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**The Injustice of the Current Global Economic
Order in the Light of Thomas Pogge's Argu-
ment from Negative Duties**

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Abstract

Global poverty and its concrete symptoms such as food insecurity are deeply unjust and often linked to a global economic order that promotes this injustice through unfair trade rules. This thesis critically assesses Thomas Pogge's approach to global economic injustice and his argument from negative duties. As the argument goes, imposing an unjust global economic order upon the world's poor, wealthy societies are violating a negative duty. This paper focuses on the applicability of this approach and discusses valuable criticisms and shortcomings of this argument without neglecting its main potentials. Drawing on statistical evidence from the current global economic order, and the analysis of agricultural subsidies with adverse effects, an empirically supported proposal is made. This will be done to revise and improve key aspects of the negative duty argument, suggesting that the notion of the first-person term be abandoned. This abandons the assignment of duties to individuals to refrain from harming and instead adopts a collective action approach that is more applicable in practice.


Keywords: Global Economic Injustice, Negative Duties, Global Economic Order, WTO, Subsidies, Collective Action

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 03.05.2022

Constantin Zeithammer

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. Zeithammer', written in a cursive style.

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Intensified globalization and the question of what obligations and responsibilities the affluent societies have towards those who suffer from radical poverty has extended the philosophical debate on justice to the global sphere. Looking at the facts about Global extreme poverty one must note that the number of undernourished people in the world continued to rise in 2020. Roughly 750 million human beings faced hunger. Measured by the World Bank, 700 million human beings live below the poverty line living of less than 1,90 \$ per day. The Covid-19 Pandemic has negatively contributed to the achievement of the United Nations target of eradicating global poverty by 2030. Motivated by these alarming numbers, this thesis draws attention to one important discussion in the discipline of political philosophy: How does a convincing theory of Global Justice look like? Starting from this difficult-to-answer question, this thesis contributes to this discussion by showing to which extent the current global economic order not only favours but fosters the status quo of radical poverty in many parts of the world. Based on the conviction that there is a capacity to fix this challenge there is an urgent need for action to redistribute wealth allocation. Most importantly, it is necessary to define what the duties of the affluent societies in the context of Global Justice are. In this light, this thesis debates the duties of the affluent (mostly western) societies and thus examines the Argument from Negative Duties by Thomas Pogge. Contrary to the argument of explanatory nationalism, Pogge

assumes, that the affluent societies violate their negative duty not to harm the global poor because they preserve their economic advantages by imposing an unjust Global Economic Order on the Global Poor. This thesis examines the argument from negative duties and weights it against critical counter-arguments and analyses its soundness in the context of the current Global Economic Order. Based on data and real-world cases, it will be shown whether this argument from Pogge holds and whether or not one can say that the global economic order, represented by supranational institutions such as the WTO, really harms the global poor. It will be shown that choices about how to measure poverty and the design of contracts and institutional agreements have an impact on the evaluation of radical poverty and Global Injustice. The goal of this thesis is to continue to expand the bridge between the argument from negative duties and an unjust global economic order which due to a system of treaties and conventions about trade contributes to global economic inequality and the persistence of poverty.

Working hypotheses

1. Despite the global consensus to eradicate radical poverty by 2030, the current Global Economic Order violates the negative duty not to harm the global poor.
2. A comprehensive theory of global Justice must emphasize a global oriented explanation of the harm which is imposed on the global poor rejecting the arguments of explanatory nationalism.
3. The participation in the system and the shared responsibility for the design of the supranational economic institutions implies a moral responsibility for the affluent societies to fulfil their negative duty not to harm the global poor.

Methodology

In the first part, the frame is set by reflecting the recent philosophical debate on the issue of Global Justice. For this, I will clarify the distinction between positive and negative duties. Further, it is to be shown why the Argument from Negative Duties is more valid in the light of the discussion of Global Injustice. To round off the theoretical framework, the concept of explanatory nationalism is weighted against the concept of globalism. This thesis advocates for

the idea to explain the challenge of Global Injustice with the role and the influence of the Global Economic Order and its institutions. In the second part of the thesis, I intend to pick up on the Argument from Negative Duties by Thomas Pogge and examine the soundness of the claim that the Global Economic Order violates their Negative Duty to not harm the Global poor by imposing an unjust system on them. For this, I will compare Pogge's Argument with other suggestions that agree with the basic point of view but favour a different approach of explanation not accusing the Global Economic Order to harm the Global poor. In the third part, I will provide arguments for the strength, and thus, the acceptance of the Poggean Argument from Negative Duties and argue why there is a ground to hold the Global Economic Order responsible for violating their Negative Duty not to harm the Global Poor. For this, in a first step, the poverty measurement choices of the World Bank will be analysed. It will be shown how the prioritization of the data that is published and communicated, influences the debate on Global Injustice and thus on policy decisions. In a second step, I will argue that there is a complex net of contracts and institutional frameworks in the Global Economic order that systematically contributes to the failure of not meeting the target of Global Poverty eradication by 2030.

In summary, this thesis is intended to elaborate on the Injustice of the current Global Economic Order and thus will be composed of the philosophical debate on Global Justice, focusing on the Argument from Negative Duties and its relevance for the issue of radical poverty on the one hand, and data-based analysis of the impact of the current Global Economic Order on the other. This thesis contributes to answering the question of who to assign responsibility to eradicate global poverty and how to reform the system of Global Economic Institutions to get there.

Outline

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Defending the Argument from Negative Duties

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The Impact of Global Economic Institutions on Global Poverty

The Convergence Theory

The Case for Institutional Reform – The Global Resource Dividend

Conclusion

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List of Acronyms

Agreement on Agriculture: AoA

European Union: EU

Food and Agricultural Organization: FAO

Gross Domestic Product: GDP

International Monetary Fund: IMF

Middle East and Northern African States: MENA

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development: OECD

Official Development Aid: ODA

Prevalence of Undernourishment: PoU

WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: SCM

Sustainable Development Goal: SDG

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: UDHR

United Nations Development Programme: UNDP

United Nations Environment Programme: UNEP

United Nations: UN

United Nations Children's Fund: UNICEF

US Dollar: USD

United States of America: US

World Trade Organization: WTO

1. Introduction

“It may well be true that the world’s poor are better off today than their predecessors were decades or centuries ago. But to judge whether this is moral progress, we must bring into view what was possible then and what is possible now. Taking this into account, we may well find that there have never been so many people avoidably subjected to life-threatening deprivations as there are today.”

(Thomas Pogge 2015, 63)

In the aftermath of the second world war, largely supported by the events of globalization, the debate of social justice experienced a shift from the domestic context to the international and global level. In 2015, the United Nations (UN) launched the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* with the aim of “ending poverty in all its forms everywhere” (UN 2015). Part of this agenda is the objective to end hunger and undernourishment and achieve food security by 2030 (UN 2015.). Since 2015, the prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) increased from 8.3 percent to 9.2 percent of the total population in 2020 (FAO 2021). The number of people living under the international poverty line of less than USD 1.90 per day amounted to 656 million people in 2017 (World Bank 2022). Despite the extent of poverty remaining tremendously high, there exists the capacity to fix this with the means and resources available to this day: The 56 million millionaires around the world, representing the global wealthiest 1.1 percent of all adults, owned an aggregate wealth of USD 192 trillion in 2020, and thus a share of 46 percent of total global wealth (Shorrocks et. al. 2021, 17). At the same time, in 2021, official development aid (ODA), defined as government aid promoting economic development and welfare of developing countries, rose to an all-time high of USD 179 billion (OECD 2021).

When comparing these numbers and considering that 1 percent of the wealth of the top 1.1 percent amounts to 11 times the annual ODA, intuitively, eradicating poverty and undernourishment by 2030 appears to be a feasible task for the international community. However, what seems to be relatively easily done is not done in reality. The distribution of economic resources remains highly unequal.

This unequal distribution of wealth and income constitutes a grave economic injustice at the expense of the poorest of the world. Thus, the problem of resource distribution served as a motivation for various philosophical accounts aiming to establish a convincing theory of distributive justice by articulating distinctive norms and principles. Such a debate necessarily entails normative *and* empirical content. Hence, the topic of distributive justice is to be located at the intersection of political philosophy and empirical social science.

1.1 In-depth Introduction

This thesis critically assesses Thomas Pogge's argument from negative duties applied to the current global economic order. Pogge (2005) contributed to the ongoing debate arguing that “we, the citizens and governments of the affluent countries in collusion with the ruling elites of many poor countries are harming the global poor in imposing an unjust order upon them” and, thereby, violate a negative duty (59). The thesis is written based on the conviction that Pogge’s approach is defensible. Accordingly, it is not intended to reject Pogge’s philosophical framework altogether, while relevant criticisms will be illuminated. However, this thesis examines relevant questions evolving around Pogge’s approach holding citizens and the governments of the affluent countries accountable for violating the negative duty not to harm others by imposing an unjust global order upon the poor. Part of this will consist of evaluating whether one can properly attribute these duties to individuals. The core of the thesis consists in a two-step empirical analysis of the current global economic order to investigate the evidence for a relationship between global economic institutions and violations of human rights.

For this aim, I will attempt to answer the following questions: Is the current global economic order unjust? Is economic inequality a matter between countries or within countries? Is it possible to gather evidence by an example for the current global economic order violating human rights? As the debate on global economic justice is fundamentally value-laden, normative statements are at the core of its subject.

Therefore, the aim of this thesis is not, and cannot be, to establish a causal relationship between the unjust actions of global economic institutions and violations of human rights. This thesis will not provide a conclusion arguing for the overall validity of every aspect of Pogge's argument from negative duties. Rather, this thesis aims to critically assess the argument from negative duties from an empirical perspective thereby evaluating its plausibility and eventual shortcomings, in order to pave the way for an argument from revision and improvement in the form of an amendment to his approach. This will be achieved by analysing an example of global economic injustice. To examine the role of global economic institutions, I will use the example of the violation of the right to food as a consequence of food insecurity in order to examine the role of global economic institutions. In this thesis' case example, I will show to what extent the WTO rule framework on agricultural subsidies negatively effects on the situation of the poor citizens in developing countries. Thereby, I refer to the protectionist measures of most trade-distorting agricultural subsidies and their impact on food security in developing countries.

A main contribution of this work is the aspired revision and improvement of a prominent argument from political philosophy and the attempt to improve its applicability by adopting facts from the real world. Moreover, by referring to a concrete example of economic injustice, the thesis illuminates a philosophical debate from a fact-based perspective. Within this debate, merging philosophical arguments and empirical facts becomes essential in order to avoid misleading policy recommendations aimed at the improvement of the situation of the world's poorest. Following this part, I provide a description of the methodology used. In chapter two, the philosophical framework of Thomas Pogge's argument from negative duties will be explained. In the sub-chapters, I will focus on the underlying assumptions and contrast them with the major critiques, thereby identifying the arguments' main weaknesses and accordingly starting points for revision and improvement.

Chapter three offers a twofold empirical analysis, with a first subchapter on the “bigger picture” of economic inequality examining the relevance of focusing on inequality within countries.

Sub-chapter two goes into more detailed investigation and provides an example of injustice in the current global economic order. I will explain and elaborate on the role of agricultural subsidies for food security and undernourishment as a matter of human rights violations taking place under the shield of the WTO. This analysis is done by comparing statistical data on harmful trade-distorting agricultural subsidies in developed OECD countries and in emerging economies. Utilizing this example is intended to provide evidence for the wealthy countries' impact on poverty and to establish a claim that low-income countries suffer not only from unequal distribution of resources in the “bigger picture,” but also from structural injustice within the global economic order and its institutions.

Chapter four, then, merges the empirical findings and their interpretation, and critically assesses Pogge's argument from negative duties. Building on the two valid aspects of Pogge's approach backed by empirical evidence, and taking into account relevant weaknesses, I will present my amendment to Pogge's approach intended to revise and improve the argument from negative duties. Chapter five will draw together the major findings and limits of the argument, and addresses what future research should focus on.

1.2 Methodology

The aim of this thesis is to critically assess the argument from negative duties applied to the current global economic order and to highlight potential ways to revise and improve the concept decisively. To do so, the following methodological design is applied. The first part is devoted to the theoretical analysis of the argument from negative duties. To illuminate points for revision and improvement, I focused on two distinguished critics challenging and questioning aspects of the argument from negative duties. The second part of the thesis is dedicated to

a twofold empirical analysis of economic inequality and the injustice of the current global economic order.

This encompasses both, qualitative, as well as quantitative research methods. Qualitative data analysis is done in the form of a case study investigating the WTO rule framework on agricultural subsidies and the effects on food security. This will be done by an evaluation of relevant WTO treaties on agricultural trade and an analysis of the rule framework. In the sections using quantitative research, in 3.1 and 3.3, I draw on statistical data on economic inequality and trade-distorting agricultural subsidies intending to assess the evidence for a relationship between institutions in the global economic order and harm done to the global poor. The outcomes will then be combined to further establish an argument for revision and improvement in the form of an amendment to Pogge's argument. For a better understanding of the applied methodology, I will briefly evaluate the decision criteria for the quantitative part for both, the case study and the statistical analysis. As established, the topic of this work includes considerations stemming from political philosophy and empirical social science. In other words, the discipline of political philosophy can be depicted as normative political theory. Therefore, for the purpose of identifying and justifying guiding political principles empirical backing is necessary. Likewise, Pogge's approach is not purely normatively grounded.

The argument from negative duties is based on claims which require real-world data on global poverty for its justification. Accordingly, I decided to investigate one example of global economic injustice. Within the literature, agricultural subsidies are, among others¹, identified as an important aspect of the international trade system, revealing major loopholes and asymmetries within the WTO rule framework. The example case which is analysed in depth in this work, investigates the rule framework of the WTO and its impact on harmful subsidies and food

¹ Another example discussed within the literature is the WTO framework on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

security. The analysis of this case will be combined with the collection, comparison and interpretation of harmful and trade-distorting subsidies used by OECD (developed) countries and emerging economies. To do so, payments to domestic agricultural industries over various periods will be compared. Stemming from FAO and OECD surveys, data on trade-distorting subsidies is derived from the OECD statistics and the OECD Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2021 data bases. The process of the data collection and interpretation was as follows: First, I researched relevant measurements reflecting harmful policies. Among various types of subsidies to the domestic agricultural sector, different types exist, varying in their degree of distortion for trade. Applying the criteria provided by the OECD - defining *market price support* and *payments linked to output* as potentially most trade distorting - I focused on these specific policies (OECD 2021). In a next step, I selected the appropriate group of countries from the OECD database. In this database, all 28 OECD countries², non-OECD EU member states and the emerging economies of Argentina, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Ukraine, and Viet Nam were included. Based on the conducted research, I decided to compare the numbers from the OECD states, as a rather homogenous group representing the developed countries, and a number of emerging economies, based on specific characteristics such as tremendously high, or low numbers of trade-distorting payments. Thus, topic-specific peculiarities were the decisive factors when selecting countries of focus.

A particular difficulty was to find coherent data on low-income or developing countries, however as FAO (2021) projected, there are aggregate numbers indicating only negative payments in Sub-Saharan African countries.

² The European Union is included as one economic region among the OECD Member States including the United Kingdom which has left the EU in early 2020 (OECD, 2021).

In a last step, interpreting the collected data, I applied the following criteria: A large amount of potentially most trade-distorting subsidies within a country or group of countries was interpreted as being strictly worse than smaller amounts of trade-distorting subsidies. Most importantly, based on numbers on agricultural subsidies, the main part of the interpretation work consisted of pointing towards major trends. All data on *market price support* and *payments linked to output* stem from the OECD databases.³

³ For further information, the data is available either in the *OECD.Stat* database of Agricultural Policy Indicators on Agriculture and Fisheries, or in the *Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation Report 2021*.

2. The Argument from Negative Duties

As a basis for the following analysis, it is necessary to place Pogge, offering a middle-ground position, between the contractarian John Rawls, as arguably one of the most influential philosophical accounts on justice in the 20th century, on one hand, and a realist, nationalist approach as David Miller's on the other.

Pogge rejects fundamental assumptions from Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls applies different principles to national and international institutional regimes. In "The Law of Peoples", Rawls, in contrast to the *difference principle* he envisioned for the domestic level, argues against any principle to organize the economic order on the international level (Pogge 2001, 40). Accordingly, "the difference principle is reasonable for domestic justice (...)," but "not feasible (...) as the way to deal with the general problem of unfavourable conditions among societies" (Rawls 1999, 42). For Pogge, this approach to justice, lacking the component of a comprehensive global distributive principle, is too limited (Pogge 2001, 40).

Miller, on the other hand, strictly differentiates between justice within a community and outside of the community. Therefore, he asks abandoning conceptions of global justice for which we treat individuals in a universalist manner across national boundaries, averting the role of individuals as ultimate units of concern (Miller 2008, 397). Pogge rejects both, Rawls's and Miller's concepts viewing them to be insufficient for global justice, as they dismiss the effects of the global economic order. In contrast to Miller, for Pogge's vision of a comprehensive theory of global justice, *individualism* and *universality* are fundamental prerequisites. Firstly, in his cosmopolitan approach, individualism takes "human beings or persons", to be the "ultimate unit of concern". Secondly, universality requires that "the status of the ultimate unit of concern attaches to every individual equally" (Pogge 1992, 356). Based on these elements, a just distribution of scarce resources is assured, regardless of the socioeconomic position or the membership to some social group (community).

This is further secured by a third element. The “special status” of *generality* assures that *individualism* and *universality* have global relevance. Hence, persons are ultimate units of concern, and this holds for everyone regardless of their nationality (356). For Pogge, therefore, the individualist stature of every human being as an ultimate unit of moral concern is global in scope (356). Proceeding from these basic elements, Pogge proposes objective goods such as “human need fulfilment” (356) to be translated into human rights, and valid for every human being equally as an ultimate unit of moral concern. Applying these fundamental elements to matters of global justice, the following argument emerged:

The cornerstone of this approach to global justice is the notion of negative duties. Defined as a duty not to harm other people, it fundamentally differs from the more common positive duty. Whereas a positive duty to assist other individuals for instance in the case of charity, the concept of negative duty implies a backward perspective. In cases where a person is harmed, she has a right to compensation as a kind of remedy (Sonderholm 2012, 367). Pogge (2005) claimed that “we”, the affluent societies, are harming the global poor by imposing an unjust institutional order upon them (3). Upholding this global economic order, millions of people avoidably die each year from poverty-related causes (3). Thus, following from the affluent citizens contribution to this imposition we have a responsibility for compensation.

The rationale behind the argument is as follows: The affluent societies in the developed countries “have a negative duty not to harm others”, as they cooperate without compensation through reform efforts by “imposing on the poor an institutional order that foreseeably gives rise to avoidable human rights deficits” (Pogge 2005, 68). The argument thus fundamentally relies on the idea of an obligation to compensate others for harm done in the past. Pogge assigns these obligations to the citizens and governments of affluent countries, presupposing governments acting representatively on behalf of their citizens.

In the following, I proceed to examine the underlying principles and basic assumptions of Pogge's argument from negative duties. Secondly, I continue by presenting two critiques that focus on the feasibility and the notion of harm, such as in the negative duty argument, thereby, identifying important shortcomings. The overall goal of this chapter is to establish a point of departure for a critical assessment of the argument from negative duties.⁴

2.1 Basic Assumptions

The following assumptions are presupposed for the argument from negative duties: Firstly, human rights are moral claims on social institutions (Pogge 1992, 356). Thus, social institutions bear major responsibility for the realization of these. As laid down before, as an argument from institutional moral cosmopolitanism based upon the conviction that every human being is to be viewed as an ultimate unit of moral concern (356), this links individuality with generality and universality. Second, individual, and collective agents have negative duties not to participate in imposing an unjust institutional scheme on others (356). Thereby, Pogge opposes refraining from direct violations as a sufficient fulfilment of negative duties. Instead, he demands not to cooperate in an unjust imposition of unjust social institutions, which is more indirect in character (356). Thirdly, the prevailing global institutional order has the most profound impact on human rights fulfilment worldwide (356). Pogge defines the existing global institutional order as “shaped and upheld by the more powerful governments” (360) and concludes that at least “the more privileged and influential citizens of the more powerful and (...) democratic countries bear then a collective responsibility for their government role in upholding this global order” (360). Pogge’s approach to justice takes on a global perspective, aimed at establishing a justly organized society. A major concern lies with the just structuring of global and international institutions, ensuring a distribution, which meets people’s justified claims to

⁴ Pogge, in his latest works, shifted his focus towards concrete recommendations for institutional reform such as the Health Impact Fund (Pogge, 2020). However, the focus of this thesis is directed to the philosophical framework and his reasoning: The argument from negative duties.

resources (Moellendorf and Pogge 2008, 25). Applied to human rights violations, those responsible for it, violate a negative duty not to harm. This claim is decoupled from direct action and merely linked to cooperation as “complicity” in the upholding of unjust rules by supporting global institutions violating the rights of the world’s poor, denying to them the realization of their justified claims to resources. Central to Pogge’s approach are the terms of avoidability and foreseeability: The negative duty not to harm includes the imposition of an institutional order that “foreseeably” gives rise to “avoidable” human rights deficits (Pogge 2014, 74 ; 2005, 60). Accordingly, under the current global economic order, economic inequality and poverty are constantly reproduced, even though most harm could be avoided by a different institutional design. (Pogge 2005, 55). The belief in the possibility of a feasible and more poverty avoiding alternative design grounds Pogge’s approach. The rationale for this is the conviction that there is a more poverty-avoiding alternative design feasible. Thus, there is capacity for improvement or reversal and, consequentially, avoidability and foreseeability justify the claim that our current institutional order is unjust. For Pogge, the “foreseeable” deaths resulting from poverty-related causes are “avoidable” (59).

Pogge stresses a minimal standard of global justice including the minimal requirement that “the institutional order must be designed so that, insofar as reasonably possible the human rights of those on whom it is imposed are fulfilled” (Pogge 2005, 76). Thus, he prefers an institutional reform over a revolutionary-like elimination of the established global economic order. The abstract notion of a global economic order, which must be reformed and is continuously addressed in Pogge’s approach, consists of the rules and regulations made by the WTO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN system (Pogge 1992, 360). These institutions together form a network of rules which – in the eyes of Pogge - represents and promotes the interests of developed countries (Sonderholm 2012, 369; 360).

More specifically, special attention is devoted to the injustice of the rules and procedures enforced by the WTO having significant influence on national governance (Pogge 2014, 75). Pogge claims the WTO scheme to be unjust because of special exemptions and privileges benefiting the rich countries. According to Pogge, the WTO regime generates “a reasonably avoidable excess of unfulfilled human rights,” and hence deemed to be unjust. Every agent contributing to the impose and uphold becomes part in a violation of human rights, “insofar as they can and should foresee its adverse human rights impact” (75). In other words, Pogge accuses global economic institutions such as the WTO of promoting unjust rules which allow for the persistence of economic inequality and severe poverty.

To expose the plausibility of his argument, he invokes a minimum standard for the minimal condition of treating the participants of an institutional scheme equally. What Pogge invoke here, and what unites him with some of his major critics (see for: Matthias Risse 2017, 57; 2005, 18), is that minor institutional reform instead to overthrowing the current institutions would be sufficient (Pogge 2005, 59). For instance, the injustice of the WTO treaty results, according to Pogge, from imposing barriers on poor populations’ ability to export their products, opening the world markets too little, and restricting the fair and open access for developing countries (Sonderholm 2012, 370). Pogge argues that the governments of developed countries and the citizens supporting them cannot justify the foreseeable avoidable harms done to the global poor by the WTO regime (370).

2.2 Major Critics

This section deals with relevant counter positions to specific aspects of Pogge's argument from negative duties. Firstly, I will examine Joshua Cohen’s rejection of the so-called “strong thesis,” (2010) and secondly Carmen Pavel’s account on “undue harms” (2015). Both critics question central aspects of Thomas Pogge's argument from negative duties. Among other

authors, such as David Miller, Cohen rejects Pogge's methodology of "explanatory globalism"⁵ considering it to underestimate the significance of domestic factors to explain world poverty (Sonderholm 2012, 375). Matthias Risse (2005) emphasized the "Institutional Thesis" which pays primary attention to domestic institutions causing poverty. Risse stressed that the global order has so far benefited the poor despite certain shortcomings. His reasoning results from viewing the global order and its institutions rather as imperfectly developed than being unjust per se (Risse 2005, 355-359).

Besides the differences, Risse arrives at one point at a similar conclusion, to argue for institutional reform instead of a revolutionary overthrow (Risse 2005, 18.). The main disagreement to be identified between Pogge and his critics concerns the root of poverty, lying either with domestic factors or global institutions. Taking up this is the point of disagreement and focusing on Cohen and Pavel, they argued for the following flaws in Pogge's reasoning:

Most prominently, Cohen criticizes the concept of negative duty presenting an argument denying the legitimacy to claim that the affluent are harming the poor and thereby violate a negative duty (Sonderholm 2012, 380). Cohen (2010) instead distinguishes a "strong thesis" from a "conventional thesis." Accordingly, Pogge relies on the "strong thesis" implying "most of the global poverty problem could be eliminated through minor modifications in the global order" (Cohen 2010, 19). Cohen adheres to the less speculative "conventional thesis" arguing that "some global poverty could be eliminated by changes in global rules" (26). Thus, in contrast to Pogge, Cohen builds on the much weaker premise since it requires less empirical support and departs from the belief that reforms of the global institutional order will be sufficient to eliminate global poverty. Thereby, Cohen denies the causal role attributed to the global order by the "strong thesis" (Sonderholm 2012, 380; 26).

⁵ Rejecting „explanatory nationalism“, Pogge does „not seek to explain all local failures in terms of failures of the global order“. Thus, he opposes to some critics claiming he is an adherent of „explanatory globalism.“ Rather, his standpoint is, that „most“ of the severe poverty today can be avoided by eliminating harmful structures within institutions (Pogge 2005, 76-77).

Reitberger (2008), aligning with Cohen's argument, and raising similar concerns, points at a fallacy of a dichotomy either blaming domestic features alone or by claiming the affluent harming the global poor through the imposition of unjust institutions (386). By this, as the critique goes, Pogge overlooks a potentially relevant impact from states on the economic situation of other countries. This is directed to individual countries failing to comply with global institutional rules (Sonderholm 2012, 379). From this, it follows those global economic institutions, such as the WTO, should not be held responsible for outcomes of trade distorting measures issued by its members.

All in all, Cohen's critique of the "strong thesis" questions Pogge's explanation of the sources of extreme poverty. Thus, he sticks with the "conventional thesis" and views it as providing "sufficient reason" for alleviating poverty on a global level (Cohen 2010, 27). This conclusion is less ambitious than the "strong thesis". In summary, according to the "conventional thesis", the poor are harmed by the failure of alleviating poverty, and not by the global order. However, as a result, Cohen has to offer less proof from the real world, since he is not required to single-out the harm caused by the institutions in the global economic order. Urging the rich citizens and countries to do more than previously, is less demanding than proving them to say that the rich simply could do more than proving their violation of a negative duty.

The second critique I examine here deals with the notion of harm. Pavel distinguishes various types of harm. Thus, she advocates a more stringent type of "undue harm" and referring to the work of Joel Feinberg (1987), argues that one can only make sense of harm, when it constitutes a violation of rights (Pavel 2015, 454). According to Pavel, the notion of harm in Pogge's sense falls short providing a solid explanation of what counts exactly as a human rights violation (457). Pavel applies the concept of undue harm to analyse Pogge's allegations of moral harm committed by global economic institutions. An undue harm, according to Pavel, is illustrated by the following case: "When country A attacks country B, kills its civilians and

depletes its economic resources in an unjust and prolonged war, country A is responsible for the deaths as well as for the economic property that ensues as a result of the conflict” (457).

By mentioning other examples of undue harm, like colonialism or unjust imprisonment (451), Pavel accuses Pogge's argument from negative duties not falling in a similar category when dealing with international trade. In the case of unjust trade rules causing harm to the global poor, the question of responsibility (or as Pogge would emphasize: “duty”) becomes more puzzling. According to Pavel, the question of undue harm or other types of harm is of major interest only if we address the notion of obligations for reparations or “reform efforts” (452). Taking on the argument that the rules of international trade are harmful, she admits that under WTO rule, trade law is unjust. But this, by no means constitutes “undue harm” (Pavel, 2015). Rather, the effects of the international institutional order cannot be shown to be causing undue harm (457). She considers the WTO in particular to be a poorly designed institution negatively affecting the ability of developing country members to advance their goals and the caused harms are more or less “unintended side effects” (461). In this reading, while missing the features of “undue harm”, thus, global economic injustice and inequality do not ask for obligations to remedy. Referring to Pavel’s war example and transferring the logic to Pogge’s approach, the controversy becomes obvious: Even if rule A imposed by the WTO clearly had serious implications for a developing country, say for its food security, resulting in the undernourishment of millions of citizens, it still, from Pavel’s point of view, does not constitute a case of undue harm. Hence, the task of holding the WTO responsible for the deaths resulting from undernourishment is much more demanding. According to Pavel, Pogge’s approach falls short in specifying the ways in which agents cause harm, thus, justifying holding them accountable for their wrongs (456). This requires firstly, identifying the WTO as an agent causing violations of human rights, and secondly, clearly pointing to the specific human rights violations second.

Wringe (2018) explains this line of argumentation as a causal contribution argument, which will be considered in a particular manner in chapter 4 (341).

Summarizing the essence of these critics, I want to re-stress the incompleteness but relevance of this selection. I focused on counter-arguments dealing with the core aspects of the argument from negative duties. Both critics reject the thesis advocated in Pogge's approach, that the trade rules imposed on the global trade system by the WTO represent the kind of harm that would justify the argument from negative duties. In doing so, Pavel stresses that misguided trade barriers do not support the argument pinpointing the international order to violate a negative duty. Instead, for Pavel, they rather are "the result of states acting independently" (Pavel 2015, 457-459). Similar to Pavel, Cohen views the global order of "global rule-making bodies", based on his refusal of the "strong thesis" to be "not a well-defined system" (Cohen 2010, 19). The rules of the WTO are central elements of this order, but Cohen does not acknowledge the idea of changes within these rules affecting global poverty.

In this chapter, I examined the underlying principles and assumptions of Pogge's approach towards global justice. The central focus laid on the argument from negative duties. I referred to major critics of this argument, identifying potential shortcomings of the notion of harm and the focus on the negative impact of an unjust global economic order. Based on these criticisms, some major weaknesses can be identified within Pogge's argument from negative duties. These weaknesses arise from the large explanatory power he ascribes to the current global economic order harming the poor, and from the need to prove of the extent to which the affluent societies, as individuals or governments, contribute to the imposition of this order. Using these criticisms as a foundation for my later argumentation, I proceed to investigate whether major global economic institutions, such as the WTO, promote unjust rules allowing for the persistence of economic inequality and severe poverty, and thus to the violation of human rights. For this, I will refer to an example of agricultural subsidies to investigate the role of

WTO rule framework for food security and potential harms for poor countries citizens and their right to food.

3. Empirical Analysis

This analysis aims at investigating a relationship between the current global economic order and economic inequality and poverty. I intend to find the necessary empirical backing for the claim that under the rules of the current global economic order, inequalities and violations of human rights are as proclaimed constantly reproduced. Following the in-depth analysis of the argument from negative duties, in this chapter, a twofold empirical analysis of the current global economic order is provided. First, I will examine the relevance of global economic inequality predominant within countries. For this, the statistical data about global economic inequality based on the findings of Chancel et. al. (2021) will be collected, analysed, and interpreted. In a next step, the claim that structural inequalities in the international economic order are the primary cause of global poverty will be assessed, using evidence derived from a thoughtfully chosen example of the current global economic order. I will investigate the relationship between the WTO rule framework on agricultural subsidies and severe poverty in the context of food security. For this, I examine to what extent the agricultural support paid to domestic producers in the form of market price support and payments linked to output distort international trade causing adverse effects on food security in developing countries. One central question that is to be answered is whether OECD member states representing the group of developed states bear a major responsibility for human rights violations in the form of food insecurity. The data is gathered from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation from the OECD and OECD statistics, comprising the domestic agricultural subsidies in developed countries and emerging economies.

3.1 Global Inequality

Do the citizens and governments of “affluent countries” in collusion with the ruling elites of many poor countries are harming the global poor? By investigating key figures concerning economic inequality, I will examine this hypothesis, while not relying on the convergence narrative.

Using real GDP figures to monitor economic growth in the last decades, from 2008 until 2017, an average growth of 3.2 percent could be observed (OECD 2021). However, economic growth figures do not sufficiently explain the distribution of resources. For a comprehensive theory of global economic justice relative numbers about the distribution of scarce resources are to be considered. Thus, I will analyse the distribution of the benefits resulting from economic growth among the world's citizens. Who benefits from the gains and who loses from economic policies? Within the debate of global economic justice two major conflicting narratives on the development of the global economic system towards a just distribution of wealth and income exist. Depending on the emphasis put on different data, opposed implications result. One story goes like this: Focusing on discrepancies between countries, aggregate numbers show a decline in total global inequality since 1988 (Chancel et. al. 2021, 11; Ravallion 2021, 19). The narrative focuses on interpersonal inequality among the whole world population. The claim is the following: The Gini coefficient, capturing within-country income inequality, declined from about 0.69 in 1988 to 0.62 in 2013 (Hickel 2017, 2). As Hickel (2017, 2) admits, the convergence claim is not inherently wrong, but arguing as if every individual lives in one big country, the convergence narrative relies on a slightly misleading representation of the data. Thus, focusing on interpreting the decline of the Gini coefficient leads to a questionable conclusion that we are on the “right track” of declining inequality between countries and eradicating global poverty. I argue against this narrative's feasibility of depicting the roots of the unjust distribution of scarce resources, and, rather, re-stress the significant inequalities within countries. Instead, the data I focus on reflects the distribution of global resources not from absolute, but relative numbers. I use the numbers and findings provided by Chancel et. al. (2021) to support the following claim: Independent of the scope of aggregate economic growth, there is little support for a distinct statement about the distribution of resources between countries and within countries.

Pointing to the remaining glaring discrepancies in income and wealth between the poorest and the richest in the world, the gap between the average incomes of the top 10 percent of countries and the average income of the poorest 50 percent of countries, even if declining, remain significant. The gap dropped from 50 times to less than 40 times (Chancel et. al. 2021, 11). Nonetheless, an important trend displays increasing inequalities within countries. The gap between the average incomes of the top 10 percent and the bottom 50 percent of individuals within countries almost doubled, from 8.5 times to 15 times (11). These numbers reflect global income as an economic resource which has always been distributed unequally. The high level of within-country inequality reached in 2020, corresponds to the level of 1910.

In other words, despite a decline in between-country inequality, the overall level remains astonishingly high (11). Re-stressing the importance of focusing on data that captures the relative numbers and displays the rising gap between the world's richest and the poorest, when it comes to the distribution of resources, such as income and wealth, the total numbers justify a pessimistic image. If total inequality between countries, say for example China and the US, is declining, little can be said about the distribution of resources among the citizens in the respective countries. For these reasons, I will not promote the convergence narrative pushed for and sustained by the World Bank (World Bank 2016). This need is further backed by the geographic breakdown of global income groups in 2021 (see for: Figure 1). Developing and emerging countries, most of which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (World Bank 2022), represent the largest share of extremely poor individuals. Almost 25 percent of the population of the world's poorest one percent in income group were residents of a Sub-Saharan country. In 2020, around 1.136 billion people lived in a Sub-Saharan African country, representing 14.6 percent of the world population. (World Bank 2022). Of these 14.6 percent, a disproportionately large share is to be located within the poorest one percent of the world.

However, looking at the population of the world's top 1 percent income group, almost 35 percent were residents of a Sub-Saharan African country, of China, India, or other Asian countries. As explained by Chancel et. al. (2021): “emerging and developing countries can combine both a very large share of extremely poor individuals and a relatively good representation among the world’s top income groups” (34). As this indicates, geographical locations do not sufficiently reflect the socioeconomic status of persons - whether extremely rich or poor. This, again, underlines a need for a within-country perspective.

Adding to that, the fact that one-fifth (18 percent) of the population of the world’s top 0.001 percent income group being a resident of China, emphasizes the role of emerging economies in the debate about unequal distribution of resources. The people of the richest 10 percent of the world, are equally spread among the world's regions. Despite Europe, and likewise North America and Oceania, accounting for a large share of almost 20 percent of the top 10 percent income group each, Middle East and Northern African (MENA) states, Latin American states, and Asian countries plus India and China are fairly represented in this group. As Chancel et. al. (2021) argue, differences in inequality are not well explained by geographic or average income differences (31).

Moreover, considering extreme concentration of capital and wealth inequality within regions (Figure 2), geographical factors in isolation lack explanatory abilities. The richest 10 percent in Latin-America capture 77 percent of the net household wealth (sum of financial assets and non-financial assets), compared with 1 percent captured by the bottom 50 percent. In Europe, the richest 10 percent own almost 60 percent of net household wealth, compared with only 5 percent captured by the bottom 50 percent. This has been addressed by Chancel et. al. (2021) as an “extremely hierarchical private property system on all continents (...) irrespective of their level of economic development” (37).

In summary, the current global economic order can clearly be said to be unjust. However, the roots of this injustice are less obvious. As this analysis shows, unequal distribution of wealth and income within countries persists in every part of the world. Therefore, required policy implications differ from re-distributing the resources from the global north to the global south. Based on these findings, I want to emphasize the necessity of shifting the attention from the trend of declining inequality between countries towards rising inequality within countries. Aiming at identifying domestic and global factors for the violation of human rights and the harm that is done to the poor, this shift of perspective is highly important. Explaining the injustice of the current global economic order, challenges increasingly arise, foremost within countries, on the domestic level, but persist on a high level globally between countries. However, as these findings outline, unequal distribution of resources of income and wealth, on a global level, as well as increasingly within countries, indicates roots of global economic injustice to be found globally as well as domestically. Thus, neither a strong explanatory cosmopolitanism, nor an explanatory nationalism allow for an adequate and complete analysis of global economic injustice. Based on these findings, I aim to investigate evidence for the claim that “the citizens and governments of the affluent countries in collusion with the ruling elites of many poor countries are harming the poor by imposing an unjust global economic order upon them” (Pogge 2005, 59). To do so, I use one example of global economic injustice in the form of food insecurity, causing undernourishment. I take the precedent case of the wide-spread human rights violation of limited access to food. I will investigate the impact of WTO rules on food security in developing countries based on the example of agricultural subsidies.

3.2 The Injustice of the Current Global Economic Order

“What entitles a small global elite — the citizens of the rich countries and the holders of political and economic power in the resource-rich developing countries — to enforce a global property scheme under which we may claim the world’s natural resources for ourselves and can distribute these among ourselves on mutually agreeable terms?”

(Thomas Pogge 2005, 7)

Around 80 percent of the world's poor live in rural areas, to be mostly found in developing countries heavily dependent on agriculture (FAO, UNDP, & UNEP 2021, 6). Constituting the majority of self and wage employment in developing countries, food system jobs are essential. Farming generates roughly 68 percent of the rural income in Africa (Townsend et. al. 2016, 6). Accordingly, structural inequalities in the international system in the form of trade-distorting measures can have a significant impact on the welfare of poor citizens with a low-income. As several observers point out, developing countries suffering from limited means raised their voices and blamed the international trade law to be to their disadvantage (Hopewell 2019, 217; Charlton & Stiglitz 2005, 293). As Dasandi (2014) shows, empirical analysis supports their despair, saying that “structural inequalities in the international system have a significant impact on poverty around the world” (201). To investigate these structural inequalities - constituting a severe injustice - the relationship between the unjust global economic order and human rights violations linked to the WTO rule framework on food security will be assessed. Using a case example, the analysis will take the following steps: Firstly, the importance of food security and the role of food systems for lowering the rate of PoU is examined. Second, I use the example of agricultural subsidies to outline how international trade law and acknowledged policies may cause harm to developing countries. Third, I investigate the role of the WTO as a major global economic institution setting the rules for international trade.

Finally, backing the findings from the case with the statistical data on developed countries and emerging economies on their harmful agricultural subsidies, I collect evidence for the use of potentially most trade distorting agricultural subsidies at the expense of low-income and developing countries. Based on these findings, it becomes clear who uses these harmful policies most – thus, clarifying whether the wealthy and affluent societies can be held accountable or whether the structural challenges faced require a broader perspective.

3.2.1 Food Security

Having sufficient access to adequate food is a fundamental human right. According to Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the right to food is a necessary component of an adequate standard of living (UDHR,1948). However, in 2020, the rate of the PoU, after a period of stabilization, increased to around 9.9 percent in one year (FAO, UNDP, & UNEP 2021, 65). The FAO projects the number of people facing hunger in 2020 between 720 and 811 million (3). FAO figures underline the fact that a majority of the world's undernourished live in Asia (418 million) and more than one-third in Africa (282 million) (FAO 2021, 8). The challenge to overcome food insecurity consists in mitigating the lack of access to food. As estimated by the FAO, in 2020, almost one third of the world population (2.37 billion) did not have access to adequate food (125). To achieve food security and to meet the internationally acknowledged United Nations Development Goal of zero hunger, agriculture and agricultural food systems play a critical role. (125; United Nations 2021) Food systems in agriculture and food security in developing countries are interconnected because of a large share of people existentially depends on small-scale farming in economic terms (Margulis 2018, 371). Food systems consist of the public policy decisions and the global supply chains, including the production, farming, and processing, and have an enormous impact on the access to food (UNICEF).

They ensure healthy and affordable food for the poorest citizens improving infrastructure and by pushing for the competitiveness of smallholder farmers and fishers (Fanzo et. al. 2020, 5). Fanzo et. al. (6) stress that food systems in their current development, negatively affect the access of the poorest to food, and thus, consequentially their food security.

The access to food in developing countries can be heavily endangered by a failure to adequately open trade in agriculture. An incentive for protectionist measures in the developed countries exists, thereby protecting their domestic markets. National governments can improve food security and the availability of food by stimulating domestic supply of food with so-called non-distorting policies, such as productivity improvements (OECD 2021, 52). Abandoning protectionist measures, Charlton and Stiglitz (2005) argued that reform in agricultural food systems will successfully impact development in poor countries and, therefore, the countries affected by food insecurity and underdevelopment, need “progressive market access reforms” in agricultural goods (311). Government policies aimed at ensuring food security, should therefore include non-distorting measures, such as policies raising income, or specific trade policies prioritizing the availability of food in developing countries, instead of trade-distorting policies (311). According to the OECD, non-distorting policies ensuring food security can be realized through productivity improvements or reduced post-harvest losses (OECD 2021, 50). However, current international trade rules allowing for protectionist measures, such as trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, cause harmful spill over effects to developing countries, seriously endangering food security (Hopewell 2019, 222) - the roots thereof must be identified and analysed.

3.2.2 Agricultural Subsidies

Subsidies of domestic agricultural production globally account for almost USD 540 billion a year and imply a proportion of 15 percent of the total agricultural production value (FAO, UNDP, & UNEP 2021, 8).

The mechanism is as follows: In developed countries and emerging economies, domestic subsidies expand domestic production and exports while reducing imports, lowering world market prices of the subsidized commodities (Smith & Glauber 2018, 166). As Smith & Glauber (2018) postulate, the stimulation of the domestic agricultural sector in developed countries, such as the US and the EU, but also in emerging economies, such as China, may have “complex implications for food security in developing countries” (166). This is seemingly counterintuitive. Lower world market prices are generally associated with declining food insecurity amongst the poor citizens in developing countries (166) since lower prices theoretically increase access to food. However, in reality, lower prices lead to reductions in staple prices, then having a negative impact on developing countries, which generally have a comparative advantage in the production of agricultural commodities (166). Following from this, richer countries domestic agricultural subsidies may have a long-term negative impact on food security and real income in developing countries (166). As Joseph (2011) further described, the WTO rules resulting in protectionism can affect the goods, which developing countries produce more efficiently than the developed countries (146). Thus, agricultural subsidies have adverse effects on international trade, causing eventually a re-location of the production in areas where resources are used relatively less efficient eventually causing losses in per capita income in developing countries (Smith & Glauber 2018, 169; Brooks & Matthews, 2015). At the same time, less developed industries in developing countries compete with better developed industries from richer countries (Joseph 2011, 146). This grave injustice happens under the shield of the WTO. Current WTO rules permit agricultural producer support, strongly relying on measures that are harmful. They distort global production and trade, hindering the availability of, and the access to more nutritious food for the poorest people (FAO, UNDP, & UNEP 2021, 9). This lack of access to and availability of food potentially lead to food insecurity and current WTO rules on agricultural subsidies should therefore be investigated more narrowly, as done in the next section.

3.2.3 The WTO

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), has incorporated agricultural domestic support measures:

“Domestic support measures for which exemption from the reduction commitments is claimed shall meet the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production” (WTO 1995, 59).

The WTO AoA hence prescribes that domestic support measures to agriculture, which are not included in any reduction commitments, are permitted as long as they meet minimum criteria. The criteria are that domestic subsidies are allowed as long as they don't or only minimally cause trade distortion - including all adverse consequences as described above. This criteria for domestic support measures are defined as “not having (sic!) the effect of providing price support to producers” (59) However, Article 1 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) permits subsidies in general. These are defined as “financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member” (WTO 1995, 229). In reality, as shown in the following statistical data analysis, the government's financial contributions to the domestic agricultural industry do by no means meet the fundamental requirement from the AoA. Setting the rules and criteria for subsidies, the WTO distinguishes between different qualities of agricultural subsidies depending on the degree of distortion to trade. Within these rules, distortionary subsidies are distinguished through categories of more or less distortionary financial contributions, depending on their effects on international trade (Gulotty 2022, 5). As Gulotty explains, the WTO thereby permits support coupled to specific policy goals. The categories for the distortionary features are the Amber Box subsidies, Blue Box subsidies, and Green Box subsidies (5; Hopewell 2019, 217). Amber Box subsidies, under the umbrella of the AoA, include subsidies tied to prices or production volume reducing the levels of support for domestic agriculture (Gulotty 2022, 5; Joseph 2011, 186).

As pointed out by Sharma et. al. (2021), under the AoA, many developing countries are restricted, lacking the “entitlement” for measures of product-specific support under the Amber Box (162). Accordingly, most developing countries lack this entitlement and can only extend product-specific support only up to 10 percent of the value of production of a given product. The United States (US), for instance, provided support of an enormous amount of 189 percent of the value of production to coffee in 2017 (162). In result, subsidized products overproduced from developed economies cause import surges hurting local producers in developing countries (Joseph 2011, 187). Hence, developing countries struggle because of existing trade rules. Other reasons point towards unequal opportunities and potentials. The WTO allowed developed countries to use subsidies to lower world market prices (Dasandi 2014, 207). Implementing product-specific domestic support under the restrictive rules of the Amber Box is nearly impossible for developing countries due to the lack of financial resources (Sharma et. al. 2021, 162). It is disproportionately challenging for developing countries to implement product-specific domestic support under the WTO Amber Box rules (162; Thow et. al. 2019, 1276). In contrast, both, Blue Box subsidies, tied to supply control and coupled with conditions for farmers to limit production to discourage overproduction, and Green Box subsidies, promoting, for instance, agricultural research and domestic food programs, are exempt from the WTO AoA rules (Sharma et. al. 2021, 164). This results in a shift of agricultural support from Amber Box to Blue Box subsidies (177). Unlike the Amber Box, the Blue Box allows WTO members to provide product-specific support without any prescribed limits. Thus, it offers mostly incentives for developed countries to breach their commitments under the AoA and also offering incentives for an unlimited policy space to provide trade-distorting support to agriculture (163; FAO, UNDP & UNEP 2021, 25; Joseph 2011, 187).

To reveal the most controversial measures, the impact of WTO rules and trade on the stabilization of markets and the mitigation of the risk of food insecurity must be considered.

WTO rules have a significant impact on world food security (Margulis 2018, 371): Indirectly by causing and reproducing structural inequalities and directly by permitting trade-distorting policies with serious effects on food security. As Brooks and Matthews (2015) argue, trade can enhance the availability of food on domestic markets by preventing access constraints from volatile prices (25). However, as Dasandi (2014) claims, several aspects of international trade law reinforce structural inequalities between countries (206). The most trade-distorting instruments, as price incentives in the form of market price support, incentivize production practices and behaviours harmful to the efficiency of food systems (FAO, UNDP & UNEP 2021, 25). The following underlying mechanism is considered to be most harmful:

Defined by the OECD (2021) as “annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, agricultural subsidies based on market price support incentives generate a gap between the domestic producer price and the border price of a specific agricultural product (46). They amounted to a total USD 272 billion from 2018 to 2020 (46; DeBoe 2020, 20). As the FAO (2021) emphasizes, these “most controversial measures” create economic distortions and have a significant impact on the distribution of resources (23). When price incentive policies, such as market price support, are realized, they prevent farmers’ decision-making process based on efficiency calculations. Moreover, they widen the income gap between small and larger firms (17). DeBoe considers market price support as “one of the most distorting measures (...) because of the direct production incentives they create” (DeBoe 2020, 21). The OECD states that potentially most distorting transfers and other support policies have adverse implications and “significant consequences for global food availability” (OECD 2021, 50). They reduce access to food for low-income consumers (50), which seriously endangers food security worldwide. In sum, in the WTO legal framework, agricultural subsidies are permitted under the Green Box, Blue Box, but also in a more restricted manner under Amber Box Rules.

These can be considered to be a legitimate policy tool. The adverse effects of potentially most trade-distorting measures on developing countries, however, are well-known and raise concerns for the situation of the poorest in the world. Building on this analysis of the WTO rule framework, part of the criticisms of the “strong thesis” and his notion of harm, are unjustified. It is not the case that global economic institutions, such as the WTO, should not be held responsible for outcomes of trade distorting measures. By setting the rules, the WTO favours trade-distorting policies with adverse consequences for developing countries. It has the power to limit avoidable and foreseeable harm and mitigate the severity of human rights violations related to food insecurity. Thus, there is a ground for the “strong thesis.” Moreover, sticking to the argument that individual countries are failing to comply with the rules overlooks the potentially relevant impact of the underlying rule framework. However, the role of states and their impact on the economic situation of other countries should not be underestimated, but Pogge raised a valid point when including the global economic institutions into his rationale.

By analysing the statistical data on the most controversial measures of trade-distorting subsidies, I investigate the extent to which they are used by countries, and by whom they are used most, paying particular attention to major trends.

3.3 Statistical Data Analysis

This subchapter provides data backed evidence of countries and emerging economies subsidizing their domestic agricultural sector with the potentially most distorting policy measures of market price support and payments linked to output. This data is utilized to empirically back the asymmetries and structural inequalities within the WTO rule framework previously described. The statistical data displays the OECD estimates of support to agriculture in the form of the potentially most trade-distorting measures of market price support (category A1)

and payments linked to output (category A2). The number of payments issued by developed countries (OECD members) and emerging economies are compared and put in context.⁶

3.3.1 OECD Countries

Analysing the data for OECD countries and evaluating market price support, a long-term decline can be observed: In the period from 1986-1988, market price support in OECD countries amounted to USD 175 billion on average per year. Following a steady decline, in 2018-2020, market price support accounted for USD 94 billion on average per year, representing a decline of market price support by 24 percent within the last 30 years. A very similar trend is observed in the payments linked to output, with USD 13 billion on average per year in 1986 - 1988, and a decline of 31 percent to USD 9 billion on average per year in 2018-2020. When comparing the share (percent) of “potentially most distorting transfers” (*See for: Figure 3*) from the total of the OECD countries’ support to agriculture, including market price support and payments linked to output, a positive trend is apparent: From slightly over 80 percent on average per year in 1986-1988 to approximately 65 percent on average per year in 2000-2002, and to approximately 45 percent on average per year in 2018-2020, it has almost halved in 30 years.

In total, OECD countries' domestic agricultural support in 2018-2020 equalled USD 329 billion on average per year, thus, being higher than in previous periods. Total support estimates for the OECD countries equalled USD 276 billion on average per year in 1986-1988, likewise in 2000-2002. Noteworthy is the trend in the dimension of payments based on non-commodity criteria which is considered to be less trade distorting (OECD 2021). Between the periods in 1986-1988 (USD 1.78 billion), and 2018-2020 (USD 4.16 billion) OECD countries more than doubled their payments based on non-commodity criteria such as land set-aside. This data is backed by FAO findings establishing several high-income countries have moved away from

⁶ All numbers used in this chapter are - if not cited otherwise - derived from the database in the OECD statistics published in the Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation Report 2021. For a detailed overview of aggregate numbers please consult the tables in the appendix. For single country details consult the online database: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr-pcse-data-en> (Last access 30 April 2022).

price incentives towards subsidies decoupled from production since the early 1990s (FAO, UNDP, & UNEP 2021, 34). According to these results, the share of price incentives fell from 50 percent in the late 1980s to less than 15 percent on average per year in 2016-2018 (34).

Looking at the data for single OECD members, divergent trends emerge. Contrasting Australia and Norway, opposite results are derived. In Australia, in the year 2000, market price support was eliminated. In result, the domestic prices for Australia's main agricultural outputs are at parity with world prices (OECD 2021, 127). From more than 80 percent of potentially most trade distorting transfers on average per year in 1986-1988, Australia has achieved a level of less than 20 percent of potentially most disturbing transfers to the domestic agricultural sector. In contrast, Norway, where support is among the highest within the OECD, makes use of policy measures which insulate them from the world markets. The country's main agricultural sectors are subject to production-distorting support (127). In 2018-2020, almost 60 percent of support to agriculture was considered to be potentially most distorting. Thus, comparing these numbers, the differences are glaring (OECD 2021, 446). As a key result it should be noted: On aggregate, when it comes to adverse outcomes for developing countries, and the harmful effects induced by OECD countries' agricultural subsidies, improvements were achieved. The same cannot be said when looking at single countries. Thus, different wealthy states contribute to an unequal extent to the harm for poor countries.

3.3.2 Emerging Economies

In comparison to the findings from the OECD countries, in the emerging economies, market price support has heavily increased from USD 1.2 billion on average per year in 2000-2002 to USD 73 billion on average per year in 2018-2020. Moreover, for payments linked to output, a long-term increase from USD 416 million on average per year in 2000-2002 to USD 3.5 billion on average per year in 2018-2020 could be observed.

For non-commodity criteria, the payments increased from USD 459 million on average per year in 2000-2002, to USD 2.22 billion on average per year in 2018-2020 (OECD 2021).

In total, transfers to the domestic agricultural sector in the emerging economies averaged USD 385 billion per year in 2018-2020 and, thus, exceeded the payments in the OECD countries. Analysing the share of “potentially most distorting transfers” (OECD, 2021) from the total support to agriculture on average per year in 2018-2020, almost 80 percent of domestic support to agriculture in emerging countries is considered to be potentially most trade-distorting (*See for: Figure 4*). Similar to the findings from the OECD countries, when comparing the numbers among the different emerging economies projected in the dataset, a heterogeneous picture emerges. For China, significantly higher numbers of market price support were projected. In 2018-2020, they amounted to an estimated USD 127 billion on average per year. India, in contrast, had a negative market price support aggregate of USD 70 billion on average per year in 2018-2020 (OECD 2021).

To conclude these findings, in aggregate, emerging economies increasingly pay for trade-distorting as well as non-trade-distorting subsidies to their domestic agricultural sector, but, as the next part will show, lift the overall level of the trade-distorting subsidies enormously, thus, affect developing countries negatively.

3.3.3 All Countries

Conflating the results of all countries in the database, market price support increased from USD 125 billion on average per year in 2000-2002 to USD 168 billion on average per year in 2018-2020. The effect of a long-term decline of trade-distorting measures in the OECD countries was balanced by the inverted trend in emerging economies. In total, all countries covered in the database provided support to agriculture of USD 615 billion on average per year in 2018-2020. The share of potentially most-disturbing transfers declined slightly but is still representing almost 70 percent of gross producer transfers across all countries (*See for: Figure 5*).

The fundamental divergences among single OECD countries and particular emerging economies, represented by the percentage of potentially most distorting transfers for single countries on average per year in 2018-2020, reflect different trends (*See for: Figure 6*). For instance, in Iceland, the total market price support equalled USD 116 million, with a significantly higher share of potentially most distorting transfers than the EU or other OECD countries like the US. Unequal trends are also illustrated by a comparison of China and India: In China and estimated USD 127 billion per year on average in 2018-2020. In contrast, in India with negative market price support of - USD 70 billion per year on average in 2018-2020 illustrate unequal trends too. For low-income countries, almost all of them located in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2022), data provided by the FAO indicates negative aggregate rates of domestic support in percentage of the production value for agriculture in 2018 (*See for: Figure 7*) (FAO, UNDP, & UNEP 2021, 37). Bottom-line, these findings indicate that their policies are not based on subsidies for their domestic agricultural sector. Rather, trying to lower the costs of food for consumers and to generate state income for the government, these countries faced costs (37).

3.3.4 Key Findings

In total, the countries' aggregate support of USD 615 billion on average per year in 2018-2020, represents more than one-third of the Sub-Saharan GDP of USD 1.7 trillion in 2020 (World Bank 2022). It can be deduced from the data that the total numbers of the share of potentially most distorting transfers declined slightly in the OECD member states, but at the same time experienced a sharp increase in the emerging economies in recent decades. Re-emphasizing the distorting effects of market price support and payments linked to output for the competitiveness and the incomes of poor farmers (Hopewell 2019, 208), the number of USD 168 billion of market price support on average per year in 2018-2020 of all countries is astonishingly high.

As Hopewell (2019) proclaims, removing all agricultural subsidies would generate an added welfare of nearly USD 16 billion per year (222).

The World Bank and WTO calculated that the removal of all trade distortions in the context of agriculture results in a reduction of the number of extreme poor (222). The impact on low-income countries achieved through a reduction of developed countries' trade distorting domestic support can potentially be effective, as it facilitated the access of developing countries' farmers to industrialized countries' markets (Igwe 2021, 79). However, considering single country examples, for example Norway and Indonesia, the data reveal that neither the OECD members states collectively, nor emerging economies can be blamed alone for the high numbers of subsidies. Rather, holding accountable states with the largest share of trade-distorting subsidies seems justifiable. Within the group of developed countries, Norway stands out as the “black sheep” while Australia leads by example. The same holds for emerging countries. There is a range from negative aggregates in trade-distorting support (India) to a 100 percent full share of trade-distorting support (Indonesia). Responsibility for food insecurity caused by spill-over effects from agricultural subsidies can thus not be solely assigned to the affluent countries, herein represented by OECD members. The total decrease of potentially most-distorting transfers of OECD countries within the last decades indicates a positive shift. The aggregate numbers of agricultural subsidies show an increase in total market price support, largely driven by emerging economies. The data pays tribute to what Hopewell (2019) examined as the “new politics” of agricultural subsidies, including the rising influence on world trade of emerging economies. China, for instance, acts at least on an eye-level with OECD members and “appears to exert greater and more effective influence over developing countries than the US” (223). For potentially most distorting transfers, the numbers from China have a clear tendency: Market price support in 2018-2020 on average per year was 17-times higher than 2000-2002. Chinese trade-distorting subsidies of market price support accounted for USD 7.3 billion on average per year

in 2000-2002 and reached USD 130 billion in 2018-2020. China is not the only case substantiating this trend.

Emphasizing data from Indonesia, almost 100 percent of support to agriculture is considered to be potentially most distorting. This is backed by the trend of increasing market price support numbers within the last decades. From USD 1.7 billion in 2000-2002, Indonesia increased its spending on market price support to USD 21.5 billion on average per year 2018-2020 (OECD 2021). The example from global economic injustice in the case of agricultural subsidies illustrates the scope of harmful policies favoured by the asymmetric rules under the shield of the WTO. These, in part, have adverse effects on the food industries and farmers in developing countries. Bearing in mind the numbers on the PoU and consequently the need for food security in the developing world, the data offers an empirical basis for a preliminary result of my thesis: As the resulting statistical numbers as well as the asymmetrical rule scheme of the WTO indicate, there is some evidence for the claim that the WTO, as an integral part of the global economic order, harms the global poor - whether directly or indirectly. Most importantly, the share of potentially most trade distorting measures compared to the total amount of agricultural subsidies supports the argument for an unjust global economic order, and the capacity for remedy by institutional reform. And, additionally, one cannot really argue that states “simply” fail to adhere to the rules of the global economic order, thus, load all the burden on them. They rather can profit from asymmetrical and unjust rules fostering structural inequalities. But, as the example showed, states nevertheless share a responsibility to refrain from policies with adverse effects, even if no one can force them to do so. Having outlined the injustice of the current global economic order, Pogge's argument from negative duties will be assessed based on his first-person term in the next chapter. The central question to be answered will be: Are “We”, the citizens, and governments of the affluent countries, responsible for these policies, having contributed to and cooperated in the imposition and the upholding of economic injustice upon the poor?

By discussing relevant aspects and shortcomings, I will provide a suggestion to revise and improve the argument in focusing on the applicability and a better adaptation to real-world phenomena.

4. Critical Assessment

The number of payments spent on trade-distorting policies and their harmful spill over effects for developing countries, including the rates of capital concentration and economic inequality within countries all over the world, show why the debate of global justice concerned with global economic institutions is of paramount importance today. Pogge contributed to the debate on global justice with his argument from negative duties. He directs the focus to the global economic order, which negatively impacts the situation of the world's poor. By analysing the example of agricultural subsidies in the WTO rule framework, I have shown that Pogge offers a convincing argument: The current global economic order is unjust. Thus, it indeed resembles a structure imposed on the global poor through a combination of asymmetrical rules on subsidies in favour of developed countries. This order functions at the expense of domestic agriculture in developing countries. While this makes Pogge's approach very plausible from empirical perspective, doubt remains whether a violation of negative duties can be assigned to the citizens and governments of the affluent countries for these specific harms.

In this chapter, I will argue for an amendment to the argument following a two-step revision of his approach: Inspired by Bill Wringe's (2018) collective agency reading of Pogge's approach (335), I promote first, abandoning the first-person term based on criteria I develop and second, to take the negative duty not to harm of individuals. In the light of Judith Lichtenberg's argument of the "new harms", I advocate for a collective agency approach tackling the injustice of the current global economic order. Setting the map for the amendment to Pogge's approach, I discuss relevant plausible points and major shortcomings, based on which the suggestions for revision and improvement are built and to show where to step in with my own argument.

4.1 Argument from Plausibility

In his approach towards a theory of global justice, Pogge prioritizes a macro-explanatory approach from global causes over an explanatory nationalism. How plausible is such a macro-explanatory approach or as Patten (2005) called it, “explanatory cosmopolitanism” (23). More specifically, how plausible is a negative duties approach when applied to the real-world? Diving into the analysis, Martha Nussbaum (2004) designated contractarian theories of justice, such as John Rawls’ *“The Law of Peoples”*, to fail to provide an adequate account of global justice (4). Accordingly, contractarian theories have structural deficits yielding to imperfect results when applied to the world stage (4). Pogge’s macro-explanation is derived from the argument of the existence of feasible and practicable alternative global regimes engendering less harm to the poor. Pogge does not attempt to deny domestic factors. Rather, he reflects that severe poverty in poor countries is “fueled by local misrule”, but such local misrule is “fueled in turn by global rules we impose” (Pogge 2005, 7).

In 2018-2020, under the WTO rules of the AoA, OECD member states spent almost USD 100 billion on average per year on trade-distorting measures of market price support (category A1). Moreover, the payments issued by emerging economies, partially with a share of almost 100 percent support to the domestic agricultural industry, show to which extent government policies result in adverse consequences for the developing countries. Thus, they promote the plausibility of the negative duty claim. This further indicates that individual countries are either failing to comply with the rules of the WTO or abuse them. The governments in the countries with the highest rates in agricultural subsidies can be deemed to have a negative impact on developing countries’ industries. This justifies the claim that governments in OECD countries and emerging economies contribute to a constant reproduction of poverty. As OECD countries like Australia and New Zealand show, for rich countries it may be a feasible task to cut all trade-distorting payments in order to realize a “more poverty-avoiding alternative design” of the global economic order.

Sticking with the harming policies is therefore rightly deemed to be unjust, because a “better world” is not only imaginable, but realistically possible. The negative consequences resulting from the imposition of WTO rules favouring developed and emerging economies by permitting them to use measures of domestic support to boost their agricultural sector, are both, foreseeable and avoidable. They are foreseeable, because, within the WTO rule framework, the potentially trade-distorting consequences for developing countries are well-known and openly communicated by the OECD (OECD 2021). As I showed, within the AoA, criteria for subsidies are defined as having to meet fundamental requirements. They should “have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production” (WTO 1995, 59). As indicated by the data, this theoretical framework is not necessarily adequately realized in the form of harm-minimizing policies in the real world. On a positive note, the findings from OECD countries suggest a positive trend. The findings from emerging economies, however, reflect a trend into the opposite direction.

Moreover, with nearly one-third of the world population lacking access to adequate food, food insecurity, is an avoidable human right deficit. The OECD (2021) reported that the global lack of food supply has never been a primary cause of continued food insecurity. Rather, food insecurity is driven by severe poverty and the lack of access for the poorest citizens (OECD 2021). Countervailing measures eliminating harmful rules are feasible, at least in the agricultural subsidies sector. Thus, the harm imposed on the developing countries through trade-distorting subsidies is avoidable. Pavel, in her critique, makes an unreasonable sharp distinction between undue harm, such as colonialism and the harm caused by the international institutional order. If the adverse consequences for developing countries are foreseeable and avoidable, and the effects of trade-distorting policies are well-known, it appears cynical to denote the harms as a result of rules having “unintended side effects” (Pavel 2015, 461).

Despite these plausible and empirically valid counter arguments to some of the critics, the argument from negative duties applied to the global economic order still holds major shortcomings and faces challenges offering grounds for revision and improvement.

4.2 Identification of Shortcomings

In section 2.3, I outlined two relevant criticisms of Pogge's argument from negative duties. In the following, I attempt to point to shortcomings, which go beyond and yield to the suggestion for revision and improvement. I attempt to challenge Pogge's (2014) appeal to "individual responsibility for global injustice (...) in first-person terms" (79). For this, I provide two reasons why the first-person term lacks important features for practical applicability. For this I refer to the example of injustice in the WTO framework in Chapter 3, and to the notion of what Judith Lichtenberg (2010) characterized as the "new harms" (558). Based on the findings from the example on agricultural subsidies and referring to what Wringe (2018) denoted as the "first-person plural mode" (336), I advocate shifting the focus from attributing responsibility for the harm of the current global economic order in first-person terms to a collective action approach focusing on collective responsibilities of states as collective agents. Different reasons for the existence of shortcomings exist: Firstly, when saying that "we are preserving our great economic advantages by imposing a global economic order that is unjust" (Pogge 2005, 4), Pogge excludes duties and responsibilities for all those citizens and countries that are not part of what Pogge defines as "affluent." Section 3.1 focusing on economic inequalities and the concentration of capital within countries constitutes an attempt to proving this point. However, economic injustice resulting from the unequal distribution of wealth and income is a major challenge in every part of the world. Thus, to specify the notion of affluent countries, a more distinct definition is needed, when promoting such a demanding normative claim like the argument from negative duties.

One must admit that the WTO's AoA and the rule framework were primarily designed to promote the agricultural interests of the industrialized countries (Joseph 2011, 187). When looking at the most trade-distorting subsidies, these harmful policies are commonly implemented on a global level - at the expense of the low-income countries. There are "rich" and affluent countries, such as Australia or New Zealand, which have already eliminated such policies. As the numbers from China or Indonesia indicate, the sharp distinction between a rich "western" global north and the "poor" global south is not as obvious. The challenges arising to guarantee food security and the severe violation of human rights resulting from undernourishment do not reflect an injustice which "we" in some affluent countries, wherever they might be located, can solve by refraining from distorting practices. Rather, this is a global task asking for institutional reform in the global economic rule framework and elimination of the loopholes outlined in the previous chapter.

Second, from the notion that human beings are "fellow participants in a single global institutional order," Pogge asserts that "all human rights have come to be, at least potentially, everyone's responsibility" (Pogge 1992, 358). He concludes that each person has a duty toward every other person, "not to cooperate in imposing an unjust institutional order upon her," if the condition of sharing the same institutional scheme is met (358). Accordingly, individual agents and collective agents have a negative duty not to participate in imposing an unjust institutional scheme on others (358). Two potential lines of interpretation apply to this claim: According to Wringer (2018), Pogge can be read either from a collective agency perspective or from a causal contribution perspective (341). The claim to be made here is to abandon an approach from attributing causal contributions. This implies that individuals causally contribute to upholding the current global economic order.

Attributing responsibilities, or even more stringent - duties - to individuals by claiming that “we” individually are violating negative duties towards other persons falls short of providing a practically applicable account of global justice.

Referring to the example of the WTO rule framework permitting the use of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, I must re-stress the harmful spill-over effects these subsidies may have (Hopewell 2019, 222, 225). These harmful effects stand in contrast to the classical picture of harm, as the one Pogge argues for in his negative duty argument. Based on this example, individuals are not responsible for the harm, in a causal relationship-reading, as individual actions are insufficiently hindering poor citizens' access to food in low-income countries. The harm induced by severe poverty and undernourishment is indirect in the sense, as it is an indirect consequence of trade policies from governments all over the world. This corresponds with Lichtenberg's notion of the “new harms” (2010), where no individual's action is the causal contributory factor of any harm, and as her reasoning goes, from an efficiency perspective, per unit of dollar of aid, an individual would have better arguments to give aid than to refrain from harm. Therefore, it is unreasonable or as Lichtenberg puts it, “too much”, to expect individuals to refrain from contributing to “new harms” (559, 561), especially when there is uncertainty about the effects from refraining from “new harms” in the context of the large processes for which agents lack necessary information (561). Thus, a major shortcoming of Pogge's approach can be identified as his focus relies on institutions and how they are unjustly imposed upon the poor while using the first-personal term attributing and addressing duties foremost to individuals. Thus, Pogge demands more from individuals than realistically possible. As Lichtenberg argues, given the large number of people suffering in the world, it is limited what can be demanded of them (561).

4.3 Argument from Revision and Improvement

The example of global economic injustice occurring under the WTO rule framework and allowing for large-scale harmful subsidies clearly underscored the fact that concrete policies realized by states and supervised by their governments may cause adverse consequences for developing countries. It has also become clear that eliminating these harmful policies would benefit the poor.

Thus, I re-emphasize what Cohen called the strong thesis: Drawing on both, foreseeability and avoidability of the harm, I support the claim that minor changes of the global economic order will be sufficient to alleviate most severe poverty. If harmful policies, such as those trade-distorting subsidies to the domestic agricultural industries, are identified, eliminated or replaced through institutional reforms, the situation of the global poor could be improved. This task would not require direct re-distribution of economic resources, but the indirectly refraining from those policies would already constitute a benefit for developing countries. Despite this agreement with Pogge, when applied to the real-world stage, the main shortcomings that I examined previously, were aimed at providing a rationale for abandoning the first-person term in the argument from negative duties. Firstly, the scope of addressees of Pogge's argument from negative duties is too narrow. Assigning negative duties to the citizens and governments of affluent countries excludes relevant states and agents in the global economic order, which also contribute to the harm. Thereby, Pogge's argument fails to directly address other countries equally responsible for harm. Second, attributing duties to individuals for "new harms" in a relatively causal argument is flawed because individual actions from citizens must not be understood as contributory factors for the harm of the global poor. In the following, attempting to abandon the first-person term, I will suggest a response to these shortcomings and yield to a proposal for an amendment to the argument from negative duties.

4.3.1 Argument from Amendment

The reasoning for the amendment is as follows: Throughout his work, Pogge favours principles of social justice such as the responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights applied to institutional schemes and to ascribe a prominent role to global economic institutions for the persistence of severe poverty (Pogge 1992, 357; Pogge 201, 46). It is therefore valid to refer to Wringer (2018) and attribute Pogge an institution-focused approach (336). While Pogge's most central hypotheses focus on institutions, the negative duties he demands are only attributed to individuals, never to institutions. Pogge (1992) claims that "Our negative duty not to cooperate in the imposition of unjust social institutions triggers obligations to promote feasible reforms" (359). Accordingly, he addresses the citizens of the affluent countries collectively, when saying that "we are harming the global poor if and insofar as we collaborate in imposing an unjust global economic order upon them" (Pogge 2005, 5). Even though, in the argument, he prominently refers to institutions, his conclusion consists in attributing negative duties foremost to individuals, who contribute and cooperate with this institutional order. Hence, he proclaims an institution-focused approach but at the same time directly addresses individuals. If aimed at directly addressing institutions instead of individuals, Pogge would be required to give up the first-personal term. I shall not deny that one might legitimately say that some individuals contribute to the upholding of the global economic order. It is obviously necessary that these institutions such as the WTO are upheld by states consisting of individuals. Another valid objection is to say that individuals constitute the states, and their governments are just representatives of the public will. But even in such a case, causal effects of individuals would be hard to argue for.

My goal, however, is to show why a collective action approach better fits the complex realities of the injustices of the current global economic order. I claim that the focus on individuals causally contributing to the upholding of the unjust order, or cooperating in the realization of harmful policies, seems to be flawed.

Wringe (2018) argued that such a causal contribution would necessarily imply that “we” collaborate to, or “our” cooperation in upholding this order is true, only if “each of the individuals included in the “we” makes some causal contribution to upholding the global economic order” (341). As Lawford-Smith (2019) formulates it, an action taken by an individual alone is “extraordinarily unlikely” to have a substantial effect on the unjust global trade rules (64). To prove this point in practice, I examined a set of rules within the WTO framework. States, as far as they have the economic means to it, apply policies for their domestic benefit. Lawford-Smith (2019) called the harm resulting from spill over effects an “indirect” exploitation of poor individuals, realized through intermediaries such as the state (63). Referring to the concept of “new harms” (Lichtenberg, 2010), I re-emphasize that harm in the form of violation of human rights from food insecurity for example, does not adequately allow for the attribution of causal contributory elements to individuals. Thus, it is not possible to argue - as Pogge tries to - that “we”, as citizens not suffering from poverty, are contributing to the upholding and imposition of the global trade rules. This “causal argument” (Lichtenberg 2017, 2) rests on hard-to-deliver premises about the underlying mechanisms of global poverty. As the example of injustice in Chapter 3 underscored, when examining the connections between the factual challenges of large-scale human rights violations such as food insecurity on the one hand, and the role and effects caused by the responsible global economic institution such as the WTO on the other, assigning the responsibility to prevent and avoid harm should be collectively acknowledged. Only then unjust rules and practices can realistically be addressed.

For all these reasons, I suggest that Pogge, by addressing “us” and “our” collaboration and cooperation, proposed an argument from negative duties, which is only hardly implementable. I propose taking on a collective action perspective, abandoning the focus on individual actions’ effects on the current global economic order for the harm of the global poor.

In order to establish a collective action approach addressing the injustice of the current global economic order, it is necessary to provide an account for the international rule framework reflecting some minimal degree of certain decision structures. Peter French established the idea of collective action as a corporate conception. Accordingly, “corporations have established internal decision structures that make their concerted actions possible” (French 2020, 19). Hence, the actions of the collective agent are carried out by its members according to some decision structure. If actions of states on the international level within the rule framework of economic institutions such as the WTO were treated as being carried out by the member states, we could establish the idea of French’s corporate decision structure on a global level. Then, a major task is to identify patterns of decision structures on the global level.

As Wringe (2018) argues, on a global level, an international institutional framework exists which sufficiently resembles a corporate decision structure (349). The WTO rule framework on agricultural subsidies represents an example of such a corporate decision structure at least so far it was the negotiation of member states and their collective agreement on rules that constitutes the present framework on agricultural subsidies. Furthermore, it is possible to aggregate the individual constitutions of states with individual corporate decision structures (Wringe 2018, 348). These theoretical prerequisites support the attempt to establish a case for collective agency in the context of the global economic order.

How could this translate into a collective action problem? If international trade rules were treated as a global public good and the challenge of food security as a collective action problem, then the injustice caused by the currently existing global economic order can be viewed as a problem of collective action. As international trade or the WTO is intended to benefit all countries reducing trade barriers, and nobody has to pay for participating in international trade, there is good reason to treat international trade rules as global public good. Josling (2014) argued for taking this perspective:

He made the claim that the refusal of individual states and governments to respond to food insecurity prevents the implementation of appropriate rules. Thus, the collective action problem underlying the international trade rules relevant for food security applies to the WTO (Josling 2014, 3) and, in consequence, also to the example of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies provided in this thesis. Therefore, the governments of WTO member countries share a collective responsibility. The nature of collective action problems, as Olson examined, results from countries' abilities to benefit from "free-riding" which prevents them from collectively changing the rules (Josling 2014, 1).

As long as individual countries can benefit from the trade-distorting subsidies without facing major constraints, they will continue to do so. Thus, in order to give up a causal argument in the first-person term, to abandon assigning negative duty to refrain from cooperating and contributing to the imposition of unjust trade rules to individuals, I argued that in the light of the "new harms" this can be done when establishing a collective agency approach towards the injustice of the current global economic order. Thus, the injustice of the global economic order is indeed imposed and upheld by the countries with the financial means to do so. But my reasoning presented here departs from the argument from negative duties saying that we rather should assign collective responsibility to governments and less to individuals in affluent countries. Also, because the notion of affluent countries is incomplete.

5. Conclusion

This thesis was aimed at critically assessing Thomas Pogge's argument from negative duties and to investigate a relationship between the global economic order and the violation of human rights. Conflating the findings from the previous chapters, the following conclusions are made: Based on the analysis of statistical data on global economic inequality in the second sub-chapter of chapter three, two major findings are drawn. First, the economic resources of wealth and income are distributed unequally. This holds for any region in the world. Second, to assess a convincing theory of global economic justice and to analyse how resources are distributed globally, it is of utmost relevance to focus on both, inequality between countries, and rising inequality within countries. As a consequence, further investigation of the responsibility for the harm done to the poorest citizens in the world is required, in order to sufficiently assess Pogge's argument. Thus, a more differentiated picture becomes necessary. Solely dividing countries into the categories of affluent and less-affluent is insufficient.

Moreover, based on the empirical analysis on global economic injustice in the third sub-chapter of chapter three, evidence for structural inequalities within the global economic order exists. The example of the WTO rule framework on agricultural subsidies revealed the asymmetries between developed and developing countries. From the statistical data on harmful subsidies it follows, that under WTO rules, harmful policies are continuously implemented both, by developed states and by emerging economies. However, in order to pinpoint the agents contributing to the adverse effects of most trade-distorting policies and the scope of their impact, an even more differentiated analysis has to be conducted. Then, based on these empirical facts, exemplary evidence for a violation of human rights by the current global economic order can be established – as long as the adverse effects from subsidies for food security are treated as a violation of the right to food. I provided arguments, supporting this classification.

A first main conclusion from this thesis is that Pogge's argument is, in a first instance, partially feasible: The current global economic order is unjust, and it is imposed upon the global poor at their expense. The second major aim based on the conviction that the current global economic order truly is unjust, was to investigate whether “we”, the affluent societies hold responsibility, thus violate a negative duty. Based on the critical assessment in chapter four, I revealed, that Pogge’s argument is flawed to some important degree. Outlining major shortcomings of his approach, I argued for the elimination of the first-person term and proposed to abandon the assignment of duties to individuals in the form of a causal argument. I built an argument based on the notion of the “new harms”: Harm done in the form of causing global poverty is a complex phenomenon and the eradication of global economic injustice must be treated as a collective action problem. Thus, the assignment of the responsibility to refrain from harm to collective agents is required. Ultimately, the concluding twofold statement is the following: *Argument from Consent*: The current global economic order is unjust. This has been manifested firstly by the increasing concentration of capital and economic inequality within countries and, second, because the current world economic order inhabits structural inequalities, which imply negative consequences for the poorest people in developing countries.

Argument from Amendment: Contrary to Thomas Pogge's argument from negative duties, the injustice of the current world economic order does not reflect a violation of negative duties by individual citizens in affluent countries. Instead, I propose shifting this argument towards shared responsibility of nation-states and governments for institutional reform through collective action.

This thesis’s main contribution was to inspire the debate of global economic justice and the discussion on positive versus negative duties and offering an in depth- perspective on one of the most relevant arguments in this field. Thomas Pogge directed the debate from positive duties to assist towards negative duties not to harm.

Accordingly, the main question shifted from “what should I do to help the poor”, towards “what are we supposed to stop doing?”

To answer such a complex question, in a globalized world, the necessity to integrate social empirical science and political philosophy is of highest relevance. This thesis aimed at diving in this debate exactly because of this necessity to bridge the gap between “sound” philosophical accounts and real-world cases of economic injustice.

However, the limits of this underlying work are to be found when providing an example of global economic justice. To single-out data for concrete cases for evidence of the relationship between the current global economic order and the violation of human rights is, in the light of the “new harms” not an easy task. Therefore, the underlying example must be understood as evidence from a single case, not raising a claim to provide large-scale proof. Even more challenging becomes the task of assigning responsibilities to specific agents. I suggest that an approach from collective agency better fits this challenge than a first-person focused approach. Thus, a relevant task for future research will be to multiply case examples for injustices and to deeper analyse the negative impact of the global institutions. Only then, if we eradicate asymmetrical rule schemes, collective responsibility can be assigned to states to refrain from their harmful activities. As long as the rules are made unjust, unfavourable incentives persist. States bear a responsibility to refrain from violating the rights of the global poor, but to put institutional reform on the way is the main challenge. Moreover, to improve applicability and to assess the real impact on the eradication of poverty and severe violations of human rights, a political and economic discourse following the philosophical debate should be stimulated. If more integrated and interdisciplinary discourse opportunities existed, one could mutually benefit from the best of all worlds.

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
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Appendices


Appendix 1 - Figures

1) Figure 1: Geographic Breakdown of global income groups in 2021




Source: Chancel, Lucas, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman et al. 2021 ‘World Inequality Report 2022.’ *World Inequality Lab: wir2022.wid.world*.

2) Figure 2: The extreme concentration of capital: wealth inequality across the world, 2021



Source: Chancel, Lucas, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman et al. 2021 ‘World Inequality Report 2022.’ *World Inequality Lab: wir2022.wid.world*.


3) Figure 3: *OECD Countries*: Development of support to agriculture



% Potentially most distorting transfers (Share of potentially most distorting transfers in cumulated gross producer transfers)

Source: OECD. 'Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2021: Addressing the Challenges Facing Food Systems.' *OECD Publishing Paris* (2021).

4) Figure 4: *Emerging Economies*: Development of support to agriculture



% Potentially most distorting transfers (Share of potentially most distorting transfers in cumulated gross producer transfers).

Source: OECD. 'Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2021: Addressing the Challenges Facing Food Systems.' *OECD Publishing Paris* (2021).


5) Figure 5: *All countries*: Development of support to agriculture



% Potentially most distorting transfers (Share of potentially most distorting transfers in cumulated gross producer transfers).


Source: OECD. 'Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2021: Addressing the Challenges Facing Food Systems.' *OECD Publishing Paris* (2021).

6) Figure 6: Potentially most distorting transfers and other support by country, 2018-2020



Source: OECD. 'Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2021: Addressing the Challenges Facing Food Systems.' *OECD Publishing Paris* (2021).

7) Figure 7: Nominal rate of assistance as a percentage of production value, by income level.



Source: FAO, UNDP, UNEP. ‘A multi-billion-dollar opportunity - Repurposing agricultural support to transform food systems.’ Rome, FAO (2021), <https://doi.org/10.4060/cb6562en>.

Appendix 2 – Tables

1) Table 1: *OECD Countries*: Estimates of support to agriculture (USD)

Million USD

	1986-88	2000-02	2018-20	2018	2019	2020p
Total value of production (at farm gate)	594 108	671 296	1 175 905	1 215 719	1 148 956	1 163 040
of which: share of MPS commodities (%)	71.3	70.2	73.7	71.6	74.4	75.2
Total value of consumption (at farm gate)	556 062	659 840	1 121 675	1 104 208	1 121 990	1 138 828
Producer Support Estimate (PSE)	230 213	216 862	240 185	240 063	242 507	237 984
Support based on commodity output	187 273	139 137	102 931	113 492	100 356	94 946
Market Price Support ¹	174 678	124 184	93 942	101 262	96 187	84 359
Positive Market Price Support	178 979	124 776	94 176	101 618	96 537	84 375
Negative Market Price Support	-4 302	-992	-234	-336	-350	-16
Payments based on output	12 596	14 953	8 988	12 210	4 169	10 587
Payments based on input use	19 571	19 513	31 325	29 415	28 865	35 695
Based on variable input use	9 146	8 008	11 886	10 199	9 962	15 477
with input constraints	1 146	341	1 102	811	868	1 627
Based on fixed capital formation	6 882	5 078	10 963	11 463	10 605	10 823
with input constraints	1 638	629	2 517	2 902	2 322	2 327
Based on on-farm services	3 543	6 427	8 476	7 754	8 278	9 395
with input constraints	439	964	1 611	1 575	1 533	1 723
Payments based on current A/An/R/I, production required	19 377	41 382	50 182	43 694	56 613	50 038
Based on Receipts / Income	2 052	3 173	4 255	4 195	4 077	4 493
Based on Area planted / Animal numbers	17 325	38 209	45 926	39 499	52 735	45 545
with input constraints	4 093	16 898	38 538	32 010	45 437	38 166
Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, production required	533	71	2 196	2 231	2 373	1 985
Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, production not required	2 080	13 721	48 620	47 485	48 981	49 394
With variable payment rates	181	4 318	5 023	3 021	6 391	5 659
with commodity exceptions	0	4 079	4 880	2 864	6 254	5 521
With fixed payment rates	1 899	9 403	43 597	44 464	42 591	43 735
with commodity exceptions	1 561	6 081	2 565	2 510	2 515	2 669
Payments based on non-commodity criteria	1 078	3 205	4 160	3 052	4 386	5 043
Based on long-term resource retirement	1 076	2 900	2 598	1 549	2 872	3 374
Based on a specific non-commodity output	2	237	1 465	1 424	1 450	1 520
Based on other non-commodity criteria	0	68	98	78	65	150
Miscellaneous payments	300	-166	771	694	733	884
Percentage PSE (%)	35.4	28.4	18.2	17.7	18.7	18.1
Producer NPC (coeff.)	1.46	1.26	1.09	1.10	1.09	1.09
Producer NAC (coeff.)	1.55	1.40	1.22	1.22	1.23	1.22
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE)	25 568	36 555	44 366	44 360	44 264	44 474
Agricultural knowledge and innovation system	4 846	8 009	14 305	14 266	13 986	14 663
Inspection and control	1 076	1 927	4 208	4 416	4 174	4 034
Development and maintenance of infrastructure	10 223	16 393	18 180	18 623	18 365	17 552
Marketing and promotion	2 156	5 572	5 221	4 778	5 155	5 732
Cost of public stockholding	5 872	2 282	610	551	689	591
Miscellaneous	1 395	2 371	1 842	1 727	1 897	1 903
Percentage GSSE (% of TSE)	9.3	13.2	13.5	13.4	13.5	13.6
Consumer Support Estimate (CSE)	-155 044	-117 029	-72 295	-76 850	-77 707	-62 327
Transfers to producers from consumers	-163 987	-121 691	-90 282	-96 875	-93 067	-80 905
Other transfers from consumers	-22 432	-19 518	-27 377	-28 053	-26 878	-27 199
Transfers to consumers from taxpayers	19 956	23 580	44 343	46 979	41 047	45 002
Excess feed cost	11 420	599	1 021	1 099	1 191	775
Percentage CSE (%)	-28.9	-18.4	-6.7	-7.3	-7.2	-5.7
Consumer NPC (coeff.)	1.50	1.27	1.12	1.13	1.12	1.10
Consumer NAC (coeff.)	1.41	1.23	1.07	1.08	1.08	1.06
Total Support Estimate (TSE)	275 737	276 997	328 894	331 403	327 818	327 460
Transfers from consumers	186 419	141 209	117 659	124 928	119 945	108 104
Transfers from taxpayers	111 750	155 306	238 611	234 527	234 751	246 555
Budget revenues	-22 432	-19 518	-27 377	-28 053	-26 878	-27 199
Percentage TSE (% of GDP)	1.9	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Total Budgetary Support Estimate (TBSE)	101 060	152 813	234 951	230 121	231 632	243 101
Percentage TBSE (% of GDP)	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5

Source: OECD, 2021, 'Producer and Consumer Support Estimates', *OECD Agricultural statistics* (database), last data extracted on 30 April 2022. (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr-pcse-data-en>).

2) Table 2: *Emerging Economies*: Estimates of support to agriculture (USD)

Million USD

	2000-02	2018-20	2018	2019	2020p
Total value of production (at farm gate)	524 524	2 436 586	2 328 723	2 406 122	2 574 914
of which: share of MPS commodities (%)	75.2	77.7	76.6	77.5	79.1
Total value of consumption (at farm gate)	522 068	2 319 726	2 192 039	2 299 963	2 467 174
Producer Support Estimate (PSE)	20 891	189 929	181 831	189 743	198 214
Support based on commodity output	1 616	76 933	75 602	75 910	79 286
Market Price Support ¹	1 200	73 421	71 041	72 847	76 375
Positive Market Price Support	24 826	177 615	169 814	174 288	188 742
Negative Market Price Support	-23 625	-104 194	-98 774	-101 441	-112 367
Payments based on output	416	3 512	4 561	3 063	2 912
Payments based on input use	17 330	64 023	63 601	62 494	65 974
Based on variable input use	11 483	43 261	41 118	42 221	46 443
with input constraints	1	758	835	1 011	429
Based on fixed capital formation	4 466	17 883	19 518	17 434	16 698
with input constraints	2	997	1 292	1 052	648
Based on on-farm services	1 381	2 879	2 965	2 839	2 833
with input constraints	3	0	0	0	0
Payments based on current A/A/R/I, production required	813	27 649	27 339	28 195	27 414
Based on Receipts / Income	813	2 406	2 397	2 455	2 365
Based on Area planted / Animal numbers	0	25 243	24 941	25 740	25 049
with input constraints	0	0	0	0	0
Payments based on non-current A/A/R/I, production required	0	0	0	0	0
Payments based on non-current A/A/R/I, production not required	370	17 769	11 432	20 022	21 853
With variable payment rates	0	0	0	0	0
with commodity exceptions	0	0	0	0	0
With fixed payment rates	370	17 769	11 432	20 022	21 853
with commodity exceptions	0	0	0	0	0
Payments based on non-commodity criteria	459	2 222	2 325	2 169	2 171
Based on long-term resource retirement	459	2 222	2 325	2 169	2 171
Based on a specific non-commodity output	0	0	0	0	0
Based on other non-commodity criteria	1	0	0	0	0
Miscellaneous payments	302	1 333	1 532	953	1 515
Percentage PSE (%)	3.8	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.4
Producer NPC (coeff.)	1.01	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Producer NAC (coeff.)	1.04	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE)	18 734	57 230	60 982	55 276	55 432
Agricultural knowledge and innovation system	2 988	12 019	12 501	11 951	11 606
Inspection and control	791	4 030	3 531	4 304	4 255
Development and maintenance of infrastructure	6 962	23 271	25 252	21 771	22 790
Marketing and promotion	29	644	620	652	658
Cost of public stockholding	7 861	17 135	18 946	16 442	16 017
Miscellaneous	103	131	132	156	105
Percentage GSSE (% of TSE)	42.2	20.4	23.3	20.8	17.6
Consumer Support Estimate (CSE)	-1 254	-79 308	-78 842	-92 468	-66 613
Transfers to producers from consumers	-4 166	-91 616	-87 906	-91 285	-95 656
Other transfers from consumers	-2 892	-30 379	-19 568	-30 734	-40 835
Transfers to consumers from taxpayers	4 735	33 524	19 340	20 134	61 096
Excess feed cost	1 069	9 163	9 291	9 416	8 782
Percentage CSE (%)	-0.2	-3.5	-3.6	-4.1	-2.8
Consumer NPC (coeff.)	1.01	1.06	1.05	1.06	1.06
Consumer NAC (coeff.)	1.00	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.03
Total Support Estimate (TSE)	44 360	280 683	262 154	265 153	314 743
Transfers from consumers	7 058	121 994	107 473	122 018	136 492
Transfers from taxpayers	40 195	189 068	174 248	173 868	219 086
Budget revenues	-2 892	-30 379	-19 568	-30 734	-40 835
Percentage TSE (% of GDP)	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.4
Total Budgetary Support Estimate (TBSE)	43 160	207 262	191 113	192 306	238 368
Percentage TBSE (% of GDP)	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0

Source: OECD, 2021, 'Producer and Consumer Support Estimates', *OECD Agricultural statistics* (database), last data extracted on 30 April 2022. (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr-pcse-data-en>).

3) Table 3: *All Countries*: Estimates of support to agriculture (USD)

Million USD

	2000-02	2016-20	2018	2019	2020p
Total value of production (at farm gate)	1 195 819	3 638 643	3 572 201	3 581 869	3 761 858
of which: share of MPS commodities (%)	72.4	76.4	74.9	76.4	77.8
Total value of consumption (at farm gate)	1 181 908	3 495 771	3 355 887	3 475 764	3 655 662
Producer Support Estimate (PSE)	237 753	435 565	427 680	437 727	441 287
Support based on commodity output	140 753	180 512	189 789	176 910	174 838
Market Price Support ¹	125 385	167 956	172 960	169 624	161 285
Positive Market Price Support	149 601	272 438	272 142	271 504	273 668
Negative Market Price Support	-24 217	-104 482	-99 182	-101 880	-112 384
Payments based on output	15 369	12 556	16 829	7 286	13 553
Payments based on input use	36 844	95 950	93 628	91 967	102 254
Based on variable input use	19 491	55 312	51 477	52 353	62 107
with input constraints	342	1 861	1 647	1 880	2 057
Based on fixed capital formation	9 545	29 194	31 379	28 425	27 778
with input constraints	630	3 514	4 194	3 374	2 974
Based on on-farm services	7 808	11 444	10 772	11 190	12 370
with input constraints	967	1 611	1 575	1 533	1 723
Payments based on current A/An/R/I, production required	42 194	79 505	72 787	86 667	79 062
Based on Receipts / Income	3 986	6 734	6 607	6 548	7 046
Based on Area planted / Animal numbers	38 209	72 772	66 180	80 119	72 016
with input constraints	16 898	39 658	33 179	46 551	39 245
Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, production required	71	2 197	2 235	2 373	1 985
Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, production not required	14 091	68 864	61 592	71 519	73 482
With variable payment rates	4 318	5 023	3 021	6 391	5 659
with commodity exceptions	4 079	4 880	2 864	6 254	5 521
With fixed payment rates	9 773	63 841	58 571	65 128	67 823
with commodity exceptions	6 081	2 565	2 510	2 515	2 689
Payments based on non-commodity criteria	3 664	6 421	5 415	6 595	7 253
Based on long-term resource retirement	3 358	4 820	3 875	5 041	5 545
Based on a specific non-commodity output	237	1 502	1 462	1 489	1 555
Based on other non-commodity criteria	69	99	78	65	153
Miscellaneous payments	136	2 115	2 235	1 697	2 412
Percentage PSE (%)	18.2	11.2	11.2	11.4	10.9
Producer NPC (coeff.)	1.13	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.05
Producer NAC (coeff.)	1.22	1.13	1.13	1.13	1.12
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE)	55 289	101 670	105 413	99 616	99 963
Agricultural knowledge and innovation system	10 996	26 362	26 805	25 978	26 304
Inspection and control	2 718	8 238	7 947	8 477	8 289
Development and maintenance of infrastructure	23 354	41 501	43 918	40 178	40 408
Marketing and promotion	5 602	5 845	5 387	5 799	6 349
Cost of public stockholding	10 144	17 751	19 497	17 131	16 624
Miscellaneous	2 475	1 973	1 859	2 053	2 008
Percentage GSSE (% of TSE)	17.2	16.5	17.6	16.6	15.4
Consumer Support Estimate (CSE)	-118 283	-152 228	-156 394	-170 858	-129 433
Transfers to producers from consumers	-125 857	-182 574	-185 556	-185 099	-177 068
Other transfers from consumers	-22 410	-57 761	-47 623	-57 622	-68 038
Transfers to consumers from taxpayers	28 315	77 881	66 334	61 192	108 117
Excess feed cost	1 669	10 226	10 450	10 671	9 557
Percentage CSE (%)	-10.3	-4.5	-4.8	-5.0	-3.6
Consumer NPC (coeff.)	1.14	1.07	1.07	1.08	1.07
Consumer NAC (coeff.)	1.11	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.04
Total Support Estimates (TSE)	321 358	615 116	599 427	598 535	647 386
Transfers from consumers	148 267	240 335	233 179	242 721	245 107
Transfers from taxpayers	195 501	432 542	413 871	413 436	470 318
Budget revenues	-22 410	-57 761	-47 623	-57 622	-68 038
Percentage TSE (% of GDP)	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9
Total Budgetary Support Estimate (TBSE)	195 973	447 160	426 467	428 911	486 101
Percentage TBSE (% of GDP)	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6

Source: OECD, 2021, 'Producer and Consumer Support Estimates', *OECD Agricultural statistics* (database), last data extracted on 30 April 2022. (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr-pcse-data-en>).

Note:

p: provisional.

NPC: Nominal Protection Coefficient.

NAC: Nominal Rate of Assistance Coefficient.

A/An/R/I: Area planted/Animal numbers/Receipts/Income.

