

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of International Relations

**Gender equality, women's participation in the
post-conflict society, and civil war recurrence**

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Master's thesis

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Year of the defense: 2022

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on July 29th, 2022

Katarína Drevená

References

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Abstract

A large amount of academic literature demonstrated that intrastate conflicts often occur in countries that have already experienced civil war. This reoccurring pattern forced several researchers to analyze which factors contribute and which lower the risk of war recurrence. This master thesis focuses on the civil war recurrence through the lenses of gender. I will argue that higher gender equality could lower the risk that intrastate conflict will reoccur. If the countries are organized by norms of gender inequality, the same treatment is reproduced towards the other groups within society. On the other hand, more gender-equal societies may transform these relationships into the same tolerant relationships with those who are perceived as different and foreign in the country. Moreover, socialization and the way children have been raised play an important role in how they will behave as adults. Less patriarchal societies with a lower focus on the norm of dominance create space for norms of tolerance, respect, peace, freedom, and equality which has a pacifying effect on the behavior of the state and people within it. Therefore, I will hypothesize that the higher women's political, economic, and social participation, the longer the duration of peace after the civil war. Large-N quantitative analysis in which the Cox proportional hazards model was utilized only partly confirmed these hypotheses. The social participation, when measuring women's primary education compared to men's one, was statistically significant and confirmed that increased women's education has a positive effect on peace. On the other hand, when the social dimension was measured with the variable fertility rate, no effect was found. The economic participation of women also did not reveal statistically significant results. However, when measuring with an alternative variable, one of the models showed statistically significant results that higher participation of women in paid labor market increases the duration of peace

after a civil war. Finally, the political participation of women did not show any effect on the duration of peace based on my dataset.

Abstrakt

Veľké množstvo odbornej literatúry dokázalo, že vnútroštátne konflikty sa často vyskytujú v krajinách, ktoré už zažili občiansku vojnu. Tento opakujúci sa vzorec prinútil viacerých výskumníkov analyzovať, ktoré faktory prispievajú a ktoré znižujú riziko opakovania vojny. Táto diplomová práca sa zameriava na znovu sa opakujúce občianskej vojny cez prizmu rodovej rovnosti. Budem tvrdiť, že väčšia miera rodovej rovnosti môže znížiť riziko obnovenia vnútroštátneho konfliktu. Ak sú krajiny organizované podľa noriem rodovej nerovnosti, reprodukuje sa rovnaké zaobchádzanie aj voči ostatným skupinám v spoločnosti. Na druhej strane, spoločnosti s väčšou rodovou rovnosťou môžu tieto vzťahy transformovať na rovnako tolerantné vzťahy s tými, ktorí sú v krajine vnímaní ako iní, odlišní a cudzí. Okrem toho socializácia a spôsob výchovy detí zohrávajú dôležitú úlohu v tom, ako sa budú správať v dospelosti. Menej patriarchálne spoločnosti s nižším dôrazom na normu dominancie vytvárajú priestor pre normy tolerancie, rešpektu, mieru, slobody a rovnosti, čo má pacifikujúci účinok na správanie štátu a ľudí v ňom. Preto v práci predostieram hypotézy, že čím vyššia je politická, ekonomická a sociálna participácia žien, tým dlhšie trvá mier po občianskej vojne. Kvantitatívna analýza, v ktorej bol využitý Coxov model proporcionálnych rizík, tieto hypotézy potvrdila len čiastočne. Sociálna participácia, keď bola meraná ako miera základného vzdelania žien v porovnaní so základným vzdelaním mužov, bola štatisticky významná a potvrdila, že vyššie vzdelanie žien má pozitívny vplyv na mier. Na druhej strane, keď sa sociálny rozmer meral pomocou nezávislej premennej zachycujúcej mieru plodnosti, nebol zistený žiadny vplyv. Ekonomická participácia žien tiež

neodhalila štatisticky významné výsledky. Pri meraní pomocou alternatívnej premennej však jeden z modelov ukázal štatisticky významné výsledky, že vyššia účasť žien na platenom trhu práce zvyšuje dĺžku mieru po občianskej vojne. Napokon, politická participácia žien nemala na základe môjho súboru údajov žiadny vplyv na trvanie mieru.

Keywords

Gender equality, women's participation, economic participation, social participation, economic participation, civil war recurrence, intrastate war recurrence, post-conflict peace, Cox proportional hazards model

Kľúčové slová

Rodová rovnosť, participácia žien, ekonomická participácia, sociálna participácia, ekonomická participácia, obnovenie občianskej vojny, obnovenie vnútroštátneho konfliktu, mier po konflikte, Coxov model proporcionálnych rizík

Title

Gender equality, women's participation in the post-conflict society, and civil war recurrence

Názov práce

Rodová rovnosť, participácia žien v povojnovej spoločnosti a obnovenie občianskej vojny

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Introduction

The last decades observed a noticeable shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts (Fearon, Laitin 2003: 75; Quinn, Mason, Gurses 2007: 167-168). Civil wars have a significant effect on the population within the state where the dispute takes a place. The most well-known consequences are the increase in poverty, deterioration of civil liberties and political rights, decreased quality of health and education system, widened level of inequality, destruction of human and physical capital, killing, torturing, harming, and looting individuals within the society, etc. Apart from domestic disruptions, intrastate conflict negatively affects neighboring countries or international trade. Last but not least, civil wars often have unpredictable long-term effects, impact the region's stability, and alter international relations (Couttenier, Soubeyran, 2015: 788-789).

Furthermore, intrastate wars are not only more prevalent than interstate ones, but they also show an unfortunate pattern. Countries that experienced civil war have a high risk of experiencing another one (Mason, Gurses, Brandt, Quinn 2011: 171; Berg 2020: 1308). That means that the conflict in these countries was followed by a period of peace which later deteriorated and a new war emerged. The initial civil war was either settled or the situation got into a stalemate and the parties of the dispute decided not to fight anymore. The transformation from the stage of the violent dispute to peaceful coexistence takes time, the state needs to establish new mechanisms to cope with potential future problems, destroyed infrastructure has to be restored, antagonist groups need to undergo the process of reconciliation, and former belligerents need to be assimilated back into society. However, some countries fail to do so, while others register success. Therefore, it is crucial to determine what conditions make the recurrence of intrastate war more likely to increase the possibility that they will be prevented. Resolving the dispute requires a lot of time, effort, and finance from both the local and international representatives. It is in the interest of the whole global

community to do as much as possible to ensure that the countries will not experience renewed conflicts. That is only feasible when the factors contributing to post-conflict peace will be uncovered.

Given that civil wars have a reoccurring pattern, it should be one of the main interests of the international community to prevent these disputes. To do that, it is necessary to understand what conditions prolong the post-war peace. Several researchers to explain the phenomenon focused on the characteristics of the previous conflict, the level of economic development of the country, the strength of state institutions and the application of non-discriminatory measures, the commitment and information problems, as well as opportunities and incentives to join the combat. Although all these factors demonstratively affect the duration of peace, the goal of my diploma thesis is to expand the scope of existing literature by focusing on gender and its impact on peace after an intrastate dispute.

My research question is: *What is the impact of women's social, political, and economic participation in the post-conflict society on the risk of civil war recurrence?*

The diploma thesis aims to determine whether higher domestic gender equality can positively affect the duration of peace after a civil war. I will examine whether the political, economic, and social participation of women in the post-conflict society affects preventing intrastate conflicts to reoccur. I will hypothesize that the norms of gender inequality which are present in the form of the lack of participation of women in the social, economic, and political spheres have negative impacts on post-conflict peace and increase the risk of intrastate war recurrence. To confirm or disconfirm my hypotheses, I will analyze countries after intrastate wars.

The following diploma thesis will be divided into two main parts, the theoretical and practical sections. In the first chapter, I will provide the literature review which will be primarily

focused on the existing findings on the impacts of gender equality and female participation in society, and to a small extent, on causes of recurrence of intrastate conflicts. In the second chapter, I will conceptualize the main terms with which I will work throughout the whole thesis. I will define the concepts of civil war and its reoccurrence, gender equality, and political, social, and economic participation. The conceptual framework will be followed by the third chapter, in which I will provide the theoretical framework and propose three research hypotheses. I will introduce two theoretical approaches that explain why women's participation should lead to more peaceful societies, namely biological determinism and social constructivism. Based on the findings from the previous academic work on gender equality and women's participation in society, I will propose the argument that higher political, economic, and social participation of women in society after intrastate conflict increases the duration of peace. In the fourth chapter, I will operationalize the concepts into measurable observations and I will introduce dependent, independent, and control variables which will be used in the analysis described in the next section.

The second part of the thesis will be devoted to the quantitative analysis of the data to answer the research question presented at the beginning and to ascertain whether the proposed hypotheses were confirmed or not. To test the hypotheses, I will utilize the Cox proportional hazards model. Therefore, in the fifth chapter, I will present the main findings from the analysis and assess whether my hypotheses were confirmed or not. Finally, in the conclusion, I will shortly summarize the main findings of the research, discuss and address the thesis's shortcomings, failures, and limitations, and I will propose possible directions toward which should be future research directed to improve the knowledge about the recurrence of civil conflicts.

1 Literature review

Civil wars are among the widely studied phenomena in the field of security studies. Extensive work on intrastate conflicts and their causes exists, researchers focus particularly on the questions about what conditions and factors lead to civil war in the first place. Literature about the reoccurrence of civil war is not as vast as in the case of general causes of intrastate conflicts, however, the number of scholars concerned with this question is growing. The majority of them focuses on the characteristic of the previous war and how they affect the durability of post-war peace (Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998; Hartzell 1999; Doyle, Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, Rothchild 2001; Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004; Downes 2004; Walter 2004; Smith, Stan 2004; Hegre, Sambanis 2006; Toft 2006; Johnson 2008; Derouen, Bercovitch, Wei 2009; Mason, Gurses, Brandt, Quinn 2011; Rudloff, Findley 2016).

Researchers also ascribe the reoccurrence of intrastate conflict to the economic underdevelopment of the country, in terms of poverty, low income, economic grievances, poor living conditions, high GDP per capita, high infant mortality, or large population (Fearon, Laitin 2003; Walter 2004; Sambanis 2004; Quinn, Mason, Gurses 2007; Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom 2008; Arena and Hardt 2014; Rudloff, Findley 2016). Furthermore, other explanations that can cause civil war recurrence are the information and commitment issues, as well as incentives and opportunities for rebellion. According to this part of academic literature, a potential cause for the conflict reoccurrence might be information asymmetries among parties of the dispute, difficulties to commit to settlements, the existence of indivisible stakes, such as symbolically or strategically important territory, and favorable opportunities and positive incentives to engage in the dispute, which is closely connected to the level of economic development in the country (Collier and

Hoeffler 2004; Quinn, Mason, Gurses 2007; Walter 2004; Walter 2009; Mattes, Savun 2009; Cunningham 2013; Arena, Hardt 2014; Rudloff, Findley 2016).

Finally, several scholars explain the civil war reoccurrence by weak state institutions and the lack of democracy together with discriminatory practices and the exclusion of parts of the society from decision-making processes (Henderson, Singer 2000; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, Gleditsch 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Yartey 2005; Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom 2008; Walter 2011; Mason, Gurses, Brandt, Quinn 2011; Gurses and Rost 2013; Buhaug, Cederman, Gleditsch 2014; Walter 2015; Hegre, Nygard 2015; Piccone 2017).

To prevent the conflict from reoccurrence, many academics concluded that the inclusion of warring parties into post-conflict society is one of the most important pre-conditions. Several researchers, however, further argue that the scope of the inclusion has to be extended to other groups as well. For the purposes of the diploma thesis, I will focus on literature that discusses the inclusion of women. In this regard, several academics argue that countries with higher gender equality tend to be less violent and behave in a more pacifist way compared to countries with a lower level of gender equality (Tessler, Warriner 1997; Caprioli 2000; Caprioli, Boyer 2001; Caprioli 2003; Melander 2005; Caprioli 2005; Caprioli, Trumbore 2006; Dworkin, Schipani 2007; Bjarnegård, Melander 2011; Gizelis, Pierre 2013; Ekvall 2013; Herbert 2014). The majority of them derived their findings from the evidence of interstate conflicts.

First, gender equality leads to positive attitudes toward diplomacy and preferences toward pacific behavior among states, their leadership, and their citizens. Caprioli (2000) found out that domestic gender equality leads to a more pacific foreign policy behavior. She defined gender equality in terms of political, economic, and social power. According to her justification, states and their leaderships follow a similar pattern in international politics as in domestic ones.

Therefore, if countries apply discriminatory and violent politics in domestic affairs, it is more likely that they will behave similarly in the international arena. Moreover, Tessler and Warriner (1997) argue that people who are more supportive of gender equality are more likely to use diplomacy and compromise in conflict situations. They analyzed four societies with dissimilar characteristics and in each of them, the positive relationship between attitudes toward gender issues and attitudes toward international conflict remained statistically highly significant. Similarly, Cook and Wilcox (1991) concluded that feminist consciousness and preferences, regardless of whether they are among men or women, create societies that adhere to more egalitarian values and policy preferences.

In addition, states with lower levels of gender equality tend to adopt more violent behavior in times of crisis. Caprioli and Boyer (2001) studied the effect of domestic gender equality on the use of violence during the international crisis. They found out that increasing gender equality decreases the severity of violence in crisis employed by the state. These findings held stable even in an environment that exhibits a high propensity toward violence. Similarly, Caprioli (2003) examined the impact of gender equality or inequality on the behavior of states involved in international disputes. She concluded that higher levels of gender equality decrease the risk of the use of force. Therefore, social justice, and more specifically gender equality, has demonstrated its positive impact on states in terms of minimizing aggression. Caprioli argues that the main reason for this phenomenon is that gender equality eliminates the norms of violence inherent to structural hierarchy, and at the same time, includes women's values in state policy. That is why the state is more prone to try non-violent methods of conflict resolution to achieve its objectives.

Dworkin and Schipani (2007) and Ekvall (2013) agree that there is a relationship between gender equality and its norms and the levels of violence, including in countries engaged in armed

conflict. Less equal countries in gender terms tend to be more violent. According to Ekvall (2013), the higher the level of political and socio-economic gender equality, the lower the risk of civil war, and peace is more likely to be sustained. Dworkin and Schipani (2007) further argue that the empowerment of women leads to less violent conflicts, as well as to a reduction in poverty and greater social stability.

Moreover, gender inequality increases the risk of a war outbreak. Herbert (2014), based on a comprehensive review of the evidence, concluded that gender inequality and the lack of women's empowerment contribute to the risk of a war outbreak. Caprioli and Trumbore (2006) analyzed states that violate human rights in terms of ethnic and gender discrimination and personal integrity rights. They concluded that these human rights rogues are more likely to get involved in militarized and violent interstate conflicts. Furthermore, they found out that the states where discrimination, violence, and inequality are a domestic norm, are more likely to become the first ones to use force when involved in an interstate dispute. This is not only the case for ethnic discrimination but also for gender discrimination. In general, the state manifests its domestic norms not only at home but also in the international realm (Caprioli, Trumbore 2003a; 2003b). Sobek, Abouharb, and Ingram (2006) similarly argue that countries that respect human rights are more peaceful in the international system due to their domestic norms. When the state follows the rules of respect for human rights, such as physical integrity rights, women's rights, and empowerment rights, the risk of conflict decreases.

Additionally, the positive impact of women on peace was demonstrated by researchers that focused on the impacts of participation of women in peace negotiations. Even though the number of women involved in peace processes is still comparatively small, and the level of impact of their presence continues to raise skepticism, some evidence suggests that their participation has positive

effects (Gizelis 2018: 5). Caprioli, Hudson, and Nielsen (2010), and Stone (2014) argue that advancing the role and the representation of women in the peace process increases the duration and the quality of peace negotiations and peace itself. O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz (2015) in the comparative study have proved, by using both quantitative and qualitative sets of data, that women's participation and their influence on the peace process increases the chance that the agreement will be reached in a short term and peace will be more durable. According to the previous research, women are perceived as trusted members of societies and, compared to men, they more often emphasize social and civic issues (Dollar, Fisman, Gatti 2001; Bolzendahl, Coffé 2009).

Similarly, Krause, Krause, and Bränfors (2018) discovered that there is a positive correlation between peace agreements signed by women and the durability of peace after conflict. Furthermore, women's participation leads to better accord content as well as higher implementation rates which researchers identified as a strong predictor of longer peace (Joshi, Quinn 2015; 2017). Paffenholz (2015a; 2015b) claims that to reach quality agreements that properly address the causes of the conflict, felicitous actors that can influence both the content and its subsequent implementation are required. She further argues that when women groups are included in the process and their role is influential enough, the peace is stronger. Krause, Krause, and Bränfors (2018) explain the positive impact of women's participation in peace processes on the durability of peace through strong linkages between women signatories and women civil society groups which result in their collaboration and information and knowledge sharing.

Even though the research on the impact of gender equality on post-intrastate peace is significantly smaller than for interstate conflicts, the findings seem to follow the same pattern. Caprioli (2005) found out that states with higher gender inequality are more likely to experience

intrastate conflict. According to her, gender inequality does not have negative effects only on women but its repercussions extend to the societal level as well. Similarly, Melander (2005) concluded that more equal societies in terms of gender have a strong pacifying effect compared to those that are less equal.

Gender equality is also important for the post-conflict reconstruction of society. Bjarnegård and Melander (2011) suggest, based on their examination of the relationship between gender, democracy, and peace, that democracy can facilitate peace but only when accompanied by steps toward political gender equality. Gizelis and Pierre (2013) also gave credit to gender equality and its positive effects on the long-term development of the country which helps to facilitate the situation after the war. According to them, it modifies the structural conditions that contributed to the conflict in the first place and positively affects the development of the country which lowers the risk of war reoccurrence.

Shair-Rosenfield and Wood (2017) agree that the higher proportion of female legislators in national legislatures increases the durability and stability of peace after the civil war, especially in cases when the dispute ends in a negotiated settlement. They provide explanations based on policy priorities and public perception of women and men. According to them, female representation reduces the risk of conflict reoccurrence because women tend to prioritize social welfare policies over military spending, and their inclusion in legislature improves public perception of good governance and the credibility of political elites. Last but not least, Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly (2014) concluded that including women in social and political dimensions of society reduces the risk of reoccurrence of civil war, or more specifically, higher female literacy and higher women's parliamentary representation do so. Including women in the national economy

through participation in the labor force might have, on the other hand, undesirable effects and increase the risk of conflict.

Gizelis (2009; 2011) further added that the UN post-conflict peacekeeping missions after the war are significantly more successful in societies with higher levels of women's empowerment and where women enjoy relatively high social status. According to her explanation, the improved social status indicates that women have social capital and domestic capacity which can be used by peacekeeping operations to succeed. Furthermore, Gizelis proved that in societies where women have higher social status, the cooperation of the local population with peacebuilding policies and activities increases compared to countries where women enjoy only low social status. The UN missions tend to become more effective in achieving their goals, and therefore, women have a direct impact on post-conflict reconstruction.

Even though the amount of research focused on the effects of gender on war and peace is growing, the majority of academics examined cases of interstate conflicts. The impacts on intrastate disputes were studied only by a few researchers and most of them considered only one dimension of gender equality or operationalized the whole concept of gender equality by one variable which seems not sufficient enough. Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly (2014) examined all three dimensions of gender equality, namely political, social, and economic ones, but their operationalization left out important aspects which need to be taken into a consideration. For example, they measured political participation as a percentage of all parliamentary seats held by women which fails to acknowledge that women are often more active in the sphere of civil society which is a part of political participation as well.

Therefore, given the limited extent of academic literature that is oriented on the impact of gender on post-intrastate conflict peace, I believe that there is a gap that needs to be filled. In the

following thesis, I will analyze what are the effects of women's participation on the risk of civil war recurrence.

2 Conceptual framework

In the following chapter, I will define the main concepts with which I will work throughout the thesis. The most important terms are civil war and its reoccurrence, gender inequality, and political, economic, and social participation.

Civil wars are, for the purpose of the thesis, defined as proposed by the Correlates of War (CoW) on three main dimensions: types of war participants, internality, and the degree of effective resistance (Sarkees 2010: 5). Intrastate conflict is sustained combat, it involves organized armed forces that are capable of effective resistance, and it must result in a minimum of 1000 battle-related combatant fatalities within twelve months. Each side of the conflict has to be either initially organized for violent conflict and prepared to resist the attack or, in the case of the weaker side, it does not have to be initially prepared but has to be able to inflict at least five percent of the fatalities to the other party of the dispute. Therefore, intrastate conflicts are differentiated from massacres and genocides, one-sided state killings, or unorganized mass riots. In the typology, the CoW differentiates between three types of intrastate wars: civil wars, regional internal wars, and inter-communal wars. In this thesis, it will be referred only to the first type, a civil war, which includes the participation of the government of the given country against a non-state entity. The government has to control the state's institutions, regardless of the legality, but not necessarily the armed forces (Dixon, Sarkees 2016).

Furthermore, for the state to be considered to be a participant in the war, it has to either commit 1000 troops to the given conflict or suffer a minimum of 100 battle-related fatalities. In

the case of non-state groups, they have to either commit 100 armed personnel or suffer at least 25 battle-related deaths. The requirements for non-state groups are lower because, in general, they tend to be smaller and are capable to accumulate a lower amount of resources compared to the state (Dixon, Sarkees 2016). The intrastate war starts either with the formal declaration if followed by sustained military combat or the beginning is considered to be the first day of the combat when hostilities and sustained military actions precede the formal declaration or are completely missing. The civil war continues as long as there is sustained military combat with at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year or until it terminates. The intrastate dispute might end with an agreement, ceasefire, or if rebels cease fighting. In the last case scenario, the war ends if there is a twelve-month period without 1000 battle-related fatalities, or if there is a truce, agreement, or one side is apparently defeated for at least one year (Sarkees 2010: 20-21).

The reoccurrence of the civil war is considered to be a situation in which one intrastate conflict is followed by another intrastate conflict in the same country. There has to be a minimum of one year of peace between given civil wars. The country is considered to be in a phase of peace when there is a break from fighting and when there are less than 1000 battle-related deaths per year (Sarkees 2010: 22-23). The new conflict, regardless of whether it is between the same or different combatants, what the causes of the violence are, and what kind of goals the warring parties have, has to comply with the identical criteria as defined above.

Gender inequality refers to a social reality in which women and men are treated differently and in which power and material and immaterial resources are distributed unjustly based on gender. Such behavior tends to be justified based on biology, psychology, and cultural norms. Caprioli (2005) and Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-Spanvill, McDermott, and Emmett (2008/09) applied Galtung's (1969; 1975) definition and concept of structural violence specifically to women. It is

understood in terms of exploitation, penetration, fragmentation, and marginalization. Due to gender roles and expectations, women are exploited and the possibilities for personal development differ from men's ones. The structure maintains structural violence through socialization and gender stereotyping. Women have greater family responsibilities, fewer job opportunities, and minimal leisure time which significantly reduces opportunities for socialization and participation in societal matters. Gendered hierarchies, from which the inequality arises, are amplified by social practices, beliefs, and values that promote male domination and women's subordination. Moreover, structural violence is created, sustained, and legitimized by cultural norms (Caprioli 2005; Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-Spanvill, McDermott, Emmett 2008/09).

Gender inequality and structural violence against women exist in all parts of the world in varying degrees and in various forms (Morse, Gupta 2019). They refer to a collection of interlinked problems that affect the daily life of each individual and society as a whole (Sen 2001: 466). Practically, it can be demonstrated in a variety of ways, from discriminatory laws and unjust social norms, political underrepresentation, sexual violence, discrimination in health, education, or the labor market, etc. According to the United Nations, gender equality is a fundamental human right and a necessary basis for a peaceful world and human development (UN n.d.).

Three main dimensions can be used to capture gender inequality. They are related to political, economic, and social power. First, political power refers to the ability to influence the goals and outcomes in the public sphere. Gender inequality in political terms creates an environment in which women have lower access to political power, and therefore, their ability to influence decision-making processes is diminished (Caprioli 2000: 55).

Political participation is an activity undertaken by the public that either directly or indirectly influences public policies. There are different views on what political participation

means and what kind of political activities should be included in the definition. Kateřina Vráblíková (2008: 366-369) stressed two important academic pieces that improved and deepened the understanding of political participation. While Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim (1978: 46) focused on the conventional definition of the concept, Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kasse (1979: 41) incorporated also unconventional forms of political participation. Therefore, political participation does not include only elections, but also other forms of political activity, such as contacting a local or national representative, donating money to the candidate, petitioning, protesting, etc. (Vráblíková 2008: 368-369).

Second, the social dimension of gender equality captures the value given to individuals based on their sex and the structural perceptions of women and femininity compared to men and masculinity. It is a fundamental part of gender equality because it is closely connected to other two dimensions, political and economic ones. It consists of elemental demographic indicators and normative beliefs, values, norms, and understandings, or in other words, the value-based distribution of investment in individuals depending on gender (Olsson, Forsberg 2016).

The term social participation is in academic literature used in three different ways: consumer participation, social activity, and involvement in society (Piškur, Daniëls, Jongmans, Ketelaar, Smeets, Norton, Beurskens 2013: 213). For the purpose of my thesis, I will refer to social participation in terms of involvement in society through activities and interactions with others in the community and society (Levasseur, Richard, Gauvin, Raymond 2010: 2148). It results from the enactment of potential ties in real-life activity (Berkman 2001: 14327). There are several goals of social participation, such as connecting, interacting, helping others, and making contributions to society (Levasseur, Richard, Gauvin, Raymond 2010: 2141). Social participation is very important in the country transitioning from war to peace because it allows to reconcile and unite

the divided society. Most peaceful initiatives are addressed to the communities, and therefore, actively engaged citizens may accelerate the process of stabilization.

Finally, the economic dimension of gender equality refers to access to material resources that help the individual affect the quality of their own life and the people around them. The distribution of financial resources that tends to be focused on the employment rates of women and men is an important indicator of the level of influence the individuals have. This measure can help to understand how are physical resources distributed within society (Forsberg, Olsson 2016).

Therefore, economic participation will refer to labor force participation. Economic participation means that the individual works at least one hour per week, for which she or he receives financial incentives. Every person who supplies labor to produce economic goods and services, regardless of whether she or he does so for pay, profit, or family gain, is an economic participant. This excludes activities that do not count as market labor, such as unpaid work like taking care of the household or nurturing children (Ortiz-Ospina, Tzvetkova, Roser 2018).

3 Theoretical framework and research hypothesis

There are several reasons for the reoccurrence of civil wars, however, most researchers concluded that to prevent it, the state must establish strong domestic institutions which provide access to the decision-making to everybody, apply non-discriminatory measures, and reconcile the society (Hartzell, Hoddie 2003; Yartey 2005; Walter 2011; Gurses, Rost 2013; Buhaug, Cederman, Gleditsch 2014; Walter 2015; Hegre, Nygard; 2015). To build trust in the government, people must feel that they are equal. However, when talking about inclusion and non-discrimination in society, most of the academic literature about civil wars focuses on fighting groups. This is, undoubtedly, valid, but there is one large part of the society that tends to be left out from the discussion: women.

Gender as an analytical tool has for traditional security studies only limited relevance. As Forsberg and Olsson (2016) observed, the most frequently cited studies that are focused on the causes of civil wars, completely omit gender inequality. The attention to gender in the context of the research on peace, conflict, and international politics was brought by feminist scholars and feminists (Boulding 1981; Elhstain 1995; Lorentzen, Turpin (eds.) 1998; Enloe 1993; Tickner 1992). They conceptualized political violence and war as manifestations of patriarchal and hierarchical social structures that are present in the societies. Feminist research criticized traditional security studies for the lack of acknowledgment of the relationship between gender and power structures that are responsible for creating and supporting violence (Gizelis 2018: 2).

Therefore, gender is an important analytical tool for the study of armed conflict and peace. War is always gendered in terms of who participates, who and how is affected, and what are the causes and consequences of the dispute (Bjarnegård, Melander, Bardall, Brounéus, Forsberg, Johansson, Sellström, Olsson 2015: 101). Besides, gender as a causal factor is closely linked to other variables, such as weak institutions, bad governance, inadequate access to health, education, security, justice, social exclusion, etc. (Birchall 2019: 7).

In general, there is demonstratively an important link between the treatment of women and other state-level variables. Researchers (Rathgeber 1990; Asante 2002; Thomas 1990; Esteve-Volart 2000; Schultz 1993) highlighted the essential role of women in the economic development of the country and the quality of life for all citizens. The state significantly benefits from increased gender equality, and on the other hand, gender inequality leads to negative social, human, economic, and development costs. Studies suggest that active political participation of women has positive effects on the implementation of welfare state development policies and negative impacts on defense spending (Bolzendahl, Brooks 2007; Swiss, Fallon, Burgos 2012; Kittilson 2008; Koch,

Fulton 2011). For example, Thomas (1990) found out that if the unearned income is in the hands of mothers, it has a noticeably more positive effect on the family's health compared to income in hands of the father. Another example is provided by Esteve-Volart (2000) who claims that sex discrimination has harmful consequences on the economic performance of the state. When women are excluded from the labor market, the GDP per capita is reduced.

From the perspective of war and peace, there is a significant amount of evidence that gender equality and empowerment of women create more stable societies (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli, Boyer 2001; Regan, Paskeviciute 2003). When women are empowered, countries are less likely to engage in a militarized and violent dispute with another country, they tend to have better relationships within the international community, their behavior in foreign policy is more pacifistic and diplomacy-driven, and the state's crime and violence records decrease, and the risk that the state will engage in human rights abuses reduces (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli, Boyer 2001; Caprioli 2003; Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005; O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, Paffenholz 2015).

Two main theoretical explanations, which will be further discussed in the remaining chapter, clarify the existence of the phenomenon: biological determinism and social constructivism (Caprioli 2000: 52; Melander 2005: 397-399).

3.1. Biological determinism

Biological determinism, or essentialism, argues that there are physiological differences between women and men, such as size, strength, speed, and stamina, that determine their behavior, and therefore, their attitudes to violence as well (Miller 2001: 84). Each gender has unique characteristics and their identities are based on biological factors that cannot be altered. Women have an inherent reproductive role which makes them more prone to give life than to take it. Several studies demonstrated that women tend to take a negative stance toward violence and the

use of force (Togebly 1994; Tessler, Warriner 1997; Regan, Paskeviciute 2003). According to the essentialist view about the peaceful nature of women, it is reasonable to believe that they will try to prevent conflict to avoid further societal problems and they will be more willing to compromise and make concessions.

According to Regan and Paskeviciute (2003), women's attitudes toward the use of force are different from men's attitudes, and when given access to the decision-making political processes, they are more constrained to use the force. Besides, societies, where women are actively present and involved in decision-making processes, tend to display an increased amount of collaboration, solidarity, and non-violent conflict resolution. The norms of reciprocity and trust are more likely to occur in groups with women's presence since their responsibilities rely on frequent and intensive collaboration (Westermann, Ashby, and Pretty 2005). For example, Molinas (1998) showed in the case of Paraguay that cooperation is higher as the level of women's participation and social capital increases.

Moreover, based on opinion polls from Western Europe and Northern America, women tend to be less militaristic, keener to maintain peace, less likely to approve of the use of force and violence and policies related to it, or the involvement in international wars (Smith 1984; Shapiro, Mahajan 1986). Women are less likely to support the use of troops and military aid, and they prefer rather pacific foreign, defense, and nuclear policies (Lamare 1989; Fite, Genest, Wilcox 1990; Togebly 1994). Besides, women tend to show more support to peace movements and ideas, and they are more hostile to nuclear armament compared to men (De Boer 1985). In general, women support measures that help to protect the environment, minorities, or economically disadvantaged groups in society (Gierycz 2001: 25).

Modest gender differences were found in countries outside of the Western hemisphere as well. Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop (1996), Bendyna, Finucane, Kirby, O'Donnell, and Wilcox (1996), and Wilcox, Ferrara, and Allsop (1993) concluded that women were less supportive of the Gulf war than men. Even though women and men agreed on the interpretation of events leading to hostilities, on the affective responses of actors to the conflict, and they supported the same foreign policy goals, women were less willing to support military actions to achieve the foreign policy goals that they believed in compared to men. Women and men prefer similar outcomes in foreign policy but they differ in their preferences of how their governments should achieve them, specifically regarding the use of force as a tool of foreign policy (Tessler, Warriner 1997; Fite, Genest, Wilcox 1990).

More peaceful attitudes of women are confirmed by several studies from the field of psychology as well. All-male groups tend to use more conflictual and self-interested approaches when negotiating while all-female groups are more collaborative, less conflictual, and less self-interested (Florea, Boyer, Brown, Butler, Hernandez, Weir, Leng, Johnson, Lima, Mayall 2003). Women are more committed to fundamentalism and they have more positive attitudes toward the disadvantaged groups in society (Conover 1988). Besides, men prefer punitive and preventive actions more than women while women support human service actions more than men. According to Gault and Sabini (2000), the main difference is played by emotions. While men's preferences for punitive actions are driven by anger and women's preferences for human service actions and willingness to volunteer were predicted by the mental state of empathy. Furthermore, women's experiences from several decision-making bodies show that women can create a more collaborative atmosphere due to emphasis on consensus and discussions about problems (Gierycz 2001: 25). Last but not least, women tend to be less prone to use violence in experiments with

simulation crisis games and gaming. Men were more likely to acquire weapons and engage in war and aggressive behavior compared to women (McDermott and Cowden 2001; Johnson, McDermott, Barrett, Cowden, Wrangham, McIntyre, Rosen 2006).

Given evidence could confirm the essentialist theoretical belief that women's higher participation in the post-conflict society increases the duration of peace due to biological differences between sexes. On the other hand, biological determinism has several weaknesses that have to be acknowledged. Essentialism is based on the belief that some objects have certain timeless and immutable qualities. However, even though everything has a certain essence, that does not mean that it has to be perceived in the same way. For example, there are certain biological differences between women and men but that should not lead to the conclusion that the behavior, attitudes, actions, and perceptions of all women or all men are the same (Skjelsbæk 2001: 49).

Essentialism reduces the diversity of society or population by claiming that it is possible to recognize the unchanging essence of individual and social identity which then connects views and behavior to identity. This unjustly simplifies the reality (Smith 2001: 33-34). Goldstein (2001) stressed that although biological argument provides a partial explanation of why are men more associated with war, it does not sufficiently explain the puzzle of gendered war roles. The evidence provided by biology is nuanced and the knowledge of it is far from complete.

Even though several researchers believe that women are less militaristic in their nature based on their peaceful behavior, the evidence is mixed. First, women do not express negative attitudes toward war and violence under all circumstances. In the US context, Conover and Sapiro (1993) found out that even though women are more afraid of war and are not as supportive as men of foreign involvement when given proper justifications, they are similarly willing to use force as men. Women react slightly more negatively to war than men but these differences are not large

enough to argue that women are less militaristic. Women tend to be more likely to support humanitarian and multilateral wars which in other words means that they are in favor of war when the main objective is to save innocent lives and/or when it is approved by the United Nations (Brooks, Valentino 2011). Women supported some types of military actions in some historical episodes. Besides, there are certain factors that reduce the support for the use of force by both men and women (Eichenberg 2003).

Outside the USA, mixed results can be found as well. For example, Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant (1999) did not find evidence of less militaristic attitudes of women compared to men in countries in the Middle East. According to them, there is not a statistically significant relationship between sex and attitudes toward international conflict. The reasons for these differences were not determined, however, the researchers lean toward the explanation that it depends on the characteristics of the given conflict. No gender differences in attitudes toward violence were found in Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait toward the Arab-Israeli conflict as well. Women did not express less militaristic attitudes and they were not more oriented toward diplomacy and compromise than men (Tessler, Warriner 1997).

Second, women are not necessarily conducting only peaceful acts and they directly get involved in conflicts (Tickner 2001; Charlesworth 2008; Hunt 2003). As Gizelis (2018: 2) highlighted, women were involved in wars as warriors for centuries and the trend continues to this day. There is plenty of evidence that women fought in several conflicts, such as in wars in Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ukraine. According to Braithwaite and Ruiz (2018: 1), women participated as combatants in almost 40% of civil conflicts between 1979 and 2009. They also engage in all kinds of violence. For example, women in Chechnya, Palestine, or Iraq engaged in

violence as suicide bombers, became terrorists in Al-Qaeda, or perpetrated genocide and supported genocidal rape in Darfur, Rwanda, or Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sjoberg, Gentry 2007).

Women participate in wars but they are often hidden and their roles have been largely ignored for centuries. Historically, women generally performed as combatants as well as men in combat units, either in combined or in female ones, as individual fighters, and as military leaders. The evidence from several conflicts, such as during the Second World War in the Soviet Union, in guerilla armies in Vietnam, Northern Ireland, South Africa, etc., suggest that women are able to fight and kill. Women's physical strength, supposedly lower levels of aggressiveness, and their nurturing nature do not tend to be obstacles (Goldstein 2001: 59-127).

Besides, even if women's violence is acknowledged, it tends to be understood in gendered terms, and therefore, differently than men's violence. According to Sjoberg and Gentry (2007), women's violence is described with narratives of mothers, monsters, and whores and it can be found across cultures, times, religions, and states. First, women's violence is linked to motherhood and the fulfillment of the biological destinies as mothers and wives, as well as attributed to vengeance driven by maternal and domestic disappointments, not necessarily by ideology and belief in a given cause. The second narrative explains women's violence as a biological flaw that disrupts their naturally given femininity, and therefore, they are considered to be rather inhuman monsters than real women. Finally, the third narrative vilifies women because of their perceived sexual deviance, either in terms of their insatiable need or inability to have sex (Sjoberg, Gentry 2007).

As Sjoberg and Gentry (2007) argue, these narratives might explain women's violence to some extent, however, they deny women's agency, their responsibility, and full knowledge of their own actions, as well as condemn their femininity. Contrary to the gendered understanding of

violence, women engage in conflicts for several reasons, such as revenge, representation, politics, social role fulfillment, or other personal issues (Düzel 2020: 443; Giri, Haer 2021: 3).

As demonstrated above, even though women in many instances adhere to more peaceful attitudes compared to men, the reason might not lay in their nature and biological characteristics. For example, Lamare (1989) argues that diverging perspectives on defense and nuclear issues between women and men in New Zealand might be products of gender-related socialization experiences and processes. This leads to the explanation from the theory of social constructivism which might provide a better explanation of why to expect the political, economic, and social participation of women to have positive effects on post-conflict peace.

3.2 Social constructivism

The theoretical approach of social constructivism is not based on the inherent characteristics of biological sexes, but on the belief that attitudes to the use of force, violence, and war are socially constructed and the differences between genders are due to the different ways girls and boys are raised and socialized (Melander 2005: 698). Gender identities are not naturally given but constructed by social, economic, political, historical, and cultural factors, and people become who they are through social interactions (Skjelsbæk 2001: 50-52). Femininity and masculinity, together with closely linked stereotypical roles that are reproduced within society shape the behavior of both men and women. The distinction comes from differing conceptualizations, more precisely, femininity and masculinity tend to stand in the contrast to each other (Enloe 2000, Hunt 2003; Cockburn 2010).

The construction of gender roles has two main functions. First, it socializes girls and boys in specific ways from early childhood and prepares them for the roles of tough protectors in the case of boys, and caring and nurturing mothers and wives in the case of girls. Second, it legitimizes

the subordination of women and emphasizes the domination of men (Tickner 1992; Tickner 2001; Goldstein 2001; Melander 2005).

Traditionally, boys are raised as potential warriors, while girls as nurturers and caregivers. Men are required to act tough, or otherwise, those who do not live up to this expectation lose their societal status (Melander 2005: 698). As Goldstein (2001) argues, men and women are made, not born. Men in many cultures have to first take some actions, such as rites, to come from boyhood to manhood. Those who are not perceived by society as proper men are shamed and considered to be bad examples. Cultures produce and support masculine identities that support men as warriors if needed. The concept of masculinity is closely linked to the features of warriors and the values related to it. Since men typically fear war, the intense socialization which guides and motivates them toward war and violence is needed. The most reoccurring conceptions of qualities of warriors are physical courage, endurance, strength and skills, and honor. Men are supposed to suppress their emotions, especially fear and grief, and remain brave at all times. Shame and humiliation prevent men from not obliging to these norms (Goldstein 2001: 264-301; Smith 2001: 39-40). Moreover, masculine stereotypes that praise men as strong protectors who use violence if needed are further reinforced by the discourse about weak women who require protection (Birchall 2019: 6).

The roles of women are created by society's expectations as well. The ideal woman is described as a caring, nurturing, and protective mother, wife, and helpmate. The argument comes from the traditional understanding of women who have a special connection to life and its preservation due to their ability to bear a child. Therefore, it is expected that they will be more in favor of peace and be resentful toward violence (York 1996: 323-324). However, if needed, they are expected to not directly engage in conflict but actively support men in war and provide other

supporting assistance. The feminine construction is supposed to fuel males' masculinity and witness their bravery (Goldstein 2001: 321-322).

Therefore, gender roles glorify militarism, and toughness is suggested to be an important part of manhood. At the same time, these socially given gender norms legitimize the subordination of women. Militarized masculinity is accompanied by chauvinism and oppressive behavior toward opponents, and it legitimizes violence as a means to maintain domination and achieve goals (Bjarnegård, Melander 2011: 142). Gender norms and hierarchies have a direct effect on conflict norms. Militarized masculinity relies on the belief that men are warriors who are supposed to protect the nation while women are expected to support men and the collective goals at all times. Militarized masculinity that celebrates men as warriors can become culturally dominant/hegemonic masculinity. As Schaftenaar (2017: 764) highlighted, several researchers, such as Caprioli (2005), Melander (2005), or Bjarnegård and Melander (2011: 142), claim that this hegemonic masculinity manifests itself in oppressive behavior toward other groups within the society. Therefore, it can be argued that if given the right circumstances, the conflict is more likely compared in countries where hegemonic masculinity is not dominant.

In other words, each society consists of groups with conflicting interests and attitudes, and these groups compete for power. Gender is a dominant organizing principle, and therefore, the level of gender equality matters. If the society is organized by the norms that produce gender inequality, the same treatment might be used toward other groups that are perceived as out-groups or foreign (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2005; Caprioli, Boyer 2001; Melander 2005; Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-Spanvill, McDermott, Emmett 2008/09; Gizelis 2009; 2011). Children in highly patriarchal societies are raised in a culture in which, normally, women are dominated over. Violence and domination are considered to be unquestionable and just behavior and this can be easily

transformed into how other groups are treated. Additionally, highly patriarchal societies usually value traditional gender roles based on which men have to behave tough under all circumstances to demonstrate their manhood (Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-Spanvill, McDermott, Emmett 2008/09). Inequality and intolerance in the country have a very important effect on the behavior of the state on both the domestic and international level, and therefore, can lead to violence and legitimization of the use of force (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli, Boyer 2001; Regan, Paskeviciute 2003; Caprioli 2005).

At the same time, societies that can be described as gender-equal tend to transform the relationships that are between women and men into relationships with members of other groups (Melander 2005; Bjarnegård, Brounéus, Melander 2017). These societies tend to be more peaceful than societies where gender inequality is dominant (Tickner 2001; Goldstein 2001). If violence is not considered to be a norm, other more peaceful forms of solving problems and grievances are likely more institutionalized, and non-violent conflict strategies are applied (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005; Schaftenaar 2017). Besides, on an individual level, those who support gender-equal norms are less likely to engage in violence. On the other hand, individuals, in particular males, who endorse honor ideology consisting of the adherence to patriarchal values, the ideals of masculine toughness, and support for violence, are prone to violence toward other members of the society (Bjarnegård, Brounéus, Melander 2017; Cohn, Zeichner 2006; Reidy, Shirk, Sloan, Zeichner 2009; Parrott, Zeichner 2003; Poteat, Kimmel, Wilchins 2011).

Therefore, to sum it up, social constructivism argues that violent behavior does not lie in the nature and biology of individuals, but rather in social norms that can be constructed and deconstructed. If societies are unequal in gender terms, these norms tend to be reproduced in the behavior toward others in the society. According to Bonta (1996) and Maoz (1997), states apply

the same norms and behaviors on both the domestic and international levels. That is why, norms of intolerance, non-recognition of others, and inequality lead to a higher risk of legitimizing violence as a tool of conflict resolution (Caprioli 2005: 163). Contrary, norms of tolerance, respect for others, peace, freedom, and equality have a pacifying effect on the behavior of the state not only in the domestic realm but also in the international one (Caprioli, Trumbore 2003a: 381-382; Caprioli, Trumbore 2006: 134).

3.3 Research hypotheses

The social construction of gender roles creates different socialization processes for both men and women which results in specific values concerning power, politics, and security (Caprioli, Boyer 2001: 504-505). Men are more likely to seek power for personal gains, and in general, are more competitive than women. Women, on the other hand, are more focused on egalitarianism, sharing resources, or equality (Gidengil 1995; White 1988). According to Rosenthal (1998), these differences might derive from different preparatory experiences that they go through in early childhood. Socially constructed gender roles are, however, not static. *"The constructivist argument linking gender equality and peace thus turns on the normative aversion to violence that is believed to pervade societies in which people tend to identify with more equal gender roles. Once men begin to identify with a form of masculinity that discards warlike behavior as the test of manhood, and rejects the subordination of women, they are expected to be less averse to violence than women who similarly deny the legitimacy of their subordination and violence as a means of imposing domination"* (Melander 2005: 698-699). In other words, the more equal states in gender terms are, the more peaceful they tend to be.

That being said, it is reasonable to expect that increased gender equality will lead to a more peaceful society after a civil war and decrease the risk of conflict reoccurrence. Women's presence

does not mean that the state and the whole society will suddenly pursue more peaceful policies, women's presence is rather a sign of greater gender equality within the country. This gender equality then can have positive impacts on choices of policies and reduction of violence (Tickner 1999).

Gender equality can be measured in three dimensions: political, economic, and social. First, considering the political dimension, several studies suggest that higher representation of women in political institutions tends to be associated with more equal societies that demonstrate more peaceful attitudes toward other states and groups within the country (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2005; Caprioli, Boyer 2001; Regan, Paskeviciute 2003; Melander 2005).

The participation of women makes a difference in decision-making in terms of style, content, and priorities (Gierycz 2001: 25-26). Women can broaden the political agenda and raise issues at the highest level that would be otherwise overlooked. For example, they tend to discuss topics beyond military action, power, and territory, and focus rather on the social and humanitarian needs of people, while advocating for excluded groups of the society and addressing underlying causes of the dispute (O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, Paffenholz 2015: 8). Furthermore, women tend to give special attention to social and welfare policies which reduce poverty and inequality and contribute to peace (Collier, Hoeffler 2006; Taydas, Peksen 2012; Walter 2004; Azam 2001; Thyne 2006). According to studies, women give a higher priority to public goods provisions than men, which includes areas such as education, health care, or social welfare policies (Doepke, Tertilt, Voena 2011; Miller 2008; Abrams, Settle 1999). The research indicates that they often occupy positions in the ministries of health and social affairs, and since they favor public goods investments, it leads to increased funding of these policies (Hessel, Jaramillo, Rasella, Duran, Sarmiento 2020: 1166; Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras 2014). Gender equity and increased political

representation of women has also had a positive impact on populations' health and life expectancy, and it is accompanied by a decrease in infant and maternal mortality (Shen, Williamson 1997; Hessel, Jaramillo, Rasella, Duran, Sarmiento 2020; Bhalotra, Clarke, Gomes, Venkataramani 2018).

Therefore, women's different perspectives lead to broadening the political agenda and focusing on different issues, which can have a positive impact on the country after the civil war. Moreover, the orientation on social policies can have stabilizing effects because multiple grievances that people have might be solved. Last but not least, the political participation of women ensures that decision-making processes in the country are more democratic, inclusive, and responsive to different segments of the society (Falch 2010: 4). Therefore, my first hypothesis is:

H1: The higher women's political participation in the post-conflict society, the longer the duration of peace after the civil war.

Active social participation is a crucial component that facilitates the stabilization of the situation and reconciliation of the society after intrastate conflict. Women tend to be a linking point between divided societies. They share similar problems, such as taking care of children or providing water, and therefore, can look for peace together (Gizelis 2011: 527). Women demonstrate already during the war that they can work across conflict lines to establish peace. For example, thanks to women's peaceful actions in India and Pakistan in 1999, prime ministers met on the borders and stopped the violence (Hunt 2003:564). Women in Liberia launched in 2003 a non-violent campaign that included peaceful marches, songs, and sit-ins, which convinced the president to engage in peace talks with rebel groups (Bisarya, Manning, Perotti, Shah 2017: 251). Another example is women in Northern Ireland who won a Nobel Prize for their non-violent protests in the war. The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, which is comprised of women from

both sides of the conflict, was one of the main campaigners for the Good Friday Agreement which ended a dispute in the country (Hunt 2003: 565).

J. Krause, W. Krause, and Braenfors (2018) found out that women's participation in peace negotiations positively impacts the durability and quality of peace after the dispute. They argue that women and women's civil society groups have strong linkages with local expertise and grassroots movements. Thanks to these relationships, women can bring to the table specific issues and agendas which can lead to a better peaceful agreement. Furthermore, even though they are often excluded from peace negotiations, they participate in informal peacebuilding in their communities, and through women's networks and organizations collaborate across ethnic and religious divisions (Falch 2010: 7). For example, women in Burundi, Somaliland, Sudan, Rwanda, Nepal, and Sri Lanka got engaged in providing basic needs and ensuring survival, peacemaking, advocacy, decision-making and leadership, and in community outreach and rebuilding communities after the conflict. The experience with the work in the local communities ensures that women are aware of their grievances and needs, and therefore, can facilitate reconciliation (El-Bushra 2003: 42-48). *"Women's resistance to violence is widely believed to be a mobilizing factor in both local and international peace movements* (El-Bushra 2007: 131)."

Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that active social participation of women that already began during the war, can speed up the process of reconciliation and community-building, and trust-building. Thanks to their strong connections and linkages with local people across disputing lines, they can better address people's grievances and come up with solutions how to establish a united post-conflict society. My second hypothesis is:

H2: The higher women's social participation in the post-conflict society, the longer the duration of peace after the civil war.

The economic dimension is closely connected to the social and political ones. Studies suggest that the destructive effects of war can create new opportunities for women, including an opening in the economic sphere. Conflict changes the gender division and opens space for women in areas that were inaccessible for them before the dispute (Hughes, Tripp 2015; Webser, Chen, Beardsley 2019; Bakken, Buhaug 2021). After the conflict, however, they tend to be among the first ones who lose their jobs and are expected to return to traditional roles as mothers and wives (Cahn, Haynes, Aoláin 2010: 103). On the other hand, the violent conflict changes the roles of women in the households and communities and this creates opportunities to continue this trend after peace was signed. Justino, Cardona, Mitchell, and Müller (2012) suggest that increased labor participation of women in countries transitioning to peace increases the overall household and community welfare. Similarly, Duflo (2011), Wang (2007), and Balamoune-Lutz (2007) argue that women's empowerment, gender equality, and economic development are closely related, and they have positive effects on each other. At the same time, to prevent rebel recruitment, economic development is especially important in the post-intrastate conflict society (Collier, Hoeffler 2004; Collier 2007; Fearon, Laitin 2003, Hegre et al. 2001, Hegre, Sambanis 2006).

Besides, these benefits are more visible when women are employed in better-paid jobs. However, even when they perform lower-status work, the positive effects on welfare are observable. Moreover, women are central to any socioeconomic reconstruction after the war and without addressing their grievances and fears, the recovery cannot be completed. Full inclusion and equality of women do not improve only their lives but also others in the community. For example, when girls gain proper education, their welfare increases and it has the same effect on the welfare of their families and their communities (Cahn, Haynes, Aoláin 2010: 353). If women can work outside the household, it can be assumed that they have a higher chance to influence the

post-conflict society. There are several studies (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2005; Caprioli, Boyer 2001; Regan, Paskeviciute 2003) that consider high levels of employment to be an important indicator of a gender-equal society. That being said, my third hypothesis is:

H3: The higher women's economic participation in the post-conflict society, the longer the duration of peace after the civil war.

4 Empirical data

The data about civil wars are taken from the CoW dataset (Intra-State War Data (v5.1) according to which intrastate conflicts were defined (Dixon, Sarkees 2016). The CoW dataset is one of the most utilized data resources in the field of war studies. The same dataset was used, for example, by Walter (2004), Mattes and Savun (2009), or Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2008) for studies about peace after intrastate disputes. As described in the conceptual part of the thesis, for the country to experience intrastate conflict for this research, it has to comply with four main requirements. The civil war is between the government of the country and at least one non-state group, each party has to be capable of active resistance, the conflict is taking place within the borders of the recognized state, and each year of the conflict has to be characterized by at least 1000 battle-related fatalities (Small, Singer 1982). The dataset contains 66 countries and two former states (the full list of countries is presented in Table 1), namely the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic, that have been unified in 1990 into one country, Yemen.

Since the thesis is focused on determining whether higher women's participation in the post-conflict society increases the duration of peace, the analysis is limited to the countries that already experienced civil war. Owing to the character of this research, I have excluded all countries

that did not experience intrastate conflict as well as all conflict years and years before the first civil war in the given state. The reason for this approach is that country cannot have a subsequent war if its territory was not a place of an initial conflict. Furthermore, attention is paid to the peace period, and therefore, conflict years do not fall under this category.

The conflict is considered to be recurrent when peace breaks in the country after the initial war, regardless of who the combatants are and what goals they are fighting for. That means that one of the warring parties has to always be the government, but the other party can change and it will be still considered a reoccurrence of intrastate conflict. The justification for this approach is similar to the justification of Mason, Gurses, Brandt, and Quinn (2011). The concern of the thesis is the stability and duration of peace after intrastate conflict and not whether the particular dyad was resolved. It focuses on sustaining peace in the given state as a whole and whether the causes of the initial conflict were resolved. The potential stabilizing effect cannot be established if one civil war ends but another one begins.

The thesis analyzes countries where civil wars started between 1946 and 2014, which is the year of the last update of the CoW dataset. The dependent variable is the number of *peace years* that country has experienced after the civil war. I have created a time-series cross-sectional dataset in which each year in a post-conflict period in every country that is included in the analysis is a separate observation. In every case, the analysis starts with the following year after the civil war ended, regardless of whether it was a victory, peace agreement, or stalemate, and therefore, it starts with the coding of 1 year of peace.

According to the hypotheses, it is expected that increased political, social, and economic participation of women in the post-conflict period will lead to an increased duration of peace. To measure all three dimensions, five independent variables were chosen. Each dimension will be

measured individually, even though, as Caprioli (2000: 56) pointed out, in practice, they are highly intertwined and interdependent. For example, if women have low social status, they are less likely to participate in political life in the country, or if women have more children, it is less likely that they will participate not only in social but also in the economic and political life of the country. This limitation will have to be kept in mind when interpreting and discussing the results of the analysis.

4.1 Measures of political participation

The political participation of women will be measured with two variables: *women's political participation index (v2x_genpp)*, and *women's political empowerment index (v2x_gender)*.

The first variable that would measure the political participation of women is the *women's political participation index (v2x_genpp)*. This variable was used by Bakken and Buhaug (2021) to study the transformative potential of war for female empowerment. The data are collected from the Variety of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset which measures women's rights and political, social, and economic standing in society (Coppedge et al. 2022; Permstein 2022). The variable that is utilized in this index consists of the average of the indicators for lower chamber female legislators and power distributed by gender. It measures the situation of women relative to men. I chose this indicator because it captures how are women represented in formal political institutions, as well as what gender distribution in relation to power looks like. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, higher values capture higher women's political participation.

Other researchers, such as Caprioli and Boyer (2001), Caprioli (2000), Regan and Paskeviciute (2003), and Melander (2005) used the variable percentage of women in the parliament to capture gender equality and the participation in politics in the country. Although I

consider it to be a relevant measure because it indicates to what extent are women included in direct decision-making at the national level and it can predict which path will the country follow regarding the inclusion of women in politics, I have decided to include more advanced variable. The women's political participation index does not take into consideration only women's parliamentary involvement, but also the power distributed by gender, which is for political participation similarly relevant.

The second variable that will measure the political participation of women is the *women's political empowerment index (v2x_gender)*. As in the case of the first variable, it was obtained from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2022; Permstein et al. 2022). It measures fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues, and participation in civil society organizations. The main aim of the second variable is to capture nonelectoral forms of direct democracy, openness, and women's participation in less formal institutions, unlike in the case of the first variable, such as civil society organizations. As in the case of the first variable, v2x_gender ranges from 0 to 1, and higher values capture higher women's political empowerment.

There are other variables regarding women's political participation which could be good indicators for measuring this dimension and which were carefully considered. For example, Melander (2005) used a dichotomous indicator of whether the highest leader of a state is a woman. This variable captures the extent to which women hold positions that allow them to influence matters of war and peace in the given country. It takes into consideration women's presence in politics with a particular focus on power, however, I decided not to include it because it captures women's participation only to a limited extent. Apart from this, I weighed the advantages and disadvantages of measures such as political party gender quotas, females' right to vote, the percentage of women registered to vote, the percentage of women that voted in elections, or the

proportion of women elected into local and communal governments. However, the data for these variables were either not available or did not capture women's political participation well enough, and therefore, I decided not to include them in my analysis.

4.2 Measures of social participation

The social participation of women will be measured with two variables: primary education will be measured as either *the ratio of female-to-male total primary education* or *the Gender parity index (GPI)*, and *fertility rates*.

Above I argued that women tend to be a linking component between divided social groups within society. They usually demonstrate already during the war that they are capable to work across conflict lines to establish peace. Their actions, such as peaceful marches, campaigns for peace, or involvement in grassroots movements, contribute to the stabilization of the situation and rebuilding of the society. After the intrastate conflict, the social participation of women can either increase or decrease. I believe that looking at the fertility rates can predict what is the social status of women within society. Social participation requires time which is significantly harder for women to find when they have many children. The education captures how are women valued within society. With increased literacy, the understanding of the world around improves, people tend to get more respect and they can have more impact on society. Furthermore, when people are literate, they might have more confidence in themselves which can result in increased engagement in societal matters.

That is why variables measuring the social participation of women are *the ratio of female-to-male total primary education* and *the GPI*. These measures will be used in separate models. Melander (2005) used the female-to-male higher education attainment ratio, however, I believe that lower education is a more suitable measure. Melander argues that higher education captures

how women are valued in society relative to men. On the other hand, I have two main reasons to believe that lower education can be important in the context of post-war society as well. First, even though the durability of the dispute needs to be taken into a consideration, during the war there tends to be a lower emphasis on higher education for both women and men, and therefore, it captures how women are valued in society only to a limited extend. Second, women can be active in the social dimension even with lower education. Any education level achieved increases social status and it can affect individuals who tend to feel more confident and comfortable contributing to society.

The data for the ratio of female-to-male total primary education is from the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Data from 1950 to 2010 (Barro, Lee 2013). The data are constructed based on estimates of educational attainment for the population between 15 and 64 years and they are disaggregated by five-year age intervals. The ratio in my dataset might range from 0 to 2, the value greater than 1 suggests higher total primary education for girls compared to boys, and the value smaller than 1 is the opposite. The GPI is a socioeconomic index that indicates parity in education between girls and boys. A GPI greater than 1 suggests that boys are more disadvantaged in their learning opportunities compared to girls, and a value smaller than 1 means the opposite. The data are available in the World Bank dataset which was collected by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (World Bank 2021a). In case the data was missing for a maximum of five years in a row but there was value before and after the years in question, I have counted an average between those values and substituted it for the missing value or values.

The second variable to capture the social participation of women is the *fertility rate*. The measure was used in several articles to capture social equality (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2003; Regan, Paskeviciute 2003; Caprioli 2005). Caprioli (2000) argues that fertility rates are an essential

measure to monitor the social status of women because it shows the opportunities for them beyond being mothers since motherhood is the term they are generally described in. Furthermore, fertility rates are sometimes being used to capture overall gender inequality, namely in political, economic, and social areas (Regan, Paskeviciute 2005; Caprioli 2005). Although I agree that this variable is closely connected to other dimensions as well and it will be stressed when interpreting the results, I have decided to use it as a measure of social participation because it primarily captures the social standing in society. The higher the fertility rate, the higher probability that the society remains stereotypical and believes that women belong to the household. The data for the *fertility rates* are available on the World Bank website (World Bank 2021b). I used this dataset because it is more comprehensive and updated than data provided by the UN or the OECD. Some of the missing values were, however, replaced by values from the UN dataset (United Nations 2022).

Besides two chosen variables, I have considered including in the analysis the variable of the ratio of female-to-male life expectancy which was used by Gizelis (2009). She argues that women are often faced with poorer access to healthcare which leads to the higher life expectancy of males compared to women. Although I agree with this hypothesis, I do not include the variable in my research because I believe that especially right after the civil war, several other factors have an influence on life expectancy for both men and women, and they do not have to affect both genders equally. Besides, I have considered two other variables that could be used as a measure of social participation: maternity mortality and infant mortality. High rates of both maternity and infant mortality could indicate a bad healthcare system or unequal access to it. However, I decided not to include it in my research because these measures could not be compared to men and they do not take into account other factors that could deter the healthcare system, and therefore, it would not provide a full picture of the situation on the ground.

4.3 Measures of economic participation

The economic participation of women will be measured as *the percentage of women in the total labor force*.

One of the best predictors of economic participation of women is their presence in the paid labor market but it is still far from perfect. Even if women are employed, their work tends not to be paid equally to men's one. Similarly, even if women earn money, they do not necessarily have to have control over their wealth and finances. To control for this, it would be suitable to include variables such as the gender wage gap or the control over finances. However, data for these matters are either very limited or they do not exist at all. Therefore, the only variable that will be used to capture the economic participation of women is *the percentage of women in the total labor force*. Higher participation in the economic sphere indicates that women enjoy better status within the society and it implies that there are fewer gender restrictions and more opportunities. Moreover, women's employment tends to raise when they engage less in unpaid work, which indicates that women's status in society increased. Women in the labor force gain independence which creates more space for them to choose their way of life.

The same approach to measure gender inequality with the independent variable of the percentage of the adult labor force made up of women was chosen in several studies (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2003; Regan, Paskeviciute 2003; Caprioli 2005; Demeritt, Nichols, Kelly 2014). They argue that this measure captures women's access to the economic sphere in society and contributes to a sense of empowerment. This value makes a comparison between women and men and takes into consideration that there might be high unemployment on the men's side as well. The most comprehensive data for this variable are available in the World Bank database (World Bank 2021c). Some of the missing values were complemented with the data gathered by Caprioli (2005) in her previous research.

4.4 Control variables

To assess the real effect of women's political, social, and economic participation on the duration of peace after the civil war, I will include in the analysis several control variables. These variables take into consideration other potential causes that influence the durability of post-conflict peace which were briefly mentioned in the first part of the literature review.

From the academic work on the civil war reoccurrence that focused on the characteristics of the previous war, four variables that potentially can affect the duration of peace will be included in my analysis. The first control variable is the *duration of the conflict*. According to the prevailing consensus among experts in the field, the longer previous wars were, the less likely they are to occur. On the other hand, peace after short conflicts tends to be more fragile (Walter 2004; Smith, Stan 2004; Derouen, Bercovitch, Wei 2009). Smith and Stan (2004) explain that during longer wars, each side reveals more information about its capabilities which creates a more stable and transparent environment when the dispute is settled.

Closely connected to the literature concerned with the effects different durations of wars might have on peace is *the number of battle-related fatalities*. Costly wars in terms of a high number of fatalities and displaced people have a lower risk of renewed intrastate disputes (Walter 2004; Smith, Stan 2004; Derouen, Bercovitch, Wei 2009). After such intensive conflicts, popular support for the war decreases, combatants are discouraged, fatigued, and exhausted, and supplies have been significantly reduced (Walter 2004: 373). Besides, a high number of casualties might increase the doubt on each side that the war can be won (Derouen, Bercovitch, Wei 2009: 110).

These two measures, the duration of the war, measured in days, and battle-related fatalities, control for the severity of the conflict which can potentially have a negative effect on post-conflict peace. Both variables were logged and taken from the CoW dataset (Dixon, Sarkees 2016). If a civil conflict was followed by another civil conflict without having at least one year of peace in the

given country, the duration and number of battle-related deaths were counted together. This was the case, for example, in Angola, Indonesia, or Iran. If during intrastate war another intrastate war took a place in the same state, the number of deaths were counted together as well. However, in the case of the variable duration of the conflict, it was not counted together since two wars overlap, but the number of days represents the real number of days during which the fighting took a place in the country. This is the case for China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Georgia.

From the part of literature that focuses on the impacts of characteristics of the previous war on civil war reoccurrence, I will include two additional dichotomous variables: *third-party intervention* or not, and *victory* or not.

For post-conflict peace is important to how the war terminated, more specifically, whether it ended with a victory, by negotiated settlement, a ceasefire, the conflict ceased to exist or it was transformed into another type of war. While negotiated settlements have a negative impact on the duration of peace, victories have a positive one (Derouen, Bercovitch, Wei 2009; Toft 2006; Downes 2004). The researchers argue that after a decisive victory, each party in a dispute is quite certain what is their position and what would be potential costs or benefits if they would engage in violence again. Furthermore, the losing side of the conflict has fewer resources to renew a war, and therefore, the winning party feels more secure. Toft (2006) added that rebel victories might be more favorable to peace. Rebels employ mechanisms of both harm and benefit to each party of the equation, and therefore, are more suitable for the reconstruction of the state. On the contrary, negotiated settlements include only mutual benefits, and that is why, when no potential for harm is clearly visible, peace tends to fail. Therefore, in the analysis will include a dummy variable *victory*. If the civil conflict ended with the victory of the government or rebels, it is coded as 1,

and if it ended with compromise, stalemate, continues below war level, it was transformed into another type of conflict, or it is ongoing in 2014, it was coded as 0. The data are from the CoW dataset (Dixon, Sarkees 2016).

Besides, most scholars believe that third-party intervention prolongs peace after the war (Hartzell, Hoddie, Rothchild 2001; Mason, Gurses, Brandt, Quinn 2011; Doyle, Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004). The stabilizing effect is produced by ensuring the security of former combatants by third-party states, international organizations, or regional institutions. Besides, especially multidimensional peacekeeping is very effective in supporting the democratization of the country based on accountable institutions and increasing the period without war (Doyle, Sambanis 2000). If the country hosted a third-party peacekeeping mission in the given year, regardless of whether it was established by the UN, regional organizations, or independent states, it was coded as 1. If it did not, it was coded 0. The data are from Mullenbach's (2017) dataset.

Economic underdevelopment is believed to have negative effects on peace after the civil war while higher economic development decreases the risk of recurrence of intrastate conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom 2008; Walter 2004; Fearon, Laitin 2003; Quinn, Mason, Gurses 2007; Sambanis 2004; Rudloff, Findley 2016). High poverty, low income, poor living conditions, high GDP per capita, high infant mortality, or a large population significantly increase the probability of renewed conflict. Economic grievances and dissatisfaction with living conditions are among the most important factors that can help to explain the initiation of intrastate disputes (Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom 2008: 4). Economic inequalities which lead to the deprivation of certain groups can provoke conflict and increase the chance that people will join the combat (Koubi, Böhmelt 2014: 19). On the other hand, people are rational actors and if their

socioeconomic well-being is improved, the costs of resuming the dispute are higher and they are less likely to join the combat (Walter 2004; Quinn, Mason, Gurses 2007; Arena, Hardt 2014).

Therefore, to control the effects of economic underdevelopment on post-conflict peace and intrastate war reoccurrence, I will include variables *the GDP per capita, life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and the size of the population*. These measures capture the quality of healthcare, the quality of life, and the economic situation which are important factors that can predict whether belligerents have incentives to fight or not. The lower the GDP per capita and life expectancy are, and the higher the child mortality, and the size of the population are, the higher the risk that the war will reoccur. Variables of GDP per capita and the size of the population were logged.

The indicators for life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and the size of the population were predominantly acquired from the World Bank dataset (World Bank 2021d; World Bank 2021e; World Bank 2021f). Some of the missing values about the first two mentioned variables were complemented with the data from the UN dataset (United Nations 2022). Afterward, when data was missing for a maximum of five years in a row but there was value before and after the years in question, I counted an average between those values and substitute it for the missing value or values. The missing values about the size of the population were complemented with the dataset created by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Lastly, the GDP per capita was obtained from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt, Zanden 2020).

Moreover, to further capture potential grievances of people, it is controlled for the *ethnic fractionalization* of the country obtained from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF) (Drazanova 2019). The data is available until 2013, for 2014 I have copied the same value as in the year before. Although there are mixed results on whether it is harder to sustain peace after ethnic wars compared to wars fought for other reasons or not, ethnicity plays an

important defining role in societies. Kaufmann (1996; 1998) and Johnson (2008) believe that peace after ethnic wars is less stable. On the other hand, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) argue that ethnicity and ethnic fractionalization play a role only in cases of lower-level armed conflicts, not necessarily in civil wars. Nevertheless, it is essential to control for ethnic fractionalization because according to the prevailing evidence, identities are not fluid and they are difficult, if not impossible, to change. Members of one ethnic group tend to be loyal to their groups and they are rarely willing to fight for the opposing side. Furthermore, ethnic groups might be generating dividing mobilization rhetoric which creates a very difficult post-conflict situation for reconciliation and sustaining peace and can increase the risk of civil war recurrence (Johnson 2008: 145-147).

Last but not least, I will include seven variables (and one squared variable) from the literature about political openness and inclusion, regime stability, post-conflict institutions, and their effects on post-conflict peace. The first variable is *polity2* from the Polity V dataset (Marshall, Gurr 2020) that captures the level of autocracy-democracy. Democratic states have a lower risk of insurgency within the country (Henderson, Singer 2000; Piccone 2017). However, the evidence suggests that the main reason for this phenomenon might not be democracy itself, but rather strong institutions that can react to citizens' needs. This assumption is confirmed by Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001) who found out that the relationship between democracy and civil war is best defined by U-curve. This indicates that countries that are in the middle range of the autocracy-democracy index are faced with the highest risk of civil war. Therefore, to control for this phenomenon, I did not include only *polity2* but also the square of the variable.

Although there is no statistical difference between strong autocracies and strong democracies when the regime is in a transition to either side, the probability of intrastate dispute increases (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, Gleditsch 2001). T. David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Patrick T.

Brandt, and Jason Michael Quinn (2011) came to similar conclusions and added that weak authoritarian regimes and partial democracies are most likely to experience renewed civil dispute. That is why the variable *durable* is included. It is taken from the Polity V dataset (Marshall, Gurr 2020) and it shows the stability and durability of the regime in a given year, or more specifically, the number of years since the last substantive change in authority which is measured as a 3-point change in polity2 score.

Five other control variables are related to the strength of institutions after the war and the application of non-discriminatory measures in decision-making processes. Walter (2010, 2015), Yartey (2005), and Hegre and Nygard (2015) argue that weak institutional settings are often incapable to prevent the renewal of violence among citizens. Several indicators of good governance and accountability are positively associated with durable peace. Among them are widespread political participation, political accountability in terms of the presence of a written constitution, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, government stability, low level of corruption, and political inclusion. Discriminatory and repressive policies increase the risk that the country will experience violence again, but on the other hand, carefully targeted policies and institutions can improve peaceful coexistence (Hartzell, Hoddie 2003; Gurses; Rost 2013; Buhaug, Cederman, Gleditsch 2014). Therefore, to capture these risks, I will include in my analysis the following variables: *executive constraints*, *political competition*, *political rights*, *civil liberties*, and *the political terror scale index*.

Variables of *executive constraints* and *political competition* are from the Polity V dataset (Marshall, Gurr 2020), the same one as for the level of autocracy-democracy and the durability of the regime. Variables of executive constraints and political competition were treated in the same way as polity2, which was suggested by the authors of the dataset. The value -66, which determines

foreign interruption or occupation, was treated as a missing value. The number -77 which described interregnum or anarchy due to the collapse of central authority was coded as a neutral value of 0. Finally, the value -88 which captured a transition and undergoing changes was interpolated using the previous and subsequent codes. The variable of political competition combines the measure of the regulation and competitiveness of political participation, and executive constraints refer to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of individual and collective chief executives.

The measures of *political rights* and *civil liberties* have been obtained from the Freedom House (2021) and *political terror scale index* from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) provided by the US Department of State (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Haschke, Arnn, Pisanò, Barrett, Park 2021). The PTS measures violations of basic human rights by the state and has the potential to capture political exclusion and repression in the country which has a negative effect on peace in the post-conflict society. Some of the missing data were replaced by values from PTS provided by either Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch.

5 Results

To test the above-proposed hypotheses, a Cox proportional hazards model was utilized. The same approach was chosen in several other studies interested in war recurrence (Mason, Gurses, Brandt, Quinn 2011; Gurses, Rost 2013; Demeritt, Nichols, Kelly 2014; Walter 2015; Rudloff, Findley 2016; Zeigler 2016; Shair-Rosenfield, Wood 2017; Karlén 2017; Berg 2020). The dependent variable is a measure of time in years until intrastate conflict recurred in the country. I have opted for this model, and not for the Weibull model or other parametric survival models because I do not assume that intrastate conflicts recur in some predictable pattern that could

be captured over time (Berg 2020; Rudloff, Findley 2016). The chosen model allows to focus specifically on the recurrence of the conflict and at the same time account for the duration of peace and time-varying independent variables (Demeritt, Nichols, Kelly 2014). The Cox proportional hazards model demands the hazards of the event, which in this case is the peace failure, to be proportional over time (Krause, Krause, Bränfors 2018). To ensure that this assumption is met, I have tested both fully specified models with all variables, both control and the gender ones, with the Schoenfeld residuals.

First, Table 1 proves that intrastate conflicts tend to reoccur. The sample based on the data from the CoW dataset captures 66 countries and two former states between 1946 and 2014. 25 states from this sample had only one civil war and 43 of them experienced at least one reoccurrence of intrastate conflict. More precisely, 13 countries had two civil wars, ten countries had three civil wars, seven countries had four civil wars, three countries had five civil wars, five countries had six civil wars, three countries had seven civil wars, one country had nine civil wars, and one country had one civil war. That means that approximately 63% of states experienced at least one reoccurrence of intrastate conflict.

I have made three models (Table 2, Table 3, Table 4) which are presented below. Table 2 reports results in a restricted model which includes only control variables to assess dominant explanations in the academic literature regarding the intrastate war recurrence. Table 3 and Table 4 report results from fully specified models with variables measuring political, economic, and social participation of women, as well as control variables. Between these two models is, however, one difference. While the second model includes the ratio of female-to-male total primary education as one of two variables capturing the social participation of women, the second model

uses the GPI as a measure of primary education instead of the ratio of female-to-male total primary education.

For each independent variable are presented the estimated coefficients, hazard ratios, and statistical significance. The estimated coefficient shows the direction of the relationship. If it is positive, there is a higher risk of intrastate conflict recurrence and if it is negative, the risk is lower. The hazard ratio presents the risk that the peace will fail and the war will start again. It is an exponentiated coefficient and it captures an expected change in the risk that the war will reoccur. The hazard ratio above 1 signifies that the war recurrence is more likely and the hazard ratio below 1 signifies that the war recurrence is less likely (Box-Steffensmeier, Jones 2004).

In Table 2 are results that focus only on factors that dominate the academic literature about civil wars and their recurrence, which will be later threatened as control variables. From the academic work which focuses on the characteristics of the previous conflict, I have included variables the duration of the conflict, the number of battle-related fatalities, the peacekeeping, and whether the conflict ended in a victory or not. Based on my dataset, only the presence of the peacekeeping mission, regardless of whether from the UN, regional organization, or independent states, turned out to be statistically significant. Interestingly, the direction of the relationship is different as expected. The presence of the third-party increases the likelihood that the conflict will reemerge. This runs counter to the conclusions of several researches that were conducted in the last two decades (Hartzell, Hoddie, Rothchild 2001; Mason, Gurses, Brandt, Quinn 2011; Doyle, Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004). However, even though the direction remained the same, in both fully specified models (Table 3, Table 4) which included gender variables as well, peacekeeping fell out of the range of statistical significance.

Other measures related to the characteristics of the previous intrastate war were not found to be significantly related to the new civil war onset. However, in the case of the number of battle-related deaths in the previous war, there are indications that they might play a role in predicting whether the conflict will reoccur or not. In the first model where only control variables are included, it is nearly significant but in the second and third models (Table 3, Table 4), which are fully specified with variables regarding gender, it becomes significant. In each model, it increases the duration of peace after intrastate conflict, as expected based on the previous research (Walter 2004; Smith, Stan 2004; Derouen, Bercovitch, Wei 2009). Therefore, it suggests that the more costly in terms of battle-related deaths the previous war was, the less likely it is that conflict will reoccur.

Regarding the effects of the economic development and the potential grievances people might have after intrastate conflict, based on my dataset, only the infant mortality rate turned out to be statistically significant. The higher the infant mortality is, the more likely it is that the intrastate conflict will reoccur. Other measures capturing economic development and potential grievances, namely GDP per capita, life expectancy, population size, and ethnic fractionalization, were not significant based on my dataset. Life expectancy was nearly statistically significant in the restricted model (Table 2) with only control variables, but in both fully specified models (Table 3, Table 4), it was not.

Finally, I have included in the first model (Table 2) several variables that capture the political openness and inclusion, regime stability, and post-conflict institutions. In the restricted model, only the variable of the index of political terror scale was statistically highly significant. With the increasing levels of political terror and abuse from the state, the risk of civil war

recurrence significantly increases compared to countries with lower scores on the political terror scale index. The results were confirmed by both fully specified models (Table 3, Table 4).

All other variables with which I have measured the strength of institutions, regime, and political openness and inclusion were statistically insignificant. More specifically, among these variables were the level of autocracy-democracy, the durability of the regime, the executive constraints, the level of political competition, political rights, and civil liberties. In the case of the continuum on the scale of autocracy-democracy, I have, in addition, included the square value of this variable to capture the potential inverted-U relationship. Neither of these measures was significant.

One variable, however, showed some signs that it might have an effect on the durability of peace after intrastate conflict. Political rights were in the restricted model (Table 2) nearly statistically significant, in one of the fully specified models insignificant (Table 4), and in the second fully specified model statistically significant (Table 3). The direction is as expected, the more political rights people in the country enjoy, the more likely it is that peace will remain and the new intrastate war will not reoccur.

One of the conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis based on my dataset is that civil war recurrence is related to some extent to some of the characteristics of the previous war, the quality of life people in the post-conflict society have, and to what extent regime engages in political terror and abuse of its citizens. Eventually, the number of political rights can have an impact on the duration of peace after an intrastate conflict. On the other hand, due to the mixed results of my analysis, further research into each of these dimensions is needed.

To assess whether the above-proposed hypotheses can be confirmed or not, I have created two models (Table 3, Table 4) which include both variables regarding the social, political, and

economic participation of women, as well as control ones. Table 3 presents results with the variable the ratio of female-to-male total primary education as one of the measures capturing participation of women in the social dimension. Table 4 uses instead the GPI as one of the measures of women's social participation.

When looking at the variables capturing the participation of women in the political dimension, neither of them is statistically significant. Similar results are produced by both fully specified models (Table 3, Table 4). These results are unexpected since several researchers came previously to the conclusion that the political participation of women has a positive effect on peace (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli, Boyer 2001; Regan, Paskeviciute 2003; Melander 2005; Demeritt, Nichols, Kelly 2014; Shair-Rosenfield, Wood 2017). With my dataset, the results were, however, not statistically significant even when I included alternative measures of political participation of women, namely the percentage of women in the lower chamber of the parliament (*women.rep*) and the women civil society participation index (*v2x_gencs*). The women civil society participation index was extracted from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2022; Permstein 2022), and the percentage of women in the parliament from the Women in Parliament Dataset created by Paxton, Green, and Hughes (2008) and supplemented with the data from the World Bank (World Bank 2021g). Indicators for both variables are available in the dataset. Therefore, given the evidence based on my dataset, the political participation of women does not have an effect on the duration of peace after intrastate conflict which disconfirms the first hypothesis (H1).

Regarding the social participation of women, the variable fertility rate was statistically insignificant. However, in the second model (Table 4), it was nearly significant (standardly, $\Pr(>|z|)$, which is the p-value associated with the value in the z-value column, has to be smaller than 0,05 to be considered statistically significant; in this case, the computed value was 0,0507).

Although I cannot conclude that the fertility rate has any effect on peace after war, based on the results from Table 4, this possibility cannot be completely ruled out and it should be further investigated. Furthermore, it shows an interesting and very unexpected pattern. In the hypothetical scenario that it would be statistically significant, the direction of the relationship would not follow my proposed hypothesis since it shows that the higher fertility rate would have a positive effect on the duration of peace.

The second variable that was capturing the participation of women in post-conflict society in the social dimension was their primary education relative to men's one. Table 3 displays that the variable ratio of female-to-male total primary education is highly statistically significant. The estimated coefficient is negative which signifies that it has a positive effect on the duration of peace after an intrastate dispute. The more women get in the country at least primary education compared to men, the less likely it is that the conflict will reoccur. The hazard rate is 0,01902 which suggests that a one-unit increase in the female-to-male total primary education makes the reoccurrence of war 98% less likely.

Similarly, Table 4 shows that when measuring primary education with the GPI, it has also statistically significant results. The outcome is the same as when measuring the female-to-male total primary education. The estimated coefficient is negative, and therefore, the GPI has a positive effect on peace. The hazard rate is 0,01204 which can be interpreted in a way that one-unit increase in the GPI, holding other covariates constant, makes the reoccurrence of war 98,8% less likely. The higher the GPI is, the less disadvantaged girls compared to boys in learning opportunities are. Therefore, based on the results from Table 3 and Table 4, it can be concluded that the social participation of women in the post-conflict society has an effect on the duration of peace after the intrastate war. This partly confirms the second hypothesis (H2). Although the fertility rate did not

present statistically significant results, the primary education of women seems to be positively associated with peace. With increased access to primary education for girls compared to boys, the risk of civil war recurrence decreases.

Finally, regarding the economic participation of women in the post-conflict society, the results are in both fully specified models statistically insignificant (Table 3, Table 4). Therefore, it cannot be concluded that women's participation in labor has any effect on the duration of peace after intrastate conflict, neither positive nor negative. This again counters the expectation proposed in the hypothesis above, as well as counters the previous findings (Caprioli 2000; Regan, Paskeviciute 2003; Caprioli 2005). No impact of women's labor participation on peace was found only by Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly (2014).

However, it is important to note that in one of the models (Table 4), the variable percentage of women in the total labor force which was capturing the economic dimension, was nearly statistically significant (as stated above, standardly, $\Pr(>|z|)$ should be smaller than 0,05 to be considered statistically significant; in this case, the computed value was 0,0641). Furthermore, when in this model I replaced the variable percentage of women in the total labor force with the alternative variable ratio of female-to-male in the labor force (ratioFM_labor) from the World Bank database (World Bank 2021h), the results for this measure were statistically significant. The higher participation of women in labor compared to men was positively associated with the duration of peace after a civil war. I also replaced the variable percentage of women in the total labor force with the ratio of female-to-male in the labor force in the other model (Table 3), and in this case, the results were statistically insignificant. Therefore, these results have to be interpreted with caution. All being said, even though some indicators suggest that the idea of economic participation of women having an effect on peace after the intrastate war should not be ruled out,

based on my dataset I have to conclude, that it did not have an impact on the civil war recurrence. The last hypothesis (H3) is, therefore, disconfirmed.

Conclusion

In recent years, the world registered a significant shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts (Fearon, Laitin 2003: 75; Quinn, Mason, Gurses 2007: 167-168). Furthermore, it was proved that if the country experiences a civil war, it has a high risk of experiencing it again (Mason, Gurses, Brandt, Quinn 2011: 171; Berg 2020: 1308). Therefore, it is inevitable to ascertain what factors contribute to the intrastate war recurrence to be able to adopt appropriate measures to end this vicious circle. The diploma thesis has focused on the research question *what is the impact of women's social, political, and economic participation in the post-conflict society on the risk of civil war recurrence*.

The main aim of the diploma thesis was to examine whether higher domestic gender equality, measured in terms of political, economic, and social participation of women, has an impact on the duration of peace after the civil war. The thesis was divided into two main parts. In the first one, I have provided the literature review of the academic work that primarily focuses on the impacts of gender equality and female participation in society, as well as a theoretical and conceptual framework with which I have worked. Besides, I have proposed three research hypotheses and operationalized the concepts of political, economic, and social participation of women into measurable observations. In the second part, I have presented the results from the Cox proportional hazards model.

My hypotheses were, however, confirmed only to a small extent. Based on my dataset, no effect of political participation of women on the duration of peace after the civil war was found.

Similar results were found even with alternative measures of women's political participation. Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) was disconfirmed. One of the explanations for these unexpected results could be that even if women are allowed to engage in the political life of the country, they still remain trapped in the institutions created and predominantly run by men. Even when women are present as a small minority, political institutions remain to be composed mostly of men, and therefore, they cannot change politics to a large extent. Moreover, these institutions are created based on masculine norms, and the pressure to act tough and take similar decisions as men tend to be present. That is why the presence of women in politics might not be directly reflected in political decisions.

Regarding the social participation of women, the hypothesis (H2) was partially confirmed. I have measured this dimension with primary education and the fertility rate. To capture the primary education of women, I have used two different variables, namely the ratio of female-to-male total primary education and the GPI, in two separate models. In both cases, the measure was statistically significant and in the case of the ratio of female-to-male total primary education, it was highly so. The higher primary education girls compared to boys have, the lower chance that the civil will reoccur. Based on the results presented in Table 3 and Table 4, a one-unit increase in the female-to-male total primary education makes the reoccurrence of war 98% less likely. In the case of the GPI, the risk decrease was 98,8%.

On the other hand, the second variable that was capturing the social participation of women, the fertility rate, was statistically insignificant. However, this variable should be further investigated in the future for two reasons. First, in one of the models (Table 4), it was nearly statistically significant. Second, even though the results cannot be considered accurate due to lack

of statistical significance, the higher fertility rate seemed to have a positive effect on peace which was an expected direction. This relationship deserves further analysis.

Finally, the third hypothesis (H3) was disconfirmed. The percentage of women in the total force did not have an effect on the duration of peace after the intrastate conflict. However, the possibility that women's engagement in labor has an impact on peace should not be completely ruled out and should be further investigated. First, in one of the models (Table 4), the results were nearly statistically significant. Second, the alternative measure of the economic participation of women, the ratio of female-to-male in the labor force, was statistically significant when used in the model reported in Table 4. In this case, the higher female participation in labor compared to men had a positive effect on peace after the intrastate conflict.

To sum it up, I can conclude that based on my dataset hypotheses H1 and H2 were disconfirmed and hypothesis H3 was partially confirmed. However, several weaknesses, limitations, and shortcomings of my research have to be taken into an account. First, as I have stated above and as Caprioli (2000: 56) rightly pointed out, political, social, and economic dimensions are highly intertwined. Therefore, variables that were chosen to measure one dimension can be related to the other one as well. For example, the fertility rate, which was measuring the social participation of women, is related to the economic and political dimensions as well. It is because the more children women will have, the less able they might be to engage in paid labor or become active in politics. In such societies, women tend to devote a considerable amount of time to taking care of their families and households (Forsberg, Olsson 2016). That being said, it would be not right to definitively say that participation of women in one dimension is important, and the other one it is not, even though the results might on first look suggest that.

Moreover, there is no perfect variable that would fully capture gender equality and participation of women in each dimension. For example, it might look like the economic participation of women is adequately captured by the ratio of female-to-male in the labor force. However, this measure does not take into consideration whether women actually have control over their wealth and finances. In case women work and contribute to paid labor but their husbands are in charge of the money they receive for their work, it is not possible to talk about gender equality in economic terms.

This leads me to one of the biggest empirical obstacles I had when looking for the empirical sources for the thesis, the lack of data, particularly the one related to gender. Several core measures were not available for all years or all countries in my dataset. As an example, countries do not report adequately on the education of women or the percentage of women contributing to paid labor. Besides, some data are completely missing for several or the majority of the countries. For example, I have considered including in my analysis control over finances by women, the gender wage gap, or the percentage of women voting in elections but due to lack of data, it was not possible.

All the mentioned limitations could contribute to the results not being adequate enough. Therefore, in the future, it might be useful to use a different definition of an intrastate conflict or to use other indicators to capture each dimension of gender equality to ensure the robustness of my findings. Additionally, in my thesis, I did not take into consideration the security of women which is also an important dimension that can tell a lot about gender equality and the position they hold within society. That is why I would like to look in my future research on how the security of women affects the duration of peace after the civil war.

Last but not least, quantitative studies are, in their essence, simplifying. They do not take a consideration that each country and each conflict within this country is unique, and therefore, the results have to be interpreted with caution and they cannot be overgeneralized. It would be very interesting to look in the future at individual cases of states that experienced civil war recurrence and those that did not, and to analyze the examples of concrete countries in how women's participation and gender equality contribute to peace.

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Table of appendices

Table 1 – full list of countries with their intrastate wars that the dataset contains

Country	Intrastate war years	Number of wars
Afghanistan	1978-1978, 1978-1980, 1989-1992, 1992-2001, 2014-?	5 wars
Algeria	1962-1962, 1992-2002	2 wars
Angola	1976-1991, 1992-1994, 1998-2002	3 wars
Argentina	1955-1955, 1975-1976	2 wars
Azerbaijan	1991-1993	1 war
Bolivia	1952-1952	1 war
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992-1994, 1995-1995	2 wars
Burundi	1972-1972, 1993-1998, 2001-2003	3 wars
Cambodia	1971-1975, 1989-1991, 1993-1998	3 wars
Central African Republic	2013-2013	1 war
Chad	1968-1971, 1977-1978, 1980-1984, 1989-1990, 1998-2000, 2005-2006, 2007-2008	7 wars
Chile	1973-1973	1 war
China	1947-1947, 1955-1957, 1956-1959, 1967-1968	4 wars
Colombia	1948-1953, 1955-1962, 1988-?	3 wars
Costa Rica	1948-1948	1 war
Cote d'Ivoire	2002-2002, 2002-2003, 2011-2011	3 wars
Croatia	1995-1995	1 war
Cuba	1958-1959	1 war
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1960-1963, 1964-1965, 1964-1965, 1978-1978, 1996-1997, 1998-2002	6 wars
Dominican Republic	1965-1965	1 war
El Salvador	1979-2002	1 war
Ethiopia	1963-1964, 1975-1979, 1976-1977, 1978-1980, 1982-1991, 1999-1999	6 wars
Georgia	1991-1993, 1992-1993, 1993-1994	3 wars
Greece	1946-1949	1 war
Guatemala	1966-1968, 1970-1971, 1978-1983, 1987-1990	4 wars
Guinea	2000-2001	1 war
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1998, 1998-1998, 1999-1999, 1999-1999	4 wars
India	1948-1950, 1956-1957, 1970-1971, 1984-1984, 1989-1993, 1992-2005	6 wars
Indonesia	1950-1950, 1951-1962, 1958-1961, 1967-1968, 1976-1979, 1977-1978, 1990-1991, 1999-2002, 2003-2004	9 wars
Iran	1978-1979, 1979-1983	2 wars

Iraq	1959-1959, 1961-1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1970, 1974-1975, 1985-1988, 1991-1991, 1991-1991, 1996-1996, 2010-2014	10 wars
Jordan	1970-1970	1 war
Kosovo	1998-1999	1 war
Laos	1960-1961, 1962-1962, 1963-1968, 1976-1979	4 wars
Lebanon	1958-1958, 1983-1984, 1989-1990	3 wars
Liberia	1989-1990, 1992-1995, 1996-1996, 2002-2003	4 wars
Libya	2011-2011, 2014-?	2 wars
Mali	2013-2013	1 war
Moldova	1991-1992	1 war
Mozambique	1981-1992	1 war
Myanmar	1948-1950, 1958-1960, 1965-1980, 1981-1993, 2011-2013	5 wars
Nepal	2001-2003, 2003-2006	2 wars
Nicaragua	1978-1979, 1982-1988	2 wars
Nigeria	1967-1970, 1980-1981, 2013-?	3 wars
Oman	1973-1975	1 war
Pakistan	1971-1971, 1973-1975, 1976-1977, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2007-?	6 wars
Papua New Guinea	1990-1991, 1991-1991	2 wars
Paraguay	1947-1947	1 war
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	1986-1986	1 war
Peru	1982-1992	1 war
Philippines	1950-1954, 1972-1981, 1981-1986, 1987-1992, 2000-2001, 2003-2003, 2005-2006	7 wars
Republic of the Congo	1997-1997, 1999-1999	2 wars
Romania	1989-1989	1 war
Russia	1994-1996, 1999-2003	2 wars
Rwanda	1963-1964, 1994-1994, 1997-1998, 2001-2001	4 wars
Sierra Leone	1991-1996, 1998-1999, 2000-2000	3 wars
Somalia	1988-1991, 1991-1997, 2006-2008, 2009-2012, 2014-?	5 wars
Sri Lanka	1971-1971, 1983-1985, 1985-1987, 1987-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-2001, 2006-2009	7 wars
Sudan	1963-1972, 1976-1976, 1983-1991, 1992-2002, 2003-2006, 2011-?	6 wars
Syria	1982-1982, 2011-?	2 wars
Tajikistan	1992-1997	1 war
Thailand	1972-1973	1 war
Turkey	1984-1986, 1991-1999	2 wars
Uganda	1966-1966, 1982-1986, 1986-1987	3 wars

Vietnam	1960-1965	1 war
Yemen	1994-1994, 2004-2005, 2007-2008, 2014-?	4 wars
Yemen Arab Republic	1948-1948, 1962-1970	2 wars
Zimbabwe	1976-1979	1 war

Note: The data begin in 1946 and are right-censored in 2014. Peace spells with the end date (?) continue beyond this point. The information about how many civil wars the country experienced, as well as their total number, is based on the CoW definition.

Table 2 – Cox proportional hazards model on peace duration after intrastate war (restricted model with only control variables)

	Coefficient	Pr(> z)	Hazard ratio
Peacekeeping	0,83478	0,0264 *	2,3043
Victory	-0,29559	0,5092	0,7441
Duration	0,191117	0,6663	1,2106
Deaths	-0,777625	0,0626 .	0,4595
Infant mortality rate	0,022066	0,013 *	1,0223
Life expectancy	0,04234	0,0897 .	1,0432
GDP per capita	0,482648	0,4709	1,6204
Size of population	0,094107	0,7471	1,0987
Ethnic fractionalization	-0,497501	0,567	0,608
Polity2	0,010625	0,8421	1,0107
Polity2 (squared)	-0,002532	0,7823	0,9975
Regime durability	-0,013141	0,3426	0,9869
Executive constraints	-0,131475	0,4685	0,8768
Political competition	-0,097433	0,339	0,9072
Political rights	-0,337384	0,056 .	0,7136
Civil liberties	0,174179	0,3438	1,1903
Political terror index	1,085832	1,34E-05 ***	2,9619
n= 1467, number of events= 59 (618 observations deleted due to missingness)			
Concordance = 0.792 (se = 0.036)			
Likelihood ratio test = 90.21 on 17 df, p=6e-12			
Wald test = 157.6 on 17 df, p=<2e-16			
Score (logrank) test = 113.5 on 17 df, p=3e-16, Robust = 29.69 p=0.03			
Significance codes: 0 '****' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1			

Table 3 – Cox proportional hazards model on peace duration after intrastate war (fully specified model, with female-to-male total primary education as an indicator for women’s primary education)

	Coefficient	Pr(> z)	Hazard ratio
Women’s political participation	1,413568	0,578347	4,110594
Women’s political empowerment	-1,471619	0,650962	0,229553
Female-to-male total primary education	-3,962038	0,000245 ***	0,019024
Fertility rate	-0,347435	0,273759	0,706498
Percentage of women in total labor force	-0,033044	0,415256	0,967496
Peacekeeping	0,593842	0,374926	1,810932
Victory	-0,399481	0,45732	0,670668
Duration	-0,083317	0,884196	0,92006
Deaths	-1,419732	0,037531 *	0,241779
Infant mortality rate	-0,00282	0,8698	0,997184
Life expectancy	-0,032687	0,536239	0,967841
GDP per capita	-1,713228	0,176009	0,180283
Size of population	0,509147	0,282891	1,663872
Ethnic fractionalization	-0,309871	0,898286	0,733542
Polity2	-0,039117	0,744895	0,961638
Polity2 (squared)	0,009364	0,379105	1,009408
Regime durability	-0,010389	0,638195	0,989664
Executive constraints	-0,32739	0,280932	0,738792
Political competition	0,105077	0,5217	1,110797
Political rights	-0,653866	0,028639 *	0,520032
Civil liberties	-0,127763	0,611011	0,880062
Political terror index	1,751621	2,51E-08 ***	5,763939
n= 908, number of events = 33 (1177 observations deleted due to missingness)			
Concordance = 0.857 (se = 0.04)			
Likelihood ratio test= 71.68 on 22 df, p = 4e-07			
Wald test = 278.9 on 22 df, p=<2e-16			
Score (logrank) test = 68.03 on 22 df, p=1e-06, Robust = 28.77 p=0.2			
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1			

Table 4 – Cox proportional hazards model on peace duration after intrastate war (fully specified model, with GPI primary as an indicator for women’s primary education)

	Coefficient	Pr(> z)	Hazard ratio
Women’s political participation	-0,23678	0,8335	0,789163
Women’s political empowerment	-0,3287	0,8862	0,719856
Female-to-male total primary education	-4,41949	0,0229 *	0,01204
Fertility rate	-0,4255	0,0507 .	0,653448
Percentage of women in total labor force	-0,03783	0,0641 .	0,962878
Peacekeeping	0,870626	0,0999 .	2,388406
Victory	0,030333	0,956	1,030798
Duration	0,539676	0,1635	1,715451
Deaths	-0,96488	0,0417 *	0,381027
Infant mortality rate	0,007787	0,5467	1,007818
Life expectancy	-0,03796	0,351	0,962752
GDP per capita	-0,56791	0,5629	0,566707
Size of population	-0,05631	0,8773	0,945243
Ethnic fractionalization	-0,81385	0,3727	0,443147
Polity2	0,012527	0,8628	1,012606
Polity2 (squared)	0,005356	0,6064	1,00537
Regime durability	-0,01524	0,3688	0,984873
Executive constraints	-0,2954	0,1595	0,744232
Political competition	0,070023	0,4935	1,072533
Political rights	-0,33244	0,1732	0,717171
Civil liberties	-0,10544	0,5964	0,899929
Political terror index	1,6254	3,34E-13 ***	5,080451
n= 1298, number of events= 50 (787 observations deleted due to missingness)			
Concordance= 0.844 (se = 0.033)			
Likelihood ratio test= 101.2 on 22 df, p=4e-12			
Wald test = 220.6 on 22 df, p=<2e-16			
Score (logrank) test = 111.7 on 22 df, p=5e-14, Robust = 30.57 p=0.1			
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1			