Three Shades of Green: Anthropocentric, Biocentric, and Ecocentric Conceptualisation of Green Violence

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Abstract

This dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of two things: First, how does the security paradigm work through the three environmental ethics worldviews of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism in human-nature relationships in general and conservation issues in particular? Second, to what extend is green violence enabled by those three paradigms from the lens of security? While there have been academic publications about conservation practices, environmental ethics, and green violence, these issues have not yet been combined and conceptualised from a security lens. Therefore, the objective of this dissertation has been to examine how the security paradigm works in terms of green violence, distinguished by the three different ethical perspectives. In order to achieve this goal, this dissertation has first developed three conceptual lenses based on the three environmental ethics approaches. Based on that, green violence was analysed from a security perspective. The dissertation has come to the conclusion that green violence can be enabled by all three environmental ethics paradigms, however, to a different extend and with different effects. The anthropocentric paradigm is currently enabling green violence the most because it is the predominant paradigm which is embraced by powerful actors. Ecocentrism is the most radical enabler of green violence and more dangerous to humans than anthropocentric or biocentric green violence. Because humans are part of the protected community from an anthropocentric and biocentric perspective, violence against humans is an extraordinary measure which is not automatically enabled but can of course be framed to be. This, however, is not the case in ecocentrism, where humans do not enjoy protection and the collective always trumps the individual.

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In memory of Cheyenne and Thomas Patzleiner with whom I would have loved to discuss my research

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1   Introduction

The protection of non-human nature, that is what is commonly referred to as, for example, 'the environment', 'wildlife', 'biodiversity', 'mother earth' is a recurring theme in public discourse. Just to name a few examples to show that the topic is not only current but also important in a wide range of different areas: Nation states implement some aspects of environmental protection in their national security strategy (Sweden, 2017), the extinction of certain iconic species is brought to the attention of the masses through popular culture[1] and issues such as biodiversity loss (Watts, 2018) and climate change (Watts, 2019) are frequent subjects of newspaper articles and public demonstrations such as the Friday to Future movement. Since according to the Oxford Dictionary, the term 'conservation' refers to the "[p]reservation, protection, or restoration of the natural environment and of wildlife" (Lexico, n.d.-b) arguably, all the issues mentioned above can be summarised broadly with the term 'conservation'. The debate about conservation in regard to its objectives, methods, goal, and scope is divided between three major environmental ethics schools of thought: Anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism (Kopnina, Washington, Gray, & Taylor, 2018). According to the Oxford Dictionary's definition of 'ethics', they are "[m]oral principles that govern a person's behaviour or the conducting of an activity" (Lexico, n.d.-c). Hence, each of the three different paradigms fundamentally influences and governs conservation practises and shapes discussions as they place moral value on different referent objects. This subsequently changes the objectives and goals that are pursued, and it also has a fundamental impact on the methods and scope of conservation activities. A side-effect of conservation activities is an issue that Büscher & Ramutsindela (2016) have termed 'green violence' which refers to violence exercised against humans for the protection of non-human nature (for example individual animals, certain species, trees, or the whole ecosystem). While green violence has so far mainly been discussed in regard to wildlife conservation practises (see for example Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2016; Duffy, 2016; Lunstrum, 2014; Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016) the general definition can be applied to any conservation issue, especially if violence against humans is not only narrowed down to kinetic violence but also encompasses instances of non-kinetic violence. The phrase "do violence to"

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[1] For example, the movies: Sides of a Horn; Virunga; The Ivory Game; The Last Days

essentially means to "[d]amage or adversely affect" (Lexico, n.d.-h) and as such is not strictly limited to the application of physical force.

This dissertation will not enter into discussions about the merits of each environmental ethics paradigm and will also not conceptualise them according to their feasibility. It is not the intention of this dissertation to engage in discussions about which environmental ethics paradigm should be embraced and which conservation goals should be pursued. However, the environmental ethics school of thought applied to conservation has a huge impact on how conservation is approached and conducted. As Bryant (2000) points out, "politicized moral discourses — albeit in complex ways — are inevitably at the heart of all conservation projects" (p. 678). The inspiration for this dissertation topic is derived from the three environmental ethics paradigms and their impact on conservation and on green violence. Kopnina (2012) claims that so-called radical environmentalists "are among the least understood of all contemporary opposition movements" (p. 237). According to Kopnina, this is possibly the case because their biocentric, ecocentric or deep ecology approach is drowned out by the predomination of anthropocentrism in the current political and socio-cultural discourse. Since the environmental ethics paradigms have profound impacts on how conservation is approached, the hypothesis is that conservation-related green violence is also heavily changing depending on which paradigm is taken. As Büscher & Fletcher (2018) say, "an understanding of violence's role in conservation must continue to be expanded, with special emphasis on how and why [green] violence is practised, distributed, negated and/or resisted, and with what effects on different actors and the long(er) term prospects for non-humans" (p. 111). This dissertation aims to provide a piece of the puzzle in hopes that it will contribute to a better understanding of how conservation is influenced by the three paradigms and what effect they have on green violence. While there have been academic publications about conservation practices, environmental ethics, and green violence, these issues have not yet been combined and conceptualised from a security lens. Therefore, the objective of this dissertation is to examine how the security paradigm works in terms of green violence, distinguished by the three different ethical perspectives. In order to achieve this goal, this dissertation will first develop three conceptual lenses based on the three environmental ethics approaches. It will then discuss them in terms of their impact on green violence in an effort to build on the puzzle left by Büscher & Fletcher (2018).

1.1   Research Question

Based on the introduction this dissertation aims to answer the following research question:

How does the security paradigm operate through the three environmental ethics worldviews of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism and to what extend is green violence enabled by them?

To tackle this question, the research will be split into two parts. First, the three environmental ethics paradigms will be translated into the workings of security. This will effectively be done by splitting the main research question into three sub-questions:

- How does the security paradigm operate through the lens of anthropocentrism?
- How does the security paradigm operate through the lens of biocentrism?
- How does the security paradigm operate through the lens of ecocentrism?

On the basis of those findings, the fourth sub-question will be tackled:
- To what extend is green violence enabled by the environmental ethics paradigms of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism when analysed from a security perspective?

2   Methodology

What is now known as Security Studies has been under constant transformation and change in an effort to keep up with and reflect paradigms of how the world is understood and to incorporate newly arising threats and issues. Before the Second World War, Security Studies itself was not yet a distinct academic branch. Instead, the major fields of inquiry and interest were military history and war studies with geopolitics and defence as its core concepts. With the end of the Second World War and with the Cold War at the horizon, Security Studies started to develop as a subfield of International Relations. Through the emergence of the Cold War with its inherent ideological dualism which caused the rivalry between the East and the West and the threat of nuclear warfare, Security Studies was very preoccupied with strategies of nuclear deterrence and containment (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

It is only after the Cold War came slowly to an end, that Security Studies opened up to a broadening and widening of the concept to react to newly created interdependencies in a globalised world (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Hama, 2017). Rooted in realism, the mentality of the Cold War is living on in what is understood as the traditional approach to security. Traditionalists base the concept of security on the assumption that the international arena is anarchic and that states try to secure themselves through military means. For traditionalists, security is about survival of the state with the state as the only possible referent object for security and the only relevant actor in the international system (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998; Walt, 1991). However, an increasing number of scholars think that "safeguarding the 'core values' of a state from military threats emanating from outside its borders is no longer adequate (if it ever was) as a means of understanding what (or who) is to be secured, from what threats, and by what means" (Krause & Williams, 1996, p. 230).

The rise of intrastate as opposed to interstate conflicts, transnational crime and other agendas outside of the traditional state-centred and military-centred view, such as economic and environmental issues, have called for new concepts and approaches (Buzan et al., 1998; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Hence, an increasing number of scholars has started to call for the widening and deepening of security studies as the realist approach does not offer a sufficient framework to deal with the contemporary, globalised world and newly arising threats (Booth, 1997; Buzan et al., 1998; Klare & Thomas, 1998; Peterson, 1992). As a result, different views and strands of security have

emerged alongside the traditional approach and the traditional approach has also been expanded (Buzan et al., 1998).

While Security Studies has evolved over the past decades, in a similar way has the placement of humanity within the world changed over the past centuries. To say in in the words of Grey (1993): "The intellectual history of the past few centuries can be characterized as pedestal bashing: a succession of successful demolitions of comforting myths through which we have sought to locate ourselves in the world" (p. 463). Driven by scientific progress and new discoveries, dominant worldviews changed, and humanity had to constantly reposition itself within the newly established paradigms. Just to name a few examples: Heliocentrism challenged the at that time predominant belief of the geocentric model, the theory of evolution challenged intelligent design, and Freud debunked the perception of rationality (Anderson, 2017; Grey, 1993). Similar to the constant reconceptualization according to new scientific discoveries and theories briefly sketched here, there seems to be a rising tension between the three different paradigms of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism.

> One strand of environmental thinking provides a challenge to a further alleged bastion of anthropocentric parochialism - anthropocentrism or human chauvinism. Just as we have abandoned our geocentric cosmology, our anthropocentric biology, and related conceits, so, it is claimed, we should give up our anthropocentric morality. (Grey, 1993, p. 463)

So, a number of authors call for a paradigm change and urge for the abandonment of anthropocentrism within the wildlife conservation and environmental protection debate and instead argue for the paradigm of biocentrism (Cochrane, 2012; Singer, 2009; P. W. Taylor, 2011) or ecocentrism (Kopnina et al., 2018; Leopold, 1968; Næss, 2010). Other authors defend anthropocentrism and argue that the anthropocentric approach to conservation yields the most satisfying and desirable results (Hargrove, 1992; Norton, 1984). For the most part, international security has been inherently anthropocentric (Mitchell, 2014). While the recent widening and deepening of the security agenda allowed for the inclusion of the environment as possible referent object for security, it is still only considered in anthropocentric terms. Environmental security is only interested in the environment in as much as it is important for state survival or human security purposes. The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to look at the differences of the three paradigms in regard to conservation-related violence against humans (termed 'green violence'). In order to do that, this dissertation aims to analyse how the three environmental ethics paradigms work in relation to conservation-motivated security conceptualizations.

Loosely based on Dimitrov's (2002) conceptualisation of security, this dissertation aims to answer the fundamental questions of security from the narrow lens of conservation and green violence. This dissertation will thereby go through the conceptualizing questions of security one by one from the point of view of the three paradigms, as is visualised in figure 1 below. First, it will try to answer the question of 'what is to be protected' which will be in close relation to 'for which higher goal is it to be protected' or 'to what end is it to be protected'. This dissertation is built around the phenomenon of violence committed by humans against other humans in defence and for the protection of elements of the non-human world. This is why the question "security of what" will include non-human referent objects while "security for what" will take on a broader view and also take human-motivated ends into account (which is especially important for the anthropocentric paradigm). It will then continue to look at the possible threats (question 'from what is it to be protected') and will then move on to look at the methods (question 'with which means is it to be protected'). Dimitrov's last question, 'who is responsible' will be dropped as a separate question but might be addressed in relation to one of the other questions. The first paradigm analysed will be anthropocentrism, as it is the dominating paradigm and therefore it is deemed to be the best starting point. The second paradigm is biocentrism and the third paradigm analysed will be ecocentrism. This conceptualisation will provide the foundation for the fourth sub-question which tackles the issue of green violence.


Figure 1: based on Dimitrov (2002, p. 680)

The basis for the development of the three conceptualisations of security explained above will be provided by an extensive literature review. The literature review aims to gather relevant academic publications about green violence and the three environmental ethics paradigms of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. There will be no other method of data collection as anthropocentrism is currently still the dominating paradigm and therefore the main sources to biocentrism and ecocentrism exist mainly in academic literature and not in many real-world practices. If, during the course of this research, any suitable real-world examples can be identified and if they provide valuable additional insight, they will be included, however, only written publications or other media forms which can be accessed online, such as YouTube videos or podcasts. No surveys, interviews, focus groups or other similar research methods will be employed.

One of the major issues when debating the three paradigms of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism is that those terms are often used to refer to different things. Anthropocentrism is the most straight-forward term and there is little debate or question in the literature of what exactly is meant by it. Biocentrism and ecocentrism, however, are often used interchangeably. This is why the main aim for the literature review will be to provide an overview of the three paradigms and the main discussions surrounding them.

2.1   Structure

The first chapter has provided an introduction to the topic by showing its relevance and by introducing the problem statement which is directly built on up-to-date questions surrounding the three environmental ethics paradigms and the topic of green violence.

The second chapter has explained the methodological foundation of this dissertation. It has given a rough overview of how security studies evolved over time and draws a parallel to how paradigms, through which humanity sees the world, also have changed over time. This provides the entry point for the three environmental ethics paradigms. The methodology chapter has also explained how the three paradigms will be analysed from a security lens, which will then serve as a foundation for the green violence research sub-question.

The third chapter provides a literature review on green violence and environmental ethics. This is intended to provide an overview of the current academic inquiry and is also intended to set the foundation for the following three chapters. As literature (mainly academic literature) is the only data and information source to answer the research question, the literature review provides the essential information for chapter four, five, and six. The literature review is intended to clearly distinguish between the three paradigms and to define their meaning as well as to give an overview of common debates in the field.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapter are each focusing on one of the three environmental ethics schools of thought: Anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. Each of the paradigms will be analysed separately by looking at the following questions: Security of what, security for what, security from what, and by what means. The goal is to strike a balance between descriptive writing and analysis. The phenomena have to be described in order to be analysed but the main conclusions to be taken away are the analytical parts.

The seventh chapter is discussing the findings of chapter four, five, and six in regard to the green violence themed research sub-question. The aim is thereby to not just summarise and repeat what has already been discussed but to discuss the paradigms further in terms of their impact on green violence.

While the previous chapters four to seven all answer one of the sub-questions, the eight chapter provides the conclusion with a summarised answer to the main research question. It also provides an account of the limitations encountered with during the writing of this dissertation and it also provides an overview of possible further research topics.

3   Literature Review

The literature review chapter is divided into two subchapters: Green violence and environmental ethics. The first subchapter will give a brief overview of what has recently been written on green violence. Because the question whether green violence is a continuing or new phenomenon is not part of this dissertation, the focus for the first subchapter lies primarily on new publications to capture the current state of research. The second subchapter will provide an overview of the three environmental ethics paradigms which are central to this dissertation: Anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. As the second subchapter aims to give an idea of how the three paradigms are defined and compete with each other, this section contains older publications as well. Without older publications it would not be possible to adequately convey the thoughts behind the paradigms because there are a few older publications which still have a great impact on how the paradigms are conceptualised today. A number of publications deal with more than one paradigm and therefore might appear in two or more of the subchapters.

As Büscher & Fletcher (2018) have noted, the terms 'green wars' and 'green violence' have been used to describe different phenomena which has the potential to create some confusion as to what is ultimately meant by those terms. For the following literature review on green violence, only publications, that use those terms to refer to violence against humans in the name of non-humans, have been considered.

The subchapter of environmental ethics is further divided into three sections, one for each of the three paradigms discussed. The flow of argument continuous through all three sections, as the three paradigms are very intertwined and sometimes difficult to logically separate. The division into three sections was only done for ease of reading.

3.1   Green Violence

Büscher & Ramutsindela (2016) define green violence as "the deployment of violent instruments and tactics towards the protection of nature and various ideas and aspirations related to nature conservation" (p. 2) According to the authors they build on Lunstrum's (2014) description of green militarization and extend it towards a broader understanding of violence in the name of non-humans. Their article is focused on the contradiction presented in the usage of green violence to protect peace parks which are parks spanning across two or more countries in an effort to promote international cooperation,

development, peace, and conservation. As already mentioned above, Lunstrum (2014) has coined the term green militarization and defines it as "the use of military and paramilitary (military-like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation" (p. 817). Lunstrum argues that the particular locations of conservation areas partially cause the need for the militarization of conservation. Military technology and expertise is needed to be able to surveil vast and inaccessible areas which are also often close to international borders. While the mere need of military-grade technology does not necessarily provide sufficient justification for the use of military-inspired conservation techniques, Lunstrum also links the emergence of green militarization to certain established values and assumptions which legitimise and call for the use of military force for the protection of the non-human world. This is similar to what Büscher & Ramutsindela (2016) describe as the "space of exception" (p. 3) and also similar to what they describe as discursive violence, as well as Neumann's (2004) observation regarding the dehumanization of the perceived threat. Lunstrum (2014), however, argues that in the case of green militarization the core issue lies with the discursive framing of certain species as national heritage and as property and part of the nation state hence framing the conflict as an insurgency against the state. This is thereby "[d]iverging from Neumann's (2004) observation that [non-human animals] are invited into an expanded human community through anti-poaching conservation discourse, [instead, they] are invited into an expanded national community" (Lunstrum, 2014, p. 826) which justifies the need to protect them militarily. Similar to this phenomenon, Humphreys & Smith (2014) coined the term "rhinofication" of security (p. 795) and criticise the military- and war-like focus of South African security operations to secure the rhino. Same as Lunstrum and Büscher & Ramutsindela, Humphreys & Smith argue that the adopted aggressive approach will actually be counterproductive to conservation goals as it alienates local communities and just enforces old power structures (Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2015; Humphreys & Smith, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014).

The theory of green militarization has been taken a step further by Duffy (2016) who describes a phenomenon called 'war by conservation'. Through taping into powerful narratives such as the global war on terror, conservation issues become part of global security concerns. The author coins the term 'poachers-as-terrorists' narrative and tracks the origins of the claim that poaching activities significantly fund terror networks. Even though Duffy proves that the claim can be traced back to an insufficiently evidenced publication the claim that poaching is financing terrorism is still holding strong. "It is

significant that local communities are also being drawn in and reconfigured as a 'first line of defense' against poachers-as- terrorists, rendering them military operatives engaged in advancing the agendas of external actors concerned about global security" (Duffy, 2016, p. 245). White (2014) argues on similar terms as Duffy by describing how conservation strategies feed into already existing narratives of global concern. Duffy, however, has taken the concept one step further by analysing a shift where conservation issues are acting more as an enabler of national security and COIN operations, not the other way around.

Neumann (2004) explores how the war on biodiversity, which is inherently violent with, for example, shoot-on-sight policies, is justified by conservation actors. Neumann thereby identifies two distinct narratives: First, a narrative that highlights the honour and mercy of European, white hunters in comparison to the cruel and savage poachers. Second, iconic species such as elephants are attributed human qualities such as close family ties, strong emotions to be elevated into the protected community out of which the poachers have been excluded. The discursive framing of the savage poacher and the human-like animal allow for an easier justification of violence against poachers for the protection of animals. Marijnen & Verweijen (2016) investigate the justification of extraordinary measures in the form of green violence further and add to Neumann's observations. Marijnen & Verweijen thereby describe how violent conservation practises get widespread public acceptance through strong visual storytelling campaigns which marketize conservation.

Peluso (1993) describes a scenario where nation states use environmental protection and conservation as a pretext to use violence to pursue their own interests which are not conservation related. "[W]hen a state's incomplete hegemony hinders it from controlling people contesting its resource claims, the state may use both conservation and economic arguments to justify the coercive exclusion of certain groups from valuable resources" (Peluso, 1993, p. 201). Similar to this Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones (2012) and Massé & Lunstrum (2016) describe how states use conservation as a justification for dispossessing local communities.

While the point of view of Mogomotsi & Madigele (2017) is not easy to find in most of the academic literature, they see the from other authors (Duffy, 2015; Lunstrum, 2014; Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016; Neumann, 2004) criticized militarisation of conservation and shoot-to-kill policies as a valid course of action to tackle the poaching issue in Sub-Sahara Africa. Mogomotsi & Madigele argue, that for example in the case

of Botswana, shoot-to-kill policies have been successfully implemented as a serious deterrence to poachers. Other conservation initiatives, such as grassroot strategies targeting the local population alone are not enough but a combination of a militarized approach to conservation together with other, long-term strategies. Mogomotsi & Madigele's argument is in line with McCann's (2017) defence of the militarized conservation approach. Both authors compare conservation with other crimes and argue, that the violent response to poaching should be seen similar as other law enforcement responses to other crimes. McCann compares shoot-to-kill policies where poachers get shot by park rangers to bank robberies where a bank robber gets shot by the police. By committing the crime of poaching, all three authors agree that the poachers step out of the protected community which, according to Mogomotsi & Madigele, makes shoot-on-sight policies also legal from the perspective of international humanitarian and the law of armed conflict. Same as Mogomotsi & Madigele, McCann also argues that non-violent conservation policies should be implemented alongside the militarized approach. However, without the militarized approach, according to McCann, there will soon be no iconic species left to protect as non-violent approaches such as community projects on the grassroot level.

3.2   Environmental Ethics

According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy's definition, "[e]nvironmental ethics is the discipline in philosophy that studies the moral relationship of human beings to, and also the value and moral status of, the environment and its non-human contents" (Brennan & Sze Lo, 2015, para. 1). Traditional Western philosophical thinking is highly human-centred, or in other words: anthropocentric. While in ancient Rome non-human nature was recognized as part of an extended ethical community, the rise of Christianity diminished those rights in Western philosophical thought (Nash, 1989). Even though there had been a number of non-anthropocentric thinkers in the past centuries, such as Henry More, Gottfried Leibnitz, Charles Darwin, and Baruch Spinoza, just to name a few, the dominant way of thinking had been (Nash, 1989) and still is anthropocentric in social, political and scientific discourse (Washington et al., 2018).

3.2.1 Anthropocentrism

Wandén (2001) summarises anthropocentrism as the claim of human superiority based on biological (e.g. brain complexity), psychological (e.g. abstract thinking capabilities) and socio-philosophical arguments (e.g. human personalities are socially constructed by relationships between humans) that distinguish humans from non-human animals. This human superiority thinking leads to what Halsey & White (1998) describe as the anthropocentric view where non-human nature is only viewed instrumentally guided by human self-interest as underlying ideology. According to the authors, this human self-interest translates into a competition for material resources which in turn translates into centralised power organisations (nation-states and corporations) determined to subordinate non-human nature to human needs guided by capitalist market principles. Little thought is spent on the impact of the economisation of non-human nature outside of economic interests, basing decisions solely on economic outcomes. Furthermore, Halsey & White (1998) associate the anthropocentric paradigm with the strategy of sustainable development which is seen as a variation of "green capitalism". What Halsey & White (1998) describe is actually an absolute version of anthropocentrism and thereby similar to Norton's (1984) conceptualization of strong anthropocentrism.

Norton (1984) distinguishes between strong and weak anthropocentrism. Strong anthropocentrism is really only concerned about non-human nature in as much as it provides instrumental value. Strong anthropocentrism is, as mentioned in the previous subparagraph, an absolute version of anthropocentrism which Halsey & White (1998) also describe. Weak anthropocentrism, on the other hand, sees a connection between humans and non-human nature and realises that nature itself can inspire value formation (Norton, 1984). Hargrove (1992), however, criticises Norton's (1984) theory of value transformation. Hargrove, using the example of art, argues, that "the value of a painting does not depend on the occurrence of particular emotional experiences in the general public. Rather it depends on the judgement of experts who interpret social ideals" (Hargrove, 1992, p. 198). According to Hargrove, to explain the act of valuing something for its own sake, intrinsically, it is not necessary to go into mysticism or make it dependent on an emotional experience like Norton's (1984) interpretation of weak anthropocentrism. In Hargrove's view the term weak anthropocentrism describes the act of valuing something not just for instrumental reasons. Hargrove argues that anthropocentrism is therefore often unjustifiably reduced to instrumental value only.

It is, however, important to note that while there are two different versions of anthropocentrism, strong and weak, anthropocentric thought can also take on different forms. For example, Hargrove (1992) argues that environmental ethics theories claiming to be non-anthropocentric, are actually just different versions of anthropocentrism with varying degrees of anthropocentric values. He identifies four types of ethic thinking which are a combination of anthropocentric/non-anthropocentric and instrumental/intrinsic values. He argues that anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric instrumental value are basically based on undisputed facts and are therefore common knowledge and uncontroversial in nature. Anthropocentric intrinsic value is a human act (and therefore categorised as being anthropocentric) to value something for historic, cultural or other personal reasons regardless of its instrumental value.

Another example of how anthropocentrism can take on different forms is Callicott's (2014) distinction between three different types of anthropocentrism: Metaphysical anthropocentrism which refers to the belief that humans are privileged in relation to other beings, as for example the biblical worldview proclaims; Moral anthropocentrism with refers to the belief that humans are the ultimate moral subject (and is usually claimed on the basis of metaphysical anthropocentrism); And tautological anthropocentrism, which refers to the fact that any form of value experienced by humans is anthropocentric, as it is coming from humans. While it is not possible to be tautological non-anthropocentric, the other two types have non-anthropocentric anti-theses as alternative option, for example the theory of evolution is metaphysical non-anthropocentric or animal liberation (which belongs to biocentrism) is moral non-anthropocentric (Callicott, 2014). So, based on that account, every paradigm must have a minimum of anthropocentric tendencies in the form of tautological anthropocentrism. Even if other paradigms, biocentrism and ecocentrism, ascribe intrinsic value to non-human nature and claim to be thoroughly non-anthropocentric, it is still humans ascribing intrinsic value, which makes it according to Callicott, tautological anthropocentric.

Taylor (1983) has also addressed the issue of what Callicott calls tautological anthropocentrism and argues that "[w]e must realize that accepting the [biocentric belief] is accepting a human "interpretation" of the realm of life and nature on Earth, but the truth of the "interpretation" and the justifiability of adopting it in practice are not a matter of furthering human ends or values" (p. 240). Therefore, according to Taylor, the tautological anthropocentric perspective does not matter beyond philosophical discussions about anthropocentrism itself. Because, so Taylor (1983), what Callicott

(2014) calls metaphysical non-anthropocentrism is a scientifically established truth which is the foundation of what Callicott calls moral non-anthropocentrism. Hence, Taylor (1983) argues, that tautological anthropocentrism does not matter as it does not change the metaphysical or moral perspective. Hence, for the protection and conservation of non-human nature, the discussion about tautological anthropocentrism is of no value (P. W. Taylor, 1983).

This shows that from a philosophical perspective it is not a straight-forward affair to clearly distinguish between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches. When it comes to conservation in relation to environmental ethics, Norton (1984) argues that the competition between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism is unnecessary as anthropocentrism itself provides a way how non-human nature can be protected by environmentalists without having to justify and argue the intrinsic value argument on which ecocentrism (*remark by the dissertation author:* as well as biocentrism) is often based on. The author's solution is the distinction between strong and weak anthropocentrism explained above. Weak anthropocentrism, so Norton (1984), provides a satisfying framework to protect non-human nature. While Norton's accounts are already three decades old, Kopnina (2017). Kopnina et al. (2018) still observe that the contemporary conservation debate is mainly divided by the competing ethical perspectives of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. Same as Norton, in this observation Kopnina et al (2018) do not take biocentrism into account as a separate paradigm. Instead, Kopnina et al only mention it in passing together with ecocentrism, probably in an effort to not dilute the main argument of their work. Kopnina et al argue that while in some situations anthropocentrism can cause positive outcomes for both, humans and non-human nature alike, this is only possible as long as their interests align. Therefore, she argues that ecocentrism would be the better option because its fundamental principle is that "justice for one species should not come at the expense of a host of other species, and, especially, of their very survival" (Kopnina et al., 2018, p. 144). Kopnina's main objective is to reject anthropocentrism which, arguably, renders the exact distinction between biocentrism and ecocentrism for her mission unimportant. The same goes for Norton, whose main effort is dedicated to validating anthropocentrism as a satisfying paradigm for non-human nature conservation. Norton (1982) argues that ascribing rights to non-human nature (*remark by the dissertation author:* as biocentrism and ecocentrism is doing in various degrees) cannot be translated into a usable framework for environmental protection. He argues that

"[e]xpanding the number and types of rights holders does not address the problem of deciding which individual claims have priority over others - it only increases these demands and makes it more and more difficult to satisfy them. The basic problem, then, lies precisely in the emphasis on individual claims and interests. An environmental ethic must support the holistic functioning of an ongoing system. One cannot generate a holistic ethic from an individualistic basis, regardless of how widely that basis is expanded. (Norton, 1982, p. 36)

While it is true that simply adding further right holders to the protected community is not helpful if it does not come with a framework which prioritizes the rights of different entities in case they ever end up being in conflict with each other. However, while Norton (1982) certainly raises a valid point there, all it says is that expanding the rights is simply the first step which must be followed by a framework for competing rights issues. Callicott (2014), for example, resolves conflicts between human and non-human nature by applying his second-order principles SOP-1 and SOP-2 and the third-order principle TOP. SOP-1 means "that the duties and obligations generated by memberships in our more intimate and venerable communities take precedence (p.67) over those generated by memberships in the larger, more impersonal, and more recently evolved (or more recently recognized) communities" (p. 66-67). SOP-2 means that "stronger duties and obligations take precedence over weaker ones" (p. 67). The third-order principle (TOP) calls for SOP-1 to be observed first, then SOP-2. However, if SOP-2 is stronger than SOP-1, then SOP-2 takes precedence over SOP-1 (Callicott, 2014).

Furthermore, according to a study conducted by Thompson & Barton (1994) people show a different level of engagement and commitment to nature conservation depending on whether they support anthropocentric or ecocentric values. While people with an anthropocentric worldview value nature, they primarily do so because they understand that there is a correlation between environmental health and the health and comfort of humans (for example extensive air pollution has a negative effect on human health). If nature conservation interferes with human comfort or health (e.g. if conservation efforts make the accumulation of wealth more difficult), people with anthropocentric views show less interest in engaging in conservation. In contrast to this, people with ecocentric worldviews are more likely to engage and commit to conservation regardless of the impact of such activities on human welfare, comfort and health (Thompson & Barton, 1994). Before ecocentrism can be discussed however, the review moves on to shed light onto biocentrism:

3.2.2 Biocentrism

In contrast to anthropocentrism discussed above, biocentrism sees either all or some non-human species as moral subjects equal to humans according to different criteria, ranging from the ability to feel pain to the possession of live (Wandén, 2001). Callicott (as cited in Hargrove, 1992) argues that non-anthropocentric intrinsic value for non-human nature is simply derived from the fact that humans are a part of the whole of nature. From the direct quotations of Callicott's work cited in Hargrove (1992), Callicott seems to build this argument by looking at nature as a whole which consists of different parts, one of which are humans. By claiming that humans have intrinsic value and by accepting the premise that humans are a part of nature, nature must also have intrinsic value, which can then be also said of other parts of nature, i.e. non-human animals. Along similar lines argues Singer (2009) in his book "animal liberation" for the ethical consideration of the suffering of non-human animals by the hands of humans. Singer, as well as other environmental ethics authors arguing for biocentrism or ecocentrism, accuses anthropocentrists of speciesist thinking which is "is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species" (Singer, 2009, p. 5). Singer's main point throughout the cited book is that speciesism is not different from racism or sexism and cannot be justified on any grounds. It needs to be acknowledged that human and non-human animals are just different species and are from an evolution biological perspective the same. Same as Singer, Kopnina (2012a) also rejects anthropocentrism and argues that "if moral considerations underlying present-day social issues such as racism, sexism, and wealth inequality are to be extended to other species, the contrast in ethical values and anthropocentric bias is quite striking" (p. 239). According to Kopnina's (2012a) analysis, non-human nature and especially biodiversity is often framed in terms of ecosystem services and as common goods. This framing is, however, inadequate for biodiversity protection as arguably not all species are needed to sustain human survival. Therefore, the anthropocentric paradigm turns a blind eye towards speciesism (Kopnina, 2012a). Furthermore, not all parts of the ecosystem can be commodified. Hence, from an anthropocentric perspective, non-human nature with little to no economic value might be left out from anthropocentric-motivated conservation efforts (Leopold, 1968). However, biocentrism is not only seen to be important for the protection and survival of non-human animals, but biocentrism also argues for the ethical treatment of non-human animals. For example, Singer (2009) argues that it needs to be

acknowledged that as long as non-human animals have the ability to suffer and feel pain, they need to be regarded with the same moral consideration as humans. This does not necessarily call for an equal treatment, as the appropriate treatment varies from species to species (what is right for fish might be wrong for pigs). Singer argues this point with a clear rejection of anthropocentrism and suggests that everything, that would not be ethically correct to do to a human, should also not be done to a non-human animal.

As should be clear by now, a common theme in the environmental ethics debate is the question of which kind of values are applied to which entities on which basis. Anthropocentrism sees humans superior to non-human animals and therefore mainly (but not exclusively, as the discussion in the previous section demonstrates) assigns instrumental value to non-human animals. Biocentrism assigns value and moral consideration to non-human animals as well as humans. According to the Oxford Dictionary, intrinsic means "belonging naturally" (Lexico, n.d.-f) and the Oxford Thesaurus lists "innate", "inborn", "natural", "build-in", "inseparable" as synonyms (Lexico, n.d.-g). In contrast, "instrumental" is described as "serving as a means of pursuing an aim" (Lexico, n.d.-d) with synonyms such as "helpful", "of assistance", "of use" (Lexico, n.d.-e). However, even those terms are not as absolute as they seem at first sight, as the discussion in the anthropocentrism section has already demonstrated. But also in the biocentrism discussion there are different understandings and deliberations in regards to the kind of values that are assigned. For example, Taylor (1984), another important and influential biocentric philosopher, distinguishes between "instrumental value" (as means to an end), "commercial value" (as economic worth), "merit or excellence" (in relation to any kind of ranking something that calls for appraisal respect), the "immediately good" (which is synonyms with Taylor's understanding of intrinsic value), "intrinsically valued", and "inherent worth" (P. W. Taylor, 1984, p. 150). What P. W. Taylor (1984) calls 'inherent worth' is arguably the same as what most other authors call 'intrinsic value'. P. W.Taylor (1984) seems to be the only one giving the term 'intrinsic value' a slightly different meaning. According to P. W. Taylor (1984), something is intrinsically valued "insofar as some person cherishes it, holds it dear or precious, loves, admires, or appreciates it for what it is in itself" (p. 151). Hence, for something to hold intrinsic value it needs a human valuer, which brings the discussion back to Hargrove's (1998), Callicott's (2014a), and P. W. Taylor's (1983) discussion in the anthropocentrism section. In contrast to P. W. Taylor's (1984) understanding of intrinsic value, all living things (including plants) hold inherent worth as they are good in

themselves and deserve what P. W. Taylor calls "recognition respect". In short, all living beings should be seen as entities deserving of being recognized as such regardless of their other values (i.e. instrumental value or someone's "intrinsically valued" feelings for it). Even if all other forms of values are stripped away, the inherent worth of a living being still needs to be recognized and respected on the terms of species egalitarianism (P. W. Taylor, 1984).

Schmidtz (2011), however, criticises the idea of species egalitarianism as proposed by Taylor and argues that the argument for inherent worth does not necessarily mean that all species must have equal moral value as in a species egalitarian way. As biocentrism tries to better the world through the abolishment of speciesist thinking, Schmidtz (2011) argues that this does not only refer to human superiority thinking (i.e. anthropocentrism) but can also be observed in other aspects. The example Schmidtz uses is scientific experiments which result in the death of animals. The animal species used is, among other criteria, probably also chosen because harming this particular species is seen as morally less reprehensible than certain other species (e.g. mice versus chimpanzees). Schmidtz (2011) furthers his argument by saying that respect of nature and species egalitarianism are not compatible. By claiming that all species are equal, more complex species (such as humans, dolphins, apes) would be brought down to the same level as simpler life forms such as amoebae (Schmidtz (2011).

Sterba (2011) addresses the issues raised by Schmidtz (2011) by comparing it to humans. Even though it is agreed that all human beings have the same moral standing, they necessarily do not have to be treated equally in all matters. For example, "[i]n welfare liberalism, everyone has an equal right to welfare and to opportunity, but this need not commit us to providing everyone with exactly the same resources" (Sterba, 2011, p. 167). For this Sterba (2011) proposes a rough framework with three principles as moral guidelines which allow for unequal treatment without questioning species egalitarianism. The first principle allows to go against the needs of animals and plants if doing so is necessary to meet the basic need of one or more humans to ensure human preservation. This should not translate into ruthless exploitation and domination; therefore, the second principle (of disproportionality) prohibits any interference with the basic needs of non-humans for non-basic human needs, i.e. luxury ends. Lastly, the third principle allows for the harming, killing and destruction of parts of non-human nature if those parts threaten oneself or someone or something cherished and if it is necessary for defence purposes.

As a consequence of biocentric thought, authors argue that rights (similar to human rights) should be granted to non-human animals (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013). An example for this is Cavalieri & Woollard (2002) who argues that human rights, by definition, do not exclusively refer to humans, i.e. members of the homo sapiens species. As a result, the author argues for the inclusion of certain non-human animal species into the human rights doctrine. Cavalieri & Woollard (2002) thereby state that "among the beings that an expanded theory of human rights should cover there undoubtedly are mammals and birds, and probably vertebrates in general" (p. 139).

3.2.3   Ecocentrism

Leopold (1968) only uses the term "intrinsic" once in his work "A Sand County Almanac" but his writing makes it clear that his suggested "land ethics" go beyond mere anthropocentric instrumental value. Leopold suggests an ethical approach which focuses, as the name already suggests, on the land (i.e. ecosystem) as a whole. Its main rule can be quite simply summarized by saying that "[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Leopold, 1968, p. 224). Apart from this quote, Leopold's land ethics are not a precise formulation of behaviour rules but seem, to the author of this dissertation, more like a general idea on a new ethical approach conveyed in poetical writings. Leopold's main message, according to Callicott's (2014) analysis is that the whole biotic community (i.e. the whole ecosystem) has a right to live and flourish. Thereby, Leopold's land ethics do not focus on the rights of the individual, as for example the right to live and flourish of an individual non-human animal or tree, but instead the focus lies on whole species. With that, the collective trumps the individual (Callicott, 2014). This makes Leopold's land ethics very different from biocentrism which, as discussed above, only focuses on non-human animals and thereby focuses on the individual as the moral subject instead of the collective.

According to Halsey & White (1998) ecocentrism, in contrast to anthropocentrism and biocentrism, sees humans as an integral part of the global ecosystem and as such humans can neither be more nor less important than the ecosystem itself as they are a part of the same entity. "Ecocentrism therefore attempts to strike a balance between the instrumental and intrinsic conceptions of non-human nature espoused by anthropocentrists and biocentrists respectively" (Halsey & White, 1998, p.

356). Ecocentrism sees the ecosystem as a whole as the relevant moral subject (Wandén, 2001). As such, the highest priority is maintaining the health of the ecosystem either by focusing on keystone species as the fundamental basis of ecosystem health or by extending ethical value to all members of the ecosystem, regardless of their specific function as each part is a piece of the ecosystem health puzzle (Wandén, 2001).

When it comes to ecocentrism tackling issues socially, Washington et al. (2018) argue that it is an anthropocentric act to frame nature as part of human culture or to extend social justice (meaning justice for humans) towards non-human nature. Instead of abandoning anthropocentric bias, non-human nature is just integrated into anthropocentric thinking and in case of any conflict between humans and non-humans, humans win. Furthermore, the usage of the term "environmental justice" is mainly used anthropocentrically, referring to the just distribution of ecosystem services and resources (Washington et al., 2018). Treves, Santiago-Ávila, & Lynn (2019) largely argue along the same lines as Washington et al (2018), however, they find Washington et al's account for non-human individuals lacking. According to Treves et al (2019), this approach

> "fall[s] short once again when individual non-human interests are subsumed in some notion of the collective. This happens often (all the time?) in conservation, because conflicts between individual humans and individual non-humans commonly face the rebuttal that 'the collective is not jet jeopardized by action x, so we can sacrifice the individual non-human for the benefits of action x'" (p. 138).

Thus, they argue for strong non-anthropocentrism which fosters a multispecies society with democratic representation which also accounts for the rights of human and non-human individuals (Treves et al., 2019). However, not all authors agree on the ecocentric premise that non-human nature has intrinsic value. For example, Hargrove (1992), borrowing from Taylor's (1984) different conceptualisations of value, contests the claim that non-living non-human nature can have intrinsic value and argues that it is only possible to attribute intrinsic value to living beings. Based on that he argues that to protect non-living objects, the only option is to make use of anthropocentric instrumental value. So by showing humans that they need non-human nature such as trees or mountains for their own survival or comfort, non-human nature will be protected to ensure the continuation of the instrumental services that they provide to humans. Kopnina (2012a, 2012b, 2019) argues for ecocentrism and claims that an anthropocentric approach to conservation is not suitable to adequately protect non-human nature and is, in fact, not only inadequate but also counterproductive to conservation efforts.

Another perspective which has to be mentioned in any overview of environmental ethics is what Næss (2010) calls 'deep ecology'. Deep ecology emphasises the ecocentric holistic view and deeper questioning of interrelationships as opposed to "shallow ecology". The deep ecology movement, as described by Næss (2010), does not subscribe to anthropocentrism but acknowledges the intrinsic value of non-human nature. Deep ecology also subscribes to a Gandhian non-violent approach as, according to Naess, non-human nature is routinely falling victim to the mentality created by violent conflicts which shows indifference to nature preservation. Ecocentrism and deep ecology seem to share a common baseline as both reject anthropocentrism and both paradigms are also not only limited to living beings, that is humans and non-human animals, but to all other entities of the ecosystem as well. The founder of the deep ecology movement does not position deep ecology within or along with other environmental ethics paradigms, so saying that deep ecology is the same as ecocentrism would be wrong (Naess, 2010). However, Naess (2010) also says that deep ecology does not necessarily exclude or compete with all other environmental paradigms and Naess also confirms that there are parallels to ecocentrism. For the purpose of this dissertation, the difference seems to be marginal as both see intrinsic value in non-human nature and both focus on the collective as opposed to the individual. Due to time and space constraints, ecocentrism and deep ecology will be put into the same category.

3.2.4   Concluding remarks

The notions of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism, as described and discussed in the literature review, are not the ultimate versions and definitions of those ethics because there are no universal definitions that everyone agrees on. The literature review's aim is to provide a brief overview of some of the debates in environmental ethics. This is by no means a full account of all different authors, ideas, suggestions and trends as this would be impossible within the provided space. There are also many more topics of discussion which have not made it into the overview above, such as the relationship between religions and the environmental ethics paradigms.

The literature review set out to give an idea of the three (or arguably four, including deep ecology) paradigms (anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism) that shape many conservation and green violence related discussions and arguments. So this is what the review has focused on. Even within those paradigms are different

influences and ideas, which take the paradigms into different directions and make it impossible to argue for just one universal (in an absolute sense) definition of those.

There are also many more authors and readings on the topic which did not make it into the literature review. Including them would have made the literature review shallower as the provided space does not allow for an all-encompassing in-depth analysis of every new strain. For the purpose of this dissertation it is essential that it is understood what the three paradigms mean, and this was the main goal that the literature review has aimed to achieve. For ease of access, the main principles of each paradigm will briefly be repeated again in the introduction section of each of the following three chapters.

4 Anthropocentrism

In environmental ethics anthropocentrism refers to a philosophy which is based on human superiority and supremacy (Halsey & White, 1998; Steiner, 2010; Wandén, 2001). The claim of human superiority is mostly made on biological, psychological and socio-philosophical arguments. The idea of a biological superiority is derived from the unequalled complexity of the human brain and neural system. Humans are considered to be psychologically superior because they are able to think in abstract terms and conduct long-term planning. And in socio-philosophical terms, the relationship between humans socially constructs humans' personalities and thus is also of moral significance (Wandén, 2001). "Obviously, the three qualities are connected. Our developed brain makes our consciousness and power of logical thinking possible, which in their turn are the basis for our social relationships" (Wandén, 2001, p. 93). The non-human world is only considered in as much as it is of any benefit to humans. From an anthropocentric point of view, the non-human world is framed in terms of ecosystem services and nature capitals. It is prioritised in relation to the degree of importance these services are to humans (Kopnina, 2012b). "Non-human nature is therefore viewed *instrumentally* – as something to be appropriated, processed, consumed and disposed of in a manner that best suits the immediate interests of human beings" (Halsey & White, 1998, p. 349, emphasis in original). The anthropocentric perspective also manifests itself in Buzan (1991) definition of environmental security: "Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend" (Buzan, 1991, pp. 19–20). This definition shows that traditionally, environmental security is only interested in the environment in as much as it is necessary for the environment to serve as human support system. The environment itself is not seen as a valuable referent object which deserves protection for its own sake without considering the benefits that humans derive from it (Mitchell, 2014).

4.1 Security of What

From an anthropocentric perspective, the general answer to the question *security of what* is quite broad and encompasses the elements of traditional security studies as well as the new agenda of environmental security that has come along with the widening of security. The evolution of security studies with an overview how the subject of security has

changed over time has been discussed in the methodology section of this dissertation which can be found in Chapter 2. However, as has also been discussed in Chapter 2, this dissertation approaches security from a rather new perspective, which focuses on the non-human world as referent object. This is why the general answer to the question *security of what* discussed here is non-human nature from the anthropocentric perspective. When it comes to the specific parts of non-human nature that are deemed to be worth protecting within the anthropocentric paradigm, there are different perspectives of what qualifies as a suitable referent object and different opinions regarding their prioritization. This dissertation cannot realistically aim to build a universal list of what is deemed protect-worthy and with what priority it is considered important under an anthropocentric lens. Instead, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the anthropocentric paradigm works and how and with what arguments elements from non-human nature are chosen to be secured.

From the perspective of strong anthropocentrism, the focus lies on the instrumental value assigned to the non-human world to determine what needs to be protected and with what priority (Halsey & White, 1998; Kopnina et al., 2018; Mitchell, 2014). Therefore, while there is a broad list of potential referent objects, the answer to the question *security of what* from an anthropocentric lens does not refer to the whole non-human world. This is the case because arguably humans do not require an abundance of non-human nature for their continuous survival and to uphold their quality of life (Kopnina, 2012b; Leopold, 1968). According to Mitchell (2014), strong anthropocentrism has manifested itself in the notion of human security which subjugates all other aspects of security (environment security, economic security, etc.) to humans as the ultimate referent object. Other areas of security are only regarded in as much as they serve the interests of human security (Mitchell, 2014). Hence, to ensure humans' survival and quality of life it is only necessary to focus on certain key aspects of non-human nature, such as clean air, clean water, and food security as well as aspects that can be commodified (Leopold, 1968). Furthermore, with technological advancements humans are expected to find more and more ways to create ecosystem services artificially, rendering more of the non-human natural world dispensable for human survival and quality of life. Other, less pressing reasons for protecting something non-human from a strong anthropocentric perspective, are aesthetics and enjoyment, as for example enjoying watching animals in the wild and the urge to conserve them to allow future generations to find pleasure in seeing them as well (Norton, 1984).

The weak anthropocentric perspective is a little less rigid compared to the strong anthropocentric perspective. It acknowledges non-human nature's potential to inspire value formation (Norton, 1984) as has been mentioned in the literature review in Chapter 3.2. Therefore, the weak anthropocentric perspective might deem non-human nature to be worth securing even outside of strong anthropocentric instrumental value considerations. However, compared to other human needs, like food security, clean air, and similar issues, value formation might arguably be deemed of only trivial importance. Thus, in situations where vital human interests and the weak anthropocentric acknowledgement of value transformation from non-human nature collide, it can be concluded that vital human interests take precedence. So, while weak anthropocentrism can see non-human nature as a referent object of security, it is only to a very limited extend which arguably loses its footing the moment it gets challenged by other issues more important for human survival and comfort. Hence, the dissertation author concludes that weak anthropocentrism will most likely not lead to green violence or any other strong measure.

Even though the widening of security has brought environmental security onto the security agenda (Buzan et al., 1998) the environment is often framed as a threat to national, international, or human security and is less found as the referent object of what needs to be secured (McDonald, 2013). In other publications, the environment is framed as a referent object as it is vital for human security, survival, and development but the language used is not security-centred but more focused on mitigation and resilience (Buzan et al., 1998). An example would be the threat to atoll countries coming from climate change induced rising sea levels (Barnett & Adger, 2003) or environmental scarcity as a threat to peace (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Also, the decline in pollinators (such as bees) can be seen as a threat to food security (Potts et al., 2016) as their decline is threatening up to 35% of global major food crops (van der Sluijs & Vaage, 2016). So, generally speaking, the declining planetary health (including climate change, ocean acidity, and similar environmental issues) is seen as to threaten the overall health of future human generations (Whitmee et al., 2015). This has the potential to inspire the framing of those issues as a referent object of security but, as said above, it generally does not inspire strong security terminology.

Interestingly, also wildlife seems to be a common subject of security not just from a biocentric lens but also from an anthropocentric perspective. Mostly iconic species such as elephants (Bale, 2018) and rhinos (Nuwer, 2018) or more recently (coinciding

with the release of the new Lion King movie which feeds into the strategies explained in the next Subchapter) also lions (Chin, 2019) are turned into referent objects for security. This is interesting because arguably, the issues mentioned in the preceding paragraph have a much stronger claim to provide essential instrumental value for humans (such as pollinators for food security). In comparison, the instrumental value (apart from weak anthropocentrism's value transformation or simple aesthetics and enjoyment) of iconic wildlife species is not as clear on first sight. In the case of wildlife and iconic species, the strong anthropocentric instrumental value needs to be defined first. Furthermore, in the case of wildlife as the referent object, the language of security and with it the distinct proceedings of the security machinery, are a lot stronger. This will further be discussed in the following subchapters.

In short, for something to be deemed a suitable referent object for security from an anthropocentric lens, a connection has to be drawn between the non-human nature element that is to be secured and its instrumental value which is usually defined in terms of resources, national security, or human security.

4.2   Security for What

As anthropocentrism only assigns instrumental value to the non-human world, it can be argued that from an anthropocentric perspective the non-human world is only worth protecting if there is any instrumental value prescribed to it. Hence, non-human nature is not protected for its own sake but because the prescribed instrumental value has to contribute to some greater human good. A minor exception is weak anthropocentrism, but it has already been discussed in Chapter 4.1 why weak anthropocentrism is, as the name already suggests, too weak to impose strong security measures for non-human nature. Hence, "[a]n important part of the development of the idea of a Just War around wildlife protection is the ways that animals are elevated to the status of threatened global natural heritage which must be defended for the greater good" (Duffy, 2015, p. 4).

For example, in the case of Rhino poaching in the Kruger national park in South Africa, Rhinos are discursively framed as national heritage and part of the state (Lunstrum, 2014). Thus, when poachers attack Rhinos for their ivory, it is framed as an attack on the state itself, which results in the state launching counter-insurgency operations against poachers (Lunstrum, 2014). In such framings, the Rhino is the subject that is protected while poachers are expelled from the protected community. This is

possible because Rhinos are framed as part of the state and therefore, if the rhino gets attacked, indirectly the state gets attacked. In such a narrative the Rhino is not protected for its own sake but because it is seen as part of the state and is emphasized as being national heritage and a national resource (Lunstrum, 2014). While anthropocentrism basically means human-centred (Lexico, n.d.-a) and the state itself is not human, the state is still a human-produced institution. From a traditional perspective of security, states are suitable referents "as the collective embodiments and guarantors of human subjects" (Mitchell, 2014, p. 7). This makes it possible to argue that the framing of Rhinos in South Africa's Kruger national park is anthropocentric as opposed to biocentric or ecocentric. The expulsion of poachers from the protected community is happening by Othering of the poachers and discursively framing them as savages while at the same time uplifting the non-human animal by anthropomorphism (Ghazal Aswad, 2019; Humphreys & Smith, 2014; Neumann, 2004). According to Byers (as cited in Neumann, 2004)[2] "[b]iodiversity in all its forms has been constructed as a scarce 'resource', conceived of as ecologically and economical vital, limited in supply, and threatened by human activities, thereby appearing to force us into 'painful choices' about 'sacrificing some humans of this generation for the benefit of future human generations or nonhuman species'" (Byers, as cited in Neumann, 2004, p. 817).

Similar to the framing of Rhino poaching in South Africa's Kruger national park (Lunstrum, 2014), a broader phenomenon called *war by conservation* can also be observed (Duffy, 2016). *War by conservation* describes a recently observed shift in conservation, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, which positions conservation issues into broader matters of global security (Duffy, 2016). This is done by the so-called poachers-as-terrorists narrative which allows to situate poaching within the wider issue of terrorism (Duffy, 2016). The naming of non-human nature as referent object for security and the denunciation of human poachers "relies on the idea that securing natural heritage will simultaneously achieve national security objectives, and more critically, address global security concerns, notably the US-led War on Terror" (Duffy, 2016, p. 240). Weak anthropocentrism might be motivated to secure non-human animals due to aesthetics and

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[2] Unfortunately, the author of this dissertation was unable to get ahold of the original source and therefore had to make use of a secondary reference. The original source according to Neumann (2004) is:
Byers, B. A. (1994). Armed forces and the conservation of biological diversity. In J. Kakonen (Ed.), *Green security or militarized environment* (pp. 111–130). Brookfield: Dartmouth Press.
According to Neumann (2004) the quote can be found on page 124.

enjoyment if they are threatened by the finality of distinction. But, as has been mentioned before, weak anthropocentric sympathies do not provide a strong enough force to defend non-human nature by going against humans. However, by framing poachers as terrorists and by spreading the fear that each poached animal adds to the financial funds of terrorist organisations, the protection of animals from poachers and the killing of poachers gets fuelled with more importance and urgency. This framing is also valid from a strong anthropocentric perspective. The urgency and importance of the protection of animals is not derived from the intrinsic or aesthetic value of those animals but from the threat that the link between poaching and terrorism poses to humans and to the state. This is not to argue that the state itself has established those narratives to ensure its own protection. In fact, Duffy (2016) has traced the origin of the poachers-as-terrorists narrative back to a publication of the Elephant Action League. This is a non-profit organisation dedicated to save elephants from extinction by an intelligence-driven approach to wildlife crime in an effort to identify key players in international wildlife crime networks (EAL, n.d.). Therefore, it is, of course, not only possible but even quite likely that agents with a biocentric or ecocentric mindset are using anthropocentric framings for their goals because such framings provide greater chances of success. It can be argued that anthropocentric framings are less questioned and better established in society and raise less opposition as if violence is committed against humans for the sole protection of the non-human world, with no greater good for humans in mind.

Other elements of the natural world besides the already discussed iconic species carry instrumental value without it having to be framed as such, as for example water. It can be argued that it is common knowledge that water is vital for the survival of humans, so the protection of natural water sources should raise less questions than the protection of other elements of non-human nature. However, water has not been successfully securitized to the extent of iconic wildlife species which causes humans to turn against other humans in the name of the non-human world. Instead, when it comes to so-called water wars, they seem to be less about the protection of non-human nature (water in this case) but rather about other underlying grievances, rivalries, and conflicts (Beaumont, 1994; Octavio, 2018). The same goes for other issues such as pollinators, clean oceans, air purity and so on. A good example of this is the mission statement of the REDD+ campaign which was launched to mitigate climate change: "To support countries' efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation through national REDD+ strategies that transform their forest sectors so as to contribute to human

well-being and meet climate change mitigation and adaptation aspirations." (UN-REDD, n.d., p. 6). Again, nature needs to be preserved for human well-being, however, the language is of mitigation and adaption instead of an appeal to a security machinery.

4.3   Security from What

As discussed in the methodology section of this dissertation (Chapter 2), a number of scholars criticise the military-centric focus of traditional security and urge for security to be widened beyond military-threats. According to Ullman (1983) something is a threat if it has a profound impact on the quality of people's life and if it "threaten[s] significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state" (Ullman, 1983, p. 133). This can cause a "spectrum of disturbances and disruptions ranging from external wars to internal rebellions, from blockades and boycotts to raw material shortages and devastating 'natural' disasters such as decimating epidemics, catastrophic floods, or massive and pervasive droughts" (Ullman, 1983, p. 133). So, from an anthropocentric perspective everything that limits policy choices is a threat (*security from what*) as it can cause significant dangers (*security for what*).

However, in the case of iconic wildlife species the violence for their protection, physical and non-kinetic (as will be discussed in the next Subchapter 4.4), is often indirectly affecting local communities. While the framed enemies are poachers who attack the state or are contributing to terrorism financing, in reality it is often local communities who are affected. Local communities are either taking part in poaching activities to generate income in the absence of other job opportunities or are caught in the crossfires while performing small-scale hunting to sustain their livelihood (Duffy, 2016; Lunstrum, 2014, 2017). Bushmeat is often the only available protein source for local communities and small-scale hunting is a well-established part of their tradition and culture while the social construction of poaching is said to be a newer phenomenon and often criticised as being a Western concept (Dorward & Barnes, n.d.). Also, the close proximity of local communities to national parks often makes them victims of so-called *green grabbing*. This is the revocation of access rights or land dispossession in the name of the protection of non-human nature (Fairhead et al., 2012; Kelly & Ybarra, 2016).

As can be seen in Subchapter 4.1, environmental security is also heavily focused on planetary health and thus also on climate change which is, according to the

current scientific consensus, to a considerable degree caused by humans (NASA, n.d.). So, humans are causing the environment harm and subsequently causing humanity (themselves and future generations) harm in the long-term. This harm, however, is caused on a collective level, as it is closely linked to the industrial revolution (NASA, n.d.). So, building on that a vital threat to the environment is posed by humanity which is in conflict with anthropocentrism which sees humans as the sole moral subject and only considers the environment in as much as it serves humans. It is difficult to divide the human population between climate change causing threats to the environment (and thereby also threats to humanity) and those who do not pose a threat. Because the reasons for climate change is tied to contemporary human life with practises like using trees, oil, gas and coal on a large scale and eating meat (European Commission, n.d.). This makes it difficult to articulate clear enemies which is a necessity for the security machinery to operate. In contrast, it is a lot easier to frame specific groups as enemies in the case of wildlife conservation, which will be discussed in Subchapter 4.4. below.

4.4   By What Means

As has been described so far, anthropocentric framings of non-human nature as subject of security often feed into existing and already well-established narratives of human security, national security, and international security. Examples for those narratives are the urge to secure national borders (Humphreys & Smith, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014), the perceived threat of China's rise (White, 2014) or to cut finance from terrorism (Duffy, 2015, 2016). By doing so they tap directly into security practices and resources which have already been allocated to those previously established issues. This results, for example, in the usage of para-military tactics, military technology and weapons, sophisticated air surveillance (Lunstrum, 2014) and in the dispossession of local communities (Massé & Lunstrum, 2016). This phenomenon is so profound that Humphreys & Smith (2014) coined the term "rhinofication of South African security" (p. 795). Physical violence is a common response to poaching and has reached its most extreme form with the establishment of shoot-to-kill policies (Neumann, 2004).

From an anthropocentric perspective it can be argued that violence against humans in the name of non-human nature is an extraordinary measure. This is because in anthropocentrism humans are the moral subject which is conflicting with the notion of green violence as green violence is by its definition directed against humans. Hence, in

anthropocentrism, non-human nature should only be secured in as much it makes human lives easier, not to satisfy the needs for non-human nature. To defy the anthropocentric hierarchy of humans over non-human nature, the humans posing a threat to the subject need to be expelled from the moral community to allow for the extraordinary measure of green violence. This has, in the case of the iconic wildlife species, been accomplished by securitization acts from conservation organisations (see for example the analysis of (Massé & Lunstrum, 2016; White, 2014). To legitimise violence against humans to protect non-human nature (which is *not* considered to be a moral subject by itself) the humans against whom violence is directed have to be expelled from the morally protected community. This is enabled by marketization and spectacularisation (Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016) as well as the Othering of the discursively framed enemy in combination with the anthropomorphism of the security referent object (Ghazal Aswad, 2019; Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016; Neumann, 2004; White, 2014). Media productions are used to "clearly [identify] heroes, villains and victims [to] generate a satisfying viewer experience, portraying an 'epic battle' for a 'just cause'" (Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016, p. 274), thus generating public acceptance. This spectacularisation approach is accompanied by strong calls to action, mostly in the form of donations to portrayed causes which should further market the violent security strategy (Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016). The actual threat to wildlife species and the marketization and spectacularisation campaign behind it, arguably depends more on the possibility of instrumentalising the non-human animal for higher human goals discussed above which translate into national, international or human security, than on the real threat the species faces. And it has less to do with the actual threat that the wildlife species is facing. For example, there are quite a view movies framing elephants and rhinos as security referent objects[3], but even though pangolins are the most threatened species worldwide Pangolins have not been marketized and spectacularized to the same extend (Handley, 2018).

In other instances where the anthropocentric paradigm in nature conservation and protection does not feed into existing narratives as outlined above, the language of security is not as profound. This means that the inherent characteristics of security are more subtle and less in terms of classical responses in military terms with physical violence at its core.

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[3] As for example can be seen in the movies: Sides of a Horn; The Ivory Game; The Last Days of Ivory

4.5   Conclusion

How does the security paradigm operate through the lens of anthropocentrism?

From an anthropocentric perspective non-human nature can only be regarded as a referent object of security if there is some kind of instrumental value assigned to it which is vital for the satisfaction of some greater end to humans. In some cases it can be argued that the instrumental value is quite obvious, for example in the case of water as it can arguably be regarded as common knowledge that water is paramount for human survival. In other cases, however, the instrumental value for higher human ends is less apparent, as it is the case with iconic wildlife species which are hunted for their horns, claws, teeth, or bones. In such cases also weak anthropocentrism's appeal to aesthetics or the wish to save iconic species for the enjoyment of future human generations can hardly be regarded as strong enough to justify extraordinary measures against humans. To view them as suitable referent objects through the lens of anthropocentrism, their instrumental value is often defined in terms of national security, counterterrorism, and other well-established narratives of global concern. This framing allows for the mobilisation of already well-established resources and practices as the higher end, which justifies extraordinary measures against humans. It is not the simple saving of an iconic species that mobilises, but – for example – the cutting of terrorism financing.

      Even though the instrumental value of some parts of non-human nature is more obvious, as it is the case with the example of water mentioned above, the security machinery is in most of such cases not as profound as one might think. There are either underlying issues at work which only get triggered by non-human nature as a referent object, or the language is generally more of cooperation, resilience and mitigation. A possible explanation for this could be that many threats that those parts of the environment face (air purity, ocean purity, pollinators for food security, etc), are indirectly caused by humanity as a collective. First, the threat to those areas of non-human nature are posed by the same group as the group that is supposed to be the higher end which anthropocentrism serves. Second, the line between friends and foes is very blurry which makes it difficult to clearly define targets against which the security machinery could operate.

5   Biocentrism

Biocentrism is a philosophy in environmental ethics which sees humans on the same moral level as other living parts of non-human nature. Because humans are just seen as another animal species and not as superior to non-human animals, non-human species are also regarded as having intrinsic value which means that they need to be preserved regardless of their instrumental value to humans (Halsey & White, 1998). This kind of decisive value can best be understood as

> a worth that [those beings] possess simply in virtue of their being members of the Earth's Community of Life. Such worth does not derive from their actual or possible usefulness to humans, or from the fact that humans find them enjoyable to look at or interesting to study. (P. W. Taylor, 2011, p. 13)

There are different approaches as to what constitutes as an ethically decisive quality to extend intrinsic value to a non-human species. Examples would be a certain level of consciousness (as seen in apes), the ability to feel pain (which would rule out plants and simple live forms such as bacteria), or the possession of live (rendering all living beings onto the same moral level, whether it is a complex life form such as a monkey or a simple life form such as a virus) (Regan, 1986; Singer, 2009; Wandén, 2001). These approaches are, however, not without criticism. As it is humans who decide on the criteria of what is needed to extend intrinsic value to non-human animals, these criteria are said to be not without anthropocentric bias. Furthermore, with human-like qualities used as a reference for those criteria, it could happen that one species gets to be protected while the ecosystem that it needs to survive might get destroyed as the ecosystem has not been offered membership in the extended ethical community worth saving (Park, Purser, & Montuori, 1995). Another issue is that if all non-human animals are given intrinsic value beyond their instrumental value, how and according to which set of rules can non-human animals be ethically prioritized (Schmidtz, 2011).

Some advocates of animal rights go so far as to say that the refusal of granting all living beings the same intrinsic value is comparable to the oppression of women or to oppress humans based on race membership (Benton, 1998; Kopnina, 2012b; Regan, 1986; Singer, 2009). This comparison, however, is seen as quite problematic by other authors as unlike disadvantaged human groups, non-human animals do not have the capability to self-define and express their preferred status in the world (according to the current state of knowledge). This means that non-human animals "are dependent on our (human)

beliefs as to their nature, and their vulnerabilities, as well as to what is to count as 'flourishing' for them" (Benton, 1998, p. 160).

Biocentric ethics manifest themselves in more precise and practical terms in the form of animal rights movements and animal liberation movements. Their foundation is always the biocentric premise which then gets translated into more specific demands ranging from the acknowledgement of non-human animal personhood (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013; Francione, 2009), non-human animal rights similar to human rights (Cavalieri & Woollard, 2002), or the political inclusion of non-human animals (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013). Even though some biocentric philosophers also include plants in their conceptualisation of biocentrism (P. W. Taylor, 2011), the literature and biocentric activist groups mostly deal with demands for non-human animals. The author of this dissertation would therefore argue that while it is possible to include plants into biocentric thought, this stream of thought only plays a marginal role in biocentrism as a whole.

5.1   Security of What

Generally speaking, biocentrism focuses on living beings, as has been discussed in the literature review in Chapter 3 and in the introduction to Chapter 5. Biocentrism rejects the premise of anthropocentrism that humans are in some way superior and deserving to be the main moral subject. Humans, however, are living beings and as such they are still included in what biocentrism deems to be the moral subject. Biocentrism does not exclude humans from the protected community but extends it (P. W. Taylor, 2011). The scope of this extension differs slightly and depends on the various philosophers. Some include all living beings and only exclude inanimate non-human nature (P. W. Taylor, 2011). In this case the referent of security is everything that is in possession of life: Humans, non-human animals, microorganisms, and plants. Excluded are, for example, rocks. A less inclusive but more common approach to biocentrism only argues for humans and non-human animals to be on the same moral level and leaves out the matter of plants (Cochrane, 2012; Singer, 2009). This does not necessarily include all non-human animals but depends on a predefined set of criteria which must be met in order to be part of the protected community that biocentrism refers to. Such criteria are, for example, the ability to feel pain and to suffer (Singer, 2009), the ability to have and follow interests whether knowingly or not (Cochrane, 2012), or a specific level of sentience and consciousness (Cavalieri &

Woollard, 2002; Regan, 1986) in the sense that a distinct form of *someone* can be recognised in the other being and the body is not just an empty shell (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013). However, the extension of the moral community to include all living beings without establishing a hierarchy also raises further questions and issues. As (Luke, 1997) puts it:

> [W]ill we allow anthrax or cholera microbes to attain self-realization in wiping out sheep herds or human kindergartens? Will we continue to deny salmonella or botulism their equal rights when we process dead carcasses of animals and plants that we eat? In the end, humans inevitably put themselves above other species and natural entities. (p. 17)

The issue with biocentric thought when the interests of different members of the protected community collide, calls for ruleset that deals with such issues. According to Grey (1993) "if we attempt to step too far outside the scale of the recognizably human, rather than expanding and enriching our moral horizons we render them meaningless, or at least almost unrecognizable" (p. 463). This issue can be underlined with (B. Taylor, 2016) example of what happened in a zoo in the United States in 2017. A little boy fell into the enclosure of a Western Lowland Gorilla and was subsequently rescued by the authorities who had decided to shoot the gorilla in the enclosure during the rescue operation. This has raised the question whether a human life is truly more valuable than the life of the member of an endangered species (B. Taylor, 2016). From an anthropocentric point of view to even ask such a question is considered outrageous as of course a human life is always more valuable than any non-human animal life. However, from a biocentric perspective the issue is not that clear-cut. Because biocentrism rejects the anthropocentric premise that humans are superior and strictly follows its pre-defined criteria for moral consideration (P. W. Taylor, 2011), it can also result in what others would criticise as misanthropic tendencies. For example, some biocentric philosophers argue that if there are certain criteria for entry into the protected community and on the basis of those criteria some non-human animals are included while some non-human animals are excluded, the same criteria should be applied to humans (Cochrane, 2012; Regan, 1986; Singer, 2009). They raise the question if fish are excluded from the protected community because it lacks the necessary sophistication that, for example dolphins display, then what about mentally severely disabled humans who lack the same sophistication (Regan, 1986)? Furthermore, the premise that one unique characteristic found in a few species (e.g. the ability to recognize oneself in the mirror) is more special than another unique characteristic found

in a few other species (e.g. being able to breathe underwater) is arbitrary and cannot be defended outside out speciesist claims (Francione, 2009).

An important aspect is that biocentrism refers to the individual more than to the collective. The appeal to biocentrism is thereby similar to anthropocentrism, which does not seek the mere continuation of the human species but is concerned with the individual human as moral subject (P. W. Taylor, 2011). Biocentrism, as opposed to ecocentrism, does not focus on whole species and ecosystems as a collective but on individuals same as anthropocentrism. While the collective in the form of whole species or the entire ecosystem is of course not unimportant in biocentric thought, especially when it comes to the habitat of the individuals, the moral focus still lies on the individual level (Regan, 1986; Singer, 2009; P. W. Taylor, 2011). Hence, the ultimate referent of security is also the individual.

5.2   Security for What

Biocentrism bases its ethical principles onto science. Darwin's theory of evolution is the foundation onto which biocentrism builds its claim (Francione, 2009; P. W. Taylor, 2011). Biocentric philosophers argue that any rational thinker following scientific thought has to accept the biocentric premise that humans are just another species of animals and therefore human animals and non-human animals must be on the same moral level (Singer, 2009). The ultimate goal is species egalitarianism as opposed to speciesism (Francione, 2009; Singer, 2009; Sterba, 2011; P. W. Taylor, 2011). Speciesism is defined as discrimination on the bases of membership of a specific species or lack thereof, meaning, in speciesism certain living beings are either discriminated because they belong to a certain species or because they do not belong to the species which is seen as superior (as humans in anthropocentrism) (Best & Nocella, 2004; Singer, 2009). This makes biocentrism the opposition of anthropocentrism. However, also within biocentric thought there are different strands which are philosophically in conflict with each other, as there is no clear and universally agreed-on framework how to decide which species are included in the protected community of biocentrism and which are excluded (as has been discussed in the introduction of Chapter 5 and Chapter 5.1) and what the ideal situation would look like exactly. The major difference is the question whether equal consideration is enough but non-human animals are still allowed to be used instrumentally (Cochrane, 2012; Singer, 2009) or whether they should be completely liberated from humans (Cochrane,

2012; Regan, 1986). The common baseline, however, is that non-human animals have irrevocable value regardless of their instrumental value and that this warrants respect and consideration. Living beings are "seen to be a teleological (goal-oriented) centre of life, pursuing [their] own good in [their] own unique way" (P. W. Taylor, 2011, p. 45). This teleological centre of life is to be protected in the sense that it is not interfered with. The general aim of biocentrism, therefore, is to preserve and protect living organisms so that they are able to pursue their own good, whichever this might be. The biocentric higher goal has therefore nothing to do with humans, anthropocentrism, or instrumental value. It thereby elevates non-human animals onto the same level as humans, which also means that humans do not enjoy the same room of manoeuvre as they do from an anthropocentric perspective. However, the major claims are not anti-human. The goal is to liberate living beings similar to what happened when society started to oppose racism and sexism. While it took away the liberty of the formerly privileged group to mistreat other human beings based on gender or race membership, the overall goal was elevation instead of downgrades, enabling instead of preventing. This can, for example, be seen by the discussion of non-human animals and mentally disabled humans. Similarities between the two are often drawn to further the biocentric argument, however, never with the intention of excluding disabled humans from the protected community. Instead, while the comparison is drawn partially for shock-value, the central intention is for non-human animals to be elevated, not for disabled humans to be degraded (Cochrane, 2012; Francione, 2009; Regan, 1986; Singer, 2009).

5.3   Security from What

It is not humans per se who constitute the biggest threat to the biocentric referent object, especially also because humans are in fact part of the referent object as has been discussed in Subchapter 5.1. Instead, it is anthropocentric thought that poses the biggest threat, and which is framed as the enemy in biocentric literature (see for example Francione, 2009; Singer, 2009; P. W. Taylor, 2011). Even though humans are the ones bringing insecurity onto non-human nature by bringing anthropocentric ethics to life, humans are still part of the biocentric referent object. Another interesting fact is that only the non-human animal part of the referent object, though not the human part is under threat. Because anthropocentrism poses the biggest threat, humans are protected even when framed as subject of security from a biocentric security lens. This is because humans are also

regarded as subject of security from an anthropocentric perspective, and anthropocentrism is the major threat from a biocentric perspective. Furthermore, humans are the only beings (as far as we are aware at the time of writing) capable to act as moral agents (Cochrane, 2012). Biocentric philosophers have argued extensively that non-human animals can and should be on the same moral level as humans, even though non-human animals can only be moral subjects and not moral agents (Cochrane, 2012; Francione, 2009). Some even argue that non-human animals might be moral agents after all (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013). But still, the fact remains that humans as the only known and *universally accepted* moral agents are, speaking on the collective level, subjects of security, friends, and foes at the same time.

Threatening anthropocentric thought manifests itself in the form of anthropocentric laws (for example laws that view non-human animals as properties and inanimate things), and anthropocentric practices (for example animal testing in laboratories or factory farming) (Singer, 2009). While anthropocentrism is the threat enabler, the various modes in which the threats manifest themselves are habitat destruction, torture, death, and exploitation (Cochrane, 2012; Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013; Francione, 2009; Singer, 2009). Some biocentric positions allow for non-human animals to be used instrumentally by humans as long as their interests are being considered and respected equally to human interests. This point of view even allows to hurt and kill non-human animals but only as a last resort if all other options have been exhausted and only if it is for a greater good that has been weighted against the non-human animals' suffering (Singer, 2009). Similar to this another approach allows for non-human animals to still be used instrumentally, most notably as food source, as long as it is necessary for human survival and not done out of a sport and recreation mindset such as sport hunting (P. W. Taylor, 2011). Other positions are more rigid and claim that any instrumental usage at all is to be prohibited as it interferes with the inherent rights of non-human animals (Regan, 1986).

Generally speaking, from a biocentric perspective living beings need to be protected from humans enacting on anthropocentric thought. While of course also non-human dangers to non-human beings exist, such as predators, bacteria, or environmental issues such as natural water scarcity due to droughts, the general premise is that humans are the main danger that has to be dealt with. Whether the referent objects also need to be actively protected from non-human factors is up to debate but only in very limited terms. While most authors take the stance that nature should be left to do its course, there is also

the perspective that some non-human animals must be protected more than others depending on its dependency status (domesticated, wild, or liminal) (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013).

5.4   By What Means

From a biocentric perspective, either all living beings or a number of species falling into specific pre-defined categories which make them 'worthy', are to be protected (see Chapter 5.1.). In all discussed versions of biocentrism, however, humans belong to the protected community. This might explain why there seems to be a tendency that even those labelled as eco-terrorists "claim adherence to a strict code of nonviolence, at least with respect to other humans. [...] In this they commonly draw a distinction between violence exercised against living beings and that directed at inanimate objects" (Fletcher, 2018, p. 150). Elevating non-human animals into the protected community does not exclude humans, but all species seem to enjoy the same right to live (see Chapter 5.3).

However, it could also be argued that physical violence against humans to protect non-human animals is necessary in order to secure the non-human animals' right to live. It can be seen as a "necessary evil, considering the obligation to protect [non-human animals] from extinction. It appears that poachers will do anything to ensure that they kill these animals, unless they are made aware of the possibility of their own death in the process" (Mogomotsi & Madigele, 2017, p. 57). The difference between the two approaches (one only allowing violence against inanimate objects, i.e. vandalism, the other seeing physical violence against humans as a necessary evil) could possibly be attributed to different circumstances. Non-violent approaches are mainly used by groups protesting factory farming or animal experiments (Fletcher, 2018; Rosebraugh, 2004) while physical violence seems to be more prevalent when it comes to the conservation of endangered iconic species (Duffy, 2015, 2016; Fletcher, 2018; Lunstrum, 2014). While the first issue can for sure be seen as pressing and of utmost importance, it still lacks the urgency and seriousness that the prospect of extinction bears in the second issue. This is a possible, yet unproven speculation of why there is such a difference in methods. However, it also needs to be considered that the states imposing shoot-to-kill policies act out of anthropocentric motivations (see Chapter 4). The non-governmental organisations feeding into those agendas might, however, act out of biocentric motivations.

Furthermore, the non-human animal advocacy movement might have made progress in some areas, notably in the area of anti-cruelty laws. But when one looks at the bigger picture the cause is failing (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013).

> For the foreseeable future, we can expect more and more animals every year to be bred, confined, tortured, exploited, and killed to satisfy human desires. [...] The reality is that animal exploitation underpins the way we feed and clothe ourselves, our forms of entertainment and leisure, and our structures of industrial production and scientific research. The animal advocacy movement has nibbled at the edges of this system of animal exploitation, but the system itself endures, and indeed expands and deepens all the time, with remarkably little public discussion. (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013, p. 2)

The sense of a failing cause increases the feeling of urgency and might pave the way to extraordinary measures. Since humans are included in the moral community and therefore also part of the referent object of biocentric security, extraordinary measures would arguably entail violence against humans as this would be clearly out of the norm of biocentric ethics.

> Realizing that nonviolence against animal exploiters in fact is a pro-violence stance that tolerates their blood-spilling without taking adequate measures to stop it, a new breed of freedom fighters has ditched Gandhi for Machiavelli and switched principled nonviolence with the amoral (not to be confused with immoral) pragmatism that embraces animal liberation "by any means necessary." (Best, 2004, p. 301)

However, when biocentric activists refer to non-violence, they mostly mean non-violence against humans but embrace violence against inanimate objects. The preferred method of kinetic violence is ecotage which means environmentally-inspired sabotage (Fletcher, 2018; Regan, 2004). Another common expression meaning the same thing is monkeywrenching (Rosebraugh, 2004). While it is often claimed that ecotage is non-violent, as it is not intended to result in the injury of human bodies, it is still violence in the sense that it is the wilful destruction of property and therefore such practices cannot be claimed as being non-violent (Regan, 2004). While such acts mean breaking the law or even be prosecuted for terrorism on, for example, the basis of the U.S. Patriot Act (Black & Black, 2004) they are often justified with the argument that it also meant breaking the law to help Jews in the Third Reich but because helping Jews was the right thing to do from a moral and ethical perspective, breaking the law was right as well (Watson, 2004).

In the absence of powerful biocentric institutions or states able, willing or legitimized to take violent action in defence of biocentric security subjects (Eckersley, 2007) the means are mainly guerrilla like warfare (Best, 2004), civil disobedience, and

ecotage (Nash, 1989; Rosebraugh, 2004). There are a few organised and somewhat official organisations following those principles, such as Sea Shepherd, however the majority is biocentric activism is made up by individuals usually loosely organised in decentralised organisations such as the Animal Liberation Front (Best & Nocella, 2004). However, as humans are the only accepted moral agents and also loosely divided in security subjects, friends, and foes, it is humans who have to act upon biocentric defence against other humans. The dynamic generated by that would be an interesting point of inquiry in the sense that it is humans policing humans to adhere to the biocentric ideal. An example to demonstrate this line of thought would be the case of Cecil the lion. An American dentist shot a lion who happened to be well-known due to him having been part of a long-term study conducted by the University of Oxford. Once word got out that Cecil was shot by trophy hunting American dental doctor Walter Palmer a public outcry followed. Politicians, celebrities and conservationists condemned the kill and the out-lash of the general public was so intense that Palmer was forced to close his dental practice (Tasch, 2015) and to publicly apology and justify his actions (O'Conner, 2015). Those ramifications can be seen as a form of violence committed against Palmer in the name of the non-human animal Cecil (Lunstrum, 2017). But more importantly, it might be a case of biocentric communities policing and punishing behaviour against biocentric ideals. Some speak from the *Cecil Effect* which is described as the decrease of trophy hunting after the public outrage over Cecil's death (McAdams, 2016). This could be a phenomenon similar to what is described by Büscher & Fletcher (2018) but in biocentric terms. An "intensification of pressure" which might result in a new form of biocentric biopower which works through a population rejecting anthropocentrism and embracing biocentrism through biocentric governing (loosely based on Büscher & Fletcher, 2018). This is just informed speculation on the part of the dissertation author, but the prospect raises interesting questions worth investigating.

A way of how biocentric thought is already manifested in some cases of policy is through the extension of legal rights to non-human animals. For example, the two Indian provinces Punjab and Haryana have granted all non-human animals legal rights. The ruling reminds of a mixture of corporate legal rights and children's rights. The non-human animals in those Indian provinces are enjoying the status of a legal person, similar to the law that allows certain company types to be a legal entity, and the citizens of those provinces are to be their guardians, hence the association with children (Soni, 2019). Once biocentric objectives are achieved in the sense that biocentric ethics become

the new predominant ideology/philosophy, the means to maintain this status will most likely be policy in the form of prohibition of everything that interferes with biocentric ideals (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013).

5.5   Conclusion

> How does the security paradigm operate through the lens of biocentrism?

Biocentrism has been difficult to conceptualise because of the lack of unity within biocentric philosophical circles. While the other two paradigms also lack universal frameworks, biocentrism seems to be more divided on key aspects than the other two paradigms. The major key point of biocentrism is that either all or some species of living organisms, which are selected according to pre-defined criteria, are attributed with intrinsic value. This value translates into membership to the protected community. While the opinions differ on whether plants should be included and not all philosophers agree on the inclusion of all non-human animal species, there is no version of biocentrism that excludes humans. However, in all versions of biocentric thought humans are on the same level as other organisms and do not occupy a special status within the protected community, as they do in anthropocentrism. Thus, in all versions of biocentrism, the referent object of security are the individual members of the protected community, including humans. The arbitrary dichotomy between humans and non-human animals is rejected by an appeal to science and the theory of evolution as well as by drawing similarities between the capabilities of non-human animals and mentally disabled humans. The threat to the biocentric referent object is posed by the manifestation of anthropocentrism in the form of habitat destruction, exploitation, torture, and death of non-human animals. This puts humans into the position of simultaneously being part of the referent object and part of the threat while the danger only extends to the non-human part of the reference object. The means how non-human animals are protected vary from shoot-to-kill policies against poachers to ecotage only directed at inanimate objects.

6   Ecocentrism

In environmental ethics ecocentrism is a philosophy that views the ecosystem as a collective whole as the most important moral subject. In contrast to biocentrism, which only places moral value on some or all living beings, that is human and non-human animals, ecocentrism sees intrinsic value in the whole ecosystem with no hierarchy within the ecosystem as to what is of more or less value (Halsey & White, 1998). Instead, ecocentrism places the highest priority onto the health of the whole ecosystem and therefore sees the ultimate aim of all moral consideration to keep the ecosystem in its balance. To maintain the balance that ecocentrism sees as the moral subject, there are different approaches that can be taken. One approach is to focus on keystone species which play a paramount role within the ecosystem and are fundamental to keep it in balance. The other option is to treat every single entity within the ecosystem with the same importance (Wandén, 2001). Because even if scientists have not been able to attribute special services to certain entities, it can be assumed that - unbeknown to humans - they still play a crucial role in complex and highly intertwined ecosystem processes that are all needed to maintain the ecosystem's balance (Wandén, 2001). "However, the unique capacity for human beings to develop and deploy methods of production which have global consequences, means that humans also have an explicit responsibility to ensure that such production methods do not exceed the ecospheric limits of the planet" (Halsey & White, 1998, p. 355). Hence, ecocentrism recognises that nature does not only have intrinsic value but also instrumental value. Therefore, it places a moral responsibility onto humans to not overexploit and to maintain a balance between the instrumental usage of natural resources and the necessary respect that the ecosystem's intrinsic value demands (Halsey & White, 1998). Ecocentric and deep ecological thought manifest themselves in more practical terms in the form of spirituality (some forms of Buddhism, Taoism, nature religions), romanticism, and eco-resistance (Luke, 1997). An example of ecocentric non-governmental organisations would be the Earth Liberation Front or Earth First, which are from an anthropocentric perspective mostly labelled as radical environmentalist groups or ecoterrorist organisations.

6.1   Security of What

Ecocentrism is a holistic paradigm and its focus lies on keeping the balance between all parts of the ecosystem and the interrelationship of ecosystem processes and entities (Leopold, 1968; Lo, 2001). When speaking of *entities* from an ecocentric perspective, the word *entity* does not specifically refer to individuals, as it does in biocentric and anthropocentric thought. Instead, the word refers to the whole collection of a certain thing. For example, it does not refer to a single mountain or a single river, but to all rivers and all mountains. Same, it does not refer to an individual, specific wolf but to the whole species of wolves. In short, it is a holistic instead of an individualistic approach to ethics (Luke, 1997; Nash, 1989; Protopapadakis, 2014). The focus on collectives instead of individuals allows, if it is taken in absolute terms, for the scarification of the individual for the good of the collective (Callicott, 2014; Lo, 2001). The focus on the ecosystem, however, can also call for the scarification of harmful collectives (as for example invasive species) to ensure the continuous health of the ecosystem (Protopapadakis, 2014).

According to Leopold (1968) the protected community enlarges to also include all other non-human entities from non-human animals to plants to soil, which, collectively, is called "the land". To emphasize the holistic importance of the collective over the individual, the term *ecosystem collective* will be used henceforth in this dissertation. The role of humans in Leopold's (1968) ecocentric land ethic is that of a mere member of the community, neither more nor less important than its other members. The priority on the ecosystem collective as moral subject shifts the focus of security onto the ecosystem collective as the matter that is insecure and needs securing. The question, however, is what exactly is meant by the ecosystem? To be able to secure something it first needs to be clear what exactly it is that needs to be secured. What exactly are those ecosystem processes and entities that need to be secured and how can this be done if the focus lies on the ecosystem as a collective whole? As Leopold (1968) rightly states "[a] science of land health needs, first of all, a base datum of normality, a picture of how healthy land maintains itself as an organism" (p. 196). So, the question of what needs to be secured does not only refer to the entity itself, which is the ecosystem collective, but also to the preferred state that the secured entity should ideally be in. Hence, going from Leopold's statement, simply knowing that the ecosystem collective is the referent object of security is not enough, it also needs to be clear what securing effectively means for the ecosystem collective. Taking Leopold's words, it is therefore necessary to establish an

ideal status, a baseline of what balanced ecosystem looks like and at which point in time this kind of ecosystem has existed. Rogers (as cited by Detraz, 2018) explains the goal to be "the creation of a condition where the physical surroundings of a community provide for the needs of its inhabitants without diminishing its natural stock" (p. 45).

With the ecosystem collective being the referent of security, humans are seen as mere members of the collective, together with other entities such as rocks, plants, and non-human animals. Humans therefore are part of the referent object, but it is neither the human individual nor humanity as a collective that is secured but the contribution that humans bring to the ecosystem. From the perspective of the ecosystem's health and balance humans are viewed instrumentally and together with other entities evaluated in terms of their positive and negative contribution (Lo, 2001). It "shifts human power over nature (and humanity by implication) from external sovereign control in a Hobbesian sense to internal participative normalization with Nature in a new Foucauldian sense" (Luke, 1997, p. 18). Even though humans are evaluated in an instrumental sense, ecocentrism still acknowledges intrinsic value to all single parts of the ecosystem, humans included.

6.2   Security for What

The definition of ecocentrism dictates that the answer to the question of *security for what* has to be the intrinsic value of the ecosystem. While instrumental value can play a role, the highest motivational principle should be the ecosystem's intrinsic value or otherwise it would not be classified as ecocentric. From a deep ecological point of view the higher goal to be achieved is to go "beyond the modern Western *self* which is defined as an isolated ego striving primarily for hedonistic gratification or for narrow sense of individual salvation in this life or the next" (Devall and Sessions as cited in Luke, 1997, p. 15, emphasis in original)[4]. Nature is thereby reanimated as a being of subjectivity. What matters is not species membership or race membership but acknowledging to be a part of nature which generates a feeling of wholeness. With that also comes an understanding that if the ecosystem is hurt, everyone else is also hurt, as nothing can exist without the

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[4] Unfortunately, the original source could not be obtained by the author of this dissertation and therefore had to make use of a secondary reference. The original source, according to Luke (1997/1999) is:
Devall, B. & Sessions G. (1985). *Deep Ecology*. Salt Lake City: Peregrin Smith Books, pp. 66-67.

ecosystem as its home (Luke, 1997). From an ecocentric and deep ecological perspective, nature needs to be left to follow its 'natural' course without human intervention (Luke, 1997; Nash, 1989) or the intervention of invasive species that do not belong into a certain ecosystem (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013). Deep ecology then promises, if it is followed properly, a proclaimed improvement of quality of life for every member of the ecosystem as opposed to higher living standards (Næss, 2010). Trying to attain harmony with instead of dominance over nature also has destructive tendencies "[The] construction of reenchantment, mature selfhood, and Nature bear the birthmarks of modernity in its reconceptualization of the postmodern as primal premodernity [...] [It] mirrors Rosseau's confrontation with the Enlightment" (Luke, 1997, p. 19). The achievements of the Enlighment together with reason should be replaced by intuition and the voice of Nature (Luke, 1997).

In more practical terms, ecocentric groups such as Earth First and the Earth Liberation Front are focusing on the interconnectedness of nature in their mission statements. Together with deep ecology philosophers they base the higher goal of ecocentrism on anthropocentric terms, claiming that humans can never be truly healthy or living a fulfilled life in the absence of a healthy and well-functioning *Mother Earth* (Rosebraugh, 2004). Basing the higher goal of ecocentrism on anthropocentric terms is not only a way of gaining more support but actually in line with ecocentric and especially deep ecologist thought (Luke, 1997). Hence, ecocentrism is framed in similar terms as anthropocentrism with an appeal to the higher good of human security as the ultimate motivating factor. However, they do so on very different bases as this chapter is intended to show.

6.3   Security from What

With the health and balance of the ecosystem as the moral subject with the highest priority, the role of humans and other single entities is relative to its relationship with the ecosystem as the collective whole and the contribution the single entity brings to it (Lo, 2001). This framing translates into the antithesis of anthropocentrism but also in the rejection of biocentrism. In anthropocentrism, humans are assigned intrinsic value while non-human nature is only attributed with instrumental value. In the framing of ecocentrism above, the opposite is happening. In biocentrism the focus lies on the individual as opposed to the collective. In ecocentrism, however, the ecosystem as a

collective whole is of the highest moral priority and assigned intrinsic value. All other entities within the ecosystem, humans, non-human animal species, and non-living entities, are assessed in accordance to their instrumental worth to the ecosystem collective (Lo, 2001; Protopapadakis, 2014).

The major enemy from an ecocentric perspective are arguably humans. Pretty much the same arguments that anthropocentrists use to justify human superiority over non-human nature, also causes humans to be seen as the major threat for the ecosystem's balance. Some anthropocentrists argue, that due to humans' unique intellectual capabilities, such as the ability to reason, call for humans to be the most important moral subject (as has been discussed in Chapter 3.2 and 4). The same reasons though also make humans the sole moral agent, capable of reasoning and deliberating actions and consequences (Cochrane, 2012). As the only known moral agent, humans have a special obligation to keep the ecosystem in balance and to refrain from overexploitation (Halsey & White, 1998).

The role of indigenous people is, however, unclear. While they are also human and therefore also a part of the perceived problems, such as overpopulation, they are also sometimes pictured as living more in harmony with nature, especially by deep ecologists (Luke, 1997). However, there is also the counterargument that indigenous populations are often idealised and falsely seen as to live in harmony with nature while there are ample cases where they fail to see intrinsic value in non-human nature, are guilty of overusing ecosystem services, and even sell mining rights to capitalist corporations (Kopnina, 2012a, 2012c, 2019). While it might have been true at some point in the past that indigenous populations lived in harmony with nature, through modernisation, the influence of capitalism and population growth, even the activities of indigenous communities cannot and should not be idealized and doing so is actually a case of anthropocentric bias (Kopnina, 2012a, 2012c, 2019). However, the idealisation of pre-industrial society and indigenous people are a major aspect of ecocentric and deep ecology thinking as they are often romanticised as the pre-modern ideal of human life (Luke).

The threat is, as can be seen by the argument regarding indigenous populations, not coming from humans in general but the threat that humans pose is derived from capitalism, industrialisation, technology, and consumerism (Luke, 1997; Zimmerman, 1995). Humans nowadays do have a major impact on the environment, there is no denying that (NASA, n.d.). This is also something that can hardly be changed as it

is unlikely that humanity will go back to pre-industrial times and simply 'forget' about technological advancements. However, this is exactly what ecocentrism strives for, at least in its purest form. Some, however, see in human overpopulation the biggest threat and largely side-line criticism regarding human consumption and technology. This approach provides a fertile ground for ecofascism. So has the environmentally-oriented group called *Wandervögel* been easily absorbed by the Nazi ideology in Germany during the time of the Third Reich (Smith, 2003). Through the *blood and soil* doctrine a connection between the population and the land was emphasised and translated into national identity (Staudenmaier, 1996). "For a people seeking to assert themselves against an outside intruder, an 'ecologized' [homeland] in which they are biologically embedded can become a useful tool [..] against immigration, foreigners, and 'overpopulation'" (Biehl, 1996, p. 23).

6.4   By what means

Due to the correlation of increasing resource demand and urbanization (Seto, Parnell, & Elmqvist, 2013), ecocentrism in its more extreme form can demand for the rejection of human advancements, such as technological advances, increasing urbanisation, industrialisation, and consumerism (Linkola, 2009; Luke, 1997; Protopapadakis, 2014). Furthermore, the longer humanity waits to change according to ecocentric principles, the harsher the measures will have to be in order to save the biosphere from complete destruction (Zimmerman, 1995). Linkola (2009), for example, envisions a new post-modern life where modern advances are discouraged or banned in favour for a life perceived to be more in harmony with nature. No privately-owned cars, strictly rationed electricity use, regulated birth rates to not contribute to overpopulation, no immigration, no trade, living-of-the-land mentality, state-controlled manufacturing, all imposed by strong leaders (Linkola, 2009).

Instead of making such radical suggestions as Linkola in line with the *blood and soil* mentality, some ecocentric thinkers deem the *Nature Needs Half Movement* to be the best way to achieve the ecocentric goal of keeping the ecosystem in balance (Kopnina et al., 2018). Compared to more radical suggestions such as those proposed by Linkola, the Nature Needs Half Movement tries to strike a balance between modern-day living and ecocentric demands. Others, however, raise the issue that simply dividing the planet into two halves – one to be populated by humans and one for the sole enjoyment

of non-humans, will not be enough if humans keep "misbehaving" on their side (Büscher et al., 2017). So, declaring half of the terrestrial surface as protected non-human nature will not be enough without also regulating human behaviour in the human territories (Büscher et al., 2017; Kopnina et al., 2018). So, while the Nature Needs Half Movement is by no means as radical as other ideas, it still needs to arguably violate and regulate humans. The Nature Needs Half Movement works in two ways: First, it rips away half of the earth's surface for human population and second, it has to establish control mechanisms to ensure that humans do not venture too far of from ecocentric principles in their half of the planet (Büscher et al., 2017).

Apart from the two proposals of ecofascism and Nature Needs Half, ecocentric principles raise questions which would from an anthropocentric perspective be outrages to ask. With human overpopulation in mind, if faced with the choice between killing a human or a member of a rare species (non-human animal or plant species), the ethical thing to do would sacrifice the human so that the individual of the rare species may live (Lo, 2001). However, actively going out to hunt and kill humans as the culprits of ecosystem destructions is not advocated. This would also not make a lot of sense as the ones that would make the decision that humans need to be hunted and killed can only be other humans, as humans are the only moral agents capable of making such sophisticated decisions. So those advocating such an extreme would basically have to kill themselves and save the ecosystem by mass-suicide, which would be quite an absurd turn of events. However, while the decision between humans and non-human nature is not taken to such extremes, it is still made in favour of non-human nature and at the expense of humans. It is just less direct, with no call to direct action but by promoting indifference and inaction. Diseases such as AIDS are seen as nature's way to cleanse and to restore the balance, hence, they are framed as something good and to be welcomed and thus should not be cured (Smith, 2003). The same goes for famines, poverty, and other issues which cause the premature death of humans. Because the resulting population decline is viewed as something positive as it restores the ecosystem's balance and cures the earth of the perceived disease of human overpopulation, the real underlying causes (like colonialism) for issues such as poverty and famines are neither questioned nor tackled (Smith, 2003).

The majority of the earth's population is not human which should be acknowledged in terms of a social justice (ecojustice) movement which takes non-human nature's rights also into consideration. Furthermore, some argue that true democratic

thinking should abandon human supremacy ideologies and also account for non-human nature (Kopnina et al., 2018). This is indeed another way how the ecosystem can be protected from an ecocentric perspective and has already be done by the extension of rights to non-human nature. Those authors that put the idea forward see it as the continuation of a larger historical process of expanding the circle of rights bearers, as it was done before with children, women, people of colour, native Americans and the list goes on (Nash, 1989; Stone, 1972). To extend rights to a new group always seems unthinkable at first but marks an important step in changing how this group is perceived by the broad masses. Granting rights, however, does not mean that every rights bearer has to be treated the same way. Stone (1972) uses the example of capital punishment by saying that even though all humans are supposed to enjoy basic human rights, they can – at least in some countries - still be executed. So, granting rights to non-human nature would not automatically prohibit humans (or non-human animals) to use non-human nature for their means, such as cutting a tree to have fire wood (Stone, 1972). Even though the initial proposal for that was made by Stone in 1972, the idea has caught on: So has Ecuador as the first country officially acknowledged the rights of the whole of Ecuadorian non-human nature in its constitution in 2008 (Tanasescu, 2013). Bolivia has followed suit by granting "Mother Earth" legal rights similar to human rights (Vidal, 2011). Human legal rights have also been granted to Te Urewera forest (Environment Guide, 2017) and Whanganui river in New Zealand (Roy, 2017), Ganges and Yamuna rivers in India (Chandran, 2017), to the Amazon rainforest in Columbia (Schmidt, 2018), and to the ecosystem of Lake Erie in the United States (Kilbert & Cullen, 2019). This is just to name a few examples, the list goes on and shows a process that has been started by Stone in 1972 and is continuously increasing in impact in various countries across the globe (CELDF, 2019).

The methods embraced by ecocentric environmental groups, often publically denounced as radical environmentalists or ecoterrorists from an anthropocentric point of view will not be discussed here. Their situation, methods, and motivations, apart from the ideology that they embrace, is very similar to biocentric movements. Their methods such as ecotage (monkeywrenching), tree spiking and civil disobedience (Rosebraugh, 2004) have for the most part already been discussed in Chapter 5.4.

6.5   Conclusion

How does the security paradigm operate through the lens of ecocentrism?

Ecocentrism is a holistic environmental philosophy while anthropocentrism and biocentrism are individualistic. As such, ecocentrism focuses on the whole ecosystem as a collective as the moral subject. Thus, from an ecocentric perspective, it is the health and balance of the whole ecosystem that needs to be secured. For security to be able to operate it is important that it is defined what exactly is meant by ecosystem health and balance. A certain ideal state needs to be defined that has to be established and secured. Especially from a deep ecological perspective this ideal state is often an idealised and romanticised version of pre-modern times or indigenous communities living a hunter and gatherer lifestyle with as little of an impact as possible on the natural surroundings. With this idealised picture in mind, it is common for advocates and defenders of ecocentrism to claim that humans can neither be truly healthy nor life a fulfilled life as long as humans are alienated from non-human nature. This is actually an anthropocentric framing as it appeals to the higher end of human security as ultimate reason what ecocentrism should be embraced for. However, the execution of this anthropocentric ideal is very different from true anthropocentrism. As the whole ecosystem is seen as the moral subject and therefore also the subject of security, humans are only regarded in as much as just a part of the collective. Humans are, same as every other entity, evaluated in terms of their contribution to the ecosystem's health and balance and can be sacrificed for the greater good of the ecosystem, same as every other entity. In ecocentrism the collective trumps the individual. Same as it is the case in biocentrism, the enemy that ecocentrism faces is humans acting on anthropocentric ideals which results in the embrace of capitalism, industrialisation, technology, and consumerism. Those principles are in conflict with the ecocentric ideal of a simple life in harmony with *Mother Earth* while leaving the least impact on the planet as possible. Those ideals can be turned into ecofascist ideals where a special relationship between the land and the population is framed which can be used as the basis to reject immigration and frame foreigners as a threat. This also feeds well into the ecocentric perspective which sees human overpopulation as another major threat to the ecosystem's balance. Some ecocentric philosophers propose extreme means to reach the desired state which translates into a complete rejection of modern human life. Ecocentric organisations and activist groups, however, refrain from such extremes and

stick to very similar techniques as biocentric activists; mainly civil disobedience and ecotage directed at inanimate objects.

7   Discussion

As has been set out in Chapter 1.1, the main research question of this dissertation has been split into three sub-questions which have been tackled in the previous three chapters. The conclusion of Chapter 4, 5 and 6 provide a summary of the findings. Based on those findings the fourth sub-question will be answered in this chapter.

> To what extend is green violence enabled by the environmental ethics paradigms of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism when analysed from a security perspective?

Green violence can be enabled by all three environmental ethics paradigms, however, to a different extend and with different effects. Since the quote from Büscher & Fletcher (2018) in Chapter 1 provided the starting point for the conducted research, it will now be used for guidance to tackle the fourth sub-question. Büscher & Fletscher say that inquiries have to be made into the questions of "how and why [green] violence is practised, distributed, negated, and/or resisted, and with what effects on different actors" (p. 111).

Green violence is currently mainly enabled by the anthropocentric paradigm, simply because it is the predominate paradigm which is embraced by powerful actors such as nation states. It is arguably also the predominant paradigm in academia and therefore violence has mainly been investigated from an anthropocentric perspective (Washington et al., 2018). Authors, who have touched on this topic are for example Büscher & Ramutsindela (2016), Humphreys & Smith (2014), Lunstrum (2014), Marijnen & Verweijen (2016), White (2014). As this dissertation does not include any original field work but is built on other authors, it might not be able to contribute to a new, different or better understanding of the enabling of green violence from the anthropocentric paradigm.

The biocentric and ecocentric paradigms, however, have not been as intensely studied and the author believes that this dissertation can shed light onto a few interesting aspects. The major contribution thereby is probably the clear distinction between biocentric and ecocentric ethics. In many publications those terms are used interchangeably or with very similar meanings and are mainly used to say 'non-anthropocentric'. So even if a difference is made, it is often not done in-depth as the major focus lies on the discussion of 'anthropocentric' vs. 'non-anthropocentric' (Kopnina,

2012b; Luke, 1997; Norton, 1984). However, biocentrism and ecocentrism follow their own distinct dynamics and as such it is arguably important to treat them as two different entities with their own distinct qualities. From a biocentric perspective, green violence is generally condemned as humans are part of the moral community and therefore are also part of the protected community when the security paradigm works through biocentric environmental ethics. However, because the main threat to an ideal biocentric world is coming from anthropocentric practises as discussed in Chapter 5.3, humans who visibly embrace such practises could be expelled from the protective community. While most biocentric activists try to adhere to a ethos of non-violence against humans and try to focus on civil disobedience, an escalation into green violence could be in Clausewitz' terms 'a continuation of policy by other means', similar to what Humphreys & Smith (2011) explore. Green violence would then probably mainly be enabled by an increasing sense of urgency and the feeling of a failing cause as discussed in Chapter 5.4. Another thought that has briefly been discussed in Chapter 4 is the possibility that behind anthropocentric forms of green violence are biocentric enablers. Because of a lack of powerful biocentric institutions capable of enforcing their philosophy, biocentric organisations might try to anthropocentric principles to further their goals. An example for this could be the poachers-as-terrorists narrative mentioned in Chapter 4.2. Furthermore, biocentrism provides a fertile ground for violent action against humans because biocentrism's focus on the individual allows for parallels to be drawn from human torture and the murder of humans to animal torture and animal murder (B. Taylor, 2004).

Ecocentrism presents an entirely different case opposed to anthropocentrism and biocentrism due to its holistic nature. Because humans are only indirectly part of the security referent object and because the collective always trumps the individual and because humans are evaluated in terms of their contributions to the ecosystem, ecocentrism arguably works as a strong enabler for green violence. However, it enables a different form of violence than anthropocentrism and biocentrism. Unlike the other two paradigms, ecocentrism enables violence in the form of inaction. Because human overpopulation is seen as a threat to the ecosystem and because the ecosystem is seen as a kind of self-regulating organism, threats to humans such as diseases can be welcomed. Ecocentrism, therefore, would not inspire active killing, however, inaction is also a form of violence if it causes widespread death due to untreated diseases. Also, in terms of non-kinetic violence, ecocentrism seems to enable more drastic measures than the other two

paradigms. As has been discussed in Chapter 6.3 and 6.4, ecocentrism is strictly opposed to modern human advancements. To micromanage such a drastic change from the current human society to some form of pre-modern, primal stage would require strict policing of almost every aspect of human life. Hence, the dissertation author would argue that ecocentrism is the most radical enabler of green violence and more dangerous to humans than anthropocentric or biocentric green violence. While violence against humans is an extraordinary measure from the perspective of anthropocentrism and biocentrism, this is not the case in ecocentrism.

8   Conclusion

The overarching research question has been split up into four sub-questions which have all been addressed in the previous chapters. Now based on the answers to those sub-questions will the overarching research question be answered with a brief summary of the findings.

> How does the security paradigm operate through the three environmental ethics paradigms and to what extend is green violence enabled by them?

From an anthropocentric and biocentric perspective, humans are part of the referent object of security (*security of what*) and are thereby part of the protected community. Ecocentrism, on the other hand, only evaluates humans in terms of their contribution to the ecosystem's health. In ecocentrism, the balance of the ecosystem is the ultimate referent object which creates an environment where the collective always trumps the individual. Because humans are part of the protected community in anthropocentrism and biocentrism, both paradigms see violence against humans to protect non-human nature as an extraordinary measure. In anthropocentrism it is therefore necessary to ascribe a significant instrumental value to the non-human nature entity that is to be violently protected against humans. The ascribed instrumental value is thereby often framed in terms of national, international, or human security as the instrumental must contribute to some higher goal which is able to trump the protection of the humans against which violence should be conducted (*security for what*).

In biocentrism, all living beings included in the protective community enjoy equal value and therefore neither humans nor non-humans should be harmed. The threat is posed by anthropocentric practises which are in direct conflict with biocentric ideals (*security from what*). While biocentric means are, in accordance with biocentric ideals, for the most part non-violent against living beings, the emphasis on species egalitarianism also invites for parallels to be drawn between human killings and torture and non-human killings and torture. If the framing of such parallels is successful, biocentrism could enable violent means against the human offenders. Also the increased feeling of a failed biocentric mission can result in a 'continuation of policy by other means' in Clausewitz terms and legitimate biocentric activists to fight with violent means against those humans who stand between them and their goal of animal liberation. Furthermore, with an increased acceptance of biocentric ideals in the global population, a new form of

biocentric biopower might evolve which shapes human behaviour according to biocentric ideals. Anthropocentric marketisation and spectacularisation as discussed in Chapter 4.4 could also feed into the emergence of such a form of biopower. However, whether such a form of biocentric biopower as briefly outlined in Chapter 5.4 is more than just informed speculation, can also be said once further analysis into the matter has been conducted.

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, currently the main enabler of green violence is anthropocentrism due to it being the dominant and almost universally accepted ethical approach, deeply rooted in historical memories and religion (see Nash, 1989). Because ecocentrism is so radically different from the current predominant paradigm of anthropocentrism, it is rather unlikely that ecocentrism will enable serious instances of green violence in the immediate future. However, as history has demonstrated with the blood and soil doctrine, extreme ecocentric philosophies can be instrumentalised and misused on the national level in the form of ecofascism even without a global paradigm shift (Smith, 2003). Even though ecocentrism is from the current point of view unlikely to use its full potential as green violence enabler, it has been argued in Chapter 7 that ecocentrism does provide the most fertile ground for kinetic and non-kinetic green violence on a mass scale. While biocentrism does not aspire to the same extremes as ecocentrism, it is not unlikely that biocentrism inspired green violence will slowly gain momentum either as a global paradigm shift or because it instrumentalises anthropocentric principles for its own goals (see Chapter 4).

8.1 Limitations

It is not to say that the analysis and conceptualisation of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism proposed and presented in this dissertation have some kind of universal claim. It is highly likely that some authors might disagree with some aspects and conceptualise the three paradigms differently, especially considering that there is no clear universal line of agreement in environmental ethics. However, this dissertation aims to start the conversation from a security lens which it arguably has succeeded to do. Due to the broad nature of the topic which tried to combine five different entities (three environmental ethics paradigms, the security paradigm and green violence) into one rather short piece of writing did not allow for a more in-depth analysis.

8.2 Further Research

The dissertation opens up many new questions and areas which would be interesting for further analysis. For example, B. Taylor (2000) argues that there is a big discrepancy between deep ecology literature and deep ecology activists when it comes to their understanding of deep ecology. While Taylor's observations have been made almost twenty years ago, they still serve as a reminder that arguments cannot be solely build on the picture that philosophers draw in their writings. Instead, it is necessary to look more closely at activists and biocentric and ecocentric movements to conceptualize what they believe in and what they are doing and then see how similar or different it is from the original philosophical works that initially inspired those activists and movements. Furthermore, during the course of the dissertation the term *extraordinary measures* has been mentioned multiple times. This is an invitation into further analysis of the dissertation's broad conceptualisation with regard to securitization theory and the securing of the – speechless? – body of non-human nature. As another area of interest, the idea of a biocentric form of biopower has been mentioned a few times which might open up interesting new possibilities for further inquiries.

9   References

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