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Identity and Euroscepticism at odds with EU institutions and Grand Strategy.

Master's Thesis

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Statement I hereby declare that I have written this diploma thesis solely by myself and I agree with its eventual publication in print or electronic form. All sources and literature have been properly cited. This work has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

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Introduction:

The international arena is merciless in how it is riddled with complexity that often acts as a barrier for scholars or experts who seek to study, and represent it. The European Union notably stands out for its precedency in being a web of institutions, member states, institutions, and a combination of various political bodies that come together to form a complex Union, but even that may be considered an understatement. The EU is the subject of interest in this thesis as I seek through it to combine different topics to get a better understanding of the EU's situation most notably from a time period that goes from 2014 to 2019, excluding the recent events that most remarkably were initiated with 2020's Brexit referendum. This chronological limitation I attempt to narrow down the material and official documents the later chapters handle. First off would be a characterization of identity, through elaborate definition and a locating of identity in proximation with the European Union with concerns that reach the EU citizens' identity, the process of Europeanization, and how all of these interact within a European integration and project.

Alongside identity, an issue that often is carried along with it is the lack of identification with the EU by some states, or even on an individual level, creating what we now know as Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism is a dimension of the EU's challenges that has been looming since the nineties, initiated by various factors, hence it now being more prominent in the European discourse. For this as a whole, I try to answer the questions of what is identity? What is European

identity? Is European identity and national identity rivaling of each other in nature? Or are they mutually inclusive? What is Euroscepticism? What has led to Euroscepticism?

Secondly, through my thesis paper I seek to look into Grand Strategy that I regard as largely interesting and insightful, and underused in relation to the EU and the challenges it has been facing recently in the new century especially ever since the 2008 Euro crisis. Grand Strategy and defining it in and of itself is one of the missions of this research. For this my questions revolve around fundamental understandings such as: what is Grand Strategy? Does the European Union have a Grand Strategy? If at all, how is Euroscepticism manifested into Grand Strategy?

A fourth aspect of my thesis that I deem to be most crucial is European institutions. The previous questions in all three topics represent aims / ends of this research, but the means to reach those answers I put into an understanding and utilization of European institutions as instrument to uncover how Euroscepticism is manifested, are these institutions reactive to the skepticism phenomenon? Are institutions at the forefront of an EU Grand Strategy formulation? Do their policies emit a European identity? How do these institutions navigate identity and Europeanization? The research recognizes institutions both supranational and intergovernmental ones, but Supranational ones more exclusively considering their nature, and closer tie with European integration. I use institutions in this paper as I believe them to provide perfect grounds that bridge between all of identity, Euroscepticism and Grand Strategy by mediating between them in terms of policy making. All of these

considerations, despite seeming diverse serve to understand the nature, behavioral and strategic initiatives of the EU as an international organization (IOs). The attempt at more than one topic is in effort to orchestrate a larger, more comprehensive understanding of this organization's *état d'être*, and that entails a backdrop of decline and continuous challenges put in the Union's path, where its geopolitical future and interests can very well be at stake; especially if we take into account that the EU is not heavy on a militant and power deterrence with its neighboring states, and the rising ones as well (despite its military international interventions), it is an organization that capitalizes more on diplomatic dialogue, soft power and implementation of sanctions to further interest. Due to that, the political might of the EU has always been under scrutiny as it is one of its most important assets, and it just so happens to be that this political and diplomatic presence and existence of the Union is riddled with Euroscepticism, is reliant on strategy, policy making, and requires strong identity to maintain its gravity in the international arena.

Methodology:

The contribution of this thesis aims to pursue an understanding of identity in relation to the EU especially under the guise of an uncertain period in the Union's history, but even more so, to understand and follow the trends around Grand Strategy, conceptualize it and relate it to the EU as an international organization, in the midst of which Euroscepticism is more pronounced than ever.

Due to relevancy, the institutional framework of the European Union provides a compelling case to understand the Union's standing and function policy making wise, perhaps on a grander scale. All of the aforementioned alludes to this research being theoretical, and qualitative thesis, as it is not concerned with numerical representativity, but to instead develop a deeper understanding of EU institutions under a Grand Strategy, Euroscepticism, and in light of identity.

“Qualitative methodology is to produce in-depth and illustrative information in order to understand the various dimensions of the problem under analysis [...] it is concerned with aspects of reality that cannot be quantified, focusing on the understanding and explanation of the dynamics of social relations” (Almeida et al, 2017: 370), in this research's case the social relations established will be ones intertwining among the topics selected by implication of institutions.

Much more particularly, this paper considers textual content analysis as its research method as this is a thesis that addresses more than one topic on a different field, content analysis is appropriate seeing its flexible nature.

Alternatively, also textual analysis. “Research using qualitative content analysis focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1278) in which case working documentation and communications from EU institutions are put into the political context they were in at their release, to understand what shapes the direction they entailed, and the reasoning behind them. Additionally, with consideration to literature that was leading the discourse on Grand Strategy, and Euroscepticism. “Qualitative content analysis is defined as a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data

through the systematic classification process of identifying themes or patterns.” (ibid: 1278) and indeed various patterns that link between the two aforementioned phenomena can be pointed out in the policy making trends of EU institutions in which some do hint to an identity taken into consideration, identity of the EU citizens, or a lack of encouraging or corroborating an identity in policy making (the ECSC example in chap1). Commission communications along with leading literature in each field is treated as primary source, like Juncker’s speech for instance, orienting literature such as Catherine De Vries for Euroscepticism, Balzacq et al in regards to Grand Strategy, and Risse for Identity. Accordingly, EU institutions and their policies are approached as dependent variables, much like Grand Strategy as they constitute it, whereas identity, political context, and Euroscepticism (to an extent) are influencing of strategy, policy and institutions overall to a degree.

Despite the qualitative nature of the research that provides flexible grounds to navigate the questions and particular needs of this thesis, it still has its limitations by virtue of not developing quantitative data of numerical property, that can be grounded in facts. Seeing as this research looks often into policy, it is also known that policy-makers in general do not grant much credibility to results from qualitative approaches, for instance, in the United States when the education system is to be re-assessed, policymakers on the state and national level alike decided to quantify the students and teachers’ performances at schools, instead of using the usual qualitative direction (Rahman, 2016). Additionally, utilizing a smaller sample size in one’s method and drawing observations and conclusions off of it risks generalizations that can be false,

researches that are aware of such disadvantages try to claim less generalization to other contexts (Rahman, 2016). Thirdly, sometimes research data that is collected and the research data can clash at instances, as deviation can occur, “. It seems that the data analysis and developing the research question using the same data, which is previously collected, is likely to be a harder and continuous process of conducting qualitative research.” (Rahman, 2016: 105). I recognize that in my case it will be hard to draw and apply conclusions that can be stretched to the totality of the European Union, especially taking into account its colossal volume as an international organization, but moreover, identity is even harder to pin point to one particular axiom that can be applied to a subject. Despite providing tools later on that assist in measuring identity, the task remains difficult and daunting. Nonetheless, qualitative reserves some benefits to be kept in consideration, like the flexible structure for the reconstruction room of a research design, that it allows to a great extent. This leads to a qualitative research that can be thorough, applying analysis that accommodates particularly the topic and not the other way around (Rahman, 2016).

Chapter 1: Identity, Euroscepticism, and the EU's multiple institutional challenges in the face of that.

1.1: Identity and EU's identity, multi considerations.

Throughout history, the European culture witnessed many changes, radical ones as consequence to internal conflicts. The continent as a whole accumulated a grand social and power capital due to its presence throughout each continent, by coming into impact with other cultures and asserting its own to a large extent, and the accumulation of achievements in each of the continent's nations. Regarding the cultures that were receptive of European expansion and presence, they were back in time 'dubbed' as the East 'plain and simple' and this impact has evolved into generational influences, century after century in the collective memory of various cultures/states under the umbrella of orientalism. Europe as a whole, despite its fragmented politics through its main states and regions, was regarded as a massive world power, prior to America's ascension and even after, as a peer in dominance. With this sheer existential gravity, Europe had to have an institutional body of diplomatic and foreign affairs, and an even more complex institutional configuration with considerations to its interest across the continents. This catering had to be beyond the mere 'local' conflicts in the continent, and the European Union embodies the perfect institutional vessel for European interest, reputation, presence and durability overall. Even in a fast-paced world, in which the power dynamics are constantly changing and

morphing. The European Union remains the political unit with the highest global presence To adapt its presence with the changing needs of states, and the changing outer-views into what should be constitutional, legal, and illegal; the European union makes out various policies, and plans to help assure its continuity, presence, and interests. The communicability between institutional bodies is vital to a stream of diplomatic acts that grant mutual benefit and an organization's longevity.

One can generally argue on what good are elaborate foreign policies if the interior identity is not intact, or is ultimately faint and not strong. That is the main focus of this research as it seeks to understand the inner-workings of the EU in light of some of its major institution, primarily through policy and the lens of identity. In order to conjure a strong sense of solidarity, empowering of the citizens within is required, and this can be done in inflicting outwardly procedures that keep into consideration inwardly identity and civilizational weight, in an ethical manner at all costs.

The EU above all has a duty to implement continuation of mutual interest between its members and incentivize roles, rights and leverage that keeps the membership of states beneficial, though the identity dimension, this can be a matter of concern as it may easily be discarded or neglected in the shadow of fortifying an international image, and economic grip. The internal process of the Euro continent also depends on its representation, and governance internationally, and on the balance of national identity, and European belonging.

This can be seen as an essential dichotomy to the union. For this, there needs to be a Europeanization process, for both main members, and ones joining at rather later stages. This poses the question or dilemma of what is truly European, and what is unifying identity, especially under a proximate western civilization (as Huntington would vouch for this quarter of the world, in this continent); would it be enough to maintain a common image that unifies 'subcultures'? In this case can we consider the national identities as subcultures, and subordinate to the European one? How do institutions also approach the European project? This may be most vital to ponder upon especially with the concept of statehood being a recent one in history, relatively. Thus, as Ernest Gellner puts it, nationalism is new in essence, and perhaps even argued to be an invention (as per Hobsbawm's views on what constitutes culture and nationalism). In line with the standpoint of Gellner, since nationalism aims to unify ethnicity and culture under the same roof, individual, national, and collective identity may clash, and the question on how this can be projected on the regional European level may be the same, and a clash could be due. From a civilizational studies point of view, if we consider Huntington and his mapping of civilizations and the grouping of Europe within a western culture/civilization, one sees that indeed there is an undeniable basis line for all the states concerned within and outside the union on the shared continent, whether it be for a previously held belief (Christianity), geographical (a shared continent), or proximate racial similarities (color). But this can still be counterproductive for the fact that under such a broad outlook, there is a distinction between east and west, orthodox, catholic and protestant; south and north, and the sub cultures that branch out from each region. As well as the

priorities that vary according to each culture within. Ranging from Scandinavian, Mediterranean, Slavic, Germanic, Baltic, and so on, it should then be acknowledged that the EU as an institutional body would be faced with challenges to mold these differences, and provide a clearer, unifying identity under which all these particularities can be put aside. Much like the nationalism template in how it does just that, encouraging individuals to -despite their differences- put their countries first, prior to any 'local regional' considerations. What will prove to be a challenge for this master thesis is to use identity as a pivotal identifier of the issues it recognizes shortly within this chapter. This is due to the conceptualization of identity in social sciences being a tough mission to carry out, "its ontological and epistemological status is subject to a sometimes-fierce dispute among scholars representing well-established disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science or international relations. Identity is, therefore, both a contested and a crucial social science concept." (De Jong Lars Klein and van der Waal, 2013: 77). Thus, it wouldn't be wise to limit identity within one paradigm, since to have identity and understand identity are some of the most crucial imperatives to the human experience. While identity had issued a center of controversy in humanities and social sciences to a large extent, it remains an exciting topic that many have been keen on both exploring and utilizing in research, but what some scholars fail to consider at certain times, is that identity is sometimes volatile, it is not an ultimately stable reality, and that it is subjective to a certain degree, and that constitutes one of its key issues (Huddy, 2001).

As a recent constitutional and institutional entity, the EU can be interpreted in many ways and approached from various differing angles. But as it stands, the union has a strong policy presence within its precinct and outwardly in an echo through other entities and international institutions/governments. Regardless, this may not entirely be the case identity and values wise, for the "emergence of the values-based community has been stymied and the transnational public spheres are rather thin" (Hauser et al. 2016). This is what the study seeks to elaborate on, by having an up-close look into how identity plays out in the general European discourses, how that is reflected in the policies created by the union, and the diplomacy it adapts; but most efficiently, can that be held true for a central European state, considering all its distinctions, traits, history, and values?

An important part of the study is to understand whether a common legal culture can coexist with the notion of difference in the sense of citizens identity recognition, especially when such national identities are taken into account. In order to approach this most optimally, the paradigm around EU's institutional evolution should be kept in regard. When speaking of Europeanization, the renaissance is pivotal, since the illuminating values and ideas in the likes of those that Kant brought, do reflect what the European identity (predominantly the western side) seeks to be, and holds dear. The Union operates as well through a number of international interferences, permissible in the name of its liberty's protection. That is within a discourse that views the EU as a guardian of sorts to a set of values among which liberty is the most important. However, the current paradigm of law was unsuccessful in bringing balance to different important

aspects, like the aforementioned, that it resulted in a 'democratic deficit' or a 'crisis of public legitimacy' (Hauser et al, 2016). While the union has been considered to have acquired state like traits, and has been a forerunner in expanding and implementing its policy responsibilities, it has nonetheless failed in bringing forth its political identity to match its powers, and position, which can lead to a conflict with national identities that may be bound to occur at a certain point. Matching political projects to the union's economic capacity and powers can then be questionable, under scrutiny, and criticized for a better lack of legitimacy (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). This Legitimacy that is questioned can be a ramification of civic frustration at a lack of representation, emitting from no reflection to the identities concerned ultimately, in the decision making of the European as a political body and organization. This can be seen as dire, especially when considering the union has to serve a representation role in essence.

The previous concerns can actually push towards an even more glaring question, of whether the EU not only recognizes and acts in accordance with the local national identities of its citizens, but has it actually shaped an identity unique to it in institutions? And if so, how does that interplay with already existent identities that had the leverage of history, and colossal events to their side? How, do political bodies of some member states, in recent times, react to the European project? Does an EU citizen identity already incorporate historical credibility of its local identities into its own self, or does it exist independent of them? Luckily, this is a matter that has been academically debated, and many scholars have already taken it upon themselves to look into it.

This writing tries to define a political identity, in contrast to a national (pre-established) one. And how identity plays out institutionally when faced by foreign challenges in its sphere. Though this research also distinguishes that identities can vary and be multiple in different domains and that at times, even with the same corpus (the union), some aim towards being the dominant identity with a dominant discourse.

Prior to engaging in EU's political identity, political identity itself is a very elaborate domain, especially from a social sciences angle. It should be brought up that it is a common occurrence for political experts, and scholars to treat identity as an independent variable. It is approached from how it can impact and influence other variables, rather than the other way around (Abdelal et al. 2009). Albeit this varies and is also dependent on academic research and their end goal, whether it is to define identity as an actor or as the result of certain factors, and from then on, the utilized measures to study identity are selected accordingly.

Due to the theoretical nature of my research paper, content and process analysis are tools I mainly depend on to treat particular documents toward the second part of my research, in looking at primary sources. Analysis of literature and context around the topic handled, in effort to verify and understand the logical consistency and the social context, and cues even on an international institutions level.

Stepping down from political identity, it pays off to contextualize identity as well, despite it being a more macro level one than say identity particular to a certain community, nationality, etc. Identity can come in a multitude of forms, reflecting various domains in life (religious, linguistic, class, etc.) that influence this very

identity on a macro end of the spectrum like economic, social and political identities. On the one hand, “The ubiquity of identity-based scholarship suggests an emerging realization that identities are among the most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics, yet the literature has remained diffuse” (Smith, 2002). While on the other hand, identity has become an overly elaborated upon concept in academia, it winded up an amorphous concept, that is elusive and is capable to bring ambiguity into research/investigation for some. To sanely approach this, methods of breaking down identity can be found across social sciences, and one particular method that could be relevant to this paper for a larger extent, is the consideration of identity as having two recurring issues: conceptual issues and coordination gaps.

Conceptually speaking, how to compare different types of identities should be addressed and established, it is an issue that deals with the theoretical frameworks of working with identity. Then again, the coordination part signals the lack of consistency in defining identities, and as the ‘identity Guide book for social scientists’ indicates, this is a commonly found issue of coordination in cross-disciplinary and cross-subfield levels.

“Being able to differentiate between types of content is the key to such a framework. To this end, we offer a definition of collective identity as a social category that varies along two dimensions” (Abdelal et al, 2009: 18). In the context of approaching European identity, and the ‘sub-identity’ it branches into on national levels, rather than regional ones, we can handle identity through the conception of collective identity, and indeed section it into its two dimensions which come in form of content and contestation. The meaning of a collective

identity constitutes its content (as aforementioned), and it can come as well in different forms (such as social purposes, constitutive norms, etc.). The level to which a social group holds agreement over the content of their shared social category, is interpreted as contestation. Contestation, as a collective identity dimension, indicates the degree of agreement or disagreement over communal facets of living (within a social compound) among the members of a group (Abdelal et al, 2009). Accordingly, these dimensions can be used as template to approach the concerned cultures/identities in the later chapters.

Prior to analyzing, and elaborating on the national identities that constitute the Union, and how they are balanced off within its institutions, it would be of essence to build perspective through wondering to what extent the European identity is prevalent on the national and individualistic levels. If we could use a marking starter point, it would be that identities do not exist in a vacuum. Like Hungarian writer Peter Esterhazy points out on his reflections over the 2003 united states and Iraq entanglement, the notion of which stirred a new discourse on 'Core'-European countries (Risse, 2010). Now a trait by which virtuous European countries that were not involved in the Iraq war, got bestowed, such as France and Germany that now were labeled 'core-European'. Though ironically such label was maintained only exclusively to western states. By the same token then, the non-core Europeans are also birthed, and Peter saw himself as thrust from being central European to being non-Core after having been Eastern European for the longest while. This shows that if anything, the sense of being European is rather volatile across the continent itself, and not all have an equal

claim to it, despite their membership and physical, geographical presence within the union.

“Once I was an Eastern European; then I was promoted to the rank of Central European... Then a few months ago, I became a New European. But before I had the chance to get used to this status— even before I could have refused it—I have now become a non-core European.” —Hungarian writer Péter Esterházy, quoted in Case 2009.

Evidently, it should also be put into case the fast transition of the EU from the nineties to the beginning of the new century in which its members more so than doubled, as they became twenty-seven after having been only twelve. Such a transition is well capable within reason to be geopolitically gaining leverage, value, and even add benefits economically. Regardless of that, on the identity level, many clashes are bound to arise. The previous members would have to view the new eastern states as equal to them, not many decades after both sides were at each other’s throats in the past century. To best understand a transition from macro to micro and vice versa, one can bring up the self-categorization theory. The latter is based on a dichotomy of individual identity and social identity. Social identity is inherently reliant on the existence of a social group, with which the individual can merge their individual identity, and use it as a baseline to identify with a larger group. A link between the two is established on social identification processes that one individual experiences (Tajfel, 1981). Within

such realm one can find the dynamics that are created as a result, like the ‘we’ and ‘I’, the ‘us’ versus ‘them’, these dynamics are but reinforcers to a larger identity, which conveys a sense of “we-ness”, this is on the promise of a common fate, history, and culture (Risse, 2010). Social identity becomes parcel of collective identity. It is true, that within one social setting there can be an existence of multiple identities, but within the interest of this paper, the EU’s understanding of its own identity, and then that of its occupiers as well is more prevalent. In accordance with the founding Maastricht treaty -on which the European union was established- during 1993 ‘s summer the Copenhagen accession criteria was held as a turning point that defined certainty for the Union’s future, at a time in which a unified currency was yet to be established. Despite the point of the treaty was to set officially the goals, identity, sought-after results, focuses of the union, and introduce a set of criteria for future members. A thing which one can argue it can only be done through first better defining what it is the host party is, what it seeks, and what should the admission look like for those wishing it (Ibid). This treaty represents what the union initially wanted, and how it initially views itself, it can be considered by some as a compass for the European morality. Thus, the treaty emphasized openness and subsidiarity as a ‘view to bringing the community closer to its citizen’ (conclusions of the presidency, 1993).

“The EU’s 1993 Copenhagen criteria, for example, describe the EU as a community of liberal democracies and market economies governed by the rule of law and respecting human rights including minority rights. The Copenhagen

criteria signify a set of constitutive norms, one that accession candidates have to comply with before they can enter membership negotiations.” (Risse, 2010: 14).

Beyond what was mentioned by Risse, it should be put into question if the Citizens within the union regards themselves as belonging and existing within an enterprise of such supposed characteristics and traits.

Along the line of Ernest Gellner’s explanation of nationalism and its recent birth in society, producing a national identity, interest, and tying of fates has been bound to modern reality post the first world war state system. Nationalism was new to many and then was stretched to the rest of the world, even to areas that lacked regional belonging to begin with (existence of communities in terms of tribes, nomads, etc.). In respect of such regards, the Union would find itself catering to the new challenge of providing individuals new to the national identity with a persuasive narrative to integrate them into a bigger cluster of multiple nation state identities that have to relate to another, and feel a sense of oneness among this all. This has been labeled by some scholars a Europeanization process. But to scholars like Dieter Grimm (1995), claim that a European identity cannot exist due to a lack of a European public sphere, language. This lack prevents there being a collective identity

In order to delve into all of the aforementioned questions, and to tackle the legitimacy of Europeanization as an identity among the concerned subjects, this chapter will take an approach of breaking down self-categorization to better understand belonging, then to understand the transition from individual to a whole of ‘we/us’, next to comprehend the distinction of national identity to

European identity, and finally how identity can morph from a social one to be factored into a political one.

Categorization as a cognitive action serves to simplify the perceiver's input of the world around them. Taking the stimulative nature of reality, it brings infinite variability of perception as experience but categorization is capable of narrowing down these stimuli variations into more manageable, distinct and digestive ones (categories to be beheld) by the human brain. Categorization in social stimuli (settings), is heavily dependent on the notion of sense, and this can be recognized from the Wilkes and Tajfel classical experiment on perception, and the accentuation generated by categorizing. In simple terms, accentuation is when one perceives a matter/subject more intently when aware of social context around their existence and/or being. This accentuation is due to the importance one relays on the categorization process which stems from an important level of awareness and self, and this can be translated into stereotyping, and prejudice even, "We are also people, so categorizing others must have direct implications for ourselves in so far as it says something about the category relations between self and other. People tend to classify others on the basis of their similarities and differences to self." (Abrams and Hogg, 1998). The way in which categorization that englobes accentuation can benefit the reader of this research is that it plays into self-perception within a group and of that said group. "The greater the perceived differences between groups in contrast to the differences within one's own group, the greater a group's collective identity" (Risse, 2010: 27). These outwardly and inwardly features of perception (individual to group and vice

versa) are based mainly on the differences that distinguish identities. On this front, one can propose the glaringly alien East or Orient that contributed a lot into shaping the West's identity, by virtue of contrast (West vs East), to distinguish it from the rest of the globe as a leading identity, much more refined and supposedly capable. This serves as an example of difference accentuating identity. And in some way, the basic rule of the 'other' (l'autrui) and the 'I' applies on a slightly macro level of individual and group, but it remains interesting to apply that to what can be national (self-citizen) to regional (other, European identity) and if instead a harmony can link the two.

The group is seen as having direct impact, both psychologically and causally on social behavior. It has been a long argument in academia, and even prior to the higher education establishment, on whether society is based on individuals or are individuals based on the society/ social cluster that surrounds them. While sociology took this heavily into research, through various scholars that approached this question in ways they deemed best, such as Max Weber, Thomas Kuhn, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and many more. Though the one most relevant to bring up at this juncture would be Norbert Elias for his figurational or process sociology, an approach unique to him as elaborated upon in his magnum opus the civilizational process. Figurational sociology, or process sociology as Elias preferred it to be labeled, was his way of approaching and understanding social structures.

The elaborate links of interdependencies that people operate within, and which links the individual to a group, and society is the basis of human societies and their structures, it is the understanding that social relations within a group and

between individuals are complex in the sense they are formed around and by interdependent links (Loyal and Quilley, 2004). The reason this is useful to this chapter is that interdependence theory helps in understanding how group identity and individual identity grow a dynamic around the complex links that make them. While this theory is surely to put things into perspective regarding identity, a critique of it can be more relevant, that is the self-categorization theory as coined by John C. Turner in the eighties. Not only does Turner provide a criticism through this new theory, but builds on the latter one. “The self-categorization theory makes social identity the social-cognitive basis of group behavior, the mechanism that makes it possible (and not just the aspects of the self-derived from group memberships), and by asserting that self-categorization function at different levels of abstraction makes both group and individual behavior ‘acting in terms of self.’” (Turner, 1987: 3). The social psychology of such theories serves as a good starting point to conceptualize social identities. Additionally, it has been long held, in psychology for instance, that “group functioning is a regression to more primitive, irrational, or instinctual forms of behavior” (Turner, 1987: 3), and this gives rise to concepts and terms such as ‘deindividuation’, ‘diffusion of responsibility’, ‘group think’ and so on which can be categorized with the common stereotype of herd-like behavior when cognitively conducting oneself according to a group’s wide held view. The way in which we can observe this on what is relevant to the paper is how consciously does a state’s members/citizens perceive itself as European or as distinguished from that belonging. I propose considering this in the second chapter that recognizes the Eurobarometer surveys as a leading element in understanding European

belonging and categorization. Aside from the individual targeted question of whether one sees themselves as a European citizen or not, other studies have also been done to locate countries' on the categorization spectrum, testing their level of agreement and disagreement with the EU's regime, and policies.

Self-categorization theory sees that “in-group identification as an adaptive social-cognitive process that makes pro-social relations such as social cohesion, cooperation and influence possible.” (Turner, 1987: 5). Thus, the psychology of a group can be emancipating to one person from what could be at times limiting individual restrictions, or to enact on matters that require more than just individualistic action. “Social identities not only entail cognitive components in terms of social knowledge about the properties of the group. They also contain evaluations and emotional attachments that connect to one’s personal self-esteem.” (Risse, 2010: 22), and this what ties the knot together of individualistic dimensions being complimentary to the in-group identifications. On this side, to familiarize this understanding more to this research, perhaps we can take Brexit, for a unanimous decision, as a setting in which in-group identification plus action enabled a general consensus that adhered to a widely held desire from a group of people. Europeanization as a concept is difficult to apply and explain in terms of identity, but by implication, Europeanization can also stem from European integration. Becoming a member state of the Union can generate new found loyalty because of the economic interdependence and benefits that come along with this membership, this effects identification (Risse, 2005).

While identity relies to an extent on identification, and categorization as tool or dimensions to assert itself, or exist in the individual's psyche too, it is still not exclusively bound to the concept. Furthermore, collective identity -which is part of this chapter as well- is much more complex and distinctive, as Laura L. Adams puts it "the concept of identity is that it is inherently a relational phenomenon: "self" is primarily defined in relation to "other." [...] collective identity is a reflexive self-understanding of group belonging" (Abdelal et al, 2009: 316). The reflexivity as an essence of identity has a nature that varies, it is volatile, it withholds the trait of self-awareness which enables this reflexivity. And even further according to Adams, it is this very reflexivity that sets aside identity from other collective phenomena (Abdelal, 2009). Collective identity came into attention fully in the last century, but truly broke through and became a trailblazer concept in the second half of the century after the fifties. Although there is no consensual concrete definition for it, one can say that beyond labelling collective as a reflexive state of being and state of affairs, it can also be seen as a process. A process that serves a passage from self to pluralistic existence, and a process of redefining what would otherwise be perceived as 'concrete' social behaviors, symbols and norms. "Opposition between the individual and the collective ontology of identity is transcended by the introduction of the social as a space where the individual and the collective meet, merge and transform each other. The social is the space where the individual and the collective gain concrete meaning as they emerge as a consequence of social role playing." (De Jong Lars Klein and van der Waal, 2013). Collective identities are by default multi-layered, multidimensional the more fragmented, and structurally

differentiated, and culturally pluralistic societies have become. But regardless of that, this research does not seek to contest identity in and of its own, but rather use it as a navigation tool to touch up on many facets of the European existence, as the content will unfold later on, to show these facets to be geopolitical, political, and policy oriented.

While some may speculate that the nationalism bound to one particular and clearly defined country, it will be more grounded than the European sentiment, of belonging to the Union. In hindsight, one can easily argue for this as it sounds logical at first sight. The reason it may come off as reasonably logical is that one most assumes that nationalism is adaptive to its' territory's language, and culture. But opposed to that, Eisenstadt sees that social, and modern imaginaries gave rise to national identities when dissecting his research on Israel and Zionism (Sinai, 2019). To press on the matter even further, Ernest Gellner puts forth the argument that nationalism and industrialism went hand in hand, however in the sense that readjustments is what made the change. That in essence, for nationalism to be, cultural boundaries just like political ones had to adjust accordingly. "The age of transition to industrialism was bound, according to our model, also to be an age of nationalism, a period of turbulent readjustment, in which either political boundaries, or cultural ones, or both, were being modified, so as to satisfy the new nationalist imperative which now, for the first time, was making itself felt" (Gellner, 1983: 40). In this way, one can see that while the EU has to impose a new identity that is too recent (in the collective memory) of Europeans, they were required to feel a new belonging that is maybe not authentic as it felt institutional, and new altogether, unlike nationalism. But

that can also be argued against since nationalism has followed the same mantra of not adjusting to what was, but attempted to regulate what already existed (culture) to its means, goals, interest, and purposes. Regardless, and as it seems in recent literature, statistics and research (Risse 2010, Grimm 1995, De Vries 2018, Balzacq 2019, etc.), the Union's identity that constitutes a sentiment of belonging to this political enterprise may not be the most successful, at least not as much as nationalism, and this can be due to many factors. Which is what the later parts of this research aim to comprehend and put into context, but most importantly integrate into different fields (Grand Strategy, Euroscepticism) for a better relative understanding.

To better understand the European Union's provided identity to its citizens, it is most helpful to understand the crux of nationalism, and what gives it its vantage point. Without much speculation, it is easier to say that nationalism has an advantage of establishing itself on the basis of language, territory, and more, but it is not evident if it is bound to one specific characteristic. For as Hobsbawm puts it:

“The search for objective criteria of nationhood, singly or in combination, quickly breaks down. Is its basis territorial, linguistic, ethnic, historic, or something else – or a combination of these?” (Hobsbawm, 2021: 167).

Collective identity can be seen as a leeway for national identities, both which can be categorized as imaginaries as they are fabricated along and according to a specific social agenda, mostly ideological, englobing various facets of social reality. First evidence of this was post the first world war in which states'

pedagogical institutions adopted a new additional role of constructing a national identity as its new contribution to society, and this became immediately evident (Sinai, 2019). Hallwachs for instance was a scholar that recognized memory as a subject of social formation. This is especially relevant since nationalism or national identity relies heavily on memory / collective memory for it can be utilized as a tool that emits strong sentiment within a social group, and hence function as an incentivizer to act according to a certain social agenda; in which case we could say it seeks to forge national sentiment. National sentiment is a useful tool for any authoritative body within a given territory, it allows for domains and fields such as national military, and institutional education to exist, and further be systemized. Nationalism becomes a convenience to allow for hegemony, but economically and culturally speaking it has advantages in terms of policy combining units of social living, such as through institutions with polity might and authority that overlook the continuity of social services, and order. (Sinai, 2019).

It is true that collective memory and collective identity are complimentary and they play a grand role in the making of national consciousness. But it is not sufficient to comprehend nationalism as it puts one in a difficult predicament of wondering if nationalism just is the output from a corpus that behaves like a nation, and can only be recognized as one, but not necessarily be predictable. This ambiguity has haunted scholars for a while, though Hobsbawm recently addressed this issue straight forwardly, “The most fruitful approach to ‘the national question’ has undoubtedly been historical.” (Hobsbawm, 2021: 167); this

is definitely something that can be accepted within reason, for nationalism surely required an appropriate historical setting (that births a specific social climate) to establish itself. Consequently, this brings up two first predicaments that this paper latches onto as what could actually be major challenges for the European Union and its identity. The union lacks the advantage of history and historical gravity, while surely some could predict the union can be a reinforced unit decades or centuries from now -generally speaking-, it still is relatively a very new supranational and intergovernmental organization. This relative recency can pose an issue, as longevity creates credibility in certain cases (Hobsbawm, 2021). While this challenge may not ring true for recent nations that either exited the Soviet grip in Europe, or colonialism outside of Europe, the Europe Union is distinct due to being seen as an organization that first must serve an economic and security benefit for its constituent members. If this is what we can label as the first challenge, the second one also ties to a European identity's existence in the face of its rival national identity. When the Union expands and admits new members like those within the East, such as Romania, Poland, Hungary and others- then would these members be able to share the same history as those on the far west (Denmark, Norway, England, etc.)? Each of the members can have proximate culture, and shared history to other members, but they do not all necessary relate to one another, especially on the historical grounds. One can move on to argue that the World wars are binding experiences that brought the continent together (Balzacq et al 2019, chap 12). While that may be true, not all members have a similar experience of these wars, since some could perceive themselves as the oppressed, sharing membership in the Union with whom they

also perceived as the oppressor once upon a time. I propose considering a general academic and political look (Simon, 2013) at what the EU really is, and it is seen overall as the sum and result of various founding treaties inspired by founding fathers (De Vries, 2018). But what I would like to suggest from this brief stance is that most of the founding treaties were mostly based in northern west Europe countries like the Declaration of European Identity in 1973, or the Accession Criteria summit both held in Scandinavian Copenhagen, or Treaty on European Union signed in 1992 at Maastricht. These areas/cities also bear significance as they are seen as the cradle for the Union from an idea, concept to a manifestation into a globally respected organization. Sure, southern parts of Europe hosted a number of summit and treaties, most notably Lisbon, but Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands are also most recognized for the founding stages of the Union, for that I do wonder if this aspect of the European project can be an alienating element to the later-on added eastern and central states.

“Nationalist rhetoric, the construction of specific events as decisive for a nation’s history, the use of symbols such as flags, national anthems, and national currencies—all these are means to construct a nation-state as “real” and to reify its existence. Europe is no exception” (Risse 2010). Granted the world wars conjure all sorts of social scars within the collective memory of many states that were involved, the cold war on the other hand can be distinguished as a different experience. For one, it is an event that can also be categorized as ‘decisive’ for the continent’s history like Thomas Risse suggests. Unlike the world war, EU members were a European unit that joined forces with America against a

common enemy that was 'crawling' into the EU vicinity. Albeit some members at the time were part of this common enemy which is the USSR, to some extent they had wished for liberation (liberation that was eventually achieved after the collapse of the USSR) and to some degree these countries must have fantasized over the capitalist realm of the western world, a world in which the European identity is well incorporated. But as things seem not to be as smooth in reality. After the cold war, in the two decades that followed, the EU was able to more than double its membership, and this 'widening' has led into somewhat lead to identity crises, which could be understandable under the light of an overwhelming amount cultures and identities admission at such a proximate time. the Balkan wars that occurred in the nineties deepened the uncertainty about the EU as a whole (Risse, 2010). The second decade (the 2000's) was not void of conflicts and issues either (US-led Iraq war, Turkey's dilemma), which contributed all the more to what Europe's identity and fate question. Towards the beginning of the 2000's, the European constitutional convention was putting efforts to push forth a constitutional treaty that can be englobing for all members. Though it consecutively faced rejection, it was eventually implemented in 2009 after a second Lisbon Treaty referendum, and it looked radical in the sense that it was 'shedding' identity, as it "stripped the EU's foundational texts of all symbols such as the flag" (Risse, 2010: 13). This was conveniently executed in order to appeal to a 'larger varied audience', loosely so to speak. It could be that in seeking inclusion, certain identity elements can be easily lost.

Domestic politics of dominant countries within the EU have played an important role of being the radar that sifted through all the new admissions gradually. It is

accurate to say that prior the 2008 crisis, the EU was at its peak, especially as it has introduced the Schengen reality, and national sovereignty was no longer only concerned with national security, but the Union focused on providing security to the entire members included in the Schengen region. Moreover, the introduction of a common currency, the Euro, was altogether more encouraging to the optimism around the economic potentials of the states, and the economic security far into the future. For surely some new members must have found resolve in sharing currency with older, much more stable members (Germany, the UK). The promise of security could also be seen reflected in EU-sponsored missions in a common military in areas of concern like the Balkan, this is more so enhanced with the UN's gravity and value at the time, and the fact it had a military of its own that was not country bound, but ascended geographical existence. At this juncture, transnational public spheres in Europe would come to life, and their awareness of the identity crises would only grow after the excitement for potential would wear off, and new questions would come to the surface, giving rise to multiple concerns (Balzacq 2019, chap 12).

1.2: Euroscepticism and institutional insight.

The previous subchapter dwelled on academic ponderings of identity in itself, national identity and in rivalry to European identity. The question on whether EU citizens identify with a European identity, if that clashes with their national identities is not recurring topic by mere chance, but it is due to a larger problematic that invokes identity often, and that is Euroscepticism. This part of

the chapter will provide a clearer insight into what Euroscepticism is by building its way to it, in laying grounds on what could entice it as new phenomenon. But a noticeable trait of Euroscepticism has to do with identity, it is a phenomenon that finds base in questioning the EU's future endeavors, current polity, and is consideration for the member states and their 'individuality'. The previous part is also basis to transition into Euroscepticism, which is riddled with identity issues and concerns. To understand Euroscepticism, identity deserve a closer examination, and see how values can also go hand in hand with identity.

Identity won't only be a lens used to look into Euroscepticism, but European institutions will be instrumental in understanding the rise of skepticism, and how they deal with it. This part of the first chapter seeks to answer: are the set of aims from institutions policies coherent? Are some of the aims of these EU institutions policies presented as fundamental or subordinate, or do they fall within both categories? And what are they? And are these aims shared across Europe?

As it was mentioned in the previous part, the Schengenland's Union was able to expand its reach and power overall through key policy domains. These domains were previously exclusive in authority to legitimate nation states, and this transition in its own right gives legitimacy and dominion to the union, though not necessarily credibility. As it still maintains a weak political identity (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). What may be a challenging side to this chapter, is to define the Union's political identity in light of policy making.

Multiple scholars nowadays argue that the political identity in question is a matter that has to do with Gemeinschaft, i.e a political community, as distinct

from a functional society, a *Gesellschaft*. A political community is based on publicly announced values that are commonly held and respected, this announcement is to be done by political institutions that are involved in social matters. Therefore, these values can be seen as ‘building blocks’ of identity (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). What this paper will go on to put in bold letters and consider, is that values are an understanding that is ‘produced by social convention and is asserted by an institution’ (Foret and Calligaro, 2018). While it is hard to find a definitive definition of value in social science as a field, we can still limit it to certain understandings to achieve a proximate definition. ‘*Value-principle*’ by which we are concerned, hints to “the notion underlying the act of evaluation, the relationship that the individual establishes with something in a given context”, and this value would be the one relevant for this research as a whole (Foret and Calligaro, 2018: 5). To elaborate, we can understand values to be cultural in a double sense. They do not pertain to individual opinions nor adhere to them, and values are not appreciated on the basis of their factuality. Instead, values are both a mental and collective representations. Despite values not being objective or universal, they are ever rarely excluded from interactions and exchanges among people, and even institutions (Foret and Calligaro, 2018). To clarify, the values that this thesis looks at particularly is the European values within the understanding of the European Commission (EU institution) of them, more specifically through the elaborations of the 2014-2019 head president of the Commission, Junckers, this will constitute the final part of the second chapter.

Now that we have put values into context, we can take a step further toward how values are questioned when controversies and social conflicts arise. Values socially thrive when they are endorsed by a strong collective support, and when institutions weaken, eventually, the values they put into force are more and more put into doubt. Based on that, it is then no surprise that the EU during the early 2000's has not faced much dismay from its citizens or members (Foret and Calligaro, 2018). The Schengenland was rather the stable, and instead the Union was more focused on articulating new processes that helps it better establish its position in a rapidly changing world at the time, and to also deliver a balance of up-keep with the political and economic progress it was witnessing/achieving. The fact that the EU was encompassed of various members among which we had some largely strong countries, and a grand geographical scattering on many fronts, was by default a qualifier for strength and power. Power which is definitely required to assert credibility and give validation for whatever values this Union holds. But, values "are arguments to establish standards to which countries and citizens are invited to comply, and which would ultimately serve as catalyzers of further integration. However, research shows that the identification with European values varies strongly according to social groups. While generally high among mobile elites able to take advantage of the opening of borders, it remains very low in the populations less likely to benefit from globalization." (Foret and Calligaro, 2018: 23).

To understand the EU's attempts of its values implementations, we should question whether or not this implementation is actively going against a 'resilience' of the national values of its citizens. It is true that the EU faces issues

with its 'political activation of values'. One must also recognize that the EU is above the normative rules of geographical bound culture, and language and thus its values can be more 'forward-looking'; but that is not always necessarily compatible with domestic values, and that can result in a push back from individuals who do not relate nor identify with these values in their daily lives, since "A growing literature shows that many values implemented by the EU are in fact productions of a global normative regime, identified as the neoliberal market or as the bio-political imperial model." (Foret and Calligaro, 2018: 23). Additionally, "In the 1989 European elections the party campaigned – true to its values – under the banner of *Europe et patrie*, for a Europe of nation-states. The choice at stake, according to Le Pen, was one between 'a geographically, politically and culturally defined Europe' or 'a cosmopolitan and multiracial Europe', 'a resolutely patriotic' or 'a Socialist, *mondialiste*, utopian adventure'." (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004), if we are to consider that the head of the EU Commission in his 2017 speech defined European values in the Freedom, rule of law, and liberty trio (Juncker- speech, 2017), then it may not be far-fetched that these values are global and any authoritative body would love to strive for them. Values go hand in hand with identity, though in this instance the value do not reflect an identity particular or unique to Europe, nor a political Europe that makes the EU stand out in the international scene.

According to Saurugger and Thatcher who have been mentioned earlier in the chapter, to best approach the political identity of the EU, it can be articulated within three capacities. One which is that this identity is shared across the EU, thus it should have an internal dimension as a requirement. Secondly, this

identity is fundamental, it is unalterable and takes 'precedence' over others. Thirdly, this identity is to be distinct. It should stand out when put into picture against other polities, this would be its external dimension, such as that differentiation can be between what is EU member states polities and non-European polities (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). To better conceptualize this policy wise, we can label the EU for what it is, which is a 'policy state' (Richardson, 2012), and further elaborate on the previous points on values and polity by looking at the EU's policymaking.

Policy is able to have a political identity in and of itself, but this identity is not exclusive to the policy's content as it can be misleading, hidden, or be based off of values that differ from the public claims made for it. Perhaps the best way to narrow down this political identity in policy, is by inspecting the foreign policy of the EU for it can be very telling. In so we also link between EU identity and policy through two steps following Hebel and Lenz's template (2016). It is that identity goes through the process of *identity construction*, through which a collective EU identity is formed in accordance with the members' norms. A second link would be *identity operationalization* where regulative norms are actually formulated and applied. Identity can also be directly observed through the EU institutions' interactions with outsider actors (institutions, organizations, media, NGOs.), and it goes to show why foreign policy can be highly interesting in our case. This chapter does not impose the idea that the actors concerned (European institutions) initially have a set-out overall plan to define their political identity, but instead what matters is their directed actions towards the creation of "political norms that can construct an EU political

identity." (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). To put things into perspective, I will be mentioning the 1973 Declaration on European Identity in a Summit at Copenhagen, which showcases that the formulation of a collective European identity has been a focus of the continent for decades; where we see an entire declaration dedicated solely to identity. But unlike that era, in recent times identity is most often than not coupled with economics, political and financial crises, rather than be an independent and prioritized topic. I will start off with a preliminary mention of Saurugger and Thatcher's finding on how the EU has actually not entirely dedicated its institutions to mere and pure gain and expansion, but reserved consideration for identity. This would be seen in that institutions like the European Central Bank (ECB), the Commission and the European Court have all favored identity in instances that do not necessarily benefit their gains and aims. Like the commission that would stunt free movement of goods for the sake of 'cultural exceptions' which would automatically reflect the assertion of identity, and its positioning above interest at times. Regardless though, Saurugger and Thatcher also found that this identity can be blurry. Furthermore, with the expansion, development and change overtime, identity also goes through similar motions of expansion and change, and its contents can be subject to modification (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019).

To create a better understanding of the institutions involved, one must differentiate and distinguish between intergovernmental and supranational, especially since these two are a recurring theme in academia, when dwelling on EU's polity. On the one hand, intergovernmental organizations are *'international*

governmental' bodies, they are established on a treaty basis as they (treaties) act as an authority to create, and are made up by lawful representatives that approve and sanction formally, giving an IGO an international legal personality. Intergovernmental organizations are important to public international law. On the other hand, supranational organizations stand for an international entity (group, union, etc.) that can best be seen as a vessel through which certain members states exert influence and power beyond their national boundaries, and eventually they get involved in decision making going beyond their locally national interest, but now they cater to an interest of the collective body instead (Matignon, 2019). The EU is generally expected to be and act as supranational due to being the composition of multiple member states, but in certain domains like foreign policy and military it acts as an intergovernmental body since not all members have an equal or definitive say in such matters. This is where it becomes useful to question if the domain one investigates is external or internal to the EU, since that introduces a world of difference. Though it should be taken into consideration that both the intergovernmental and supranational sides of the EU have distinct identities, and they may very well clash with one another. And logically it can be easily deduced that the intergovernmental identity will pose a challenge to the supranational one. For if we consider that the intergovernmental domains like military and foreign policy are more objective and goal oriented, with agendas that involve various requirements and needs to be met; then they are less concerned with implementing identity concerns, especially when dealing with pressing matters like security. They are not as constrained unlike the supranational domains that still have to cater to the

members' identities, needs, and views on particular topics. The supranational side of the EU would have to incentivize an inclusion of identity in policy to its institutions even when that may contradict with their agenda (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). This is corroborated as we have seen in the early mentioned examples of the ECB and European commission that needed to promote a supranational identity in their discourses. Not that only, but the intergovernmental organizations are less concerned with identity (despite its inclusion in their polity) but they come across less opportunities to form identity, as opposed to the supranational ones that even get to mold it.

There are distinguished factors and processes in one given domain. The first would be *institutional*, in that it is of exclusive powers (like in external trade negotiations). And a second one can be represented in *opposition*, a self-assertive trait. One sees an example of that in how the EU is oppositional to the USA when it comes down to food standards (GMO food) for instance. Or the opposition to both Turkey and Russia in the EU's emphasis on boundaries and setting borders in regards to these two states. Outwardly, the EU is able to distinguish itself and assert its presence, but then again, the same is not necessarily similar on the internal matters level as they could have various constraints (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). Whereby confirming the aforementioned point of External Domains having an easier time navigating their roles and applied solutions when they are not necessarily required to go out of their way to cater to domestic concerns (identity). To take an exemplary look at how identity remains an issue, in his study on central banking and identity, Erik Jones came across the finding that the unelected ECB were actually vouching in

their agenda for the developing of an EU identity in hopes of harboring more legitimacy and credibility in the domain. Though at hindsight that may sound like the logical reasoning behind such an orientation, the unelected ECB was also aspiring to share more responsibility and say in decision making matters for inherently political decisions (Jones, 2019).

To take an exemplary look at how identity remains an issue, in his study on central banking and identity, Erik Jones came across the finding that the unelected ECB were actually vouching in their agenda for the developing of an EU identity in hopes of harboring more legitimacy and credibility in the domain. Though at hindsight that may sound like the logical reasoning behind such an orientation, the unelected ECB was also aspiring to share more responsibility and say in decision making matters for inherently political decisions (Jones, 2019). According to Jones, the more the EU's policies competencies do expand and reach more potential, the more their inclination to seek establishing an identity for credibility purposes, and to give their actions more legitimacy. Then again, there are occasions in which policy in one area lead directly to pressure for more policy identity in another related one (area). Although there is not one immediate link between the two (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). By underlining the distinctiveness of EU identity—as in a set of common European values that are opposed to nationalistic ones in parts of cultural policy. The current populist wave that identifies the EU with values such as economic neo-liberalism, openness to immigration and austerity may thus have the effect of strengthening the EU's identity. (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019).

In the next paragraphs I will be mentioning some instances of EU policy and inspect what identity looks like through it, and what are some challenges that identity faces in policy that we can directly investigate, and this will be done also as an elaboration complimentary to previous points in this second part of the chapter. First off, it could be appropriate to start with the most controversial area of policies which is immigration and asylum rules in the Schengenland. Here there is a glaring issue of rift between national interests and preferences, over EU goals. The presence of 'long-standing powerful' national identities can be seen as rivalry. "This is clearest in heritage policy where national identities are closely associated with conceptions of the nation state or in immigration and asylum policies where the right to exclude 'foreigners' is seen as a key prerogative of the modern nation state" (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). In this case, the EU is constantly faced with previously well established, and better formed institutions that have the national legitimacy, historical credibility and a multitude of arguments on why the immigration domain should be reserved for national decision making as it directly crosses paths with the national identity itself, more so than anything else.

As brought up previously in this part of the chapter, The European Commission (EC) is the EU'S 'politically independent executive arm', it has responsibility in drawing up and sifting through proposals for new Eu legislation, it moves further to implement decisions of said parliament alongside the council of the EU. The Commission is largely englobing, since its agenda involves policies to EU funding allocations, enforcing law and being a representative entity.

If we were to look at the commission as a stable institution to inspect policy development, then one is ought to look into competition policy which is seen as a heavily Europeanized policy concept where European rules predominate and find root, and in which the commission has much say on the general decision making and autonomy of the area. It should be considered that it took a while for the commission to actually establish its position in the Schengenland, as it faced resistance from the member states for a while (Richardson, 2012). Similarly, to many other policies and rules that the commission passes, it also enforced the competition rules (in which the parliament is involved) which includes the European competition policy. Eu Competition rules is a witness of a more value-based policy, enticing fairness in the market above all. The reason we bring this up particularly is due to it being a policy important for integration. It acts as a driving force within market activities. If this goes on to show anything, it would be that the EU sought to move past the grip of national leaders to that of an objective ruling that guarantees liberalism, will and fairness in acting (Richardson, 2012).

By all means however, these values, despite being values, can still be more categorized as global than European, since not one particular culture is required to follow them, and competition rules eventually morph into a standard. For instance, when the Paris Treaty of 1951 took end toward 2002, it showed somewhat a cutting off from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) who had their treaty expire after fifty years of execution and delivery. The ECSC represented the existence of a steel industry primarily both loyal and unique to the EU, and this reflected what the treaty sought, as it was established on the

desire and promise of a united European Union with grounded key ideas and values. But the cutting off of the major representative of an industry such as steel, it drove the industry away from the EU supranational institutions and their reach (Richardson, 2012). A wave of privatization took over in major leading countries with coal, like France, Britain and Spain. Other countries remained with state belonging companies in coal and steel, and this qualified them to be perceived as national champions, but even that would also soon be short lived, since when provided the space of say, these companies refused the old governance systems and instead wanted more reach and cross-national alliances. Hence, they "relied less on governments, at whatever level, and began to detach themselves from the system of governance that the EU had created. A fundamental shift in power was about to take place. A new culture of 'European champions' replaced the former systems of governance which had the 'national champions' at their core. This fundamental shift in the preferences of key interests was not a total break with the past, however. The new ideas and policy frame still had a clear European focus." (Richardson, 2012). And this proves policy can be rather murky and ambiguous when relating to identity and values. But a shift from local and domestic essence still remains evident, and that could very much well ripple off negatively from an individualistic perception.

To recapitulate what was said previously, the EU identity succumbs to many factors in how it is presented and questioned. A conflict of identities on the macro level is imminent, to have supranational and intergovernmental identities clash in certain instances can be a challenge and even echo of confusion among individual perceivers on how the EU identifies itself ultimately. Secondly, the

expansion of the union either drove some industries to globalization, or far from identifying exclusively with the EU, despite being European businesses. This expansion both in size and geographically has put strains on the Commission to harbor more of a European identity, which worked at times (the EU's fight on GMO food standard with the USA) and was unsuccessful in others (the Steel and coal industry drifting further from the EU, and its privatization where identity is no longer incentivized) (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). Thirdly off is immigration, a lack of consideration for the domestic and national say in this can prove to be hard to navigate, especially because it affects the EU identity most directly due to the effect of immigration policies impacting the singular person in their daily lives, as they bring changes that can be felt on a quotidian level. One could argue that immigration poses concerns on how the delivery of social change when bringing new elements to European social reality, of well-established different, and foreign cultures through incoming immigrants (Webber, 2015). Views concerned with the extent to which the EU citizens want to assimilate with a change that pulls slowly toward multiculturalism, and their readiness to embrace it. Other concerns on the general expectation of the Other (*l'autrui*) i.e., immigrants having to adjust to the new European culture they're brought into, though some national leaders can be fiscally incentivized and aided to accept immigration, it is not necessarily accurate that their decision will be mirrored in social reality. After the 2015 immigration crisis especially, it has become evident that public sentiment towards immigration is that not all perceive their countries as capable of backing up immigrants, and this echoes most true to smaller

countries, both in population and parameters, like smaller central European, and Baltic countries (Richardson, 2012).

Euroscepticism:

The previous points act as a gateway into what could be the most damaging outcome of the volatility of the European identity and political within EU policies, which would be Euroscepticism (put within a proper theoretical frame). And eliminate the mere shallow binary of pro and anti-EU. In order to understand Euroscepticism however, I must establish context by better dissecting the nature of intergovernmental and supranational entities, their agendas and identities. To dwell upon these entities would provide clarity concerning how Euroscepticism came to be, and what it really is. It all starts with European integration that is often pushed and lobbied for hard by supranational institutions and personnel. Then again, the views of elites also impact institutions, and it was a dualistically held view by both the institution body and its elite to push for more integration (Brack and Costa, 2012). European integration was seen by supranational leaders as a means to fight a democratic deficit, in which federalism was positively agreed upon as an instrument to reinforce and implement their new policies. Pro-integrationists were drawn to supranational institutions, among which I repeat are the Commission (EC), the European Court and the European Parliament for instance, as the ones that stand out most. Initially, the integration dynamics are conveyed through basic notions such as loyalty, communities, and actors like the roles of elites, and supranational institutions (Brack and Costa, 2012). Ultimately, these

institutions were working towards the goal of federalism, desiring a more Federal Europe.

The European Commission (EC) is a guardian and enforcer of integration as well. It is supranational, the same as the Parliament too as it vouched for integration even by deploying Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who adopted resolutions that directly endorsed more integration. The activism of these institutions, and actors gave way to resolutions that put somewhat a sort of a pressure on the Council and Commission (in early stages), as well as member states to follow suit and develop on this European integration to reach a European polity. "This activism from the supranational institutions is further attested by the various tensions and crises it provoked with the national level. Indeed, from the 1950s to the 1990s, it led to some strong, although most of the time isolated, reactions from member states" (Brack and Costa, 2012: 7). At this juncture in time, we see that besides the member states gradually recovering from the previous wars, coping with the cold war, and being countries in the process of identity and nationalism establishment, they would be overwhelmed by the bureaucratic, economic and political potential of this European Union; so much so that skepticism was not worth the shot of expanding on. Most especially at a time that the union felt somewhat like a safety blanket to these countries trying to figure out their future post two traumatizing wars, and a very nerve-racking cold war. Thus, it is no surprise that is doubtfulness or skepticism would be somewhat 'individualistic' to each country, and remain repressed.

To understand the diverging views of European institutions, and their complexity I must consider the origins to a degree, by looking at ideas that brought European integration to be (Brack and Costa, 2012). European ideas were established by 'founding fathers' of the treaties, which are seen today as corner stones to the Union and Europeanization. Regardless, with these 'founding fathers' we can name a few like W. Hallstein and J. Delors (from the Commission), along Spinelli, and S.Veil (for the Euro parliament) all of whom can be labelled (according to some scholars in academia) as 'Europhiles'. These Europhiles had convictions of European integration and an intent on deepening it institutionally. The same can be said for the earlier personal that chose to serve these institutions in Luxemburg, Strasbourg and Brussels, which would have been seen as a gamble at the time, instead of providing an assured servitude on the national level to their countries, around the time stamp of the fifties to the early seventies. And federalism only came after eventually (Brack and Costa, 2012).

Aside from the ideological factors that can explain these institutions' commitment, one may as well also consider the institutional interest behind them. The first assumption would be that they possessed a rational interest in the success of the union being a part of it, by association, and the overall success of the European project would consequently mean an addition in terms of power and resources of these institutions (Brack and Costa, 2012). The main driving force behind supranational institutions would be a combination of their ideals and interests. Within academia and research, it is not evident how the evolution and processes of the socialization of EU institutions work. But at least, most

researches in European studies confirm the development of an *'esprit de corps'* sentiment among civil servants and allegiances of supranational bodies that have a pro-integration bias (ibid), which explains the loyalties of elites as aforementioned for being one of the 'tools' used to convey integration dynamics. According to Costa and Magnette in their 2003 research "*The European Union as a Consociation? A methodological assessment*", the Eu Parliament relied primarily on European integration as a strategy when instead other solutions were possible, such as the creation of independent controlled bodies, an involvement of national parliaments to reinforce and establish new policies, this could have been seen as national involvement, but more so as aid than interference, it was also possible to adopt intergovernmental integration instead, but overall and above all EU integration was implemented. Much similarly to the European Court which strongly promoted this system with legality and thus placing itself at the top of this order, by which it only increased and amplified the role the treaties initially provided it with (Costa and Magnette, 2003). All of the previous points can be conjoined and lumped together to understand how they led to a heavy pro-integration bias in the EU among its supranational institutions. In conclusion, this but all goes to show that the early actors of the EU had a particular, and maybe well justified, enthusiasm toward the EU future and European integration. It would be well within reason then that member states that had some coalition or parties that were Eurosceptic would wind up appointing officials into the EP and Council. Though these officials or candidate may not be sharing of anti-EU views, but they at least did

not reflect or match the same enthusiasm as that of the first generations of EU actors (Brack and Costa, 2012).

Next to the previously put arguments, terminology must be reiterated, and in this case, I look at Euroscepticism as it is the next elaboration beyond the understanding of European integrationalism in institutions. In this instance, historical or chronological context is of essence. In the early 2000's and to these days, many events occur that continuously hit at the core of EU credibility, and legitimacy. Doubt leads to skepticism on a broader scale when the events at hand 'play out' on the macro level. The 2008 is esteemed by some experts and scholars as one of the larger blows to the EU's capabilities as a Union and launched a series of doubtful apprehensiveness towards EU security, and the union's future (Leruth et al, 2017). After that, the continent would not catch a break due to a spike in terrorist attacks, most predominantly the infamous ones in Brussels and Paris to soon after have an immigration crisis throughout the following years coupled with some terrorism, it only fueled the skepticism around the EU. But the highlight of a series of downfalls is the 2016 majority vote in the UK referendum on EU membership that signaled the great Brexit. This only left the EU leaders and elites in a state of disarray dealing with the consequences of consecutive unfavorable events (Leruth et al, 2017).

One thing that stands out about Euroscepticism is that it is stretched to almost all intellectual and social facets. One can come across it in Politics, international relations, public opinion, psychology, institutions, economics, geography, and many more. It is considered to be a phenomenon on its own, and it seems to

spread everywhere. Though this generates difficulty since its spread has made it an ambiguous topic. Formerly, it was not directly labelled, and it used to be seen as mere extension of political life. Now however, it has been addressed often and 'chalked-up' to other that it became hard to define it, and explain the factors that lead to it, and why it happens. In origins, the term was developed in the United Kingdom during the eighties, first used by public figures and representatives like politicians and journalists when speaking of parliament members (Leruth et al, 2017). And it comes as no surprise that this was more prevalent in the conservative part as they had their own doubts and reservations about the so pronounced integration. The term faces issues that have to do with its genesis, as it was firstly developed by non-academics, and linguistically the 'ism' in the term did not make much academic sense at the time, which provided an easy leeway for opposers of this construction to have a pushback against it in public discourse (Leruth et al, 2017). Moreover, the term is broad in nature as it conveys it only opposes some unspecified aspect of European integration, and ultimately this leads to large number of possibilities on what it could hint to. Its lack of specificity made it movement more challenging to carry out. And consequently, the concept is not encouraging to potential joiners and contributors as they lack clarity on what the pursuit may be. Thirdly, the geographical connotations of the concept, it became full on widespread across continental Europe as well after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which cemented the opposition against the EU, and Euroscepticism became from then on, a phenomenon, that ascended to be in public language. But the recent crises in the Eurozone, and the recession has only made it an 'embedded' understanding within member states (ibid). Until

now, there is still not much evidence of what the extent and impact of Euroscepticism is, even after Brexit has happened. "There is still scant research on how and to what extent Eurosceptic activity shapes public policy or public discourse. One might argue that this is due to the negative construction of Euroscepticism, which lends itself to stopping things happening that would have otherwise happened, rather than the other way around. [...] it is hard to know how much of what that has not happened is due to Eurosceptics' agency and how much is due to the 'normal' (however we define that) cut-and-thrust of the highly bargained EU system." (Leruth et al, 2017: 5).

To circle back to the integration topic as mentioned prior, we link it to Euroscepticism through the fact that it as a concept was not immediately recognized in the EU itself, but more relevantly to me and the reader of this thesis, is that institutions have went through a denial phase in which they evaded the existence of Eurosceptics under the guise of the early Europhiles that persisted in ruling positions (Brack and Costa, 2012). Regardless, it eventually grew to a point of not being ignored, for Euroscepticism went rampant on both the micro and macro level, becoming a known phenomenon among civilians, all the way to reaching higher officials and political leaders in member states. EU actors had to take it into account, this manifested itself through a re-alignment of these public actors that had to adjust their discourses, public appearances and statements to accommodate the skepticism that was undeniably among perceivers. Under these new considerations, the pro-integration bias became a problematic matter (Brack and Costa, 2012). And so, reforms were inevitably underway to show a visible reaction from the 'higher-ups' to criticism (from

Eurosceptics) and to showcase pro-active efforts that address and deal with the rising concerns. This led to a moderation of the Pro-European discourse in said institutions, this only went to show the level of political wariness they newly acquired, and these institutions slowly became more self-aware. To inspect examples of the new 'watered down' presence of European institutions can be seen in how the Commission's president maintained a low profile, the dialing back in the federal question from the Parliament and its major groups, and the Court of justice's newfound self-restraint actors (Brack and Costa, 2012).

Next, a coexistence between Euroscepticism and Euro discourses/presence. The coexistence of diverging views within EU institutions manifested in there being members of the parliament that they themselves were Eurosceptic for more than two decades already. Additionally, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) had no issue speaking their criticism out loud, despite their low function positions on the assembly's quotidian matters. Furthermore, it was noticeable that gradually the succession of presidencies in the European council included heads of states that were openly Eurorealist, which is yet another term with negative connotations in respect of the Pro-Euro discourse (Brack and Costa, 2012). Ever since the 90's, in academia attempts to conceptualize and understand both opposing and supportive views of the EU were made. Yet, the divergence of such studies has disregarded the exception of these two facets. Now beyond the 90's and into the new twenty first century, scholars are trying to go beyond the scope of the pro and anti binaries. For instance, Costa and Brack (2012-2015) based their findings in that the expansion of the EU overtime along with its competences would branch out to new levels, and fields has resulted in a varying

of criticism that branches out as much as the EU and in more variants according to each local entity that hold these views or criticism. Thus, concluding that the views on the EU are now largely way more complex, sure they can be grouped into a division of anti and pro ultimately but it does not hold back from the fact the views within are very flexible, poignant, specific, and vary. The motivations behind the oppositions or support of the EU can be backed by various motivations, ranging from idealistic views to utilitarian positions. In addition to how these views can vary in what it is that drives them, they can also vary in what form they are manifested, some coming in a loud-spoken self-imposing action driven form, while others can be mere endorsement, or indifference (Brack and Costa, 2012). At the current juncture of writing this thesis, especially post covid, it is safe to say that Euroscepticism has become an integral part of EU politics as it is widely taken into considerations of public EU discourses, announcements, statements, legislations. Perhaps one fact that can be overlooked often and yet is so crucial in European studies and understanding the EU is that the union is a political and economic enterprise is an ever moving 'target', it is not static nor stagnant, but is undergoing continuous change and an ongoing 'process', and this has grand implications in studying the views, actors, and entities around and constituting the EU (ibid).

One of the aims of this thesis is to introduce a new consideration related to most of the previously mentioned concepts. Being that a big portion of this first chapter was considering the identity aspect of the EU, Euroscepticism, and Policy under the light of both latter concepts. However, to give a new approach to these notions, I would like for this paper to consider the field of Grand strategy in its

own right, attempt to define it, reconceptualize it according to an EU grand strategy, and perceive it as a concept where identity, and policy can all be found, all the while questioning whether the EU institutions operate within grand strategy and do, they exhibit Euroscepticism to some or not. Therefore, this is what I will be mainly addressing in my next chapter in two parts. Though seeing as Grand strategy is an academic and political concept that targets many outwardly policies, such as foreign and defense policies, I will be stretching the theoretical frameworks to the EU only. I see this as fair advancement, considering the focus and rotation of the fields (interdisciplinary or not) to be heavily focused on the United States predominantly, and if not, these fields are interested in the Major Strategies of rising powers like China, India, or Russia. Even at the opportunity that Grand Strategy research looks into Europe, member states like the United Kingdom, Germany or France is what gets to be discussed, seeing their leading positions in the Union (Silove, 2018). An insight at the EU, despite it being more macro, as an international political organization can be more insightful in understanding the institutions involved, especially as this is an approach that deviates away from merely and exclusively member states and their national interests (Silove, 2018). This not only brings interesting insight in relation to identity but the chapter will be using the EU's institutions and Grand Strategy as a vessel to better particularly understand the Union's situation institutionally, policy-making with a categorization of what is supranational and intergovernmental.

Chapter 2: Grand Strategy, EU Grand Strategy and cross-over

1.1: Grand strategy and the EU: hints of Euroscepticism?

Strategy is a very broad term and concept, the way in which this term would be handled, written about took precedent from Carl Von Clausewitz with his infamous "On War" writing of 1832, which may have generated a common generalized trend on how to approach strategy. It is a term and concept that went on to stretch to an ever-widening variety of topics. The topic that interests us though is more on the macro scale that reaches international bounds, and that would be Grand strategy. It is a relatively recent concept related to nations, or more so grand bodies of power monopoly. After the propagation of nationalism, countries in the advanced sense we are of national and boundaries security, it currently it is a well-established Academic field in its own right. It had started with Paul Kennedy, a British historian who specializes in international relations and recently Grand Strategy after he had coined it with his revolutionary book "Grand strategies in war and peace", though it was Yale university that officially breathed life into this field by launching a program of grand strategy in 2000 (Silove, 2018). It had become eminent that fields like security studies are void of

grand strategy, likewise for international relations where scholars go the extra mile of claiming to expanding on Grand strategy into a wider range. Despite Grand Strategy scoring highly academically, it still struggles in having a definitive or global definition, especially as scholars find a hard time grasping a unified understanding of it in the existing literature. Regardless of this discord, it is observed that some definitions are often used much more than others.

The glaring issue with Grand strategy is that it is rather hard to handle, due to a lack of a unified and agreed upon conceptual framework for it. This is manifested in how scholars approach fundamental limits of the concept such as what does its existence look in reality's grounds, definition, and who possesses it through basically 'staking their own claim', and this results in a blurry, and ever-growing list of articles that could clash, are not harmonious and at times claim conflicting understandings and results (Silove, 2018).

Grand strategy may not have the smoothest route of molding itself into a recognizable research program as the research around it rarely has a methodology that focuses on testing the explanations of this very concept per se, but instead just elaborates on theories that deal with 'countering neorealism'. To explain this, I would like to start by stating that international relations, like many other fields, has its own different levels of analysis at which it approaches any one phenomenon, or grand scale event (Von Alt, 2018). The systemic level is one on which a scholar would consider the international scene primarily, inspect power relations around a certain dynamic, and could exclude the internal characteristics of the actors being studied. Whereas the unit level is one at which

the state is considered and analyzed as the international analysis is regarded as insufficient for it tells only a part of the international consideration which can – for some – be viewed more as hypothetical. Alternatively, there are other levels like ones on the individual level that analyze key figures in conflicts / treaties / global events, etc. (Von Alt, 2018).

The reason I dwell on this is to bring up that the neorealism that grand strategy seeks to counter for some researchers is something that must be done at the systemic level, yet it is applied to the unit level where grand strategy only operates as a dependent variable. "There is little explicit discussion of methodologies of concept construction in the literature on grand strategy. Most contributions implicitly commit to scientific realism and use grand strategy to refer to a real object or phenomenon, something that exists independently of the mind of the observer." (Silove, 2018: 31). And while this can also pose an obstacle for this paper, I consider alternative approaches that are, according to Nina Silove –Dr and Professor in security studies in Zurich– more reasonable. Thus, an approach where grand strategy I use is to refer to a construct in an analytical model that depicts "a reality" without claiming it to depict "*The* reality". Especially as this grand strategy is used to read into the EU project, its situation and what extent of Euroscepticism one can deduct from it. And for this, a new rising field within Grand Strategy is rising, and it brings new insights, and is widely held to be fruitful in empirical research, and that is Comparative grand strategy. Though prior to that, it would only make sense to attempt and give a grounded definition of the concept Grand Strategy.

To define Grand Strategy, it must be understood that it can be divided into Grand Behavior, Grand Principles, and Grand Plans. First, I would like to look closely at Grand Strategy as a plan in more depth than the other two (behavior and principles), because it holds in relation to policy which stands as most relevant to the previous chapter, the second part to come or what I aim to achieve with this thesis as a whole. To begin, as a plan, grand strategy has a purpose in 'policy execution', this is based on the relation between strategy, military, and the fulfilment of a political objective through carrying out war. This drags us back to the Clausewitz and his contribution to strategy. To carry out a strategy within a higher scale by a large governing body such as a kingdom/country, a set of policy is bound to be established and be a point of reference (Silove, 2018). Though Clausewitz did not particularly mention or specify this in his writings. Yet the coupling of policy and strategy is eminent when speaking of Grand strategy as a plan, despite them being distinct. These two concepts have different ends, and means; and to fill the gap between them in a setting that has many war connotations, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, a previous British Soldier, historian and theorist succeeded in filling the gap Clausewitz had, a gap in which we can answer whether Grand strategy is more like policy or strategy? And how can these three concepts relate to one another? To answer these questions Hart has made a distinction between policy as one that is 'fundamental' the other as 'policy in execution', whereby Clausewitz only elaborated on fundamental policy, but the interesting parcel of Hart's theory is that policy in execution is "practically synonymous" with the Clausewitzian understanding and illustration of Strategy. This last combination is then amounting to Grand Strategy as is "higher

strategy" which coordinated the resources of its wielder -nation state for example- (Hart, 1991). From this one understands that Grand Strategy is more in line strategy than mere policy. In this old or particular understanding strategy in relation to wars that required commanders with little to not much weaponry, Grand Strategy becomes a plan through which a 'gameplay' is executed in order to win a war. But to stretch this on a more contemporary expression, one can look at JFK's National Security Strategy (NSS), which at the time of his presidency, was effectively Kennedy's definition of a Grand Strategy. In accordance with the Congressional Act the NSS was to have clearly outlined interests, goals, and objectives. Policies, national capabilities and power were then in order to be deployed to meet those NSS set objectives. Ever since, the National Security Strategy would be continuously implemented by a new corpus, the National Security council for the president's signature. To put it simply, this strategy can be taken as an example of a modern, and ongoing Grand strategy as a plan, regardless of its degree of Success. It fulfills the requirements of having a clear interest, an outlined end and to be achieved goals, along with components or actors to be utilized as means to get to those ends (Silove, 2018).

As is typical to academic discourses, there are scholars who oppose this understanding of Grand strategy as a plan, and instead conceptualize it as an organizing set of principles, or an organizing principle. This mere description is representative of the essence of difference between Grand strategy as a plan or as a principle. One is more applicable and practical, whereas principle acts as a compass in that it is 'guiding', a metaphor that we can lend from Henry Kissinger in how he differentiates between a plan and a principle in one being a "recipe"

and the other but a "guiding principle", so the principle provides "direction" to policy." (Silove, 2018). The scholars that subscribe to this understanding of Grand Strategy usually give it a definition or start a discussion around it by 'clarifying' what Grand strategy is not, and for instance Grand Strategy not being a grand plan is largely meaningful in its own right. "Rather than denoting detailed plans, blueprints, or recipe books, grand strategy for scholars and commentators in this tradition is about an overarching guide, a framework, a basic strategic view, critical considerations, overarching foreign policy doctrines, or sets of ideas shared by policy makers. This concept of grand strategy can be thought of using the shorthand grand principles." (Silove, 2018). The issue that this view faces however is characterized by equifinality. Meaning that the state of a given country does not exist in a vacuum but rather in open systems and the outcome of its state can be due to various factors, and chalking it up to a set of organizing principles is not virtually sufficient.

Lastly, would be Grand Strategy as a behavior, more specifically a pattern of behavior. Here we understand the pattern to be the Grand Strategy itself, as weird as that sounds. We find justification and explanation of such a claim in Edward N. Luttwak's statement on how "all states have a grand strategy, whether they know it, or no". Accordingly, Grand Strategy is but the strategic "the employment of the state's resources, including military strength, diplomacy, and intelligence, which interact with the employment of these resources by other states" (Silove, 2018). From this, scholars use the correlation of both concepts to 'dub' grand behavior'. In this realm, the explanation behind executive decisions lose value as they are not ultimately defining of the actions carried out by any

one type of institutional or governmental body, for strategies unfold in a reactive manner, for consistent manners replay themselves in most decision over and over. To give an example for this, the United States' pattern of behavior post the second world war to be a Grand Strategy, or at least qualifies to be labeled a Grand Strategy in that it emits a behavior of 'extra-regionality' or even global hegemony (Silove, 2018). That may ring true in today's world and even in the scenario of the second world war. For you, as the reader of this paper, I encourage you to reflect on how the United Kingdom despite its global weight and outreach toward the forties still had not enabled it to reach a global hegemony status unlike the United States or Russia. Furthermore, as Barry Posen sees it, he suggests that America's position as an overseas hegemon is not a mere 'accidental' one, "The United States did not become an extra regional hegemon in a fit of absentmindedness Washington deliberately has strived for that hegemony since the early 1940s." (Silove, 2018: 45).

Now that these three levels of Grand strategy have been established, I move on to assert a definition of the concept, and surely it is to be understood that a definition of Grand Strategy involves all of the three aforementioned considerations as its constituents to an extent. While academically there is a race to define Grand strategy by bringing up Clausewitz as a precedent that utilized the concept of Strategy in one proximate to its current use in Academia, I still believe it to be more efficient to list the behavioral, principles and plan sides of it. And between these three ones can find they have essential commonalities that point at means and ends (Hooft, 2017). In the realm of these concepts and more, Grand strategy stands for the highest level of a nation's statecraft', establishing

how the major force units and state pillars are conducted, such as political, military, diplomatic, diplomatic and more sources, in a pursuit of achieving and maintaining a certain level of power, and insuring the interest of the concerned state. "The "Grand" in the concept is often confused for grandiose or ambitious" however, this grand strategy and its notion of grandiose "does not suggest expansive goals but rather the managing of all the state's resources toward the means of the state's perceived ends" (Hooft, 2017).

After having laid the ground with what Grand strategy is, what it amounts to academically, and how it can be observed, I still focus on the consideration of studying a construct in an analytical model to depict a reality, but not the reality itself. To initiate the next analytical part, I look at the European Union's Strategy. Thus, one first understands Grand Strategy to be molded around an understanding of where the State and its policy makers wish to direct the state's 'ship', and so much anticipation of its future being is taken into account. A clear identification with sought out ends is a prerequisite for all Grand Strategies.

When dwelling on European Grand Strategies, scholars often look primarily at England or the United Kingdom for its unique experience. Its grand strategy is, unlike that of America, a result and product of its historical expression and experience (Balzacq et al 2019, chap 2012). The United Kingdom's experience is unique due to its geographical placement, being contained as an island next to continental Europe on one end, an ocean in the other with Iceland and North America included, this entourage is simply benevolent. Hence, war was a notion that is also contained and labeled 'limited', aside from a war on what the UK has annexed overseas, it faced no immediate threat with its 'land base'. Invasions

were not a worry, and resources are to be maintained from an outer source.

Regardless, maritime war was also probable and potential (Balzacq et al 2019, chap 2012). All of this can be seen as advantages that other continental powers had no access to, and this is taken into account for the United Kingdom's grand strategy, and that surely enough attracted more international relations, and studies intellectuals. Nonetheless, instead of looking into one face of the EU through some of its members, the European Union's Grand Strategy is also widely captivating, for one sees its grand strategy as that of an international organization, more so than of a country's. Aside from the EU, it is not currently known that another organization is in the same caliber, and independently forming its grand strategies for its goals (ibid).

One would naturally assume that the EU's grand strategy, being that it is focused on security and foreign policy, is grounds for contest between member states on who can assert their views onto the Union and to some extent ensure some of their interests as well. However, reality is far from that. The EU can also be better conceptualized as an organization based on a cluster of treaties that make its essence and on which the 'founding fathers' based their vision for the union (Balzacq et al 2019, chap 2012). In case of Grand Strategy, it is also based in treaties such as the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which one can surely esteem as the equivalent of the American National Security Strategy (NSS) as the paper mentioned earlier. Additionally, the EU Global Strategy of 2016 (EUGS) can also be grouped with the European Security Strategy in the same category. Understanding what makes the baseline of the EU Grand Strategy to be relevant treaties, now the next point revolves on who are the

actors that conjure the Strategy for the Union. In that case the answer stands to be that institutions are what keeps the EU's gears turning for Grand Strategy. Among which a number of the institutions mentioned in the first chapter, mainly the European Council, the European Commission, and the European External Action Service (EEAS). These institutions form competences that qualify them to overlook diverse and expanded polity ranging from economy, to military, and more, like monetary policy, diplomacy, trade, and security as examples (Balzacq et al 2019, chap 12).

Thus, the EU's Grand Strategy is mainly linked to its intergovernmental and supranational institutions, and while it may not seem at first sight, but it is a challenging situation if we consider other countries (Russia, China, and the United States) have central and synchronized institutions to set their strategies. The different institutions of the EU as was discussed in the second part of the first chapter, have varying scheming's and understanding of policy, as well as different priorities due to their nature being either intergovernmental or supranational (Balzacq et al 2019, chap 2012). Thus, a harmonization of views is necessary to establish unanimous agreement on what the ends and means of the Grand Strategy must be. To understand where the EU must be coming from in its articulation of a strategy, would be to understand its 'foundational historical experience' which is mainly the second world war. Being a tragic event that had ramifications that rippled off across the planet, the second world war gave the EU a preventative dimension in most of its views and actions. The wars had left an imprint even on the founding fathers for being a grand incentive for the European unity and the basis of what type of Strategic actor it can or must be

(Balzacq et al 2019, 2012). The EU's general principles were morphed into solidified beliefs that were a result of the union's reality post WWII and during the cold war. For instance, the deployment of most natural and human resources in two consecutive wars affected the member states greatly, and for their economic recovery they had received aid, but nonetheless, were indebted to the Marshall Plan and the Nato. The EU had rejected the use of force / brute force as means of political directives implementation. Instead, the union put more emphasis on dialogue, diplomacy, law and rights. Transformations were in line and due if the EU was to restore not just its economy but also its 'glory'. The opening of borders and lowering of political and economic barriers is a side of the attempts made toward this recovery. These attempts are actually actions that brought much success, and this success was easily "translated into a more general support for global trade and an outward looking foreign policy under European Political Cooperation (EPC) during the 1970s—EPC was an informal way for European foreign ministers to meet and discuss foreign policy issues" (Balzacq et al 2019, chap 12: 263). under such circumstances, it was no surprise that the western European unions endorsed Capitalism, despite being part of the American liberal camp, they had more than one incentive to join that side of the market. And being a part of Capitalism equally meant a belonging to a democracy. This system should be understand to lay a foundation on which EU institutions see eye to eye, and with the 90's triumph that marked the Soviet pressure to seize, the EU's official role as a major actor in international affairs and the global market was cemented by an expansion of the EU and the Nato, and most especially in the 1992 treaty of Maastricht where the Union was able to

formalize its' Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), from which many institutions on the EU level were policy focused, alongside what their values are and should be. It is furthermore through the Common Foreign and Security Policy that the EU seeks to develop the leverage to intervene in crises that have a potential of impacting its liberty and security in the long run. While we understand the main actors to be institutions, some of them still hold more say than others, so past the general categorization, it is more complex to lay a finger on how the Strategy is formed (ibid).

To delve into the next section of this part that focuses on the EU's Grand Strategy, but most predominantly its actors contributing to the policy making, I will be referencing from one my primary sources which is the book of comparative Grand Strategy by Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, all figures considered to be of major importance in the Grand Strategy dialogue. But being that their book is a collaborative work above all, I would like to shine light particularly on the contribution of Luis Simon and Daniel Fiott. Simon being a highly regarded scholar, senior analyst, director of the Elcano Royal institute in Brussels, specialized in international relations and Geopolitics with a particular specialization on the European Union. Alongside him, is Fiott Daniel who is also an analyst, but one of the EU institutes for Security studies in Brussels, his fields being very similar and adequate to those of Simon. Though despite a recurring referencing of Balzacq's book, it is mainly a referencing of Fiott and Simon's findings on the EU's position in respect of Grand Strategy.

First, one must look into who the main actors are. This chapter already mentioned that the institutions concerned are either intergovernmental or supranational. The first most essential one I will be beginning with is the European Council, it is an intergovernmental institution that is pivotal to Strategy making. The Council is specialized in policies that overlook economic, justice and home affairs; for all these fields it makes point to establish a set of objectives, that we identify as a set of *Ends* in terms of Grand Strategy (Balzacq et al 2019, chap 2012). These declarations from the end of the Council usually take place in meetings at Brussels, and the objectives that are set have an influence and impact on the overall direction of the European Union, whether it be directly or indirectly. The objectives discussed do require unanimity, for the Council has to ensure consensus among all the member states, and this is where the President of the Council plays a role pivotal in unifying views around the Union's future and its goals for that matter (Balzacq et al, 2019, chap 12). Along the European Council is another intergovernmental institution which is the Council of the European Union, though they sound similar they remain distinct and different to one another; many ministerial 'configurations' (bodies) from the member states find 'refuge' in the Council of the EU. This Council hosts various ministries as members, providing them with a platform to voice their national priorities and concerns. Regardless of having permanent members, it still serves as a common ground that brings together many member states' capitals and Brussels together. These nations and their ministries are represented through the COREPER which stands for the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the member States to the EU. The COREPER is comprised of ambassadors from each member state

that meet continuously in Brussels, weekly, and they are concerned with strategic action, that we can classify as Executed Policy in line with the previous chapter's mention of policy in execution and fundamental execution (Balzacq et al, 2019, chap 12). Beyond Strategic action, the COREPER is not concerned with being a decision-making body. Aside from the latter, I mention another Intergovernmental institution which is the Political Security Committee (PSC), and despite it being distinct in its own right, it still supports the COREPER. Being that the Council of the EU is Intergovernmental, it would come as no surprise that the values behind its policies would naturally push for national interests of the ministries it hosts. While this may be an accusative major claim of some sort, it remains true that narrowing down the Council to a particular value, principle or ideology. This stems from it being a multilevel institution of various layers of representatives, and different degrees of liability distributed across its actors, "Such a system not only gives life to a complex web of governance for a variety of potentially strategic decisions, but it also represents a diffuse decision-making structure where interests can converge and diverge in sometimes quite stark ways" (Blazacq et al, 2019, chap 12: 266).

As it was put earlier within the paper, the EU Commission is considered supranational, it is yet another example of an institution of its kind that runs for Grand Strategy formulation alongside the Council as an intergovernmental one. However, there are different institutions that fall on an 'in-between' position that combines intergovernmentalism and Supranational traits. The European External Action Service or EEAS is an institution that fits that very description, and simultaneously supports the council and its works for strategy making

(Balzacq et al 2019, chap 12). I briefly mention these institutions to give a clue on what the institutional plane leading the conversation and decision making for the European Union's Grand Strategy, after an introduction of what Grand Strategy is, though I plan on elaborating on the next part on European Grand Strategy, and attempt to link it to many themes, and concepts brought up in the previous first chapter.

1.2: Grand Strategy, a mold for Euroscepticism? Policy in execution.

If Grand Strategy can be regarded as the implication of a common grounds that identifies unified principles that direct the union, then the policies exuded by the institutions within are action, or in other words, categorically policy in execution as opposed to fundamental policy which is the Grand Strategy. Furthermore, the suggested policies can be regarded as 'observable behavior'. Though these two are conceptually different, they remain complimentary in nature (Simon, 2013).

Grand Strategy is not merely a strict gateway to understand policy, but it at least provides a view into what it is, and some claim Foreign Policy is where Grand Strategy meets reality. Considering this, I will go back to the EEAS (European External Action Service), it is an institution that provides diverse services like EU military Staff (EUMS), Crisis Management Planning Division (CPCC) and more; though one particular aspect about it that stands out is that the EEAS is headed by the "Union's high representative for foreign and security policy and vice president of the European Commission (HRVP) [...] The individual EEAS departments in Brussels are supported by an extensive diplomatic capacity

afforded by the 140 or so EU Delegations stationed across the globe" (Balzacq et al 2019, chap 12: 266). The EEAS has evolved so far that it is recognizing, and targeting issues that are particular to today's new age virtual existence, such as fake news, or online disinformation. This stems from its extensive specialized own military and intelligence units, which is no surprise if we understand it is a hybrid institution with departments scattered across the world, as Simon points out in the last previous Quote from Balzacq, Dombrowski, and Reich's Comparative Grand Strategy.

According to an all-inclusive table that Luis Simon and Fiott (see the illustration) have compiled, it shows on what level EU institutions are involved in the strategy making of the Union, and accordingly, the EEAS –as a hybrid one- can be seen to cover fields that some intergovernmental and supranational don't 'tick' at the same time. So as to explain, supranational institutions like the European Parliament and the Commission both are active in strategic directions, along foreign and security policy guidance whereas an exclusively and explicitly intergovernmental institution like the council of the EU does not cover Strategic Direction like its supranational counterparts, however, unlike them it covers military operations, and civilian missions. While on the other hand, the European External Action Policy covers all of those simultaneously showing its flexibility along the board. A further proof of its weight and value across the globe in representing the EU is its intervention in the Iran Nuclear crisis, using its HRVP (high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) too instead of member states that were involved.

The EU's principal strategy makers

| Institution | Strategic direction | Foreign & security policy guidance | Trade policy | Development aid | Humanitarian assistance | Border management | Energy policy | Sanctions Policy | Military Operations | Civilian Missions |
|--|---------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| European Council | x | x | | | | x | | | | |
| Council of the EU | | x | x | | | x | x | x | x | x |
| Foreign Affairs Council | | x | | x | x | x | x | x | x | x |
| COREPER | | x | | x | x | x | | | x | x |
| Political and Security Committee | | x | | x | x | x | | x | x | x |
| EU Military Committee | | | | | | | | | x | |
| CIVCOM | | | | | | | | | | x |
| European Commission | x | x | x | x | x | x | x | x | | |
| Foreign Policy Instruments Service | | | | x | | | | x | | |
| European External Action Service | x | | | | | x | | | x | x |
| EU Military Staff | | | | | | | | | x | |
| Military Planning and Conduct Capability | | | | | | | | | x | |
| Crisis Management Planning Division | | | | | | | | | x | x |
| Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability | | | | | | | | | | x |
| European Parliament | x | x | | | | | | | | |
| European Border and Coast Guard | | | | | | x | | | | |

Figure 1: Source: Luis Simon and Daniel Fiott's.

I would like to now bring back a supranational institution in this part -which is a primary one-; since the EU commission is different to other institutions involved in decision making, because its sole goal is not to only and merely ensure solutions that include resolutions benefitting certain or some member states and their interest, but it adds its agenda into its own contributions on the Policy making level (Balzacq et al, 2019). The Commission's strategy policy not only promotes and maintains EU competences of the union's institutional web system, but it also is a means that has the capacity to include, and indeed advance the EU integration (Balzacq et al. 2019, chap 12). This relentless endorsement and push for Euro integration even in policy making, which is consistent with the

general Supranational beliefs, makes a perfect point to perceive the issue of identity and culture. As was mentioned in the first chapter, European identities are heavily contested, immediately related to Euroscepticism and they, along European culture, have all generated a controversial discourse (De Vries, 2018). As previously established, Euroscepticism as a concept and now-presence in the EU, it had legitimate impact on institutions, namely the Commission lowering its emphasis and eagerness on European Integration. Euroscepticism affects these institutions especially around their re-election. The Union, as a whole, takes into consideration the internal views and engagement of the citizen with the European project, through various means, among which the Eurobarometer by the Commission is considered important. But Euroscepticism is often under doubt on whether it is being fueled by identity issues or an insecurity toward the socio-economic and security status of the union?

Ernst B. Haas, an expert political scientist and founder of neofunctionalism was one among many who definitely disregarded public opinion as a futile pursuit when assessing European integration (De Vries, 2018). And the previous state of affairs in which elites' views on the EU project were the only thing that mattered, could be labelled as a 'permissive consensus' period, but public opinion grew in relevance and power year after year that it developed a 'constraining dissensus' era, since Euroscepticism is widely held among private individuals alike (De Vries, 2018). In her study of European integration, De Vries Catherine introduced a new benchmark theory of EU public opinion in which she suggests that the way individuals perceive and view the EU is 'intrinsically

linked' to how their nations of origin's conditions, which come in contrast at times with the general conditions of the EU, resulting in a comparison between the two.

“EU public opinion resembles a kaleidoscope mirroring people’s experiences with and evaluations of starkly different national political and economic contexts that together make up the Union” (De Vries 2018: 5)

Accordingly, Euroscepticism can be of a major key role in how European citizens view their surroundings both in the daily and institutional plane. Despite that however, the opinions of the public are not only conveniently polarized in the two shades of black and white that are Eurosceptic or Not-Eurosceptic. This is something one can observe in the Commission’s Eurobarometer of 2016, much like previous Surveys of the same nature by the Commission, they show that Euroscepticism is not necessarily linked to how strongly one feels about their country. In the fifth section of the Standard Eurobarometer survey of spring 2016 that is about European Citizenship, it was shown that among 26 member states only one country had a higher percentage that goes beyond half the 50% with a negating answer of ‘no’ to the question “Do you feel you are a citizen of the European Union?” (See figure 2), whereas the remaining countries show percentages larger than half correspondents identifying with their European citizenship, “Two in three Europeans feel that they are citizens of the EU (66%, +2 percentage points since autumn 2015), while a third still do not (33%, -1).” (The EU Commission, 2016).




Figure 2: Eurobarometer spring 2016, public opinion in the EU- first results.

Such Survey helps indeed to put things into perspective and eliminate what could be a rather one dimensional or limiting consideration. But it is not sufficient in its entirety seeing as Euroscepticism comes in different shapes and public opinion follows suit, it can be divided into four different types: Exit Skepticism, Regime Skepticism, Policy Skepticism, and Loyal Support. Individuals that fall in the *exit skeptics* category consider that the alternative state of their country being outside of the Union could be more beneficial. This signifies that their nation state is at a point that is seen as largely favorable as is, with or without the union. The opposite of this would be the case of *loyal supporters* who equally evaluate their countries and the EU regime as favorable, this mean that they perceive EU policies to be also of good use. When the EU regime such as procedures, and operations are seen under a negative light but the policies that come with it are still considered beneficial, then that would sum up *regime*

skeptics. Finally, those that are in favor of the regime but are skeptical of policies in the EU are *policy skeptics*. While indeed countries do hold various individuals that can identify with the union, it does not negate the possibility of them being part of one of these four categories. It should further be considered that an increase in one of these types generates different implications for the European project (De Vries, 2018). In a cumulative work of bringing the Eupinions survey of 2016, the European Social Survey (ESS) wave survey of 2014, and cross-validated with the European Election Studies (EES) of 2014, De Vries showcases the spread of the four categories of public opinion across member states (See figure 3), interestingly showing how some members are the border between two types, in a peculiar manner depicting the Czech Republic as the only policy skeptic state, and Britain's placement on the board does not come as a grand surprise in light of the 2016 Brexit that shortly followed the survey two years later, or the conclusive referendum four years after. And yet the figure shows perfectly that Euroscepticism is nothing but a simple matter, if we consider Poland falling under the loyal supporters end yet it held a strong unfavorable stance against immigration in 2015 and 2018 (De Vries, 2018).




Figure 3: Plotting countries in an EU differential space, ESS 2014. De Vries (2018).

When mentioning the Grand Strategy of the EU, it is recurring to hear about foreign policies that involve development such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which involves external states such as Turkey, or north African, Middle Eastern neighboring countries. Such policy like many others is highly regarded by implication of the EU's sheer leverage in political terms as an economic power of more than three hundred million inhabitant. Yet prior to dwelling on the foreign capacity of the EU in such policies as the ENP, the fabric of the Union relies on its members, and a deduction like that of Brexit creates grand ramifications. Ergo, Euroscepticism is of significance in terms of what holds the Union, and what helps it keep legitimacy (Balzacq et al, 2019, chap 12). Moreover, identity must be considered due to internal factors as such and even

due to external ones in the international sphere like the rise of new powers in the likes of the BIC (Brazil, China, and India) which the trade policies of the EU, considered as big part of the grand strategy in question, do not necessarily recognize nor address (Garcia-Duran et al, 2016). It may be of more benefit if the European project is dealt more grounds in the policy making arena and be part of the institutions agenda, as it is not only and merely about market integration, but its ideals reach a spread of a European identity and the proliferation of a sense of this identity and the obligations that come along with it among member states. “[...] The identity dimension is based on people’s identification with the EU and items tapping into pride in being an EU citizen, feeling close to other Europeans and their culture and history, as well as adherence to EU symbols such as the flag. The affective dimension reflects an emotional response to the ideals embodied in the integration process, whereas the utilitarian dimension refers to support based on the specific costs and benefits associated with membership in the EU” (Balzacq et al, 2019).

In terms of EU Grand Strategy, one of its main challenges as suggested by various scholars, but namely Simon Luis, is that it lacks a sovereignty of militant power, and to double down on this, Douglas Webber, emphasizes how the EU seeks to solve the foreign ‘hurdles’, threats or general challenges around it through its economic leverage by imposing sanctions. These sanctions can be seen in the examples of taking back the access of a second targeted party to financial aid, or access to the Market (Webber, 2016). This can be one of the actors relating to the intensification of controversy around immigrations and outer borders, as it is a topic most prevalent in Euroscepticism. While sanctions do indeed play a role

and are effective, it does not hold back from the desire of some member states to yield more militant deterrence like the rest of the major leading and rising powers. In his 2017 State of the Union Address speech at Brussels, Jean Claude Juncker -famously known for being head of the EU Commission from 2014 to 2019- has brought borders security and put emphasis on it, yet also insisted on Europe's responsibility to be remain an open haven for those seeking refuge and help. Though indeed Juncker also spoke on European values that he defined in 'freedom, equality, and love', under which an openness to immigration lays, yet throughout the entire speech not once was culture, European culture or identity brought up. Nonetheless, the president made point to mention the Parliament, and Council's work along the Commission, in both gratitude and anticipation for working towards goals yet to be reached until the end of their then running term at 2019 (Juncker - speech, 2017). But most definitely what one can take from this speech is that Juncker added the parliament with much enthusiasm to the policy and decision-making process. In chronological context, this speech was more so of relevance as it was affirming to the agenda Juncker laid out in 2014 that he labeled 'a new start for Europe' a very ambitious piece for his candidacy at the time.

I do believe it to be pivotal to look at how the EU institution view and contextualize the EU especially at time of decline as some scholars and political experts would put it (Simon 2013, Webber 2016, Winn 2015). I mentioned earlier how the trade part of EU Grand Strategy is not addressing rising powers of the B.I.C, this can be considered as one of the Union's Grand Strategy shortcomings, a lack of regard to the 'other'. More shortcomings can be seen in how the Euro

currency was unsuccessful in replacing the Dollar as the world's reserve currency, especially after the 2008 Euro crisis, despite the hard lobbying and policy implementation of the EU through the world bank (Webber, 2015). Moreover, a matter that raises doubt among Eurosceptics is the southern debt crisis which the EU was not able to get ahead of for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did beat it to a claim of the crisis resolution superseding it to some extent in its local matters, relatively to Europe (Winn, 2016). This and more helps in understand the contextual circumstance of the EU especially between 2010 and 2019 that marked the end of the Juncker's Commission term, and it comes at no surprise that Euroscepticism grew considerably among elites, and citizens alike; furthermore, showing that the EU Grand Strategy is far from an all-comprehensive formulation. Yet under Juncker's administration, the Commission has shown lineaments of Grand Strategy, in his words "I see it as my key task to rebuild bridges in Europe after the crisis" (Juncker, 2014) were the words of Juncker in his Political Guidelines for his 2014 candidacy. These words initiate a trail of Grand Strategy, his word mirror a reflection on the state of Europe at the time he came into power in 2014, after a series of hardships the Union endured, at their head the Euro crisis that led in a domino effect to Brexit and a further reignition of Euroscepticism (Stathman and Trenz, 2015), emphasizing the decline backdrop from earlier, all of which affects the Union's self-perception and Juncker's Grand Strategy. The first path the Commission took with the new administration was to 'Rebuild Europe'. The Commission had a very clear goal to enhance and empower the European Union's presence abroad, but to remedy that, it had to look into internal issues where the crises that piled

on the Union had some internal issues characteristics which shook the unity baseline within the EU. Notably, Juncker asserted that in the pursuit for this Union fortification and empowerment, the admission of a new member state would not be considered until the Union is first strengthened (Juncker, 2014). The *Rebuilding of Europe* as strategic approach to what can be, is not merely an attempt by the Commission to rebuild on what is, and enhance on it, but in fact Juncker made it clear that he relies on adding new elements than to simply run after pre-existent ones. For instance, the Digital Single Market idea, as an innovative one that not only is fiscally favorable to the Union in the profits it can generate, but it is a solution that takes into account the new modern available resources that keep up with innovation and the digital world, an initiative that opens the EU to new possibilities. The benefits of which can be immediately felt not only by businesses, sectors on a macro scale, but even individuals in their quotidian lives. For a framework of Grand Strategy, I approach the Juncker's *Political Guidelines* as a basis, it also provided framework for the Commission's grand strategic framework, especially considering that it served as a reference or even template to other strategies like the Digital Single Market strategy (DSMs). Rebuilding Europe as an initiative is a compilation of goals, has many aims that touch up on different domains, like the monetary side by catering to financial institutions through growth focused plans that involve investments into these institutions. But more relevant to this thesis is the political side that concerns itself with a democratic deficit rejecting a technocratic dialogue but seeking a political one instead, showing expectations for the Council to cooperate and keep the dialogue open, to tackle a populist threat, and a political crisis in the EU, and

emphasized the relationship between the Commission and the national parliaments, a relationship that should be characterized by transparency above all (Juncker, 2014: 12-13). Another political aim that touched on the civilian side is issues with public security generated from the terrorism and immigration threats and more (Juncker, 2014: 10). What can be considered as impressive as well about the Political guidelines is their regard for citizens' experiences, and an aim for their facilitation by linking national judicial systems to one another to ease bureaucratic procedures that citizens rely on most (Juncker, 2014: 10). For its political goals, and aside from the Council- the Commission sought to also involve and enhance its intra-institutional relations by involving the parliament in its decision-making (Juncker, 2014), this not only helps the ties and reach of the Commission but also legitimizes its actions. Moreover, the agenda for security is one in which the parliament was also involved, and where the Commission elaborated on the political problems it seeks to solve (European Commission, 2015) as can be examined in the Single Market Strategy for Europe (SMSE) commission working document, among which I would like to point out to the guaranteeing of public space safety. As I briefly mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, the Commission looks to remedy the effects and rifts created by crises that can be seen as external, but their consequences touch the internal innerworkings of the EU that the Union, and in the SMSE we can see an example of that, since the Commission targets problems like Terrorism and crime across Member States, but by virtue of seeking to secure a safe Union space, the Commission indirectly stimulates and promotes unity between member states and addresses the threat of fragmentation among them. The Commission used

what can be described as “principled pragmatism” in respect of an ideological framework of *the Rebuilding of Europe* by the Commission, as it brings up European values in its staff working documents as an element incorporated within, these values that were initially launched with the founding treaties, and as Juncker still emphasizes in his 2017 speech, his administration is bent on liberty values. This point despite one on which we can raise questions on whether or not this is how the Commission identifies itself, it is still no surprise that a relatedness to these values give more legitimacy to the actions of the institution, especially as it is one of the institutions overlooking, or acting as a guardian of the treaties.

Conclusion:

Tackling identity in regards to any one particular topic that applies to social sciences is rather a difficult and challenging process that can be riddled with blurriness. Identity is a rough notion to encapsulate in either one of collective, social, community, personal, or national identity. To land on an one relevant to this research, identity had to be grasped in both European identity and national identity, both that can be parallel to one another. These two identities also seemed daunting to EU institutions as navigating the both of them, and fueling the both of them is hard to do, especially when both parts must remain satisfied, and intact for the continuation of the European Project. Yet the EU is riddled in its current state -and since the nineties- of skepticism that represents the doubts of some of the elite, the public and even countries of the Union's capabilities, and future in an ever-changing world. A decline of the EU in the face of a world transformed is more noticeable in political, diplomatic and economic shortcomings (Webber, 2015), this and if anything, only fuels the member states' skepticism, especially when as we saw in the previous chapter one is able to hold on to their national identity, embrace the citizenship and membership within the EU yet question its regime and policies as inadequate. Rise of skepticism can be due to various other factors, but for a master thesis that wanted to concern itself with what is really European, civil and concerning of identity and institutions, I disregarded the military or economic dimensions through which Euroscepticism can be discussed, and in which it is actually discussed most predominantly. To uncover this Euroscepticism, I had to look into

EU institutions and the extent of their awareness of said skepticism. Indeed, and as it seems, Euroscepticism has grown too large in recent decades that no political enterprise can simply afford to ignore it, especially when even political personal, representatives, and even some elite hold a view skeptic of the Union, “both sceptics and supporters (of the EU) are wary of further supranational organization of decision making. These policy and regime concerns are shared by a majority of citizens. Hence, they deserve careful consideration by national and European political elites alike” (De Vries, 2018: 210). It has become rather normal to publicly side with this phenomenon in EU institutions. To understand them, a revisiting of their origins, ideology, and interest was due.

Intergovernmental and supranational institutions alike have held ideologies that go back to their founding days

Though concerns about a lack of identity in the Union is what fuels this skepticism such as concerns for European businesses that have moved past the EU into a more global existence, like the example of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) by no decision of its own but rather a push back it received from the EU due to being dropped after its almost half a century long contract’s end by 2002 (Saurugger and Thatcher, 2019). The privatization of various sectors puts a decline in the incentivization of companies to adhere to a particular or unified European identity. Or else the infamous immigration crisis, from it rose a large debate, and has become a contested issue in a number of member states. Immigration in essence is not just a matter of security and rights, but it is also about the creation of boundaries; not so much so in terms of the outer boundaries of the EU, but the inner boundaries where identity is put into

consideration. Immigration only became more and more politicized in the recent decades (Risse 2010, chap 9). With use of Leruth's handbook of Euroscepticism, I highlighted in the first chapter the scant research on how Euroscepticism influences the public policy, though I attempted to show that in terms of public representation of some institutions that are supranational, Euroscepticism cornered them into a position where 'excessive' European integration was frowned upon and thus had to be less emphasized in their discourses, statements, declarations, agendas and public outings; some scholars identify such changes as reform (Brack and Costa, 2012) but I suggest it is nothing but adaptive adjustment to the EU's political climate. Euroscepticism has not been however a glaringly paralyzing issue in the EU, as it found itself a middle ground of coexisting along varying views, and terms like Eurorealist were invoked in the Eurosceptic discourse, moreover, with Members of the European Parliament that had no issue voicing their doubts out loud.

As I have made sure to state in the introduction, one of the purposes of this thesis is to also define and understand Grand Strategy in order to grasp that of the EU. Putting Grand Strategy in its historical context was an unavoidable to signal and rid of its militant bias, especially since some one can easily fall into the over military characterization of the Grand Strategy of a country by looking at its security and defense policies. Instead, the components of Grand Strategy were more important, ends, means and how they are linked, this proved useful later when goals of certain institutions like the Commission (EC) and the ends it uses. Much similarly to Euroscepticism, Grand Strategy has been elaborated much open in relation to different fields like international relations, security studies,

and more. To define it past the generic line of being the employment of a state's resources at the highest order, I used Silove's (2018) three understandings resolve that divides Grande Strategy into Grand Behavior, Grand Principles, and Grand Plans. From this I propose that policies like the National Security Policy (NSS) by the Security Council is an example of policy in execution as well as Grand Plans. What I would deem as a relevant contribution of this thesis is its consideration of Grand Strategy as a goal in its own right, while other works in the same line would see it an inherent or innate process within a state, and that its sovereignty enables this strategizing practice on the macro level, with an assumed access to all the tools required for it. This research tries to prove the opposite, especially with the subject at hands being an organization, and its instrumentalization of resources and institutions is not entirely deliberate and free but depends on the contribution and collaborative work of constituting member states. But I would go beyond to add that the European Union is not only an international organization but is much more unique in construct, and the least that can be said about its intricacy, is that it is a 'web of governance and institutional systems'. The second part of the second chapter theorizes the linking between identity, Euroscepticism and Grand Strategy. Initially, I viewed the Commission's interactions to be telling of what kind of vision they hold and represent, as well as their regard to identity (Commission's survey), and its representative declarations where a strategy can be spotted. I used the Commission's working documents and strategies, along Juncker's contributions to make the Commission a modular working subject illustrating a crossover of Grand Strategy, and European unity; where I found that the Commission -

especially under Juncker's administration- has been a forerunner in reconceptualizing the Union, its potential and a rebuilding of its identity. What comes across as most

This research comes across as enthusiastic in looking at more than one concept to study, and while that may undermine not really dwelling deep enough into any single one of them by expanding on its theories, and the literature or research around it, I see the real contribution of this research to be the combining of different topics, and trying to link them together by detecting there being a cross over, formulating how each topic hosts an aspect of the other within it, and make a reflection on that. I do suppose that such a study would serve well under an expanded PhD study research that would allow it the space to incorporate more documentation, literature, and a revisiting of the historical side of each topic in more details for contextualization's sake. I suppose my research opens more questions than answers them, but I see it as advantageous to not shy away from topics with proximate fields, especially under the umbrella of a unifying organization like the EU, that can make the initiative of research interesting and worthwhile, as it remains an unparalleled unique political body.

Lastly, I would like to add that I see a benefit in raising such questions, or even intentions of developing on views that question the state of the EU from different angles, that is if we consider its state now mid-2022. In an ever changing world, but mostly with changing circumstances caused by the Ukraine war, and Russia's invasion to some of its territory, a security threat is verily launched, a new refugee wave is upon the rest of Europe, and this presents a critical time at which the Union's capabilities will be put under the lens. The uncertainty around

the entire situation is what adds to the gravity of it, and for the proximity and direct impact of the Union and its member states from such a collision with Russia, the future may seem uncertain, and with the advancements that occur, it would also be interesting to know how Eurosceptics will view this months down the line. At such a time, I think Grand Strategy derives more importance and relevance.

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