of Vourlakis in Lamia, the bands of Kaliodimitris and Baloumbas in Epirus, the bands of Vangelis and Kappas in Kavala or the band of Tsaous Anton (Antonis Fosteridis) in Drama. See Marantzidis, ‘Ethnotikes diastaseis tou Emfyliou Polemou: I periptosi ton tourkofonon pontion kapetanaion tis Makedonias [The Ethnic Dimensions of the Civil War: The Case of the Turkish Speaking Captains of Macedonia]’; Kalyvas, ‘Morfes, diastaseis kai praktikes tis vias ston Emfylio (1943-1949): Mia prota prosengisi [Forms, Dimensions and Practices of Violence in the Civil War (1943-1949): A Preliminary Approach]’, 203–6.

<sup>502</sup> Polymeris Voglis, ‘I koinonia tis ypaithrou sta chronia tou Emfyliou Polemou [The Provincial Society in the Years of the Civil War]’, in *Istoria tis Elladas tou 20ou aiona. Anasyngkrotisi - Emfylios - Palinorthosi 1945-1952*, ed. Christos Hatziosif, vol. D1 (Athina: Vivliorama, 2009), 347; Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, 159–60.



attackers knew each other, the attacks resulted less from political motives and mainly from personal grievances.<sup>503</sup>

There were multiple reasons why one's participation in these anti-communist organisations could be attractive. Many of such bands were already active during the war and fought the EAM/ELAS alongside the occupying authorities. Thus, as explained by Voglis, their direct engagement in instigating post-war *parastate* violence within the state's tolerance was a matter of their personal survival. In this way, their members could avoid persecution as war criminals and collaborators.<sup>504</sup> Besides their frequent criminal or collaborationist past, paramilitaries often emerged from the lower and precarious social strata. Their involvement in the activities of local bands could thus help them preserve their position in the ever-changing political conditions. The paramilitaries were usually well integrated within the prevalent system of clientelism and patronage. They influenced local administration and sometimes took part in the committees of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which distributed material aid to the Greek population impoverished by war. Due to their personal links to local politicians, gendarmerie and the National Guard (*Ethnofylaki*), paramilitaries had access to weapons, mostly confiscated from the ELAS following its partial demobilisation, or were provided with other necessities, such as false identity documents.<sup>505</sup>

Concerning the regime in Athens, the “white terror” of the anti-communist paramilitaries, royalist or nationalist irregular bands and local armed thugs had been widely tolerated and even encouraged. Shortly after liberation, the Greek government enjoyed little public support and could not fully rely on the armed forces, which were still under construction. At the time of the Varkiza agreement, the Greek army was composed of only about 8,800 men, organised within the Sacred Band and the LOK; these troops formed the core of the future army, and it quickly grew into 75,000 men by

---

<sup>503</sup> Kalyvas, ‘Morfes, diastaseis kai praktikes tis vias ston Emfylio (1943-1949): Mia proti prosengisi [Forms, Dimensions and Practices of Violence in the Civil War (1943-1949): A Preliminary Approach]’, 205–6. See also Riki van Boeschoten, *Anapoda chronia: syllogiki mnimi kai istoria sto Ziaka Grebenon (1900-1950) [Disarrayed Years: The Collective Memory and History in Ziaka of Grevena Region]* (Athina: Plethron, 1997), 144–54.

<sup>504</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 56.

<sup>505</sup> See Kaloudis, *Modern Greece*, 50–51; George Th. Mavrogordatos, ‘The 1946 Election and Plebiscite. Prelude to Civil War’, in *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis*, ed. John O. Iatrides (Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981), 182; Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, 160–66; Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’, 46–48.

the end of 1945.<sup>506</sup> Initially, the governmental authority could have been regionally enforced solely by the gendarmerie and the newly emerged, undisciplined and poorly trained National Guard. In the position of unofficial anti-communist forces, the paramilitaries replaced part of the missing state structures. By instigating terror against the EAM/ELAS, they provided the government with an instrument to curb the influence of left-wing resistance and to take over administrative functions from the EAM in certain regions at the end of the Axis occupation.<sup>507</sup> Tsoutsoumpis summarises the role of paramilitaries in this period as follows:

Conservative elites were therefore prompted to forge an unofficial, subrosa alliance with irregular non-state armed actors in the form of bandit gangs, criminal organizations, and paramilitary crews. The pacts between the government and such actors allowed the conservative faction to act against the left with relative impunity, while retaining plausible deniability in the face of mounting international pressures.<sup>508</sup>

The individual components of this anti-communist “shadow state” – paramilitaries, vigilantes and former right-wing resistance fighters – were mutually intertwined through a network of personal and professional ties; in addition, they were oftentimes linked to the representatives of the official security forces. The gendarmerie and the National Guard not only tolerated their activities; in many cases, they even acted as bystanders, accomplices or arm suppliers.<sup>509</sup> The so-called Kalamata incident of January 1946 can serve as an example: during an upsurge of right-wing violence following the appointment of the liberal Sofoulis government in November 1945 and the adoption of the amnesty for many leftist political prisoners a few weeks later, the “white terror” provoked retaliatory actions by leftist outlaws.<sup>510</sup> The Kalamata region was particularly affected by such clashes. The majority of released leftists became subject to violent attacks, which then triggered a chain of acts of vengeance. A local “X” chief Manganas was murdered with his child near the town of Sparta, which led to the opening fire on a

---

<sup>506</sup> Close, ‘The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950’, 130–31.

<sup>507</sup> Voglis, ‘I koinonia tis ypaithrou sta chronia tou Emfyliou Polemou [The Provincial Society in the Years of the Civil War]’, 347; Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, 159–60.

<sup>508</sup> Spyridon Tsoutsoumpis, ‘The Far Right in Greece. Paramilitarism, Organized Crime and the Rise of “Golden Dawn”’, *Südosteuropa* 66, no. 4 (2018): 507.

<sup>509</sup> For more on the role of the gendarmerie and the National Guard in postwar Greece, see Panagiotis A. Kousoulinis, ‘I chorofylaki, i ethnofylaki kai i ethnofroura stin metakatochiki Ellada, 1944-1949 [The Gendarmerie, the National Guard and the Home Guard in Post-Occupation Greece, 1944-1949]’ (PhD Thesis, Thessaloniki, Aristotle University, 2016).

<sup>510</sup> Close and Veremis, ‘The Military Struggle, 1945-9’, 97–100; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 60.

leftist café in Kalamata, resulting in the deaths of two people. In reaction to a mass left-wing protest on 18 January 1946, the “X” members surrounded Kalamata and terrorised the local population, killing nine people, taking 76 hostages and facilitating the release of about thirty right-wingers from the local prison. The actions of the “X” found sympathisers among local gendarmes, who did little to prevent the terror. The subsequent military intervention under Colonel Nikolaos Papadopoulos contributed to the release of hostages, yet the right-wing bandits were neither punished nor disarmed. The disloyal gendarmes were relocated to different positions.<sup>511</sup>

The entanglement of security forces with paramilitaries further increased as the National Guard massively recruited new forces among these nationalist bands. While their members frequently had previous experience with the resistance, former army officers were amply represented among paramilitary leaders. Close underlines that the upsurge of paramilitarism during the “white terror” was largely a result of the administrative and economic collapse in post-war Greece. The nationalist bands took advantage of the accessibility to arms, mostly seized from ELAS caches and sponged on provincial communities, using the struggle against the left-wing outlaws as an excuse for their terror.<sup>512</sup> According to Voglis, in the post-war disorder, the state lacked instruments to suppress the EAM/ELAS and thus made use of paramilitaries, largely motivated by vengeance for the previous “red terror.”<sup>513</sup> This temporary disruption of the state was also reflected by the left-wing newspaper *Rizospastis* which, on 13 July 1945, published an article titled “150 Bandit-Gangs [listosymmories] with 18,000 Armed Monarchists Are the Real State!” It was accompanied by a map of Greece divided by the territorial range of individual paramilitary groups.<sup>514</sup> The *Rizospastis* was naturally interested in the activities of this anti-communist *parastate*. One of its journalists, Kostas Vidalis, was murdered a year later while in the field. In August 1946,

---

<sup>511</sup> Haris Vlavianos, *Greece, 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 155–56; David Brewer, *Greece, the Decade of War: Occupation, Resistance and Civil War* (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 246; Close, ‘The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950’, 130–31; Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 158–59. On the bandit leader Manganas, who headed the attack, see Nasi Balta, “‘Tote me ta Xitika den kotages na peis oute t’onoma sou’: Martyries gia ton Emfylio se ena chorio tis Pylas [Back Then with the X-ites, You Did Not Bother to Even Tell Your Name: Testimonies of the Civil War in a Village in Pylia]’, in *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949) [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)]* (Athina: Themelio, 2002), 176–87.

<sup>512</sup> Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 152–56.

<sup>513</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 56.

<sup>514</sup> “150 listosymmories me 18 chil. enoplous monarchikous einai to pragmatiko kratos! [150 Bandit-Gangs with 18,000 Armed Monarchists Are the Real State],” *Rizospastis* (13 July 1945), 1.

after he set off for Thessaly to investigate the operation of the Sourlas' gang, he was kidnapped by some members of this banditry group and tortured. His body was found close to the village of Melia, a base of Sourlas' followers.<sup>515</sup>

The “white terror,” or as Mavrogordatos puts it, “nationwide complicity and solidarity of bandits, policemen, military, and judiciary,”<sup>516</sup> did not exclusively target Leftists but republicans in general. The violence peaked during the legislative elections in March 1946 and the constitutional referendum in September 1946, which decided the future of the Greek monarchy. Yet, Tsoutsoumpis questions the usual presentation of the “white terror” “as being a period of brutal, premediated violence that was inspired and co-ordinated by reactionary politicians,” claiming that “militia violence was brutal but seldom co-ordinated or lethal.”<sup>517</sup> Due to the extensive savagery, the Left boycotted the elections and the referendum and did not recognise the results. Local nationalist organisations and paramilitaries attempted to disrupt the electoral campaign. They assisted in rigging the process of electoral registration and voting and even produced lists of persons to be arrested in the event of a coup.<sup>518</sup> According to Mavrogordatos, based on the records of the National Sovereignty (*Ethniki Allilengi*), the EAM's welfare organisation, between February 1945 and March 1946, 1,289 people were allegedly murdered, most of them (953 person) by bandits and paramilitaries (further 250 by the National Guard, 82 by the gendarmerie, and four by the British armed forces). Nearly seven thousand were wounded; tens of thousands were arrested; many of them were imprisoned or tortured.<sup>519</sup> In February 1946, *Rizospastis* published similar data, showing 1,192 killed, 6,413 injured, and 159 raped over the past twelve months.<sup>520</sup> Hundreds of EAM's offices and printing shops were subject to mass raids, and the property of political opponents was plundered. Extensive violence was also reported by the UK and US observers from the American Mission to Observe Greek Elections (AMFOGE).<sup>521</sup>

---

<sup>515</sup> Romaios, ‘Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]’, 24–25.

<sup>516</sup> Mavrogordatos, ‘The 1946 Election and Plebiscite’, 185, 377.

<sup>517</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, ‘Paramilitarism, Politics and Organized Crime’, 268.

<sup>518</sup> Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 156.

<sup>519</sup> Mavrogordatos, ‘The 1946 Election and Plebiscite’, 185, 377.

<sup>520</sup> “O aimatiros apologismos enos chronou [The Bloody Score of the Past Year],” *Rizospastis* (12 February 1946), 1.

<sup>521</sup> Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 155–56; Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 55.

#### 4.4 The *Parakratos* in the Civil War

During the civil war, the government in Athens mostly depended on the national army, trained and armed first by the UK and then the US. In a bid to increase its forces, the army continued recruiting among former collaborators with Axis occupation authorities. Their massive integration into the security forces (approximately 12,000 former Security Battalionists were deployed in the National Guard)<sup>522</sup> and, in general, into the state institutional mechanisms provided for their indirect rehabilitation, provoking the further repulsion of the Left, and – as a result of the anti-communist campaign – even granted them a patriotic aura.<sup>523</sup> The main strategic focus of the army lay in the Greek borderlands, whose protection from the domestic communist insurgency as well as from external threats was deemed imperative. In the rest of the country, the gendarmerie, the police and the National Guard were tasked with the maintenance of public order. Yet, the National Guard turned out to be unreliable and even disloyal to the central authorities; therefore, it was to be replaced by a regular army in the future. Meanwhile, the gendarmerie and the police suffered from inefficiency, lack of equipment and great politicisation. In this situation, anti-communist paramilitaries were openly encouraged to assume control over certain rural areas.<sup>524</sup> Possibly because of this, Pelt defined the *parakratos* as “an informal alliance of army officers, National Guards, police, armed thugs and political organisations supported by a vast number of people which had grudges against EAM”; their activities were often “instigated by politicians or army officers in order to avoid direct responsibility for actions against their enemies.”<sup>525</sup> Such cooperation appeared to be beneficial for the paramilitaries as well since the anti-communist networks provided them with contacts and professional opportunities, which they would not have otherwise acquired in these marginalised regions.<sup>526</sup> Their employment against communist guerrillas was also of strategic importance, as Tsoutsoumpis suggests, because while conventional armed forces struggled to combat them, “a shadow army” of paramilitaries was seen as of more use.<sup>527</sup>

---

<sup>522</sup> Veremis and Gerolymatos, ‘The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949’, 113–14.

<sup>523</sup> Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodechia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’, 34–36.

<sup>524</sup> Iatrides, ‘Civil War, 1945-1949’, 198.

<sup>525</sup> Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West*, 44.

<sup>526</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, ‘The Far Right in Greece’, 509.

<sup>527</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, ‘Paramilitarism, Politics and Organized Crime’, 276.

The *parastate* groups continued to be mutually permeable with the official security forces, especially after the creation of new local and regional militias: the Municipal Security Units (*Monades Asfaleias Dimosyndiritoi*, MAD) and the Country Security Units (*Monades Asfaleias Ypaithrou*, MAY).<sup>528</sup> The former ones were organised and financed by local political leaders for the protection of villages; the latter were set up by the army as auxiliary forces for regional defence, charged with surveillance of the population, the provision of information on guerrillas as well as their helpers and the protection of infrastructure.<sup>529</sup> These formations that, according to Close, counted 41,000 members in May 1948<sup>530</sup> eventually proved highly unreliable as well; they tended towards lawlessness and the abuse of power, oftentimes being more loyal to their local patrons than to the central authorities. They were frequently linked to prominent politicians, for example, Petros Mavromichalis (the Minister of Army in the 1946 Tsaldaris government), Colonel Pavlos Gyparis (Deputy of the Parliament for the Liberal Party) or Theodoros Tourkovasilis (politician of the People's Party). Mavromichalis, in particular, facilitated the armament of these militias from his ministerial position, which was accompanied by their recognition from the Tsaldaris government as official armed forces representing the Greek state.<sup>531</sup> In 1948, the MAY/MAD militias transformed into the Battalions of National Defence (*Tagmata Ethnofylakis Amynis*, TEA), which aimed at combatting communism in the countryside under the KYP's supervision. The TEA units, whose chiefs often had a criminal past and were paid from the KYP's "secret funds," played a significant role in instigating politically motivated terror in local municipalities and neighbourhoods; according to Tsoucalas, they served as "repressive mechanisms [...which] ensured that villagers voted 'correctly'."<sup>532</sup> Being intensively deployed during electoral periods, including the 1961 rigged election, the TEA was considered to be part of the rural structures of the

---

<sup>528</sup> Voglis, *Becoming a Subject*, 2002, 71, n. 46.

<sup>529</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, 'Paramilitarism, Politics and Organized Crime', 277.

<sup>530</sup> See Close, 'The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950', 140-41.

<sup>531</sup> ASKI, k. 418, F 24/2/115. Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)*], 35-36; Katsoudas, 'Ethnikistes kai Ethnikofrones [Nationalists and Nationally-Minded]', 26.

<sup>532</sup> Tsoucalas, *The Greek Tragedy*, 143ff.

*parakratos*, mostly for their capability to integrate members of various *parastate* organisations within its ranks.<sup>533</sup>

The civil-war *parastate* groups were not only responsible for widespread terror in the countryside but also for targeted attacks against left-wing personalities. In March 1947, for example, a leading cadre of the EAM and the KKE, Ioannis Zevgos, was shot dead in Thessaloniki. His assassin, Christos Vlachos, was a former communist who claimed to act in revenge for having suffered torture in the KKE's disciplinary facilities in Bulkes, Yugoslavia. The Left suspected the involvement of the Hellenic military police and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Hellenic Army Corps directed by the militant anti-communist Minister of Public Order and the former EDES leader Napoleon Zervas. Yet, the case had never been fully resolved, and in 1981, Vlachos confessed – while being hospitalised at the psychiatric department in Leros – that he was receiving orders from Greek and foreign intelligence services.<sup>534</sup> The assassination of George W. Polk, the CBS News correspondent covering the civil war from Thessaloniki in May 1948, provoked even greater controversy. A staunch critic of the clientelism and corruption of the Greek government and the involvement of the Truman administration in Greek affairs in favour of the repressive political regime, Polk carried out investigations of the alleged misuse of the AMAG funds by Athens. Shortly before his death, he arrived in Thessaloniki from where he was supposed to travel to the mountains of Western Macedonia to meet the DSE's Chief Markos Vafiadis. Instead, his body was found floating in the city's bay a week later; he was shot dead in the back of his head with his hands and feet tied.<sup>535</sup> While foreign intelligence, far-right paramilitaries or local criminals were blamed for his death<sup>536</sup> – Richter even explicitly named the *parakratos*

---

<sup>533</sup> Spyros Linardatos, *Sygyhroni Elliniki Istoría: Apo ton Emfylio sti Chounta. Tomos G' 1955-1961 [Contemporary Greek History: From the Civil War to the Junta. Volume 3: 1955-1961]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1978), 481; Tsoutsoumpis, 'The Far Right in Greece', 506.

<sup>534</sup> Gkotzaridis, *The Life and Death of a Pacifist*, 249–50; Romaios, 'Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]', 25–26.

<sup>535</sup> See Edmund Keeley, *The Salonika Bay Murder: Cold War Politics and the Polk Affair* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989); Kostas Papaioannou, *Politiki Dolofonia, Thessaloniki '48: Ypothesi Tzortz Polk [Political Murder, Thessaloniki '48: The Case of George Polk]* (Athina: To Pontiki, 1993); Eleftherios A. Vourvachis, *Poios skotose ton Polk? Mia politiki dolofonia kai dikastiki plani [Who Killed Polk? A Political Murder and the Judicial Plan]* (Chalandri: Proskinio, 2003); Athanasios G. Kafiris, *Ypothesi Polk-Staktopoulou. Mia anthropini kai dikastiki tragodia [The Polk-Staktopoulou Case. A Human and Judicial Tragedy]* (Athina: Proskinio, 2008).

<sup>536</sup> See the series of articles "Schizo ton peplon tou mystiriou Polk [I Tear the Veil of the 'Polk' Mystery]," *Ethnos*, 7-16 March 1966; for a more contemporary debate, see Stavros Tzimas, "I Thessaloniki ton politikon dolofonion [Thessaloniki of Political Murders]," *kathimerini.gr*, 17 December 2006, <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/271973/i-thessaloniki-ton-politikon-dolofonion/> (accessed 17

to be the perpetrator of the crime<sup>537</sup> – a show trial was organised with three communist suspects.<sup>538</sup>

In the post-civil war years, the Greek state continued keeping a close watch on the northern borderlands. The regions of Macedonia, Thrace, and Epirus played an important role in the containment of the communist influence from neighbouring states; at the same time, they were home to ethnically heterogeneous populations, which was prone to disloyalty and susceptible to communist propaganda from the perspective of central authorities. The paramilitaries and local anti-communist organisations assisted the Greek state with putting its policies of nationalisation, assimilation and resettlement into practice.<sup>539</sup> The KYP financed their activities and recruited agents among former resistance fighters, paramilitaries, and local bandits, smugglers and various criminals, as well as local peasantry. Furthermore, it organised irredentist groups in Macedonia and Epirus; in cooperation with UK and US intelligence between 1949 and 1953, it launched several clandestine operations in the Albanian territory.<sup>540</sup> While intensifying surveillance and political persecution, the KYP covered for the criminal activities of its collaborators, which included human smuggling, arms trafficking and contract killing. Allegedly, the KYP officers even received their cuts of illegal profits.<sup>541</sup>

Paramilitarism recorded a decline in the first post-civil war years, especially under Papagos' rule when, according to Gianoulopoulos, there was less need for maintaining unofficial security structures in the conditions of the authoritarian-leaning state.<sup>542</sup> The temporary weakening of the Right caused by the death of Papagos, the

---

December 2020); John O. Iatridis and Edmund Keeley, "Sixty-five years later: Will justice finally prevail in George Polk's case?," *ekathimerini.com*, 30 June 2013, <https://www.ekathimerini.com/133129/article/ekathimerini/comment/sixty-five-years-later-will-justice-finally-prevail-in-george-polks-case> (accessed 25 May 2020).

<sup>537</sup> Heinz Richter, *Geschichte Griechenlands im 20. Jahrhundert (Band 2: 1939-2004) [The History of Greece in the 20th Century (Volume 2: 1939-2004)]* (Wiesbaden: Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen, 2015), 293.

<sup>538</sup> Two defendants were sentenced as murderers in absentia to the death penalty, yet one of them had allegedly died in bombardment a month before the Polk murder occurred, while the other one was provably fighting in Grammos at that moment. The third one, Grigoris Staktopoulos, was imprisoned as the abettor of the crime for life, out of which he served eleven years. Although being proven innocent by numerous judicial analyses, his appeals (as well as appeals of multiple public personalities) were overruled. For his autobiographical book, see Grigoris Staktopoulos, *Ypothesi Polk. I prosopiki mou martyria [The Polk Case. My Personal Testimony]* (Athina: Gnosi, 1988).

<sup>539</sup> Katsanos, «Orkisthisan piston eis tin patria» ["They Swore Allegiance to Their Homeland"], 41–63; Tsoutsoumpis, 'The Far Right in Greece', 511–12.

<sup>540</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, "'Political Bandits"', 55.

<sup>541</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>542</sup> Gianoulopoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]', 153–54.



novel Centre-Left cooperation in the 1956 legislative elections and especially the 1958 electoral success of the EDA provided the justification for the repeated activation of *parastate* groups. However, with increasing urbanisation, changing demographics, the depopulation of the countryside and the mobilisation of social and student protest movements in the early 1960s, the focus of paramilitaries gradually shifted from rural to urban areas.<sup>543</sup> Amidst the new political and social conditions, the manners of anti-communist struggle further diversified, and so did the scale of presumed *parastate* actors.

#### 4.5 The Agents of the Post-Civil War *Parakratos*

The scholarly conceptualisations of who formed the post-civil war *parakratos* have been essentially three-fold. One interpretation followed the understanding of the *parakratos* as a *paramilitary* entity that operated with the state's support or under the state's tolerance and functioned as a complementary or subsidiary mechanism of political power and security provision.<sup>544</sup> Secondly, the *military parakratos* attempted as an interpretative approach to capture the situation in the post-civil war army, affected by great internal tensions and a culture of conspiracism. The army was, on the one hand, subject to massive politicisation and, on the other hand, tended towards greater autonomisation.<sup>545</sup> While the paramilitary and military forms of the *parakratos* can be rather easily defined and delimited, the third understanding, which I would characterise as “mixed” or “all-pervasive” to emphasise its deeply conspiratorial nature, is less easy to frame. It represents an image of a broad politico-military plot pertaining to various spheres of state administration and public life and reached all social strata.<sup>546</sup> In the subsequent analysis, I aim to draw the lines between these three general approaches.

<sup>543</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 107. See also Tsoutsoumpis, “‘Political Bandits’”, 54–56.

<sup>544</sup> Cf. Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*; Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’; Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegesis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’; Psarras, ‘O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]’; Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’.

<sup>545</sup> Cf. Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*; Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*; Petridis, *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967 [The Power and Para-Power in Greece]*; Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*.

<sup>546</sup> Cf. Gianouloupoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’; Tzannetakos, ‘Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]’; Gkotsaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”

Nevertheless, while a single, unified vision of the *parakratos* does not exist, the diverse perspectives of it, as provided by various authors, do not necessarily disprove or exclude one another. In reality, they tend to be complementary and mutually interconnected.

#### 4.5.1 The Military *Parakratos*

Before resuming the analysis of paramilitary organisations and their role on the domestic scene, it is necessary to provide some background for the post-civil war secret organisations of military officers, which were active within the ranks of the Hellenic army, and their prevalent perception in Greek historiography as a *military parakratos*. While the strong presence of various politically defined factions has been minimally characteristic for the army since the Goudi coup of 1909 (the first autonomous military intervention in modern Greek history),<sup>547</sup> the emergence of clandestine officers' groups became particularly pressing in the Greek army-in-exile, which was formed under the British command in the Middle East during the Second World War. At that point, secret military organisations were springing up in the army against the backdrop of fundamental disagreements between the supporters of monarchists, republicans and the EAM/ELAS within the Greek military; this tension eventually led to the mutiny and subsequent suppression of the latter in spring 1944. The ensuing purge of officers of communist and liberal orientation from the army helped facilitate the monarchists' dominance.<sup>548</sup> Military officers perceived their participation in secret military organisations as their chance to later influence post-war political developments in Greece in compliance with their political preferences. Moreover, they strived to gain superiority in the army, which would guarantee them a stable position and further professional growth.<sup>549</sup>

In post-war Greece, two major clandestine organisations of junior and middle-ranking army officers were active. First, the Holy Bond of Greek Officers (*Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon*, IDEA) emerged in Athens shortly after Greece's liberation, once again aiming to influence decision-making in the army and the process of promotions. It represented monarchist, patriotic and "nationally-minded" officers who shared a mistrust towards the army's leadership and Greek political representation

---

<sup>547</sup> Beaton, *Greece*, 184–88.

<sup>548</sup> Close and Veremis, 'The Military Struggle, 1945-9', 136–38.

<sup>549</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 92–96.

in general.<sup>550</sup> In 1951, some IDEA members launched an unsuccessful coup in support of Papagos, requesting his engagement both as the highest military and political leader.<sup>551</sup> Following its public exposure, the IDEA putschists remained practically unpunished; many of them were rehabilitated following the accession of Papagos to power in 1952. Satisfied with Papagos' authoritarian leanings and their professional needs being met, the activities of IDEA members steadily declined.<sup>552</sup> In 1956, amidst growing unrest following the death of Papagos and as a result of the ongoing political strengthening of the Left, an offspring organisation of the IDEA, the Union of Young Greek Officers (*Ethniki Enosis Neon Axiomatikon*, EENA), was established. It was constituted of the younger generation of officers affiliated with the IDEA, who were even more radical in terms of their militant anti-communism, their disenchantment with parliamentary politics and their dissatisfaction with the Greek monarchy.<sup>553</sup> The EENA's activities were boosted by the EDA's 1958 electoral success and persisted until the ill-fated 1967 coup, which the EENA orchestrated. Many EENA members (including its leader Georgios Papadopoulos) and numerous former representatives of IDEA occupied the highest positions in the state administration and army leadership during the years of the junta.<sup>554</sup> Yet, while I still focus on the post-civil war years, the EENA was accused of organising psychological operations, disinformation campaigns and *parastate* terror, especially during the 1961 legislative elections, the 1965 removal of the Papandreou government and the 1967 imposition of military dictatorship.<sup>555</sup>

While the existence of the EENA – unlike the IDEA – stayed hidden from the public until the 1967 coup, the problem of existing conspiracies in the army was a broadly discussed topic, both politically and by media, repeatedly speaking about potential coups in preparation, the activities of “secret organisations” and the persistence of “anomalies” and “dark forces” in the officer corps.<sup>556</sup> Let us review some

---

<sup>550</sup> Ibid., 99–100.

<sup>551</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)*], 61–66.

<sup>552</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 141; Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce* [*Political Forces in Greece*], 346.

<sup>553</sup> Gkotsaris, “Who Really Rules This Country?”, 650.

<sup>554</sup> Couloumbis, ‘Post World War II Greece’, 296; Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 24–25; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia* [*The Cachectic Democracy*], 181.

<sup>555</sup> Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 47.

<sup>556</sup> For example, “I mystiki organosis dra eis ton straton [A Secret Organisation is Active Within the Army],” Ora, 15 June 1956; “Ai yfistamenai anomaliai eis tas enoplous dynameis [The Existing

quotes provided by historians regarding the emergence of the *military parakratos*. According to Veremis (similarly Stavrou), during the civil war, the Greek army gradually evolved into “a state within a state,” immune to political interventions that did not fit its ideological convictions.<sup>557</sup> As for the early post-civil war years, Veremis argues that the army was enjoying extraordinary prestige thanks to its victory against communist guerrillas. Due to the intrinsic mistrust in parliamentary politics, which many officers inherited from the turbulent interwar period and the Metaxas dictatorship, the army leadership tended to believe that the army should become free of political interventionism; it should instead be an autonomous body that would only be answerable to US military advisers.<sup>558</sup>

The situation in the early post-civil war army is also discussed by Vournas, according to whom “The [political] power [in post-war Greece] essentially belonged to the stratocracy and the parastate,” as the country was governed by the IDEA;<sup>559</sup> the “military parastate” acted alongside the “state of secret services.”<sup>560</sup> Lendakis assumes that “IDEA had branches in all military units and state services, reaching from the palace and the Hellenic Army General Staff (GES) to the lower levels of the command. Thus eventually, the IDEA became another, invisible army’s command.”<sup>561</sup> Close accuses a military clique of instigating the *parastate*, which he referred to as “a cabal of senior officers under [Konstantinos] Ventiris.”<sup>562</sup> Ventiris, who was appointed Chief of GES in 1944 and then again in 1947, was a former Venizelist-turned-monarchist as a result of the EAM’s rise. At the time of occupation, Ventiris headed a minor, Athens-based, radical monarchist resistance organisation known as Rumelia-Avlona-Nisoi (RAN), whose name illustrated the organisation’s post-liberation territorial claims. According to Tsoutsoumpis, the military circle around Ventiris and later the IDEA closely cooperated with the “X,” which acted as a “state within a state” under Grivas’

---

Anomalies in the Armed Forces],” *Vima*, 11 April 1956; “Ai skoteinai dynameis [Dark Forces],” *Ethnikos Kiryx*, 8 November 1955.

<sup>557</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 9, 151–52. Kakaras uses the same expression for the IDEA. Cf. Antonis A. Kakaras, *I Ellines stratiotikoi: axiomatikoi kai ypaxiomatikoi stin metapolemiki Ellada [The Greek Military: Army Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers in Postwar Greece]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 2006), 399.

<sup>558</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 155.

<sup>559</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 11.

<sup>560</sup> *Ibid.*, 140. The IDEA was blamed for imposing stratocracy on Greece also by Foivos N. Grigoriadis, *Vasilevomeni Stratokratia [Crowned Stratocracy]* (Athina: Neokosmos, 1975), 15.f

<sup>561</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 44.

<sup>562</sup> Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 156.

leadership, surveilling populations and introducing its own political and security order.<sup>563</sup> Besides the paramilitaries, the IDEA attempted to foster contacts with UK and US representatives in Greece as well as with numerous domestic politicians.<sup>564</sup>

Sometimes the *military parakratos* has been academically portrayed as an isolated centre of power composed of clandestine groups of military officers. It not only conspired against the left-wing opposition but also targeted the Greek parliamentary regime, aiming at a violent takeover of power. For example, Mouzelis criticised the Papandreou government for failing “to attack the structure of the power bloc [of secret military organisations, and] to deliver an effective blow to the [military] para-state.”<sup>565</sup> Stavrou and Gianoulopoulos saw the EENA (rather than the IDEA) as the *military parakratos*, first and foremost, due to its genuine clandestinity, absolute defiance with regard to political control and the absence of needing to seek support from political parties and the palace. From this perspective, they assume, the EENA truly attempted to form a parallel centre of power.<sup>566</sup> Another approach considers the *military parakratos* to be a collaborator of the “right-wing establishment” or even a functional part of the wider politico-military conspiracy that had allegedly been diverging political developments in Greece during the 1950s and 1960s. As shown below, such a stance can be supported by the fact that the army – and, specifically, many former IDEA and EENA members – played a significant role in performing strategies of combatting communism, including planning and executing psychological operations while also managing and directing *parastate* organisations.<sup>567</sup>

#### 4.5.2 The Paramilitary *Parakratos*

The *paramilitary parakratos*, a modern successor of the 19<sup>th</sup>-century brigandage, was composed of so-called *parastate organisations*, which formed a loose network of far-right nationalists, vigilantes, thugs and petty criminals. They contributed to combatting “anti-national,” “communist” activities by launching disinformation and propaganda campaigns and instigating terror from local militias and action squads. Furthermore,

---

<sup>563</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, ‘Paramilitarism, Politics and Organized Crime’, 269–71.

<sup>564</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 27–28; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 38–41.

<sup>565</sup> Mouzelis, ‘Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece’, 72.

<sup>566</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 180–81; Gianoulopoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 141.

<sup>567</sup> See especially Stefanidis, ‘I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]’, 199–241.

according to Sakkas, they assisted the official security forces at guarding prominent political personalities, monitoring and providing information on left-wing associations and individuals and subverting their activities.<sup>568</sup> Kostopoulos describes them as “task forces” (*omades krousis*) and “a network of parastate organisations instructed by security services or the army and in charge of exercising physical and psychological violence against the left-wing sympathisers.”<sup>569</sup> According to Tsoutsoumpis, these organisations “provided local societies with a series of services which the state was unable or unwilling to provide,” although their members did not necessarily act out of ideological motivation.<sup>570</sup> Rather, they pursued a large range of specific political, economic, social, personal and professional goals.

These groups were thus characterised by a certain level of agency and autonomy. At the same time, they were tightly interlocked within a system of clientelism and patronage and were thus often perceived as a tool of state governance, subject to the control and direction of the state security organs. For instance, according to Xenakis, the *parakratos* consisted of “clandestine far-right paramilitary groups closely associated with the state security services,”<sup>571</sup> which, according to Tzoukas, “acted under tolerance or cover of the state organs.”<sup>572</sup> In the view of Tsoukalas, the *parakratos* was a mechanism that enabled and participated in the “channeling [of] influence, support, and access to the allocation of public funds.”<sup>573</sup> The activities of paramilitaries were closely intertwined with the interests of the local political and security forces’ representation. The political power, economic well-being and social status of *parastate* members depended on their merit in the anti-communist campaign and the fulfilment of tasks assigned by their patrons.<sup>574</sup> To balance this seemingly full dependence of *parakratos*

---

<sup>568</sup> Dimitris N. Sakkas, *Konstantinos Karamanlis kai to kratos tou tis periodou 1955-63 [Konstantinos Karamanlis and his State in the Period of 1955-63]* (Athina: Gutenberg, 2010), 152.

<sup>569</sup> Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’, 73.

<sup>570</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, ‘The Far Right in Greece’, 511.

<sup>571</sup> Xenakis, ‘A New Dawn?’, 439–40.

<sup>572</sup> Vangelis Tzoukas, “O Emfylios mesa tous.” Sygchrones ermeneies gia ti dekaetia 1940-1950 kai politikes diamaches stin elliniki metaneoterikotita [“The Civil War Inside Them.” Contemporary Interpretations of the 1940s and the Political Controversies in the Greek Post-Modernity], in *Afigiseis gia ti dekaetia tou 1940. Apo to logo tou katochikou kratous sti metaneoteriki istoriografia [The Narratives about the 1940s. From the Speech of the Occupation State to the Post-Modern Historiography]*, ed. Vassilis K. Dalkavoukis et al. (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2012), 403.

<sup>573</sup> Tsoukalas, ‘The Ideological Impact of the Civil War’, 328, 332.

<sup>574</sup> Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’, 73; Dordanas, ‘To trikyklo, ena “atychima” kai i adekasti dikaiosyni [The Tricycle Truck, One “Accident” and the Incorruptible Justice]’, 126–42.

on the state, we can turn to Tsoutsoumpis, who states: “while those [*parastate*] groups relied on violence and the patronage of the state, they were not without popular support nor legitimacy. The ideology of wartime paramilitaries had seeped into society and legitimized authoritarian and militarist ideals.”<sup>575</sup>

The communication between the state and the paramilitaries was realised locally and presumably facilitated through various channels, ranging from KYP officers, the representatives of police units in cities and their neighbourhoods, politicians and businessmen.<sup>576</sup> For the right-wing regime (as claimed by Close), the “numerous anti-communist vigilante groups [...] were useful because their activities could be disowned.”<sup>577</sup> This factor was probably the greatest advantage of the *paramilitary parakratos*, which also justified its ongoing existence in post-civil war Greece. Furthermore, for being rather unscrupulous and multi-purpose, the paramilitary *parastate* organisations provided security forces with a tool that offered various solutions to inconvenient situations. Dordanas summarises that “these and other parastate organisations comprised, for the security forces, golden reserves of citizens of 'undisputable political convictions' for 'fighting communism by all means,' actively participating in the 'witch hunt' which has been officially launched by the state against the illegal KKE and its 'anti-nationally acting' sympathisers.”<sup>578</sup> Furthermore, Dordanas continues, “this whole unofficial army of private persons happened to be in the state’s direct interest and received its economic support.”<sup>579</sup>

Although there was a partial continuity in paramilitarism from the civil war to the post-civil war era, the key period of *parastate* activities occurred in conjunction with the rise of political opposition to the right-wing regime, first on behalf of the Left and subsequently of the Centre. Starting from the legislative elections in May 1958 until the fall of the Papandreou government in July 1965, and then again in the wake of the 1967 legislative elections (forestalled by the coup), the *parastate* organisations were thriving, driven by support from their patrons.<sup>580</sup> According to *Eleftheria* daily, in the period

---

<sup>575</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, ‘The Far Right in Greece’, 511.

<sup>576</sup> *Ibid.*, 508.

<sup>577</sup> Close, ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’, 85.

<sup>578</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 303–4.

<sup>579</sup> *Ibid.*, 304.

<sup>580</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 124, 134; Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 303–4; Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’, 72–73.

between 1959 and 1963, there were over 40 *parastate* organisations, which the newspaper labelled as “the huge parastatal network” of the ERE.<sup>581</sup> Tsoutsoumpis estimates that some groups had up to 5,000 members<sup>582</sup> and were predominantly active in urban areas – in Athens, Thessaloniki and other regional centres with the prominence of Northern Greece.<sup>583</sup> Gkotzaridis underlines the significance of the 1958 elections by characterising them as a moment in which the Greek *state* and the *deep state* “entered into a tacit alliance to counter its threat [i.e. EDA].”<sup>584</sup> Similarly, Paraskevopoulos claims that “the main characteristic of the new anti-communist campaign after the 1958 elections was the realignment of the *parakratos* of the Right and the encouragement and the reorganisation of pro-dictatorial conspiratorial groups in the armed forces.”<sup>585</sup> As of 1958, the mobilised right-wing regime intensified the anti-communist campaign on several levels. As part of the process that Nikolakopoulos considers an increasingly authoritarian orientation of the Karamanlis government, a series of countermeasures were taken in an attempt to subject the opposition to even greater pressure.<sup>586</sup>

First of all, the ERE strove for the complete political isolation of the EDA, even persecuting its own deputies for maintaining any sort of contact with the Left.<sup>587</sup> Particularly in provincial towns, physical attacks against EDA executives were on the rise. In autumn 1958, many EDA offices were destroyed, with the offenders undisclosed.<sup>588</sup> On the institutional level, in early November 1958, the General Directorate of National Security (*Geniki Diefthynsi Ethnikis Asfaleias*; GDEA) was established at the Ministry of Interior to coordinate the actions of the police and the gendarmerie related to the issues of national security, public order and anti-communist policies. It was headed by Iraklis Kontopoulos, an IDEA member and one of the 1951 putschists.<sup>589</sup> The role of the army was manifested through the KYP and, for example,

---

<sup>581</sup> “Apokalyptetai i enochi tou kommatikou kratous. Mega ‘parakratikon’ diktyon syntirei i E.R.E. Plireis apodeixeis synergarias. [The Guilt of the Party State is Revealed. The ERE Sustains a Huge ‘Parastatal’ Network. Full evidence of Complicity],” *Eleftheria*, 9 June 1963, 1, 15.

<sup>582</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, ‘The Far Right in Greece’, 511.

<sup>583</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*.

<sup>584</sup> Gkotzaridis, “Who Really Rules This Country?”, 646.

<sup>585</sup> Paraskevopoulos, *Georgios Papandreou [Georgios Papandreou]*, 11.

<sup>586</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 256–58. See also Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 160–61.

<sup>587</sup> Stefanidis, ‘I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]’, 206.

<sup>588</sup> Papatheanasiou, ‘I aristera antimetopi me ti dolofonia Lambraki [The Left Faces the Assassination of Lambrakis]’, 100.

<sup>589</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 166.



through its Directorate for Psychological War (*Diefthynsi Psychologikou Polemou*) and military courts by making decisions on espionage cases.<sup>590</sup> The government intensified its left-wing oppression based on extraordinary anti-communist legislation, launching mass arrests and increasing the practice of deporting left-wingers to barren Greek islands. According to Stefanidis, EDA claimed that within six months after the election, 175 people were banished to the Agios Efstratios camp.<sup>591</sup> Under the provisions of the compulsory law against espionage (no. 375/1936), one of the prominent figures of the left-wing resistance and EDA representative Manolis Glezos was sentenced to 5 years in prison in 1959 for meeting the KKE's general secretary in the summer of 1958; even harsher punishments were imposed on 56 KKE members in April 1960.<sup>592</sup> The introduction of such strict measures further coincided with the 1959 municipal elections, in which the EDA marked a decline.<sup>593</sup>

Some historians paid attention to the emergence of the so-called “invisible committee” (*afanis epitropi*) in the days following the 1958 elections, as well as to the establishment of several other institutions as part of the state organs and security mechanisms, which aimed at large-scale oppression of political opposition, including psychological operations. The regime's change in terms of intensification and efficiency of its anti-communist campaign led Gianouloupoulos to speak of “the golden era of parastatism.”<sup>594</sup> The existence of this “invisible committee” has been known from the testimony of far-right publisher and journalist Savvas Konstantopoulos, who participated in its meetings during the initial phases. The first encounter of the committee reportedly took place in Kifissia shortly after the elections at the invitation of Prime Minister Karamanlis. Stefanidis asserts that the meeting resulted in the formation of the Special Committee of Ministers (*Eidiki Epitropi ex Ypourgon*) in June 1958. This newly set body aimed to develop and specify methods and measures, leading to the suppression of communist activities and propaganda; several ministers and vice-ministers of the Karamanlis government joined the meeting, including Evangelos Averoff (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Konstantinos Tsatsos (Minister of Presidency),

---

<sup>590</sup> Stefanidis, ‘I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]’, 209.

<sup>591</sup> *Ibid.*, 207.

<sup>592</sup> *Ibid.*, 207–8.

<sup>593</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 260.

<sup>594</sup> Gianouloupoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 154–55.

Aristidis Dimitrakos (Minister of Labour), Evangelos Kalantzis (the vice-minister of Interior) and Alexandros Natsinas (Chief of KYP and a former IDEA member).<sup>595</sup>

Furthermore, the Special Advisory Committee for the Combatting of Communism (*Eidiki Symvouleftiki Epitropi Katapolemiseos tou Kommounismou*) was established as a clandestine consultative body under the auspices of the KYP's Service of Special Studies (*Ypiresia Eidikon Meleton*) at the behest of the prime minister in July 1958. Under the presidency of Natsinas, some high-ranking security officers were involved in it, such as the director of the government's military office Brigadier General Dionysios Verros or KYP Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinos Mitrelis. Aside from them, leading propagandists and ideologists of anti-communism took part in the committee's meetings, including already mentioned Konstantopoulos, another journalist and political analyst Georgios Georgalas and a prominent lawyer and writer Angelos Prokopiou.<sup>596</sup> During the junta, Georgalas and Konstantopoulos would become the main ideologues of the regime. Their engagement in the Special Advisory Committee in the late 1950s led to their rapprochement with future dictator Georgios Papadopoulos, who served as the major of the artillery and the operative of the KYP's Service of Special Studies at that time. Georgalas, similarly to Eleftherios Stavridis, another ideological cadre employed by the regime in the formation of anti-communist policies, had a communist past, and his expertise was thus seen as particularly valuable.<sup>597</sup>

While the Special Advisory Committee mostly dealt with organisational matters, from 1959 onwards, the coordination role was attributed to the General Directorate of Press and Information (GDTP), established as a department of the Ministry of the Presidency (*Ypourgeio Proedrias*) in 1951.<sup>598</sup> From January 1959, the Ministry of the Presidency took a more radical course against the country's Left under its new Vice-

---

<sup>595</sup> Stefanidis, 'I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]', 210.

<sup>596</sup> Leonidas Kallivretakis, 'Mia istoria tou 1958, proangelos tou 1963 (kai tou 1967) [The History of 1958, the Precursor of 1963 (and of 1967)]', in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitis 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 207–8; Rizas, 'Dekaetia tou 1960 [The 1960s]', 219–20.

<sup>597</sup> Stavridis used to serve as KKE's deputy and, during the 1920s, he was shortly appointed as the party's general secretary. Georgalas, a graduate of the Moscow school for communist cadres, returned to Greece from exile in Budapest. After a short imprisonment, he turned into a collaborator of the Hellenic Army's General Staff and the KYP. Papadimitriou, *Apo ton lao ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon [From the Law-Abiding People to the Nation of the Nationally Minded]*, 279; Stefanidis, 'I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]', 210–11; Gianouloupoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]', 154–55.

<sup>598</sup> Gkotzaridis, "'Who Really Rules This Country?'" , 655.

Minister Tryfonas Triantafyllakos, who became responsible for the intensification of anti-communist propaganda in the press.<sup>599</sup> The key department of the GDTP, which according to Dordanas, contributed to the increase in efficiency in the organisation of the *parakratos*,<sup>600</sup> was the newly created Directorate of Information, known from 1960 as the Information Service (*Diefthynsi Pliroforion/Ypiresia pliroforion*). Its additional branch was dispatched in Thessaloniki in 1961.<sup>601</sup> The management of the *paramilitary parakratos* was divided between the Information Service and its Studies Council (*Symvoulío Meleton*) and the KYP's Service of Special Studies. While the latter designed psychological operations with the use of *parastate* organisations, including the employment of “counter-demonstrations of indignant citizens” that were used to discourage and disperse leftist and centrist protests, the former was responsible for the planning of governmental propaganda policies, controlling the media and supervising *parastate* organisations as well as various citizens' associations of a nationally minded orientation.<sup>602</sup>

The Information Service, directed by another former IDEA member Nikolaos Gogousis, closely cooperated with the National Defence General Staff (*Geniko Epiteleio Ethnikis Amynas*; GEETHA), the GES, the GDEA, the KYP as well as US and UK intelligence in Greece and other security organs. Additionally, it was professionally interconnected with Papadopoulos and other EENA members.<sup>603</sup> According to Kallivretakis, for instance, GDTP disposed of “secret funds,” which enabled it to include propagandists like Georgalas, Stavridis and other anti-communist collaborators to its payroll and to finance numerous “patriotic” and *parastate* organisations.<sup>604</sup> The alleged existence of GDTP's “secret funds” had already been exposed in December 1963 by the *Eleftheria* daily, which claimed that the clandestine financing provided by this institution rose by almost three hundred per cent from 27 million drachmas in 1955

---

<sup>599</sup> Rizas, ‘Dekaetia tou 1960 [The 1960s]’, 219–20.

<sup>600</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 304.

<sup>601</sup> See also Petridis, *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967 [The Power and Para-Power in Greece]*, 171–77.

<sup>602</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 68–70; Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 91–92; Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 992–93.

<sup>603</sup> Stefanidis, ‘I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]', 212–13.

<sup>604</sup> Kallivretakis, ‘Mia istoria tou 1958, proangelos tou 1963 (kai tou 1967) [The History of 1958, the Precursor of 1963 (and of 1967)]’, 207–8.

to 77 million in 1962.<sup>605</sup> Stefanidis illustrated how significant such an amount was by comparing it to the parallel decrease in the financing of education, which went from 80 million in 1957 to 68 million in 1961.<sup>606</sup> As of 1961, according to Chalazias, due to the large-scale anti-communist campaign launched by the state, “parastate organisations and mechanisms started functioning without limits.”<sup>607</sup>

The historiographical interpretation of the post-civil war *paramilitary parakratos* has thus portrayed it as an unofficial instrument of the state anti-communist policies, where the state played both the role of the *parakratos*’ initiator and sponsor. Yet, in this case, we can still draw a clear line between the paramilitaries on the one hand and the state, the army and the security forces on the other hand. In contrast, some other authors presume that the *parakratos* was of a much broader scale in terms of its social and political impact.

### 4.5.3 The *Parakratos* as a Broad Conspiracy

Several historians and intellectuals approached the *parakratos* as an entity composed of radically diverse actors. The army, intelligence service, security forces and paramilitaries usually formed an inseparable part of the *parakratos*, further supplemented with an array of other partakers: political parties and their factions, representatives of the palace and the US embassy, judicial officials, university professorships and student associations, businessmen and entrepreneurs, local patrons and their clientelist networks, petty criminals and secret police confidants. In the view of these authors, the *parakratos* acted in an organised manner; it “infiltrated” state institutions, “penetrated” the military and state security organs and “permeated” all social strata. The existence of the *parakratos* in the state presumably testified about the authoritarian character and overall corruption of the post-civil war regime. The state and its political representatives then acted in direct complicity with the *parakratos* and benefited from its functioning; effectively, the state was involved in criminal, illegal activities.

---

<sup>605</sup> “Etriplasiasthisan kai ta mystika kondylia tis Diefthyneoseos Typou [The Secret Fund of the Directorate of Press Increased Three Times],” *Eleftheria*, 6 December 1963, 1.

<sup>606</sup> Stefanidis, ‘I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]’, 212.

<sup>607</sup> Chalazias and Lamprakis, *I dolofonia tou Lampraki kai to parakratos [The Assassination of Lambrakis and the Parakratos]*, 26.

Correspondingly, Gkotzaridis, in one of the most recent writings on the Greek *deep state* (as she calls it) in the 1960s, describes *parakratos* as “an invisible government that, having infiltrated the Army, police, and intelligence bodies, was steering policy away from domestic initiatives that could have ended the Cold War quarantine of the Left.”<sup>608</sup> She emphasises the importance of “the covert relationship” between the state authorities and the “underworld,” which includes petty criminals, local thugs and paramilitaries. Furthermore, she observes that the transformation of paramilitarism took place as a result of the civil war. While before it, she claims, paramilitaries occurred as private or self-appointed armies thriving as a result of the power vacuum caused by military conflicts, “by the 1960s, it had assumed a wholly different character since [...] it was fomented and abetted by the State” to “spread terror, persecute dissidents, and assassinate personalities.”<sup>609</sup> By the latter, Gkotzaridis refers explicitly to the 1963 murder of Lambrakis, whose life and death she analysed and depicted in detail in her book.<sup>610</sup>

Another layer of this all-encompassing anti-communist network is apparent from the approach of Gianoulopoulos, according to whom *parakratos* was also asserted through many anti-communist citizens’ organisations and public figures. In his view, *parakratos* penetrated the military, the police, the gendarmerie and the KYP; from there, it expanded to the field of justice and public administration, which served as a cover-up for the *parakratos*’ activities. Aside from these, he includes in the *parakratos* various legally assembled paramilitary and reservist organisations that were administered by active army officers, such as the Units and Battalions of the National Defence (*Monades Ethnofylakis Amynis/Tagmata Ethnofylakis Amynis*; MEA/TEA). On top of this, Gianoulopoulos states that the *parakratos* was also manifested through the operation of “patriotic” *parastate* organisations (he refers to them as “fighting divisions” of the *parakratos*).<sup>611</sup> These groups, composed of nationally minded citizens, were endowed with legal status, equipped with internal statutes and allotted officially registered offices. The functioning of the overall shadow system of power was enabled by the existence of an extensive and heterogeneous network spanning from prominent and respectable personalities, once again nationally minded, such as judicial officers,

---

<sup>608</sup> Gkotzaridis, “Who Really Rules This Country?”, 647.

<sup>609</sup> Ibid., 647–48.

<sup>610</sup> Gkotzaridis, *The Life and Death of a Pacifist*.

<sup>611</sup> Gianoulopoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 140.

university professors, businessmen and high-ranking ministerial officials, to individuals of lower social status, such as police informers and inciting agents paid to cause unrest in local communities and neighbourhoods.<sup>612</sup>

The imagination of the *parakratos* as a network connecting the representatives of possibly all social strata is further supported by Tzannetakos. According to him, the imaginary “tentacles” of the *parakratos* stretched from observant concierges and the owners of news outlets to the 1967 putschists.<sup>613</sup> He suggested that intelligence officers were the driving force behind the mechanism as they played the key role in recruiting civilian collaborators of various social backgrounds willing to contribute to the combat against an “internal enemy.” Their motivation was either voluntary, meaning based on shared political convictions as in the case of former anti-communist resistance fighters, civil war victims and supporters of the right-wing regime, or driven by economic benefits. In other instances, nonetheless, the security forces blackmailed individuals into collaborating with them. Being uneducated, unemployed or even criminal offenders, they were compelled to do so by their unfavourable personal circumstances or simply needed to receive a service in return. Through agents, collaborators and informers, the secret service infiltrated various social organisations, especially labour unions and student associations whose activities raised the regime’s suspicion. Greater surveillance and the spread of propaganda within these crucial social environments were facilitated by the pro-regime National Social Student Organisation (*Ethniki koinoniki organosis foititon*, EKOF) and the corruption of labour unionists. Concerning the actions of the *parakratos* within state administration and the justice department, Tzannetakos points to public officials exceeding their competencies, abusing their powers, covering up for the illegal persecution of political opposition, assisting with the protection of anti-communist perpetrators and putting interest organisations under state control by having the right to install temporary leadership.<sup>614</sup>

Sakkas, in contrast, highlights the US presence in Greece as a major element in the functioning of *parakratos*. Namely, the CIA, the AMAG, the US Embassy, and even the “propagandist” Voice of America, in his view, instigated the parallel system of power in the country. Sakkas speaks of the CIA as “the eyes and ears” of the US

---

<sup>612</sup> Ibid., 140–41.

<sup>613</sup> Tzannetakos, ‘Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]’, 128.

<sup>614</sup> Ibid., 131–32.

government, which permeated with the KYP, the armed and security forces, and political and economic elites, implying that even Queen Frederica was a collaborator of the CIA.<sup>615</sup> According to Sakkas, the CIA's activities consisted in, among others,

the creation of a network of agents, the corruption of conscience, the bribing of newspapers and magazines and the defamation of political personalities and parties by their means, the support and the undermining of governments, the forging of elections, sabotage, [and] murders of personalities [...].<sup>616</sup>

Sakkas further suggests that the CIA was involved in assembling propagandist associations and *parastate* organisations. In the post-1961 period, when the *parastate* organisations were on the rise and the conspiratorial army circles unthreatened, the political power allegedly lay in the hands of “neither Konstantinos Karamanlis nor the ERE,” but of the *parakratos*.<sup>617</sup> These claims directly oppose the stance of Paraskevopoulos, according to whom “parastate of the Right and the army’s pro-dictatorial elements” had been dominating the Greek state already since 1958. He notes that “the Karamanlis government, the state mechanism and the army leadership, they all are ‘captives’ of the parastate organisations of the Right and the conspiratorial paramilitary groups [...]”<sup>618</sup> Yet, both authors assume that the Right created the *parakratos* but eventually lost control over it. Using the words of Paraskevopoulos, the Right “fell in the parastate’s trap.”<sup>619</sup>

The conspiratorial understanding of the *parakratos* is characteristic of the left-leaning historiography written by the older generation of authors, many of whom were affiliated with the left-wing political camp, either as part of the student movement in the 1960s, through a party membership or as correspondents of left-wing newspapers. For instance, I refer to the work by Potis Paraskevopoulos (1924-1996), who at a young age participated in the EAM resistance and later worked for the left-wing daily *Avgi*;<sup>620</sup> to Tasos Vournas (1913-1990), another left-wing intellectual collaborating with the same newspaper;<sup>621</sup> to Makis Mailis (1950-2021), a journalist and a top representative of the

---

<sup>615</sup> Sakkas, *Konstantinos Karamanlis*, 127–53.

<sup>616</sup> *Ibid.*, 128.

<sup>617</sup> Paraskevopoulos, *Georgios Papandreou [Georgios Papandreou]*, 13.

<sup>618</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>619</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>620</sup> Paraskevopoulos, *Georgios Papandreou [Georgios Papandreou]*.

<sup>621</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*.

KKE,<sup>622</sup> to Babis Georgoulas (1946),<sup>623</sup> *Avgi*'s correspondent who was also affiliated with the KKE and other left-wing subjects. The journalist Giannis Tzannetakos (1940)<sup>624</sup> and the historian Giannis Gianoulopoulos (1939)<sup>625</sup> were both active in the 1960s student democratic movement. Only Evi Gkotzaridis (1969), as a historian coming from a younger generation of authors with a different background, represents an exception in this group, suggesting that the conspiratorial scholarly approach to *parakratos* has not been exhausted yet and continues to persist until the present days.

The authors, who became members of the KKE during their lives, portrayed the *parakratos* in a particularly ideologised manner. For instance, Mailis, who was in charge of the History Section of the KKE's Central Committee, perceived the *parakratos* as a mechanism invented under the guidance of the right-wing state, which consisted of

traitors of the [Axis] occupation, Metaxist inciting agents, KYP collaborators, veterans active in the army and the gendarmerie, tormentors and various elements of the underworld, as well as anti-communist ideologists.<sup>626</sup>

In his view, the palace, the justice, the KYP and the CIA, secret army organisations, security forces as well as their informers and paramilitary organisations were to be blamed for the emergence of the *parakratos*. Furthermore, he stressed the role of the palace (rather than of the Right) in instigating the murder of EDA deputy Grigoris Lambrakis.<sup>627</sup> Similar to Mailis, Vournas made a controversial remark when claiming that it was Queen Frederica who planned the assassination of Lambrakis, characterising her as “satanic.”<sup>628</sup> Elsewhere, Vournas stated that the event was organised by “palace camarilla and the parastate that acted within the state mechanism.”<sup>629</sup> Last but not least, Georgoulas demonstrated his negative attitude towards the monarchist regime and the “foreign factor,” opening his book on the *parakratos* with the following words:

---

<sup>622</sup> Mailis, *To astiko politiko systima stin Ellada apo to 1950 eos to 1967 [The Bourgeois Political System in Greece from 1950 to 1967]*.

<sup>623</sup> Georgoulas, *To parakratos stin Ellada [The Parastate in Greece]*.

<sup>624</sup> Tzannetakos, ‘Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]’.

<sup>625</sup> Gianoulopoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’.

<sup>626</sup> Mailis, *To astiko politiko systima stin Ellada apo to 1950 eos to 1967 [The Bourgeois Political System in Greece from 1950 to 1967]*, 58.

<sup>627</sup> *Ibid.*, 243.

<sup>628</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 166, 175.

<sup>629</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.



The parastate in Greece is not only the neofascist-glücksbourg organisations but also the ones who plan the anti-communist hysteria, the ones who are in the orbit of the US secret services and the ones who allow the circuit to function.<sup>630</sup>

Unlike the previous authors, Georgoulas wrote his critic in 1975 to react to the presumed continuation of the *parakratos* in the post-junta period, despite the so-called de-juntisation of the state sector and the armed and security forces (*apochoundopoiisi*), which he deemed unsuccessful.<sup>631</sup>

The above-described peculiar conspiratorial discourse on *parakratos* drew from the Centre's and the Left's anti-Right political speech in the post-civil war period, and precisely for these political connections, it lacks objectivity. The EDA representatives constantly suspected conspiratorial behaviour behind most of the ERE's moves, and in this manner, they also described the 1955 accession of Karamanlis to power:

But the same night, even before Papagos was buried, an unprecedented conspiracy was plotted in the dark couloirs. The Greek and foreign oligarchy representatives, factors of the palace environment, foreign political advisors, and especially Americans, and military representatives of the NATO in our country in close cooperation promoted and declared Mr Karamanlis as the country's prime minister.<sup>632</sup>

In this statement, we can again observe the political opposition's endeavour to portray the everyday functioning of the "right-wing establishment" as an outcome of a plot by multiple powerful actors, which prevented the opposition from assuming control in a fair political competition. One of the EK's top representatives, Sofoklis Venizelos, repeatedly called the perpetrators of the 1961 "elections of violence and fraud" as the "super-state of the right" (*yperkratos tis dexias*). When asked by a journalist for an explanation of the term, he replied:

I mean the complex organism which has dominated our public life in the last years. In the [1961] elections, we did not fight against the ERE, but we confronted the Army General Staff, the KYP, the Gendarmerie, the TEA and other dark factors.<sup>633</sup>

Comparably, the EDA described the 1961 events as

an electoral coup which was organised according to an engineered [military] staff plan of the ruling clique of the Right and its foreign and

---

<sup>630</sup> Georgoulas, *To parakratos stin Ellada [The Parastate in Greece]*, 5.

<sup>631</sup> *Ibid.*, 6–9.

<sup>632</sup> Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA), *Mavri vivlos [Black Book]*, 18.

<sup>633</sup> Enosis Kentrou (EK), *I dimokratia tha nikisi [The Democracy Will Win]*, 8.

domestic supporters. A coup that sought specific aims and was programmatically performed with methods determined in advance by the pro-monarchist interim government and the fascist state mechanism.<sup>634</sup>

The Centre and the Left held the ERE and its “right-wing establishment” accountable for the organisation of the *parakratos*.<sup>635</sup> What concerns their position, they played the card of martyrdom and victimhood, both to denounce the Right and to mobilise their supporters. The Right, on the other hand, deemed the growing political ambitions of the EDA and the EK as a sign of communist expansion in Greece. In such a situation, the ERE leadership regarded the continuation of the official and unofficial anti-communist mechanisms as entirely justifiable. They were thus ready to close their eyes to the profoundly undemocratic political mechanisms that were corrupting the country’s pro-democratic regime.

#### 4.6 The Position of the *Parakratos* Towards the State

Departing from the exclusively left-wing historiography towards a general approach, the scholarly debate on the post-civil war *parakratos* lacks consensus on the nature of the relationship between the state (*kratos*) and the “para-state” (*parakratos*). It has at times been perceived as a “parallel state” that is an independent mechanism exerting power alongside official state institutions and following its specific interests. In such a case, the *parakratos* acted without the state’s contribution but, most probably, with its political representatives’ awareness and tolerance, possibly even with their silent support. In comparison to this, another perspective required the complicity of the state in the operation of the *parakratos*, which then, in a sense, acted as the state’s long arm.

The former approach was adopted by Lendakis, who reflects on the *parakratos* as “mechanisms which act next to the state (parallel to it), but autonomously as if they would be literally a second state.”<sup>636</sup> Petridis speaks about the coexistence of political power and parapolitical power (*paraexousia*).<sup>637</sup> Gianoulopoulos describes the *parakratos*’ activities as “extra-institutional operations of groups of individuals who act, because they are allowed to act, in a way parallel to the state, disregarding its statutory

---

<sup>634</sup> Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA), *Mavri vivlos [Black Book]*, 17.

<sup>635</sup> Chalazias and Lamprakis, *I dolofonia tou Lampraki kai to parakratos [The Assassination of Lambrakis and the Parakratos]*, 28.

<sup>636</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 15.

<sup>637</sup> Cf. Petridis, *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967 [The Power and Para-Power in Greece]*, 15–26.

powers.”<sup>638</sup> He clarifies that “the *parakratos* is a complex organism that functions with the awareness of the political system, or as a part of it. The political system authorizes the activities of the *parakratos* when it believes such decision is in its interest.”<sup>639</sup> While Gianoulopoulos focuses on post-civil war Greece, other authors have emphasised the presumably independent status of the *parakratos* as they were writing on its previous stages of development, especially during the “white terror.” They either referred to the state’s tolerance of the *parakratos*<sup>640</sup> or the competition between the state’s authority and the power of the *parakratos*.<sup>641</sup>

Turning to the second approach, Mouzelis and Pagoulatos put a much greater emphasis on the interconnection between the state and the *parakratos*. According to them, various *parastate* organisations were created and operated “under the authorities’ full tolerance and complicity” and “formed the state’s long arm in the political repression of left-wing citizens.”<sup>642</sup> In other words, as van Boeschoten puts it, they were acting “in collusion with the state, but working at its margins.”<sup>643</sup> Gkotzaridis presents the state and the *parakratos* as a sort of partners in crime; she speaks of “the entire machinery of the state and para-state [...] put into motion.”<sup>644</sup> Thus she blames the Greek state for many acts done by the *parakratos*, including the assassination of Lambrakis.

The relation between the state and the *parakratos* became even closer and more subordinate in the approach of Fleischer, according to whom the *parakratos* was “the largely indirectly government-run network of right-wing extremists who manipulated political decisions behind the scenes.”<sup>645</sup> Fleischer positioned the *parakratos* as one of the actors of the “right-wing establishment,” comparing it to the Right, the palace, the army and US representatives, describing their unified reaction during the *iouliana* events:

---

<sup>638</sup> Gianoulopoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 139.

<sup>639</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>640</sup> Alivizatos, ‘The “Emergency Regime” and Civil Liberties, 1946-1949’, 221–22.

<sup>641</sup> Richter, ‘The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War’, 173, 175.

<sup>642</sup> Nikos P. Mouzelis and George Pagoulatos, “Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece,” September 2002, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203311462>, 3-4.

<sup>643</sup> Boeschoten, ‘Enemies of the Nation’, 101.

<sup>644</sup> Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Will Help Me to Get Rid of This Man?’: Grigoris Lambrakis and the Non-Aligned Peace Movement in Post-Civil War Greece: 1951-1964’, 310.

<sup>645</sup> Fleischer, ‘Authoritarian Rule in Greece and Its Heritage’, 265.

“In July 1965, Papandreou was overthrown by palace intrigue. A puppet government was formed by defectors from the Centre Union after often profitable persuasion by, according to a Greek saying, ‘known unknown’ influential circles close to the palace, the para-state, and U.S. agencies.”<sup>646</sup>

Last but not least, Tsoutsoumpis (in compliance with Tunander’s approach) asserts that the *parakratos* was “an entity separate from the transparent, officially recognized ‘democratic’ state, the deep state, or security state, [which] represents coalitions within the government that work to ‘veto’ or ‘fine tune’ policies related to national security.”<sup>647</sup>

The shift from “being tolerated” by the state and “being run (even if indirectly) by the government” is quite significant. The thin line between the interventions of the *parakratos* into the authority of the state and the complicity of state administration in the activities of the *parakratos* is apparent from the definition by Tzannetakos, who saw *parakratos* as “a collective construct of individuals who as a rule act outside the law, substitute or assist public officials, usurp authority possibly in cooperation with its representatives or at its command and carry out illegal missions of all natures.”<sup>648</sup> According to Sakkas, it is the operation mode of various actors rather than their formal status that decides whether they act as *parakratos*. As an example, a foreign embassy may become the *parakratos* if its representatives intervene in the political issues of the country and conspire with other unconstitutional cliques, such as the palace; the security forces may turn into *parakratos* if they engage in politically motivated violence and the army takes the form of *parakratos* if it strives for the dissolution of democracy.<sup>649</sup>

Many authors, among them Stergiou, Seferiades and Pantelouris, outlined the *parakratos* as an agent of the state’s unofficial anti-communist campaign, while the state openly pursued an official anti-communist policy within the boundaries of the legal system.<sup>650</sup> Bournazos, for instance, suggested that the *parakratos* represented an example of “extra-institutional” measures taken by the Greek state to crack down on political opposition in an unofficial manner; and characterised it in opposition to the institutionally based measures, such as the previously described anti-communist

---

<sup>646</sup> Ibid., 242.

<sup>647</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, “Political Bandits”, 39. See also Tunander, ‘Democratic State vs. Deep State’.

<sup>648</sup> Tzannetakos, ‘Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]’, 128.

<sup>649</sup> Sakkas, *Konstantinos Karamanlis*, 127.

<sup>650</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 109; Seferiades, ‘Polarization and Nonproportionality’, 74–75; Pantelouris, *Greece*, 79.

legislation.<sup>651</sup> Likewise, Batsalias understood the *parakratos* as a clandestine power mechanism introduced by the post-civil war right-wing regime to fight its opponents with methods that went further than the “legal administrative repression” that the state used to carry out through standard means.<sup>652</sup> Lyrintzis stated that the “KKE was proscribed and the left-wing sympathisers were systematically suppressed and harassed by the right-wing governments and their specially designed ‘extra-legal’ and ‘para-state’ mechanisms.”<sup>653</sup> The principle of illegality was also emphasised by Tsoukalas, who labelled the years 1961–1974 as transitional on Greece’s path to democracy. In his opinion, the country developed “from ‘anomaly’ to the liberal political normality, from *parakratos* to the rule of law, from paraconstitution to constitution, from authoritative and oppressive arbitrariness to democracy.”<sup>654</sup> Similarly, Gotzaridis suggests that the *parakratos* was “involved in an unhindered violation of the principles of democratic legality in the name of anti-communism.”<sup>655</sup> The approach towards the *parakratos* as a mechanism that prevented post-civil war Greece from restoring a democratic order and the rule of law thus seems to be the one that has been broadly recognised. Moreover, it once again supports the complicity of the Greek state in the wrongdoings of the *parakratos*.

#### 4.7 The Purpose of the *Parakratos*

The Greek historiography commonly interpreted the post-civil war *parakratos* as acting in the interest of multiple actors. Stergiou, for instance, characterised the *parakratos* as a Cold War product, which corresponded with the position of the Greek Left, according to which the *parakratos* emerged under US tutelage.<sup>656</sup> Van Steen framed the idea similarly, claiming that “the 1950s era of Greece’s notorious ‘parastate’ and ‘Paraconstitution,’ [were] byproducts of the nation’s Cold War alliance with the United

---

<sup>651</sup> Bournazos, ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]’, 12.

<sup>652</sup> Christina Batsalias, *Soziale Probleme der Modernisierung in Griechenland Eine empirische Untersuchung mit qualitativen Methoden* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1994), 41.

<sup>653</sup> Lyrintzis, ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece’, 101.

<sup>654</sup> Konstantinos Tsoukalas, ‘I elliniki dekaetia tou ’60: “syntomi i makra” [The Greek 1960s: “Short or Long”]’, in *I ‘syntomi’ dekaetia tou ’60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The ‘Short’ 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, ed. Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008), 41.

<sup>655</sup> Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 664.

<sup>656</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 109.

States.”<sup>657</sup> Kaloudis also affirmed direct US involvement: “Behind the parakratos was a loose network of right-wing paramilitary organizations devoted to protecting Greece, with United States assistance, from the Left.”<sup>658</sup> The *parakratos* was also a result of the dominance of the army during the civil war, which to a great extent persisted in the post-civil war years. Thus, according to Strassner,

The army secured its influence through a quasi-shadow government (*‘parakratos’*), in which the military and right-wing conservative circles from industry and politics influenced the ruling monarchs, while the elected prime ministers were restricted in their freedom of action but knew how to criticise the illegitimate influence of right-wing conservative circles in the population for propaganda purposes.<sup>659</sup>

Besides the US and the army, the Greek historiography deemed the *parakratos* a promoter of the “right-wing establishment,” which included the Right, the palace, and pro-regime economic elites. In this sense, Gianoulopoulos considers the *parakratos* principally an organ of the ERE, which assisted the party in its political campaign.<sup>660</sup> So does Lendakis, according to whom, in the post-civil war conditions, the winning Right characterised itself as the only representative of national interests. It “monopolised patriotism” and presented the potential rise of other political powers as a “deadly threat to the nation.”<sup>661</sup> The Right was willing to use any means necessary to retain control, including the *parakratos*:

This mechanism is the parakratos, which undertakes, in an unorthodox manner, doing what is prevented from being done by the state and its organs due to legality. It is maintained from the secret funds, its actions are instructed by the party-state, and it is protected by cover-ups and non-persecution.<sup>662</sup>

Gkotzaridis also speaks of “the para-state of the Right,” which permeated the most in public discourse because the ruling ERE “tried to retain power by any means necessary.”<sup>663</sup> She explains: “if the Centre and Left used the aforementioned phrase to

---

<sup>657</sup> Van Steen, *Adoption, Memory, and Cold War Greece*, 241.

<sup>658</sup> Kaloudis, *Modern Greece*, 51.

<sup>659</sup> Alexander Strassner, *Militärdiktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert: Motivation, Herrschaftstechnik und Modernisierung im Vergleich [The 20th Century Military Dictatorships: Motivatiopon, Governance Techniques and Modernisation Compared]* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013), 142.

<sup>660</sup> Cf. Gianoulopoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’.

<sup>661</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 18–19.

<sup>662</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>663</sup> Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 647. For the usage of the term (*parakratos tis dexias*) see also Paraskevopoulos, *Georgios Papandreou [Georgios Papandreou]*, 11–12; Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 145.

describe this ‘shadow executive,’ it is because they wished to underscore the Right’s complete identification with the State and, by implication, its determination to maintain power.”<sup>664</sup> Doumanis presented a similar idea, assuming that the *parakratos* was formed by “clandestine networks within the police and security forces that were prepared to do anything to maintain the status quo.”<sup>665</sup>

Hand-in-hand with the preservation of the political power of the Right, the *parakratos* aimed at the oppression of political opposition. According to Pelt, “The *parakratos* was an attempt to co-ordinate persecution of Communists at a regional and national level.”<sup>666</sup> Gianouloupoulos offers a more universalist approach by claiming that the *parakratos* aimed at terrorising citizens and was omnipresent; it was active in cities as well as in the countryside; it was intervening in local communities, neighbourhoods, workplaces and universities.<sup>667</sup> In contrast, according to Alivizatos, during the early post-civil war period, persecution through the employment of the “para-constitution” and the *parakratos* did not only occur during critical moments of political development, such as during election times, but it affected the citizens’ everyday life. Yet, as of the 1960s, it only concerned a relatively small group of highly politically active individuals affiliated with the (mainly communist) opposition. The growing democratisation of Greece (ceased by the 1967 coup) prevented the simple exercise of these parallel mechanisms, at least to the extent it was employed up to that point.<sup>668</sup>

The *parakratos* challenged the opposition in multiple ways. For instance, according to Stavrou, the *parakratos* engaged in the activities of “a significant number of protest structures”; it directed and manipulated the intention of these groups to give concerns over a communist danger some credibility. The *parakratos* took part in political provocations and contributed to creating an atmosphere of tension.<sup>669</sup> Fleischer stresses that the *parakratos* “instigated and controlled crowd violence through the use of

---

<sup>664</sup> Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 647.

<sup>665</sup> Doumanis, *A History of Greece*, 209–10.

<sup>666</sup> Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West*, 44.

<sup>667</sup> Gianouloupoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 140.

<sup>668</sup> Nikos Alivizatos, ‘I adynati metarrythmisi: Syntagma kai parasyntagma sti dekaetia tou ’60 [The impossible reform: Constitution and Paraconstitution in the 1960s]’, in *I ‘syntomi’ dekaetia tou ’60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The ‘Short’ 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, ed. Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008), 50.

<sup>669</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 179–80.

thugs.”<sup>670</sup> Stergiou claims that it instigated electoral violence, intimidated voters, manipulated the vote, and helped eliminate leading opposition figures.<sup>671</sup> Gkotzaridis implies that “contemporaries often linked the two events [the 1961 elections and the 1963 Lambrakis assassination], seeing them as the sinister work of the same hand or the moment when the forces of anomaly crossed a political Rubicon.”<sup>672</sup>

While the more authoritarian course in Greek politics of the 1950s seemed to keep the *parakratos* under control, the growing democratisation of the 1960s triggered a harsh response of the regime. As multiple authors underline, the *parakratos* became increasingly disenchanted from the Right and the palace, further autonomised and striving to exercise political power regardless of the interests of the conservative political elites. Gianoulopoulos suggests that, first, the Right made use of the *parakratos* to fulfil its political aims; however, the diverse goals and motivations of individual actors of the *parakratos* did not necessarily correspond with the needs of the right-wing regime. Be it high-ranking military officers associated with clandestine military organisations, local representatives of the security forces, businessmen or paramilitaries, each of them enforced their own political agendas.<sup>673</sup> The 1967 coup was the utmost example of this development as the EENA putschists carried out their plans against the will of the traditional political actors.<sup>674</sup>

This idea inspired Tzannetakos to claim that the interests of the *parakratos* eventually prevailed over the interests of not only the right-wing regime but the state itself: in his view, the military *parakratos* (para-state) attempted to become a *yperkratos* (super-state) by launching the 1967 coup and, eventually, turned out to be an *antikratos* (anti-state) by negating the previous political regime.<sup>675</sup> Sofoklis Venizelos, the above-mentioned promoter of the term *yperkratos*, made a prophetic statement when accusing Vasileios Kardamakis, a former IDEA member and the Chief of GES, of his direct involvement in the 1961 violent electoral campaign. He warned the Right that it “should beware since this super-state that the ERE created and tends with such affection [...]

---

<sup>670</sup> Fleischer, ‘Authoritarian Rule in Greece and Its Heritage’, 256.

<sup>671</sup> Stergiou, ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’, 115; Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism’, 40.

<sup>672</sup> Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 646.

<sup>673</sup> Gianoulopoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 141.

<sup>674</sup> Gerolymatos, ‘The Road to Authoritarianism’, 7.

<sup>675</sup> Tzannetakos, ‘Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]’, 129. See also Sakkas, *Konstantinos Karamanlis*, 127.



might turn against it.”<sup>676</sup> Sakkas captured the moment of the state’s liquidation by the *parastate* as follows:

A parastate is constituted by forces that act on the side of the state or behind it to its detriment. They may think or claim that they are working for it, appearing as its protectors, but they do not abide by the Constitution, they do not enforce the laws, they act against it, they tend to substitute it, they undermine governments [and] the regime for their own benefit or that of foreigners.<sup>677</sup>

Thus, we are returning to the point when, under the conditions of an authoritarian regime, the *parakratos* (or the *deep state*) merged into uniformity with the state.<sup>678</sup> Lendakis depicted the process leading towards the “victory” of the *parakratos* in this manner:

However, when such a mechanism turns permanent and swells because it has to keep playing its role, then it slowly starts to autonomise and to acquire its own logic, which supports the fact that, eventually, it will play the dominant and decisive role in the outcome of events and the formation of the local political reality. This logic leads it [...] to full autonomisation and, in a given moment, to collision with its generator and its presumed guardian.<sup>679</sup>

To conclude, the historiographical debate on the *parakratos* has predominantly focused on the post-civil war period. However, some characteristic elements of the *parakratos*’ functioning appeared already in the previous decades, starting from the Balkan Wars and continuing to the Greek Civil War. These consisted of countryside paramilitarism expanding due to the widespread system of clientelism and patronage. The informal employment of paramilitaries by public officials in geographical areas out of reach from the centre was supposed to compensate for the weak state power. Employed as private “armies” of local political representatives, the paramilitaries engaged in terrorism and intimidation of political opponents and the “nationalization” of the population in ethnically heterogeneous environments. Their ties to political elites ensured their impunity and tolerance by official security forces.

---

<sup>676</sup> Spyros Linardatos, *Sygchroni Elliniki Istoría: Apo ton Emfylio sti Chounta. Tomos D’ 1961-1964 [Contemporary Greek History: From the Civil War to the Junta. Volume 4: 1961-1964]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1978), 120.

<sup>677</sup> Sakkas, *Konstantinos Karamanlis*, 127.

<sup>678</sup> Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 1–9.

<sup>679</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 19.

However, the Greek historiography has mostly framed as *parakratos* only the post-civil war functioning of a parallel power system, despite its clear continuity from the previous periods. The fact that *parakratos* as a term was a product of the then political discourse, dictated by the Greek Civil War and the Cold War, predetermined its application while analysing the political reality as ideologically biased. Unlike the *military* and *paramilitary parakratos*, the concept of the *parakratos* as a broad conspiracy of multiple actors – the palace, the army, the US representatives, businessmen and the church – under the leadership of the Right has been based on similar ideological presumptions, derived from the anti-Right political discourse of the EK and the EDA. This conspiratorial discursive framing of the *parakratos* influenced how the Greek historiography evaluated the post-civil war historical development and the overall political regime. The left-wing historiography became the leading proponent of this conspiratorial approach.

## 5. The “Parallel Structures” in the Greek Military

In the previous chapter, I briefly outlined the issue of clandestine military organisations and their portrayal in Greek historiography. I focused on the Holy Bond of Greek Officers (IDEA) and the Union of Young Greek Officers (EENA), which the Greek historiography dominantly perceived as the *military parakratos*. The latter group of officers by the 1967 coup undermined the post-civil war political regime that it previously helped set up. Within this chapter, I attempt to approach the *military parakratos* not as a dark conspiracy of malevolent officers that causelessly took place without context. Instead, I perceive it as a dangerous deviation enabled by a non-functioning democratic political system, the long-term politicisation of the armed forces and their proneness to conspiracism. I am limiting myself to several selected episodes concerning the development of clandestine military organisations, starting from their Second World War roots and continuing through their post-civil war functioning.

Before that, I would like to highlight a few points that appear crucial for my analysis. The army emerged from the civil war as a powerful player, even a protector of the political and social order. Especially in the early period, it could openly influence political matters and later still played an irreplaceable role in the anti-communist campaign. The army, however, did not become a political actor overnight. Gradually formed since the 1830s, it initially refrained from politics with two exceptions. In 1843, it supported the public move towards abolishing the absolute rule of King Otto I. (1832–1862) and in 1862 towards his forced abdication, endorsed this time also by the Great Powers.<sup>680</sup> Instead of creating a strong national army based on the Greek revolutionary forces, Otto I., a Bavarian prince by origin, preferred his Bavarian troops. His successor, George I., continued to undermine the army’s coherence by his favouritism of selected military cliques and nepotism.<sup>681</sup> The first genuinely autonomous intervention of the Greek army in domestic politics thus took place only in 1909. The Goudi coup, inspired by the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, represents a momentous event that opened the way

---

<sup>680</sup> Zaharopoulos, ‘Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece’, 20; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)*], 19.

<sup>681</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce* [*Political Forces in Greece*], 342.

to the political rise of Eleftherios Venizelos and the introduction of a new political system.

A secret organisation of junior army officers called the Military League (*Stratiotikos Syndesmos*) launched the Goudi coup, acting out of frustration from the disastrous defeat of the Greek armed forces in the Graeco-Turkish War (1897) and the government's incompetence to reform the country and prepare it for new political and military challenges.<sup>682</sup> Nevertheless, the Military League did not aim to overthrow the existing political and social order. On the contrary, its members were persuaded about the legality of their move and exerted pressure on the government to facilitate the adoption of legislation that they deemed necessary.<sup>683</sup> While until 1909, the army officers limited their political involvement in public affairs, simply acting as arbiters backing particular political groups. However, since the Goudi coup, there was a tendency towards more active participation and even the imposition of military rule. Furthermore, the army's ongoing professionalisation influenced the profile of the officer corps. The army opened its ranks to middle and lower social classes, which facilitated a shift in the overall political preferences of the officers from conservative royalism to liberal republicanism.<sup>684</sup>

Secondly, the post-civil war army was deeply affected by an atmosphere of mistrust, bordering on paranoia, which gave officers additional reasons to conspire. Although burdened with the civil war heritage and the Cold War context, the military conspiracies were principally a result of the army's interwar politicisation, which then also undermined the stability and reliability of the Greek army-in-exile during the Second World War.<sup>685</sup> The roots of these internal disputes lay in the National Schism (1915–1917), when the armed forces became increasingly exposed to the country's political polarisation. They suffered from internal politicisation in a situation where having control over the army constituted a fundamental asset for any domestic political power if it wanted to endure. As a result of the Asia Minor Catastrophe (1922), a military defeat of the Greek army in the war with Turkey, Greece delved into a deep

---

<sup>682</sup> Beaton, *Greece*, 184–88.

<sup>683</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 43–49; Kaloudis, *Modern Greece*, 24–28; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 19–20.

<sup>684</sup> Zaharopoulos, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece', 20–21.

<sup>685</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 216.

political crisis, leading to several military interventions; this included the introduction of the Plastiras dictatorship (1924), which abolished the monarchy in 1924, and the Pangalos dictatorship (1925–1926).<sup>686</sup> Nevertheless, unlike the junta, the interwar military regimes – although driven by the will of their dictators – tended to rely on civilian governments. This was valid even for the Metaxas dictatorship (1936–1941), which depended on the army's confidence while also enjoying the support of the palace and was governed by bureaucratic cabinets.<sup>687</sup>

The ongoing domestic political instability had a detrimental effect on the internal stability of the army: as Gerolymatos stresses, each coup, whether successful or not, always resulted in purges; in 1922, the army was deprived of many monarchist officers, while it lost many republicans in 1933 and 1935.<sup>688</sup> As a result of the latter case, the ideologically more homogeneous, pro-royalist army supported the constitutional change and the reinstatement of George II in 1935, along with the instalment of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936. Under Metaxas, the purges inside the army continued; by 1940, most anti-monarchists were forced into retirement through courts-martial.<sup>689</sup> Such treatment of the officer corps led, on the one hand, to the loss of the army's independence from politics. On the other hand, it increased officers' fears over their career prospects. The limited opportunities for promotions and appointments to high-ranking positions in the post-civil war army constituted an immense source of frustration for the officer corps. Thus, the professional growth of officers depended on their positive attitudes towards the regime, their abilities to perform solid anti-communist convictions, and demonstrate political loyalties.<sup>690</sup>

The clandestine military organisations attempted to resist this influx of political pressure and permanently remove it from the army. Furthermore, membership in such networks could be decisive for facilitating political connections and building one's carrier. Paradoxically, these groups attempted to enforce their interests through the

---

<sup>686</sup> Gerolymatos, 'The Road to Authoritarianism', 9–10; Hondros, 'Greece and the German Occupation', 34–37. For more see Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 85–97; Gallant, *Modern Greece*, 180–87.

<sup>687</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, ix, 6–7; Gerolymatos, 'The Road to Authoritarianism', 9–10.

<sup>688</sup> Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War*, 29.

<sup>689</sup> According to some estimates, the 1935 purge resulted in the removal of about 1,500 officers. By 1940, the number reached approximately 4,500 officers. Gerolymatos, 'The Road to Authoritarianism', 11–12.

<sup>690</sup> For example, see Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 154; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 252–53.

exploitation of their political contacts, whom they often despised – as they despised parliamentary democracy as such. Like the *parastate organisations*, the *military parakratos* represented yet another link in the chain of patron-client relations, a common practice in the then-Greek social environment. Both the civilian and military parallel structures were instigated by the ruling political power but largely evaded its control, which eventually proved fatal to the latter.

Despite this, the post-civil war army was far less internally homogeneous and institutionally autonomous than the historiography generally perceived it. Mainly the left-leaning authors chose to portray the “right-wing establishment” as a firm bulwark of anti-communism formed by the army alongside the Right, the palace, and the Church. The image evoked was particularly fitting for the tradition of left-wing martyrdom,<sup>691</sup> but it was also conveniently exploited by centrist populism.<sup>692</sup> Rather, the armed forces were driven by various internal conflicts between interest groups and individuals with their particularistic agendas.<sup>693</sup>

## 5.1 Wartime Ideological Struggles Inside the Greek Army

During the Metaxas dictatorship, the army became a dominant institution of the state, closely cooperating with the government and the palace. In compliance with the regime’s political character, the officer corps developed an increasingly authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-communist orientation.<sup>694</sup> Despite its relative ideological homogeneity, facilitated by the ongoing purges and intense surveillance practices, small resistance groups existed within its ranks committed to fighting the Metaxas regime: for instance, the Secret Revolutionary Organisation (*Mystiki Epanastatiki Organosi*, MEO) as well as other groups mostly linked to the Communists. Meanwhile, some of the purged republican officers entered resistance or were recruited by the UK’s Special Operation Executive (SOE). The SOE planned to form the core of the future Greek anti-Nazi resistance with the help of republican officers and even of Communists in the

---

<sup>691</sup> Lialiouti, ‘Contesting the Anti-Totalitarian Consensus’, 112; Margaret Poulos, ‘Gender, Civil War and National Identity: Women Partisans during the Greek Civil War 1946-1949’, *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 46, no. 3 (2000): 421.

<sup>692</sup> For later populism and the political exploitation of the past by Andreas Papandreou, see Takis S. Pappas, *Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 138–41.

<sup>693</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 186.

<sup>694</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 191–94; Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 132–33.

eventuality that Metaxas would agree to join the Axis powers.<sup>695</sup> The UK was concerned that Metaxas was surrounded by many pro-German oriented personalities, even though Greece under his leadership succeeded in defeating the attack by fascist Italy.<sup>696</sup>

Following the Axis invasion of Greece, an exiled Greek army was formed under British command in the British-controlled Middle East, known as the Royal Hellenic Army of the Middle East (*Vasilikos Ellinikos Stratos Mesis Anatonlis*, VESMA). The First Greek Brigade, which participated in all major battles in Northern Africa, counted 6,000 men (out of whom 400 were officers) in October 1941.<sup>697</sup> The Greek troops in the Middle East were mainly composed of those called to duty, fugitives, and Egyptian Greeks. Political disputes tainted the process of constructing the army. Monarchist officers joined the military first and thus also occupied the most critical positions. Initially, the character of the army-in-exile was monarchist, although only about 2,500 monarchist officers decided to arrive from Greece. Others chose a different path: they either entered the domestic resistance or remained passive, as General Papagos did.<sup>698</sup> Some of them occupied ministerial posts in collaboration governments or fought in the Security Battalions, aiming to suppress the rising left-wing guerrillas. The Security Battalions were composed of monarchists, Metaxist supporters and some Venizelists, previously purged from the army ranks.<sup>699</sup>

Prime Minister Emmanouil Tsouderos decided to reintegrate some of the dismissed republican officers into the army and even granted the post of commander to General Emmanuel Tsakanakis, purged as a Venizelist in 1935.<sup>700</sup> This move provoked outrage among the royalist camp and plunged the army into political conflicts: first between republicans and monarchists and, later, with supporters of the rising EAM/ELAS. These conflicting sides were struggling for control over the army and the system of promotions and appointments to high-ranking positions and influence over post-war political arrangements in Greece. Concerning the latter, the central questions

---

<sup>695</sup> Veremis and Gerolymatos, 'The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949', 112–13.

<sup>696</sup> Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War*, 40.

<sup>697</sup> Veremis and Gerolymatos, 'The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949', 106–7.

<sup>698</sup> Gerolymatos, 'The Road to Authoritarianism', 15.

<sup>699</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 30–35, 40–44; Kostopoulos, *I autologokrimeri mnimi [The self-censored memory]*, 27.

<sup>700</sup> Only 3,000 out of 4,500 purged officers were called to active duty. Veremis and Gerolymatos, 'The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949', 106–7; Gerolymatos, 'The Road to Authoritarianism', 14.

were whether the future Greek constitution should be monarchic or republican and whether a nationwide referendum should solve the issue.

Initially, the Allies and the Greek government-in-exile aimed at the “democratisation” of the officer corps, which entailed removing radicalised, authoritarian leaning individuals. As a result, the monarchist officers were increasingly relieved from positions of authority or even expelled from active duty, while republican ones secured dominance.<sup>701</sup> Such discrimination logically provoked resentment and led some royalists to associate within a secret organisation called Nemesis and demand the dismissal of republican and pro-communist officers, threatening the government with their mass resignation or even a coup.<sup>702</sup>

In such an atmosphere, the Antifascist Military Organisation (*Antifasistiki Stratiotiki Organosi*, ASO) emerged on the scene in 1941/1942, with branches in the Navy and the Air Force. The ASO promoted the professional interests of liberal and republican officers against the royalists and enforced the idea of post-war Greece as a republic.<sup>703</sup> Its power increased after Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, a Venizelist, was appointed as Minister of Defence; yet, this move further radicalised the Greek units and led to an overall decline in discipline. In February 1943, the military leadership removed many monarchists from active service and isolated them in internment military camps in Sudan. Additionally, in July 1943, a rebellion of ASO in the Second Brigade was suppressed.<sup>704</sup> The establishment of the Political Committee of National Liberation (*Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis*, PEEA) in March 1944 on the territories liberated by the EAM/ELAS intensified the rivalry between the Left and the rest of the political spectrum. The demands of the left-wing officers to reconstruct the government in line with the PEEA’s principles led to the resignation of Tsouderos and the formation of a new rebellion organised by the ASO and its Navy branch. With the help of the British forces, the rebels were disarmed and incarcerated.<sup>705</sup> The uprising nevertheless negatively impacted Greece’s international position and undermined the Greek army’s

---

<sup>701</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 91–92.

<sup>702</sup> Veremis and Gerolymatos, ‘The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949’, 107.

<sup>703</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>704</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 21–26.

<sup>705</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 136–38.



image of a credible and reliable actor that could assist the UK in wartime activities and Greece's liberation.<sup>706</sup>

Following this event and the KKE's refusal to recognise the results of the Lebanon conference in May 1944 (which aimed at the formation of a National Unity government with the participation of the EAM), the exiled government purged the army from many leftists and liberals and appointed anti-communist leadership. Thus, despite the previous democratising attempts, the army's royalist and nationalist wing prevailed by the end of the war. In July 1944, it consisted of the Third Mountain Brigade (*G' Elliniki Oreini Taxiarchia*, EOT), with approximately 2,500 men, and of the Sacred Band (*Ieros Lochos*), counting over 700 men (out of which nearly one half were officers). These units became a stronghold of monarchism, anti-communism and even anti-parliamentarianism, and with the UK's and the US's assistance, formed the core of the post-war Greek army.<sup>707</sup> A similar turn towards royalism took place in the non-leftist resistance in mainland Greece and the Security Battalions: many of their members decided to support the king, which they considered a guarantee of future impunity for their wartime deeds. By contrast, the officers who joined the EAM/ELAS were often victims of the 1935 purge; some of them, being opponents of Metaxas, had already gone underground during the dictatorship. Later, they frequently faced persecution for their participation in the resistance and were barred from entering the reconstructed army.<sup>708</sup>

The deployment of the armed forces in the *Dekemvriana* against the EAM/ELAS in December 1944 stirred up the antagonism between them and the Left. In the subsequent period, the army's hard-line anti-communist and anti-liberal orientation was actively bolstered by continuous purges and programmatically only admitting conscripts with corresponding convictions.<sup>709</sup> Despite the army's ongoing ideological homogenisation, the internal factionalism was rife, causing its inefficiency, already thwarted by constant political interventions. Bound together by strong anti-communism, the individual

---

<sup>706</sup> Veremis and Gerolymatos, 'The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949', 109.

<sup>707</sup> Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 93; Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 195-96; Iatrides, 'Civil War, 1945-1949', 146; George M. Alexander, 'The Demobilization Crisis of November 1944', in *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, ed. John O. Iatrides (Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981), 160-62.

<sup>708</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 140-42.

<sup>709</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 196-97; Zaharopoulos, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece', 21.

military factions did not share common loyalties, be it for the palace or any political party in particular.<sup>710</sup>

The US backing against the DSE, resulting from the Truman doctrine (1947), consisted of the Greek army's financing, providing arms and military equipment, training, and military operations planning. Many of its members were inexperienced, and the leadership unfamiliar with counter-insurgency warfare.<sup>711</sup> The close cooperation with the US cemented the army's policy of non-reconciliation with the Left. The US further cultivated the exclusivist spirit in the officer corps and undermined its loyalty and trust in Greece's parliamentary politics. Under US guidance, as Nikolakopoulos suggests, certain army representatives voiced a vision of the army as an autonomous body, independent from politics and responsible towards US military advisors. He claims that from January 1949, the army's autonomisation reached the institutional level because Papagos as the Commander-in-Chief obtained "nearly dictatorial powers."<sup>712</sup> Until 1951, the civilian control of the army was nevertheless restored. As Hatzivassiliou suggests, when Papagos became prime minister in 1953, he restricted the army's autonomous tendencies as its independence ceased to be in his interest.<sup>713</sup>

The Greek-US military relations intensified in the early 1950s with Greek troops deployed in the Korean War (1950–1953), Greece joining NATO (1952), and the US establishing military bases on Greek territory (1953). The US supported the Greek army within the Military Assistance Program (MAP) beyond the civil war as Greece was part of US containment strategies and should form a barrier to a potential attack led from Bulgaria or delay a potential Soviet invasion.<sup>714</sup> Nevertheless, the US willingness to finance the overgrown Greek army was steadily declining; this eventually resulted in a cessation of military aid in 1962.<sup>715</sup>

The Greek army's size was a particularly contentious topic and subject to ongoing US-Greek and domestic negotiations. As a result of the civil war, the army extended in magnitude far more extensive than its budget could afford on a long-term basis. While the US administration and the Greek Centrists considered the situation

---

<sup>710</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 186.

<sup>711</sup> Geroymatos, 'The Road to Authoritarianism', 17–18.

<sup>712</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 99.

<sup>713</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 25.

<sup>714</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>715</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 155.

economically unsustainable, the Right and the army leadership insisted on preserving a large army that could resist the attack of the much stronger Bulgarian military forces.<sup>716</sup> The Greek officer corps maintained this position both for strategic reasons and for the personal benefits that ensued. According to Zaharopoulos, Greece's accession to NATO meant "a sacred bond" for Greek officers as "the effect of NATO was to unite the geopolitical interests of the Greek nation with the corporate and professional interests of its armed forces."<sup>717</sup> A larger army meant more significant career opportunities for officers regarding promotions and appointments to high-ranking positions. Aside from this, the professional rise of officers greatly depended on their political contacts, loyalty to the regime, and ideological convictions. However, the codependence between military officers and politicians was mutual as the army represented an essential base of support for the ruling elite. In such an environment, secret organisations, or the *military parakratos*, represented a platform for enforcing the army officers' particular interests.

The army leadership maintained a detailed overview of the officer corps' ideological preferences, based on the internal system of supervision and gathering of information on their past and present activities.<sup>718</sup> It emphasised the ideological indoctrination of conscripts, which involved the censorship of their reading. The military radio channel served as one of the key propaganda tools not only inside the army but also towards the public.<sup>719</sup> During elections, the voting of army unit members was organised collectively, controlled, and used to influence electoral results on the local level.<sup>720</sup> All in all, the army had considerable influence over the domestic political scene. Although part of NATO, the role of the Greek army consisted in taking part in the US containment strategy as opposed to Warsaw pact countries; in reality, until the early 1960s, the army was primarily trained and employed for the ensurance of internal security and the elimination of domestic left-wing organisations and activists. For that reason, as Gerolymatos suggests, the army's position was highly political, further

---

<sup>716</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 11–12, 29–31.

<sup>717</sup> Zaharopoulos, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece', 22. See also Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 201, 261.

<sup>718</sup> Zaharopoulos, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece', 23–24.

<sup>719</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 345.

<sup>720</sup> Due to their professional status, soldiers were allowed to vote in the constituency where they were deployed at that particular moment. This rule enabled the military leadership to purposively relocate units and thus decide elections in constituencies with a balanced political situation. This strategy was repeatedly employed beginning with the 1951 election when the army overwhelmingly favoured Papagos and continued through the controversial 1961 election. Ibid., 146–47; Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 45–46.

bolstering its image of being the state's guardian; it was not only involved in the creation and channelling of anti-communist policies but also promoted various anti-communist associations, including *parastate* ones.<sup>721</sup>

## 5.2 The Emergence of Anti-Communist “Secret” Organisations

During the Second World War, conspiratorial groups of military officers of various political orientations were flourishing. Surrounded by six other generals in May 1943, Papagos established a clandestine entity known as Military Hierarchy (*Stratitiki Ierarchia*) in occupied Greece. They supported the military effort of the Allies and the army-on-exile by organising armed forces in the Greek mainland that would – in cooperation with the Security Battalions – free the Greek capital from communists as soon as Greece was liberated from the Axis Powers. Thus, they perceived the communists as an even greater threat than the Nazis by these officers.<sup>722</sup>

In August 1943, the Union of Young Officers (*Enosis Neon Axiomatikon*, ENA) was founded within the army-in exile by seven monarchist junior officers who met in the General Centre for Training and Schools Camp in Palestine after their recent arrival from Greece. The organisation emerged amidst the “democratisation” campaign in the army, after the suppression of the royalist rebellion of February 1943, and thus acted out of resentment against the exiled government. The ENA members were motivated by their meagre professional prospects and unfulfilled political expectations.<sup>723</sup> They also feared the EAM/ELAS's rising power in Greece and radicalised in reaction to the 1944 leftist mutiny.

Governed by a five-member executive committee, the organisation was mainly composed of junior officers, soon counting several hundred. Many managed to assume higher positions in the military hierarchy once the rebelling “antinational” officers were released.<sup>724</sup> Following Greece's liberation, the exiled army transferred back to the country. On 25 October 1944 in Athens, approximately one week after the Greek government reached the capital, seven lower-ranking officers established the IDEA.

---

<sup>721</sup> Gerolymatos, ‘The Road to Authoritarianism’, 19.

<sup>722</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 36–38.

<sup>723</sup> Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 23–28; Veremis and Gerolymatos, ‘The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949’, 115.

<sup>724</sup> Gerolymatos, ‘The Road to Authoritarianism’, 17; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 27.

This new and more universal organisation was a product of the ENA, merged with members of the resistance organisation Trident (*Triaina*).<sup>725</sup> The IDEA members, with the prominence of Colonel Solon Ghikas,<sup>726</sup> actively participated in fights during *Dekemvriana*. According to estimates, the IDEA already counted between 1,000–2,000 members in 1945.<sup>727</sup>

However, IDEA represented only one out of four major power centres in the post-liberation era. The Officers League (*Syndesmos Axiomatikon*) around the Chief of GES Konstantinos Ventiris was anti-communist and pro-monarchist but did not provide unconditional support to the king. The Royal League (*Vasilikos Syndesmos*), on the other hand, united the sympathisers of the king under General Papagos' leadership. The republican Democratic Association (*Demokratikos Syndesmos*) emerged around General Plastiras.<sup>728</sup> These factions pursued political aims and represented their members' professional interests against their opponents within the army ranks. While the Ventiris group dominated the GES and controlled the system of appointments, the groups of Papagos and Plastiras waited for their opportunity. The former projected the king's return as their chance to rise to power, whereas the latter hoped for the opposite since the restoration of monarchy would end their careers.<sup>729</sup> Eventually, the IDEA became the most powerful of them, leaving a significant imprint in the country's post-war political situation as well as in the historiographical debates on the existence of parallel structures in the army. Furthermore, the environment of IDEA members gave rise to its offspring organisation – the EENA.<sup>730</sup>

---

<sup>725</sup> The Triaina operated on the Greek territory as an anti-Axis intelligence group; however, little is known about its origin, membership composition, and activities. Richter, 'The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War', 175; Gerolymatos, 'The Road to Authoritarianism', 17; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 27.

<sup>726</sup> Colonel Ghikas originally headed another clandestine organisation of the exiled army, the Association of Young Officers (*Syndesmos Aksiomatikon Neon*, SAN), whose existence was publicly exposed by Prime Minister Tsouderos. Subsequently, Ghikas joined the ranks of IDEA. See Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 26–27; Kakaras, *I Ellines stratiotikoi [The Greek Military]*, 394.

<sup>727</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 51–52, 132–34; Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 152; Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 27.

<sup>728</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 26–27.

<sup>729</sup> Veremis and Gerolymatos, 'The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949', 114–15.

<sup>730</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 13–14.

### 5.3 The IDEA on the Rise

The growing tendency of IDEA membership continued during the civil war with approximately 4,500 members in 1948 when it most probably became the largest officers' organisation in the history of the Greek armed forces.<sup>731</sup> The IDEA hired its followers among lower and middle-ranking professional officers of a “nationally minded” orientation with the maximum rank of colonel and who had graduated from the military academy after 1929. On the other hand, new graduates and reserve officers were barred from entering. These requirements show that the organisation held reservations about the army leadership, whom it blamed for linking up with politicians. Moreover, it distrusted inexperienced officers or those who would be difficult to control after returning to civilian life.<sup>732</sup>

Many IDEA members served in combat units such as the 3rd Greek Mountain Brigade, the Sacred Band, and the Hellenic Raiding Force.<sup>733</sup> A considerable share of them were former Nazi collaborators, mostly Security Battalionists, whose inclusion in the armed forces lobbied two IDEA members, Georgios Karagiannis and Konstantinos Karabotsios, at the Ministry of Defence. The main criterium for their acceptance to the army was their strong anti-communist sentiments. For instance, Colonel Christos Gerakinis, a former Security Battalions' officer, served as the deputy director of the military academy and was elected for the Greek Rally in the 1952 legislative elections, shortly holding a deputy ministerial position in the Papagos government in 1954.<sup>734</sup>

The IDEA was managed by a collective leadership of five to seven people who decided by a majority vote, although there were attempts to substitute it by a single leader. For practical reasons, this, as well as the high centralisation of the body, proved to be unfeasible. The internal organisation needed to be flexible when reacting to the frequent transfer of officers to new positions within the army so that its operation would not be disrupted. The IDEA leadership was allegedly proposed to Colonel Ghikas, who refused when named a military attaché in Washington. In 1956, he even became the

---

<sup>731</sup> Ibid., 17, 28.

<sup>732</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 99–100.

<sup>733</sup> Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’, 57–59.

<sup>734</sup> Veremis and Gerolymatos, ‘The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949’, 119–20; Gerolymatos, ‘The Road to Authoritarianism’, 19–20; Papdiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 36. See also Giorgos N. Karagiannis, *To drama tis Ellados 1940-1952. Epi kai athliotites [The Drama of Greece 1940-1952. Epics and Misery]* (Self-publication, 1950).

Chief of GES.<sup>735</sup> Besides him, the press later speculated about Papagos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Spyridon, and other key individuals as its presumed heads.<sup>736</sup> Among other prominent IDEA personalities were, for example, Nikolaos Gogousis, Stylianos Tzouvaras, Alexandros Natsinas, Iraklis Kostopoulos, and Athanasios Frontistis. All of them succeeded in building their careers in the top military and political positions.<sup>737</sup>

The hierarchy of the IDEA had several organisational levels; the clandestinity of individual units was further protected by separating newly admitted members from the rest of the organisation, setting up specialised units for a probation period and using coded communications. The IDEA strived to expand both territorially and professionally. Following 1946, it tried to infiltrate the Air Force and the Navy (the former was still strongly affected by the war and was nearly non-existent). Nevertheless, from a long-term perspective, the organisation depended on army officers. The administrative operation of the IDEA was financed from monthly membership fees.<sup>738</sup> The IDEA partly managed to satisfy the expectations of its members to obtain higher-ranking military positions during the civil war. In the post-civil war era, this task became more difficult as the army naturally became deflated during peacetime and chances for promotion decreased. Despite this, the IDEA pursued its political agenda and attempted to enforce the creation of a more nationalist government while supporting Greece's anti-communist political trajectory.<sup>739</sup>

It is believed that the existence of the IDEA was known to all major political actors in Greece. King George II probably learned about the organisation in early 1946 while still residing in exile in London; initially, he sought its support for the restoration of the monarchy. However, in the bigger picture, the IDEA activities clashed with his

---

<sup>735</sup> Karagiannis, *To drama tis Ellados 1940-1952. Epi kai athliotites [The Drama of Greece 1940-1952. Epics and Misery]*, 245–46.

<sup>736</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 181; Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 105–6; Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 50; *Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon: I.D.E.A. A. Apokalypseis Tou Typou [Holy Bond of Greek Officers: IDEA. 1. Revelations by the Press]*, Ellinika Themata: Katochi-Antistasi-Emfylios 20 (Athina, 1975), 4; Kakaras, *I Ellines stratiotikoi [The Greek Military]*, 397.

<sup>737</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 109.

<sup>738</sup> *Ibid.*, 101–6, 131. See also Iatrides, 'Civil War, 1945-1949', 198.

<sup>739</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 111–12, 143–44, 152–53.; Gkotzaridis, "'Who Really Rules This Country?'" , 648–49.

plans to exert total control over military leadership.<sup>740</sup> Between 1947 and 1949, the IDEA leadership allegedly approached US political and military figures,<sup>741</sup> holding numerous meetings with prominent right-wing and centrist politicians.<sup>742</sup> Due to these connections and its strongly anti-communist stance, the IDEA's existence was tolerated by the political representatives who started questioning it only when the organisation proceeded towards a coup attempt.

#### 5.4 The 1951 Coup and Its Aftermath

In principle, the IDEA considered itself a non-political organisation that strived to remove all political pressure from the army. As part of its Encyclical Order No. 8, the IDEA claimed, "This Corps, with its noble traditions, its impartiality, its patriotism, contrasts with the present rottenness of the political leadership, whose partisanship and selfishness verse on treachery."<sup>743</sup> Considering itself "a vanguard of the salvation of the Motherland,"<sup>744</sup> it aimed to suppress leftist tendencies as well as to overcome the factionalism inherited from the interwar and wartime period.

Although its members perceived themselves as "nationally-minded," they did not openly pronounce support to the king. Their stances were nationalist, anti-democratic and anti-communist, favouring Greece's territorial expansion and highly suspicious of parliamentary politics.<sup>745</sup> After the civil war ended, the IDEA entered a phase of relative inactivity, once again revived by the 1950 electoral success of the People's Party. It focused on bolstering the professional interests of its members and

---

<sup>740</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 123–24; Gkotzaridis, "Who Really Rules This Country?", 648.

<sup>741</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 27–28.

<sup>742</sup> Among these were Georgios Papandreou, Sofoklis Venizelos, Themistoklis Sofoulis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Spyros Markezinis, and Alexandros Sakellariou, all in an attempt to secure support and foster contacts. Panos Krikis, *O rolos tou stratou stin exeliki tis istorias apo tin epanastasi tou 1821 mechri to 1975 [The Role of the Army in the Historical Development from the Revolution of 1821 until 1975]* (Athina: Kouloura, 2008), 264.

<sup>743</sup> The IDEA's Encyclical Order No. 8 was published by Eleftheria on 8 August 1951 but was written during the civil war. See also *Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon: I.D.E.A. A. Apokalypseis Tou Typou [Holy Bond of Greek Officers: IDEA. 1. Revelations by the Press]*, 5–7. Cited according to Richard Clogg, ed., *Greece 1940-1949: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War. A Documentary History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 214.

<sup>744</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>745</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 152; Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 346–47; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 30–31.



countering any political reform attempts of the army.<sup>746</sup> However, the IDEA became notorious for the failed 1951 coup supporting Papagos, which also led to its revelation to the public.

The IDEA counted on the possibility of launching a coup already during the civil war.<sup>747</sup> Its 1951 move was a reaction to the resignation of Papagos from his position of Commander-in-Chief, which he handed to Prime Minister Venizelos on 30 May. Papagos was about to start his political career, incompatible with his military role. Many officers, including those involved in the IDEA, received his decision with great concern. Interestingly, in January 1949, the IDEA members objected to Papagos' appointment as the highest army representative. Their scepticism stemmed from the fact that Papagos, although a Greek-Italian war hero, was a retired officer. Papagos only earned their sympathies once the Greek army under his command defeated the DSE half a year later. Subsequently, Papagos preserved his powers, and his decisions continued to be binding for the government, a fact that was once again positively acknowledged by the IDEA. At this point, the IDEA shifted its loyalty from the palace to Papagos since it believed that Papagos would be strong enough to counter the king's influence on military promotions.<sup>748</sup> Thus, once Papagos shared his intention to resign, some of his admirers intervened to prevent him from doing so.

They launched the coup on 31 May 1951 under the leadership of Brigadier General Alexandros Christeas. The putschists took over the GES and the GEETHA at the Old Palace; meanwhile, they also occupied certain strategic spots in the capital, including the radio station building.<sup>749</sup> The 1951 putschists (as well as those in 1967) did not rely on the king's consent and acted without the knowledge of political actors. Still, the two military interventions significantly differed. The 1951 coup aimed solely

---

<sup>746</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)], 45–46.

<sup>747</sup> Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974* [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974], 200.

<sup>748</sup> Gerolymatos, 'The Road to Authoritarianism', 19.

<sup>749</sup> In 1951, a strategy similar to the 1967 coup was used: a day before the coup, on 30 May 1951, the Supreme Military Council convened in Athens for its monthly meeting. The highest military leadership was thus located in the capital while their units were temporarily overseen by their deputies. In reaction to the resignation of Papagos, Theodoros Grigoropoulos (as his successor in the military hierarchy) ordered the representatives of the Supreme Military Council to return to their units and introduce extraordinary security measures. However, as a result of a delay, not all units became subject to these measures in time. Some units (mostly the 7th division, which disobeyed its commander) supported the IDEA coup and assisted in the occupation of strategic spots in Athens. See Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 138–43. See also Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo* [The Greek Politics after the Civil War], 82–83.

at retaining the highest command in Papagos' hands. The 1951 putschists did plan to overthrow the political regime or introduce military rule; therefore, they also lacked any action plan for the coup's aftermath.<sup>750</sup> For the same reason, they did not seek political support or backing from the army or even the whole organisation of the IDEA.<sup>751</sup>

The US representatives denounced this military intervention as a rebellion against the government and excluded a military dictatorship as an option. Despite that, they still favoured the continuation of Papagos as the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>752</sup> Papagos claimed that he was unaware of the coup or even of the IDEA's existence.<sup>753</sup> According to witnesses, he fiercely rejected the move while personally meeting the putschists in his office. Later he pleaded for them not to be punished, excusing their actions by their presumed patriotism.<sup>754</sup> Under the pressure of the authorities, the press was belatedly informed about the coup. Its concealment from the public and the US representatives was supposed to spare Greece a negative campaign during the country's NATO accession period, but it had the opposite effect by raising concerns about the complicity of the authorities or Papagos himself.<sup>755</sup>

The Plastiras–Venizelos government did not keep its initial promise to Papagos and launched an investigation into the officers involved. The case became a dominant topic of the subsequent pre-election campaign, where Papagos capitalised on it the most. Papagos and other prominent politicians, among them Georgios Papandreou, criticised the Centrist government for acting against national interests by exposing the coup and persecuting its actors. As for that matter, in January 1952, the investigation concluded by recommending 17 officers for the courts-martial; however, the government decided, under tremendous pressure from the opposition, to demand that the king grant amnesty to them. The US Ambassador John Peurifoy intervened and defended the IDEA as “anti-communist” and “patriotic” during his audience to the king. The US embassy further argued for the necessity of avoiding any unrest if the conviction of the IDEA

---

<sup>750</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)*], 84–87.

<sup>751</sup> *Ibid.*, 88–89.

<sup>752</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis demokratias* [*The Rape of Greek Democracy*], 28–29.

<sup>753</sup> See Official Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament (*Episima Praktika*), 17 March 1952, 735–736.

<sup>754</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce* [*Political Forces in Greece*], 342; Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 140–43.

<sup>755</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis demokratias* [*The Rape of Greek Democracy*], 28–29; Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 145.

members could decrease the armed forces' operational readiness.<sup>756</sup> Thus, by a Royal Decree on 24 January 1952, King Paul I pardoned “simple and complex political offences committed in Greece from April 1949 until August 1951 by military personnel of all ranks” related to the formation of and participation in the military organisation IDEA and involvement in the mutiny of 30 to 31 May 1951.<sup>757</sup>

The amnesty did not apply to disciplinary violations within the respective period; thus, some officers were punished by being dismissed from the army. Many were, however, rehabilitated following the landslide victory of Papagos in the 1952 legislative elections. In some cases, they even returned to the armed forces or were later promoted. Thus, the 1951 coup and the IDEA's public exposure did not prevent its members from assuming high-ranking positions. For instance, Colonel Gogousis became the Head of the Information Service of the Karamanlis government; Colonel Natsinas held the position of KYP Chief for a decade until the 1963 appointment of the Papandreou government; Lieutenant General Kontopoulos was assigned as the first-ever Chief of GDEA in 1958, which he once again kept until the EK's electoral victory; and Lieutenant General Frontistis became the Chief of GEETHA in 1959. Some other IDEA conspirators achieved prominent positions during the junta, such as Dimitrios Ioannidis, who headed the notorious Special Investigation Department of the Greek Military Police (*Eidiko Anakritiko Tmima tis Ellinikis Stratiotikis Astynomias*, EAT-ESA) and who launched a countercoup against the Papadopoulos leadership in 1973.<sup>758</sup>

## 5.5 IDEA in Decline

Papagos' rise to power in the first half of the 1950s resulted in an overall decrease in IDEA activities. Yet, its members continued to be professionally active and impacted the development of the army. The possible intervention of the IDEA has been discussed, especially in the political scandal and subsequent anti-communist trial known as the Case of the Aviators (*Ypothesi ton Aeroporon*). Media and scholars later interpreted the affair as an orchestrated court case and even a scheme to shake the position of the

---

<sup>756</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)], 77–83; Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 145–49.

<sup>757</sup> Royal Decree of 24 January 1952 “On the Granting of the Amensty” (ΦΕΚ Α 17/1952).

<sup>758</sup> Couloumbis, ‘Post World War II Greece’, 296; Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 24–25; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia* [The Cachectic Democracy], 181; Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 648–49; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)], 105–6, 117.

centrist Plastiras government by uncovering an alleged communist conspiracy in the Hellenic Royal Air Force.<sup>759</sup> Its credibility was enhanced by a tense atmosphere influenced by the campaign against communist spies, which involved the Belogiannis process. Central to this presumed conspiracy was the Air Force Academy (*Scholi Ikaron*), where an investigation was launched in autumn 1951 to purge the institution of unreliable staff. The inquiry determined that retired Lieutenant Colonel Theofanis Metaxas, formerly the academy's director and a personnel officer at the Ministry of Aviation, should be the head of the anti-communist group. The accusations of communist infiltration of the Air Force and potential sabotage seemed to gain some credibility when one of the accused, cadet Nikolaos Akrivogiannis, fled to Albania on a plane.<sup>760</sup>

The subsequent trial with twenty accused, mostly military officers and cadets and several civilians, took place between 22 August and 17 September 1952. It resulted in twelve sentences, out of which two were capital punishment imposed by the Metaxist Law 375/1936 on espionage. Two accused were sentenced to life imprisonment, and the rest of the group received punishments of many years imprisonment.<sup>761</sup> During the process, several defendants withdrew their previous confessions, claiming that they were tortured. Expert opinions later confirmed this factor. Furthermore, it turned out that evidence and witness testimonies were falsified so that the court case would lead to the conviction of the accused.<sup>762</sup>

The hearing, which later went to a court of appeal, peaked between September and November 1953. The court decided on the reduction of the previously imposed punishments. Even afterwards, the issue continued to be debated in parliament and poisoned the atmosphere in the Air Force. Eventually, under the 1955 amnesty, all convicted were freed (but not rehabilitated).<sup>763</sup> The amnesty also covered those who

---

<sup>759</sup> For example, Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 157; Kakaras, *I Ellines stratiotikoi [The Greek Military]*, 403–11.

<sup>760</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 128.

<sup>761</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 157.

<sup>762</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 129.

<sup>763</sup> “Ai diataxeis tou katatethentos chthes nomoschediou peri amnistevseos ton 11 katadikon aeroporon kai peri apolyseos kommouniston kratoumenon [Provisions of the Law Filed Yesterday on the Amnesty for 11 Convicted Aviators and the Release of the Detained Communists],” *Vima*, 8 November 1955; “O k. G. Papandreou ziton devteran anatheorisin tis dikis tis aeroporon [Mr. Papandreou Demands the Second Review of the Trial of the Aviators],” *Kathimerini*, 8 November 1955.

facilitated the realisation of the staged process and, therefore, thwarted the prosecution of those involved in torturing the defendants and providing false testimonies.<sup>764</sup>

The Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (*Geniko epiteleio aeroporias*, GEA) Emmanouil Kelaidis, an IDEA member and a person close to Sofoklis Venizelos, was later determined to be the main person behind the plot, aiming at purging the Air Force from liberal officers.<sup>765</sup> Some sources mention another IDEA member (and a future junta's official), Antonios Skarmaliorakis, who was supposed to design the scheme within the GES where he worked with his team at the Information Security Directorate (*Diefthynsi Pliroforion Asfaleias*).<sup>766</sup> Despite the engagement of certain IDEA members, the organisation as such was probably not involved. IDEA was traditionally strong in the ground forces but never in the Air Force and the Navy. Thus, as Papadiamantis assumes, the case was more a result of internal disputes in the Air Force.<sup>767</sup> However, it can illustrate the persistent influence of IDEA members directly or indirectly affecting political development and the situation in the military throughout the 1950s.

The IDEA as an organisation was steadily declining, and most probably, it ceased to exist in the second half of the 1950s, surviving only as a professional network of old contacts.<sup>768</sup> First of all, under Papagos' rule, IDEA officers were generally satisfied with the political situation; secondly, many of them reached their professional aims during the 1950s, and either occupied senior military positions and were thus involved in the army's leadership or retired and, alternatively, continued their careers in politics or state administration. For instance, Ghikas retired from his position as the Chief of GES in June 1956; more IDEA members followed in his steps in the late 1950s and the early 1960s.<sup>769</sup>

---

<sup>764</sup> “I antipolitevisis zitei timorian ton enochon vasaniston kai psevdomartyron tis Aeroporias [The Opposition Demands Punishment of the Guilty Torturers and False Witnesses of the Air Force], *Nea*, 11 April 1957; “I kyvernisis kalyptei tous vasanistas ton aeroporon [The Government Covers the Torturers of the Aviators],” *Avgi*, 11 April 1957. For the media coverage of the case, see GAK (Athens), Archive of the Royal Palace, f. 612.

<sup>765</sup> “Terastion thema ithikis taxeos [Immense Problem with the Ethical Order],” *Eleftheria*, 6 June 1957. See also Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 157.

<sup>766</sup> Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’, 60–61. See also Vlassis Dedes, *I Diki ton Aeroporon [The Trial of the Aviators]* (Athina: Self-publication, 1987).

<sup>767</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 130.

<sup>768</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 232.

<sup>769</sup> According to Hatzivassiliou, by the time the Centre Union rose to power in 1963, most IDEA officers had already retired from the army. In April 1964, Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou rejected the existence of such an organisation in the army. Regardless of this, rumours about the continuous activities

In contrast, the needs of IDEA's junior, lower-ranking officers still waited to be saturated. In comparison to their more senior colleagues, this younger generation appeared to be more radical in its demands; they were fervently nationalist and anti-communist as well as critical of Papagos, whose anti-leftist policies it considered as insufficient.<sup>770</sup> Furthermore, IDEA's junior officers showed little respect to the monarchy or were directly republican, inspired by Egypt's authoritarian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, who overthrew the monarchist regime in 1952 and dominated his country until he died in 1970.<sup>771</sup> As one of their leading personalities, Georgios Papadopoulos even received the nickname "Nasser" to emphasise both his admiration of the Egyptian president and his constitutional preferences.<sup>772</sup> The visions and interests of the junior officers, dissimilar from those of the older IDEA generation, contributed to their gradual alienation.

## 5.6 The Establishment of the EENA

The IDEA's junior members gained greater independence in the critical period between Papagos' death in October 1955 and the legislative elections of February 1956. In these elections, the centrist and leftist powers formed an anti-rightist electoral coalition, the Liberal Democratic Union (*Fileleftheri Dimokratiki Enosi*, FIDE), gaining over 48 per cent of the vote. Despite this, the right-wing ERE of Konstantinos Karamanlis emerged with 47 per cent as the winner due to the controversial electoral system in effect. Amidst the heated discussions over a potential centre-left government, which shocked the conservative political and military circles, rumours about the possibility of a coup started spreading. Yet, none of the state's dominant actors – the palace, the military leadership, or the ERE – favoured such a solution.

Similarly, the senior members of IDEA refused to intervene, and Ghikas, specifically, was not willing to endorse such a move, which would go against the king's

---

of IDEA were persistent, and it was widely believed that the 1967 coup was carried out by this organisation. See Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 141; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 13–14, 144–45; Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 346.

<sup>770</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 146–48.

<sup>771</sup> Gkotzaridis, "Who Really Rules This Country?", 650; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 130–37.

<sup>772</sup> C. M. Woodhouse, *I anodos kai i ptosi ton Syntagmatarchon [The Rise and Fall of the Colonels]* (Athina: Elliniki Evroekdotiki EPE, 19..), 23–24.

will.<sup>773</sup> The junior officers received this passive and conciliatory approach with incomprehension. Among them were Majors Dimitrios Ioannidis, Georgios Papadopoulos, and Dimitrios Patilis, future leading representatives of the junta, who established a new organisation – the EENA. The organisation’s members committed to the idea that the palace’s consent should not condition its future actions.<sup>774</sup> The example of the EENA thus shows that despite the ongoing purges, the army was not perfectly homogeneous and enabled the internal presence of groups that were increasingly more hostile to the political establishment.<sup>775</sup> The EENA portrayed Greece as a country in decay, facing potential disintegration due to the rising domestic communist threat, which needed to be combated by the army – the nation’s guardian.<sup>776</sup>

The disputes between the IDEA and the EENA did not prevent their members from continuing cooperation on the interpersonal level. For example, as a KYP operative since 1961, Papadopoulos was in close contact with the Chief of KYP Natsinas, who acted as his mentor and protector.<sup>777</sup> Furthermore, the EENA was cooperating with the Director of the Service of Information, Gogousis.<sup>778</sup> These connections, however, do not imply that the IDEA identified itself with EENA’s activities. The environment of IDEA officers gave rise to not only EENA sympathisers but also to other personalities with qualitatively different attitudes. Some of them later formed the resistance organisation Free Greeks (*Eleftheroi Ellines*), which actively fought against the junta – and thus the men of EENA – and represented its ideological counterpart in the armed forces during the military dictatorship.<sup>779</sup>

The 1958 legislative election, which marked a new strengthening of the Left, provided another incentive for the activation of the EENA. The organisation principally distrusted Karamanlis and was open to radical solutions for the political situation. New speculations about a planned military intervention started spreading, putting pressure on the Karamanlis government. However, once again, a potential coup

---

<sup>773</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 56–57.

<sup>774</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfyllo Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 228–29.

<sup>775</sup> Gerolymatos, ‘The Road to Authoritarianism’, 7.

<sup>776</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 151.

<sup>777</sup> Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 649.

<sup>778</sup> Kallivretakis, ‘Mia istoria tou 1958, proangelos tou 1963 (kai tou 1967) [The History of 1958, the Precursor of 1963 (and of 1967)]’, 207–8.

<sup>779</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 142.

did not have the support of the army's leadership as well as of the US, which demanded approval of the palace.<sup>780</sup> Former Chief of GES and IDEA member Ghikas now served as Minister of Communications and Public Works, and together with the Minister of Defence, Giorgos Themelis, planned to introduce increased anti-communist measures in the country. Alongside the rumours of an upcoming coup, the authoritarian-leaning Ghikas was discussed as a potentially fitting personality to become a new dictator.<sup>781</sup>

After Ghikas, the more moderate Petros Nikolopoulos, a strong critic of factionalism in the army, occupied the position of the Chief of GES. Nikolopoulos uncovered the existence of the EENA and aimed to crack down on the clandestine activities of the conspiratorial officers, including the future junta leaders – aside from Papadopoulos, of course – Nikolaos Makarezos and Ioannis Ladas.<sup>782</sup> Removed from his office by Karamanlis, Nikolopoulos was replaced in November 1959 by the former IDEA member Vasileios Kardamakis while another IDEA representative Athanasios Frontistis became the Chief of GEETHA.<sup>783</sup> These changes in the top army leadership enabled the EENA to strengthen and develop its structures, push its members through to higher-ranking positions, and get actively involved in the designing of anti-communist operations.<sup>784</sup>

## 5.7 The Pericles Plan

In the period between the 1958 and 1961 legislative elections, as outlined in the previous chapter, the army played an irreplaceable role in the intensified anti-

---

<sup>780</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 231.

<sup>781</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 64–65; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 151–53.

<sup>782</sup> In summer 1957, the Ministry of National Defence received a document that characterised EENA's requests and threatened the government with undesirable consequences if these demands were not met. Subsequently, Nikolakopoulos launched an investigation which discovered that the core of the EENA was formed by approximately fifteen officers, holding significant though not crucial posts at the GES and in the units. Therefore, the Chief of GES did not perceive the EENA to be capable of starting a coup yet. Specifically, the results of the inquiry mention Lieutenant Colonel Papadopoulos (newly promoted) and majors Dimitris Ioannidis, Ioannis Ladas, Nikolaos Gantonas, Michail Balopoulos, Antonios Mexis, Dimitrios Patilis, and Dimitrios Karapiperis. Following the dismissal of Nikolakopoulos in November 1959, the investigation of the EENA was called off. See Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 146–48, 154–56; Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 58; Kallivretakis, 'Mia istoria tou 1958, proangelos tou 1963 (kai tou 1967) [The History of 1958, the Precursor of 1963 (and of 1967)]', 201–3.

<sup>783</sup> Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West*, 258; Gkotzaridis, "'Who Really Rules This Country?'"', 650–52.

<sup>784</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 64–65; Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 233.



communist persecution and propagandist campaign. Former IDEA and EENA members significantly contributed to these efforts from their positions in the army, the KYP, and organs of state administration. The Information Service, directed by Gogousis, was supposed to coordinate governmental anti-communist policies, including the supervision of *parastate* organisations, but as shown by Stefanidis, it was criticised for mismanagement, internal disputes, and incompetence; moreover, it struggled with the existing overlap in responsibilities with regard to related services of the army, security forces, and the KYP.<sup>785</sup> In reaction to this, the supreme military leadership was charged with the task of synchronising these efforts in summer 1960, resulting in the establishment of two new bodies: the advisory Primary Committee (*Protovathmia Epitropi*) and the more important Secondary Coordinating Committee of Information and Enlightenment (*Devterovathmia Syntonistiki Epitropi Pliroforion kai Diafotiseos*), which, based on the Primary Committee's reports, was deciding on the coordination of various intelligence and propaganda services and issued recommendations for the government.<sup>786</sup>

Importantly, those who participated in the work of the Secondary Committee were all IDEA members (some of them directly being putschists in 1951). Among them were the Chief of GEETHA Frontistis as its chairman, the Chief of GES Kardamakis, the Director of GDEA Kontopoulos, the Chief of Gendarmerie Vardoulakis, the Chief of Police Rakintzis, the Director of MEO Ballas, the Director of Information Service Gogousis, and the Chief of KYP Natsinas, while the KYP operative Papadopoulos served as the committee's secretary.<sup>787</sup> Prime Minister Karamanlis endorsed the Secondary Committee's activities and facilitated the promotion of at least three committee members – Frontistis, Kardamakis, and Gogousis. He either participated in crucial meetings of the committee or was informed by the Director of his Military Office, Brigadier General Dionysios Verros. The issue of the personal involvement of Karamanlis in the planning of anti-communist actions appears to be fundamental since this body has been largely held responsible for the implementation of the so-called “Pericles Plan,” an intelligence and propagandist operation designed to counter the

---

<sup>785</sup> Stefanidis, ‘I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]', 229–30.

<sup>786</sup> Ibid., 230. See also Petridis, *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967 [The Power and Para-Power in Greece]*, 92–138.

<sup>787</sup> Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 90–91; Kallivretakis, ‘Mia istoria tou 1958, proangelos tou 1963 (kai tou 1967) [The History of 1958, the Precursor of 1963 (and of 1967)]’, 207–8.

EDA's potential rise in the 1961 legislative elections. Yet, Karamanlis later denied having known about the existence of such a plan.<sup>788</sup>

The final version of the Pericles plan was approved shortly before the vote during three consecutive meetings of the Secondary Committee in August 1961.<sup>789</sup> It engaged a vast range of actors from armed and security forces, including the gendarmerie and the Battalions of National Defence (TEA), through state propagandist agencies (which were supported by the representatives of the Church on the local level), to anti-communist paramilitaries and citizens' associations. Both the pre-election campaign and the voting day (29 October) were affected by physical attacks and psychological intimidation, happening both in the countryside and in urban areas.

The left-wing *Avgi* reported violence throughout October and even published its first speculations about an organised scheme behind the electoral violence.<sup>790</sup> In contrast, the centrist press only started reflecting on the situation when the EK's candidates began to be attacked.<sup>791</sup> Papandreou failed to anticipate the extent of electoral violations and initially even considered post-electoral cooperation with the ERE. Apparently, he concluded that defending the EDA was not in his party's interest.<sup>792</sup> The ERE's leadership did not openly turn down the accusations about the widespread violence, which – according to Nikolakopoulos – seemed a confirmation of it.<sup>793</sup> Assaults by the paramilitaries often took place with tolerance or the complicity of the police and the gendarmerie. Overall, the violence claimed two victims. On election day, a soldier and an EDA executive, Dionysios Kerpiniotis, was murdered in Demiri,

---

<sup>788</sup> Stefanidis, 'I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]', 231–32.

<sup>789</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 219–20; Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon [The State of Nationally-Minded]', 47.

<sup>790</sup> See for example, "O laos saronei tin via kai gigantonei to PAME [People are Sweeping the Violence and the PAME is Becoming Gigantic]," *Avgi*, 1 October 1961, 1; "O k. Venizelos ekalase tin ypiresiaki n'anasteili to G' Psifisma [Mr. Venizelos Called on the Interim Government to Suspend the Third Resolution], *Avgi*, 11 October 1961, 1; "I tromokratia strefei tora tous dexious kata tis ERE [Terror Now Turns Right-Wingers Against the ERE]," *Avgi*, 13 October 1961, 4; "I proeklogiki tromokratia epekteinetai sti mousiki kai ston kinimatografo [The Pre-Election Terror Expands to the Field of Music and Cinema]" and "Avstires proeidopoiiseis tou PAME kai tis EK gia to tromokratiko orgio [Stern Warnings from the PAME and the EK About the Terror Orgy]," *Avgi*, 17 October 1961, 2 and 3; and finally, "Pataxin ton praxeon vias zitei i Enosis Kentrou [The EK Demands the Combatting of Acts of Violence]," *Vima*, 18 October 1961, 1.

<sup>791</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 270.

<sup>792</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 169.

<sup>793</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 269–78.

Arcadia; three days earlier, the representative of EDA's youth, Stefanos Veldemiris, was shot dead in Thessaloniki by a member of the gendarmerie.<sup>794</sup>

The opposition reacted with mass protests, student demonstrations, and industrial actions. The largest of them was organised by the EK in Athens on 20 April 1962. The protesters were faced with the violence of the security forces, causing several deaths over time.<sup>795</sup> The post-electoral mobilisation of the opposition was already raising great concerns in the army's leadership. Chief of GEETHA Frontistis and Chief of GES Kardamakis, both IDEA members, retired from the army in 1962. They were replaced by candidates close to the palace – Lieutenant-General Ioannis Pipilis and General Petros Sakellariou. Consequently, new rumours started spreading about a potential coup prepared by junior officers, disenchanted by this change in leadership and by the political developments.<sup>796</sup>

The situation worsened a year later when the position of the Karamanlis government further weakened under the weight of investigations of the Lambrakis assassination. The EENA, which was – without convincing evidence – sometimes blamed for having instigated the murder case,<sup>797</sup> withdrew its support from the prime minister. Natsinas criticised him too for failing to provide sufficient backing to the security forces, which found themselves under great pressure during the investigation.<sup>798</sup> In the respective period, the EENA split into two factions, the first one headed by Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos, who opposed fostering political ties with the ERE, and the other one led by Lieutenant Colonel Papadopoulos. The latter was a proponent of closer cooperation with ERE deputies, among them Natsinas and Nikolaos Farmakis, who was a representative of the ERE's far-right. Papadopoulos

---

<sup>794</sup> Christos Avramidis, «Spase kardia mou echathi to gelasto paidi»...55 chronia apo ti dolofonia tou Stefanou Veldemiri, *To Periodiko*, 29 October 2016, <http://www.toperiodiko.gr/55-χρόνια-από-τη-δολοφονία-του-στέφανου/#.XZYfo0YzY2w> (accessed 12 November 2020); Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 115–16.

<sup>795</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 105.

<sup>796</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 236–37; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 180.

<sup>797</sup> Gkotzaridis, *The Life and Death of a Pacifist*, 218.

<sup>798</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 82–84; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 180–86.

considered them as important channels of information, facilitating the EENA's communication with the Right.<sup>799</sup>

The EENA allegedly started preparing another coup for November 1963, aiming to prevent the appointment of the Papandreou government and the potential Centre-Left cooperation. The plan even secured support from General Sakellariou, but neither from the palace nor the US.<sup>800</sup> The EENA members perceived Papandreou's premiership as proof of growing communist penetration of the state and feared that his government would launch yet another purge of the army, introducing his allies to top military positions. Indeed, the cabinet proceeded towards some crucial professional changes in the armed and security forces' leadership. First and foremost, Natsinas resigned as KYP Chief under pressure, and other senior positions, including the chiefs of the air forces and naval staff, were replaced by the EK's candidates.<sup>801</sup>

About a month after the 1964 re-election of the EK, on 25 November 1964, the tense political atmosphere became further aggravated due to a terrorist attack during a public event at the Gorgopotamos bridge, commemorating the successful 1942 joint operation of the EAM/ELAS and EDES. Although attended for the first time by the representatives of both resistance organisations, the ceremony continued reflecting on the ongoing politicisation of the resistance heritage. The vice-Minister of Defence Michalis Papakonstantinou represented the Papandreou government; despite this, the authorities imposed restrictions on the event, and Papakonstantinou eventually disbanded it. The deadly blast that followed killed thirteen and injured forty-five people. Various theories emerged, blaming a civil war bomb, the CIA, or KYP agents for the explosion; however, former EAM/ELAS members were subsequently put to trial.<sup>802</sup> The ERE, led by Kanellopoulos, took the opportunity to accuse the Papandreou government of leading the country towards collapse, emphasising that the communist threat to the country was imminent.<sup>803</sup> The British Embassy commented on the event in the same vein:

---

<sup>799</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 286–88.

<sup>800</sup> Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 1106–10; Gianoulopoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]', 142.

<sup>801</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 344–45.

<sup>802</sup> Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 1114–17.

<sup>803</sup> Antonis Klapsis, 'O Panagiotis Kanellopoulos kai i politiki krissi tou 1965-1967 [Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and the Political Crisis of 1965-1967]', in *Praktika epistimonikou synedriou gia ton Panagioti Kanellopoulo, Athina, 22-25 Noemvriou 2012 [Proceedings of the Scientific Conference on*

The anniversary had been turned by the Communists [the EAM supporters] into an occasion for a display of strength; they brought several thousand supporters from all parts of the country and their behaviour, which before the explosion had been aggressive, turned into a physical attack on the police in the panic which followed the explosion.<sup>804</sup>

A few months later, amidst growing political instability, Prime Minister Papandreou re-opened the issue of the violent 1961 pre-election campaign during a speech to parliament on 23 February 1964. He disclosed information on the existence of the Pericles Plan, a document that was allegedly found in the archives of the Ministry of National Defence and proved the involvement of the armed and security forces in electoral intimidation and voter rigging. Furthermore, he accused IDEA and EENA members of participating in the plot.<sup>805</sup> The Pericles plan was based on older NATO contingency plans, designed in 1959 by the armed forces and KYP to neutralise the communist threat in the event of war through preventive arrests. The Secondary Committee finalised it over the summer of 1961.<sup>806</sup> The plan outlined the army's role as crucial due to its geographical distribution over the whole territory, while the gendarmerie and TEA dominated the countryside, disposing of good access to local information and contacts.<sup>807</sup> Many other actors were involved, including the Church, right-wing trade unions and professional organisations, nationalist citizens' associations, veteran and reservist organisations, and organisations of local self-administration.<sup>808</sup>

The plan aimed to keep the electoral result of the Left under 20 per cent, a target that was indeed met in 1961. Yet, it did not explicitly mention the Left: it operated with general terms, anticipating a psychological war between the "Blue" (*ethnikofrones*) and the "Yellow" (communists). The latter were defined as the utmost danger and the primary political opponent to be demoralised, using systematic violence, mass arrests,

---

*Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Athens, 22-25 November 2012*] (Athina: Etaireia filon Panagioti Kanellopoulou, 2013), 560–63.

<sup>804</sup> NA FO 371/180008 (22 June 1965).

<sup>805</sup> Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 268; Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 159; Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 161–63; Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 55–56.

<sup>806</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 208; Samatas, 'Greek McCarthyism', 40; Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 221.

<sup>807</sup> Gkotzaridis, "'Who Really Rules This Country?'"', 654; Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 221–22; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 167.

<sup>808</sup> Stefanidis, 'I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]', 235.

increased surveillance, blacklisting, and the isolation of left-leaning populations as some of the methods of the anti-communist struggle.<sup>809</sup> Various scholars have broadly discussed the issue of whether the Pericles Plan was eventually implemented. There is no historical evidence for this particular plan's actual usage, mainly because no particular order was preserved in the archives. The Pericles Plan was only one of four different action plans devised to lead psychological operations.<sup>810</sup> However, as Rizas emphasised, the fundamental question does not stand in whether the Pericles Plan was employed in the 1961 elections or not, but whether the army intervened in the elections and how the ERE benefited from it, which are two points that have been sufficiently proven.<sup>811</sup>

The ERE's leadership condemned Papandreou's accusations as a way of putting national security at risk. Kanellopoulos called the revealed documents false and even blamed Papandreou for acting in a purposive way to increase his fading public popularity and strengthen his party's weakening coherence.<sup>812</sup> Furthermore, Kanellopoulos, as well as Frontistis (now acting as ERE's deputy), stated that the plan was not designed to be used in elections but in the possibility of a war.<sup>813</sup> This claim is questioned by Stefanidis, according to whom measures such as mass arrests rather point to the first option.<sup>814</sup>

Papandreou defended his decision to expose the plan by his democratisation attempts of public institutions, including the army.<sup>815</sup> With that, he further increased the animosity between his government and the palace, which claimed the highest authority over military affairs. As a result of the Lambrakis case, Papandreou pushed through his candidate, Stavros Valsamakis, to the post of the Chief of Gendarmerie against the

---

<sup>809</sup> Petridis, *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967 [The Power and Para-Power in Greece]*, 68–87; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 268–70; Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 169–70; Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 82–83.

<sup>810</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 167–68.

<sup>811</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 189.

<sup>812</sup> Antonis Klapsis, "Proeortia tis Ioulianis krisis [A Prelude to the Iouliana Crisis]," *Kathimerini*, 23 October 2016, <https://www.kathimerini.gr/880491/article/epikairothta/ellada/proeortia-ths-ioylianhs-krisis> (accessed 28 December 2020).

<sup>813</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 208.

<sup>814</sup> Stefanidis, 'I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]', 235.

<sup>815</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 161–65; Gkotzaridis, "Who Really Rules This Country?," 653–54.

king's wish. However, in return, he appointed two conservative candidates – General Ioannis Gennimatas as Chief of GES and conservative Petros Garoufalias as Minister of National Defence.<sup>816</sup> While attempting to preserve a fragile balance, the issue of high-level appointments eventually led to Papandreou's resignation in July 1965 once he was weakened by yet another scandal related to parallel structures in the army.

## 5.8 The ASPIDA Scandal

In March 1965, Chief of GES Gennimatas uncovered a clandestine conspiratorial group known as ASPIDA,<sup>817</sup> formed by the members of the Greek Expeditionary Troops in Cyprus. The palace presumably knew about it already earlier that year.<sup>818</sup> Gennimatas based his findings on the statement provided by two officers, who confided to him the names of ASPIDA's leader, Captain Aristidis Bouloukos, and other two members and the text of the organisation's oath. The ASPIDA aimed to spread the EK's influence in the predominantly right-wing army and counter opponents of the Papandreou government.<sup>819</sup>

As a result of later investigations, Andreas Papandreou, the prime minister's son and, since April 1964, the deputy minister for coordination in his father's cabinet, was presented as a central figure of this military conspiracy. The younger Papandreou, heading the EK's left-wing, was a controversial figure with provocative political style, inconvenient not only for right-wing opposition but also for many prominent representatives of the Centre, such as Stefanos Stefanopoulos and Konstantinos Mitsotakis. In the mid-1960s, Andreas Papandreou repeatedly made his presence in public, where he – accompanied by a group of sympathising army officers – called for the radical reform of the military. His entanglement in the ASPIDA affair was thus

---

<sup>816</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 107–9. Traditionally, the Greek monarchs claimed their right to decide on the most significant issues, including the promotions and appointments to high-ranking military positions. Papandreou as prime minister respected; however, the foreign political stance of the EK towards the NATO, especially in the Cyprus issue, differed from the conservative position of the king and the ERE. Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974 [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974]*, 265–67.

<sup>817</sup> The ASPIDA, meaning “Shield,” is an acronym that stood for “Officers Save the Country, Democracy, Ideal, Meritocracy (*Aksiomatikoi Sosate Patrigan Idanika Dimokratia Aksiokratia*). For example see Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 164–65.

<sup>818</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 335.

<sup>819</sup> *Ibid.*, 336.

particularly displeasing for his father and contributed to the weakening of the latter's position both as prime minister and party leader.<sup>820</sup>

After his discovery, Gennimatas, distrustful towards the Papandreou government, solely informed the palace and the Minister of Defence Garoufalias, all while keeping the issue hidden from the prime minister. The same situation repeated in May 1965, when Papandreou was not notified about the statement provided by Grivas, who was in close contact with Bouloukos in Cyprus as the latter was his long-time supporter.<sup>821</sup> Despite their connection, Grivas denounced the activities of the ASPIDA and claimed that the discipline in the said unit significantly worsened following the Cyprus visit of Andreas Papandreou in November 1964; this allegedly instigated the conspiracy activities in question.<sup>822</sup>

In reaction, Garoufalias persuaded Papandreou to remove two officers who were previously appointed with the EK's support from the KYP and the 2<sup>nd</sup> branch of GES for failing to expose the conspiracy.<sup>823</sup> Until this point, the affair remained concealed from the public, which, however, changed when a local Larisa newspaper, sympathising with the ERE deputy Konstantinos Rodopoulos, published information on the organisation called the ASPIS, thus opening the way to heated debates and eventually to a long-term political crisis.<sup>824</sup>

To a great extent, the ASPIDA affair was symptomatic of the tense atmosphere that emerged in the armed forces due to Georgios Papandreou's accession to power. At the same time, it was a continuation of the decades-long factionalism in the military. The ERE politically exploited the alleged involvement of Andreas Papandreou, claiming that the EK attempted to penetrate the army with its supporters and expose it to communist infiltration.<sup>825</sup> The head of the conspiratorial group, Bouloukos, was a supporter of the centrist government and also an acquaintance of the EK's Minister of Foreign Affairs Stavros Kostopoulos. Bouloukos held a position in the KYP, to which

---

<sup>820</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 169.

<sup>821</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 210–11.

<sup>822</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 167–68.

<sup>823</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 213–15.

<sup>824</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 337.

<sup>825</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 164–65; Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 167–68.



the Papandreou government was able to appoint many of its candidates as the agency was directly answerable to it.<sup>826</sup> Bouloukos was persuaded that the Papandreou cabinet underestimated the army's anti-governmental stances and founded the ASPIDA as a platform to support the government's interests. In this sense, the ASPIDA hostilely profiled itself against Chief of GES Gennimatas and Minister of Defence Garoufalias.

Strikingly, the ASPIDA was inspired by IDEA's mission, which is especially remarkable in the formulation of the organisation's oath or its aspirations for power. This can be explained by the simple fact that at that time, the IDEA was the only Greek secret military organisation that was known in great detail, even to the wider public.<sup>827</sup> The ASPIDA members sought the EK's support and fostered contacts with centrist politicians. In autumn 1964, Bouloukos encountered Andreas Papandreou during a personal meeting.<sup>828</sup> With about 40 members at that time, the ASPIDA strived to spread its influence to the GES, the KYP and the strategically important units in the Attiki region in Central Greece.<sup>829</sup> In winter 1964/1965, Bouloukos was moved to Cyprus to work on counterespionage. Yet, gaining support for the ASPIDA in Cyprus was difficult. Under Papandreou's premiership, many officers who openly opposed his attempts to reform the army were relocated to distant posts far away from the capital, their promotion was blocked, or they were straightaway retired.<sup>830</sup>

The assumption that the army faced a widespread left-wing conspiracy was further boosted by what turned out to be a set-up known as the Sabotage of Evros. The event referred to sabotage presumably carried out based on the KKE's suggestion by two soldiers in the 117<sup>th</sup> artillery unit in Orestiada, Evros. As a result of their alleged hostile activities, three military motor vehicles were destroyed. The aforementioned

---

<sup>826</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 210–11.

<sup>827</sup> Ibid.

<sup>828</sup> Both Andreas Papandreou and Aris Bouloukos refer to their meeting in their memoirs; yet, Papandreou claimed that despite meeting Bouloukos, he had never heard of the existence of the ASPIDA, see Andreas P. Papandreou, *I dimokratia sto apospasma [Democracy at Gunpoint]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Karanasi, 1974), 219–20; Aris Bouloukos, *Ypothesi ASPIDA [The ASPIDA Affair]* (Athina: Typos, 1989), 170–71. Furthermore, it is not determined whether they found common ground; Bouloukos was critical about Andreas Papandreou's negative stance towards NATO. Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 212–13.

<sup>829</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 212–13.

<sup>830</sup> Close, *Greece since 1945*, 107–9.

soldiers confessed to their deeds after being tortured and later received light sentences for damaging the property.<sup>831</sup> According to *Kathimerini*,

On interrogation by their officers, they admitted their actions and said they were specially trained by civilians for such acts of sabotage. They gave the names of their civilian instructors who were arrested in a few hours.<sup>832</sup>

The Evros affair obtained a disproportionate level of political attention and was artificially blown up further to stir up public emotion about the ASPIDA case. Furthermore, the fact that the news appeared in the gazettes even before it reached the GES and the circumstance that Georgios Papadopoulos held the position of the commander of the Evros unit<sup>833</sup> witnessed that he set up the Sabotage of Evros as a provocation. It was interpreted as such by the British Embassy as well:

In fact, the affair seems to have been grossly exaggerated. [...] there might be some truth in the pro-Government Press's accusations that General Natsinas [...] has had a hand in publicising the story. On the other hand, the amount of fuss it has generated is symptomatic of the current malaise in the armed forces resulting from the Government's permissive attitude towards the Communists, as well as from the Aspida affair, where the junior officers being punished are widely regarded as scapegoats for their seniors.<sup>834</sup>

Papadopoulos, who probably aimed to portray the Papandreou government as unable to control the situation in the armed forces,<sup>835</sup> was initially prosecuted, but he was later acquitted and even avoided being released from the army. Interference of the palace on his behalf or the overall indifference of political leadership have been discussed as possible explanations.<sup>836</sup>

Additionally, the ASPIDA affair tended to be presented by the Centre as a right-wing set-up created to thwart investigations into the Pericles Plan by the Papandreou government; yet, at the same time, Papandreou was blamed for re-opening the discussion of the Pericles Plan to distract attention from the accusations against his

---

<sup>831</sup> Gkanoulis, 'Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]', 61–62.

<sup>832</sup> Published in *Kathimerini*, 15 June 1965; cited according to the translation by the British Embassy in Athens, NA FO 371/180008 (15 June 1965).

<sup>833</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 123.

<sup>834</sup> NA FO 371/180008 (15 June 1965).

<sup>835</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 340.

<sup>836</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 171–72; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 260–62; Gkanoulis, 'Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]', 61–62.

son.<sup>837</sup> Unlike the Sabotage of Evros, there is enough historical evidence for the existence of the ASPIDA group; yet, compared to the IDEA and the EENA, the ASPIDA was not considered strong enough to pose any serious threat to the political order. Although the investigations, carried out after the fall of the Papandreou government by the new Minister of National Defence Stavros Kostopoulos, brought similar findings, the ASPIDA affair served as a pretext for another purge of the KYP and the armed forces.<sup>838</sup>

Papandreou resigned in July 1965 following a dispute with the king over the removal of Garoufalias from the position of Minister of National Defence, which Papandreou wanted to assume himself. The king rejected Papandreou's proposition, demanded an undelayed investigation of the ASPIDA case, and criticised Papandreou for losing control over the KYP, which facilitated the allegedly subversive conspiracy within the army that was threatening the political regime.<sup>839</sup> The king's intervention provoked large public protests, including a general strike, and created renewed fears of a military coup.<sup>840</sup> The scandal shook the position of Georgios Papandreou in his party, which subsequently suffered a split that led to the formation of the so-called cabinets of "apostates," composed of Papandreou's former collaborators.

The court case with the ASPIDA conspirators was launched in November 1966 and resulted in prison terms for 15 officers out of 27 suspects ranging from 18 to 2 years. They were tried for various crimes, including high treason, incitement to rebellion, wire-tapping politicians and military leaders, and hatching a plot to assassinate the king's secretary Michail Arnaoutis.<sup>841</sup> Political interventions marked the court proceedings; many witnesses who offered their testimonies were close to the former KYP chief Natsinas, and many became collaborators of Papadopoulos during the

---

<sup>837</sup> NA FO 371/180008 (25 May 1965; 8 June 1965); see also Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 166; Close, *Greece since 1945*, 107–9; Woodhouse, *I anodos kai i ptosi ton Syntagmatarchon [The Rise and Fall of the Colonels]*, 26.

<sup>838</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 222–23.

<sup>839</sup> Their dispute took the form of letters, for the complete texts see Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 224. See also Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 142–43.

<sup>840</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 188–89.

<sup>841</sup> "I diki ton 30 stratiotikon tou ASPIDA ton Noemvriou [The Trial of 30 ASPIDA soldiers in November]," *Eleftheria*, 2 October 1966, 1, 15. Arnaoutis was a close contact of EENA officers as well as the main advisor to the king on military issues, see Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 240, 260–62.

junta. Some of them claimed that Georgios and Andreas Papandreou were preparing a coup that would result in the deposition of King Constantine II and the instalment of Prince Peter, or eventually, the change of the constitutional regime and the appointment of Georgios Papandreou as president.<sup>842</sup>

The court did not gather enough evidence to support the presumption of an existing conspiracy and did not provide any substantial basis for the conviction of Andreas Papandreou.<sup>843</sup> Papandreou did not question the existence of the ASPIDA and even stated that he could identify with some of the opinions of its members. He rejected his involvement in any conspiracy related to the organisation.<sup>844</sup> The US and UK representatives were convinced about the existence of the organisation and its contacts with the EK, but they remained sceptical about the accusations of conspiracy.<sup>845</sup> The ASPIDA affair mirrored the internal struggles in the army for political influence. The trial attempted to erase all the traces that the Papandreou government left while restructuring the army and appointing personalities loyal to it.

## 5.9 The 1967 coup

In the months that preceded the 1967 coup, rumours about the prepared military takeover were quickly spreading. The media speculated about three different conspiracies: one of the generals, one of the colonels, and one of the captains. The group of colonels – members of the EENA – was the one that eventually succeeded in introducing a military dictatorship.<sup>846</sup> Many of the EENA officers were, as opponents of the EK, relocated to Northern Greece and Cyprus following the party's accession to power so that they served further away from the capital. Since the ERE's return to power in spring 1966, these officers started returning to more critical posts in the Attica region, owing to the organisation's good connections with Lieutenant Colonel Vagenas, director of the GES' personnel office, and Lieutenant Colonel Lazaris, director of the Office of the Chief of GES. None of them was part of the EENA, although they were on

---

<sup>842</sup> Ibid., 234–35.

<sup>843</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 166–68.

<sup>844</sup> Papandreou, *I dimokratia sto apospasma [Democracy at Gunpoint]*, 219–20; Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 1206.

<sup>845</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 238.

<sup>846</sup> Woodhouse, *I anodos kai i ptosi ton Syntagmatarchon [The Rise and Fall of the Colonels]*, 33–34.

friendly terms with its members.<sup>847</sup> In May 1966, Papadopoulos was appointed Deputy Chief of the Office for Psychological Operations at the GES, which was a post that enabled him to launch the coup once ready. From their new positions, they started monitoring the situation in military units dislocated in the Attica region and fostering contacts.<sup>848</sup>

Paradoxically, the army leadership was informed about the EENA's activities; in fact, the group enjoyed the protection of the consecutive Chiefs of GES, including the incumbent General Grigoris Spandidakis, who assumed the position in 1965. However, the army leadership underestimated the capabilities of the EENA and believed its members would stay loyal to it, not launching a coup without the king's consent.<sup>849</sup> The 1967 putschists eventually proceeded with the coup against the will of the palace and the Kanellopoulos government and without the knowledge of the army leadership. Under the pretext of an imminent communist threat, they negated Greece's monarchist regime as such.<sup>850</sup> By their move, they prevented the May 1967 elections from taking place and forestalled another coup attempt, the so-called junta of generals, which Chief of GES Spandidakis prepared in coordination with the palace and the US.<sup>851</sup> The group of Papadopoulos, who assumed the primary responsibility for leading the colonels' coup, managed to keep their plan secret. Before April, they agreed on the character of the future Greek government, which would be composed of politicians, technocrats, and military officers.<sup>852</sup>

The EENA conspirators carried out the coup based on a plan codenamed Ierax II, a variant of the NATO contingency plan Prometheus, developed to control domestic

---

<sup>847</sup> Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 109–10.

<sup>848</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 262–66.

<sup>849</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 286–88.

<sup>850</sup> Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*, 109–10; Thanasis Diamantopoulos and Georgios Pagoulatos, *10 kai mia dekaeties politikou diareseon: oi diaretikes tomes stin Ellada tin periodo 1910-2017. 7o tevchos, I enstoli ethnikofrosyni (1967-74), stratokratia enantion politikis [Ten and One Decades of Political Divisions: The Divisive Cuts in Greece of 1910-2017. Volume 7: The Uniformed National-Mindedness (1967-1974) Stratocracy against Politics]* (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2018), 45–47.

<sup>851</sup> During 1966, Queen Frederica, former prime minister Pipinelis and former minister of defence Garoufalias pushed King Constantine II to install a dictatorship, but he was hesitant to grant his support to the coup. The US administration was ready to support the coup but insisted that it must be carried out based on the king's decision; his hesitation caused great concern to Washington. Papachelas, *O viasmotis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 293; Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 389; Mouzelis, 'Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece', 73.

<sup>852</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967) [Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)]*, 264–66.

disturbances in times of external threats.<sup>853</sup> The decision to implement such a plan lay in the hands of the army and not of the Greek government, which was once again pointing to the relative weakness of Greek democracy as opposed to the power of unconstitutional actors, including the army. The king's approval was possible but not necessary since the plan counted on the eventuality that the king could no longer grant his support.<sup>854</sup> The plan indicated the takeover of control over many strategic points in Athens, including parliament, the royal palace, the radio station and other communications centres.<sup>855</sup> Shortly before the coup, the plan was updated. The list of politicians, journalists, and political activists to be preventively arrested was extended; eventually, this led to the arrest of about ten thousand people within the first five hours, including Georgios and Andreas Papandreou.<sup>856</sup>

Although the possibility of a coup belonged to issues widely discussed by the political leadership and the media, many actors, including the EDA and the EK, were taken by surprise. For instance, Andreas Papandreou deemed the coup improbable as he believed that NATO would not allow it.<sup>857</sup> The EK was a favourite of the planned elections. After forming the government, Georgios Papandreou would most probably introduce a more neutral foreign political course; this furthermore relied upon the possibility of Greece's departure from NATO, an option strictly rebuked by army leadership.<sup>858</sup> There were several reasons why the EENA was willing to risk and proceed with the April coup. As Veremis explains, the army was weakened by the ongoing entente, which reduced its importance as a guarantor of the political and social order. By the coup, the army attempted to restore its previously strong position.<sup>859</sup> According to Stavrou, the EENA officers did not pretend fear of anti-communism and suffered from a messianic complex, firmly believing in their mission to save the

---

<sup>853</sup> The implementation of the plan was facilitated by an annual exercise of the Greek armed forces, which took place as part of NATO obligations and focused on training the management of urban disturbances in the Attica region. Therefore, under the plan's provisions, large military units were deployed in the vicinity of the capital, which merged with the forces prescribed in the Prometheus operation during the coup. Woodhouse, *I anodos kai i ptosi ton Syntagmatarchon [The Rise and Fall of the Colonels]*, 42–45. See also Giannis A. Katris, *I gennisi tou neofasismou: Ellada 1960-1974 [The Birth of Neofascism: Greece 1960-1974]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1974).

<sup>854</sup> Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 259.

<sup>855</sup> Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 220–21.

<sup>856</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 171–72.

<sup>857</sup> Fleischer, 'Authoritarian Rule in Greece and Its Heritage', 243.

<sup>858</sup> Zaharopoulos, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece', 23–34.

<sup>859</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 153.

nation.<sup>860</sup> Papadiamantis underlines the EENA's desire to rule as well as their conviction that parliamentary (or Greece's crowned) democracy could not resist the power aspirations of the Left.<sup>861</sup>

The previously discussed issues of the ongoing autonomisation of the army and the urge of many military officers for further professional development played a significant role in the coup. While the 1965 crisis loosened the political control over the army and the palace failed to consolidate its power over it,<sup>862</sup> the internal pressures related to the high demands for promotions continued to be strongly present. In a sense, thanks to the growing importance of the army, the introduction of the junta offered many career opportunities.<sup>863</sup> Thus, in this respect, it is not so surprising that even the counter-coup of December 1967, which was organised by some high-ranking officers who were loyal to the king, was partially motivated by their personal ambitions. They feared that the new regime would decide on their retirement.<sup>864</sup> Indeed, due to their failure, their protector was removed from the throne and forced to leave for exile.

It has often been argued that “he who controls Greece's armed forces, controls Greece,” and according to Couloubis, secret military organisations served as vehicles for such control.<sup>865</sup> Yet, other authors relativised their importance. For example, Meynaud claims that not the secret organisations but the army's strength and its political importance were the key elements that eventually mattered.<sup>866</sup> Stavrou assumes that the secret organisations should be considered as pressure groups rather than “real” conspiracies. Since their existence was known to a great range of public personalities, he prefers to approach them as self-proclaimed alternatives to political impasses. Quite illustratively, in his view, the EENA “benefited from the atmosphere of artificial tensions, most of which it helped create” in 1967.<sup>867</sup> Veremis implies that military conspiracies were a situation far more natural for the post-civil war army than one might imagine and that it sometimes was an issue of pure survival:

---

<sup>860</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 223–24.

<sup>861</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)*], 264–66.

<sup>862</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, 141–43; Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)*], 13.

<sup>863</sup> Papadiamantis, *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)*], 252–53.

<sup>864</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 154.

<sup>865</sup> Couloubis, ‘Post World War II Greece’, 296.

<sup>866</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce* [*Political Forces in Greece*], 347–48.

<sup>867</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 84–89, 181.

[...] interest in conspiracies and clandestine societies was in inverse proportion to an officer's ability and professional prospects. Membership of secret organisations that expounded nationalist orthodoxy but also promoted the corporate interests of its followers became a guarantee of success and indeed of survival for the least prominent and able elements in the army.<sup>868</sup>

Therefore, military conspiracies appeared as a natural consequence of the long-term politicisation of the army. It affected the military as a whole and corresponded with the gravity of the army's role as an important domestic actor and, symbolically, the "guarantor" of the political regime and the nation's "saviour." The existence of secret military organisations stemmed from the rivalry between various factions in the army, far less homogeneous than often presented by the Greek historiography. In compliance with the culture of clientelism and in reaction to the precarious situation of many junior officers, these interest groups primarily provided platforms for negotiating political support and facilitating the professional advancement of their members. The EENA, as a single example, eventually exceeded the limits provided by the political regime. Its leaders assumed power amidst a protracted political crisis, and after many years of persistent rumours about a potential coup had been rife. The lack of unity within the army and the "right-wing establishment" hardly provides evidence for a broad conspiracy that the *parakratos* presumably was. Instead, it indicates how feeble the post-civil war Greek democracy was and how the political climate tended towards conspiracism, influencing in many ways the then and later interpretation of the political reality.

---

<sup>868</sup> Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 153.



## 6. The Parakratos of Citizens' Organisations

Alongside the conspiratorial groups in the army, the realm of organisations composed of nationally-minded citizens, militant anti-communists, and far-right extremists – rarely without a collaborationist or criminal background – represented another aspect of the alleged parallel power mechanism of post-civil war Greece. The social status of *parastate* members – who were predominantly men – significantly varied from well-positioned, respectable personalities to the uneducated, the unemployed, and even people of the “underworld.”<sup>869</sup> Funded mainly from the state budget and enjoying protections thanks to their contacts with politicians, businessmen, and representatives of the state's security forces, the *parastate* organisations constituted a somewhat darker manifestation of the country's historically significant system of clientelism and patronage. In exchange for limited political and economic influence, professional permits, the provision of less significant jobs in the public sector, access to social and housing benefits, and the possibility of lenient treatment from security and judicial authorities, *parastate* members made themselves available to spread anti-communist propaganda and assist local police and gendarmerie in countering left-wing activities in the public space through various means.<sup>870</sup> This system of corruption, which traded economic benefits in exchange for loyalty and service, was widespread. As previously stated, the same principle applied to the civic-mindedness certificates, which served as a prerequisite for state employment, a university education, professional licences, and other administrative permits.

As opposed to countryside bands, the urban-based *parastate* organisations spread in larger cities in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. These groups were usually hierarchically structured and, in some cases, disposed of specialised combat units or task forces with military-style training. The *parastate* organisations did not have guaranteed access to arms and military equipment; in fact, their main occupation was propaganda production. Despite this, violence was an essential tool for them.<sup>871</sup> The groups often cooperated and were even mutually permeable, even allowing parallel

---

<sup>869</sup> Gianoulopoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 140–41.

<sup>870</sup> Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’, 73.

<sup>871</sup> Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 647–48.

membership in multiple organisations. Although they were independent of each other, the *parastate organisations* were often perceived as an unofficial network of anti-communist militants, sometimes even as self-appointed, private armies.<sup>872</sup> Although the public knew of their existence, the connection between them and the state organs was exposed only gradually. Following a paramilitary raid at the Hellenic Parliament in July 1964, the Papandreou government ordered the dissolution of a few *parastate* groups.<sup>873</sup> Nevertheless, other organisations carried on their activities throughout the 1960s until the junta.

In the following text, I present the main characteristics of these *parastate* organisations, their functioning, and their activities. In terms of structure, I preserve the usually perceived division between youth *parastate* organisations and *parastate* organisations of “indignant” and “patriotic” citizens of anti-communist orientations. This differentiation, though, provides only limited knowledge and an added value because, in reality, a clear border between these two types was absent due to the considerable permeability of members of various *parastate* organisations. Moreover, given their significant number, I strive to explain the phenomenon as a whole rather than to produce a detailed description of its constitutive parts.

First, I summarise the emergence, organisational structures, and themes of the post-civil war Greek youth movement. The reason is that from the viewpoint of anti-communist circles, the youth *parastate* organisations constituted a counterweight to the activities of “standard” youth and student associations as well as a tool to counter the spread of left-wing and liberal initiatives. By referring to the peace movement, I will provide the necessary background for the second type of *parastate* organisations as well. There, I will focus on the case of Lambrakis assassination, which – given its prominence in the history of *parakratos* – can hardly be omitted. I attempt to approach the *parakratos* of nationally-minded citizens and students not only as a tool of unofficial state violence. It was also an element of the post-civil war clientelist system as well as a platform through which former Nazi collaborators, anti-communist paramilitaries, outlaws and, generally, people on the fringes of society were seeking their social

---

<sup>872</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 66; Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’, 40; Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*.

<sup>873</sup> Cited according to Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 296–97.

recognition, re-integration into society, and, eventually, political influence and economic profit as well.

## 6.1 The Mobilisation of the Youth Movement

Like many Western countries, Greece experienced a decade of exceptional social unrest since the late 1950s. The mass mobilisation of the Greek population stemmed from significant demographic changes, which included faster urbanisation, significant economic growth, and improved access to education.<sup>874</sup> The activation of various citizen initiatives with political content reflected on the domestic development, which, on the one hand, saw the strengthening of non-right-wing political alternatives and, on the other hand, the intensification of the anti-communist campaign. In this sense, the 1956 and the 1958 elections and the Cyprus crisis of 1956/1957 represented remarkable milestones.<sup>875</sup> The Greek public, and the growing youth and student movement in particular, was increasingly aware of the constitutional violations and irregularities within the legal and political system. They requested compliance with civil rights and freedoms, an independent investigation of cases involving their violation and the overall regime's democratisation.<sup>876</sup> Besides, the pro-leftist camp insisted on the rehabilitation of the EAM/ELAS resistance.<sup>877</sup>

The Greek public was also influenced in its protest activities by the international political developments. As a result of the growing appeal of peace initiatives under the leadership of the Youth League for the Nuclear Disarmament “Bertrand Russell,” the peace movement institutionalised in Greece through the establishment of the Greek Committee for International Détente and Peace (*Elliniki Epitropi dia tin Diethni Yfesi kai Eirini*, EEDYE) in the mid-1950s. Although collaborating with various non-aligned

---

<sup>874</sup> Rizas, ‘Dekaetia tou 1960 [The 1960s]’, 189.

<sup>875</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 31–32.

<sup>876</sup> Cf. Seraphim Seferiades, ‘Syllogikes draseis, kinimatikes praktikes: i “syntomi” dekaetia tou ’60 os “sygkrousiakos kyklos” [The Collective Actions, Movement Practices: The “Short” 1960s as “Conflict Cycle”]’, in *I ‘syntomi’ dekaetia tou ’60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The ‘Short’ 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, ed. Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008), 57–77; Nikos Serdedakis, ‘Syllogiki drasi kai foititiko kinima tin periodo 1959-1964: domikes proypotheseis, politikes evkairies kai erminevtika schimata [Collective Action and Student Movement in the Period of 1959-1964: Structural Conditions, Political Opportunities, and Interpretational Schemes]’, in *I ‘syntomi’ dekaetia tou ’60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The ‘Short’ 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, ed. Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008), 241–63.

<sup>877</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 177–79.

peace networks, the EEDYE was closely connected with the EDA and oriented towards the Soviet Bloc.<sup>878</sup> Inspired by mass demonstrations aiming at nuclear disarmament taking place in the UK during the 1950s and 1960s (the so-called Aldermaston Marches), similar protest events were organised in Greece. They were called “Marathons,” gaining their name after the Greek city from where they originated and where a US military base was located. Two marches were realised in 1961 and 1962 under the auspices of the EEDYE.<sup>879</sup> As of 1964, the anti-nuclear agenda of the peace movement was set aside; instead, protests against US intervention in Vietnam gained prominence.<sup>880</sup>

The activities of the peace movement in Greece and its anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist demands were popularised by Grigoris Lambrakis, a parliamentary deputy elected in 1961 for PAME (the left-wing electoral coalition with the EDA’s participation) who served as EEDYE’s vice-president since 1962. A renowned and respected medical doctor, athlete, and charismatic figure, Lambrakis turned out to be one of the harshest critics of the Right and the monarchist regime, pointing to the oppression of the political opposition and the fate of political detainees. Known for his intransigence, Lambrakis became a target of harsh police harassment, such as during the 1962 peace march, which he decided to carry out with a group of his sympathisers despite the prohibition issued by the Karamanlis government. The police attempted to forestall the march by closing the route from Marathon to Athens and arrested approximately one thousand people, only to discharge them later that day.<sup>881</sup> In May 1963, Lambrakis lost his life after giving a speech at a peace rally in Thessaloniki. His assassins attacked him amidst a violent crowd of his opponents and in front of inactive

---

<sup>878</sup> Makris, ‘The Greek Peace Movement and the Vietnam War, 1964–1967’, 162–65.

<sup>879</sup> Romaios, ‘Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]’, 29–30; Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 657; Christos Christidis, ‘Dytikoi diplomates kai ypothesi Lambraki: Xenoi paratirites kai esoteriko politiko plaisio 1963-1966 [Western Diplomats and the Lambrakis Case: Foreign Observers and the Internal Political Framework 1963-1966]’, in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton koinovouleftismo kai ti dimokratia, 2016), 56–57.

<sup>880</sup> See Makris, ‘The Greek Peace Movement and the Vietnam War, 1964–1967’.

<sup>881</sup> For a detailed description of the events that day, see Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 177. See also Christidis, ‘Dytikoi diplomates kai ypothesi Lambraki [Western Diplomats and the Lambrakis Case]’, 57.

security forces.<sup>882</sup> His funeral was attended by hundreds of thousands of mourners and allegedly became the largest public manifestation since liberation in October 1944.<sup>883</sup>

The violent death of Lambrakis led to the further politicisation of the peace movement and its increasingly hostile attitude towards the Karamanlis government and the ERE as such.<sup>884</sup> Furthermore, the event motivated the establishment of the left-wing organisation Lambrakis Democratic Youth (*Dimokratiki Neolaia Lambraki*, DNL). It emerged in September 1964 after the merger of the EDA Youth organisation (*Neolaia tis EDA*, NEDA; established in 1951) and the preceding youth protest movement, known as the Youth Democratic Movement “Grigoris Lambrakis” (*Dimokratikis Kinisis Neon Grigoris Lambrakis*), formed in June 1963 shortly after Lambrakis’ assassination. The first congress of the DNL convened in March 1965 and elected Mikis Theodorakis, a leftist activist and world-renowned music composer, as its chairman. Supporting peace and global disarmament stood in the centre of the organisation’s program. The DNL had several hundred thousand members at that time, constituting the second-largest student organisation in post-war Greece.<sup>885</sup> Besides the leftist youth association, analogical organisations were founded by the ERE following the consolidation of the Karamanlis government in 1958 and by the EK after the unification of the Centre by Papandreou in 1961. The National Radical Union's Youth (*Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi Neon*, EREN) and the Centre Union’s Youth Organisation (*Organosi Neon Enoseos Kendrou*, ONEK) acted alongside the less significant Progressive Union of Youth (*Proodeftiki Enosi Neon*, PEN), affiliated with the Progressive Party of Spyros Markezinis.<sup>886</sup>

The tremendous social mobilisation, triggered by the relentless struggle of Georgios Papandreou after the 1961 elections, was also instigated through the activities of the ONEK. The ONEK, alongside the NEDA, stepped out to demand the

---

<sup>882</sup> Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Will Help Me to Get Rid of This Man?’: Grigoris Lambrakis and the Non-Aligned Peace Movement in Post-Civil War Greece: 1951-1964’, 314–15.

<sup>883</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 188.

<sup>884</sup> Makris, ‘The Greek Peace Movement and the Vietnam War, 1964–1967’, 165–66.

<sup>885</sup> The largest one was the Second World War resistance youth organisation, the United Panhellenic Organisation of Youth (*Eniaia Panelladiki Organosi Neon*, EPON), dissolved in 1958 after years of illegality. Cf. Catherine Saint-Martin, *Lambrakides. Istoria mias genias [Lambrakides. The History of One Generation]* (Athina: Polytypo, 1984); Ioanna Papathanasiou et al., *I Neolaia Lampraki ti dekaetia tou 1960. Archeiakas tekmiroseis kai aftoviografikes katatheseis [The Lambrakis Youth in the 1960s. Archival Documentation and Autobiographical Statements]* (Athina: Institutou Neollinikon Ereunon, 2009).

<sup>886</sup> Giannis P. Tzannetakos, “I veolaia kai to Foititiko Kinima [Youth and the Student Movement],” Kathimerini.gr, 16 October 2016, <https://www.kathimerini.gr/879454/article/epikairothta/ellada/h-neolaia-kai-to-foititiko-kinhma> (accessed 17 April 2020).

democratisation of the country's political regime, greater adherence to the Constitution, and the protection of citizens' rights and freedoms. In pursuit of their political aims, they relied on Art. 114 of the Constitution, according to which "observance of the constitution is entrusted to the patriotism of the Greeks who shall have the right and the duty to resist by all possible means against anyone who attempts the violent abolition of the Constitution."<sup>887</sup> The slogan "1-1-4", as well as the demand of "15 per cent dowry for education," which requested higher state funding for the education system, became symbols of mass protests at the time.<sup>888</sup> The situation improved only with education reforms introduced by the Papandreou government in 1964.<sup>889</sup> The increasing cooperation of the ONEK, the NEDA, and the PEN led to establishing the National Student Union of Greece (*Ethniki Foititiki Enosis Ellados*, EFEE) in spring 1963.<sup>890</sup>

Besides the Lambrakis case, a renewed radicalisation and politicisation of youth, mainly affiliated with the *Lambrakides*, followed the killing of Sotiris Petroulas, a student supporter of the EDA, by police at a demonstration amidst the 1965 *iouliana* events.<sup>891</sup> In this period, the Greek youth movement reached its peak. Subsequently, it faced intensified attacks from the ruling regime, aiming to outlaw the Lambrakides and defame the EDA's and EK's supporters as proponents of communism and Soviet influence.<sup>892</sup>

---

<sup>887</sup> Constitution of Greece (1952): Art. 114.

<sup>888</sup> For example, "Agona ekpaideftikis paliggenesias ekiryxan oi foititai. Dimopsifisma yper tis paideia seis olin tin choran [The Students Proclaimed the Struggle for the Educational Rebirth. Referendum in Favour of Education in the Whole Country]," *Eleftheria*, 8 December 1962, 1, 7. See also Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 920–34; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 271.

<sup>889</sup> Linardatos, *Syghroni Elliniki Istoría, Tomos G' [Contemporary Greek History, Volume 3]*, 140; Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 920–32; Konstantina Botsiou, 'I epiroi tis dolofonias Lambraki stis scheseis tis ERE me tin Enosi Kentrou kai tin Aristera [The Influence of Lambrakis' Assassination on ERE's Relationship with the Centre Union and the Left]', in *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisí 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, ed. Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou (Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016), 80–89.

<sup>890</sup> Giannis P. Tzannetakos, "I veolaia kai to Foititiko Kinima [Youth and the Student Movement]," *Kathimerini.gr*, 16 October 2016, <https://www.kathimerini.gr/879454/article/epikairothta/ellada/h-neolaia-kai-to-foititiko-kinhma> (accessed 17 April 2020). Journalist Giannis Tzannetakos served as the EFEE's first chairman.

<sup>891</sup> Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 1218–21; Botsiou, 'I epiroi tis dolofonias Lampraki [The Influence of Lambrakis' Assassination]', 86.

<sup>892</sup> Kofas, *Under the Eagle's Claw*, 76.

## 6.2 The *Parakratos* of the Youth

Parallel to the expansion of the pro-democratic youth movement, a mass of youth *parastate* organisations emerged, forming a dynamic, loose, and heterogeneous network. These groups often resembled one another in their political background, organisational structures, the scope of activities and methods. Yet, while some youth *parastate* organisations gained a firm position over the years, the lifespan of others was much more limited. The most well-known youth *parastate* organisation was the National Social Organisation of Students (*Ethniki Koinoniki Organosi Foititon*, EKOF), a neofascist group operating in the sphere of university students with branches in Athens and Thessaloniki. The EKOF became notorious for violent attacks against leftist and liberal students and political provocations far beyond the line of acceptability in democratic regimes. The EKOF aimed to dissolve rival student organisations of non-right-wing and non-nationally minded orientations. As in the case of other *parastate* organisations, its persistence was the result of the existing political and financial backing by the establishment.<sup>893</sup>

Besides the EKOF, there were numerous other youth *parastate* organisations, such as the Organisation of National Youth – Corps of Hopeful Youth (*Organosis Ethnikis Neolaias – Soma Elpidoforon Neon*, OEN-SEN) and its offspring – the Student Organisation of National Youth (*Organosi Spoudaston Ethnikis Neolaias*, OSEN), the Corps of Valiant Greeks (*Soma Ellinon Alkimon*, SEA), the 4<sup>th</sup> August Party (*Komma 4is Avgoustou*, K4A), the National Social Action (*Ethniki Koinoniki Drasis*, EKD), the National Royalist Youth Organisation (*Ethniki Vasiliki Organosi Neolaias*, EVON), the Organisation of Nationally-Minded Medical Students (*Organosi Ethnikofronon Foititon Iatrikis*, OEFI), the Association for the Spiritual and Cultural Development of the Youth of Vyronas (*Syllogos Pnevmatikis kai Ekpolitistikis Anaptyxeos Neon Vyronos*, SPEAN), the Youth of National Action (*Neolaia Ethnikis Draseos*, NED), the Piraeus Spiritual Home for Students (*Foititiki Pnevmatiki Estia Peiraios*, FPEP), and the Panhellenic National Social Union of Youth (*Panellinia Ethniki Koinoniki Enosi Neon*,

---

<sup>893</sup> ASKI EDA 301/12 “Syllogos Ergazomenon Foititon Spoudaston: Anakoinosis (Athina, 13/08/1963) [The Association of Working Students: Announcement (Athens, 13/08/1963)].” See also Sakkas, *Konstantinos Karamanlis*, 152–53.

PEKEN), a splinter organisation of the OEN-SEN.<sup>894</sup> These groups had a nationalist, anti-communist and anti-liberal profile, and their members characterised themselves as nationally-minded; yet, they usually did not have a solid ideological background or autonomous political strategy.<sup>895</sup>

While some *parastate* organisations identified themselves with the ERE, others tended towards radicalism, anti-parliamentarism, and fascination with hierarchical leadership and militarism. Some adherents of the youth *parastate* belonged to the admirers of the Metaxas authoritarian regime; nevertheless, they were prone to cultivating their vision of Metaxas that suited their own needs and fit their image of neo-fascists organisations. The 4<sup>th</sup> August Party (K4A), which emerged under the leadership of Konstantinos Plevris and his deputy Dimitris Dimopoulos in Athens in summer 1965, can serve as the best example of this phenomenon.<sup>896</sup> Plevris maintained close connections with some prominent personalities of the Metaxas era; first and foremost was Konstantinos Maniadakis, former Deputy Minister of Public Security and infamous for his engineering of the anti-communist persecution in the late 1940s. During the 1950s and 1960s, Maniadakis was repeatedly elected parliamentary deputy for his minor political party and later for the ERE. In the mid-1960s, he became one of the harshest critics of Andreas Papandreou.<sup>897</sup> Besides Maniadakis, Plevris was supported by the Metaxist prefect Nikolaos Antonakeas as well as the ERE's deputy and leader of the EREN Nikolaos Farmakis, who was a former "X" member known for his far-right tendencies and a future exponent of the junta.<sup>898</sup>

Plevris reflected on the ideological foundations of the Metaxas regime in his own writing, where he developed his version of Hellenic national socialism that was to be set in the Greek cultural and social environment rather than derived from the Third Reich legacy. His ultimate aim was to introduce a fascist dictatorship in Greece and assume the role of Greece's new "Metaxas." Despite all that said, the role of the K4A

---

<sup>894</sup> See ASKI EDA 188, "1963, Parakratikes Organoseis: katalogos tis EDA me ta onomata 34 organoseon (1963) [1963, Parastate Organisations: The EDA Catalogue with Names of 34 Organisations (1963)]." The titles were translated with the help of *Reference Aid: Abbreviations, Acronyms and Special Terms in the Press of Greece and Cyprus* (Arlington, Virginia: U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1977), <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a375623.pdf>.

<sup>895</sup> Katsoudas, 'Ethnikistes kai Ethnikofrones [Nationalists and Nationally-Minded]', 30.

<sup>896</sup> Psarras, 'O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]', 47–48.

<sup>897</sup> "I dexia sto kynigi tou Andrea [The Right in the Hunt of Andreas]," [efsyn.gr](https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/124637_i-dexia-sto-kynigi-toy-andrea), 24 September 2017, [https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/124637\\_i-dexia-sto-kynigi-toy-andrea](https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/124637_i-dexia-sto-kynigi-toy-andrea) (accessed 9 May 2020).

<sup>898</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 129–34.



was not principally subversive with respect to the ruling regime, and the organisation did not have a revolutionary character.<sup>899</sup> In 1967, Plevris welcomed the junta's arrival but soon became disappointed by its leadership, who did not fulfil his neo-fascist theoretical expectations.<sup>900</sup>

Other *parastate* organisations also shared fascination with the Metaxas regime and the desire to introduce an authoritarian political order, which influenced their programmatic aims and organisational structures. Most groups outlined their internal division to correspond with the principles of a military-style hierarchy and the specialisation of their constituent units, including action squads. During public events, their members wore uniforms with symbols reminding of the emblems of interwar European authoritarian regimes.<sup>901</sup> Some *parastate* organisations attempted to resemble the fascist-inspired Metaxist National Youth Organisation (*Ethniki Organosis Neolaias*, EON),<sup>902</sup> such as the Organisation of National Youth – Corps of Hopeful Youth (OEN-SEN) that was established in Athens in 1957,<sup>903</sup> the National Social Action (EKD) that emerged in Athens during the late 1950s,<sup>904</sup> and the Corps of Valiant Greeks (SEA) that was originally founded in Piraeus in 1924 and revived in Athens in 1947.<sup>905</sup>

The latter organisation, already active under Metaxas, heavily drew on the heritage of Ancient Sparta, organising yearly commemorative celebrations in the ancient city's location. Typically, its leadership invited prominent representatives of the Palace, government, political parties, the Church, and armed and security forces. In their performances, they adeptly combined nationalist content with cultural programs and charity work, fostering the professional contacts necessary for receiving state funding.<sup>906</sup> The applied theme of Sparta as a cult of an idealised, militarised society was

---

<sup>899</sup> Psarras, 'O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]', 47–50. For Plevris' political visions, see for example Konstantinos Plevris, *Antidimokratia [Anti-Democrat]* (Athina: Nea Thesis, 1987).

<sup>900</sup> Psarras, 'O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]', 55.

<sup>901</sup> Dordanas, 'Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]', 37.

<sup>902</sup> Sarandis, 'The Ideology and Character of the Metaxas Regime', 157–59.

<sup>903</sup> ASKI EDA 188 "Organosis Ethnikis Neolaias (OEN): Katastatiko (1958) [The Organisation of National Youth (OEN): Statutes (1958)]."

<sup>904</sup> ASKI EDA 188 "Ethniki Koinoniki Drasis – Dioikisis Vyronos: Mia Megali Epeteios (04/08/1959): Entypi prokiryxi gia tin epeteio tis 4is Avgoustou [The National Social Action – The Administration of Vyronos: A Great Anniversary (04/08/1959): A Printed Announcement for the 4<sup>th</sup> August Anniversary]."

<sup>905</sup> ASKI EDA 188 "Soma Ellinon Alkimon (S.E.A.): Katastatiko, 1954 [The Corps of Valiant Greeks (SEA): Statutes, 1954]." See also Gianoulopoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]', 148.

<sup>906</sup> ASKI EDA 188, 575, 598 "Soma Ellinon Alkimon (S.E.A.): Programma tis 5is etisias eortis ton Alkimon eis tin Spartin tin 24in Apriliou 1960 [The Corps of Valiant Greeks (SEA): Program of the 5<sup>th</sup>

once again in accordance with the Metaxist political tradition honouring Sparta, Byzantium, and the 4<sup>th</sup> August regime as three instances when the so-called Hellenic civilisation reached its historical, political, and cultural climax.<sup>907</sup>

Even though some youth *parastate* organisations claimed their allegiance to Metaxas, they were, in reality, more related to the European neo-fascist and neo-Nazi movements of the time. There were also existing ties between them and their counterparts in other countries. Especially later on during the Greek junta, the Plevris' K4A maintained contacts with Italian neo-fascist organisations as well as those involved in the Gladio stay-behind mechanism, such as the New Order (*Ordine Nuovo*), the National Vanguard (*Avanguardia Nazionale*), the Italian Social Movement (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*, MSI), Young Italy (*Giovane Italia*) and the University Front for National Action (*Fronte Universitario di Azione Nazionale*, FUAN).<sup>908</sup>

Furthermore, some extremist tendencies arising from the youth *parastate* imitated the Metaxist tradition but stood in contradiction to Metaxas' convictions. First and foremost, Plevris was an anti-Semite who was sued for denying the Holocaust in post-junta Greece.<sup>909</sup> The OEN-SEN, which Lendakis calls “a replica of EON,”<sup>910</sup> was principally a neo-Nazi organisation with connections to likewise groups in West Germany. Similarly, the EKOF did not hide its fascination with the Third Reich and its anti-Semitic tendencies. In 1961, its members attempted to disrupt the May Day celebrations in Athens by attacking participants of the protest rallies, causing injuries on both sides.<sup>911</sup> Furthermore, they made a public appearance in the streets of the capital,

---

Annual Celebration of the Valiant in Sparta on 24 April 1960].” See also Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodeksia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’, 38–39.

<sup>907</sup> Sarandis, ‘The Ideology and Character of the Metaxas Regime’, 150–51; Papacosma, ‘Ioannis Metaxas and the “Fourth of August” Dictatorship in Greece’, 184.

<sup>908</sup> Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodeksies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’, 82–83. See also Nikos Kleitsikas and Andrea Speranzoni, *Fenomena tromokratias: O ellinikos neofasismos mesa apo ta aporrhita engrafa ton mystikon ypiresion [Phenomena of Terrorism: Greek Neo-Fascism in Confidential Documents of Secret Services]* (Chalandri: Proskinio, 2003).

<sup>909</sup> Anna Maria Droumpouki, ‘Shaping Holocaust Memory in Greece: Memorials and Their Public History’, *National Identities* 18, no. 2 (2 April 2016): 212, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2015.1027760>; Kateřina Králová, ‘In the Shadow of the Nazi Past: Post-War Reconstruction and the Claims of the Jewish Community in Salonika’, *European History Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (1 April 2016): 163, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691416630930>; Tobias Blümel, ‘Antisemitism as Political Theology in Greece and Its Impact on Greek Jewry, 1967–1979’, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 17, no. 2 (3 April 2017): 188, 192, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2017.1324263>.

<sup>910</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 26.

<sup>911</sup> Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 815.

praising Adolf Eichmann (who at that time stood trial in Israel) and threatening their opponents that they would “make soap out of them” (“*Tha sas kanoume sapounia.*”).<sup>912</sup>

The youth *parastate* organisations mainly targeted university and high school students (with a significant representation among students of night schools) and young people in general, whom they were attracting with political, social, and economic incentives. For example, the EVON’s leaflet was promising healthcare free of charge, the provision of food and clothes, job offers and the coverage of travel expenses for membership applicants.<sup>913</sup> The youth *parastate* organisations aimed to remove leftist and liberal influences from the youth and student environment and implant their political visions. For that purpose, they were organising public events and publishing their press to spread propaganda and gain new supporters. For instance, the EKOF was publishing a magazine called the Echo of Students (*Icho ton spoudaston*), and the fact that the military printing office printed it provoked many controversies.<sup>914</sup> The K4A was putting out a newspaper of the same name. Its first issue was released in August 1965; alongside Plevris’ book publications, it served as a platform for developing his ideas.<sup>915</sup> Besides the aggressive propaganda, the organisations were applying violent methods as well: attacking their opponents, sabotaging their public events and blocking them with “counter-demonstrations,” provoking conflicts, gathering valuable information, and providing assistance to security and intelligence forces, all aimed at eliminating the left-wing and liberal presence in public space.<sup>916</sup>

The membership of youth *parastate* organisations was not limited to younger generations, and their leadership was often middle- and older-aged. In terms of social composition, their members ranged from lawyers, businessmen, medical doctors, and retired officers to less educated and more socially disadvantaged individuals. For

---

<sup>912</sup> ASKI EDA 301/84, “Syllogos Ergazomenon Foititon Spoudaston: Katangelia (Athina, 08/05/1960) [The Association of Working Students: Denouncement (Athens, 08/05/1960)].”

<sup>913</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “Vasiliki Organosis Kallitheas: Entypi anakoinosi [The Royalist Youth Organisation: Printed Announcement].”

<sup>914</sup> Petridis, *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967 [The Power and Para-Power in Greece]*, 292; Tzannetakos, ‘Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]’, 130–31.

<sup>915</sup> Psarras, ‘O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]’, 47–48. For Plevris’ interpretation of the respective period, see Konstantinos Plevris, *Gegonota 1965-1977. Ta agnosta paraskinia [Events 1965-1977. The Unknown Backstage Politics]* (Athina, 2009).

<sup>916</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 70–71; Psarras, ‘O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]’, 55.

instance, the EKOF was closely associated with the student strata, founded in Athens in December 1959 by 20 students from the University of Athens led by Pavlos Manolopoulos. Its Thessaloniki branch, officially active since March 1961, was established by 26 students from Aristotle University, headed by Konstantinos Kyriakopoulos.<sup>917</sup> Additionally, the OEFI, had operated under Vasileios Alevizatos since the early 1960s and was principally an EKOF branch at the Medical Faculty of the University of Athens.<sup>918</sup> In contrast, the OEN-SEN head was a retired lieutenant and former “X” Commander Ilias Spiliopoulos; in its executive committee, there were also three female members.<sup>919</sup> The EKD head was a physical education teacher, Memos Kolokythas,<sup>920</sup> whereas ERE politician Panagiotis Panagopoulos led the NED, and the SEA had been headed by a retired Colonel-General Konstantinos Kostopoulos.<sup>921</sup> There was a considerable permeability between members of the EKOF and the ERE’s Youth (EREN). For instance, Plevris was active in the K4A, the SEA, and another youth organisation called the Frontline (*Proti grammi*).<sup>922</sup>

In terms of geographical distribution, the youth *parastate* organisations were concentrated in Athens, Thessaloniki, and some other regional centres, operating in university and education spaces and local neighbourhoods. Characteristically, most of them were legally registered, in possession of statutes recognised by the court, having an official seat with offices on publicly known addresses and a clear organisational structure, including a chairperson, an executive committee, a treasurer, and a secretary. The first seat of the EKOF was to be found on Akadimias Street in central Athens on the premises owned by Angelos Prokopiou, a lawyer and theoretician of anti-communism involved in the post-1958 planning of anti-leftist psychological and propagandist operations. In 1963, EKOF’s offices moved to the nearest neighbourhood to the gallery between Akadimias Street and Ippokratous Street, which also seats the

---

<sup>917</sup> Christos Poulianas, ‘Ethniki Koinoniki Organosis Foititon (EKOF): Praktikes kai politiki ideologia tou dexiou extremismou sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1960-1967) [National Social Organisation of Students (EKOF): Practices and Political Ideology of the Right-Wing Extremism in Post-Civil War Greece (1960-1967)]’ (MA Thesis, Athina, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2017), 59–63.

<sup>918</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 121–22.

<sup>919</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “Organosis Ethnikis Neolaias (OEN): Katastatiko (1958) [The Organisation of National Youth (OEN): Statutes (1958)].”

<sup>920</sup> Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 103.

<sup>921</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 333, 345.

<sup>922</sup> Psarras, ‘O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]’, 55.

National Opera.<sup>923</sup> The OEN-SEN shared its offices with the OSEN in Gladstonos Street close to Omonoia Square in Athens;<sup>924</sup> the K4A maintained its premises nearby – on Bouboulinas Street – but later relocated to the Athens neighbourhood of Exarcheia. The Thessaloniki branch of the K4A was seated on Tsimiski Street, a popular avenue running through the city centre. The SPEAN and the EKD were active in the Athens neighbourhood of Vyronas, while the EVON settled in Piraeus.<sup>925</sup>

The youth *parastate* organisations were on the rise in the post-1958 era, as they were financed and directed by the GDTP's Information Service and its Studies Council, coordinated by the KYP's specialised department dealing with issues about student movements, and connected to the gendarmerie.<sup>926</sup> The “secret” funds, designed for anti-communist measures and psychological operations (including *parastate* organisations), were allocated from the budget of various state ministries – the Ministry of the Presidency, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Northern Greece and other state institutions such as the Directorate of the Gendarmerie.<sup>927</sup> The EKOF received funding from the Information Service, the Ministry for Northern Greece, and from some private donors;<sup>928</sup> the SEA was paid from the budget of the Ministry of National Defence;<sup>929</sup> the SPEAN was funded by the General Secretariat of Sports (*Geniki Grammataia Athlitismou*);<sup>930</sup> the OEN-SEN and the OSEN – predominantly active in the environment of night high schools – were financed by the KYP and the Ministry of the Presidency.<sup>931</sup>

Out of all youth *parastate* organisations, the EKOF deserves special attention given its significant impact on the atmosphere within the student movement and the

---

<sup>923</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 48–49.

<sup>924</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>925</sup> *Ibid.*, 118–19.

<sup>926</sup> Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’, 73; Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 90–92; Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 32.

<sup>927</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 296–97.

<sup>928</sup> ASKI EDA 301/12 “Syllogos Ergazomenon Foititon Spoudaston: Anakoinosis (Athina, 13/8/1963) [The Association of Working Students: Announcement (Athens, 13/08/1963)].”

<sup>929</sup> ASKI EDA 188, 575, 594 “Soma Ellinon Alkimon (S.E.A.): Epistoli tou Genikou Epiteleiou Ethnikis Amynis me thema tin oikonomiki enischysi tou S.E.A. (27/10/1961) [The Corps of Valiant Greeks (SEA): Letter of the National Defence General Staff on the Economic Support of the SEA (27/10/1961)].”

<sup>930</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 351–53.

<sup>931</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “Ekthesis K. Datsika, Diefthytou Tmimatou Asfaleias tis O.E.N.-S.E.N. pros ton Genikon Archigon tis organoseis (31/10/1960) [A report by K. Datsikas, Director of the Security Department of OEN-SEN for the General Chief of the Organisation (31/10/1960)].” See also Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 114.

political scene. Since its establishment in December 1959, it presented itself as a non-political organisation aiming at depoliticising the student environment. On the contrary, it acted as a representative of the chauvinist Right, connected with some ERE's extremists.<sup>932</sup> The EKOF was initially designed as the student branch of the ERE's Youth, but then it became fully autonomous. Regardless of this, it could stand in as EREN's unofficial far-right "wing" and carry out tasks that would be impossible for the EREN to get involved with. Many of EREN's radicals also gradually entered the EKOF.<sup>933</sup>

The EKOF spread at the University of Athens and subsequently at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, focusing on terrorising leftist students and curbing the influence of rival student associations. Thus, it contributed to deepening the gap between the liberal and left-wing studentship on the one hand and the right-wing nationalists on the other. As a result of the EKOF's aggressive interventions into university life, many events like the December 1960 Third Student Congress (*G' Panspoudastiko Synedrio*) in Thessaloniki took place amidst violence and an atmosphere of intimidation and fear.<sup>934</sup>

During the congress, the EKOF representatives pronounced their support for the Karamanlis government, criticised the politics of the Soviet Bloc, and denounced the EDA as "enemies of the fatherland."<sup>935</sup> The usage of violence by EKOF members against their opponents underlined the event's undemocratic course. Left-wing and liberal students were intimidated and even deprived of the right to vote in the election for student associations. The EKOF further attempted to increase its position by bribing voters with economic benefits.<sup>936</sup> At this moment, the controversies by the EKOF members exceeded the confines of the university space. After the congress was

---

<sup>932</sup> Kostopoulos, 'O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]', 73; Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 90–92.

<sup>933</sup> Giannis P. Tzannetakos, "I veolaia kai to Foititiko Kinima [Youth and the Student Movement]," *Kathimerini.gr*, 16 October 2016, <https://www.kathimerini.gr/879454/article/epikairothta/ellada/h-neolaia-kai-to-foititiko-kinhma> (accessed 17 April 2020).

<sup>934</sup> See ASKI EDA 299/1 "Ethniki Koinoniki Organosis Foititon (E.K.O.F.): Stoicheia kai katangelies tis EDA kai tis Neolaias EDA gia ti drastiriotita tis E.K.O.F. (1960-1963) [National Social Organisation of Students (EKOF): Facts and Complaints of the EDA and the EDA Youth about the Activities of the EKOF (1960-1963)]; "Arthro-analysi gia to dexio foititiko kinima kai to rolo tis E.K.O.F. (1966) [An Analysis of the Right-Wing Student Movement and the Role of EKOF (1966)]." See also Gianoulopoulos, 'To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]', 157–59.

<sup>935</sup> Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 813.

<sup>936</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 35, 39–41.

dissolved on 21 December, a hundred of the EKOF and the EREN members looted the editorial office of the *Makedonia* daily in Thessaloniki. In the act of revenge for their critical comments about the congress' corrupt proceedings, they abused the present employees, including the editor-in-chief. The perpetrators – among them, the son of the Inspector of the Gendarmerie for Northern Greece General Konstantinos Mitsou, who was himself later convicted for his involvement in the Lambrakis case – escaped punishment after expressing their apologies to the attacked editors.<sup>937</sup> In early April 1961, a similar attack occurred against a left-wing newspaper in Athens.<sup>938</sup> A month later, besides the disruptions to the May Day celebrations, EKOF members attacked independent parliamentary deputy Nikolaos Zorbas, later that year re-elected for the EK.<sup>939</sup> During large demonstrations organised by the opposition, such as those relying on Art. 114 of the Constitution and in favour of education reforms, the EKOF acted as police informants, assisting the security forces in arresting protestors.<sup>940</sup>

At this point, the activities of *parastate* organisations were already vividly discussed at the highest political level. For instance, in early 1960, the EDA had already brought the issue of the OEN-SEN military-style units assisting the police at the maintenance of the public order into political discussions during parliamentary sessions, as it happened during the January visit of the US president Dwight Eisenhower in Athens. Among the interpellating deputies was also leading party member Ilias Iliou, a lawyer who was previously mentioned as a promoter of the term “para-constitution.”<sup>941</sup> In contrast, the security forces continued backing *parastate* groups. In summer 1961, shortly before the rigged elections, the General Security of Athens (*Geniki Asfaleia Athinon*) stated that the mass of anti-communist organisations deserved greater moral and economic support as they often intervened against communist activities on behalf of the police.<sup>942</sup> In reaction to the electoral violence, the EDA, in cooperation with the Democratic Union (*Dimokratiki Enosis*) and the Modern Agricultural Movement (*Nea Agrotiki Kinisi*), submitted a list of nine *parastate* organisations, which they presumed

---

<sup>937</sup> Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 103.

<sup>938</sup> Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 812.

<sup>939</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 35. For a more comprehensive list of offences done by EKOF, also see Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 236–39.

<sup>940</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 38.

<sup>941</sup> Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 812.

<sup>942</sup> Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’, 40.

to be involved in the intimidation tactics applied against the opposition, on 29 November 1961. Several of the listed organisations had former Security Battalionists as their leaders.<sup>943</sup>

The invasion in the Hellenic Parliament in July 1964 constituted an even more disturbing attack against democracy. Approximately fifty youth *parastate* members, who managed to break into the building, belonged to the EKOF, the OSEN, and the Association for the National Renaissance (*Omilos Ethnikis Anageniseos*, OEA). They were led by Iraklis Apostolis, a journalist and a candidate in the upcoming Athens municipal election listed on the ballot of the ERE deputy Georgios Plytas. The attack took place shortly after Plytas' public appearance in front of a crowd of sympathisers at nearby Klafthmonos Square. The attackers injured one minister and five deputies of the ruling EK. Following the assault, 32 people were arrested.<sup>944</sup> During the subsequent trial, the defence summoned some ERE deputies as well as the director of the political office of Panagiotis Kanelopoulos, Dionysis Livanos (who appeared to be Kanelopoulos' nephew), as witnesses. Furthermore, the defence relied on the testimonies of several notorious personalities affiliated with the far-right, including Maniadakis, underworld gangster Anastasios Rizas and neo-Nazi thug Longinos Paxinopoulos.<sup>945</sup> In July 1964, the court decided to imprison 23 of those involved in the incident. Renos Apostolidis and Achilleas Vittas, who were determined to be the main organisers, received the longest sentence, amounting to two and a half years in prison. Furthermore, the court imposed financial compensation for the injured centrist politicians.<sup>946</sup>

Subsequently, as a result of the court resolution, the Papandreou government decided on the dissolution of eleven *parastate* organisations on 14 July 1964. They included both youth and citizens' associations; eight of them were legally registered, and three had an illegal status. Furthermore, an order was issued to arrest the leaders of

---

<sup>943</sup> Trikkas, *EDA 1951-67*, 182.

<sup>944</sup> "Travmatiai: Eis ypourgous, 5 vouleftai [Injured: One Minister, 5 Deputies]", *Eleftheria*, 4 July 1964, 1, 7.

<sup>945</sup> "Epithesis Tagmaton Efodou tis ERE sti Vouli [The Attack of ERE's Assault Battalions Against Parliament]," *Avgi*, 9 July 1964, 1; "Archizei simeron proi i diki dia ta gegonota tis Voulis me ektakta metra [The Trial for the Events at Parliament Starts Today in the Morning with Extraordinary Measures]," *Eleftheria* 7 July 1964, 1, 7.

<sup>946</sup> "Avstirotatai poinai eis tous epidromeis [Stricter Punishments for the Aggressors]," *Eleftheria*, 16 July 1964, 1, 7.



those groups that avoided registration.<sup>947</sup> The *parastate* organisations were accused, referring to the words of Ioannis Toumbas, Papandreou’s Interior Minister, of “having unlawfully seized state responsibilities” and “using violence to reach their goals.”<sup>948</sup> Furthermore, Toumbas defined the *parastate* organisations as follows: “By this term, I mean organisations which, while according to their statutes and in their apparent declarations pose legal aims patriotic or social in orientation, in practice they diverted from this aim, turning into the organs of one political party and propagandists destroying our free institutions.”<sup>949</sup> The public was informed that these organisations, financed from the state budget and protected by security organs, sought to impose a dictatorship in Greece and were in close contact with ERE’s far-right wing. The EK and the EDA heavily criticised the ERE for having allegedly protected *parastate* mechanisms. One of the disbanded groups, the illegal National Social Change (*Ethniki Koinoniki Allagi*; EKA), was circulating its press entitled “Our fight” (*O agon mas*) in June, containing – according to *Makedonia* – “a vulgar attack against the parliamentary deputies” as a presage for upcoming aggressions.<sup>950</sup>

For a complete picture of the situation, it should be noted that in summer 1964, the Papandreou government similarly proceeded in terms of left-wing organisations. In this period, the court in Athens decided on the dissolution of four “communist *parastate* organisations.” The general prosecutor launched the court proceedings against the left-wing newspaper *Avgi* for having published a statement by the EDA which praised the EAM/ELAS resistance.<sup>951</sup> Furthermore, the continuation of the *Lambrakides* was constantly put into question. Its situation can be illustrated by this external assessment from January 1964, provided by the British Embassy in Athens:

---

<sup>947</sup> Out of the legally recognised organisations, the government disbanded the the OEN-SEN and the OSEN, the Panhellenic National Crusade (*Panellinos Antikommounistiki Stavroforia*, PES), the National Resistance of Greece (*Ethniki Antistasis Ellados*), the National Anti-Communist Organisation (*Ethniki Antikommounistiki Organosis*), the Association of Resistance Fighters and Victims of the Northern Greece (*Syndesmos Agoniston kai Thymaton Ethnikis Antistaseos Voreiou Ellados*), the Union of Nationally Minded ELAS Fighters (*Enosis Ethnikofronon Elasion*), the Anti-Communist Crusade of Greece (*Antikommounistiki Stavroforia Ellados*, ASE) and the National Organisation “Blue Phalanx” (*Ethniki Organosis “Kyani Falangx”*); as for unregistered ones, the EKA, the “Karfitsa” organisation and the Guarantors of the King (*Engyitai tou vasileos*) were abolished. “Ai parakratikai organoseis yparxoun en drasei [Parastate Organisations Are in Action],” 15 July 1961, 1; see also Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 118–19.

<sup>948</sup> Cited according to Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 296–97.

<sup>949</sup> “Ai parakratikai organoseis yparxoun en drasei [Parastate Organisations Are Active],” 15 July 1961, 1.

<sup>950</sup> “Dialyontai 11 parakratikai organoseis. Dietachthi syllopsis ton archigon ton trion [11 Parastate Organisations Dissolved. An Order Issued to Arrest the Leaders of Three of Them],” *Makedonia*, 15 July 1964, 1, 7.

<sup>951</sup> Botsiou, ‘I epirooi tis dolofonias Lampraki [The Influence of Lambrakis’ Assassination]’, 85.

This movement has been increasingly in evidence, particularly in villages and has taken on a rather menacing appearance of strength and militancy which has caused a good deal of disquiet. There have been rumours that Ministers and security officials have made strong recommendations to Papandreou that it should be banned.<sup>952</sup>

The report suggests that Papandreou outlined his plan to weaken the organisation by establishing a new alternative platform called the “Greek Democratic Youth Organisation.” In his 1964 New Years address, he remarkably claimed that the organisation would not become a state, governmental, or *parastate* organisation of the Centre Union.”<sup>953</sup> Nevertheless, the *Lambrakides* resisted these political pressures. Since September 1964, as mentioned above, they cooperated with the NEDA within the newly created DNL and continued their activities until the 1967 coup. The important thing here is that the strengthening of the Centre at the expense of the Right did not lead to an improved strategic position of the Left. Secondly, not only the Right but also the Centre and the Left were denounced for using violent and *parastate* means in their political struggles.

The problems did not disappear from the domestic political scene by the disbandment of the selected *parastate* organisations by the Papandreou government. On the contrary, the activities of dozens of *parastate* organisations remained untouched, including the EKOF. The National Student Union of Greece (EFFE) unsuccessfully demanded the dissolution of the EKOF after the July attack against parliament. With its excellent political connections, the EKOF escaped unscathed, allegedly for lack of available evidence supporting its culpability.<sup>954</sup> Following the 1964 controversy, the ERE’s relationship with the EKOF officially simmered down. Characteristically, the EKOF was hostile towards Kanellopoulos’ leadership of the ERE and favoured his opponent, Panagiotis Pipinelis. The latter was a proponent of hard-line, “anti-parliamentary solutions” to the alleged imminent communist threat, which he saw in the potential rise of Andreas Papandreou to power. Unsurprisingly, during the junta, the two men stood on opposite sides: Pipinelis serving as the regime’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Kanellopoulos supporting the resistance against the regime, which forced

---

<sup>952</sup> NA FO 371/180008 (5 January 1964).

<sup>953</sup> Ibid.

<sup>954</sup> Meynaud, *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*, 295–97; Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’, 72.

him into seven years of house arrest.<sup>955</sup> If not with the ERE, a vivid collaboration between the EKOF and the EREN continued. Both organisations, as well as Plevris' K4A and other groups, were involved in the National Front (*Ethniko Metopo*), a parallel youth organisation assembled by the ERE amidst the 1965 *Iouliana* events. It aimed to actively challenge the presumably growing communist danger, which meant countering the left-wing and centrist opposition using all means available, including the violent ones. Their cooperation within this platform lasted until spring 1966. Aside from this, then-EREN's leader Pavlos Manolopoulos was the former head of the EKOF.<sup>956</sup>

Youth *parastate* organisations were operating until the 1967 coup. In the weeks that preceded the coup, the youth *parastate* instigated violence against the pro-democratic student movement. In the heavy atmosphere of upcoming elections, the EFEE mobilised its supporters to pressed for free elections and the resignation of the interim Kanellopoulos government. Parallel to this, the EK launched an escalated pre-election campaign, affected by the recent court verdict in the ASPIDA affair, with the EK demanding amnesty for those convicted.<sup>957</sup> In spring 1967, university life in two major cities was disrupted by ongoing clashes between the EFEE and the EKOF. In Athens, the tensions increased after a series of bombings in early March.<sup>958</sup> In Thessaloniki, the persecution of students involved in student associations, including the EFEE, by University Rector and Minister for Northern Greece Panagiotis Christou, a future Education Minister of the junta, brought thousands of protesters to the streets.<sup>959</sup> The security forces brutally suppressed large April solidarity demonstrations that were organised by the EFEE in both cities in cooperation with the EKOF and their “counter-demonstrations.”<sup>960</sup> EK leader Georgios Papandreou commented on the harsh intervention as follows: “The police state and the parastate were revived, and against them, we oppose the resistance to democracy.”<sup>961</sup> Andreas Papandreou denounced the

---

<sup>955</sup> Spyros Linardatos, *Syghroni Elliniki Istoría: Apo ton Emfylio sti Chounta. Tomos E' 1964-1967 [Contemporary Greek History: From the Civil War to the Junta. Volume 5: 1964-1967]* (Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1978), 424.

<sup>956</sup> Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’, 74; Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 134–35.

<sup>957</sup> Linardatos, *Syghroni Elliniki Istoría, Tomos E' [Contemporary Greek History, Volume 5]*, 424.

<sup>958</sup> *Ibid.*, 411–12.

<sup>959</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 277–78.

<sup>960</sup> “I E.R.E. aimatokylise tin Thessalonikin [ERE Shed the Blood of Thessaloniki],” *Eleftheria*, 7 April 1967, 1.

<sup>961</sup> “I demokratiki antistasis antitassetai eis tin vian [Democratic Resistance Against Violence],” *Makedonia*, 8 April 1967, 1.

ruling power by claiming that “the ERE is a para-government [...], a provocation and an insult, not only with regard to the democratic world but also to the Greek people.”<sup>962</sup>

### 6.3 The *Parakratos* of the Indignant “Patriotic” Citizens

The citizens’ *parastate* organisations had a broader scope than the youth *parastate*, and the social composition of its members was more heterogeneous. For instance, among the founding members of the National Social Assault (*Ethniki Koinoniki Exormisis*, EKE), registered in Athens in 1955, there were well-to-do citizens – lawyers, state employees, business owners, and bank employees as well as one woman, who stated to be an artist by profession.<sup>963</sup> However, the organisation’s aggressive name, as well as the fact that its leader, Konstantinos Bougalis, was a wartime collaborator, did not leave the best impression.<sup>964</sup> Many former Nazi collaborators could be found in these *parastate* organisations, alongside indignant and nationally-minded citizens, militant anti-communists, extremists with neo-Nazi, antisemitic, and racist worldviews, and representatives of the local underworld, thugs, and petty criminals.

Antisemitism and admiration for the Third Reich were characteristic of the Nazi Organisation of Athens (*Nazistiki Organosi Athinon*, NOA), a *parastate* group with close links to the KYP and the General Security of Athens.<sup>965</sup> In the early 1960s, the NOA organised attacks against the Jewish community and the Israeli Embassy in Athens, vandalised synagogues and Jewish property, and addressed threatening letters to the Jewish community members.<sup>966</sup> One of the notorious neo-Nazis among the *parastate* was Longinos Paxinopoulos, who gave evidence during the 1964 trial for the assailants against parliament. Paxinopoulos was himself investigated and even put to trial twice. In

---

<sup>962</sup> “Papandreou: Einai parakyvernisis ka tha syndrivoun eis tas eklogas [Papandreou: It’s a Para-Government and They Will be Crushed in the Elections],” *Makedonia*, 12 April 1967, 1.

<sup>963</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “*Ethniki Koinoniki Exormisis: Katastatiko kai katastasi idrytikon melon*, 1955 [National Social Assault: Statutes and the Status of the Founding Members].” Furthermore, see GAK (Athens), Archive of the Athens Court of First Instance, Decision No. 7979/1955 on the Approval of the Statutes of the Organisation of the National Social Assault (28 May 1955); ELIA, Archive of Konstantinos Granitsiotis (764), f. 1.

<sup>964</sup> See also Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 103; Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’, 91.

<sup>965</sup> Giannis Voultepsis, *Ypothesi Lambraki. Tomos A’ [The Lambrakis Case. Volume 1]* (Athina: Alkyon, 1998), 51–54.

<sup>966</sup> “Exiploti eis 12 choras o antisimitismos [Antisemitism Spreads in 12 Countries],” *Eleftheria*, 5 January 1960, 1, 6; “I enochi tou kommatikou kratous. I ‘Nazistiki organosis Athinon’ parartima ton Kou-Kloux-Klan [The Complicity of the Party State. The Nazi Organisation of Athens as a Ku-Klux-Klan Branch],” *Eleftheria*, 11 June 1963, 1, 7.

1963, he was sued for illegal weapon possession after police found a large arsenal of arms in his flat. He aimed to use it to intimidate his political opponents at public demonstrations and attack them in case of their resistance.<sup>967</sup>

Besides being an OEN-SEN member, Paxinopoulos was also active in the youth section of the Anti-Communist Crusade of Greece (*Antikommunistiki Stavroforia Ellados*, ASE). In this way, the youth *parastate* permeated citizen *parastate* associations.<sup>968</sup> Founded in mid-1952 in Athens and with headquarters on Patision Street, the ASE became the most significant paramilitary group of the period with multiple branches in Athens, Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Kalamata, Patra, Volos, Larisa, Drama, and other regional centres.<sup>969</sup> Its leader, retired Lieutenant Colonel Theodoros Papadogonas, had a collaborationist past as he formerly served as a Deputy Commander of a Security Battalion unit in Peloponnesus. With his fellows, Papadogonas published a monthly called “Nationalist” (*Ethnikistis*), where they formulated the organisation’s political viewpoints. The ASE’s official symbol was a variant of the *Totenkopf*, an emblem characteristic of, among other things, Nazi Germany’s *Waffen-SS* units.<sup>970</sup>

The ASE had a determined paramilitary structure where each local organisation consisted of three sections, each of which had twelve men and a leader.<sup>971</sup> The ASE leadership appointed the heads of sections on the proposal of the security forces’ representatives. While financed by the Information Service, the ASE members received special identity cards from the police and the gendarmerie that validated their allegiance to the organisation. According to these documents, their holders were obliged to assist security forces without any delay. Their task was to monitor and report on “any serious information or anti-national action of communists related to the security and

---

<sup>967</sup> For example, see “Proefylakisthi o diatiron tin en Athinaiis oplanothikin parakratikis organoseos [The Keeper of the Athens Parastate Organisation’s Arsenal Placed in Custody],” *Makedonia*, 4 October 1963, 1; “Astynomikoi piezoun martyra dia na aposiopisi stoixeia schetika me tas parakratikas [The Police Are Pressuring Witnesses to Silence Facts About Parastate Members],” *Eleftheria*, 5 October 1963, 8.

<sup>968</sup> Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 27; for the case of Paxinopoulos see 105-107.

<sup>969</sup> ELIA, Archive of Michail Nikitiadis (7), f. 1; see also “Apokalyptetai i enochi tou kommatikou kratous. Mega ‘parakratikon’ diktyon syntirei i E.R.E. 1. I Antikommounistiki Stavroforia [The Complicity of the Party State is Revealed. The ERE Maintains an Immense ‘Parastate’ Network. 1. The Anti-Communist Crusade],” *Eleftheria*, 9 June 1963, 1, 15.

<sup>970</sup> Dimitrakis, *Oi Germanikes Mystikes Ypiresies [The German Secret Services]*, 110–11.

<sup>971</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “Antikommounistiki stavroforia Ellados (A.S.E.): Engyklios arithm. 7 (28/11/1961): Organotiki diarthrosis [Anti-Communist Crusade of Greece (ASE): The Circular No. 7 (28/11/1961): Organisational Structure].” See also Voultepsis, *Ypothesi Lambraki. Tomos A’ [The Lambrakis Case. Volume 1]*, 58.

sovereignty of our Fatherland.”<sup>972</sup> Many ASE members joined the organisation intending to improve their low social status. As Tsoutsoumpis explains, they often originated from the provinces, worked in low-paid jobs, and lacked the professional connections necessary to build their careers. Thus, membership in the ASE and other parastate organisations provided them with a sense of safety, support, and belonging while opening up new job opportunities and access to material and welfare benefits.<sup>973</sup>

In exchange, the state and its security services used the *parastate* organisations on several occasions. Some paramilitaries took part in the violent events of the 1961 electoral campaign. A far-right journalist and the former chief of the ASE, Athanasios Thomopoulos, indirectly revealed this information in October 1962 in a letter to the Head of the Information Service at the Ministry of the Presidency, Nikolaos Gogousis, as his benefactor. Thomopoulos parted with the ASE and, following the 1961 elections, established the Panhellenic National Crusade (*Panellinios Ethniki Stavroforia*, PES),<sup>974</sup> a neo-Nazi organisation located close to Omonoia Square in Athens, and its members made public appearances dressed in uniforms with the symbol of a skull.<sup>975</sup> The Information Service funded his activities, including publishing the newspaper “National Light” (*Ethnikon Fos*), but cut the financial support once Thomopoulos switched his allegiance from Karamanlis to Georgios Grivas, who was briefly pursuing a political revival on the Greek domestic scene in the early 1960s.<sup>976</sup> Thomopoulos protested against this cessation in funding, mentioning to Gogousis the credits of his organisation

---

<sup>972</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “Antikommounistiki stavroforia Ellados (A.S.E.): Deltia anagoriseos melon [Anti-Communist Crusade of Greece (ASE): Identity Cards of Members].”

<sup>973</sup> Tsoutsoumpis, ‘The Far Right in Greece’, 511.

<sup>974</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “Panellinios Antikommounistiki Stavroforia (P.E.S.), 1962 [The Panhellenic Anti-Communist Crusade (PES), 1962].”

<sup>975</sup> “Apokalyptetai i enochi tou kommatikou kratous. Mega ‘parakratikon’ diktyon syntirei i E.R.E. 2. I ‘Panellinios Ethniki Stavroforia’ (P.E.S.) [The Complicity of the Party State is Revealed. The ERE Maintains an Immense ‘Parastate’ Network. 2. The Panhellenic National Crusade (PES)],” *Eleftheria*, 11 June 1963, 1, 7.

<sup>976</sup> Grivas was offered political cooperation by the Liberals; the Karamanlis government was cautious of Grivas since he had considerable support in the army given his engagement in the Cyprus issue. Because of this, the Karamanlis government was losing its stronger position. For that reason, the Karamanlis administration considerably problematised Thomopoulos’ disloyalty. Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 85–94; Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 233.

in the anti-communist struggle, which it allegedly pursued at the cost of violating the law and being involved in electoral intimidation, violence, and vote-rigging.<sup>977</sup>

Members of citizen *parastate* organisations, such as the ASE's Anastasios Rizas, a witness at the 1964 trial, a criminal and a cabaret owner known as "Pethamenos" (*Dead*), were fighting the Left alongside the EKOF and the youth *parastate*, attempting to disrupt EDA's public events.<sup>978</sup> They assisted security forces in preventing the Peace March Marathon in April 1963 with the participation of Grigoris Lambrakis from happening after the Karamanlis government prohibited it. The then-counter-demonstration of *parastate* organisations was organised by the Information Office of the General Security in Athens; its officer Vasileios Lambrou was responsible for their coordination.<sup>979</sup> *Parastate* men were also employed as provisional security guards. Thousands of them were hired in May 1963 to help the police and gendarmerie protect the French President Charles de Gaulle, who was on a state visit in Athens and Thessaloniki. Nationally-minded citizens, retired army and security forces officers, public officials, and members of the ASE, the OEN-SEN, the PES or other organisations responded to a respective ad published in newspapers, whereby they arrived to register as volunteers at local police stations.<sup>980</sup> After a loyalty check, they received instructions alongside a pin (*karfitsa*) that – placed in the collars of their jackets – served as a distinguishing sign for both themselves and the police. Eventually, it became a symbol of a conspiratorial association called "Karfitsa."<sup>981</sup>

There were many other *parastate* organisations with similar tasks that included various kinds of anti-communist actions and propaganda; among them, for example, were the Organisation of National Resistance (*Organosis Ethnikis Antistaseos*, OEA),<sup>982</sup>

---

<sup>977</sup> Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 108; Petridis, *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967 [The Power and Para-Power in Greece]*, 294–98; Gkotzaridis, "Who Really Rules This Country?", 661–62.

<sup>978</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 82; Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 103.

<sup>979</sup> Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 103.

<sup>980</sup> "Apokalyptetai i enochi tou kommatikou kratous. Mega 'parakratikon' diktyon syntirei i E.R.E. 2. I 'Panellinios Ethniki Stavroforia' (P.E.S.) [The Complicity of the Party State is Revealed. The ERE Maintains an Immense 'Parastate' Network. 2. The Panhellenic National Crusade (PES)]," *Eleftheria*, 11 June 1963, 1, 7. See also Lendakis, *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*, 107; Voultepsis, *Ypothesi Lambraki. Tomos A' [The Lambrakis Case. Volume 1]*, 56; Dordanas, "I organosi tis karfitsas" ["The Pin Organisation"], 137–138.

<sup>981</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 328–30; Dordanas, 'Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]', 37–38.

<sup>982</sup> Kleitsikas and Speranzoni, *Fenomena tromokratias*, 297.

the Panhellenic Union of Commanders, Chieftains and Fighters of the Orthodox National Resistance (*Panellinos Enosis Archigon, Oplarchigon kai Machiton Orthodoxou Ethnikis Antistaseos*),<sup>983</sup> and the Organisation of Unseen Fighters of the Greek Nation (*Organosis Aoraton Agoniston Ellinikou Ethnous*, OAAEE) with paramilitary groups named “Papanikolis” and “Fighter-52” (*Machitis-52*).<sup>984</sup> The OAAEE circulated leaflets amidst the EK’s campaign against the *parastate* in July 1964, spreading a false report that “weapons transported from behind the Iron Curtain are distributed to communists! Shortly the murders of nationally minded will start”; in turn, it called for unity and defence against them.<sup>985</sup> While Athens was undoubtedly an important centre of *parastate* activity, many organisations were to be found across the country. As Dordanas argues, in municipalities other than Athens, having a close relationship with local political and security authorities was of the utmost importance. These connections served as compensation for the relatively poor access to decision-making actors at the central level.<sup>986</sup>

Besides the many branches of the ASE mentioned above, there were multiple organisations active in Thessaloniki, with the prominence of the Association of Resistance Fighters and Victims of Northern Greece (*Syndesmos Agoniston kai Thymaton Ethnikis Antistaseos Voreiou Ellados*; later on the organisation of Xenophon Giosmas). This organisation became notorious for the involvement of its members in the Lambrakis assassination. It had its seat in the Thessaloniki neighbourhood of Ano Toumba but succeeded in expanding within the city and in the wider area of Central Macedonia.<sup>987</sup> The Union of Nationally Minded ELAS Fighters (*Enosis Ethnikofronon Elasion*, EEE) was also based in Thessaloniki, financed by the Information Service of Northern Greece, a branch of Gogousis’ Information Service.<sup>988</sup> Its purpose, allegedly encouraged by the KYP, was to spread disinformation and cause provocations by making false claims that the EEE members were previously involved in the

---

<sup>983</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “Panellinos Enosis Archigon, Oplarchigon kai Machiton Orthodoxou Ethnikis Antistaseos: Katastatikon kai esoterikos kanonismos, 1959 [The Panhellenic Union of Commanders, Chieftains and Fighters of the Orthodox National Resistance: Statutes and Internal Regulations, 1959].”

<sup>984</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “O.A.A.E.E.: Omades Papanikolis kai Machitis-52 [OAAEE: Groups Papanikolis and Machitis-52].”

<sup>985</sup> “Oi parakratikoi en drasei [Parastate Members in Action],” *Eleftheria*, 25 July 1964, 1.

<sup>986</sup> Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’, 39.

<sup>987</sup> ASKI EDA 638 “Syndesmos Agoniston kai Thymaton Ethnikis Antistaseos Voreiou Ellados, 1960, 1963 [The Association of Resistance Fighters and Victims of Northern Greece, 1960, 1963].”

<sup>988</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 102.



EAM/ELAS. Furthermore, EEE members had close connections with the Inspector of Gendarmerie Mitsou and were also said to participate in the Greek stay-behind Operation Sheepskin.<sup>989</sup> Another Thessaloniki organisation was the Panhellenic Christian and National Defence “In This You Win” (*Panellinos Christianiki kai Ethniki Amyna “EN TOUTO NIKA”*), a group with a collaborationist background and ties to the Orthodox Church.<sup>990</sup> Moving beyond the two largest cities, the National Organisation “Blue Phalanx” (*Ethniki Organosis “Kyani Falangx”*) was founded in Kavala in 1962. Five members of this group attempted to assassinate EK deputy Dimitris Papadopoulos in Kilkis, for which they would have received 200,000 drachmas upon their success.<sup>991</sup> The National Social Assault (EKE) was registered in Athens but was primarily active in the Dodecanese.<sup>992</sup> To give one more example, the National Resistance of Macedonia and Thrace (*Ethniki Antistasi Makedonias-Thrakis*) operated in the area of Drama.<sup>993</sup>

Some of the *parastate* representatives were personalities with extraordinary life trajectories. For example, Georgios Georgalas (1928–2016), the leader of the Association of Repatriates from behind the Iron Curtain (*Syllogos Epanapatristhenton ek tou Parapetasmatos*, SEP), an organisation funded by the Gogousis Information Service,<sup>994</sup> was a Cairo-born Greek who was arrested for communist activities during his law studies in Athens. In 1948, he took refuge in Paris and then in the Eastern Bloc to avoid capital punishment. As a graduate of the Moscow school for communist cadres, he found employment as a journalist in Greek radio broadcasting in Budapest. Shortly after the 1956 revolution, he accompanied the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, to Egypt since he was familiar with the local political situation. There, he first attempted to obtain political asylum at the US

---

<sup>989</sup> Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’, 93. See also Kleitsikas and Speranzoni, *Fenomena tromokratias*. Unlike these authors, according to Paralikas, the EEE was composed of former ELAS fighters who resigned from their previous political orientation. Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 101–2.

<sup>990</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 304.

<sup>991</sup> ASKI EDA 188 “Ethnikistiki Organosis Kyani Falanx: Katastatiko kai katalogos idrytikon melon [The Nationalist Organisation Blue Phalanx: Statutes and the List of Founding Members].” See also “Dolofonian vouleptou tis E.K. eichon schediasei parakratikoi [The Parastate Members Have Planned a Murder of EK’s Deputy],” *Eleftheria*, 20 August 1964, 1, 7.

<sup>992</sup> Gkanoulis, ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos [Far-right Organisations and the Parastate]’, 91.

<sup>993</sup> ASKI EDA 656 “Ethniki Antistasis Makedonias-Thrakis, Drama: Entypi prokyrixi tou Genikou Archigou tis organosis Ant. Fostiridi (08/01/1966) [National Resistance of Macedonia-Thrace, Drama: Printed Announcement of the General Chief of the Organisation Ant. Fostiridis (08/01/1966)].”

<sup>994</sup> ELIA, Archive of Tryfon Triandafyllakos (in “Triandafyllakos Family”), II.5 Information Service, f. 2, 15 April 1961; see also Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 104.

Embassy and then decided to return to Greece.<sup>995</sup> After a relatively short imprisonment, he was released and became a close collaborator of the Hellenic Army's General Staff and the KYP, focusing on the planning of psychological war operations and anti-communist propaganda. He lectured on Sovietology at officer schools and, between 1960 and 1964, published a journal by the same name, whose subscription was mandatory for the armed and security forces and was abolished by the Papandreou government.<sup>996</sup>

Georgalas also served as a member of the Studies Council and was thus responsible for coordinating the *parastate*. His organisation and his publication activities were funded through the KYP and the Information Service.<sup>997</sup> During the regime of the colonels, at least until the 1973 rise of the hard-line wing of Ioannidis, Georgalas acted as its main theoretician and propagandist, even holding a deputy ministerial position in two governments. Unlike Plevris, who favoured installing an ideologically elaborated regime based on national-socialist ideas, Georgalas deemed ideology unnecessary and became notorious for his defence of the junta as democracy “placed in a sling.”<sup>998</sup>

After 1974, Georgalas remained unpunished for his engagement during the junta years. He was, however, sued for his alleged moral responsibility for terrorist attacks against journalists organised by the far-right in the 1970s. Among them, Nikos Michaloliakos, later to be the leader of the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn (*Chrysi Avgi*, XA), served as a representative in parliament between 2012 and 2019. Georgalas experienced a revival in the 1990s when he got involved in the protest movement related to the Macedonian issue and supported some personalities of the far-right; besides Michaloliakos and Plevris, this also included Panos Kammenos, the leader of another chauvinist political party active in parliament between 2012 and 2019, the

---

<sup>995</sup> Meletis I. Meletopoulos, *I diktatoria ton syntagmatarchon: koinonia, ideologia, oikonomia* [The Dictatorship of the Collonels: Society, Ideology, Economy] (Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1996), 211–12.

<sup>996</sup> Papadimitriou, *Apo ton lao ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon* [From the Law-Abiding People to the Nation of the Nationally Minded], 279.

<sup>997</sup> Romaios, ‘Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]’, 28–29.

<sup>998</sup> Cited according to Judt, *Postwar*, 507. See also, Dimitris Psarras, “Erga kai imeres tou theoritikou tou 'gypsou' [Works and days of the Theoretician of the 'Plaster'],” efsyn.gr, 29 December 2016, [https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/94747\\_erga-kai-imeres-toy-theoritikoy-toy-gypsoy](https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/94747_erga-kai-imeres-toy-theoritikoy-toy-gypsoy) (accessed 13 May 2020).

Independent Greeks (*Anexartitoi Ellines*, ANEL).<sup>999</sup> Through these connections, the heritage of the post-civil war *parakratos* reached out to more contemporary forms of the Greek far-right.

#### 6.4 The Case of Xenophon Giosmas

Compared to Georgalas, Xenophon Giosmas (1906–1975) was another *parastate* representative, yet of an entirely different breed. During the interwar years, Giosmas, a Minor Asia refugee whose family settled in Katerini, had been imprisoned for fraud and sued by the court for other offences, including extortion, insult, unprovoked attacks, incitement to obscenity, and adultery. Despite this, being a monarchist and anti-communist at the time of the Metaxas dictatorship, he acted as a unit commander of the regime's fascist-like youth organisation EON.<sup>1000</sup> Following the Axis occupation, Giosmas helped the occupation authorities organise anti-communist paramilitary forces to fight the communist resistance in the country. He headed the National Anti-communist Organisation of Katerini, Pieria, and Olympos (*Ethniki Antikommounistiki Organosis Katerinis, Pierion kai Olympou*, EAO), where he assembled many of his post-war collaborators. Giosmas was closely associated with Colonel Georgios Poulos, an infamous Nazi collaborator and a fanatical anti-communist, executed for treason in Goudi in Athens in June 1949.<sup>1001</sup> Poulos established the Greek Voluntary Corps of Krya Vrysi (*Elliniko Ethelontiko Soma Kryas Vrysis*), whose units were held responsible for war crimes against the civilian population in the Macedonian region; this included the 1944 massacre in the city of Giannitsa, which was carried out in cooperation with Nazi occupiers.<sup>1002</sup> Giosmas also worked as a war journalist, thus assisting Nazi propaganda and, from the summer of 1944, heading the army's Press and Propaganda Office (*Grafeio Typou kai Propagandas*). With the military advance of the ELAS, Giosmas was forced to flee first to Thessaloniki in summer 1944 and then to

---

<sup>999</sup> Ibid. See also Giorgis Th. Kremmydas, *Oi anthropoi tis Chountas meta ti Diktatoria [The People of Junta after the Dictatorship]* (Athina: Exantas, 1984), 235.

<sup>1000</sup> Stratos Dordanas, 'Apo tis proskopikes omades sti dolofonia Lambraki. I peroptosi tou Xenofontos Giosma [From Scout Groups to Lambrakis Murder. The Case of Xenofon Giosmas]', in 'Echthros' endos ton Teichon: Opseis tou Dosiologismou stin Elladas tis Katochis [The 'Enemy' Inside the Walls: The Perspectives of Collaborationism in Occupied Greece], ed. Iakovos Michailidis, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, and Hagen Fleischer (Athina: Ellinika Grammata, 2006), 233.

<sup>1001</sup> Kostopoulos, *I autologokrimeri mnimi [The self-censored memory]*, 22–23; Dimitrakis, *Oi Germanikes Mystikes Ypiresies [The German Secret Services]*, 109.

<sup>1002</sup> Lowe, *Zdivočelý kontinent [Savage Continent]*, 273.

Vienna in October of that year, where he joined the pro-Nazi “exiled government” of Ektor Tsironikos and assumed the position of minister of propaganda.<sup>1003</sup>

Giosmas returned to Greece three years later and was imprisoned based on the decision of the special court for collaboration that sentenced him in absentia to death in November 1945. In June 1947, his punishment was changed to twenty years in prison, but he was released in June 1952 after nearly five years of imprisonment thanks to a king’s pardon.<sup>1004</sup> Due to his anti-communism, Giosmas became the head of the school inspection at the 24<sup>th</sup> Elementary School in Toumba, Thessaloniki, where he served from 1953 to 1961. On top of this, between 1958 and 1962, he was publishing a journal called the *Attack of Hellenes (Exormisi ton Ellinon)*, where he praised the anti-communist struggle and the idea of Hellenic Christianity.<sup>1005</sup> During this time, Giosmas became involved in the Housing Cooperative of Fighters and Victims of the National Resistance of Thessaloniki “Alexander the Great” (*Oikodomikos Synetairismos Agoniston kai Thymaton Ethnikis Antistaseos Thessalonikis “O Megas Alexandros”*), legally registered in April 1957.<sup>1006</sup> The organisation aimed to improve the living conditions of its members, who defined themselves as nationally-minded and anti-communist while claiming to be – in the broader sense and in accordance with the organisation’s name – either protagonists of the anti-communist resistance during the Axis occupation and the civil war or the victims of communist activities. They also wanted to symbolically act as defenders of Greek Macedonia and, specifically, to protect Thessaloniki and its worker neighbourhood of Toumba from communist infiltration.<sup>1007</sup> The organisation’s membership featured several Nazi collaborators, formerly affiliated with Poulos or Giosmas himself, who appeared to be citizens of Toumba and other Thessaloniki neighbourhoods. Otherwise, it was composed of local inhabitants who shared a common belief that the state should reward them for their dedicated anti-communism and national mindedness.<sup>1008</sup>

The cooperative members perceived the organisation as a means towards receiving the support of state authorities regarding their housing and social demands.

---

<sup>1003</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 171, 184–89.

<sup>1004</sup> *Ibid.*, 285–87.

<sup>1005</sup> Romaios, ‘Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]’, 34; Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 287–92.

<sup>1006</sup> Dordanas, “I organosi tis karfitsas” [“The Pin Organisation”], 127.

<sup>1007</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 293–95, 301–3.

<sup>1008</sup> *Ibid.*, 293.

This is clear from the organisation's telegram sent to Prime Minister Karamanlis on 4 April 1960, where it asked the government to improve "for purely national reasons" the living conditions of "thirty families of fighters and victims" who appeared to be members of the cooperative. As they argued, they formed "the core defence as well as national enlightenment in this settlement, which is otherwise a significant bastion of communism."<sup>1009</sup> The cooperative tried to attract their attention by organising public events of a nationalist and anti-communist character and set about fostering contacts with politicians, army and security forces officers, and public officials. Through their telegrams and public appeals, they attempted to reach all political levels, starting from local offices up to state ministries and the prime minister's office. In their endeavours, Giosmas served as the organisation's liaison. He kept contacts with the police (the seventh police department of Thessaloniki in particular), Inspector of Gendarmerie Mitsou, and politicians or state officials for Northern Greece.<sup>1010</sup> The cooperative was also increasingly politically active, organising public protests and issuing statements regarding domestic and foreign political issues, such as the Hungarian revolution or the Cyprus dispute. Yet, in pursuing its main aim – better housing for nationally-minded of Thessaloniki – it was not entirely successful. Rather, the active engagement of its members ensured them a greater benevolence from the authorities towards their controversial past.<sup>1011</sup>

In January 1960, the Association of Resistance Fighters and Victims of Northern Greece emerged under the leadership of Giosmas as an offshoot organisation of the housing cooperative, fulfilling the role of a combat unit deployed in street clashes against political opponents.<sup>1012</sup> The aim of the organisation based on its statutes was stated as such:

- a) The recognition and utilisation of the anti-communist struggle conducted during the German occupation and up until 1949; b) the moral

---

<sup>1009</sup> ASKI EDA 638, "Syndesmos Agoniston kai Thymaton Ethnikis Antistaseos Voreiou Ellados: Tilegrafima pros ton prothypourgo Konstantino Karamanli me stegastika aitimata (06/04/1960) [The Association of Resistance Fighters and Victims of Northern Greece: A Telegram for the Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis with Housing Requests]."

<sup>1010</sup> Romaios, 'Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]', 34–35; Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 289, 295–97.

<sup>1011</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 300–301, 326–27; Dordanas, 'To trikyklo, ena "atychima" kai i adekasti dikaiosyni [The Tricycle Truck, One "Accident" and the Incorruptible Justice]', 45–46.

<sup>1012</sup> Petridis, *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967 [The Power and Para-Power in Greece]*, 54–58.

and material enhancement of its fighters and victims; c) the urban and provincial restitution of the association's destitute members; d) the provision of housing to its members and e) by all legal means, the protection of Greek interests and Rights and the combatting of all anti-national and insidious activities from wherever they come.<sup>1013</sup>

A member of the Association could include the following:

Every Greek of both sexes who took an active part against the EAM-communists and their allies for the liberation of our Fatherland during the Occupation and until 1949 against the communist bandits and provably acted patriotically, which they can evidence by official documents confirmed by police or army authorities or their former representatives, or by recognised chieftains, Mayors or Chairmen of Communities who are provably nationally-minded.<sup>1014</sup>

Twenty founding members attended the first meeting, having met in the local cafe in Ano Toumba on today's Lambrakis Street. The place previously served as a base for the meetings of the housing cooperative, and even earlier during occupation times, it functioned as a popular spot for Security Battalionists.<sup>1015</sup> The members often previously experienced imprisonment as they had either a collaborationist and/or criminal past; several of them were previously associated with Poulos. Thus, their engagement in the organisation represented their way of reintegrating themselves into society, which saw them as outlaws. While hiring new members, the organisation promised to facilitate state support in exchange for loyalty.<sup>1016</sup> Their membership cards, bearing an imitation of the German Iron Cross and certified by police authorities, stated that the organisation aimed at the "defence of our fatherland and of the Hellenic Christian civilisation until the last breath, everywhere, always and by all means," as well as at assistance to the security forces with the maintenance of public order.<sup>1017</sup> The organisation planned to spread across Greek Macedonia and establish branches, with the central administration being in Thessaloniki.<sup>1018</sup>

---

<sup>1013</sup> IAM, Judicial Records, Dik. 1.1013371, "Katastatikon Syndesmou agoniston kai thymaton Ethnikis Antistaseos Vor. Ellados [The Statutes of the Association of Resistance Fighters and Victims of Northern Greece]."

<sup>1014</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1015</sup> Dordanas, "I organosi tis karfitsas" ["The Pin Organisation"], 126.

<sup>1016</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 307–12.

<sup>1017</sup> ASKI EDA 638 "Syndesmos Agoniston kai Thymaton Ethnikis Antistaseos Voreiou Ellados: Taftotita melous theorimenei apo tin Asfaleia Thessalonikis, 20 Fevrouariou 1963 [The Association of Resistance Fighters and Victims of Northern Greece: Membership Identity Cards Confirmed by Thessaloniki Security]."

<sup>1018</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 304–6.

The members of the Giosmas' organisation received political training from their leader; the organisation, however, did not follow an elaborate ideological line. At its core stood the traditional values of fatherland, religion, family, and along with principles of national mindedness.<sup>1019</sup> Its members were involved in all kinds of attacks against political opponents and their property in Thessaloniki neighbourhoods. They acted as provocateurs during the yearly May Day celebrations, aiming to restrict the EDA's public appearance. In May 1963, they exerted unusual activity: first, in early May, Giosmas addressed a telegram to Prime Minister Karamanlis, Minister of the Presidency Dimitrios Makris, Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Averoff and parliament, requesting immediate action against communist traitors by claiming that "patience has been exhausted."<sup>1020</sup> Furthermore, Giosmas organised the recruitment of the provisional security guards for de Gaulle's visit to Thessaloniki, and his men volunteered in this visit.<sup>1021</sup> A few days later, they got involved in an attack against EDA deputy Lambrakis during a peace rally on 22 May 1963, which resulted in his death six days later.<sup>1022</sup> The subsequent investigation of the crime and the ensuing trial revealed much of what had been known about the functioning of *parastate* organisations in Greece.

## 6.5 The Assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis

Lambrakis, who appeared to be the main target of the paramilitaries that night, was like a thorn in the side of the far-right. To quote Tzannetakos, given his outstanding reputation and great popularity, Lambrakis was "worse than a communist."<sup>1023</sup> He was more than politically inconvenient due to his activism in the peace movement. Furthermore, he led a campaign for the liberation of political prisoners, over which he had a public (and highly embarrassing for the latter) conflict with Queen Frederica during her unofficial visit to London in April 1963.<sup>1024</sup> The brutal assault against Lambrakis took place after his speech at a local rally of sympathisers protesting the

---

<sup>1019</sup> Ibid., 313.

<sup>1020</sup> Voultepsis, *Ypothesi Lambraki. Tomos A' [The Lambrakis Case. Volume 1]*, 256.

<sup>1021</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 328–30; Dordanas, 'Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]', 37–38.

<sup>1022</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 188.

<sup>1023</sup> Tzannetakos, 'Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]', 132.

<sup>1024</sup> NA FO 371/169055 (24 May 1963); see also Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*, 298; Chalazias and Lamprakis, *I dolofonia tou Lampraki kai to parakratos [The Assassination of Lambrakis and the Parakratos]*, 45.

deployment of Polaris missiles in the country.<sup>1025</sup> The participants were forced to escape from furious “counter-demonstrators,” mostly paramilitaries from *parastate* organisations who besieged the assembly building while the numerous police and gendarmerie stayed idle. Once Lambrakis succeeded in getting away from the crowd, he was knocked down by a three-wheel truck and suffered a severe head injury inflicted by one of the two perpetrators riding the vehicle. Other participants were injured, including another EDA deputy Georgios Tsarouchas, who was seriously beaten and had to be admitted to hospital. The present security forces barely did anything to protect those attacked and prevent the violence from taking place. The only ones helping on the spot were passer-byes, who also attempted to stop the perpetrators’ vehicle. A random traffic officer eventually blocked its passage.<sup>1026</sup>

One of the perpetrators – the driver – was Spyridon Gkatzamanis, a carrier by profession in his mid-thirties and a representative of the young wing of the Giosmas’ organisation. Gkatzamanis had been a militant anti-communist for a long time, previously associated in the EON under Metaxas dictatorship and, after the Second World War, in the Royal National Youth (*Vasiliki Ethniki Neolaia*). His father was killed by the EAM/ELAS in October 1944 in Krya Vrysi, the operation area of Poulos’ men, which fueled his grudges against the Left. His background made him a perfect fit for Giosmas, along with his corrupt and violent tendencies, manifested in his lengthy criminal record that included bodily harm, threat, and embezzlement. Giosmas and the police strengthened Gkatzamanis’ loyalty with limited professional benefits and provided him with protection, making him feel untouchable.<sup>1027</sup>

The second person in the truck – the murderer who inflicted the fatal injury to Lambrakis – was Emmanouil Emmanouilidis. Involved in the ERE’s local organisation in Triandria of Thessaloniki, Emmanouilidis enjoyed better informal connections that facilitated him a public job in the organisation of children’s camps. However, he lost it after he was convicted of child abuse. He also had a lengthy criminal record, including

---

<sup>1025</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 177–89.

<sup>1026</sup> Romaios, ‘Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]’, 31–32.

<sup>1027</sup> “O Gkatzamanis ito melos parakratikis organoseos [Gkatzamanis Was a Member of Parastate Organisation]”, *Eleftheria*, 2 June 1963, 1, 11. See also Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 309–13.



rape, illegal possession of arms, and theft.<sup>1028</sup> Both Kotzamanis and Emmanouilidis were members of Giosmas' paramilitary organisation during the Axis occupation, while Christos Fokas (one of the attackers against Tsarouchas) used to cooperate with Poulos, for which he was imprisoned in the post-war years.<sup>1029</sup> During the trial for the Lambrakis case, Fokas stated in the act of defiance against the judges that "if it were not for the Security Battalions, Manganas, Sourlas [both of them prominent paramilitary leaders, see chapter 4], and the others, you would not be in your seat judging. It would be the 'Reds.'"<sup>1030</sup> Thus in a single sentence, he underlined the symbolical connections over time between wartime paramilitaries and paramilitaries of the post-civil war *parastate*.

The ability to blackmail perpetrators enabled their patrons to use them for dirty business in exchange for service and protection; however, this does not mean that the perpetrators would act against their own will. A subsequent investigation revealed that Giosmas headed the clandestine *Karfitsa* association, located in the neighbourhood of Toumba in Thessaloniki. Local police recruited the gang members to assist it in combatting and terrorising the Left. As a reward, they would typically receive work permits, their penal offences would be redeemed, or they would work as informers of the KYP or the General Directorate for National Security (GDEA). ERE's representatives were also involved in this patron-client network, facilitating jobs for paramilitaries in the bodies administered by the party on multiple occasions.<sup>1031</sup>

On the day of the Lambrakis assassination, Lieutenant Emmanouil Kapelonis, Chief of the Sixth District police station of Toumba and Triandria, agreed with Giosmas to hire hundreds of local thugs to disperse the peace rally.<sup>1032</sup> In the morning, Giosmas got together with his men while Kapelonis met Gkatzamanis in the Mondiano market in Thessaloniki's city centre to discuss the details of the evening's aggressions. They agreed to meet once again later that day. Gkatzamanis hesitated to get involved in the plan but eventually consented. In return for his service, Giosmas' organisation promised

---

<sup>1028</sup> Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 80; Dordanas, 'To trikyklo, ena "atychima" kai i adekasti dikaiosyni [The Tricycle Truck, One "Accident" and the Incorruptible Justice]', 44.

<sup>1029</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 309–10.

<sup>1030</sup> Giannis Voultepsis, *Ypothesi Lambraki. Tomos B' [The Lambrakis Case. Volume 2]* (Athina: Alkyon, 1998), 198.

<sup>1031</sup> Gkatzaridis, "'Who Really Rules This Country?'"', 658.

<sup>1032</sup> Gkatzaridis, *The Life and Death of a Pacifist*, 308.

to buy him off so that he would not go to prison based on the latest arrest warrant issued on him. Furthermore, Gkatzamanis needed additional money to pay off his business companion with whom he shared the ownership of the very same truck by which he hit Lambrakis. He also expected that, due to police protection, he would not be sued for the attack against the parliamentary deputy.<sup>1033</sup> Other paramilitaries found themselves in dependent positions as well; for instance, Antonios Pitsokos, who assaulted Tsarouchas, took part in the violent intervention against the peace rally to get permission to sell his goods outside the Modiano market.<sup>1034</sup>

The police and the gendarmerie's inactivity, political and judicial interventions tainted the investigation and the trial of the Lambrakis assassination. The Chief of Gendarmerie Vardoulakis, a former IDEA member, attempted to close the case as a traffic accident.<sup>1035</sup> The needed evidence was gathered thanks to the tireless efforts of several dedicated journalists, who launched an independent inquiry, and jurists who withstood the intense pressure. Even then, the court witnesses reported intimidation.<sup>1036</sup> Shortly after the crime, it was more than clear that the security forces played a particular role in the events leading to the death of Lambrakis. This fact can further be observed from the report that the British Consulate-General in Thessaloniki addressed to the British Embassy in Athens on 6 July 1963, which described the situation rather cynically:

The official investigation instituted to enquire into the circumstances attending the death of Lambrakis [...] has no doubt been largely instrumental in its slowness in allowing tempers to cool and excitement to die down. There is every indication that the group of students (and other elements?) who demonstrated outside the premises where the late Lambrakis addressed his followers was unofficially organised by, or received the blessing of at least the local police, as a counter-measure to the activities of the communist inspired "Friends of Peace", and the

---

<sup>1033</sup> Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 330–32.

<sup>1034</sup> Gkotzaridis, *The Life and Death of a Pacifist*, 307.

<sup>1035</sup> Chalazias and Lamprakis, *I dolofonia tou Lampraki kai to parakratos [The Assassination of Lambrakis and the Parakratos]*, 51.

<sup>1036</sup> The documentation was mostly gathered by journalists Ioannis Voultepsis, Georgios Romaios and Georgios Bertzos; on the judiciary's side, the leading personalities were the examining magistrate Christos Sartzetakis (later Greek President, 1985-1990) and prosecutors Dimitrios Papantoniou, Stilianos Boutis and Pavlos Delaportas, acting with the support of the justice minister Vasileios Sakellariou. Cf. Romaios, 'Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]', 31–36; Dordanas, 'To trikyklo, ena "atychima" kai i adekasti dikaiosyni [The Tricycle Truck, One "Accident" and the Incorruptible Justice]', 46–47.

police were unable to control the “over enthusiastic” members who got out of hand.<sup>1037</sup>

Despite the obstacles, the investigation of the Lambrakis case was eventually put into motion. On 17 July 1963, Kapelonis and Giosmas were arrested for abetting murder.<sup>1038</sup> On 14 September 1963, despite interference from the Supreme Court’s Prosecutor-General Konstantinos Kollias, the Examining Magistrate Christos Sartzetakis ordered the trial detention of Inspector of the Gendarmerie Mitsou, the Chief of the Thessaloniki police Efthimios Kamoutsis, and his deputy Michail Diamandopoulos for complicity in homicide and abuse of power; another police officer named Tryfon Papatriandafyllou was also charged for abuse of power.<sup>1039</sup> In June 1965, Kapelonis testified that GDEA’s high-ranking officers alongside the local police organised the counter-demonstration of 22 May 1963 in cooperation with local paramilitaries. The Commander of GDEA’s Thessaloniki branch Konstantinos Dolkas and his subordinate Lieutenant Dimitrios Katsoulis were allegedly the ones who determined Lambrakis as the main target of paramilitary violence.<sup>1040</sup>

The Lambrakis assassination eventually contributed to the fall of the Karamanlis government on 11 June 1963, 20 days after the crime. Previously, Karamanlis and the ERE insisted that the death of Lambrakis was an “isolated incident” and a “sad episode of fatal injury,” excluding the eventuality that the case would have had any political background.<sup>1041</sup> On the contrary, the EK accused the government of incompetence and complicity, blaming the *parastate* for committing the crime. Georgios Papandreou declared Karamanlis to be the abettor of the murder (*ithikos avtourgos*) and the ERE’s rule as illegal.<sup>1042</sup> On 26 May 1963, the EK issued an official statement on the matter:

M[r]. Karamanlis asks why we have called him morally responsible for the Salonica [Thessaloniki] murder. The reason is, that he is. The description was not a figure of speech. It is literal. He is not only morally responsible but also politically and criminally. When a Government

---

<sup>1037</sup> NA FO 371/169055 (6 July 1963)

<sup>1038</sup> IAM, Archive of the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal, Dik. 00802, The Lambrakis Case, f. 4, ypof. 2, “Entalma Syllipseos [Arrest Warrant],” Thessaloniki, 15 July 1963; “Entalma Profylakiseos [Detention Warrant],” Thessaloniki, 16 July 1963. See also Petridis, *Dolofonia Lampraki [The Assassination of Lambrakis]*, 47–59.

<sup>1039</sup> Gkotzaridis, ““Who Really Rules This Country?””, 658–59.

<sup>1040</sup> *Ibid.*, 664–65.

<sup>1041</sup> Botsiou, ‘I epirroi tis dolofonias Lampraki [The Influence of Lambrakis’ Assassination]’, 75.

<sup>1042</sup> Vournas, *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas [The History of Contemporary Greece]*, 187–88; Dordanas, *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini [The German Uniform in Mothballs]*, 334; Hatzivassiliou, ‘To Stavrodromi tou 1963 [The Crossroads of 1963]’, 227–28.

organises, or tolerates the organisation of, terrorist groups, it renders itself morally responsible in advance for all the crimes committed by the terrorists. The Prime Minister is the man pre-eminently responsible.<sup>1043</sup>

Furthermore, the statement criticised the inactivity of the security forces, who remained passive towards the crime scene:

There are photographs which show that fanatical hostile groups had gathered outside the cinema, while the members of the Security Forces who were present looked on indifferently. Moreover, none of the terrorists was arrested by the Gendarmerie. [...] Was any further proof necessary of the criminal activity of the terrorists and the toleration, amounting to complicity, by the Gendarmerie?"<sup>1044</sup>

Specifically, the EK's statement named several *parastate* organisations, among them the ASE, the Blue Phalanx, and the OEN-SEN, whose members presumably took part in the described activities. On that matter, the EK demanded the ERE provide information on the funding of these groups by the state.<sup>1045</sup>

Concerning the Left, the EDA proclaimed that the government's alliance with NATO and the CIA was the cause of the domestic crisis, determining Lambrakis as the first victim to the Polaris system in Greece. For the EDA, it was the Greek state rather than the *parastate* that should be held responsible for the crime. In the party's political rhetoric, Lambrakis joined the ranks of the left-wing martyrs who had fallen victim to political murders before him.<sup>1046</sup> On 27 May 1963, the EDA addressed a telegram to the UN Secretary-General in which the party denounced the Karamanlis government for having organised the Lambrakis assassination and attempted to suppress the mass march, which gathered on the occasion of Lambrakis' funeral:

The Party of the United Democratic Left denounces the Karamanlis Government, which armed the murderers of [...] Lambrakis, for launching a wave of savage police terror in order to prevent the Greek people from protesting and taking part in the funeral. Hundreds of citizens were injured, and hundreds arrested during savage attacks by the police supported by thugs of neo-Fascist para-state organisations.<sup>1047</sup>

The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Averoff characterised the EDA's statement as a "disgraceful" and "flagrantly mendacious text" which "deserves the

---

<sup>1043</sup> Kathimerini, 26 May 1963; cited according to NA FO 371/169055 (27 May 1963).

<sup>1044</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1045</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1046</sup> Papathanasiou, 'I aristera antimetopi me ti dolofonia Lambraki [The Left Faces the Assassination of Lambrakis]', 108–9; Hatzivassiliou, 'To Stavrodromi tou 1963 [The Crossroads of 1963]', 227–28.

<sup>1047</sup> NA FO 371/169055 (7 June 1963).

contempt of all Greeks” for being an example of “falsehood” by the Left “in order to slander the country.”<sup>1048</sup> Karamanlis denounced the allegations of the complicity between his government, the security forces, and the *parastate* as conspiracy theories.<sup>1049</sup> The governmental statement of 27 May 1963 reacted to the EK’s criticism by accusing the opposition of exploiting the Lambrakis case for political purposes:

M[r]. Papandreou, however, is making capital out of the regrettable case of M[r]. Lambrakis. He is making capital out of it, just as the Communists are doing, in an effort to discredit the country abroad, because here everyone knows what his aims are and cannot be misled. The injury to M[r]. Lambrakis is a matter which everyone condemns, but the exploitation of this tragic incident is a totally different matter, a despicable and shocking one. Everyone knows, of course, that the Communists have no human feelings for their supporters and that they have no hesitation in sacrificing them for political ends. Other people, however, who share the qualities of the Greek character and of European civilisation, do not endorse this cynicism. It was to be expected that this minimum decency would have stopped M[r]. Papandreou at the lowest rung of the ladder, but he has fallen even further, and the whole Greek people is witness to this.<sup>1050</sup>

The ERE also attempted to denounce the endeavours of the EK to uncover the *parastate* by claiming that the EK only exposed legal organisations, not “organisations of a para-state nature.” According to the ERE’s statement, the EK “has failed to do so because if there were such organisations, it could have obtained their dissolution by applying to the responsible judicial authority.”<sup>1051</sup> Furthermore, the ERE accused the EK of “concealing and maintaining silence over the organisations which it is itself establishing with the assistance of the Extreme Left in all sections of the community, organisations, which it directs to promote anarchy and revolutionary activities.”<sup>1052</sup>

Although in May 1964, about a year after the murder, the prosecutor filed a lawsuit against Karamanlis and other state officials on behalf of the families of Lambrakis and Tsarouchas, the issue of the government’s political responsibility has never been resolved.<sup>1053</sup> A popular interpretation claims that Karamanlis was taken off guard by the news about the Lambrakis assassination. On 25 May 1963, the KYP Chief

---

<sup>1048</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1049</sup> Botsiou, ‘I epiroi tis dolofonias Lampraki [The Influence of Lambrakis’ Assassination]’, 74–75.

<sup>1050</sup> Vradyni, 27 May 1963; cited according to NA FO 371/169055 (27 May 1963).

<sup>1051</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1052</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1053</sup> Gkotzaridis, “‘Who Really Rules This Country?’”, 664.

Natsinas reported to the prime minister about the situation in Thessaloniki, to which Karamanlis allegedly reacted as follows: “Too many things have happened unbeknownst to me lately. I want to know Mr Natsinas who really rules this country?!”<sup>1054</sup> It has been frequently stated that the *parakratos*, stretched across the Ministry of the Presidency, the Prime Minister’s office, the KYP, the army, the police, and the gendarmerie, acted behind the prime minister’s back.<sup>1055</sup> Among historians, there have been many sceptical voices about the issue of Karamanlis’ responsibility for the Lambrakis assassination and the assumption that he would not be fully in charge of governing the country. For instance, Rizas claims that the direct involvement of Karamanlis has never been satisfactorily proven, and neither were the accusations made by Georgios Papandreou.<sup>1056</sup> Similarly, Gianoulopoulos denies the idea that Karamanlis was in the position of an abettor to the murder and that such a claim had neither a legal nor a political basis. Furthermore, he stresses that it was without any doubt that the prime minister ruled the country.<sup>1057</sup>

The trial of the perpetrators of the Lambrakis assassination only started in October 1966 in a political atmosphere heavily burdened by the culminating Aspida trial.<sup>1058</sup> The final verdict was pronounced on 30 December 1966, three months before the 1967 coup took place. Gkatzamanis was found guilty of deliberately inflicting grievous bodily harm resulting in the death of Lambrakis and was sentenced to eleven years in prison. Emmanouilidis received a punishment of eight years imprisonment for having assisted in the crime. However, the junta prematurely freed both of them. Giosmas was punished by one-year imprisonment, which he had already completed during his one year in custody for violating public order but not for abetting the Lambrakis assassination. Fokas, who earlier and unsuccessfully attempted to flee to Turkey, was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, while other paramilitaries received shorter punishments of several months. None of the officers from the security forces

---

<sup>1054</sup> Cited according to *Ibid.*, 659.

<sup>1055</sup> Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 79.

<sup>1056</sup> Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*, 276–77.

<sup>1057</sup> Gianoulopoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 162–63.

<sup>1058</sup> Christidis, ‘Dytikoi diplomates kai ypothesi Lambraki [Western Diplomats and the Lambrakis Case]’, 62.

were found guilty of any breach of duty.<sup>1059</sup> The British Embassy in Athens commented on the verdict in its report of 4 January 1967 to the Foreign Office, once again proving that the final result of the investigation and the trial did not meet widely shared expectations. While not considering the Lambrakis assassination a murder, the British Embassy pointed to the failure of judicial authorities to punish those who were truly responsible for the deputy's death:

Although a verdict amounting in our parlance to manslaughter rather than murder against the principal accused seems obviously right, the rest of the findings were remarkable for dismissing an impressive body of evidence and an even greater volume of allegation that there had been police and even political collusion in the incident leading to Lambrakis' death. It is hard to believe that the police authorities of Salonica, if not the Government of the day, did not connive in or at least shut their eyes to a plan to rough up the (pretty provocative) procession in which Lambrakis figured.<sup>1060</sup>

Following the 1967 coup, many of those involved in the Lambrakis case on the side of the perpetrators and their accomplices improved their professional and social status, while those who strived to uncover the truth were punished. Not only were Kotzamanis and Emmanouilidis pardoned, but, for instance, Mitsou and Kamoutsis, who were discharged from their positions as a result of the trial, were rehabilitated by government decree. On the other hand, witnesses who featured in the trial against the defendants were prosecuted, arrested, or forced into exile. The fate of Tsarouchas, who was tortured to death by the military police EAT-ESA in May 1968, was particularly tragic. Sartzetakis faced torture and imprisonment; other judicial officials involved faced harsh treatment and persecution. For these reasons, speculations emerged about the EENA being the main driving force behind the Lambrakis case.<sup>1061</sup>

The junta welcomed and appreciated not only those who contributed to removing Lambrakis from the domestic political scene. For many *parastate* members, the junta created broad professional opportunities, and some of the leading *parastate* figures were appointed with high positions in the state sector, including on the level of

---

<sup>1059</sup> Voultepsis, *Ypothesi Lambraki. Tomos B' [The Lambrakis Case. Volume 2]*, 206–10; Lendakis, *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*, 103; Chalazias and Lamprakis, *I dolofonia tou Lampraki kai to parakratos [The Assassination of Lambrakis and the Parakratos]*, 75–77.

<sup>1060</sup> NA FCO 9/117 (4 January 1967).

<sup>1061</sup> Gkotzaridis, ““Who Really Rules This Country?””, 666–67.

regional prefectures and even the central government.<sup>1062</sup> To pick one of the most prominent examples, Plevris ceased to be the leader of the K4A but acted as one of the regime's ideologists and an advisor to Papadopoulos; he closely cooperated with one of the junta members, Ioannis Ladas, and worked as a lecturer in military and police educational facilities.<sup>1063</sup>

How did it happen that the *parastate* of youth and citizens' organisations – similar to the *military parakratos* – gradually disengaged from the “right-wing establishment”? Why did it eventually betray the Greek monarchy? From outside Greece, the Lambrakis assassination was often interpreted, using the words of Christidis, as “another symptom of a flawed political system which was not distant from becoming a manifestation of an institutional crisis that might, in turn, lead to its final collapse.”<sup>1064</sup> At all events, the paramilitaries of post-civil war Greece found themselves in an inferior position with regard to the state and its ruling class. Moreover, they had first-hand experience of the dysfunctionality of the country's political, economic, and social system. As Gianouloupoulos claims, Gkatzamanis and Emmanouilidis were essentially “folk chaps” (*laikoi typoi*) hired for dirty business on behalf of someone else.<sup>1065</sup> Their precarious personal situation and the need for economic benefits and protection, with which the social system could not provide them, led them to take the risk. In terms of their political representation, Katsoudas emphasises that the post-civil war far-right failed to build its political subjects and strategies, making it particularly dependent on the conservative ERE. He assumes that these settings eventually developed into

the formation of a culture of resentment, with elements of dissatisfaction with the political regime and the good of society, which demanded that the expendable far-rightists shed their blood (and more importantly, the blood of others) for the sake of protecting the “social establishment” only to later show them their disdain; [with elements of] disappointment for the fact that they were the dependent pole of the political networks of patronage; [with elements of] grudges due to the thwarting of their political plans through the channels of traditional politics and through

---

<sup>1062</sup> Paralikas, *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*, 90–92.

<sup>1063</sup> Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’, 75; Blümel, ‘Antisemitism as Political Theology in Greece and Its Impact on Greek Jewry, 1967–1979’, 192.

<sup>1064</sup> Christidis, ‘Dytikoi diplomates kai ypothesi Lambraki [Western Diplomats and the Lambrakis Case]’, 56.

<sup>1065</sup> Gianouloupoulos, ‘To elliniko parakratos [The Greek Parakratos]’, 162.



plebeian populism where the intransigence of an uncompromising fighter met the envy of the politically inferior.<sup>1066</sup>

The legitimacy crisis, triggered by the 1965 fall of the Papandreou government, seemed to play a significant role in the corruption process of the citizen and youth *parastate* organisations, leading to their growing disenchantment with the political representation and rapprochement with their future patrons, the 1967 putschists. In doing so, they were once again determined by their inferior social status and motivated both ideologically and economically. In this chapter, I aimed to emphasise the clientelist character of the *parastate* organisations that in post-war Greece contributed to the reintegration of former Nazi collaborators and paramilitary outlaws in the society. Without any doubt, the intelligence service, security forces and politicians hired the *parastate* members now and then to carry out illegal tasks on their behalf as part of the unofficial anti-communist struggle. Despite that, these clandestine coalitions were occasional and informal and certainly did not take the shape of broad conspiracies that would be organised by multiple right-wing actors and embedded in the political system. Even more so, because urban and countryside paramilitarism was not limited to the sympathisers of the Right but was also connected with the Left and the Centre.

---

<sup>1066</sup> Katsoudas, 'Ethnikistes kai Ethnikofrones [Nationalists and Nationally-Minded]', 30.

## Conclusion

Returning to Koselleck's theory of conceptual history, the term *parakratos* (the *deep state* or *parastate*) seems to be – at least in Greece – one of those words which are endowed with “autonomous power [...] without whose use human actions and passions could hardly be experienced, and certainly not made intelligible to others.”<sup>1067</sup> The term emerged in post-civil war Greece (1949–1967), in the conspiratorial climate of the Cold War and as part of the hostile domestic political debate. It established itself in political discourse as a value-laden, ideologically biased concept. The Greek political actors exploited the word in their public speech to accuse their opponents of depriving them of their civil rights, suppressing their active political role, and, more broadly, hijacking democracy itself by seizing control of state institutions and diverting the state in an authoritarian direction. They claimed that powerful players had created hidden structures – political, economic, legal, intellectual, military and paramilitary – within official state institutions and were using them to manipulate political realities from behind the scenes.

The term *parakratos* was first employed by the left-wing EDA and the centrist EK as the main opposition parties to criticise the ruling right-wing ERE (1956–1963). Their political campaign against the ERE culminated in the final stage of this period when it reacted to the rigged 1961 legislative elections. However, the EK's subsequent rise to power (1963–1965) showed that not only the opposition could use the term. The EK continuously attacked the ERE for its alleged connections with the *parakratos*. The EK even ascribed its inability to assume full control over the state and its armed forces and security services to the “dark forces” of the *parakratos*. The EK's conspiratorial interpretation of the political events added to the urgency of its rhetoric. The spectre of the *parakratos* eventually served as a basis for mobilising voters and bolstering the democratic legitimacy of the political Centre and Left. The public image of both the anti-communist EK and the pro-communist EDA was built on their opposition to the Right and the *parakratos*. The term continues to be used in Greek political debate today, although it has come unmoored from its historical context. Its appearance in diverse political situations shows that it has become a universal term of opprobrium. Political

---

<sup>1067</sup> Koselleck, *Futures Past*, 82–83.

adversaries of various political stripes use it to denounce one another, regardless of their actual political convictions.

When dealing with the *parakratos* in post-civil war Greece, we need to distinguish between the political phenomenon that the term has historically represented, the presumed conspiracies of military officers and paramilitaries in rural and urban areas, and the political discourse that emerged around it, suggesting the complicity of the state and the guarantors of the anti-communist regime: the Right, the army, the palace and the Church. The concept of the *parakratos* furnished scholars of Greek politics with a useful narrative of parallel power structures. Many authors accepted its reality and approached and assessed the post-civil war era with it in mind, although they never tested its validity. A critical re-evaluation of post-civil war political developments in Greece requires a critical approach to the terms that characterised the political debate of the time.

In the past several decades, however, some works have been published in the historiography of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) that problematised and critically examined the one-sided pro-communist and anti-communist narratives.<sup>1068</sup> Although many outstanding publications related to the subsequent period already exist,<sup>1069</sup> the post-civil war history still needs fundamentally revisionist approach, which would entail a fresh look at all the actors involved and leave the ideological struggles of the past behind. Given the considerably larger number of published works that deal with the post-civil war anti-communist campaign and the language used in anti-communist propaganda, Greek society and scholars seem to be more influenced by left-wing discourse. Leftist and centrist political speech directed against the Right in the same period has been understudied.

In my thesis, I aimed to contribute to this emerging debate by discussing how and why the *parakratos* and some other terms of anti-Right discourse in Greece, that share the same mobilising function, have been employed, mostly, but not only, in scholarly works. My motivation was to understand their use both in the historiographic

---

<sup>1068</sup> See especially Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Marantzidis, *Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas*; Demertzis, Paschaloudi, and Antoniou, *Emfylios: Politistiko travma [The Civil War: Cultural Trauma]*.

<sup>1069</sup> For example, see Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*; Rizas, *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo [The Greek Politics after the Civil War]*; Nikolakopoulos, *I kachektiki dimokratia [The Cachectic Democracy]*.

context of Greece and against the backdrop of an international debate on comparable concepts that is taking place in the light of the broader experience of the Cold War.

First, the term “para-constitution” embraces a set of emergency laws that were adopted during the civil war to deter the advance of communist sympathisers. Although those measures clearly contradicted the official Greek constitution, they continued to be used in post-civil war Greece. The *parakratos* is portrayed in historiography as a system of power parallel to official structures, while the “para-constitution” is understood as a parallel legal framework within which the *parakratos* operated. The “right-wing establishment” dictated the political system that enabled both the *parakratos* and the “para-constitution” to exist. The term “right-wing establishment” reflected a presumably unchallengeable dominance of the political parties of the Right in the form of the ES and the ERE, especially in the first years after the civil war. Furthermore, it implied that the Right and other guarantors of the post-civil war regime, such as the army, the palace and the Church, stood on a firm, homogeneous and cohesive foundation, oriented on the persecution of their political opponents.

The three terms – the *parakratos*, the “para-constitution” and the “right-wing establishment” – aimed at mobilising supporters of the EK and the EDA and attracting voters. They are not the only interesting and intriguing terms used in anti-Right discourse. For instance, the word “files” (*fakeloi*) symbolised surveillance by the post-civil war regime and the junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974, and their monitoring of the population’s political opinions. The primary use of the *fakeloi* was reinforcing the population’s loyalty to the anti-communist regime and suppressing any signs of communist activity. The destruction of the files in 1989, which later turned out to be only partial, was supposed to reconcile the Greek society. Instead, erasing these sources of historical memory eventually proved to be problematic because it prevented a thorough investigation of the methods the post-civil war regime and the parallel security structures of the *parakratos* used to deal with their opposition. Therefore, the destruction of files failed to lift the burden of Greece’s past.<sup>1070</sup>

The aforementioned terms stand in opposition to anti-communist speech, which referred to leftists as “bandits,” “gangsters,” “rebels,” “criminals,” “traitors,” “infidels,”

---

<sup>1070</sup> See Karamanolakis, *Anepithymito parelthon [The Undesirable Past]*; Stefanidis, ‘I dimokratia dyscheris? [Democracy Under Strain?]', 209; Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka [The History of Greece]*, 559.

“Slavs,” “EAM-Bulgarians” and “crypto-communists.” Moreover, terms such as ‘national mindedness’, ‘repentance’, ‘oaths’, and ‘certificates’ represented a set of values and political responses that constructed the political loyalty of citizens towards the regime. Both the pro-communist and the anti-communist framing of civil war and post-civil war events entailed discourses of martyrdom, victimisation, and threats, all of which reflected a society that was deeply divided as a result of the civil war. Broader critical analysis of left-wing and centrist political speech might also shed more light on populism and conspiracism. The former set of beliefs has been addressed by scholars only with respect to the period after the fall of the junta in 1974, and the latter has been linked to an even later period, especially the post-2000 political context.<sup>1071</sup>

Another important element in the investigation of the *parakratos* that often passes unnoticed in the historiography of Greece is its framing in similar concepts which appear in the international context, such as *parapolitics*, the *parastate*, the *dual state*, the *security state*, the *deep state*, and related terms. I relied mainly on two authors for understanding the international context: first, Ula Tunander’s *security state* and second, Mehtap Söyler’s analysis of the Turkish *deep state* (*derin devlet*). Tunander’s theory posits the coexistence of a democratic state and a *security state* in one nation. The democratic state is a forum for competition between political alternatives while the *security state* exists to veto democratic measures when no alternative exists that will ensure the survival of a regime. Most scholars interpret the *parakratos* as a form of *security state*.<sup>1072</sup> Typically, the *parakratos* was mobilised at moments when the conservative regime was about to lose power in an election. It eventually decided to ‘veto’ Greek democracy altogether by launching the 1967 coup, resulting in a military dictatorship.

Söyler’s dichotomy between *formal* and *informal* (or *official* and *unofficial*) structures, such as arise in the operation of the state and the *deep state* in Turkey, is also helpful for analysing the Greek case. First of all, many scholars conceptualised the *parakratos* as an informal set of actors who executed unofficial state policies.

---

<sup>1071</sup> George Th. Mavrogordatos, ‘From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: The Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece’, *South European Society and Politics* 2, no. 3 (1997): 1–26; Giorgos Katsambekis, ‘Ta rigmata tis Metapolitefsis kai oi prooptikes tis Aristeras [The Rifts of the Metapolitefsi and the Prospects of the Left]’, *U31*, July 2014, 14–19; Skoulariki, ‘Conspiracy Theories Before and After the Greek Crisis: Discursive Patterns and Political Use of the “Enemy” Theme’.

<sup>1072</sup> Tunander, ‘Democratic State vs. Deep State’, 56–57.

Furthermore, Söyler emphasised how important it is for the analysis of the *deep state* to assess the type of the political regime.<sup>1073</sup> The post-civil war regime in Greece was constantly oscillating between democracy and authoritarianism. It strove to preserve an outwardly democratic image but at the same time pursued an authoritarian security agenda that persecuted its opponents and excluded them politically and economically. The presumed purpose of the *parakratos* was to fulfil the state's aims without making the state responsible for how that was done.

Contextualising the *parakratos* in a wider Cold War perspective is another useful way to deconstruct it. I opted to compare Greece with Italy and Turkey, and revealed some important similarities. First, all those countries were NATO members and allies of the West. The regimes in those countries profiled themselves as anti-communist, although they were not equally ruthless in pursuing their anti-communist policies. Second, they all dealt with the problem of military interventionism in politics, even if that did not have the same consequences for domestic political developments. Third, they all featured 'unofficial' and 'informal' security mechanisms that relied on far-right paramilitaries under the guidance of their national intelligence services and the CIA. Among their primary objectives were increasing social tensions through terror and thus increasing compliance with the ruling conservative regimes. They also aimed to eradicate left-wing activities by attacking the Left and putting the blame for terror on it. The ultimate desired result of their actions was the maintenance of the political *status quo*. They intensified their activity when opposition to the conservative regimes was on the rise or took over power, as happened when Aldo Moro, Georgios Papandreou, and Bülent Ecevit were in power.

Historians and political analysts have portrayed the *parakratos* in Greece either as entirely unique or, at least, distinct from the Turkish *deep state*. I contend that the *parakratos* – and the Turkish *deep state* – should each be perceived as specific national variants of a wider Cold War phenomenon. Furthermore, the *deep state* as a concept, either in the Turkish or global context, is particularly useful for analysing the Greek case because of the ongoing scholarly debate on conspiratorial discourses related to it. An academic literature on the conspiratorial nature of the *deep state* already exists, but a parallel one on that of the *parakratos* is practically missing.

---

<sup>1073</sup> Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 1–9, 41.

The conspiratorial background for the *parakratos* as a term and a concept is important because it has been exploited by Greek political discourse up to the present day. To provide one remarkable example, Andreas Papandreou, an EK politician of the 1960s, the leader of PASOK (1974–1996), and later Greece’s prime minister (1981–1989; 1993–1996), claimed legitimacy for his rule based on his pre-junta political activities, saying he was a target of persecution by the *parakratos*.<sup>1074</sup> Yet, Papandreou belonged to the main protagonists of the ASPIDA affair, which pointed to the EK’s presumed infiltration in the armed forces in the mid-1960s.<sup>1075</sup> In the 1980s, the conservative opposition directly accused the Papandreou government and his party PASOK of running a left-wing *parakratos*.<sup>1076</sup>

More recently, during the post-2009 Greek crisis, left-wing media and intellectuals have been drawing parallels between the activities of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn (XA) and the functioning of the *parakratos*, based on the alleged presence of XA sympathisers in the army and security forces, justice, and the Church.<sup>1077</sup> Although these allegations are indeed serious and need to be investigated, the overuse of the term *parakratos* (or in some cases, the *deep state*) to describe the functioning of the XA may negatively affect public trust in the political system and could potentially undermine social cohesion. SYRIZA, which unlike the XA is a democratic party, has been discredited by its right-wing opponents, according to whom it instigated a left-wing *parakratos* after it acceded to power in 2015.<sup>1078</sup> The case of SYRIZA shows that

---

<sup>1074</sup> Kofas, *Under the Eagle’s Claw*, 79.

<sup>1075</sup> Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 164–65; Papachelas, *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias [The Rape of Greek Democracy]*, 167–68.

<sup>1076</sup> Konstandinidis, *To aristero parakratos tis metapolitefsis [The Leftist Parakratos of the Metapolitefsi]*.

<sup>1077</sup> These allegations were further supported by the personal connections between some far-right personalities: the Interior Minister under the Metaxas dictatorship, Konstantinos Maniatakis (1893–1972), the infamous Holocaust denier Konstantinos Plevris (1939–), the junta’s leader, Georgios Papadopoulos (1919–1999), and the XA’s chairman Nikos Michaloliakos (1957–). Furthermore, the death in 2013 of Pavlos Fyssas, an anti-fascist rapper who fell victim to a fatal attack by an XA member, has been compared to the assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis (1963) by paramilitaries. For example, see Tzannetakos, ‘Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]’, 127–28; Psarras, ‘O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party]’, 47–68; Dordanas, ‘Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]’, 41–45; Kostopoulos, ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegesis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture]’, 69–88; Romaios, ‘Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]’, 11–40., 127–128.

<sup>1078</sup> For example see “Kasidiaris: Parakratos i Aristera – Mono emeis mporoume na feroume eirini sti chora [Kasidiaris: Left is Parakratos – Only us can bring peace in our country],” iefimerida.gr, 26 November 2012, <https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/78492/κασιδιάρης-παρακράτος-η-αριστερά—μόνο-εμείς-μπορούμε-να-φέρουμε-ειρήνη-στη-χώρα> (accessed 11 March 2020); “Danellis (Potami): O SYRIZA flirtarei meto aristero parakratos [Danellis (Potami): SYRIZA is flirting with a left-wing deep

practically any Greek political party can be denounced in this manner if it upsets established politics or induces protests involving a significant share of the population.

The discourse of political conspiracy has made its way into the historiography of post-civil war Greece, leading some authors to ascribe certain political phenomena to the operation of the *parakratos*. For this reason, I attempted to present the *parakratos* in my thesis both as a historical reality and as a concept, in order to elucidate the plurality of meanings that the term bears. As a historical reality, the *parakratos* emerged from unofficial, informal power structures in Greece that had been deeply divided in political terms by the National Schism (1915–1917). In the interwar period, the restoration of democracy was hindered by strong partisanship, clientelism, and hostility between the opposing political camps of republicans and monarchists. In the weak political and administrative system of the time, *parapolitical* actors like local paramilitaries acted on behalf of the state. At times they performed its political, economic and security functions while pursuing their own particular, often illegal agendas. The power of parapolitical actors increased at moments when the Greek state was close to collapse, as it was at the end of the Axis occupation, in the early post-liberation period, and during the civil war. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the paramilitaries were more a tool in the hands of prominent political and military representatives than they were independent actors.

In the historiography of Greece, the post-civil war *parakratos* is seen as operating within the confines of the “right-wing establishment,” and the legal system of the “para-constitution.” The ongoing persecution of the left-wing opposition by the post-civil war cabinets resulted from the defeat of the Greek communists in the civil war. Suppression of domestic communism was, however, a main policy objective of the interwar governments of both conservative and liberal orientations. They portrayed communism as a threat to the established social order based on Orthodox values, a clientelist economic system, the exclusivity of the Greek nation, and the sovereignty of the state. The civil war, the Cold War and the formation of the Eastern Bloc in Greece’s immediate neighbourhood made it urgently necessary in their eyes to defend the state against the “red peril” and eliminate the “fifth column” at home. Greece joined the NATO in 1952 in fear of a possible attack by Eastern Bloc armies from neighbouring

---

state],” [iefimerida.gr](http://iefimerida.gr), 11 November 2015, <https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/235229/danellis-potami-o-syriza-flertarei-me-aristero-parakratos> (accessed 11 March 2020).



countries. This move entailed hosting US military bases on Greek territory from 1953 and developing a stay-behind partisan force in the event of foreign occupation known as Operation Sheepskin, commonly referred to as NATO's secret army. On the other hand, the "para-constitution" and the *parakratos* were aimed at the elimination of the "internal enemy." These parallel legal and security mechanisms subjected "disloyal" and "anti-national" citizens (the so-called "non-nationally minded," *mi-ethnokofrones*) to persecution, while those loyal to the anti-communist regime enjoyed greater constitutional protections, social advantages, and economic benefits.

The *parakratos* was initially researched by left-wing authors, who were critical of post-civil war anti-communist campaign and the US involvement in Greece's domestic affairs. Their political opinions led them to focus exclusively on the Cold War-era *parakratos* without questioning the concept itself. Scholarly endeavours on the part of Spyros Tsoutsoumpis (2017), Despina Papadimitriou (2014), and Stratos Dordanas (2014),<sup>1079</sup> among others, to track the roots of the *parakratos* back to earlier periods are quite novel. Depending on how we define our research subject, we can connect the term *parakratos* with a broad range of phenomena. It can be applied to nineteenth-century brigandage, First World War reservist organisations, and interwar paramilitary "armies." During the Second World War in Greece, collaborationist groups were the base of the *parakratos*, while in the civil-war and post-civil war years, rural paramilitaries and urban *parastate* organisations were its foundation. The historiography of the pre-civil war *parakratos* is less burdened with ideological ballast, but the post-civil war scholarly debate suffers from the opposite problem. The *parakratos* of that era emerges in the historiography as a heterogeneous, multi-purpose entity, active in diverse geographic and social environments, and over a long period of time. It was believed to be composed of varied actors with dissimilar professional backgrounds, social statuses, and political and economic interests.

There are essentially three major tendencies in the historiographic interpretation of the post-civil war *parakratos*, which portray it as having either a paramilitary, military or conspiratorial nature. In the first interpretation, the paramilitary *parakratos* was believed to have been created with the state's support under the guidance of the

---

<sup>1079</sup> For example, see Tsoutsoumpis, "Political Bandits", 37–64; Papadimitriou, 'Oi Epistratoi sta chronia tou protou poleμου [Epistratoi during the First World War]', 13–22; Dordanas, 'Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right]', 31–46.

General Directorate of Press and Information and its Information Service and the Studies Council, and the Service of Special Studies of the Central Intelligence Service to maintain right-wing dominance. In this interpretation, it was composed of *parastate* organisations, which combined an ultranationalist political agenda with urban paramilitary force. Their activities consisted of propaganda and disinformation campaigns, assistance and provision of information to the security services, inciting anti-communist and anti-liberal violence, and suppressing left-wing public events. Such organisations were on the rise in all major Greek cities as of the 1956 and 1958 legislative elections, in which the Left achieved growing success. Their activities peaked in the first half of the 1960s in parallel to the EK's rise to power. The increasing appeal of the Centre and the Left to Greek voters forced the ruling ERE to use new tactics to curb the influence of the opposition. The manipulation of the 1961 legislative elections by right-wing state officials and the 1963 assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis were so blatant and incompatible with the democratic image of Greece that the ERE government became unsustainable. The country faced international criticism, and the 1963 formation of the EK's government was welcomed by the Kennedy administration in the United States, among others. However, a crackdown on some *parastate* organisations by the EK in summer 1964 had only limited effect. The majority of them carried on their activities and played a significant role in mobilising right-wing elements, for example in the 1965 governmental crisis known as the *iouliana* and in the runup to the 1967 coup.

The activation of the paramilitary *parakratos* coincided with the abolishment of the anti-communist emergency legislation by Greece, which was forced by the conclusion of the association agreement between Greece and the European Economic Community (EEC) in September 1961. Thereafter, the government's ability to repress its political opposition by legal means was limited. In this sense, the *parastate* organisations became a useful tool for persecution of the regime's political opponents, but they were one which could be easily disowned by the state.

Secondly, the political regime of Konstantinos Karamanlis was far less cohesive than that of Karamanlis's authoritarian-leaning predecessor Alexandros Papagos. Where Papagos had managed to integrate the interests of the extra-constitutional players on the domestic scene (in the palace, among the US representatives, and in the army) in his favour, Karamanlis competed for power with the ambitious royal couple and lacked the

army's full support and US backing. This was unfortunate for the ERE at a moment when the Cold War was intensifying.

Thirdly, growing unrest on the domestic scene resulted in an unprecedented liberalisation of constraints and the further polarisation of Greek society. This change was facilitated by post-civil war demographic change, increasing urbanisation, and rising economic, social and educational standards. In the 1960s, the mobilisation and radicalisation of social groups repeatedly led to outbreaks of violence.

Conservative military circles observed these processes with disquiet, as did the military *parakratos*, the term some authors use for the army's conspiratorial groups of officers. Military conspiracies existed in the Greek army as far back as the 1908 Goudi coup, but they became especially salient during the Second World War when clandestine groups were formed in ranks of the Greek army-in-exile. Scholars have mostly identified the military *parakratos* with the interventions of the Sacred Bond of Hellenic Officers (IDEA) in 1951 and the Union of Young Greek Officers (EENA) in 1967. The clandestine character of these organisations of military officers and the difficulty of obtaining information about them influenced later academic works on the military *parakratos*. Their authors tended to portray the army as a wilful, deceitful institution prone to political factionalism.

Consecutive governments believed that control over the armed forces was essential to their assertion of power over the country and the army continuously had to fend off their efforts to consolidate power. The ASPIDA affair, which in the mid-1960s uncovered similar efforts of the ruling EK, proved that military conspiracies were not limited to the Right but were rather characteristic of the country's political culture. To a great degree, the activities of the military *parakratos* paralleled those of the paramilitary *parakratos*. The former planned anti-communist campaigns, pursued psychological operations against the political opposition, and coordinated the activities of *parastate* organisations. Historians tend to perceive the 1967 coup as the moment when the military *parakratos* openly took power and, in Söyler's words, became the state itself.<sup>1080</sup>

Examination of the military and paramilitary *parakratos* shows how the post-war Greek state reintegrated wartime collaborators into Greek society by including them in

---

<sup>1080</sup> Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 1–9.

both the official and unofficial security forces, rehabilitating them in the process. As a result, there were a significant number of Nazi sympathisers among the members of the *parastate* organisations, who qualified for the government's support thanks to their fervent anti-communism. Their members relied for protection and economic benefits on their connections with local politicians and representatives of the security forces, whom they in turn assisted in a wide range of tasks. In comparison, the clandestine organisations of military officers were principally interest groups that fostered contacts for their members, enhanced their influence among their peers in the officer corps, and promoted their careers. Military officers joined the organisations as a means of withstanding internal political pressures within the army and in order to benefit from their colleagues' political connections. In general, their political loyalties were of critical importance to finding a good position in the Greek system of clientelism and patronage. Ultimately, the military and paramilitary *parakratos* were a symptom of the corrupt reality of Greek society, even more than they were the result of a vaguely defined conspiracy.

Historians interpret the interwar forms of the *parakratos* as plots formulated by multiple actors, usually politicians, representatives of the security forces, and local paramilitary leaders. The perception of the *parakratos* as a broad-based conspiracy is especially characteristic of the left-wing historiography of the post-civil war period. Some more recent works share a similar understanding of it. The conspiratorial framing of the *parakratos* has been influenced by the political discourse of the EK and the EDA in the 1960s, represented by, for example, Georgios and Andreas Papandreou, and Ilias Iliou. Their distaste for *parakratos* inspired the agenda of the Centre and the Left. Their influence was particularly clear during the EK's 'relentless struggle' against the Right and the protests organised by the EDA in the aftermath of the 1961 parliamentary elections. Left-wing authors are highly critical not only of the *parakratos*, which they take strictly as historical reality, but also of the entire post-civil war political system, which they decry as authoritarian. Their pro-leftist political preferences were manifested in their criticism of the palace, the army and US representatives, whom they portrayed in particularly dark colours as supporters of the *parakratos* and secret, behind the scenes planners. Left-wing authors presented the *parakratos* as active at all levels of society, from secret police informants in local neighbourhoods to top political and military

leaders. The image they fostered of an insidious, all-pervasive *parakratos* advanced the anti-Right narrative of leftist victimhood and martyrdom.

In historiography, the term *parakratos* does not in itself necessarily imply the existence of a systemic conspiracy or any specific set of parastatal actors. The *parakratos* as a concept can also stand for the way in which some post-civil war public figures from the political, military, security, administrative and judicial spheres fulfilled their professional duties. In that case, acting like a *parakratos* means exceeding one's competence granted by the state with the aim of directing political developments in an undemocratic, wilful and illegal manner. Furthermore, illegitimate actors (such as paramilitaries) who intervene in matters of the state and usurp some of the state's roles can also be labelled as the *parakratos*. Since *parakratos* implies a breach of democratic order and the rule of law, it can be regarded as a failure of the functions of the democratic system.

Democracy in Greece suffered further setbacks due to the protracted crisis after 1965 caused by the ruling government's inability to convince the public of its legitimacy, resulting in great political instability and constant street demonstrations. During this period, the officers of the EENA seized more autonomy for themselves and prepared a coup in order to prevent the EK from returning to power. In doing so, they ignored the foundations of the post-civil war regime on the Right – the palace and the army leadership – as they excluded those actors from their planning. Meanwhile, the rank-and-file members of *parastate* organisations became increasingly alienated from the regime and its political representatives as well. They felt unappreciated and unrecognised, and forced into a subordinate position as mere instruments in their superiors' anti-communist campaign. Being mostly far-right sympathisers, many of them quickly switched their allegiance away from the politicians of the Right in April 1967 and improved their status by helping the junta into power.

In this way, the EENA officers as power brokers and the paramilitaries as the pawns of the post-civil war *parakratos* joined forces to form a new state, which transformed the previously unofficial repression of the communists into official state persecution by the use of openly authoritarian methods. The 1967 coup put an end to the existence of the *parakratos* as a historical reality, but further boosted interest in the conspiratorial interpretations of it.

## Summary

The *parakratos* (translated as *deep state* or *parastate*) is a multi-layered, politically biased term that started to be used in post-civil war Greece (1949-1967) in political speech and by the media to encompass a large variety of political phenomena that can be summarised as parallel power mechanisms. The *parakratos* as a term was part of the anti-Right political discourse of the Centre and the Left, which considered it a tool of right-wing dominance. But as a concept, it has been transposed to generally describe situations where political adversaries (regardless of their political orientation) accuse each other of attempting to divert political developments in the country by using illegal instruments and acting secretly from behind the scenes. With the subsequent emergence of the *parakratos* as a scholarly concept, the usage of the term expanded from the Cold War framework to other historical contexts, starting from the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and going to Greece under the economic crisis (since 2009). Regardless of this, the post-civil war *parakratos* has remained at the centre of attention of Greek historiography to this day.

In compliance with Koselleck's theory of conceptual history, I understand the *parakratos* as a distinctive feature of the post-civil war anti-communist regime in Greece. This not only characterised the *parakratos* but also influenced the way researchers have studied the regime or even categorised it on the axis between democracy and authoritarianism. I analyse the *parakratos* both as a set of historical events and its actors that the term encompasses as well as an explanatory political concept. Given its multi-faceted meanings, I also investigated the *parakratos* with regard to its role in then-political speech and from the perspective of the subsequent historiographical interpretation.

I set the *parakratos* into the international academic discussion on related political concepts, such as the *parastate*, the *dual state*, the *security state* and the *deep state*. Using the cases of Turkey and Italy, I contextualised it as a Greek variant of a broader Cold War phenomenon of parallel power mechanisms. Because the post-civil war *parakratos* has primarily been employed as an instrument of the Greek state's anti-communist campaign, I delved into the issue of Greek anti-communism from a wider

historical perspective, beginning with the First World War and continuing until the 1967 instalment of the Greek junta.

In particular, I focused on the evolution of anti-communist legislation, including the unconstitutional measures of the so-called “para-constitution.” While *parakratos* has often been interpreted in historiography as a parallel power system, the “para-constitution” was perceived as a parallel legal system. Furthermore, I analysed the post-civil war political system – often labelled a “right-wing establishment” – to decide whether it was democratic or authoritarian since its nature has been subject to scholarly disputes. I concluded that Greece was a democracy, although a feeble one, and that the functioning of the *parakratos* was enabled precisely by these political settings.

The term “right-wing establishment” together with the *parakratos* and “para-constitution” form part of the anti-Right discourses employed by the Centre and the Left. They can be interpreted as an antipole of anti-communist speech, which has so far enjoyed far greater scholarly interest. These terms continue to be used in academic literature without a proper analysis, although they are ideologically loaded and endowed with a tinge of conspiracy theory. These conspiracist tendencies are also inherent to a significant degree in *parakratos*-related historiography. I outlined three major trends, which portray the *parakratos* either as paramilitary, military or representing a broader conspiracy of multiple malevolent actors.

The latter is characteristic, especially for the left-wing’s historiography; it was clearly inspired by the historical anti-Right political speech. For this reason, left-wing historiography also tended to categorise the post-civil war political regime as authoritarian. As for the paramilitary and military *parakratos*, rather than conspiracies, I approach them as consequences of the weaknesses of the Greek political and administrative system, the great division of Greek society as a result of the National Schism and the Greek Civil War, the ongoing politicisation of the public space and the persistence of a clientelist system based on political loyalties.

## List of References

### Archival Collections

*Contemporary Social History Archives* (ASKI; Athens, Greece)

- Archive of the EDA

*General State Archives* (GAK; Athens, Greece)

- Archive of the Athens Court of First Instance
- Archive of the Royal Palace

*Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive Society* (ELIA; Athens, Greece)

- Archive of Konstantinos Granitsiotis
- Archive of Michail Nikitiadis
- Archive of Dimitrios Sfaellos
- Archive of Tryfon Triandafyllakos

*Hellenic Parliament Minutes* (*Praktika Voulis*)

*Historical Archive of Macedonia* (IAM; Thessaloniki, Greece)

- Archive of Judicial Records (Xenophon Giosmas)
- Archive of the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal

*National Archives* (NA; London, United Kingdom)

- Archive of the Foreign Office (FO)
- Archive of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

*Truman Library* (US National Archives)

- The Truman Doctrine

### Collections of Legislative Acts

Official Gazette of the Government of the Kingdom of Greece (FEK)

Official Journal of the European Communities (EUR-Lex)

Library of Congress (LoC) – International treaties

### Daily Press

*Avgi; Ethnikos Kiryx; Ethnos; Eleftheria; Kathimerini; Ora; Makedonia; Nea; Vima; Vradyni*

### Online Media

*Der Spiegel; Efsyn; Ekathimerini; Iefimerida; Imerodromos; Habertürk; Hürriyet Daily News; Kathimerini; Sabah; To Periodiko; The National Interest; The New York Times; Rizospastis; Sansimera; Time*

### Electronic Sources

*Metaxas Project* (<https://metaxas-project.com>)



## Bibliography

- Agridopoulos, Aristotelis. 'Die Rückkehr des A(nta)gonismus? [The Return of the Antagonism?]'. In *Griechenland im europäischen Kontext [Greece in the European Context]*, edited by Aristotelis Agridopoulos and Ilias Papagiannopoulos, 275–95. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2016. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07240-7\\_14](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07240-7_14).
- Akçura, Belma. *Derin devlet oldu devlet [The Deep State Became the State]*. Istanbul: Guncel Yayincilik, 2006.
- Alexander, George M. 'The Demobilization Crisis of November 1944'. In *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, edited by John O. Iatrides, 156–66. Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981.
- Alivizatos, Nikos. 'I adynati metarrythmisi: Syntagma kai parasyntagma sti dekaetia tou '60 [The impossible reform: Constitution and Paraconstitution in the 1960s]'. In *I 'syntomi' dekaetia tou '60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The 'Short' 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, edited by Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 49–56. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008.
- . *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974. Opseis tis ellinikis embirias [Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974. Perspectives of the Greek Experience]*. Athina: Themelio, 1983.
- . 'The "Emergency Regime" and Civil Liberties, 1946-1949'. In *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis*, edited by John O. Iatrides, 220–28. Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981.
- . 'The Executive in the Post-Liberation Period, 1944-1949'. In *Greece at the Crossroads. The Civil War and Its Legacy*, edited by John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley, 157–72. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.
- Apostolakou, Lito. "'Greek" Workers or Communist "Others": The Contending Identities of Organized Labour in Greece, c. 1914-36'. *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 3 (1997): 409–24.
- Athanasatou, Gianna, Alkis Rigos, and Seraphim Seferiades, eds. *I diktatoria, 1967-1974: politikes praktikes, ideologikos logos, antistasi [The Dictatorship, 1967-1974: Political Practices, Ideological Speech, Resistance]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 1999.
- Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos. *By Fire and Axe: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944-1949*. 1st English language ed. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Caratzas Brothers, 1978.
- Awan, Muzaffar K. 'Pakistan's Future and Its Deep State'. *Defence Journal* 16, no. 8 (2013): 33–36.
- Babinotis, Georgios. *Lexiko tis neas ellinikis glossas [Dictionary of Modern Greek Language]*. Kentro lexikologias, 2002.
- Baerentzen, Lars, and David H. Close. 'The British Defeat of EAM, 1944-1945'. In *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, edited by David H. Close. London; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Baerentzen, Lars, and John O. Iatrides. *Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945-1949*. Museum Tusulanum Press, 1987.
- Bal, İhsan. 'Ergenekon: The Turkish Gladio?' *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, no. 2 (2009): 383–86.

- Balta, Nasi. “‘Tote me ta Xitika den kotages na peis oute t’onoma sou’”: Martyries gia ton Emfylio se ena chorio tis Pylas [Back Then with the X-ites, You Did Not Bother to Even Tell Your Name: Testimonies of the Civil War in a Village in Pylas]. In *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949) [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)]*, 176–87. Athina: Themelio, 2002.
- Batsalias, Christina. *Soziale Probleme der Modernisierung in Griechenland Eine empirische Untersuchung mit qualitativen Methoden*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1994.
- Baud, Jacques F. *Encyclopédie du renseignement et des services secrets [The Encyclopedia of Espionage and Secret Services]*. Panzol: Lavauzelle, 1997.
- Beaton, Roderick. *Greece. Biography of a Modern Nation*. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2019.
- Bernays, Edward. *Crystallizing Public Opinion*. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1923.
- Biondich, Mark. *The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violence since 1878. Zones of Violence*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Birchall, Clare. *Knowledge Goes Pop: From Conspiracy Theory to Gossip*. s.l.: Berg Publishers, 2006.
- Blanuša, Nebojša. ‘The Deep State between the (Un)Warranted Conspiracy Theory and Structural Element of Political Regimes?’ *Critique and Humanism* 49, no. 1 (2018): 369–84.
- Blümel, Tobias. ‘Antisemitism as Political Theology in Greece and Its Impact on Greek Jewry, 1967–1979’. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 17, no. 2 (3 April 2017): 181–202. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2017.1324263>.
- Boeschoten, Riki van. *Anapoda chronia: syllogiki mnimi kai istoria sto Ziaka Grebenon (1900-1950) [Disarrayed Years: The Collective Memory and History in Ziaka of Grevena Region]*. Athina: Plethron, 1997.
- . ‘Enemies of the Nation – A Nation of Enemies: The Long Greek Civil War’. In *After Civil War: Division Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Contemporary Europe*, Bill Kissane. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.
- Bolat, Nur. ‘L’Affaire Ergenekon: Quels enjeux pour la Démocratie turque? [Ergenekon Affair: What is at stake for the Turkish Democracy?]’. *Politique étrangère* 75, no. 1 (2010): 41–53.
- Botsiou, Konstantina. ‘I epirroï tis dolofonias Lambraki stis scheseis tis ERE me tin Enosi Kentrou kai tin Aristera [The Influence of Lambrakis’ Assassination on ERE’s Relationship with the Centre Union and the Left]’. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisï 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 73–96. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016.
- . ‘New Policies, Old Politics: American Concepts of Reform in Marshall Plan Greece’. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 27 (2009): 209–41.
- Bouloukos, Aris. *Ypothesi ASPIDA [The ASPIDA Affair]*. Athina: Typos, 1989.
- Bournazos, Stratis. ‘To kratos ton ethnikofronon: antikommunistikos logos kai praktikes [The State of Nationally-Minded: Anti-Communist Speech and Practice]’. *Archeiotaxio* 16 (November 2014): 9–49.
- Brewer, David. *Greece, the Decade of War: Occupation, Resistance and Civil War*. London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016.

- Brozzu-Gentile, Jean-François. *L'affaire Gladio: les réseaux secrets américains au cœur du terrorisme en Europe [Gladio Affair: The US Secret Network in the Heart of Terrorism in Europe]*. Paris: A. Michel, 1994.
- Brunnbauer, Ulf. 'The Perception of Muslims in Bulgaria and Greece: Between the "Self" and the "Other"'. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 21, no. 1 (April 2001): 39–61.
- Byford, Jovan. *Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.
- Carabott, Philip. 'Aspects of the Hellenization of Greek Macedonia, ca. 1912-ca. 1959'. *Καμπος: Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek* 13 (2005): 21–61.
- Carpentier, Nico, and Erik Spinoy, eds. *Discourse Theory and Cultural Analysis: Media, Arts and Literature*. The Hampton Press Communication Series. Cresskill, N.J: Hampton Press, 2008.
- Chalazias, Christos I., and Grigoris Gr. Lamprakis. *I dolofonia tou Lampraki kai to parakratos [The Assassination of Lambrakis and the Parakratos]*. Athina: Papazisis, 2019.
- Chandler, Geoffrey. *The Divided Land: An Anglo-Greek Tragedy*. Rev ed. Wilby, Norwich: M. Russell (Pub.), 1994.
- Chandrinou, Iasonas. *Ethniki antistasi. I alithini istoria tou ellinikou antartikou [The Greek Resistance. The True History of the Greek Guerilla War]*. Athina: Periskopio, 2007.
- . *To timoro cheri tou laou: i drasi tou ELAS kai tis OPLA stin katechomeni protevousa, 1942-1944 [The People's Punishing Arm: The history of ELAS and OPLA in occupied Athens 1942-1944]*. Athina: Themelio, 2017.
- Christidis, Christos. 'Dytikoi diplomates kai ypothesi Lambraki: Xenoi paratirites kai esoteriko politiko plaisio 1963-1966 [Western Diplomats and the Lambrakis Case: Foreign Observers and the Internal Political Framework 1963-1966]'. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 55–66. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton koinovouleftismo kai ti dimokratia, 2016.
- Christopoulos, Dimitris, ed. *To 'vathy kratos' sti simerini Ellada kai i Akrodeksia: astynomia, dikaiosyni, stratos, ekklesia [The 'Deep State' in Today's Greece and the Far-Right: Police, Justice, State, Church]*. Athina: Nisos, 2014.
- Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge Concise Histories. Cambridge; New York; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- . *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- . *Anglo-Greek Attitudes: Studies in History*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.
- . *Greece, 1940-1949. Occupation, Resistance, Civil War: A Documentary History*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.
- , ed. *Greece 1940-1949: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War. A Documentary History*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- . *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy*. London: Hurst, 1987.
- Close, David H. *Greece since 1945*. Harlow: Pearson Education, 2002.
- . 'Introduction'. In *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, edited by David H. Close. London ; New York: Routledge, 1993.

- . ‘The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950’. In *Greece at the Crossroads. The Civil War and Its Legacy*, edited by John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley, 122–56. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.
- , ed. *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*. London; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- . ‘The Legacy’. In *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, edited by David H. Close, 214–34. London; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- . *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*. London; New York: Longman, 1995.
- . ‘The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State’. In *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, edited by David H. Close, 156–89. London; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Close, David H., and Thanos Veremis. ‘The Military Struggle, 1945-9’. In *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, edited by David H. Close, 97–128. London; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Coulombis, Theodore A. ‘Post World War II Greece: A Political Review’. *East European Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (1973): 285–310.
- Cribb, Robert. ‘Introduction: Parapolitics, Shadow Governance and Criminal Sovereignty’. In *Government of the Shadows. Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty*, edited by Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey, 1–12. Pluto Press, 2009.
- Czachor, Rafał. ‘Elity polityczne Osetii Południowej wobec idei niepodległości [Political Elites of South Ossetia Towards the Idea of Independence]’. *Nowa Polityka Wschodnia* 6, no. 1 (2014): 52–66.
- Danforth, Loring M., and Riki van Boeschoten. *Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
- Dangas, Alexandros. ‘To Kommounistiko Komma Elladas, ena komma ektos kommatikou systimatos [The Communist Party of Greece, A Party Outside the Party System]’. In *I ‘syntomi’ dekaetia tou ’60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The ‘Short’ 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, edited by Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 204–19. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008.
- Dedes, Vlassis. *I Diki ton Aeroporon [The Trial of the Aviators]*. Athina: Self-publication, 1987.
- Demertzis, Nikos, Eleni Paschaloudi, and Giorgos Antoniou, eds. *Emfylios: Politistiko travma [The Civil War: Cultural Trauma]*. Athina: Alexandria, 2013.
- Demiroz, Fatih, and Naim Kapucu. ‘Anatomy of a Dark Network: The Case of the Turkish Ergenekon Terrorist Organization’. *Trends in Organized Crime* 15, no. 4 (December 2012): 271–95. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-012-9151-7>.
- Demiröz, Vedat. *Reis Abdullah Çatlı*. Istanbul: Kriminal Kitaplar, 2017.
- Diamandouros, Nikiforos. ‘Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolutions, Current Trends’. In *Greece in the 1980’s*, edited by Richard Clogg, 43–69. London: Macmillan Press, n.d.
- Diamantopoulos, Thanasis. *I dekaetia tou 1910. Ethnikos Dichasmos (1o tevchos) [The Decade of 1910. National Schism (1st volume)]*. 10 kai mia dekaeties politikon diaireseon: oi diairetikes tomes stin Ellada tin periodo 1910-2017 [Ten Plus One Decades of Political Divisions: The Dividing Sections in Greece Between 1910-2017]. Athina: Epikentro, 2017.
- Diamantopoulos, Thanasis, and Georgios Pagoulatos. *10 kai mia dekaeties politikon diaireseon: oi diairetikes tomes stin Ellada tin periodo 1910-2017. 7o tevchos, I*

- enstoli ethnikofrosyni (1967-74), stratokratia enantion politikis [Ten and One Decades of Political Divisions: The Divisive Cuts in Greece of 1910-2017. Volume 7: The Uniformed National-Mindedness (1967-1974) Stratocracy against Politics]*. Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2018.
- Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. *Oi germanikes mystikes ypiresies stin Ellada tou Mesopolemou kai tis Katochis (1937-1945) [The German Secret Services in Interwar Greece (1937-1945)]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Enalios, 2009.
- Dokos, Thanos P. 'Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting'. In *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou, 42–67. London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004.
- Dondi, Mirco. *L'eco del boato: storia della strategia della tensione, 1965-1974 [The echo of the Thunder: The History of the Strategy of Tension]*. Prima edizione. Storia e società. Roma: GLF editori Laterza, 2015.
- Dordanas, Stratos. 'Antikomounistes oplarchigoi sti germanokratoumeni Kentriki Makedonia [Anti-Communist Chieftains in German-Occupied Central Macedonia]'. In *Oi alloi Kapetanioi: antikomounistes enoploi sta chronia tis Katochis kai tou Emfyliou [The Other Captains: Anti-Communist Gunmen During the Occupation and the Civil War]*, edited by Nikos Marantzidis, 63–126. Athina: Estia, 2005.
- . 'Apo tis proskopikes omades sti dolofonia Lambraki. I peroptosi tou Xenofontos Giosma [From Scout Groups to Lambrakis Murder. The Case of Xenofon Giosmas]'. In *'Echthros' endos ton Teichon: Opseis tou Dosiologismou stin Elladas tis Katochis [The 'Enemy' Inside the Walls: The Perspectives of Collaborationism in Occupied Greece]*, edited by Iakovos Michailidis, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, and Hagen Fleischer, 231–47. Athina: Ellinika Grammata, 2006.
- . *Ellines Enantion Ellinon: o kosmos ton Tagmaton asfalias stin katochiki Thessaloniki 1941-1944 [Greeks against Greeks: The World of Security Battalions in Occupied Thessaloniki 1941-1944]*. Athens: Epikentro, 2006.
- . *I germaniki stoli sti nafthalini: epivioseis tou dosiologismou sti Makedonia, 1945-1974 [The German Uniform in Mothballs: The Survival of Collaborationism in Macedonia, 1945-1974]*. Athina: Estia, 2012.
- . "'I organosi tis karfitsas": kratos kai parakratos sti Thessaloniki ti dekaetia tou 1960 ["The Pin Organisation": The State and the Parastate in Thessaloniki in the 1960s]'. In *I 'syntomi' dekaetia tou '60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The 'Short' 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, edited by Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 126–42. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008.
- . 'Parakratikes organoseis kai akrodexia: Apo ton A' Pagkosmio Polemo stin Ellada tis krisis [Parastate Organisations and the Far-Right: From the First World War until Greece in Crisis]'. *Archeiotaxio*, no. 16 (2014): 31–46.
- . 'To trikyklo, ena "atychima" kai i adekasti dikaiosyni [The Tricycle Truck, One "Accident" and the Incorruptible Justice]'. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 41–54. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton koinovouleftismo kai ti dimokratia, 2016.

- Douglas, Karen M., Robbie M. Sutton, and Aleksandra Cichocka. 'The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories'. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 26, no. 6 (n.d.): 538–42.
- Douglas, Karen M., Joseph E. Uscinski, Robbie M. Sutton, Aleksandra Cichocka, Turkey Nefes, Chee Siang Ang, and Farzin Deravi. 'Understanding Conspiracy Theories'. *Advances in Political Psychology* 40, no. Suppl. 1 (2019): 3–35.
- Doumanis, Nicholas. *A History of Greece*. Palgrave Essential Histories. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Droumpouki, Anna Maria. 'Shaping Holocaust Memory in Greece: Memorials and Their Public History'. *National Identities* 18, no. 2 (2 April 2016): 199–216. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2015.1027760>.
- Drousiotis, Makarios. *EOKA B & CIA: to ellinotourkiko parakratos stin Kypro [EOKA B & CIA: The Greek-Turkish Parastate in Cyprus]*. Lefkosia: Alfadi, 2002.
- Elefandis, Angelos G. *I epangelia tis adynatis epanastasis. K.K.E. kai astismos ston mesopolemo [The Promise of an Impossible Revolution. The KKE and the Bourgeoisie in the Interwar Period]*. Athina: Themelio, 1979.
- Engelen, Dick. 'Lessons Learned: The Dutch "Stay-Behind" Organization 1945–1992'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 6 (December 2007): 981–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390701676519>.
- Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA). *Mavri vivlos. To eklogiko praxikopima tis 29is Oktovriou 1961 [Black Book. The Electoral Coup of the 29 October 1961]*. Athina: Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, 1962.
- Enosis Kentrou (EK). *I dimokratia tha nikisi. Mavri vivlos tou eklogikou praxikopimatos tis 29is Oktovriou 1961 [Democracy Will Win. The Black Book of the Electoral Coup of the 29 October 1961]*. Athina: Ekdotis Enoseos Kentrou, 1962.
- Esayan, Markar. 'Ergenekon: An Illegitimate Form of Government'. *Insight Turkey* 15, no. 4 (2013): 29–40.
- Esche, Matthias. *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949 [The Communist Party of Greece 1941-1949]*. München; Wien: Oldenbourg, 1982.
- Estrada G., Fernando. 'The Logic of the Violence in the Civil War: The Armed Conflict in Colombia'. *Perfil de Coyuntura Económica*, no. 17 (2011): 165–94.
- Etmektsoglou, Gabriella. 'Collaborators and Partisans on Trial: Political Justice in Postwar Greece 1944-1949'. In *Keine "Abrechnung": NS-Verbrechen, Justiz und Gesellschaft in Europa Nach 1945*, edited by Claudia Kuretsidis-Haider, 231–56. Leipzig; Wien: AVA - DÖW, 1988.
- Filiu, Jean-Pierre. *From Deep State to Islamic State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and Its Jihadi Legacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Fleischer, Hagen. 'Authoritarian Rule in Greece and Its Heritage'. In *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and Lessons from the Twentieth Century*, J. W. Borejsza, K. Ziemer. Berghahn, 2006.
- Fraenkel, Ernst. *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship*. First edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Frazier, Robert. *Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-47*. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991.
- Gallant, Thomas W. *Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present*. London; Oxford; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016.
- Ganser, Daniele. *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe*. London; New York: Frank Cass, 2005.

- . ‘The British Secret Service in Neutral Switzerland: An Unfinished Debate on NATO’s Cold War Stay-behind Armies’. *Intelligence and National Security* 20, no. 4 (December 2005): 553–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520500425083>.
- . ‘The Ghost of Machiavelli: An Approach to Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Cold War Italy’. *Crime, Law and Social Change* 45, no. 2 (March 2006): 111–54. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-006-9015-7>.
- Georgoulas, Babis. *To parakratos stin Ellada [The Parastate in Greece]*. Athina: Skaravaivos, 1975.
- Gerharz, Eva von. ‘Zwischen Krieg und Frieden - Die Tamil Tigers und ihre Diaspora als Konfliktpartei und Entwicklungsakteur [Between the War and Peace - The Tamil Tigers and their Diaspora as a Conflict Party and a Development Actor]’. *Sociologus* 59, no. 1 (2009): 33–49.
- Gerolymatos, André. *An International Civil War: Greece 1943-1949*. New Haven - London: Yale University Press, 2016.
- . ‘The Road to Authoritarianism: The Greek Army in Politics, 1935-1949’. *Journal of Hellenic Dispota* 35, no. 1 (2009): 7–26.
- Gianouloupoulos, Giannis. ‘To elliniko parakratos kai i makra istoria tou, to foititiko kinima ton archon tis dekaetias tou 1960: i dolofonia tou Grigori Lampraki [The Greek Parakratos and its Long History, the Student Movement of the Early 1960s: The Assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis]’. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitis 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 139–78. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton koinovouleftismo kai ti dimokratia, 2016.
- Gill, Lesley. ‘Durable Disorder: Parapolitics in Barrancabermeja’. *NACLA Report on the Americas* 42, no. 4 (2009): 20–24.
- . ‘The Parastate in Colombia: Political Violence and the Restructuring of Barrancabermeja’. *Anthropologica* 51, no. 2 (2009): 313–25.
- Gingeras, Ryan. *Heroin, Organized Crime and the Making of Modern Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- . ‘In the Hunt for the “Sultans of Smack:” Dope, Gangsters and the Construction of the Turkish Deep State’. *Middle East Journal* 65, no. 3 (2011): 426–41.
- . ‘Last Rites for a “Pure Bandit”: Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish “Deep State”’. *Past & Present* 206, no. 1 (2010).
- Gkanoulis, Athanasios D. ‘Akrodexies organoseis kai parakratos sti metapolemiki Ellada, 1949-1967 [Far-Right Organisations and the Parastate in Post-War Greece, 1949-1967]’. MA Thesis, University of Macedonia, 2016.
- Gkotzaridis, Evi. *The Life and Death of a Pacifist: Grigorios Lambrakis and Greece in the Long Shadow of Civil War*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016.
- . ‘“Who Really Rules This Country?” Collusion between State and Deep State in Post-Civil War Greece and the Murder of Independent MP Grigorios Lambrakis, 1958–1963’. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 28, no. 4 (2017): 646–73. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1386458>.
- . ‘“Who Will Help Me to Get Rid of This Man?”: Grigoris Lambrakis and the Non-Aligned Peace Movement in Post-Civil War Greece: 1951-1964’. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 30, no. 2 (2012): 299–338.

- Gounaris, Vasilis K. 'Bonds Made Power: Clientelism, Nationalism, and Party Strategies in Greek Macedonia (1900-1950)'. edited by Mark Mazower, 109–28. London: Hurst & Company, 2008.
- . “‘Eamovoulgaroi” kai Makedonomachoi: Ideologikes kai alles vendetes sti Makedonia tou Emfyliou Polemou [The “EAM-Bulgarians” and the Macedonian Fighters: Ideological and Other Vendettas in the Civil War Macedonia]’. In *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949) [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)]*, edited by Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos, and Grigoris Psallidas, 233–45. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2002.
- . *Egnosmenon Koinonikon Fronimaton: Koinonikes Kai Alles Opseis Tou Antikommounismou Sti Makedonia Tou Emfyliou Polemou, 1945-1949 [Incontestable Political Convictions: Social and Other Aspects of Anti-Communism in Macedonia During the Civil War (1945-1949)]*. Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 2002.
- Grigoriadis, Foivos N. *Vasilevomeni Stratokratia [Crowned Stratocracy]*. Athina: Neokosmos, 1975.
- Gürpınar, Doğan. 'Deep State: Reality, Discourse, Conspiracy Theory'. In *Conspiracy Theories in Turkey*, 61–73. London ; New York: Routledge, 2020.
- Hänni, Adrian. 'Introduction: State Support for Terrorist Actors in the Cold War - Myths and Reality (Part 2)'. In *Terrorism in the Cold War (Vol. 2): State Support in the West, Middle East and Latin America*, edited by Adrian Hänni, Thomas Riegler, and Przemyslaw Gasztold, 1–14. London; New York: I.B. Tauris; Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021.
- Hatzianastasiou, Tasos. 'Dosilogoι i apeleftheromenos plithysmos? Slavofonoι synergates ton voulgarikon archon katochis sti voulgarokratoumeni Anatoliki Makedonia kai Thraki [Collaborators or Liberated Population? Slavophone Helpers of the Bulgarian Authorities in the Bulgarian-Occupied Eastern Macedonia and Thrace]'. In *'Echthros' endos ton Teichon: Opseis tou Dosiologismou stin Elladas tis Katochis [The 'Enemy' Inside the Walls: The Perspectives of Collaborationism in Occupied Greece]*, edited by Iakovos Michailidis, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, and Hagen Fleischer, 271–89. Athina: Ellinika Grammata, 2006.
- Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis. *Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967*. London; New York: Routledge, 2006.
- . *I anodos tou Konstantinou Karamanli stin exousia, 1954-1956 [The Rise of Konstantinos Karamanlis to Power, 1954-1956]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Pataki, 2001.
- . 'Shallow Waves and Deeper Currents : The U.S. Experience of Greece, 1947–1961. Policies, Historicity, and the Cultural Dimension'. *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 1 (2014): 83–110.
- . 'To Stavrodromi tou 1963 [The Crossroads of 1963]'. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 219–37. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016.
- Herzfeld, Michael. 'The Absent Presence: Discourses of Crypto-Colonialism'. *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, no. 4 (2002): 899–926.
- Hess, Henner. 'The Sicilian Mafia: Parastate and Adventure Capitalism'. In *Government of the Shadows. Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty*, edited by Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey, 153–72. Pluto Press, 2009.



- Hirschon, Renee, ed. *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2003.
- Hofstadter, Richard. *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.
- Hondros, John L. 'Greece and the German Occupation'. In *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, edited by David H. Close. London; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- . 'The Greek Resistance, 1941-1944. A Reevaluation'. In *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis.*, edited by John O. Iatrides, 37–47. Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981.
- Hradečný, Pavel. *Dějiny Řecka [The History of Greece]*. Praha: NLN, 2009.
- Iatrides, John O. 'Britain, the United States, and Greece, 1945-9'. In *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, edited by David H. Close. London; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- . 'Civil War, 1945-1949. National and International Aspects'. In *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis*, edited by John O. Iatrides. Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981.
- . 'The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century'. In *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou, 69–109. London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004.
- Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon: I.D.E.A. *A. Apokalypseis Tou Typou [Holy Bond of Greek Officers: IDEA. 1. Revelations by the Press]*. Ellinika Themata: Katochi-Antistasi-Emfylios 20. Athina, 1975.
- Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
- Kafiris, Athanasios G. *Ypothesi Polk-Staktopoulou. Mia anthropini kai dikastiki tragodia [The Polk-Staktopoulou Case. A Human and Judicial Tragedy]*. Athina: Proskinio, 2008.
- Kakaras, Antonis A. *I Ellines stratiotikoi: axiomatikoi kai ypaxiomatikoi stin metapolemiki Ellada [The Greek Military: Army Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers in Postwar Greece]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 2006.
- Kallivretakis, Leonidas. 'Mia istoria tou 1958, proangelos tou 1963 (kai tou 1967) [The History of 1958, the Precursor of 1963 (and of 1967)]'. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 201–18. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016.
- Kalogrias, Vaios. 'Enoples omades anexartiton oplarchigon kai ethnikiston axiomatikon stin periochi metaxy Strymona kai Axiou (1941-1944) [The Armed Groups of Independent Chieftains and Nationalist Officers in the Area Between the Strymonas and the Axios Rivers (1941-1944)]'. In *Oi alloi Kapetanioi: antikomounistes enoploi sta chronia tis Katochis kai tou Emfyliou [The Other Captains: Anti-Communist Gunmen During the Occupation and the Civil War]*, edited by Nikos Marantzidis, 127–200. Athina: Estia, 2005.
- Kaloudis, George. *Modern Greece: A Partner or Still a Client?* Lanham, Md: Univ. Press of America, 2002.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 'Armed Collaboration in Greece, 1941–1944'. *European Review of History: Revue Europeenne d'histoire* 15, no. 2 (2008): 129–42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507480801931051>.

- . *Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- . ‘Morfes, diastaseis kai praktikes tis vias ston Emfylio (1943-1949): Mia protí prosengisi [Forms, Dimensions and Practices of Violence in the Civil War (1943-1949): A Preliminary Approach]’. In *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949) [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)]*, edited by Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos, and Grigoris Psallidas, 188–207. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2002.
- . ‘Red Terror: Leftist Violence during the Occupation’. In *After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943-1960*, edited by Mark Mazower, 142–83. Princeton Modern Greek Studies. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- . *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Karagiannis, Giorgos N. *To drama tis Ellados 1940-1952. Epi kai athliotites [The Drama of Greece 1940-1952. Epics and Misery]*. Self-publication, 1950.
- Karamanolakis, Vangelis D. *Anepithymito parelthon: I fakeloi koinonikon fronimaton ston 20o ai. kai i katastrofi tous [The Undesirable Past: The Files of Political Convictions in the 20th Century and their Destruction]*. Athina: Themelio, 2019.
- Karyotis, Georgios. ‘Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the “Revolutionary Organization November 17”’. *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 3 (2007): 271–93.
- Kassimeris, Christos. ‘Causes of the 1967 Greek Coup’. *Democracy and Security* 2, no. 1 (July 2006): 61–72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419160600623459>.
- . ‘United States Intervention in Post-War Greek Elections: From Civil War to Dictatorship’. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 20, no. 4 (10 December 2009): 679–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290903455790>.
- Kassimeris, George. ‘Greece’s New Generation of Terrorists, Part 2: The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF)’. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35 (2012): 634–49.
- . ‘Greece’s Terrorism Problem: A Reassessment’. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39, no. 9 (September 2016): 862–70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1129820>.
- Katris, Giannis A. *I gennisi tou neofasismou: Ellada 1960-1974 [The Birth of Neofascism: Greece 1960-1974]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1974.
- Katsambekis, Giorgos. ‘Ta rigmata tis Metapolitefsis kai oi prooptikes tis Aristeras [The Rifts of the Metapolitefsi and the Prospects of the Left]’. *U3I*, July 2014, 14–19.
- . ‘The Populist Radical Left in Greece: Syriza in Opposition and in Power’. In *The Populist Radical Left in Europe*, edited by Giorgos Katsambekis and Alexandros Kioupkiolis, 21–46. London; New York: Routledge, 2019.
- Katsanos, Konstantinos. ‘«Orkisthisan pistin eis tin patriida» Orkomosies slavofonon sti Dytiki Makedonia (kalokairi 1959) [“They Swore Allegiance to Their Homeland.” Oaths of the Slavophone Population in the Western Macedonia (Summer 1959)]’. *Kleio* 5 (September 2009): 41–63.
- Katsoudas, Kostas. ‘Ethnikistes kai Ethnikofrones. Merikes paratiriseis gia tin akra dexia sti dekaetia tou ’40 [Nationalists and Nationally-Minded. Some Remarks on the Far-Right in the 1940s]’. *Archeiotaxio* 16 (November 14): 23–30.
- Kavakci, M. ‘Turkey’s Test with Its Deep State’. *Mediterranean Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (1 October 2009): 83–97.

- Kaya, Serdar. 'The Rise and Decline of the Turkish "Deep State": The Ergenekon Case'. *Insight Turkey* 11, no. 4 (2009): 99–113.
- Keeley, Edmund. *The Salonika Bay Murder: Cold War Politics and the Polk Affair*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Klapsis, Antonis. 'I vretaniki politiki kai to elliniko antistasiako kinima: i apostoli tis SOE stin Ellada (1943-1944) [The British Politics and the Greek Resistance Movement: The SOE Mission in Greece (1943-1944)]'. In *Afigiseis gia ti dekaetia tou 1940. Apo to logo tou katochikou kratous sti metaneoteriki istoriografia [The Narratives about the 1940s. From the Speech of the Occupation State to the Post-Modern Historiography]*, edited by Vassilis K. Dalkavoukis, Eleni Paschaloudi, Ilias Skoulidas, and Katerina Tsekou, 91–108. Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2012.
- . 'O Panagiotis Kanellopoulos kai i politiki krisi tou 1965-1967 [Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and the Political Crisis of 1965-1967]'. In *Praktika epistimonikou synedriou gia ton Panagioti Kanellopoulo, Athina, 22-25 Noemvriou 2012 [Proceedings of the Scientific Conference on Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Athens, 22-25 November 2012]*, 559–78. Athina: Etaireia filon Panagioti Kanellopoulou, 2013.
- Kleitsikas, Nikos, and Andrea Speranzoni. *Fenomena tromokratias: O ellinikos neofasismos mesa apo ta aporrhita engrafa ton mystikon ypiresion [Phenomena of Terrorism: Greek Neo-Fascism in Confidential Documents of Secret Services]*. Chalandri: Proskinio, 2003.
- Knight, Peter. *Conspiracy Culture: From the Kennedy Assassination to The X-Files*. London ; New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Kofas, Jon V. *Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece during the Cold War*. University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989.
- . *Under the Eagle's Claw: Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S.-Greek Relations*. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003.
- Koliopoulos, Giannis. *Plundered Loyalties: Axis Occupation and Civil Strife in Greek West Macedonia, 1941-1949*. London: C. Hurst, 1999.
- Koliopoulos, Giannis, and Thanos Veremis. *Greece: The Modern Sequel from the 1821 to the Present*. London: Hurst, 2002.
- . *Modern Greece: A History since 1821*. A New History of Modern Europe. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- Konstandinidis, Isaias I. *To aristero parakratos tis metapolitefsis [The Leftist Parakratos of the Metapolitefsi]*. Athina: Ilektron, 2018.
- Kordatos, Giannis. *Megali Istoría tis Elladas (1900-1924) [Great History of Greece (1900-1924)]*. vol. 13. Athina: Ekdoseis Eikostos Aionas, 1955.
- Kornetis, Kostis. "'Cuban Europe'? Greek and Iberian Tiersmondisme in the "Long 1960s"". *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (July 2015): 486–515. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009414556663>.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Times*. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1985.
- . *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- Kostis, Kostas. *History's Spoiled Children: The Story of Modern Greece*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Kostopoulos, Tasos. *I autologokrimeri mnimi. Ta Tagmata Asphaleias kai i metapolemiki ethnikophrosyni [The Self-Censored Memory: The Security*

- Batallions and the Post-War Nationalmindedness*]. Morphes koinonikis kritikis 5. Athina: Philistor, 2005.
- . ‘O nazismos os egcheirima antiexegersis: to “vathy kratos” kai i anodos tis Chrysis Avgis [Nazism as a Counter-Insurgency Venture: The “Deep State” and the Rise of the Golden Dawn]’. *Archeiotaxio* 16 (2014): 69–88.
- Koundouros, Roussos S. *I asfaleia tou kathestotos. Politikoi kratoumenoi. Ektopiseis kai taxeis stin Ellada 1924-1974 [The Security of the Regime. Polical Prisoners. Deportations and Order in Greece 1924-1974]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 1978.
- Koura, Jan. *Rozdělený ostrov: Studená válka a „kyperská otázka“ v letech 1960–1974 [Divided Island: Cold War and the ‘Cyprus Issue’ Between 1960-1974]*. Praha: EPOCH, 2019.
- Kousoulinis, Panagiotis A. ‘I chorofylaki, i ethnofylaki kai i ethnofroua stin metakatochiki Ellada, 1944-1949 [The Gendarmerie, the National Guard and the Home Guard in Post-Occupation Greece, 1944-1949]’. PhD Thesis, Aristotle University, 2016.
- Kousouris, Dimitris. ‘O fasismos stin Ellada: Synecheies kai asynecheies kata ton evropaiiko 20. aiona [Fascism in Greece: Continuities and Discontinuities During the European 20th Century]’. In *To ‘vathy kratos’ sti simerini Ellada kai i Akrodexia: astynomia, dikaiosyni, stratos, ekklesia [The ‘Deep State’ in Today’s Greece and the Far-Right: Police, Justice, State, Church]*, edited by Dimitris Christopoulos, 33–81. Athina: Nisos, 2014.
- Králová, Kateřina. “‘Being Traitors’: Post-War Greece in the Experience of Jewish Partisans”. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 17, no. 2 (2017): 263–80.
- . ‘Between Tradition and Modernity: Greek-German Relations in Retrospect’. *Acta Universitatis Carolinae - Studia Territorialia* 4 (2009): 97–117.
- . *Das Vermächtnis der Besatzung: deutsch-griechische Beziehungen seit 1940 [The Legacy of Occupation. German-Greek Relations since 1940]*. Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2016.
- . ‘In the Shadow of the Nazi Past: Post-War Reconstruction and the Claims of the Jewish Community in Salonika’. *European History Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (1 April 2016): 262–90. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691416630930>.
- Kremmydas, Giorgis Th. *Oi anthropoi tis Chountas meta ti Diktatoria [The People of Junta after the Dictatorship]*. Athina: Exantas, 1984.
- Krikis, Panos. *O rolos tou stratou stin exelixa tis istorias apo tin epanastasi tou 1821 mechri to 1975 [The Role of the Army in the Historical Development from the Revolution of 1821 until 1975]*. Athina: Koultoura, 2008.
- Kwitny, Jonathan. ‘The C.I.A.’s Secret Armies in Europe’. *The Nation*, 6 April 1992, 444–48.
- Lagaris, Theodoros. *Innerer Feind, Nation und Demokratie: zum Legitimationprozess in Griechenland nach dem Bürgerkrieg [Inner Enemy, Nation, and Democracy: On the Legitimation Process in post-Civil War Greece]*. Nomos Universitätschriften, Bd. 108. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000.
- Lalaki, Despina. ‘On the Social Construction of Hellenism Cold War Narratives of Modernity, Development and Democracy for Greece’. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 25, no. 4 (December 2012): 552–77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6443.2012.01432.x>.
- Landau, Jacob M. *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism*. London: Hurst, 1981.
- Lendakis, Andreas. *Oi neofasistikes organoseis sti neolaia [Youth Neofascist Organisations]*. Athina: Ekdosi D.K.N. Grigoris Lambrakis, 1963.

- . *To parakratos kai i 21e Apriliou [The Parakratos and the 21st April]*. Chalandri: Proskinio, 2000.
- Lialiouti, Zinovia. ‘American Cultural Diplomacy in Greece, 1953–1968’. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 15, no. 3 (3 July 2017): 229–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2017.1337676>.
- . ‘Contesting the Anti-Totalitarian Consensus: The Concept of National Independence, the Memory of the Second World War and the Ideological Cleavages in Post-War Greece’. *National Identities* 18, no. 2 (2016): 105–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2014.987659>.
- . ‘Greek Cold War Anti-Americanism in Perspective, 1947–1989’. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 13, no. 1 (2 January 2015): 40–55. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.990735>.
- Linardatos, Spyros. *Sygchroni Elliniki Istoría: Apo ton Emfylio sti Chounta. Tomos D’ 1961-1964 [Contemporary Greek History: From the Civil War to the Junta. Volume 4: 1961-1964]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1978.
- . *Sygchroni Elliniki Istoría: Apo ton Emfylio sti Chounta. Tomos E’ 1964-1967 [Contemporary Greek History: From the Civil War to the Junta. Volume 5: 1964-1967]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1978.
- . *Sygchroni Elliniki Istoría: Apo ton Emfylio sti Chounta. Tomos G’ 1955-1961 [Contemporary Greek History: From the Civil War to the Junta. Volume 3: 1955-1961]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1978.
- Linz, Juan. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
- Liotta, P.H. ‘Balkan Fragmentation and the Rise of the Parastate’. *Mediterranean Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 61–81.
- Lippmann, Walter. *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922.
- Livanios, Dimitris. ‘“Conquering the Souls”: Nationalism and Greek Guerilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904-1908’. *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 23 (1999): 195–221.
- Lowe, Keith. *Zdivočelý kontinent: Evropa po druhé světové válce [Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II]*, 2015.
- Lyrantzis, Christos. ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of ‘Bureaucratic Clientelism’?’ *West European Politics* 7, no. 2 (1984): 99–118.
- Maïlis, Makis. *To astiko politiko systima stin Ellada apo to 1950 eos to 1967 [The Bourgeois Political System in Greece from 1950 to 1967]*. Athina: Synchroni Epochi, 2014.
- Makris, Alexandros. ‘The Greek Peace Movement and the Vietnam War, 1964–1967’. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 38 (2020): 159–84.
- Marantzidis, Nikos. *Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas (DSE): 1946-1949 [The Democratic Army of Greece (DSE): 1946-1949]*. Themata Istorias 2. Athens: Ekdosis Alexandria, 2010.
- . ‘Ethnotikes diastaseis tou Emfyliou Polemou: I periptosi ton tourkofonon pontion kapetanaion tis Makedonias [The Ethnic Dimensions of the Civil War: The Case of the Turkish Speaking Captains of Macedonia]’. In *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949) [The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)]*, edited by Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos, and Grigoris Psallidas, 208–21. Athina: Themelio, 2002.

- . *Giasasin millet. Zito to ethnos. Prosfygia, katochi kai emfylios [Long Live the Nation. Refugeesom, Occupation and Civil War]*. Irakleio: Panepisthimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2001.
- Marantzidis, Nikos, and Giorgos Antoniou. ‘The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941-2002’. *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 2 (2004): 223–31.
- Marchetos, Spyros. ‘A Slav Macedonian Greek Fascist? Deciphering the Ethnicophrosyne of Sotirios Gotzamanis’. In *Spotlights on Russian and Balkan Slavic Cultural History*, edited by Alexandra Ioannidou and Christian Voss, 67–96. München, Berlin: Peter Lang Verlag, 2009.
- Margaritis, Giorgos. *Istoria tou ellinikou emfyliou polemou 1946-1949. Tomos 1 [The History of the Greek Civil War 1946-1949. Volume 1]*. Athina: Bibliorama, 2001.
- Marinov, Tchavdar, and Alexander Vezenkov. ‘Communism and Nationalism in the Balkans: Marriage of Convenience or Mutual Attraction?’ In *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, edited by Rumén Daskalov and Tchavdar Marinov, 469–555. Balkan Studies Library. Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2013.
- Mavrogordatos, George Th. *1915: O ethnikos dichasmos [1915: The National Schism]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Pataki, 2016.
- . *Ethnikos dichasmos kai maziki organosi. Oi Epistratoi tou 1916 [National Schism and Mass Organisation. The 1916 Reservists]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Alexandreia, 1996.
- . ‘From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: The Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece’. *South European Society and Politics* 2, no. 3 (1997): 1–26.
- . ‘The 1946 Election and Plebiscite. Prelude to Civil War’. In *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis*, edited by John O. Iatrides, 181–94. Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981.
- Mazower, Mark. *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 1430-1950*. 1st American ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.
- McCoy, Alfred W. *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*. New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1973.
- Meletopoulos, Meletis I. *I diktatoria ton syntagmatarchon: koinonia, ideologia, oikonomia [The Dictatorship of the Collonels: Society, Ideology, Economy]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1996.
- . *Ideologia tou dexiou kratous, 1949-1967: episimos politikos logos kai kyriarchi ideologia stin metemphyliaki Ellada [Ideology of the Right-Wing State, 1949-1967: Official Political Speech and the Dominant Ideology in the post-Civil War Greece]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 1993.
- Mérieau, Eugénie. ‘Thailand’s Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court (1997–2015)’. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 46, no. 3 (2016): 445–66.
- Meynaud, Jean. *Les forces politiques en Grèce [Political Forces in Greece]*. Lausanne: Études de science politique, n° 10, 1965.
- Miller, James Edward. *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
- Mitsopoulou, Anastasia I. *O ellinikos antikommounismos ston ‘syntomo 20o aiona’: opseis tou dimosiou logou stin politiki, stin ekpaideusi kai sti logotechnia [Greek Anti-Communism in the ‘Short 20th Century’: Aspects of the Public Speech in Politics, Education and Literature]*. Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2014.
- Morales Pérez, Isaac. ‘Córdoba: paraestado, clientelismo y agentes de la violencia [Córdoba: Parastate, Clientelism and the Agents of Violence]’. In *Trans-*

- pasando Fronteras*, 37–54. 6. Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios, Jurídicos, Sociales y Humanistas (CIES), Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias sociales, Universidad Icesi, 2014.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *The Decline of Democratic Politics*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
- Mouzelis, Nikos P. ‘Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece’. *New Left Review*, 1 March 1976, 57–80.
- . *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978.
- Mouzelis, Nikos P., and George Pagoulatos. ‘Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece’, September 2002. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203311462>.
- Müller, Leo A. *Gladio - das Erbe des Kalten Krieges [Gladio - The Cold War Heritage]*. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1991.
- Naar, Devin E. *Jewish Salonica: Between the Ottoman Empire and Modern Greece*. Standford: Stanford University Press, 2016.
- Nefes, Türkey Salim. ‘The Conspiratorial Style in Turkish Politics: Discussing the Deep State in the Parliament’. In *Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them*, edited by Joseph E. Uscinski, 385–94. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Newman, John Paul. ‘Paramilitärische Gewalt auf dem Balkan. Ursprünge und Vermächtnisse [Paramilitary Violence in the Balkans. Origins and Legacies]’. In *Krieg im Frieden. Paramilitärische Gewalt in Europa nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, edited by Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, 226–49. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013.
- Nikolakopoulos, Ilias. ‘Amfisvitontas ta oria tis “ethnikofrosynis”: Oi synergasies tis EDA me ton revsto choro tis kentrosristeras’. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisi 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 119–26. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016.
- . *I kachektiki dimokratia: kommata kai ekloges, 1946-1967 [Cachectic Democracy: Parties and Elections, 1946-1967]*. 1. ekd. Neoteri kai synchroni istoria 4. Athina: Patakis, 2014.
- Nuti, Leopoldo. ‘The Italian “Stay-Behind” Network – The Origins of Operation “Gladio”’. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 6 (December 2007): 955–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390701676501>.
- Pacini, Giacomo. *Le altre Gladio: la lotta segreta anticomunista in Italia: 1943-1991 [The Other Gladios: The Secret Anti-Communist Struggle in Italy: 1943-1991]*. Einaudi storia 53. Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 2014.
- Paivanas, Dimitris. ‘Un-Framing the Greek Civil War’. *Modern Greek Studies* 18 (2017): 107–22.
- Pantelouris, E. M. *Greece: An Introduction*. Glasgow: Blueacre Books, 1980.
- Papachelas, Alexis. *O viasmos tis ellinikis dimokratias: o amerikanikos paragon 1947-1967 [The Rape of Greek Democracy: The American Factor, 1947-1967]*. Athina: Estia, 2002.
- Papacosma, S. Victor. ‘Ioannis Metaxas and the “Fourth of August” Dictatorship in Greece’. In *Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe*, edited by Bernd Jürgen Fischer, 165–98. West Lafayette, Ind: Purdue University Press, 2007.

- Papadiamantis, Dimitrios A. *Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1949-1967)* [*Army and Political Power in Post-Civil War Greece (1949-1967)*]. Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2014.
- Papadimitriou, Despina. *Apo ton lao ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon: I syntiritiki skepsi stin Ellada, 1922-1967* [*From the Law-Abiding People to the Nation of the Nationally Minded: Conservative Thought in Greece, 1922–1967*]. Athina: Savvalas, 2006.
- . ‘Oi Epistratoi sta chronia tou protou poleμου. Politiki via kai “akrodexies symperifores” [Epistratoi During the First World War. Political Violence and ‘Far-Right Behaviours’]’. *Archeiotaxio* 16 (2014): 13–22.
- . ‘To akrodexio kinima stin Ellada, 1936-1949 - Katavoles, synecheies kai asynecheies [Far-Right Movement in Greece, 1936-1949 - Offsets, Continuities and Discontinuities]’. In *I Ellada '36-'49. Apo ti diktatoria ston Emfylio* [*Greece 1936-1949. From Dictatorship to Civil War*], edited by Hagen Fleischer, 138–49. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2003.
- Papaioannou, Kostas. *Politiki Dolofonia, Thessaloniki '48: Ypothesi Tzortz Polk* [*Political Murder, Thessaloniki '48: The Case of George Polk*]. Athina: To Pontiki, 1993.
- Papandreou, Andreas P. *I dimokratia sto apospasma* [*Democracy at Gunpoint*]. Athina: Ekdoseis Karanasi, 1974.
- Papathanasiou, Ioanna. ‘I aristera antimetopi me ti dolofonia Lambraki: Politikoi cheirismoι kai stratigikes epidioxeis [The Left Faces the Assassination of Lambrakis: Political Usage and Strategic Aspirations]’. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitisi 50 chronia meta* [*The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After*], edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 97–117. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016.
- . “‘To oplo para poda’”: Lektiki polemiki i politiki anasygkrotisis [“Ground Arms”: Verbal Warfare or Reconstruction Politics]’. In *O emfylios polemos: Apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo (Fevrouarios 1945-Augoustos 1949)* [*The Civil War: From Varkiza to Grammos (February 1945-August 1949)*], edited by Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Alkis Rigos, and Grigoris Psallidas, 143–61. Athina: Themelio, 2002.
- Papathanasiou, Ioanna, Polina Iordanidou, Anta Kapola, Tasos Sakellaropoulos, and Aggeliki Christodoulou. *I Neolaia Lampraki ti dekaetia tou 1960. Archeiakas tekmiroseis kai aftoviografikes katatheseis* [*The Lambrakis Youth in the 1960s. Archival Documentation and Autobiographical Statements*]. Athina: Institouto Neoellinikon Ereunon, 2009.
- Pappas, Takis S. ‘Depolarization, Cleavage Liquidation, and Two-Partyism: The Declining Role of Ideology in Postwar Greek Politics’, 1–37. Edinburgh, United Kingdom, 2003.
- . *Making Party Democracy in Greece*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
- . *Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- . ‘The Transformation of the Greek Party System Since 1951’. *West European Politics* 26, no. 2 (2003): 90–114.
- Pappas, Takis S., and Paris Aslanidis. ‘Greek Populism: A Political Drama in Five Acts’. In *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession*, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas, 175–92. Studies in European Political Science / ECPR. Colchester, United Kingdom: ECPR Press, 2016.



- Paralikas, Dimitrios K. *Synomosies I.D.E.A. kai A.S.P.I.D.A.: 1944-1974 [Conspiracies IDEA and ASPIDA: 1944-1974]*. Athina: Vaskedis, 1982.
- Paraskevopoulos, Potis. *Georgios Papandreou. Ta dramatika gegonota 1961-1967 [Georgios Papandreou. The Dramatical Events 1961-1967]*. Athina: Fytrakis/Typos A.E., 1988.
- Park, Bill. 'Turkey's Deep State: Ergenekon and the Threat to Democratisation in the Republic'. *The RUSI Journal* 153, no. 5 (October 2008): 54–59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840802521937>.
- Paschaloudi, Eleni. *Enas polemos choris telos: I dekaetia tou 1940 ston politiko logo, 1950-1967 [A War Without an End: The Decade of the 1940s in the Political Speech, 1950-1967]*. Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2010.
- Pavlaković, Vjieran. 'Simboli i kultura sjećanja u Republici Srpskoj Krajini [Symbols and Culture of Remembrance in the Republika Srpska Krajina]'. *Politička Misao / Croatian Political Science Review* 53, no. 3 (2016): 26–49.
- Peloni, Aristotelia. *Ideologia kata realismou: I amerikaniki politiki apenanti stin Ellada, 1963-1976 [Ideology Against the Realism: The US Politics Towards Greece, 1963-1976]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Polis, 2010.
- Pelt, Mogens. *Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949-1974*. Studies in 20th & 21st Century European History, v. 5. Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2006.
- Petrakis, Marina. *The Metaxas Myth: Dictatorship and Propaganda in Greece*. International Library of War Studies 6. London ; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006.
- Petridis, Pavlos V. *Dolofonia Lampraki: anekdota dokoumenda, 1963-1966 [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Unpublished Documents, 1963-1966]*. Edited by Angelos Sideratos. Chalandri: Proskinio, 1995.
- . *Exousia kai paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967: aporrta dokoumenda [Power and Para-Power in Greece: Secret Documents]*. Chalandri: Proskinio, 2000.
- , ed. *I dikes tou Gorgopotamou, 1964-66: agnosta dokoumenda apo tin polykroti ypothesi [The Trials of Gorgopotamos, 1964-66: Unknown Documents from the Noted Case]*. Chalandri: Ekdodeis Proskinio, 1998.
- Pigden, Charles. 'Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom'. *Episteme* 4, no. 2 (2007): 219–32.
- Pipes, Daniel. *Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From*. New York: Free Press, 1997.
- Plakoudas, Spyridon. *The Greek Civil War: Strategy, Counterinsurgency and the Monarchy*. International Library of War Studies 21. London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017.
- Plevris, Konstantinos. *Antidimokratis [Anti-Democrat]*. Athina: Nea Thesis, 1987.
- . *Gegonota 1965-1977. Ta agnosta paraskinia [Events 1965-1977. The Unknown Backstage Politics]*. Athina, 2009.
- Poulianas, Christos. 'Ethniki Koinoniki Organosis Foititon (EKOF): Praktikes kai politiki ideologia tou dexiou extremismou sti metemfyliaki Ellada (1960-1967) [National Social Organisation of Students (EKOF): Practices and Political Ideology of the Right-Wing Extremism in Post-Civil War Greece (1960-1967)]'. MA Thesis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2017.
- Poulos, Margaret. 'Gender, Civil War and National Identity: Women Partisans during the Greek Civil War 1946-1949'. *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 46, no. 3 (2000): 418–27.

- Psarras, Dimitris. 'O Konstantinos Plevris kai to Komma 4is Avgoustou. Apo ton Maniadaki ston Michaloliako. [Konstantinos Plevris and the 4th of August Party. From Maniadakis Until Michaloliakos]'. *Archeiotaxio*, no. 16 (2014): 47–68.
- . 'Tyfles Vomves, Aommates Arches [Blind Bombings, Indifferent Authorities]'. *Archeiotaxio*, no. 15 (2013): 24–28.
- Reference Aid: Abbreviations, Acronyms and Special Terms in the Press of Greece and Cyprus*. Arlington, Virginia: U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1977. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a375623.pdf>.
- Richter, Heinz. *British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War. February 1945 to August 1946*. London: Merlin Press, 1986.
- . *Geschichte Griechenlands im 20. Jahrhundert (Band 2: 1939-2004) [The History of Greece in the 20th Century (Volume 2: 1939-2004)]*. Wiesbaden: Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen, 2015.
- . 'The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War'. In *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, edited by John O. Iatrides. Modern Greek Studies Association Series 4. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981.
- . 'Zwischen Tradition und Moderne: Die politische Kultur Griechenlands [Between Tradition and Modernity: Political Culture in Greece]'. In *Politische Kultur in Westeuropa [Political Culture in Western Europe]*, edited by Peter Reichel. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1984.
- Riegler, Thomas. 'Gladio - Myth and Reality: The Origins and the Function of Stay Behind in the Case of Post-War Austria'. In *Terrorism in the Cold War (Vol. 2): State Support in the West, Middle East and Latin America*, edited by Adrian Hänni, Thomas Riegler, and Przemyslaw Gasztold, 15–42. London; New York: I.B. Tauris; Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021.
- Rigos, Alkis, Serapheim I. Sepheriadis, and Evanthis Chatzivasileiou, eds. *I 'syntomi' dekaetia tou '60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The 'Short' 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008.
- Rizas, Sotiris. 'Dekaetia tou 1960: To politevma se dokimasia [The 1960s: The Regime on Trial]'. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitis 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 179–97. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016.
- . *I elliniki politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo: koinovouleftismos kai diktatoria [Greek Politics after the Civil War: Parliamentarism and Dictatorship]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008.
- Roberts, Geoffrey. *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953*. New Haven [Conn.]; London: Yale University Press, 2006.
- Romaïos, Giorgos. 'Politikes dolofonies stin Ellada [Political Murders in Greece]'. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitis 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 11–40. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016.
- Rossi, Michael, and Jaime Castan Pinos. 'Introduction to Inconvenient Realities: The Emergence and Resilience of Parastates'. *Nationalities Papers* 48, no. 1 (January 2020): 12–23.
- Saint-Martin, Catherine. *Lambrakides. I storia mias genias [Lambrakides. The History of One Generation]*. Athina: Polytypo, 1984.

- Sakkas, Dimitris N. *Konstantinos Karamanlis kai to kratos tou tis periodou 1955-63 [Konstantinos Karamanlis and his State in the Period of 1955-63]*. Athina: Gutenberg, 2010.
- Sakkas, John. *Britain and the Greek Civil War 1944 - 1949: British Imperialism, Public Opinion and the Coming of the Cold War*. 55. Mainz: Rutzen, 2013.
- . ‘Old Interpretations and New Approaches in the Historiography of the Greek Civil War’. *Thetis*, no. 20 (2013): 425–39.
- Samatas, Minas. ‘Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-McCarthy Era’. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 13, no. 3–4 (1986): 5–75.
- . ‘Studying Surveillance in Greece: Methodological and Other Problems Related to an Authoritarian Surveillance Culture’. *Surveillance & Society* 3, no. 2/3 (2005): 181–97.
- Sarandis, Constantine. ‘The Ideology and Character of the Metaxas Regime’. In *The Metaxas Dictatorship: Aspects of Greece, 1936-1940*, edited by Robin Higham and Thanos Veremis, 147–77. Athens: The Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism, 1993.
- Sartori, Giovanni. ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’. *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033–53.
- Scott, Peter Dale. *American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection, and the Road to Afghanistan*. War and Peace Library. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010.
- . *Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina*. War and Peace Library. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.
- . *The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
- . *The War Conspiracy: The Secret Road to the Second Indochina War*. Indianapolis, 1972.
- Seferiades, Seraphim. ‘Polarization and Nonproportionality: The Greek Party System in the Postwar Era’. *Comparative Politics* 19, no. 1 (October 1986): 69–93.
- . ‘Syllogikes draseis, kinimatikes praktikes: i “syntomi” dekaetia tou ’60 os “sygkrousiakos kyklos” [The Collective Actions, Movement Practices: The “Short” 1960s as “Conflict Cycle”]’. In *I ‘syntomi’ dekaetia tou ’60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The ‘Short’ 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, edited by Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 57–77. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008.
- Selva, Simone. ‘Gladio Network (1945-Early 1990s)’. In *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies*, edited by Jan Goldman, 157–58. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2014.
- Serndedakis, Nikos. ‘Syllogiki drasi kai foititiko kinima tin periodo 1959-1964: domikes proypotheseis, politikes evkairies kai erminevtika schimata [Collective Action and Student Movement in the Period of 1959-1964: Structural Conditions, Political Opportunities, and Interpretational Schemes]’. In *I ‘syntomi’ dekaetia tou ’60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The ‘Short’ 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, edited by Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 241–63. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008.

- Siani-Davies, Peter, and Stefanos Katsikas. 'National Reconciliation After Civil War: The Case of Greece'. *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 4 (2009): 559–75.
- Skalidakis, Giannis. *I Eleftheri Ellada. I exousia tou EAM sta chronia tis Katochis (1943-1944) [Free Greece: The Power of EAM in the Occupation Years (1943-1944)]*. Athens: Ekdoseis Asini, 2015.
- Skoulariki, Athena. 'Conspiracy Theories Before and After the Greek Crisis: Discursive Patterns and Political Use of the "Enemy" Theme'. *Epistimi Kai Koinonia* 37 (2018): 73–108.
- Ślupkov, Ireneusz Adam. *The Communist Party of Greece and the Macedonian National Problem, 1918-1940*. Szczecin, Poland: Ireneusz A. Ślupkov, 2006.
- Smith, Ole L. "'The First Round" - Civil War during Occupation'. In *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, edited by David H. Close, 58–71. London; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- . 'The Greek Communist Party, 1945-1949'. In *The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization*, edited by David H. Close, 129–55. London; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Sotiropoulos, Dimitrios. *Populism and Bureaucracy: The Case of Greece under PASOK, 1981-1989*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996.
- Sourlas, Paulos, and Anna Karapanou, eds. *Dolofonia Lampraki: I istoriki syzitis 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*. Athina: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai ti Dimokratia, 2016.
- Söyler, Mehtap. *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics 73. London New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Springborg, Robert. 'Deep States in MENA'. *Middle East Policy* 25, no. 1 (2018): 136–57.
- Staktopoulos, Grigoris. *Ypothesi Polk. I prosopiki mou martyria [The Polk Case. My Personal Testimony]*. Athina: Gnosi, 1988.
- Stathakis, George. 'U.S. Economic Policies in Post Civil War Greece, 1949-1953: Stabilization and Monetary Reform'. *Journal of European Economic History* 24, no. 2 (1995): 375–404.
- Stathakis, Giorgos. *To Dogma Trouman kai to Schedio Marsal. I istoria tis amerikanikis voitheias stin Ellada [The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The History of American Aid in Greece]*. Athina: Vivliorama, 2004.
- Stavrou, Nikolaos A. *Allied Politics and Military Interventions: The Political Role of the Greek Military*. Athens: Papazissis Publishers, 1976.
- Stefanidis, Ioannis D. *Apo ton Emfylio ston Psychro Polemo: I Ellada kai o symmachikos paragontas, 1949-52 [From the Civil War to the Cold War: Greece and the Allied Factor, 1949-1952]*. Chalandri: Ekdoseis Proskinio, 1999.
- . *Asymmetroi etairoi: Oi Inomenes Politeies kai i Ellada ston Psychro Polemo, 1953-1961 [Asymmetric Partners: The USA and Greece in the Cold War]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Pataki, 2002.
- . 'I dimokratia dyscheris? I anaptyxi ton michanision tou "antikommounistikou agonos" 1958-1961 [Democracy Under Strain? The Development of Mechanisms of "Anti-Communist Struggle" 1958-1961]'. *Mnimon* 29 (2008): 199–241.

- . *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967*. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
- . ‘Telling America’s Story: US Propaganda Operations and Greek Public Relations’. *Journal of Hellenic Diaspora* 30, no. 1 (2004): 39–96.
- Stelios Zachariou. ‘Implementing the Marshall Plan in Greece: Balancing Reconstruction and Geopolitical Security’. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 27, no. 2 (2009): 303–18. <https://doi.org/10.1353/mgs.0.0072>.
- Stergiou, Andreas. ‘Der Antikommunismus in Griechenland [Anti-Communism in Greece]’. In *Jahrbuch Für Historische Kommunismusforschung*, 101–18. Aufbau Verlag, 2011.
- Strassner, Alexander. *Militärdiktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert: Motivation, Herrschaftstechnik und Modernisierung im Vergleich [The 20th Century Military Dictatorships: Motivation, Governance Techniques and Modernisation Compared]*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013.
- Studzińska, Zofia. ‘How Russia, Step by Step, Wants to Regain an Imperial Role in the Global and European Security System’. *Connections* 14, no. 4 (2015): 21–42.
- Taş, Hakki. ‘Turkey’s Ergenekon Imbroglia and Academia’s Apathy’. *Insight Turkey* 16, no. 1 (2014): 163–79.
- The Oxford English Dictionary*. XI. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004.
- Triantafyllidou, Anna, and Hara Kouki. *The Greek Crisis and European Modernity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Trikkas, Tasos. *EDA 1951-1967. To neo prosopo tis aristeras. Tomos B - I dekaetia ton akron [EDA 1951-1967: The New Face of the Left. Volume 2: The Decade of Extremes]*. Athina: Themelio, 2009.
- Tripp, Charles. ‘Iraq’s Dual State: Product of the Past, Very Present’. Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs, Brown University, 22 October 2010. <https://watson.brown.edu/news/2010/iraqs-dual-state-product-past-very-present>.
- Trotha, Trutz von. ‘Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika. Vom Zerfall des Staates, von der Vorherrschaft der konzentrischen Ordnung und vom Aufstieg der Parastaatlichkeit [The Future Lies in Africa: On the Disintegration of States, the Dominance of Concentric Order and the Rise of Para-Statehood]’. *Leviathan*, no. 28 (2000): 253–79.
- Trotha, Trutz von, and Georg Klute. ‘Von der Postkolonie zur Parastaatlichkeit - das Beispiel Schwarzafrika [From the Post-Colony to the Para-Statehood - The Example of Black Africa]’. In *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2001*. Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, 2001.
- Tsapogas, Michalis, and Dimitris Christopoulos, eds. *Ta dikaiomata stin Ellada 1953-2003. Apo to telos tu emfyliou sto telos tis metapolitefsis [The Right in Greece 1953-2003. From the End of the Civil War until the End of the Metapolitefsi]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2004.
- Tsekou, Katerina. *Ellines politikoi prosfyges stin Anatoliki Evropi, 1945-1989 [Greek Political Refugees in the Eastern Europe, 1945-1989]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Alexandria, 2013.
- Tsironis, Theodosios A. *Ekklesia politevomeni: O politikos logos kai rolos tis Ekklesias tis Ellados, 1913-1941 [Church in Politics: The Political Speech and the Role of the Church of Greece, 1913-1941]*. Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2010.
- Tsivos, Kostas. ‘O megalos kaymos tis xeniteias...’: *Ellines politikoi prosfyges stin Tsechoslovakia, 1948-1989 [“The Great Sorrow of Exile...”: Greek Political Refugees in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989]*. Athina: Alexandria, 2019.

- Tsoukalas, Konstantinos. 'I elliniki dekaetia tou '60: "syntomi i makra" [The Greek 1960s: "Short or Long"]'. In *I 'syntomi' dekaetia tou '60: thesmiko plaisio, kommatikes stratigikes, koinonikes synkrouseis, politismikes diergasies [The 'Short' 1960s: Institutional Framework, Party Strategies, Social Clashes, Cultural Processes]*, edited by Alkis Rigos, Seraphim Seferiades, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 41–46. Athina: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2008.
- . *The Greek Tragedy*. Harmondsworth Penguin Books, 1969.
- . 'The Ideological Impact of the Civil War'. In *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis*, edited by John O. Iatrides, 319–41. Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981.
- Tsoutsoumpis, Spyridon. 'Paramilitarism, Politics and Organized Crime during the Greek Civil War (1945–1949)'. *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 43, no. 2 (2019): 262–86.
- . 'The Far Right in Greece. Paramilitarism, Organized Crime and the Rise of "Golden Dawn"'. *Südosteuropa* 66, no. 4 (2018): 503–31.
- Tsoutsoumpis, Spyros. *A History of the Greek Resistance in the Second World War: The People's Armies*. Cultural History of Modern War. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016.
- . 'Land of the Kapedani: Brigandage, Paramilitarism and Nation-Building in 20th Century Greece'. *Balkan Studies* 51 (2016): 35–67.
- . "'Political Bandits": Nation-Building, Patronage and the Making of the Greek Deep State'. *Balkanistica* 30, no. 1 (2017): 37–64.
- Tunander, Ula. 'Democratic State vs. Deep State: Approaching the Dual State of the West'. In *Government of the Shadows. Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty.*, edited by Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey, 56–72. Pluto Press, 2009.
- Tungul, Lucie. 'The Lost Opportunity Window of the Gülen Movement in Turkey'. *Slovak Journal of Political Sciences* 18, no. 2 (2018): 141–54.
- Tzannetakos, Giannis P. 'Kratos, antikratos, parakratos, yperkratos stis arches tis dekaetias tou 1960 [State, Anti-State, Para-State, Hyper-State in the Early 1960s]'. In *Dolofonia Lambraki: I istoriki syzitis 50 chronia meta [The Assassination of Lambrakis: Historical Discussion 50 Years After]*, edited by Paulos Sourlas and Anna Karapanou, 127–38. Athina: Idryma tis Voullis ton Ellinon gia ton koinovouleftismo kai ti dimokratia, 2016.
- Tzermias, Pavlos. *Politik in neuen Hellas: Strukturen, Theorien und Parteien im Wandel [Politics in New Hellas: Structures, Theories and Parties in Transition]*. Tübingen: Francke, 1997.
- Tzoukas, Vangelis. "'O Emfylios mesa tous." Sygchrones ermineies gia ti dekaetia 1940-1950 kai politikes diamaches stin elliniki metaneoterikotita ["The Civil War Inside Them." Contemporary Interpretations of the 1940s and the Political Controversies in the Greek Post-Modernity]'. In *Afigiseis gia ti dekaetia tou 1940. Apo to logo tou katochikou kratous sti metaneoteriki istoriografia [The Narratives about the 1940s. From the Speech of the Occupation State to the Post-Modern Historiography]*, edited by Vassilis K. Dalkavoukis, Eleni Paschaloudi, Ilias Skoulidas, and Katerina Tsekou, 399–416. Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2012.
- Van Steen, Gonda. *Adoption, Memory, and Cold War Greece: Kid pro Quo?* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019.
- Vatikiotis, P. J. *Popular Autocracy in Greece, 1936-41: A Political Biography of General Ioannis Metaxas*. London ; Portland, Or: Frank Cass, 1998.

- Venianakis, Andreas. *Dangoulas, o 'drakos' tis Thessalonikis: symvoli stin istoria ton Tagmaton Asfaleias epi Katochis (1941-1944) [Dangoulas, the 'Dragon' of Thessaloniki: A Contribution to the History of Security Battalions during Occupation (1941-1944)]*. Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2016.
- Veremis, Thanos. *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy*. London: Hurst & Company, 1997.
- Veremis, Thanos, and André Gerolymatos. 'The Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece, 1940-1949'. *Journal of Hellenic Diaspora* 17, no. 1 (1991): 103–28.
- Vervenioti, Tasoula. 'The Children of the Greek Civil War. Saved or Kidnapped?' *Acta Universitatis Carolinae - Studia Territoria* Supplementum I, no. 1 (2010): 117–36.
- Vlavianos, Haris. *Greece, 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Voglis, Polymeris. *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners in the Greek Civil War*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2002.
- . *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners in the Greek Civil War*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2002.
- . *I elliniki koinonia stin Katochi: 1941-1944 [The Greek Society During Occupation: 1941-1944]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Alexandria, 2010.
- . *I empeiria tis fylakis kai tis exorias: i politikoi kratoumenoi ston Emphylio Polemo [The Experience of Prison and Exile: The Political Prisoners in the Civil War]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Alexandria, 2004.
- . 'I koinonia tis ypaithrou sta chronia tou Emfyliou Polemou [The Provincial Society in the Years of the Civil War]'. In *Istoria tis Elladas tou 20ou aiona. Anasyngkrotisi - Emfylios - Palinorthosi 1945-1952*, edited by Christos Hatziosif, D1:327–61. Athina: Vivliorama, 2009.
- Voss, Christian. 'Language Ideology between Self-Identification and Ascription among the Slavic-Speakers in Greek Macedonia and Thrace'. In *The Pomaks in Greece and Bulgaria: A Model Case for Borderland Minorities in the Balkans*, edited by Christian Voss and Klaus Steinke. Südosteuropa-Studien. Munich: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft; Verlag Otto Sagner, 2007.
- Voulgaris, Giannis. *I metapoliteftiki Ellada, 1974-2009 [Greece after the Regime Change, 1974-2009]*. Athina: Polis, 2013.
- Voultepsis, Giannis. *Ypothesi Lambraki. Tomos A' [The Lambrakis Case. Volume 1]*. Athina: Alkyon, 1998.
- . *Ypothesi Lambraki. Tomos B' [The Lambrakis Case. Volume 2]*. Athina: Alkyon, 1998.
- Vournas, Tasos. *Istoria tis synchronis Elladas: apo ta prota metemthyliopolemika chronia os tin imera tou stratiotikou praxikopimatos ton syntagmatarchon [History of Contemporary Greece: From the First Post-Civil War Years to the Day of the Military Coup of the Colonels]*. Athina: Ekdoseis Pataki, 1998.
- Vourvachis, Eleftherios A. *Poios skotose ton Polk? Mia politiki dolophonia kai dikastiki plani [Who Killed Polk? A Political Murder and the Judicial Plan]*. Chalandri: Proskinio, 2003.
- Wala, Michael. 'Stay-behind Operations, Former Members of SS and Wehrmacht, and American Intelligence Services in Early Cold War Germany'. *Journal of Intelligence History* 15, no. 2 (2 July 2016): 71–79. <https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2016.1181400>.
- Williams, Paul L. *Operation Gladio: The Unholy Alliance between the Vatican, the CIA, and the Mafia*. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2015.

- Wilson, Eric M., ed. *The Dual State: Parapolitics, Carl Schmitt and the National Security Complex*. International and Comparative Criminal Justice. Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012.
- Wittner, Lawrence S. *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
- Woodhouse, C. M. 'EAM and the British Connection'. In *Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis.*, edited by John O. Iatrides, 81–101. Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1981.
- . *I anodos kai i ptosi ton Syntagmatarchon [The Rise and Fall of the Colonels]*. Athina: Elliniki Evroekdotiki EPE, 19..
- . *Karamanlis: Anorthotis tis Ellinikis Dimokratias [Karamanlis: The Restorer of Greek Democracy]*. Morfotiki Estia A.E., 1982.
- . *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*. London; New York: Granada, 1985.
- Xenakis, Sappho. 'A New Dawn? Change and Continuity in Political Violence in Greece'. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 3 (July 2012): 437–64. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.633133>.
- Yalçın, Soner, and Doğan Yurdakul. *Reis: Gladio'nun Türk tetikçisi [Reis: Gladio's Turkish Hitman]*. Istanbul: Kirmizikedi, 2016.
- Yavuz, M. Hakan. *Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Yıldırım, Murat, and Cemalettin Emeç. *Savaşçı Yeşil [Warrior Green]*. Istanbul: Yakın Plan, 2017.
- Zaharopoulos, George. 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece'. In *Greece under Military Rule*, edited by Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos. London: Secker & Warburg, 1972.
- Zakaria, Fareed. 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy'. *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (December 1997): 22–43.