

Master thesis

*Between theory and practice: The African Peace Facility
and the securitization of EU development policy*

by

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Abstract


The African Peace Facility (APF), recently replaced by the European Peace Facility, was the EU's primary mechanism to fund African-led peace and security operations. The Facility introduced several changes to EU policy, including a new funding structure: The APF was financed by the European Development Fund, even though the Facility was ineligible as Official Development Assistance. This sparked a debate among policymakers and academic scholars about whether the APF has securitized EU development policy. However, many studies neglect the security-development nexus, which played a central role in the Facility. The thesis analyses securitizing practices which are distinct from the approach suggested by the classic securitization theory (i.e., the speech act). Through an in-depth analysis of primary and secondary sources, this thesis attempts to unpack the extent to which the APF securitized EU development policy. The analysis finds evidence of securitization but also of a developmentization of security policy, demonstrating how the Facility constantly oscillated between security and development and concludes that the APF embodied the security-development nexus.

Keywords: *African Peace Facility, security-development nexus, securitization, European Union, EU development policy*

Declaration

I, Lea Siebel declare herewith that this thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of works of others. I also declare that no part of this thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

Leiden, 17.06.2022

A rectangular area containing a handwritten signature in blue ink. The signature reads "Lea Siebel" in a cursive script. The background is a light gray grid pattern.

Lea Siebel

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Abbreviations

AMIS	<i>African Union Mission in Sudan</i>
AMISOM	<i>African Union Mission in Somalia</i>
APF	<i>African Peace Facility</i>
APSA	<i>African Peace and Security Architecture</i>
ASF	<i>African Standby Force</i>
ATIM	<i>African Transition Mission in Somalia</i>
AU	<i>African Union</i>
AUC	<i>African Union Commission</i>
CBSD	<i>Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development</i>
CEWS	<i>Continental Early Warning System</i>
DAC	<i>Development Assistance Committee</i>
DEV	<i>DG Development and Relations with African, Caribbean, and Pacific States</i>
DEVCO	<i>DG International Cooperation and Development</i>
DG	<i>Directorate General, Directorate General</i>
EEAS	<i>The European External Action Service</i>
EP	<i>European Parliament</i>
EPF	<i>European Peace Facility</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
EUTM Somalia	<i>European Union Training Mission in Somalia</i>
HR	<i>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</i>
IGAD	<i>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</i>
INTPA	<i>DG International Partnerships</i>
JCC	<i>Joint Coordination Committee of the APF</i>
MDG	<i>Millennium Development Goals</i>
MISCA	<i>International Support Mission to the Central African Republic</i>
OAU	<i>Organization of African Unity</i>
OECD	<i>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</i>
PSC	<i>AU Peace and Security Council</i>
PSO	<i>Peace Support Operation, Peace Support Operation</i>
REC	<i>Regional Economic Community</i>
SSR	<i>Security Sector Reform</i>
UN	<i>United Nations</i>

I. Introduction

“As Africa takes up the challenge of peace, Europe is at its side: The most important aim of the Peace Facility is to create the necessary conditions for development. There can be no development without peace and security.” (European Commission, 2005, p.4)

In 2004 the European Union (EU) set up the African Peace Facility (APF). It was the primary mechanism to support peace and development in Africa and the “most important tool of the Africa-EU partnership” (Council of the EU, 2014, p.8). The EU repeatedly emphasized the APF was set up at the request of the African Union (AU). However, it was the result of over ten years of negotiations between EU institutions and member states and with AU representatives, regional organizations, and African states (Olsen, 2009, p.163). The EU and its member states had a significant role in shaping the instrument before the formal request by the AU.

The APF was designed as a fund managed by the European Commission (later jointly with the Council of the EU). Contributions had to be requested by the AU and went towards funding African-led Peace and Security Operations (PSO). At the APF's launch, the mottos “African solutions to African problems” and “African ownership” (of the Facility) were constantly emphasized, whether in brochures or by EU representatives. The EU declared the creation of the APF as a milestone in the EU-Africa partnership and an important step toward equality of the partners (European Commission, 2005).

While Facility was designed as a fund, this thesis argues that it was later used more as an instrument to further specific EU security objectives. Funding for the APF came from the European Development Fund (EDF), which was met with strong opposition from the European Parliament (EP) and some EU delegations. Several member states were also critical and argued funds allocated for development aid should not finance military missions (Council of the EU, 2005; Delputte & Orbie, 2020). The Commission advocated for the APF's development focus by pointing to the decision-making power of the African Union. The Council also proclaimed funding the APF through the EDF was only a “short-term solution.” (Council of the EU, 2005, p.3). However, until the APF was superseded by the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, it remained funded with development money.

This ongoing use of funds allocated for development to a Facility with strong security implications sparked some debates over a potential securitization of EU development policy through the APF. Some see the Facility as a prime example of securitization, while others argue the APF embodies the security-development nexus. This thesis aims to contribute to this

academic debate by analyzing indicators of a potential securitization in the APF and proposing an assessment of the extent of securitization in the Facility. Therefore, the central topic of this thesis is the African Peace Facility and its impact on EU development policy. The APF is analyzed as a case study to give an overview of its history and influence on EU development policy. It aims to analyze to which extent securitizing practices are visible in the APF. The findings are then used to assess the impact of the APF on EU development policy. A particular focus is also placed on the influence of the APF on security policy and the security-development nexus. The study's timeframe is from 2004 until 2021, which corresponds to when the APF was operational.

Relevance of the research object

The APF was the primary mechanism of the EU to fund peace and security activities in Africa; thus, it has had a significant impact on EU policy towards African countries. Especially in development and security policy, it was regarded as an innovation because the Facility emphasized African ownership and solutions (European Commission, 2003). The Facility has also been subject to discussions within and between various EU institutions (Sicurelli, 2008) and member states (Council of the EU, 2005). Nevertheless, relatively few scholars have analyzed the APF in-depth: While the Facility is frequently briefly mentioned in academic journals, only a few studies primarily focus on the APF, making it a somewhat under-researched topic (Carbone 2013, p.104).

In the academic literature, there is a consensus that EU policy has become increasingly securitized, especially in the field of migration (Furness & Gänzle, 2016). Within the EU context, scholarly attention has been primarily focused on the securitization of migration as evidence of an evolving subordination of development to EU security policy. In the academic debate, some scholars regard APF as an example of securitization of development (Carbone, 2013; Delputte & Orbie, 2020; Keukeleire & Raube, 2013). However, their sole argument remains that the APF funds its security operations with the development money, so it must be an example of securitization. While this is a prevailing argument, it is only one aspect of this complex instrument with both security and development dimensions. It also underwent several changes and cannot be simply ascribed to only development policy or security policy. The APF eludes quick assumptions as it also needs to be understood in the context of the security-development-nexus. There are several hints at securitization, but the APF also inherits some elements of a development-based approach. How do these aspects fit together with the security-development nexus that play a significant role in the Facility? Therefore, the thesis attempts to

suggest an answer to this research puzzle and provide a more in-depth analysis of the APF, outlining several aspects and indications.

EU policymakers were eager to establish that the APF is a development instrument because of its funding and because it was (initially) managed by the Directorate General (DG) for Development; it also featured the APF prominently during the EU's development days (European Commission, 2018b, p.25). However, the APF has always been an instrument of both development and security policy because of the activities it funded and the objectives it pursued. Analyzing the APF through the analytical lenses of a possible securitization is helpful because it contributes to not only understanding its swaying between the two policy fields. But also the extent and role of the security-development nexus in the APF and EU development policy. Precisely this oscillation prompts the understanding that the APF has not been securitized but that EU policy has been securitized *through* the Facility.

Additionally, since its creation, the APF underwent several changes in structure and decision-making power, with many significant reforms taking place already within the first few years after the Facility's creation in 2004. This affected strategy, priorities, the role of the AU, and the facility's share of short-term and long-term goals. A thorough analysis of the APF, which traces its evolution, is needed to understand the Facility's influence on EU development policy. Lastly, the new EPF (the APF's successor, see HR Mogherini, 2018) became operational in 2021 and is argued to change the EU's policy approach toward African countries significantly (Strategic Communications, 2022). Therefore, analyzing the APF against the backdrop of the new Facility also provides insights into the APF's effect on EU development policy. The thesis aims to bridge the literature gap on the APF regarding securitization and the security-development nexus. It attempts to provide an in-depth analysis of the APF, which goes beyond the single argument of a securitization due to the EDF as the funding source. The thesis also attempts to advance the scholarly understanding of the APF's influence on EU development policy. Therefore, the thesis addresses the following research question: *To what extent has EU development policy been securitized through the African Peace Facility?* The hypothesis is that the APF securitized EU development policy to a certain extent and the security-development nexus had a significant role in furthering this process.

While this [first chapter](#) established some of the background and the research question, the [next chapter](#) elaborates on the theoretical framework and presents relevant concepts such as securitization and the security-development nexus. It also proposes an analytical framework of securitizing practices to be used later in the analysis. Moreover, the chapter also reviews the

existing literature on the APF and highlights where the thesis is situated within the academic debate. The [third chapter](#) explains the selected research methodology: The thesis employs a mixed-methods approach, combining primary sources and secondary research analysis to answer the research question. The scope of the research project spans from 2003 (the creation of the APF) until 2021 (the set-up of the EPF and the subsequent discontinuation of the APF). An overview of the APF's history and structure is given in the [fourth chapter](#), and significant changes are highlighted up until the EPF. In the penultimate [fifth chapter](#), the previously established analytical framework of securitizing practices is applied to the case of the APF and proposes an answer to the research question. Finally, the [sixth and last chapter](#) summarizes the main point of the thesis, highlights its limits, and suggests potential approaches for future research.

II. Theoretical Framework

The subsequent sections form the theoretical framework of the thesis: They review scholarly research on key terms, concepts and, based on the literature, propose the concept of securitizing practices to be used for the subsequent analysis. However, first, the following section summarizes the academic debate on the APF and situates this thesis to emphasize its contribution.

1. Overview of the academic debate on the APF and the EPF

The following section reviews the existing literature and academic analyses on the APF and its successor, the European Peace Facility. It then summarizes the scholarly research on both instruments and situates the thesis within the academic debate.

The African Peace Facility

The APF has received less scholarly attention than other EU instruments. The existing analyses can be categorized as (1) the APF as a result of policy experimentation, (2) neo-colonial aspects of the Facility, (3) tugs wars of EU institutions over the APF (4) and its oscillation between security and development.

Rakotonirina (2007) argues that in terms of policy experimentation, the EU considers Africa its privileged experimental ground, and the APF is an example of this approach. Tapping into development funds to support PSOs was first tested with the APF. Once established, the APF laid the groundwork for other EU instruments to be funded similarly (Delputte & Orbie, 2020, pp.246–247). Merket (2016), however, argues the Facility was the result of an “accidental convergence of bureaucratic interests” (p.112). Carbone (2013) refutes this claim by stating the APF was meticulously drafted, leaving no room for accidents (p.103)

Besides the critique of the use of development funds from the APF, there are only a few critical analyses of the APF, especially from a post-colonial perspective. The article by Mattei and Nader (2008) criticizes the EU’s indirect approach to peace in African countries, exemplified in the APF. They conclude this serves EU interests primarily as the indirect approach is a cost-effective way to exert influence on African countries. Olivier (2011) argues the APF is an example of the unequal relationship between Europe and Africa. Moreover, today's African Standby Force's capabilities would not have been possible without the EU’s funding through the APF. This may be problematic as it creates a heavy reliance on EU funds and, thus, effectively, a dependence of African capabilities on European funders (p.63).

In her analysis, Sicurelli (2008) examines the tug-war between Commission and Council over the APF in the case of South Africa. The country declared its interest in partaking in African peacekeeping missions, presenting a predicament to the Council and Commission: South Africa is not eligible to receive EDF funds because of its advanced economic development. However, its participation was considered beneficial to boosting the African security structure (p.227) and was ultimately accepted. Iwano (2015) describes how the Council initially did not have considerable interest in the Facility. However, with the Council's increasing ambitions to become a security provider, it recognized the potential of the Facility to become an instrument of EU external policy, through which interventions could be realized cost-effectively. Thus, a competition between both institutions arose in which both wanted to control the Facility. This resulted in a new management mechanism for the APF.

As previously mentioned, several scholars point toward the APF as an example of securitization. They base this argument *only* on the aspect that APF had substantial security implications (supporting military missions) but was funded by the development budget (e.g., Furness, 2011, Keukeleire & Raube, 2013; Furness & Bergmann, 2018). However, these quick looks neglect the insertion of a development approach, the cooperation with the AU, and other essential aspects of understanding the APF. Carbone (2013) is among the few scholars considering the impact of the security-development nexus for the APF. He discusses the meaning of the security-development nexus for the APF and states the Facility sways in an “uneasy” nexus between securitization and the nexus, without further expanding on this point (p.122). Moreover, he argues that while the APF, as an epitome of the securitization of development policy, is a continuous debate in policy circles, it “has found little reflection in the academic literature” (p.103).

The European Peace Facility

With its operational launch in 2021, the academic literature on the European Peace Facility started to grow. The first analysis of the new instrument emerged in 2018 when the EPF was presented in a proposal by the then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini. Based on this proposal, Furness and Bergmann (2018) discuss the shortcomings of the APF and how the proposed EPF may address these. In their analysis, they focus mainly on the funding problem the APF had, which could be mitigated through the newly proposed funding structure of the EPF as described in Mogherini’s proposal. Koenig (2018) adds to this argument by explaining the new EPF may also ease the funding issues of the EU-led military missions, as the EPF proposal also puts forward a new funding mechanism for both African-led and EU-led missions.

In an early analysis shortly after the publication of Mogherini's proposal, Paccaud (2018) explains what the new EPF would mean for various stakeholders, including the AU and African countries, but also EU member states, especially France. He also concludes the EPF means discontinuing the development policy in the Peace Facility (p.115). Since the EPF became operational, academic analyses focus to a large extent on the possibility of EU arms exports, as offered by the EPF: Berman (2021) warns of potential misuse of the lethal equipment and a creeping disassociation from the partnership with African partners. In a brief analysis, Teodoro (2021) argues the EPF already has substantial implications for the image of the EU as an actor because the EPF is a hard power tool paving the way for the EU as a military actor (p.97). Martinez (2021) examines the new features of the EPF, its potential impact, and how the new Facility may be used to address the shortcomings of its predecessor. There is currently a lack of analyses examining continuities and changes from the APF to the EPF and what these may mean for EU development and security policy. The thesis aims to help bridge this gap and contribute to the academic debate on this topic.

2. Security

In academia, the comprehension of security goes beyond being a simple term and is frequently understood as a concept. Questions such as “who is securing whom?” “How?” and “why” all produce different understandings of the concept, depending on the respective context, actor, and ideology. It also exhibits a power relation between a protector and a protected, with varying levels of agency. Moreover, the understanding of security is also subject to constant development: Chandler (2007) argues national security was of the highest importance during the Cold War. It also encompassed military security as it reached into the everyday life of citizens. Moreover, he claims after the Cold War and the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, international security rose in importance, adding a different dimension to security. Before, the state was the most important actor and often synonymous with being the security provider. However, with the dimension of international security, the concept of security was extended to include non-state actors or supranational organizations, which became important stakeholders in security (p.363).

Ball (2019) proposes three understandings of security: As a term, a concept, and a tool. These definitions do not exclude each other but are concurrent, sometimes on multiple levels. First, he suggests a general understanding used in everyday life, referring to the desire for the absence of any harm (Ball, 2019, p.1). Second, he explains security as an analytical concept to examine societal developments such as policy, institutions, and governance structures, including

understanding changes and continues. Third, security as a tool describes political processes and actors safeguarding a specific political unit or entity (Ball, 2019, p.1). Here, security stresses prioritizing or addressing a given issue perceived as a threat. This is already closely related to the theory of securitization, which argues there are no security issues as such but that everything may be framed as a security issue and thus securitized. This theory of securitization is explained in the following section.

2.1 Theory of Securitization

There are several understandings of securitization. As it is impossible to present all the existing theories on securitization, the thesis focuses on the most prominent: The following section first presents the most widely used theory of securitization, the so-called “Copenhagen School.” Secondly, this section highlights key aspects of the “Paris School,” an updated approach to securitization, which later also forms the basis for the analytical approach of this thesis.

The Copenhagen School: No such thing as a security threat

The most prominent securitization theory was published in various works by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (referred to as the "Copenhagen School"). It emerged after the Cold War and challenged the prevailing opinion that security was inevitably linked to the state (Buzan et al., 1998, p.15). The Copenhagen School’s securitization theory suggests there are no “security issues” as such. Instead, everything may be securitized through speech acts, indicating securitization is a discursive practice (Léonard 2010, p.235). Van Munster (2012) summarizes the three rhetorical criteria the speech act needs to fulfill: First, a claim that the existence of a reference object is threatened. The second criterion is a demand to utilize exceptional countermeasures. These exceptional measures are actions never or only rarely previously applied in this context (Léonard 2010, p.237). Lastly, the third criterion is to argue that non-compliance with the law is justified to counter the threat (van Munster 2012, para. 1).

A securitizing actor enunciates the act of securitization. This may be a governmental official, a non-state actor, a single person, or a unit. Olivié and Pérez (2021) note securitizing actors are often elites (p.1905). In the speech act, the securitizing actor refers to a reference subject they want to protect from said issue, i.e., the security threat. In order to justify the countermeasures to protect the reference subject, an audience is needed. Only when the audience accepts the securitizing speech act, an issue becomes securitized (Buzan et al., 1998, p.41). Interestingly, the audience and the reference object are not necessarily part of the same group. A referent object may be protected from an issue without approving the securitization as the audience.

There may also be a discrepancy between the designated and actual referent object (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.40-52).

As a political tool, securitization may be used in several policy fields; migration and environmental policy are prominent. Development policy has also been examined from the analytical lens of securitization theory. While there is no fixed definition of what a securitization of development policy characterizes, a common theme is visible throughout the academic debate: Securitization in development policy means subordinating development policy to a broader security agenda (see Abrahamsen, 2005; Brown & Grävingsholt, 2016; Keukeleire & Raube, 2013). In other words, a hierarchy between the two policy fields is established, with security policy as the dominating component. When development is securitized, its goals and activities primarily serve the security interests of the referent object or those set by the securitizing actor. In this study, the securitizing actors are mainly the EU Commission and Council. The referent objects are assumed to be European citizens, while the audiences are the aid recipients and the international community, which may also vary.

In some cases, there may also be additional “hidden” referent objects, for example, large donors or influential member states. Their security interests are prioritized but not explicitly named as a referent object and are thus not visible to the audience as the referent object. The audience may be European citizens, the media, and to some extent also other international actors. The aid-receiving society is not a referent object but may be part of the audience. There are cases in which securitized issues are not accepted as a “legitimate threat” by the aid receiving country, i.e., the audience. However, the securitization act can still be accepted if the audience (or parts of it) are also the referent object (Côté, 2016). When development policy is securitized, it only pursues its primary aim (poverty reduction) to serve the broader security agenda of the securitizing actor or the referent object(s). It also highlights a power shift in the securitization of development policy: The donor’s security interests are favored over those of the aid recipient.

The Paris School: Securitization beyond the speech act:

A key point of the Copenhagen School’s theory is that the act of securitization is an *impromptu* moment, and securitization is used to initiate a state of emergency. This is also represented in the unit of analysis, the speech act, as a singular event. In other words: “To securitize an issue means to take it out of the normal realm of political discourse and to signal a need for it to be addressed urgently and with exceptional means” (Hyde-Price, 2001, p.38). In this understanding, securitization is not a process that develops but rather a “spontaneous” action marking a brief transition moment between a threat-free environment and a state of emergency.

However, this understanding of securitization has been challenged, with many scholars arguing to consider securitization as a process (Léonard, 2010; Popovic, 2007). They claim when an issue is securitized, it happens as a process where the threat is re-emphasized across a timespan. This theory is contrary to the understanding of securitization as a singular event, as indicated in the Copenhagen School's theory. If securitization is understood as a process, then the speech act is no longer a sufficient unit of analysis: A process is not singular but rather ongoing or a continuum (Abrahamsen, 2005, p.59). It also operates more extensively than the relatively short timeframe of the speech act.

Additionally, in the understanding of the Copenhagen school, the measures following the speech act to address said security threat are no longer part of the securitizing process. These are only used to fulfill the message of the speech act; the securitization process has already happened. Securitizing practices, conversely, are a carrier of securitization and securitize a specific issue further through employment. This means the actual securitization happens when a specific practice is used. Moreover, other scholars argued that relying on the speech act as the sole analysis method limits the study of securitization (Léonard, 2010, p.235) and marginalizes certain voices (Nyman, 2013, p.61). Therefore, different analysis methods have been put forward; several scholars suggested studying practices instead of speech acts to understand securitization as a process (e.g., Léonard, 2007).

Out of this debate, the so-called "Paris School" emerged, with Didier Bigo among its most prominent representatives. Bigo theorized alternatives to understand securitization beyond the speech act. He states, "It is possible to securitize certain problems without speech or discourse, and the military and the police have known that for a long time. The practical work, discipline, and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse" (Bigo, 2001, p.194). In other words, extending the focus of securitization beyond its discursive practice is a more up-to-date approach to analyzing securitization. According to Léonard (2010), a focus on practices instead of discourse is more fruitful when analyzing securitization, especially in the EU context. (p.236). She partly ascribes this to the unique political framework where "[...] dramatic securitizing speech acts are seldom identified (Léonard 2010, p.236). Balzacq (2008) supports this practice-focused approach; understanding the complex political nature of the EU can "[...] be dealt with by shifting the study of securitization away from discourse and towards the empirical referents of policy" (p.76).

However, contrary to the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization with the speech act as a clearly identified and measurable method of analysis, the Paris School is still missing such an

analytical lens: There is no general definition of securitizing practices yet, and every analysis presents its understanding. For example: In her article, Léonard identifies two types of securitizing practices in the context of migration: First, those measures traditionally used to tackle issues primarily perceived to be security issues (such as drug trafficking or terrorism). Second, extraordinary measures mean those practices are never or rarely applied in the context of migration (Léonard 2010, p.238). Léonard (2010) argues separate analyses must unpack and evaluate what can be considered a securitizing practice for other policy fields (p.236). In order to analyze securitizing practices in the APF and EU development policy, the following section summarizes the trends and approaches to securitizing practices put forward in several academic articles. The identified practices are then applied to the APF and tested on their use in analyzing and understanding securitization in EU development policy.

2.2 Securitizing development through practices: A suggested approach

As previously suggested, the analytical lens of practices is the most promising for understanding the securitization process in the EU context. Even though there is no fixed definition for what a securitizing practice in development policy is, common themes can be identified in the academic debate: Olivie and Pérez (2021) argue that practices of securitization are both visible in narratives and aid flows (p.1903). Brown and Grävingholt (2016) add the category of institutional structures, defining securitizing practices as “[..] changes in discourse, aid flows and institutional structures” (pp.3–4). Based on the conceptual work of academics, the following sections present several securitizing practices identified in development policy. They are then categorized, according to Brown and Grävingholt (2016), into aid flows, institutional structures, and narratives.

Aid flows: He who pays the piper calls the tune?

Flows of development money are considered to be amongst the strongest indicator of securitization as they exemplify the donor’s strategic control over development policy and its objectives. In other words: Adjusted spending may reflect adjusted objectives. Two securitizing practices were identified and are explained in the following sub-sections:

(1) Non-ODA eligible activities in development policy

For spending by governments or supranational organizations to qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA), the funded activities must follow specific criteria. These so-called ODA criteria are determined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), specifically, the Development Assistance Committee. Most of the largest foreign aid donors, including the EU institutions and member states (except for Hungary), are members of

this committee. ODA criteria are constantly being reviewed and adjusted if needed. Between 2016 and 2018, the OECD published several clarifications on the eligibility rules for peace and security. According to those, development aid for peace and security may be ODA-eligible; however, only if they are not a “[...] promotion of donors’ security interests”. Military aid does not count as ODA (Development Co-Operation Directorate, 2019, p.1).

If activities of a development policy do not qualify as ODA, they may have security implications that overshadow the development character. When these non-ODA activities make up a significant percentage of the development policy, this may indicate securitization. The EU declares itself the “world's leading donor of Official Development Assistance” and is actively involved in shaping these (European Commission, 2020a, para. 3). Therefore, an EU instrument, funded by development money but largely or entirely ineligible to qualify as ODA, may be used as a practice to securitize EU development policy.

(2) Using development policy solely for furthering security objectives

Donor coordination has been an ongoing effort, and the EU has been eager to synchronize its different activities in foreign policy, security, and development more diligently. However, this sometimes has negative implications for aid-receiving countries (Carbone, 2015, pp.134-136). A convergence of development and security policy, where approaches of the other policy field are integrated and activities coordinated, is welcomed through the security-development nexus. As a securitizing practice, however, the coordination goes beyond the convergence of both policies: Here, the funds for development policy are directed to specific contexts where the donor has already made significant security investments. For example, the case of Afghanistan: Here, western donors allocated their development assistance to those regions they considered to be a priority area for security instead of giving money to the poorest and where it was most urgently needed (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011, p.238). This resulted in funding for development being adjusted according to security priorities and shows “that security concerns can prevail over development concerns” (Keukeleire & Raube, 2013, p.566).

Through this practice, development activities may become subordinate to security activities, with the latter receiving most of the funds (Amer et al., 2012, p.2). This securitizing practice downgrades development policy to a mere accessory of security policy. Its activities and objectives are then solely determined by security objectives. This means the donor’s security interests may “[...] come first, with potentially negative consequences for development.” (Furness & Gänzle, 2016, p.156). Amer et al. (2012) conclude: “Short-term security considerations of rich and powerful countries increasingly override the long-term

developmental challenges of poor regions. (p.2). However, it has to be noted that this practice may also be rooted in *realpolitik* and pragmatism and may not always pursue merely security objectives.

(3) Implementation of development activities by military actors

An often-cited example of this securitizing practice is the one Petřík (2016) presents: In his study, he found that military actors deliver aid supplies or build houses and schools to enhance the military's image among the local population, intending to attain acceptance for later planned military mission (pp.172-174). Another example identified in the literature is the EU's Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development program, in which military players develop the capacity of security and civilian actors (Bergmann, 2017, pp.1-3). In terms of ODA-eligibility, CSBD is not a clear case: It is sometimes regarded as military training and thus excluded; other times considered development policy and therefore eligible. Bergmann (2017) claims this practice contributes to the securitization of EU development policy. He argues CBSD only focuses on building capacity for short-term activities and neglects the long-term perspective (p.1). It may be an example of the subordination of development to security and, therefore, a possible securitizing practice.

Narratives: Reframing and (re-)writing the story of development

As highlighted by the Copenhagen School, language is important to understand securitization. However, language cannot just be traced by looking at discourse or speech acts but also through the analytical lens of practices. Changes in narratives go beyond the "short-term" speech act because they are constantly repeated and thus enforced.

(4) Considering poverty in the Global South as a security risk to the Global North

As previously explained, the primary aim of most EU development policies is to reduce poverty. However, development aid has also been linked to other objectives, be it economic or geopolitical interests. The linkage of security with development is also nothing new, as, e.g., the security-development nexus is well established in EU policymaking (Keukeleire & Raube, 2013, p.557). However, when poverty in aid-receiving countries is framed as a security risk to donor countries, the nexus becomes hierarchized, and the narrative changes: Reducing poverty is no longer a development goal but a security objective.

This may point toward a potential securitization: Brown et al. (2016) find the term "fragile state" is commonly used in securitization processes (p.238). As a securitizing practice, post-conflict states are framed as "fragile states" and fertile soil for security threats to the referent

object. However, this narrative is not only used in post-conflict contexts but to generally denote some African countries as weak states which are considered to inhibit serious threats to Europe as they can “[...] facilitate or cause organized crime, terrorism, illegal immigration, piracy, and other dangerous activities.” (Gibert, 2009, p.633). In this securitizing practice, development policy is not used to assist the local population but to prevent emerging security threats for donor countries, i.e., the referent object. These may be perceived as direct threats to the security, or the securitizing actor may interpret them as international threats when they may only have local implications (Gibert, 2009, p.633). Poverty reduction, a primary development objective, is thus necessary for security management rather than for furthering development. This practice is visible when new development activities are planned and funded with “increasing references to security, conflict, fragile states, terrorism or the perils of migration in development cooperation” (Olivié & Pérez, 2021, p.1906). Popovic (2007) calls this linkage of issues with another previously recognized threat the “security continuum” (p.17). It is different from the speech act, as the narrative is more constantly and, therefore, a process instead of the singular speech act.

(5) Resetting or reframing country ownership

Country ownership is a frequently discussed topic in the aid community (see Dornan, 2017) and was a central result of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Booth, 2012). In his analysis Carbone (2015) states donors have always been reluctant to release control of their development activities, but this phenomenon has become more prominent recently (p.124). This may be ascribed to a post-9/11 development policy that strongly favors results and further reduces the recipient’s autonomy over development processes (p.136). In 2000, the Cotonou agreement introduced a new system of EU-Africa development cooperation emphasizing recipient ownership, intending to put aid-receiving countries in the driver’s seat. He argues this was an attempt to make the aid relationship less asymmetrical and promote African ownership, but some argue this endeavor has failed to promote recipient ownership, concluding: that “more Europe meant less ownership” (Carbone, 2015, p.135).

Even though changing country ownership has been discussed in the context of the security-development nexus, it has not yet been linked to securitization or securitizing practices. However, when looking at the motives behind “reclaiming” ownership (or instead reframing the narrative of who has ownership; as it has been argued, donors never entirely give up ownership), the reasons correlate with the pursuant of the donor’s objectives and thus securitization. When there is declining country ownership, the donor is free to further the

developments they wish to see without negotiating with the aid-receiving country. These may then be used to address security issues primarily threatening donor-country citizens than the aid-receiving society. Therefore, reframing ownership of aid programs or instruments may be considered a securitizing practice. However, reframing ownership may not always be a securitization, as narrative ownership changes could also reflect economic or geopolitical interests.

Whitfield (2009) has argued that when disagreements arise, donors tend to recede control over policies and thus ownership (p.2). What may be perceived as a security threat to the donor may not always be a priority for the aid recipients in developing countries. From a donor's perspective, not having control over development aid may also be considered a security risk itself. The securitizing practice of reframing ownership does not have to come as a fully-fledged exclusion of the aid recipient from all decision-making processes. It may also take the form of discontinuing coordination formats or limiting access to strategic planning and agenda-setting. When ownership of the same activity or instrument is shifted or reframed, its objectives may no longer be aimed at establishing the conditions for development but rather at establishing the conditions to protect the reference object. Then, short-term security interests are prioritized over long-term development goals, which may indicate a securitizing practice.

Institutional structures: Securitizing development on the macro and micro level

As Brown et al. (2016) describe, institutional integration plays a significant role in the securitization of development. The following sub-section describes the securitizing practice of institutional integration of development policy in the EU context.

(6) The institutional or administrative integration of development into other policy pillars

The EU member states have recognized the added value of addressing international security concerns through their common institutions (Furness & Gänzle, 2016, p.141). The EU, its institutions, and its development policy underwent several institutional changes in the last years: Especially the Treaty of Lisbon brought significant changes because it required development cooperation to be carried out within the framework of external action (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). Several DGs were restructured and reintegrated. This integration is visible through the creation of new units within DG Development with clear security implications: The new unit "State fragility and crisis management" is one example (Brown et al., 2016, p.238). Within the European External Action Service (EEAS, a unit for development policy coordination was established, which took over managing some key development instruments (Brown et al., 2016, p.238).

After several prior mergers, the DG Development and Relations with African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (DEV) became DG International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO). It was later integrated into DG International Partnerships (INTPA), effectively becoming part of the EU foreign policy pillar (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, Article 208). Through these changes, development ceased to exist as a separate policy pillar and became an instrument of foreign policy. With that, development policy objectives also became subordinate to foreign and security policy priorities. Therefore, integrating development policy into another policy pillar may be a securitizing practice because development was not a separate policy field but one of the tools to further security objectives. Moreover, this securitizing practice may not only be observed on the macro level with institutional integration but also on the macro level with the administrative integration of development instruments and funds.

Summary of securitizing practices

Reviewing the existing literature on securitization and practices, the section proposed six securitizing practices in which development was subordinate to security policy. These are (1) Non-ODA eligible activities in development policy, (2) Using development policy solely for furthering security objectives, (3) Implementation of development activities by military actors, (4) Considering poverty in the Global South as a security risk to the Global North, (5) Resetting or reframing country ownership and finally, (6) The institutional or administrative integration of development into other policy pillars. In the Analysis chapter of this thesis, these proposed securitizing practices are applied to the case of the APF in order to understand and analyze the extent of the securitization of EU development policy.

3. Development

There is a range of perspectives on what development is; there is no single definition of the term. Thomas (2004) summarizes the challenges of finding a common answer to a term that is contested, complex, and ambiguous (p.1). Development is a political term whose meaning depends on the context and its use to justify policies or agendas, making it even more challenging to define. In many definitions, development has both an economic and a humanitarian dimension: According to the United Nations, “Development is a multidimensional undertaking to achieve a higher quality of life for all people” (UN General Assembly, 1997, pp.1–2).

However, this proposed definition remains somewhat vague; already, the understanding of a sufficient “quality of life” and its improvement are highly dependent on the context and the stakeholders who define them. There may also be a significant difference in its understanding between the policymaker and the aid recipient. Policies furthering development may address food insecurity or lack of access to healthcare. This already shows that development focuses on the process instead of a specific outcome, with long-term goals emphasizing the process. As this thesis analyzes security and development policy in the EU context, it uses the EU’s definition when referring to the development: “The primary objective of EU development policy, as laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.” (European Union, 2019, p.2).

Development is also a multi-level concept, with governments, agencies, local actors, and international organizations among the stakeholders involved. There is also an evident power relation, with actors on the policy's giving and receiving end, emphasizing its political nature because the question of “who has power?” is essential. Many definitions also reveal a western-centric understanding and social evolutionism, favoring western understandings (i.e., “quality of life”) as the ideal. It highlights the strong link between development and colonialism: In the late 18th century, development was used as one justification to colonize African countries (Chitiyo, 2010, p.24).

After the independence of African countries, development policy was a means to secure access to raw materials (Mattei & Nader, 2008, p.21). Postcolonial literature argues contemporary development policy creates post-colonial dependencies (LaMonica, 2012, para 1). Recently, some scholars argue the security-development nexus is representative of a post-development era, in which development is no longer a separate field but merely a means of security policy (LaMonica, 2012, para 1). Other scholars suggest a diffusion of development approaches into

other policy fields, especially security (see Anderson & Williams, 2011; Pugh et al., 2013). The following section explains this concept of “developmentization of security.”

4. Developmentization of security

Even though the developmentization of security has so far only received little scholarly attention, in comparison to securitization theory, it is not a new concept: Already in 1967, then U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara stated, “Security is development. Without development, there can be no security” (McNamara, 1968, p.149). Different from securitization, there is not yet a formulated theory on developmentization. However, several analyses present examples explicitly or implicitly pointing towards developmentization. From those, some general implications of the concept can be suggested.

On a global scale, Merket (2016) argues that humanitarian interventions are an example of the developmentization of security policy, as humanitarian objectives push the use of security tools (p.7). These are distinct from military interventions, which pursue security interests primarily, while humanitarian interventions are argued to utilize security to achieve humanitarian objectives. This is not uncontested, as some scholars argue that no intervention is driven by humanitarian goals but always by normative or security interests (Jahn, 2012; Waal & Omaar, 1994). Another cited example of developmentization is the concept of human security. Used in security policy, this broader understanding of security adopts a development-based: Here, the state is no longer the sole provider of security, which is also not only tied to the absence of physical violence (Anderson & Williams, 2011, p.6). While human security policy also pursues some short-term goals, it mainly focuses on long-term development objectives, effectively dominating and thus developmentizing security policy.

In the EU context, the developmentization of security is often referenced when discussing Security Sector Reform (SSR). Albrecht et al. (2010) argue that developmentization rose in importance in the 2000s by inserting principles of good governance in security issues (p.76). SSR aims to “transform” the security sector in a specific context to create a secure environment where poverty reduction, development, and good governance can be facilitated (International Cooperation and Development, 2021). This definition already reveals the inherent bias of SSR because the donor or the implementing actor determines what exactly and how it needs to be transformed. It does not necessarily correspond to the interests or objectives of the society in which the program is implemented. The focus is on long-term development objectives instead of short-term security outputs (Albrecht et al., 2010, p.76). While some short-term goals remain, the development aspect dominates, resulting in a developmentization of security policy

(Albrecht et al., 2010, pp.84-85). SSR activities are often implemented by non-state actors, suggesting an indicator of developmentization may be tasking civilian actors with security duties (Petřík, 2016, p.168). Additionally, the previously explained CSBD is sometimes integrated into SSR programs, which may indicate that CSBD could also be considered an example of a developmentization, depending on the context. The EU's approach to SSR is described as a process of the developmentization of security (Albrecht et al., 2010, p.74).

The following conclusion of developmentization can be derived from the discussion: First, developmentization may be strongly connected to the concept of security. While securitization is also associated with migration or climate, developmentization is instead often described only in connection to security policy. Second, developmentization is a process. Like securitization, it frames specific issues as development issues and inserts actors, objectives, and development activities into that other policy field. Furthermore, Pugh et al. (2013) note that developmentization is often not as negatively perceived as is securitization, and it is even welcomed by some NGOs and civil society actors (p.198). They also argue inserting development in security policy may also be considered an easy way to enhance policy coherence by policymakers. The security-development nexus is as much a product of a developmentization of security as it is the result of securitization of development. These processes have contributed to both concepts becoming linked to each other. The genesis of the nexus and its different understandings are the focus of the following section.

5. The security-development nexus

Approaches to understanding the security-development nexus

Even though the security-development nexus is a popular topic in the academic debate, its definition remains rather vague, and it often appears as a catch-all phrase used to explain any connection between development and security. This section reviews some approaches to understanding the security-development nexus. It also demonstrates how the nexus is distinct from securitization and developmentization.

Generally speaking, the nexus means the connection between security and development. However, there is no common understanding in academia on the nature of the connection, the degree of influence, or a possible dominance of one concept over the other. Based on the use of the nexus in academic articles and policy contexts, Stern and Öjendal (2010) suggest multiple frameworks to understand the nexus: One possible framework is viewing the security-development nexus as a tool of power. This may mean the nexus is tied to the interests of a specific actor, used to exercise power, or as a technique of governmentality (Stern & Öjendal,

2010, p.13). In this context, security and development are seen as mutually reinforcing techniques of power which govern everyday life. These perspectives also correspond to those scholars who equate the security-development nexus with securitization. They argue the nexus is responding to the security interest of a specific actor (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p.11). Some academics point out nexus has been increasingly hierarchized, with development becoming subordinate to security (see Brown & Grävingholt, 2016; Keukeleire & Raube, 2013). Others argue the security-development nexus always implied a securitization of development (Stern & Öjendal, 2010). When the two concepts are connected, securitization dominates development because security interests are what drive the involved stakeholders instead of development objectives (p.23).

Moreover, how the nexus may be a tool of power is visible in the tug-wars of actors in the respective policy fields. These sorts of turf wars are present in the EU and in dynamics between its institutions: When framing EU Africa policy as a development aspect and security as a dimension of development policy, then the Commission may enter the competence area of the Council in order to extend its sphere of action (Sicurelli, 2008, p.219). Many non-state actors, on the other hand, in both the security and development fields rejected the nexus to keep both fields separate: Several security experts are still dismissive of the meaning of development policies for security. Furthermore, many development actors argue any action for security is negative (Youngs, 2008, p.436). This is not necessarily a rejection of the nexus itself but rather motivated by the need to attract funds and defend or extend one's sphere of influence. However, non-state actors have recently started to embrace the nexus since a growing number of economic resources and political will were poured into it (Stern & Öjendal, 2010).

Finally, another perspective on the security-development nexus is seeing it in the context of a set of nexuses as the interrelation of so-called "human global survival issues" (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p.13). These include but are not limited to natural disasters, violent conflicts, terrorism, or climate change. They are complex issues that only a single policy field may not sufficiently address and thus need a nexus of two or more concepts or policy fields. Here, the security-development nexus is only one of many nexuses: Other nexuses include the poverty-environment nexus to address interconnected root causes of poverty or the water-energy nexus to tackle food insecurity. An often-cited human global survival issue addressed in the security-development nexus is countering terrorism, fighting transnational crime, and tackling violent conflicts. It is argued that complex issues such as terrorism cannot be tackled by a single policy field but must be addressed in a joint effort by various policy fields. Interlinking security and development aims to address the root causes of violent conflicts,

crime, and terrorism in the long term and block immediate security threats in the short term. Some argue this resulted in a “re-problematization” of poverty as evidence of a hierarchized nexus, where security is prioritized over development (Buerger & Vennesson, 2009).

Origin of the security-development nexus

The linkage between development and security can be traced back to already the 18th century. However, many scholars situate the emergence of the contemporary security-development nexus in the context after the Second World War. Holt (2014) argues the Marshall plan exemplified the security-development nexus because it used development aid to foster security and stability in post-war Europe (p.160). The Marshall Plan used significant financial investment into development in an attempt to ensure security in Europe, which was also aligned with the security interests of the United States and its allies.

In the Cold War era, development and security became again linked when funds for development were allocated based on ideological alignment to secure alliances. Development aid was promised to loyal countries, effectively furthering the security objectives of the donor countries (Merket, 2016, p.4). These “geopolitics of poverty” also indicate the lines between the nexus and securitization of development were sometimes blurred (Hettne, 2010, p.33). At the same time, donor conditionality became an important concept for European countries looking to secure access to raw materials in African countries. The approval of development aid under conditions that promoted the donor's security interests reinforced the link between development and security (Merket, 2016, p.4). The Brand Report of 1980 to the United Nations (UN) noted that development is the peace policy of the 21st century (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980, p.57), making the linkage between security and development explicit.

In the 2000s, the security-development nexus became relevant for peacekeeping and interventions. Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Anan manifested the nexus by stating: "there will be no development without security and no security without development" (UN Secretary-General, 2005, p.7). Simultaneously, international organizations like the UN, the World Bank, and the OECD advocated for a stronger link between the two policy fields (Merket, 2016, p.6). This also influenced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in which the different policy fields were assumed to be interconnected. The MDGs also resulted in an increasing number of development workers involved in governance issues and security actors tasked with civilian activities – another exemplification of both fields becoming increasingly interconnected (Tschirgi, 2010, p.50).

The security-development nexus in the EU context

In the Schuman declaration, security and development were named among the key goals for the newly created European Community, albeit regarded as separate policy fields (European Commission, 2020b). However, in 1973, a communiqué by the EP proposed using development policies to contribute to peace in the Mediterranean based on security interests (European Parliament, 1973, p.38). Even though not made explicit yet, this example shows that the nexus was present early in EU policy. Regarding the connection between security and development, the European Security Strategy of 2003 first mentions the connection between security and development, stating, “Security is a precondition for development” (Council of the EU, 2003, p.2). Even though the strategy does not explicitly recognize the relationship and *vice versa*, it still already shows the connection between the two. The 2005 Consensus on Development proclaims that “security and development are [...] complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries” (Michel, 2006, p.25). Both documents are among the first official EU papers to acknowledge the linkage between security and development (Merket, 2016, p.16), even though they do not explicitly mention the nexus yet. However, in the subsequent publications on the EU’s security and development strategy, the phrase “there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication, there will be no sustainable peace” became a recurring theme in EU policy documents (Merket, 2016, p.1). In 2007, the Council eventually affirmed that “the nexus between development and security should inform EU strategies and policies” (Council of the EU, 2007, p.1), firmly establishing it in EU policy.

Critique & postcolonial perspectives on the nexus

As previously discussed, Stern and Öjendal (2010) suggest the nexus is instilled with meaning because it is subject to different experiences and understandings (p.7). Critics of the nexus argue it inherently contains a western bias and reflects colonial logic. In their argument, development and security are social constructs rather than neutral forms of analysis and exhibit power relations reflecting only certain perspectives. Both “security” and “development” reproduce colonial logic and consequently also in the nexus (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p.7). The nexus serves as a means to justify any regulatory or interventionist initiative (Chandler, 2007, p.368), effectively privileging western states. O’Gorman (2011) argues to decolonize the security-development nexus, clear distinctions about whose security the nexus refers to must be made (p.116). Duffield (2010b) claims development efforts and policy do not lead to international security, as in “security for everyone,” but rather enforce the north-south divide

in an attempt to maintain underdevelopment in some parts of the world. He argues this pattern reveals the nexus is rooted in colonial times (p.57).

Postcolonial scholars see the linkage of the two topics already in colonial times and argue colonial history is still visible in the nexus today (Duffield, 2010a). The interests of one party still dominate, so there can be no equality in the nexus. During industrialization, equal levels of economic development in Europe were considered to be beneficial for security (Hettne, 2010). To secure supplies for this massive growth, European countries needed “gold, silver, cotton, and human beings coming from faraway lands” (Mattei & Nader, 2008, p.21). Under the disguise of “developing” African countries, European states exploited land and people to benefit their economic growth, thus fostering security in Europe (Paris, 2010, p.349). This unequal north-south relationship continued after colonialization because development aid was a “reward” for those aligning with western countries (to further western security interests). Duffield (2010b) argues former colonies were targeted back then, and their need for development aid was exploited to form security alliances (p.63). Moreover, many African nations remained dependent on their former colonizer, including receiving development aid. Bermeo (2017) calls this where “industrialized states pursue development when and where it benefits themselves” targeted development, arguing it is visible in today’s security-development nexus (p.737).

The nexus vs. securitization: What is the difference?

Even though some scholars suggest the security-development nexus is equal to the securitization of development, there is a clear distinction between the two: Securitization means the insertion of security in typically “neutral” issues, and security dominates over security policy. The security-development nexus assumes that security is an elementary part of development policy and *vice versa*. In other words, the nexus intentionally unites a security-oriented development policy and a development-oriented security policy. However, no concept is dominant over the other, contrary to securitization.

An example of this oscillation between the security-development nexus and securitization is Petřík’s (2016) research on the security-development nexus' role in Afghanistan's EU policies between 2002 and 2014. In his case study, he finds both aspects of securitization and developmentization. These complicated nets of simultaneous processes ultimately formulated the security-development nexus as a policy strategy (pp.178-180). As both processes mutually influenced and reinforced each other, they eventually became linked. In other words, through

the processes of developmentization and securitization, both ceased to be separate policies and merged into a nexus.

This thesis argues a similar process happened in the case of the APF: Several developmentizing and securitizing influences reinforced the security-development nexus. Before expanding on this point, the following chapter discusses the operationalization of this thesis. Next to reviewing the academic debate on the Facility, this chapter critically examined the concepts of securitization, developmentization, and the security-development nexus. These are essential for the analysis because the thesis argues they were all visible in the APF.

III. Research Design & Methodology

Now that the theoretical framework is established, this chapter explains the selected design and methodology of the research project. The first part outlines the research design, the reasoning for the selected methodology, and the types of sources used to answer the research question: “*To what extent has EU development policy been securitized through the African Peace Facility?*”. The second part of this chapter presents the sources used for the thesis as well as some limitations.

1. Research design

The following section outlines the framework for the collection and analysis of data. For this study, a case study format was chosen. The single case study is the preferred research design in securitization studies (Balzacq, 2011, p.32) mainly because it allows for a detailed examination of a specific case. A thorough analysis of the context is needed to grasp the extent of securitization, for this research design provides the needed space. Moreover, this research aims to understand the extent of securitization through a specific instrument, the APF. As previously highlighted, the APF is neither strictly development nor a sole security instrument, and its role in EU development policy is unclear. Therefore, it needs to undergo an intensive, detailed examination which a single case study format allows.

Moreover, this research builds on the previous assessment of scholars arguing the APF may be considered an example of securitization. Therefore, it is founded on the assumption that at least some securitization through the APF did happen. This means the thesis takes a deductive approach to analyzing the relationship between theory and research. Hence, this thesis focuses on testing the theory of securitization for the case of the APF in order to, on the one hand, explore possible limitations of the theory and, on the other hand, suggest some general implications for the relationship between securitization theory and EU development policy.

A single case study design is used, with the unit of analysis being the APF. Bryman differentiates between five types of case studies: the *typical case*, the *extreme case*, the *revelatory case*, the *longitude case*, and the *critical case*. As previously outlined, the APF is not a *typical case* of securitization of development because it already had security implications from the beginning. However, it is also not an *exceptional case*, as the Facility is one of several development instruments with security implications in the EU’s toolbox. The *revelatory* and the *longitudinal case* are not applicable here, as the APF is neither a previously inaccessible research object nor something to be solely investigated at two

or more junctures (Bryman, 2012, p.70). This leaves the *critical case study*: This study design is used to get a “better understanding of the circumstances in which [a] hypothesis will and will not hold.” (p.71). Therefore, the critical case study is adequate for analyzing the APF and testing under which circumstances the theory of the securitization of development holds and under which it does not. However, prior assumptions cannot always appreciate a case's nature and significance before it is analyzed in detailed scrutiny (Bryman, 2012, p.91). Therefore, the conclusion of which kind of case the APF is, if it is more the norm or the exception, can only be made after the research analysis at the end of this thesis. Now that the design is established, the following section explains the research methodology.

2. Research method

This study uses qualitative methods, which are considered particularly helpful in generating an intensive, detailed examination of a case (Bryman, 2012, p.68). Because the APF is quite complex, the analysis combines various qualitative methods to examine different sets of data and the APF from different perspectives. The thesis is multimethod research, which also allows the findings to be cross-checked, which adds credibility to its results (Bowen, 2009, p.30). Discourse analysis is widely used in securitization studies, sometimes combined with content analysis. This reflects the concentration of the theory on the speech act as the unit of analysis. However, this approach has recently been challenged, with more scholars turning to analyze practices instead of discourses. The thesis also adopts this approach and focuses on securitizing practices in the APF. To analyze the extent of securitization of development through the APF, the following qualitative methods were used: (1) A document analysis of primary data, (2) A secondary analysis of scholarly literature (3) as well as data from two semi-structured expert interviews.

3. Data basis

Finally, the following section further explains the source selection and highlights some of its limitations. Both primary data and secondary literature are used to answer the research question.

Documents

Document analysis is used to understand and contextualize themes according to a specific research context and is particularly applicable to generate in-depth analyses of a single phenomenon (Bowen, 2009, p.29). When analyzing EU documents, it is important to note these were written to highlight the EU's work and not (primarily) aimed at aid recipients. Instead, the motive is to further the agency of the EU among its citizens and within the international donor community. This is reflected in the analysis of these documents. The documents analyzed in

the thesis are public records by the EU or its institutions. The focus on the EU is rooted in the fact that the EU tightly controlled the APF and the impact on EU development policy is the object under investigation.

Starting in 2009, the Commission launched a publication initiative to make the APF and its impact more widely known. In these documents, detailed information on the activities and the funding structure of the Facility was given. The Annual Action Programs contains the strategy of the Council for the APF. Both sets of documents are the ones primarily used for the analysis. Next to these regularly published documents, data from communication between DGs and EU institutions were analyzed. Lastly, the evaluations of the effectiveness of the APF by the European Court of Auditors were reviewed. Their assessment influenced the agenda-setting and activities of the APF. Next to official EU documents, written records of the AU are also used, albeit to a lesser extent.

Secondary data

Next to constructing the theoretical framework of the thesis, secondary data was also consulted as sources in the analysis. As the literature review explains, several scholars have already analyzed the APF. These analyses collected data through either document analysis or interviews. While examining securitization and the APF was not the aim of these studies, the collected data nevertheless offers interesting insights for this study. The new interpretation of the data within the context of securitization enables a holistic picture of the securitization of development. Previous researchers interviewed high-ranking EEAS officials who have worked on or with the Facility but were not accessible to interview for this research project. Thanks to the work of these scholars, this thesis can nevertheless use these insights for the analysis.

Additionally, some mass-media outputs from print and digital media outlets were used. They are essential for the analysis as they contain critical comments and non-European perspectives on the APF's practice. These are considered secondary sources because the article is not the focus of analysis but rather its content. The analysis of secondary data has the risk of certain pitfalls, such as the lack of control of the quality of data (Bryman, 2012, p.316). The multimethod approach of the thesis attempts to mitigate this through the use of triangulation

Expert interviews

The third data source is insights gained from two expert interviews. These were semi-structured to guide the interview but also to allow enough flexibility to follow up on topics introduced by the interviewees (Bryman, 2012, p.471). Both interview partners have been working in the EP and on the APF for many years: Ota Jaksch is a parliamentary assistant in the GUE/NGL group

in the EP and has extensive knowledge of the practices of the APF. As part of her work assisting various Members of the European Parliament (MEP), she has closely monitored the Facility, its activities, and the use of funds since 2004. The second interview partner¹ is a member of the EP's EPP group since 1999. He serves in the EP's delegation to the Pan-African Parliament and has worked with African countries and regional organizations through the APF since its creation.

Both interview partners were selected because of their expertise in working with the Facility. In many analyses of the APF, officials from the Council or Commission are because they have significant influence over its strategy and activities. However, the Parliament has various supervisory powers to monitor the actions of the European Institutions. Because the APF was financed outside the EU budget, it was outside the Parliament's oversight control. Some policymakers argue this scenario was created intentionally (Ota Jaksch, personal communication, March 10, 2022). Nevertheless, members of the EP had access to privileged information and could still exercise some control through parliamentary questions or statements. Therefore, interview partners from the EP are useful sources, as they have insider knowledge but are also critical of several practices. Therefore, interviews are expected to provide additional insights for this research. As with any expert source, the inputs from interviews may inherit a certain bias because they are representatives of political parties. This bias is again attempted to be mitigated through triangulation.

This chapter explained why the thesis is designed as a critical case study with a multimethod approach, using documents, secondary data, and interviews as sources. The following chapter provides an overview of the APF's history before presenting the research findings in the subsequent chapter.

¹ The interview partner would like to remain anonymous. The information given here is provided as evidence of his expertise and were approved by the interview partner.

IV. From the African Peace Facility to the European Peace Facility

The following chapter gives an overview of the APF, paying attention to its history, objectives, and components. Finally, the chapter discusses the creation of the EPF and transitioning from the APF to its successor. This is useful to demonstrate the Facility unites both development and security aspects and does not belong to one field only.

1. The creation of the AU and the set-up of APSA

The AU was established in 2002 and succeeded the Organization for African Union (OAU), and its general aim is to foster cooperation between its 55 members in various areas. The promotion of peace and security on the African continent is among its main objectives. In order to respond to this demand and create a structure for a long-term response to peace and security, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was set up. APSA consists of several components and structures: At the center is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the main decision-making body of the AU. Additionally, the Panel of the Wise has the authority to advise on conflict prevention and resolution.

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) supports the PSC decision-making process and guides the African Standby Force (ASF) deployment. The ASF was set up as an intervention force in case Article 13 is invoked (which enables the AU to intervene in circumstances such as war crimes or genocide). It has military, police, and civilian contingents. ASPA, and especially the ASF, have received significant investments from the EU through the APF, the largest contributor (European Commission, 2017). African regional organizations function as the overall pillars of APSA. Eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs)² have a mandate for peace and security operations by the AU. The other pillar consists of two Regional Mechanisms. These regional mechanisms were established to create the necessary capabilities for rapid deployment of forces and are integrated into the ASF.

Even though APSA is considered a milestone in the AU's history, it has received rather negative feedback from donors. The EU Court of Auditors has rated the overall impact of APSA as weak and lacking effectiveness (European Court of Auditors, 2018). Most of the APF's budget went to supporting AU-led Peace and Security Operations, which were realized through the structures of APSA. The APF has been criticized as a neo-colonial instrument, creating

² Arab Maghreb Union, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Community of Sahel-Saharan States, East African Community, Economic Community of Central African States, Economic Community of Western African states, The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Southern African Development Community.

dependency and imposing EU interests on African countries under the mantle of development aid (Ota Jacks, personal communications, March 10, 2022). The following section focuses on the creation and development of the APF and examines changes and continuity in its objectives and activities.

2. History of the African Peace Facility

The creation of the African Peace Facility

In 2003, the EU announced its positive response to a request by African leaders to set up the APF, which became fully operational in 2004. EU officials from DG DEVCO carefully constructed the policy story that the APF was an “African idea.” In reality, the APF was a product of almost ten years of negotiations between African and European leaders, including the EU and the AU (Olsen, 2009, p.163). The EU had a significant role in designing the facility and shaping its objectives. This also included the member states: France tried to include military aid into the Facility, which was met with opposition and eventually discarded (Martinez, 2021, p.19). Moreover, several European states with historical ties advocated for a flexible instrument providing financial assistance to sub-regional organizations, later realized in the option to fund PSOs by RECs, something the AU initially rejected (Official from the Council of the EU 2015, as cited in Sicurelli, 2016, p.61). Moreover, the request by African states was based on a draft by an EU Commissioner (Klingebiel, 2016, p.78). This shows the APF was not really an “African-made project,” contrary to the EU’s narrative.

Sketching this policy history of the APF may have had several reasons: First, the cost of intervention increasingly strained member states’ budgets, which were hoping for an opportunity to share the financial burden by going through the EU. Assigning ownership to African countries also meant pushing away responsibility from European countries and moving towards an indirect approach to peacebuilding in Africa, an easier and more cost-effective way (Mattelaer & Marijnen, 2014, pp.62-64). Moreover, it also helped legitimize the presence of military actors from the EU and member states’ because the PSOs were claimed to be “African-owned” (Sicurelli, 2016, p.62). Second, this narrative allowed the EU to present itself as a strong partner to African countries. Other actors, notably China and Russia, began to expand their influence on the continent, and this policy story was a welcomed opportunity for the EU to present itself as a strong and reliable partner. Third, the APF was funded by the EDF, despite its substantial security implications and expected ineligibility for ODA. By reiterating the motto of African ownership, the EU hoped some impression of a development dimension would stick.

The funding of the APF was an issue from the start and remained heavily debated throughout (European Commission, 2015, p.4). APF Activities would be funded from the development budget but did not qualify as ODA. This was especially controversial because funding for the APF was taken from the allocated development budgets of each African country in the EDF in the form of allocated resources to replenish the EDF (Decision 3/2003/EC, Article 1 (1)). The EU justified the use of development money for the Facility with the lack of other funding opportunities and promised the current funding situation would only be a short-term solution (Council of the EU, 2005, p.3). However, the Commissioner for Development Nielson noted the decision was deliberate (European Commission, 2003, p.2). Nonetheless, some member states and EU delegations remained critical of using development funds for the APF (Council of the EU, 2005; Sicurelli, 2016, p.64). The EP also reacted negatively and remained critical of using development funds for the APF.

The African countries' official request (Decision on the Establishment by the European Union of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union, 2003) suggested that funds come from the EDF (p.1). However, this approach was suspected to be inserted by the EU rather than being a suggestion by the African side: The Facility's funding structure was repeatedly criticized by various African leaders, most notably Said Djinnit, Commissioner for Peace and Security at the AU. According to him, "The commitment of European funding initially earmarked for development to finance peacekeeping operations raised ethical and moral problems" (Security Council, 2007, p.7).

The initial proposed budget for the APF was quickly exhausted (European Commission, 2010, p.4). Almost every year since 2004, the APF's budget was topped up from leftover EPF funds. Next to funding from the EDF, the activities of the APF were occasionally financed through additional contributions from individual EU member states. EU member states could opt to support a specific PSO. In one instance, an African country, South Africa, provided funds for a PSO through the Facility. The country was interested in contributing troops to PSO and operating through the APF. Subsequently, South Africa would receive APF funds (and thus development money) to support its PSO, a sensitive issue as South Africa is not included in the EDF because of its economic power. As Sicurelli (2008) describes, the country's inquiry led to tensions between Council and Commission: The Council welcomed the request by South Africa as a sign of African countries investing in Peace and Security and recognizing the APF as an opportunity to do so. On the other hand, the Commission was worried about EDF funds going to a non-eligible country. Eventually, this was resolved through South Africa providing the

funds for the APF and only receiving a small percentage of financial support from the EU (Sicurelli, 2008, p.220; Decision 2005/5750/C).

3. Objectives and activities of the APF: Changes and continuities

When the APF was created, its main objectives were to support African-led peace missions and enhance the AU's capabilities and capacity (European Commission, 2005). The former has a clear security dimension, while the latter pursues a more development-based approach. Later, the objectives of the APF were expanded to include the Early Response Mechanism, which comprised both development and security elements. The following part gives an overview of the main components and key objectives of the APF.

Supporting African-led peacekeeping missions: The APF's linchpin

The most prominent objective of the APF was to support financial assistance to African-led PSOs. By 2020, the APF supported 15 African-led peace missions in 20 countries, with the majority located in the Sahel zone. The PSOs are the component of the APF which had received the majority of the funding, totaling €3129.9 million between 2004 and 2020, corresponding to 99,16% of the APF's overall budget (European Commission, 2022, p.23). Throughout the years, spending for peace missions consistently took up at least 90% of the APF's budget every year, except for 2007 (84%) and 2016 (86%), when it was slightly under 90% (European Commission, 2022, 2017). In these years, new capacity development initiatives were launched, resulting in larger spending on Capacity Development activities.

The supported PSOs ranged from monitoring the ceasefire in South Sudan to intervening in the Central African Republic amidst an unfolding humanitarian crisis. Interesting to note that a considerable number of PSOs aimed to combat terrorism, such as the AU mission to fight Boko Haram in Lake Chad and the African Union-led Regional Task Force to counter the insurgence of the Lord's Resistance Army in Eastern Africa (European Commission, 2022). Later, the activities of the APF were also tied to the goal of curbing migration flows to Europe, albeit this was not the primary objective. The ASF presented a viable option for the EU to have a "proxy arm," which may also reduce the financial burden of member states' intervention in African countries.

In the first four years of the APF, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was the focus of the newly set up Facility and received a large share of its funds. The AU-led mission was created in response to the Darfur conflict until it was eventually replaced by a UN mission in 2007 (African Union Commission & European Commission, 2010). In 2009 the African Union

Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) became the new center of attention for the APF and remained the largest receiver of Facility funds until 2020. After its launch in 2009, AMISOM grew considerably in size, which is also reflected in its funding: In 2017, €280 million of the €350 million PSO budget of the APF went to AMISOM. In 2015 it was even the sole beneficiary of the PSOs budget (European Commission, 2020c, p.22). The EU has provided over €2.2 billion to AMISOM, its biggest contributor (European Commission, 2022). AMISOM, dubbed the “African Union’s counter-terrorism force” (Mutambo & Aggrey, 2022, para. 1), had significant relevance for the EU to combat terrorism. Somalia is also a region of strategic interest to the EU precisely because of its importance in counterterrorism and other transnational threats. The EU’s regional strategies for the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions stress the fight against terrorism as a priority (Mattelaer & Marijnen, 2014, p.58). The EU is also present with several civilian and military missions in Somalia; in fact, the most and the longest-running EU missions are all based in Somalia (Council of the EU, 2020a; EEAS, 2022, p.2).

As AMISOM grew further, concerns about its sustainability and effectiveness emerged (Senior official from the EEAS 2012, as cited in Keukeleire & Raube, 2013, p.561). The sole focus on AMISOM and its only moderate success became increasingly problematic for the EU: Additionally, the jihadists groups in Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria and Chad forced the EU to also look at other regions for counter-terrorism efforts (Stanicek & Betant-Rasmussen, 2021, pp.2-4). Moreover, the rising financial demands of AMISOM further burdened the already complicated funding situation with the EDF and raised worries about a diminishing financial flexibility of the APF (Alexandre Polack³, as cited in Lorenz & Koigi, 2016, para. 5). Furthermore, the lack of agency for the mission has been a problem from the start; in total, only six of the 54 AU members contributed to AMISOM with troops (Williams, 2018, p.172). Lastly, in 2014, a report by Human Rights Watch documented several cases of sexual assault and exploitation by AMISOM soldiers, raising concerns about AMISOM by its western donors (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In search of a viable exit strategy for AMISOM, the EU announced a cap of 80% on the budget for AMISOM. It also lobbied for the remaining 20% to be raised by African countries (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022). Even though the EU proclaimed its continued support for AMISOM, the EU missions in Somalia saw a large influx in financial injections after the budget cut of AMISOM; their scopes were also extended considerably (Council of the EU, 2016). After the cuts, the head of AMISOM criticized that the

³ The EU spokesperson for international cooperation and development.

mission now has to respond to more threats with less money (Lorenz & Koigi, 2016, para. 5-7).

Nevertheless, spending for AMISOM remained high and peaked at €300 million in 2020 (European Commission, 2022, p.24). The EPF plans to continue the support for AMISOM and has so far reserved €65 million for the PSO (Strategic Communications, 2022, p.2). At the beginning of April, AMISOM was dissolved after 15 years and became the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATIM). If and how ATIM will be supported through the EPF is still unclear.

Even though AMISOM received the lion's share of APF funding, other PSOs were also important. The International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) and the G5 Sahel (an African regional organization) also received considerable funds from the APF. However, the AU had a less active role in these PSOs: MISCA was led by the African Union but was officially backed by France. The EU's support through the APF was a way of burden-sharing among the member states.

The G5 Sahel⁴ was one of the non-AU-led missions supported through the APF. As the G5 Sahel was initially not mandated in peace and security by the AU, it was ineligible for APF funding. Nonetheless, it did receive funding through the Facility, something repeatedly criticized by the EP (e.g., Lösing, 2017). The Council then amended the 2017-2018 Action Program to include the G5 Sahel eligible for APF funds without prior approval by the AU (Council of the EU, 2017; Ota Jaksch, personal communication, March 10, 2022). Member states pushed for the recognition of the G5 Sahel because they prefer to operate through regional organizations instead of the AU (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022). Later the EU again broadened the scope of actors eligible to receive funding by the APF: Eligible Grant beneficiaries now included also non-African actors such as UN regional offices and even local EU bodies (Council of the EU, 2019, p.3).

The number of PSOs supported and their geographical distribution increased through the years. Initially, two or three missions were supported annually; in 2007, the EU only supported AMISOM. After 2016 the EU financed, on average, four to five missions per year. This selective support may have been due to the EDF's funding restrictions imposed on the APF. Because of EDF rules, arms, military equipment, and soldier training were excluded (Council of the EU, 2014, p.13). Stipends for soldiers were also not permitted expenses under EDF regulations. However, the EU provided soldiers with per diems, effectively working around this

⁴ The regional organization comprises of five Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

regulation. Financing soldiers' stipends were the main expense for PSO. This created dependency, which became somewhat problematic: When the EU cut the funding for AMISOM, many soldiers went months without payments ("Amisom troops miss monthly stipends in wake of EU funding cut," 2016). A smaller amount was spent on equipment for communications or medical purposes and material for infrastructure. Moreover, the EU also funded the salaries of staff tasked with monitoring and evaluation. The APF financed military personnel, police officers, and civil actor's training. These activities were listed under capacity development, explained in the following section.

Developing the institutional capacity of the AU and APSA

Next to financial assistance for peace operations, a significant relevance was also given to developing the institutional capacity of the AU, which was a "major component of the APF." (African Union Commission & European Commission, 2012, p.15) Later, the Facility also aimed to develop the capacity of the RM/RECs (European Commission, 2018b). However, funding for capacity development efforts remained significantly lower compared to the PSO spending. In some years, little to no money was spent on capacity development programs (European Commission, 2022, p.24).

Initially, the capacity development aspect targeted ASPA as complementary to the support for the PSOs. However, external evaluation has found the impact of APSA to be poor and in need of refocusing (European Court of Auditors, 2018). Within the capacity development component of the APF, the annual financial assistance to the African Union Commission (AUC) concerned primarily funding staff salaries, IT infrastructure, and support to the CEWS (European Commission, 2022, pp.19–20). Specifically, this aspect was criticized by the European Court of Auditors: The EU covers the basic operational costs, which has no real impact beyond maintaining the rudimentary structure of APSA. Moreover, this created dependencies and enforced the overdependence of the AU on external donors (European Court of Auditors, 2018, p.2).

In response to these negative evaluations, the EU launched a programmatic initiative to strengthen the AU's institutional capacity. These programs included a staff exchange program, training centers, and liaison offices in conflict regions (European Commission, 2020c). Additionally, the APF also supported the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an African regional organization, in capacity development and for the CEWS (European Commission, 2019).

The motive for the EU funding the capacity development of the AU was, according to an Officer of the European Commission, that the EU prefers to cooperate directly with the AU in the field of development and security because it sees the organization as its African counterpart (Sicurelli, 2016, p.60). On the other hand, EU member states prefer to operate through RM/RECs since they are considered to have more agency (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022). The lack of agency of the AU and its PSOs, exemplified in the shortcomings in troop contribution and paying membership dues, were additional concerns and part of the EU's motivation to look for other African partners besides the AU (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022). Regional organizations tend to have more agency and are preferred for security operations (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022).

More funds were assigned to capacity development in 2011, 2014, 2016, and 2020 than in other years. An average of €200 million was spent on capacity development, while other times, the annual spending was below €10 million (European Commission, 2022, p.24). In 2011, training centers and AU liaison offices in conflict regions were launched. In 2014 the EU gave funds to support the IGAD monitoring system, which aimed at developing the reporting capacities of the organizations to prevent violent conflicts (European Commission, 2015, p.24). In 2020, new initiatives were added to complement the efforts of the IGAD; for example, a research center to train stakeholders to early identify violent conflicts in high-risk regions (European Commission, 2022).

In 2016, the EU launched an AU-EU staff exchange program. Activities under this program included training AU personnel, short-term staff exchanges, and long-term funding to prevent brain drain within the AU. It also included improving the AU's capacities in reporting and effectiveness requirements, which were determined to be below international standards. These concerns about the effectiveness of the AU's management of APSA were made explicit in the European Court of Auditors report (European Court of Auditors, 2018). The staff exchanges reveal an interesting aspect of the EU-AU power relations in the APF: The summaries of the visits in the Annual reports show that while the AU staff was sent to the EU to learn "the EU way of things," EU staff was sent to the Addis Ababa to check if EU roles and best practices were followed (European Commission, 2020c). There seem to have been no mutual learning aspect, as was hinted at when the program was established. The reports indicate the EU imposed its Eurocentric views of procurement and management on the AU. The meetings did not foster exchanges and mutual learnings but rather served the enforcement of EU values and perspectives.

Another addition were programs focusing on Security Sector Reform (SSR); these were mentioned in the annual report starting in 2013. However, SSR programs are only mentioned every other year and sometimes only the term itself with no specific information on the activity or actors involved (European Commission, 2019, p.20). What can be derived from these is that SSR activities were always included in one of the PSOs, typically those receiving a large share of funding (European Commission, 2020c, pp.15-27). This indicates SSR was considered complementary to the PSOs instead of a separate programmatic point.

Early Response mechanism

Finally, the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) is the third component of the APF. The objective of the ERM is to provide rapidly available funding for prevention initiatives by the AU, such as mediation or shuttle diplomacy. In order for these interventions to be as effective as possible, funding requests could be approved as fast as ten working days (African Union Commission & European Commission, 2013a, p.20)

Initiatives under the ERM received the smallest share of funding from the overall APF budget. Created in 2009, the ERM supported 44 initiatives across Africa in total, with the gross spending being €53 million by 2020 (European Commission, 2022, pp.20–22). In the APF's last year of operation, the ERM's spending more than doubled: Between 2009 and 2019, the total amount given to the ERM was only €28 million (European Commission, 2022, p.24). The jump in funding was because of the allocation of funds to food allowances for the Military observation in the Central African Republic in 2020. The rapid development called for fast available funding, and thus the ERM was used. Demands overgrew quickly, so the mission was turned into a PSO and will be continued to be funded from this component (European Commission, 2020c, p.22).

Changes and continuities

The APF became operational in 2004, but the first Annual report was only published in 2009, five years later, making it challenging to identify changes before. Between 2004 and 2009, besides some brochures and web pages with general information on the facility, nothing on the APF was published. Nevertheless, some changes have already been highlighted in the previous section: More investment in counterterrorism, a more programmatic approach to development, and more rapid funding through the APF. After the Treaty of Lisbon, which brought several changes to EU development policy, the APF came under new management: The Facility was now overseen by DG Relex instead of DG Development, which may have resulted from a turf war between the two DGs claiming

ownership over the instrument. DG Relex had tried to put the APF under its control for some time, arguing the APF was a foreign policy instrument instead of a development tool (Sicurelli, 2008, p.226). With the new management, the decision-making in the APF also changed and gave more influence to the Council. The Joint Coordination Committee of the APF (JCC), consisting of African and European representatives, used to develop the strategy of the APF was replaced. Through an Action Program for the APF,” the Council now sets the agenda, determining the objective and activities. The Commission was tasked with administrative responsibility, such as preparing information notes on AU requests and reporting on the APF’s annual activities and achievements (African Union Commission & European Commission, 2010, p.4).

Next to new management, the circle of beneficiaries was expanded from initially only African people (Council of the EU, 2011, p.11) to non-African actors and European citizens (Council of the EU, 2019, p.12). Additionally, the scope of the APF was also widened to include preventive purposes in 2012, an attempt to ease the financial burden of “costly peace operations” (Council of the EU, 2014, p.14). Moreover, the adjusted scope was also an effort to make the APF, at least partly, eligible as ODA (African Union Commission & European Commission, 2013b, p.17). This was a response to ongoing discussions about the APF’s funding and sustainability, considering the initial “short-term” solution of the EDF as a funding source already running for several years. Shortly after the Facility’s launch, it became clear the initially allocated sum was insufficient (Council of the EU, 2005). Consequently, the APF was replenished almost every year with leftover funds from the EDF or contributions by member states (European Commission, 2022, p.24). The ongoing budget discussion was among the reasons for establishing the APF’s successor, the EPF. Its creation and key features are examined in the following section.

4. The creation of the European Peace Facility

In June 2018, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) Federica Mogherini presented a proposal for the European Peace Facility, initiating the discussion on a new instrument (HR Mogherini, 2018). After some further negotiations, the EPF became operational in 2021, with its final features largely as presented in the HR’s proposal: First, the new Facility would not be financed by the development fund but by a joint budget. It is still funded outside of the EU budget, mainly because the Treaties do not allow funding arms. All member states participating in the Common Security and Defense Policy automatically contribute to the EPF, which is now a common fund for African-led PSOs and

EU missions. Therefore, the new Facility integrates the Athena Mechanism's⁵ intergovernmental dimension and the development aspect of the APF (Interview with EPF Committee Chair, as cited in Martinez, 2021, p.21).

Moreover, the new facility's scope was extended beyond the African continent. While the EPF could, in theory, be used worldwide, its largest share was expected to still go to missions on the African continent (European diplomat, as cited in International Crisis Group, 2021, p.11). In February 2022, the EPF was used to provide weapons to Ukraine for the first time following the Russian attack (Council of the EU, 2022). Even though there was a vocal debate about the legitimacy of delivering weapons, there was a large consensus among policymakers, MEPs, and civil society organizations on using the EPF to provide weapons to Ukraine (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022).

The option to deliver weapons to conflict regions is one of the key features of the EPF and its most controversial one. While NGOs and civil society organizations were highly critical, the EP was somewhat divided on the delivery of weapons through the EPF: Some welcomed the new instrument as a “logical step” and argued that if the EU did not deliver weapons, state armies would be further weakened because rebels and terrorist would find ways to obtain them nonetheless (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022). Other MEPs pointed to the risk of weapons being misused or sold, effectively fueling the conflict, while others said the new Facility marks a shift away from the EU's self-understanding as a soft power toward a military actor (Ota Jaksch, personal communication, March 10, 2022). Eventually, the Parliament welcomed the adoption of the EPF but demanded supervisory powers by the EP (European Parliament, 2021). Even though the Council agreed to inform the Parliament regularly, any monitoring or supervisory powers were rejected (Council of the EU, 2020b).

Another important change is the discontinuation of the AU's accentuated role. Several EU officials advocated for maintaining the special role of the AU (NGO expert and EU official, as cited in International Crisis Group, 2021, p.11). However, the AU was demoted to one of several prospective grant recipients, and funding requests are no longer subject to AU approval. Next to the AU possible funding recipients are regional African organizations, ad-hoc groups (such as the G5 Sahel or Task Force Takuba), international organizations, and EU missions. Moreover, there is no development approach planned in the EPF anymore. The APF's non-military components (including the ERM and the AU's capacity development) were suggested

⁵ Through the mechanism the common costs for EU military operations under the EU's common security and defense policy were financed, from 2004 until 2021.

to be integrated into the new development fund. However, their funding period is set to end in 2024, and it remains unknown whether they resume or be discontinued (EU Official, as cited in International Crisis Group, 2021, p.5).

The EU made a clear link between the two Facilities, designating the EPF as the successor of the APF (HR Mogherini, 2018, p.7). The member states were split on the new Facility: While the Nordic states, the Netherlands and Germany, wanted to preserve the essence of the APF, France and other member states expressed their support for a more flexible fund with greater European control (EU member state official, as cited in International Crisis Group, 2021, p.11). Several reasons may have caused the creation of the EPF, among them the ongoing financing problem of the APF, dissatisfaction with the AU, and critique by local partners. Moreover, the push of individual member states such as France and the EU's evolving security interests were additional factors.

This chapter provided an overview of the APF, including its history and activities. The last part of this chapter introduced its successor, the EPF, and examined the changes and continuities between the two Facilities. Against this backdrop, the following chapter presents the analysis part of the thesis.

V. Analysis

The subsequent chapter examines to what extent the APF has securitized EU development policy through securitizing practices. Moreover, this chapter also investigates aspects of developmentization, the role of the security-development nexus and suggests an answer to the research question.

1. Securitization through practices: The case of the APF

In this part of the thesis, the proposed approach of securitizing practices is applied to the case of the APF. The suggested securitizing practices, based on a review of the academic literature, are (1) Non-ODA eligible activities in development policy, (2) Using development policy solely for furthering security objectives, (3) Implementation of development activities by military actors, (4) Considering poverty in the Global South as a security risk to the Global North, (5) Resetting or reframing country ownership and finally, (6) The institutional or administrative integration of development into other policy pillars. The following sections are structured according to the practices.

(1) Non-ODA eligible activities in development policy

The EDF rules state, “Programming shall be designed so as to fulfill to the greatest extent possible the criteria for official development assistance” (2015/322/EU, Article 1(3)). Nevertheless, the ineligibility of the APF as ODA was there from the beginning: The Commission and Council first tried to gloss over the incompatibility with ODA criteria by arguing the current financing was only a short-term solution (Council of the EU, 2005, p.3). When it became clear that there was no alternative to this model, the strategy shifted: According to the annual reports, starting from 2009, the EU attempted to make the APF more compatible with ODA criteria. First, widening the Facility's scope to include mediation and post-conflict efforts would make the APF at least partly eligible as ODA. Second, the EU also voiced the intent to conduct talks within DAC, indicating an attempt to lobby for a change of ODA criteria in favor of the EU (African Union Commission & European Commission, 2012, p.21). In 2013, a small part of the APF qualified as ODA (African Union Commission & European Commission, 2016, p.22) after several unsuccessful attempts (African Union Commission & European Commission, 2012, p.21). In 2015, about 5% of the Facility's budget qualified as ODA (European Commission, 2016, p.5). Even though the commitment to raise the ODA eligibility of the APF was reiterated throughout the Annual Reports, the mark of 5% was never exceeded and dropped back to 0% several times (European Commission, 2022, p.10).

The deliberate creation of an instrument with little to no ODA eligibility, funded by development money, was a novum. However, it may seem like the APF set the scene for future instruments: The Instrument contributing to Stability and the EU Trust Fund for Africa are, to a significant extent, ineligible as ODA, even though development funds primarily finance them. In a communication, the Council reflects on this practice by stating that even though some development activities do not qualify as ODA, they are in the EU's interests (European Commission, 2006), and not being bound to ODA-eligibility criteria allows the EU to properly tackle the security and development nexus "(European Commission, 2011, Article 3) indicating this is a deliberate decision. It also shows that EU interests (i.e., security concerns) may prevail over development objectives. Therefore, this securitizing practice of keeping ODA eligibility low was evident in the case of the APF. As this practice could also be found in subsequent instruments, it may indicate that the Facility has, in this regard, securitized EU development policy.

(2) Using development policy solely for furthering security objectives

This securitizing practice was described as the case of money being spent where security interests lie instead of in regions where it may be needed more urgently. In the case of the APF, this practice may be seen in the EU's activities in Somalia: The country is a region of high priority to the EU, and the regional strategy for the Sahel, for example, highlighted counterterrorism as a priority (Mattelaer & Marijnen, 2014, p.58). In the words of the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa: "EU development aid is effectively used to fund a war against al-Shabaab" (as cited in Mattelaer & Marijnen, 2014, p.61).

Somalia hosts many EU missions and some of its longest-running missions on the African continent (EEAS, 2022, p.2). The EU has extended the mandate of its capacity development and military missions several times and increased the budgets significantly: Since 2017, the annual budgets for the EU missions consistently almost doubled (Council of the EU, 2016, 2020a). Like Operation Atlanta, EUTM Somalia's (European Union Training Mission in Somalia) mission and scope were extended after 2012. Its annual budget rose from originally €4 million in 2010 (Peace Operations Review, 2014, p.41) to almost €23 million (Council of the EU, 2018). Moreover, in 2018, the EU co-signed a €42 million agreement for supporting peace and security programs in the Horn of Africa region, implemented by the IGAD, an eight-country trade bloc with members from the Horn of Africa (European Commission 27.03.2018). This agreement allowed the EU to remain present in the region by proxy (through the IGAD)

but without needing to consult with the AU as they had with the APF. All of these may be evidencing the EU pursues and prioritizes its regional security interests over development goals.

AMISOM was the biggest beneficiary of APF funds, and there was a stark increase in funding needs for the mission, which consistently took up at least 70% of the Facility's total budget almost every year (European Commission, 2022, p.24). Even though AMISOM was rated ineffective by several reports, the EU continued to fund AMISOM through the Facility. Even after the budget cuts, AMISOM remained the biggest receiver of APF money until the APF's termination in 2021 (European Commission, 2022, p.24). Reports and evaluations suggested the money for AMISOM could instead be spent elsewhere and less centralized to have a greater effect on African security (see Mackie et al., 2017; Poulton et al., 2010). Even though there may be several reasons why the EU kept funding AMISOM with such large spending, the EU's presence and strong security interests may have played a significant role. According to the Council, the APF is a crisis-driven instrument, but it seems driven mainly by crises affecting the referent object rather than aid-receiving societies. It may be concluded that the EU channeled many development funds through the APF to Somalia because it served the Union's security interests which had also already made significant financial investments (sunk costs) in the region. Therefore, evidence of this securitizing practice was also found.

(3) Implementation of development activities by military actors

Not much is known about the actors who implemented the APF's activities, as neither the Annual reports nor the Action Program discusses this. In the capacity development component, funds mainly supported staff (for salaries, infrastructure, and exchange programs), and money was not spent on military actors. In the case of the PSOs, which received the largest share of funding, the money mainly went towards troop allowances. Strictly speaking, (as the APF funded soldiers' stipends), development activities (because of the APF's funding heritage) were implemented by military actors. However, this argument is not very convincing, as the soldiers were not tasked with development work but with security activities (i.e., peacekeeping). Therefore, no evidence of this securitizing practice was found based on the data gathered and analyzed.

(4) Considering poverty in the Global South as a security risk to the Global North

In its self-conception, the primary goal of EU development policy is to reduce poverty (European Union, 2019, p.2), without a direct reference to benefits from this policy for EU citizens. According to Brown et al. (2016), the term "fragile state" is frequently used to frame poverty as a security risk for donor countries (p.3-4). However, this can also go beyond the

discursive practice: When development programs are designed according to the principle that poverty is a security risk to the referent object, they may become a securitizing practice. This practice is visible when new development activities are planned and funded with “increasing references to security, conflict, fragile states, terrorism or the perils of migration in development cooperation” (Olivié & Pérez, 2021, p.1906).

In the APF, this securitizing practice may be observed, for example, through the APF’s Action Program, published by the Council of the EU. This program makes several references to the implications of displaced people for international security (Council of the EU, 2014). It also highlights the importance of a holistic approach to transnational threats caused by fragile states: “[D]eteriorating security in several regions such as the Sahel or the Horn of Africa does pose a direct threat to EU’s interests through terrorism, narcotics and people trafficking” (p.5). It further states that while prevention is important, it “does not detract from the need for a policy of intervention when a crisis can no longer be contained.” (Council of the EU, 2014, p.6). These statements also show how the development approach towards tackling poverty was considered subordinate to the security-based approach: Poverty and fragility were first and foremost perceived as a security threat to the referent object and only second (if at all) to the people experiencing and living in these contexts. The programmatic changes in the Facility show the EU turned rhetoric into action: By 2009, several supported PSOs were explicitly tied to countering terrorism and other transnational threats instead of primarily focusing on bettering the living conditions in the respective regions (African Union Commission & European Commission, 2010). This increased over the years, and by 2020, every PSO supported was implicitly or explicitly connected to improving international security (European Commission, 2022). It may show that poverty reduction was not the primary objective of the APF but rather something perceived as a risk to the referent object and thus securitized. Therefore, this securitizing practice was also identified.

(5) Resetting or reframing country ownership

When the EPF was launched, the proposed lack of involvement of the AU was a big point of criticism from civil society organizations and African stakeholders (e.g., International Crisis Group, 2021). However, several developments in the APF indicated that resetting ownership was practiced long before the EPF was created. For example, starting in 2013, the EU entered into several peace agreements with regional African organizations to provide funds for their peace missions. This effectively weakened the AU’s position and foreshadowed the circumvention of the organization, now officially part of the EPF. As previously explained, aid

donors are reluctant to give up control, even when they hold country ownership in high regard. That is also how it was in the case of the APF: Because of the EU's position as the financier, it had "a significant degree of influence over the design of the resulting peace missions" (Mattelaer & Marijnen, 2014, p.62).

By creating the APF, the European Commission prided itself in, according to them, an instrument committed to African ownership. The motto "African solutions for African problems" was repeatedly emphasized and became a mantra concerning the APF and generally the EU's approach towards African countries (Mattelaer & Marijnen, 2014, pp.62-63). However, several African scholars became quite critical of this mantra as it may attempt to negate the EU's responsibility for conflicts in Africa due to, for example, the delivery of weapons or colonial history (Mattelaer & Marijnen, 2014, p.63). The reiteration of African ownership also revealed somewhat of a paradox: On the one hand, the EU declared the APF would fund "African solutions for African problems." At the same time, funds for the APF are justified by repeating, "their security is our security" (Nielsen, 2020, para. 2). It creates the negative connotation in which problems are caused by African countries "spread" to European countries, which then "solve" these issues. This neo-colonial line of thinking ignores the European responsibility for conflicts in African countries. It also matches the EU's policy story about the creation of the APF, for which the narrative of "African ownership" came in handy. These may indicate, despite the claims, that the AU and African countries never had "real" ownership over the APF. Additionally, the decision to carry out PSOs in Africa hinged on the funding approval of the EU and a mandate by the UN. Therefore, decisions on African-led PSO were still not *finally* made in Addis Ababa.

Nevertheless, the AU initially had a significant influence on the APF and its strategy in the beginning through the JCC. The changing role of the JCC in the APF's agenda-setting may be evidence of a securitizing practice: The biennial meetings were held in rotation in various African countries and brought together representatives from the AU, the EU, and member states from both organizations, as well as some regional African organizations (European Union & African Union, 2005). These conferences featured reflections on the APF's activities and achievements, formulated objectives for the upcoming two years from both partners, and designed and shaped the programmatic design. At the end of the meetings, the results were published in a joint communiqué. The JCC was thus the primary mechanism for developing the strategy of the APF and steering its strategic direction.

However, this changed in 2010: That year's communiqué indicates the meetings had a more instructive character, with the EU informing the AU representatives about their plans for the APF (European Union & African Union, 2010). At this time, the Council had already published its Action Program for the APF, which was then presented to African representatives in the JCC. Even though they had a chance to comment, no changes to the Council strategy were visible in the 2010 JCC communiqué. Moreover, while there was an equal number of EU and AU representatives at the initial JCC meetings, there was later an increase of EU personnel attending. Several EU bodies and agency representatives were present, while the number of AU attendees remained the same (European Union & African Union, 2012). This imbalance of attendees may hint at a shift of power aimed at diminishing African ownership of the APF.

In 2014, the APF's JCC was terminated. There are no records of any other meetings afterward or new formats; the Annual reports of the APF also do not mention any official exchanges. Informal exchanges were retained through delegations or summits (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022). Nevertheless, no official framework allowed for a joint decision on the objectives and priorities of the Facility by African and European representatives. Starting in 2011, the Council controlled the strategy of the APF, published in the Action Programs.

Additionally, the AU was later also no longer involved in co-authoring the APF's Annual Report: Initially, the report was drafted jointly by the commission of the AU and the EU. Both were listed as authors, and the reports featured African and European perspectives on the achievements of the APF. However, starting in 2014, the AU is no longer listed as an author. The reports also become more Eurocentric, placing an increasing focus on the APF's achievements for security in Europe and international security (European Commission, 2015). This may indicate that the AU is no longer asked to contribute to the creation of the report, and African perspectives are no longer important to the APF. African stakeholders' diminishing role and control in the APF and its strategy mark a step away from African ownership.

There are several potential reasons for this shift. First, according to policymakers, the EU also grew increasingly frustrated with the principle of African ownership. An EEAS official reported the following: The money that went through the APF "was frozen in Addis Ababa for three years in the African Union," and this perceived lack of an EU control became problematic for the EU "as everything was subject to AU validation" (EEAS Official, as cited in Martinez, 2021, p.25). This perceived powerlessness to control the APF also meant not having the EU's (security) interests "adequately" represented in the APF. As one EEAS Official put it, "A boxer

boxing with one hand tied behind the back.” (EEAS Official, as cited in Martinez, 2021, p.15) From the EU’s perspective, African ownership may harm EU security interests and thus pose a threat that must be mitigated.

Second, many EU policymakers consider the agency of the AUC among its members to be relatively low. For example, several African countries do not pay their full membership dues, and participation in peace missions is also generally low (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022). In the case of AMISON, only six out of 54 AU members contributed troops to the mission (Williams, 2018, p.172). African regional organizations tend to have more agency among their members and also more regional expertise (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022). Therefore, many member states prefer to operate through regional organizations for peace and security operations. After the Council took control of the APF, the EU entered into several bilateral peace agreements with regional organizations (ECOWAS, 2020; European Commission, 2018a). The funds were intended to support PSOs and mediation efforts by regional organizations, effectively circumventing the African Union.

While it has now been established that African ownership diminished through the APF, how was this a securitizing practice? This thesis proposed reframing country ownership as a securitizing practice: The shift of ownership in an instrument of a project may indicate that its objectives are no longer targeting the interests of the aid-receiving country but rather those of the donor country. Often, these are security interests, which was also the case for the APF: In 2014, several options for African stakeholders to shape the APF were discontinued. At the same time, the EU started supporting several PSOs through the APF, most of them with a counterterrorism dimension, a security priority for the EU. African perspectives and interests no longer had a place to be voiced; this marks a hierarchization of security interests over others, characterizing this diminution of African ownership as a securitizing practice.

(6) Institutional integration. The Council taking control of the APF

As previously explained, the APF underwent several changes regarding its institutional location and management between 2004 and 2021. Upon the creation of the APF, there were discussions about the management of the APF. Back then, DG Development was still an independent DG and not integrated into foreign policy. While the Council later played a significant role in shaping the Facility's strategy, the body was not named in the decision establishing the APF. Because the EDF funded the APF, it automatically fell under the Commission's management, which also had a deciding responsibility. Upon a funding request by the AU, the Commission was tasked to seek a consensus with the member states on the appropriateness of the mission

and invites their opinion (European Commission, 2005, p.6). Iwano (2015) argues this initial "holding back" of the Council was also because it preferred to use the Commission's financial expertise and reduce its transaction costs.

However, in 2008, the Council sought to get stronger control of the APF, which was in line with its general objective to expand the scope of EU foreign policy (Council of the EU, 2013). Through the Treaty of Rome, development policy became part of EU external policy. The Council taking control of the APF was also an attempt to streamline member states' activities. As one EU official put it: "Member States might have gone for alternative forms of action, not through the European Union" (as cited in Martinez, 2021, p.24); this was something to be avoided. In the APF, the Council saw the potential to include parts of the Common Security and Defense Policy in a common instrument. As the APF was mainly concentrating on the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, it seemed like a good way to further the EU's security agenda: In these regions, EU development aid is effectively used to fund a war against al-Shabaab (Mattelaer & Marijnen, 2014, p.61). Subsequently, the Council started to view the APF as an instrument of foreign policy and a way to secure the EU security interests. This already happened before the Treaty of Lisbon: In 2008, the Council published its Action Program for the Facility, which set out strategies and objectives for the upcoming three years. Moreover, it obliged the Commission to publish an annual report establishing a clear hierarchy with the former as the rapporteur and the latter as the supervisor, meaning the Council now effectively controlled the APF.

This institutional change is also reflected in the types of PSOs supported after 2008: The APF mainly funded PSOs in the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, which are priority regions for EU security interests. So, the APF concentrated on supporting PSOs in these regions as this corresponded to the security interests of the Council. Moreover, a considerable number of French troops in Africa are concentrated in this area (Coex, 2022). The Council's control of the APF allowed France to not only reduce the costs for its missions but also further its security interests. Therefore, the Council's takeover of the APF was motivated by various reasons, among them to streamline the EU's external action and reduce the costs of member states' interventions. Nevertheless, it also allowed for further emphasizing the EU's security interests through the Facility. After the Council took over, more missions strongly correlated to the EU's security interests were funded. This strategy of prioritizing security interests over development concerns may be further evidence of a securitizing practice.

2. Aspects of a Developmentization of security in the APF

The previous section identified and analyzed several securitizing practices in the APF. However, throughout this thesis, there have also been hints at a potential developmentization through the APF. This section applies the previously proposed definition of a developmentization of security policy to the APF. As previously explained, the APF did not qualify as ODA from the beginning. However, its percentage of ODA-eligible activities increased several times throughout the years. Even though most of the APF remained non-ODA eligible, the increase may indicate a developmentization. Moreover, as previously explained, SSR (a part of the APF) may be considered an example of a developmentization of security. While SSR only took up a small part of the budget and ran primarily complementary to the PSOs, it was funded with the PSO budget (and not the capacity development share of the APF's budget). After 2013, SSR was a regular part of the Facility, hinting at least some developmentization. Additionally, both military and civilian actors were present in the APF, and according to Petřík (2016), this merger is among the most prominent examples of a developmentization of security (pp.168-169).

To conclude, there is relatively little evidence of a developmentization of security policy in the case of the APF. However, there is still some indication, so it may be argued that the APF has also developmentized EU security policy, albeit to a *lesser* extent than securitized. Mattelaer & Marijnen (2014) argue the EU's shift to capacity development missions instead of military ones is a way of subcontracting stabilization responsibilities to keep custodianship over the African continent. They further state that this development approach to security is also a more cost-effective strategy to get involved in conflicts: The EU is "experimenting with capacity-building not in follow up to large scale military stabilization missions but instead of them." (Mattelaer & Marijnen, 2014, p.64)

3. The meaning of the security-development nexus for the APF

In this chapter, several securitization practices in the APF have been identified. However, the outlined aspects of developmentization are among the reasons why the Facility is not a case of a fully-fledged securitization either. Given the security-development nexus featured so prominently in the APF (i.e., the respective EU documents), may the Facility be the exemplification of the security-development nexus instead?

The analyzed documents on the APF make constant references to the security-development nexus, from the creation to the discontinuation of the Facility. The review in the second chapter showed a distinction between the nexus and securitization, so the nexus does not equal

securitization. However, the analysis of the securitizing practices showed the nexus was sometimes hierarchized in the APF, with security dominating development. Depending on the context, this may be an accepted practice in EU policymaking and necessary to respond to changing environments and adjust priorities quickly (MEP, personal communication, March 11, 2022). Nevertheless, if the nexus is constantly hierarchized (with security becoming the dominant component and repressing development), then this may, in turn, be possible evidence of a securitization

On the one hand, the APF has securitized development or peacebuilding in Africa to this extent, as it laid the groundwork for a security instrument like the EPF without any development indication to be employed there. On the other hand, there were also aspects of a developmentization indicating the APF constantly oscillated between the two and that the nexus was present throughout. One may thus conclude that through the APF, development policy has been securitized, and security policy has been developmentized. This makes the APF the exemplification of the security-development-nexus. Though the insertion of a security-based approach to development and *vice versa* may not be a novelty, its explicit presence in EU policy may be, as prior EU instruments did not exemplify this as strongly. When illustrated, the cover pages of the Annual reports depict African soldiers, often performing security duties. It may be a subtle hint at the security-development nexus: African actors (trained through the development aspect) are performing military duties (as indented by the security approach of the APF).

If the APF exemplifies the security-development nexus, then what is the EPF? As previously explained, the new Facility did not merely undergo a simple name change but was almost completely overhauled in terms of funding structure, priorities, and strategy. Moreover, the EPF does not have any development implications anymore. There is a clear successor relationship between the APF and the EPF, and an EEAS official called removing the development dimension in the EPF a deliberate decision (Martinez, 2021, p.29). It may suggest that the EPF marks a new era in which the security-development nexus no longer plays an explicit role in the EU's policies toward peace in Africa. The EPF addresses the same issues the APF did but without the development approach: This may indicate the EU has moved past the security-development nexus and instead focuses only on security when attempting to further peace on the African continent.

However, there is also another interpretation: Contrary to assessments arguing for a further securitization, there are also signs indicating a developmentization of security policy through

the EPF. While most of the activities are short-term ones to address security issues, the EPF also contains some long-term development goals, even though these are not explicitly mentioned. So far, the EPF has mainly funded development activities on the African continent: These include a field hospital in Mozambique, renovations in training infrastructures in Mali, and capacity development activities in Mali (Strategic Communications, 2022, p.2). However, it is still too early to say what role the security-development nexus plays in the new Facility. How and when the EU chooses to use this instrument may inform future analyses and assess the relationship between the two Facilities in a more targeted manner.

Lastly, it needs to be highlighted that the nexus and its presence in the Facility were analyzed from a Eurocentric perspective. The review in the second chapter showed the nexus inherits a certain bias and may reproduce colonial rhetoric. No statements by African stakeholders were found but they may have a different perspective on the nexus and its meaning for the Facility. Their perspective is missing from the analysis.

4. Summary of the analysis: The APF – a little bit of everything?

The APF was never only development or security policy but belonged to both fields. The Facility had a short-term and a long-term component, with the former more security orientated and the latter more based on development. In the APF, the development aspect and the long-term goals were present, but the short-term (security) goals featured more prominently and became increasingly focused. In the EPF, however, there are (on paper) no development goals anymore; all objectives are short-term: When supporting African troops, the EPF does not aim at developing their capacity but only provides short-term support, corresponding to the fulfillment of EU security objectives.

Nevertheless, as previously explained, there are also some hints at development aspects, and the EPF's current activities are mainly development-based. This corresponds with the argument that the APF introduced a development-based approach to security policy. Some policymakers call this a "developmentization of security." (European Commission Official, as cited in Carbone, 2013, p.122). However, this is not very convincing because, in the APF's budget, development took up only a small percentage. Furthermore, the analysis in this chapter demonstrated indicators of developmentization to a small extent. Additionally, the APF seemed to have also influenced EU development policy in a broader sense: Several instruments after it, such as the Instrument contributing to Stability, are funded with development funds and have a strong security implication at the same time. In instruments prior to the Facility, this was not as

explicit, making a case for the APF having exercised some influence on EU development policy. The APF was always an instrument with clear security indications and benefited the EU and its citizens.

To conclude, the APF has securitized development policy to a *certain* extent, as several securitization practices were visible. However, this is not a full-fledged securitization because not all practices were identified, and there were also several aspects hinting at a developmentization of security policy through the APF. The APF also seems to have some influence on approaches to peace and security outside of the Africa-EU relationship: Several scholars report on ongoing negotiations between the AU and China on a “China Peace Facility” (Kambudzi, 2013, p.31) modeled after the European model (Stahl, 2017, p.141).

VI. Conclusion

This thesis has analyzed the extent to which the APF has securitized EU development policy. In order to examine the extent of securitization, the analysis used the analytical lenses of securitizing practices. The academic debate on securitizing practices was summarized in the second chapter, and based on that, an approach for the analysis was suggested. In a second step, these practices were then applied to the APF to examine the extent of securitization. The thesis challenged the argument of those stating the APF is *only* an example of securitization by arguing it is instead the embodiment of the security-development nexus and shows signs of a developmentization.

1. Contribution of the study

By outlining the APF's key components and changes, this thesis examined the research question, "*To what extent has EU development policy been securitized through the African Peace Facility?*". There is considerable evidence of securitization through the APF, as several securitizing practices were employed in the Facility. In order to further security objectives, the EU, to a *certain* extent, securitized development policy through the APF. This securitization happened through several practices. These securitizing practices are (1) Non-ODA eligible activities in development policy, (2) Using development policy solely for furthering security objectives, (4) Considering poverty in the Global South as a security risk to the Global North, (5) Resetting or reframing country ownership and finally, (6) The institutional or administrative integration of development into other policy pillars. It is important to note the degree of the different practices also varied. No evidence of the practice (3) implementation of development activities by military actors was found.

The APF was an attempt to unify security and development as a nexus in an EU instrument. However, there was a stronger dominance of security, as exemplified in the securitizing practices. Additionally, the APF also shows evidence of a developmentization of security. Therefore, this thesis argues the APF exemplified the security-development nexus, even though the security part seems to have been emphasized more. The APF constantly oscillated between security and development, but this changed with its successor, the EPF. As the analysis showed, the successor instrument, the EPF, loses its development-based security approach and seems to discard the nexus. Even though it is currently still tasked with many development activities, the EPF is considered a security instrument throughout, which is also reflected in its funding structure. This may indicate that the EU's approach towards security in Africa is no longer implemented with a development dimension.

The analysis showed that EU development policy has been securitized to a *certain* extent, as there were several securitizing practices in use, but not all of the ones identified in the academic literature. Another restriction to the extent of securitization was that the APF was never *only* a development instrument. The thesis demonstrated it was always an instrument of both security and development policy, therefore a product of the security-development nexus. Therefore, the findings corresponded to the hypothesis posed in the introduction. Additionally, the analysis also found evidence of a developmentization of security through APF. Lastly, some securitizing practices, such as security actors implementing development activities, were not identified in the Facility. The APF has thus securitized development to a *certain* extent and developmentized security to a *lesser* extent. Because the Facility was followed by several similar instruments (i.e., security dimension financed by development funds), it may be concluded that the APF has set the stage and, therefore, also had a wider securitizing impact on EU development policy.

2. Limits of the study

Nevertheless, the analysis highlighted some of the study's limits: It focused on the APF, and there was no room to analyze other EU development policy instruments to provide a complete picture. Analyzing the extent of securitization through those could advance the scholarly understanding of whether this is a general trend or if the APF remains the exception, which remains open after the analysis. Reflecting on the selected research design and methodology: The selection of the critical case study design proved fruitful in meticulously examining the case of the APF. The analysis indicated the Facility may have been an exceptional case as several of its features were unique and discontinued in its successor. However, this also remains to be seen, considering the APF only recently became history, and its effects may only be entirely ascertainable at a later time. The analyzed documents proved helpful in tracing its development and practices. Moreover, the expert interviews provided further insights into the motives behind certain policy changes and revealed discrepancies between the documents and the actual practice. This raises the question of whether different results would have been yielded if more interviews with other experts had been conducted, especially with those working on the APF and actively shaping its practice.

3. Outlook and proposal for further research

To better understand the implications of these results, future studies could address the security-development nexus in the EPF. The new Facility may also influence the EU-Africa relationship significantly because, as the analysis showed, the development approach and AU cooperation have no part in it. The changes may also indicate the EU's perspective on the security-

development nexus has changed: While development and security were initially considered equal and enforcing each other, the APF's case may suggest security plays a more dominating role in the nexus, as the extent of securitization was larger than developmentization. This potential shift from the security-development nexus towards a single focus on security may be intriguing to investigate in future research. So far, Petrik's (2016) study on PRT is the only one that finds simultaneous processes of securitization and developmentization result in the nexus. So far, his study is the only one investigating this phenomenon on the EU level, which does not mean it was not there before the APF; it just has not yet received considerable scholarly attention.

Being postponed from 2020 due to the pandemic (European Commission, 2020d), 2023 is now planned to be the new "Africa year" under the Spanish presidency of the EU Council (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). The "Focus Africa 2023" program stresses security as the strategy's primary objective. The security-development nexus is mentioned, but: "Development efforts can only be effective in a secure environment" (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021, p.2). may hint at securitization of EU-Africa relations. However, this needs to be examined in separate analyses. For now, it remains to be seen how European and African actors approach security and development issues on the African continent in 2023 and beyond.

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