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# **The Economic Warfare of the European Union against Russia:**

## **An Assessment of the Political Effects**

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## **Abstract**

This research intercepts the need for a more in dept study of sanctions' effectiveness. While the US are well studied upon, the EU does not manage to obtain the same amount of academic attention. With the importance of the EU as economic and global actor, the way they adopt economy as a weapon must be investigated. This study aims at tackling this vacancy while further investing in the literature of the effectiveness of economic sanctions.

## *Keywords*

*European Union, Economic Warfare, Sanctions, Russia, Ukraine, Policies, Public statements*

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## 1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is an economic superpower. Its member states gather a total GDP of \$15.29 trillion (World Bank, 2020). This makes the Union the third biggest economy worldwide. Though, one of the main areas in which the EU comes short of tools is foreign policy (Eckes, 2019). Despite the years-long efforts of having a sole voice in its external relations, the EU's member states still did not manage to find an agreement on the matter, and instead of a political union with a Minister for Foreign Affairs, European citizens, are still represented by High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is limited in its functions by other EU bodies and the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997). Because of the strong links with national authorities, the capabilities of the EU in foreign policy, when acting on its own are limited and often constrained by both structural, political, and institutional limitations that are inherent to how the body works, the dynamics of European interstate politics, and different interests within the EU member states. Consequently, because of the importance the EU bears in relevance to its commercial partners, and its military weakness, economic warfare assumes for the Union a prime importance as foreign policy tool.

For this reason, this dissertation aims at understanding how well the EU manages to impose sanctions, what measures it prefers, what makes them effective or not vis a vis their most aggressive neighbour: Russia. The main purpose of this study falls in contributing to the literature of economic sanctions' successfulness, putting a special attention to Europe and the EU, an actor which is overlooked in comparison to others like the United States (US) in this sphere. This analysis will be conducted with the intention of investigating *how effective were EU sanctions in achieving their political goals vis a vis the Russian Federation*. The perfect fit for the research was investigating the current breach of sovereignty that the Russian Federation

imposed on Ukraine, and the answer of the EU. To delve into this research, the author will approach the inquiry with qualitative methods, arguing that the restrictive measures adopted found a degree of efficacy which is barely effective. This study case offers its contribution to the general literature that aims at investigating the successfulness of sanctions. However, the conclusions drafted here allow us to go further with the inquiry, inferring some of the common elements that made the case analysed obtain that score.

To address these points, the present dissertation will be structured as follows. The second chapter will aim at illustrating the background and literature relevant to this research. Subsequently, chapter three will cover the research design and methodology, the fourth will be presenting the data and its analysis, and the fifth and sixth the discussion and the conclusions respectively.

## **2. Background and literature**

Economic sanctions are among the most popular foreign policy tools in terms of coercion (Hufbauer et al., 2007). The European Union does not deviate from this trend. It is through them that the organisation often pushes other countries to “incorporate into their own repertoire the European principled way to behave” (Ferreira-Pereira, 2012). In addition, international relations are facing a tendency in which ‘total’ wars become more and more unacceptable, and are found to be extremely costly both politically and economically. Because of that, wars are becoming a last resort tool for the foreign policy of democracies.

As it was imagined by Wilson, this tool was described as

*“An absolute isolation [...] that brings a nation to its senses just as suffocation removes from the individual all inclinations to fight. [...] Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside*

*of the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon that nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist”*(Wilson, 1919).

The characteristic of absolute isolation is not always true as will be seen in the next section. However, the virtually null human costs they have outside of the sanctions’ target make economic warfare tools appealing to heads of state that are responding to home audiences(McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017). As a consequence, in a world where most countries are democracies, economic coercion became the new normality of conducting war (Hagemeyer-Witzleb, 2021). In parallel, the continent where the two world wars originated, Europe, became one of the most peaceful ones in the last decades. Anyhow, two main blocks continue to be rivals in Europe in several areas of competition (soft power, economic unions, visions of the world, geopolitics).

This dissertation interrelates these features and trends of the contemporary international system, focusing on the effects of the economic warfare of the EU against the Russian Federation over the territorial disputes in Ukraine. To do so, chapter 2.1 will report the most accepted definitions of economic warfare and its typologies. This is done to clarify what this tool can encompass, beyond its current application over the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. That section will also provide the framework that allows for the identification of the single stages of economic warfare of the EU into narrower names and classifications which are going to be summarised in section 2.1.1. Chapter 2.2 will examine the current literature on the effectiveness of economic coercive means and the variables the effectiveness of those depends on.

## **2.1 Definition of Economic Warfare**

One of the most accurate definitions of economic warfare is provided by the *Encyclopedia Britannica* which defines the term as “the use of, or the threat to use, economic means against a country to weaken its economy and thereby reduce its political a military power” (Shambaugh, 2002) The weakening of a

foreign economy can be achieved in several ways, the most common of which will be listed in the following subsection. Including not only the means but also the threat of its use might seem unusual, but it is common in the literature of deterrence and coercive diplomacy, within which economic warfare can be inscribed (Levy, 2008). Relevant literature differs in defining economic warfare as a broader category in which economic sanctions belong. Economic warfare is intended as a mean that “seeks to weaken an adversary’s aggregate economic potential to weaken its military capabilities, either in a peacetime arms race or in an ongoing war” and “does not seek to coerce the target by inflicting economic pain” (Pape, 1997) Conversely, economic sanctions “seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to change its political behaviour” (Pape, 1997). The European Union, however, uses none of these terms when speaking about its coercive actions. The term that appears on the official sites is ‘restrictive measures (sanctions)’ explained as “An essential tool through which the EU can intervene where necessary to prevent conflict or respond to emerging or current crises” (European Commission, n.d.).

The choice of the term economic warfare, in contrast with part of the literature, comes from merging the need for a broader term than just sanctions and making evident the political goal of the European Union of ending the invasion and occupation of a sovereign state: Ukraine. This decision has been made as the action of the European Union against Russia goes further than just sanctioning imported goods that come from the Russian Federation and because of their proclaimed political goal (European Commission, 2022).

All in all, this paper will rely on the recurrent characteristics of economic warfare that allow us to consider what the European Union is doing against Russia as such. Economic warfare implies “the use of economic weapons for strategic purposes” (Shubik and Verkerke, 1989, p.482) as well as “an intense,



coercive disturbance of the economy of an adversary state, aimed at diminishing its power” (Førland, 1993: 151).

### **2.1.1 Popularity and Typologies of Economic Warfare**

As stated above, sanctions have been designed as a foreign policy tool after the end of the Great war. In addition, their popularity on the international stage has been further increasing in the last half century (Felbermayr et al., 2020). This appears to be a common trend among all the most frequently employed types of sanctions (Felbermayr et al., 2020). The Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) allows identifying two more trends. The use of sanctions has steadily included both more sender and receiver states and the United States and the European Union increased their use of this coercive policy tool since the end of the Cold War and are accounting for around 60% of the world sanctions in 2019<sup>1</sup> (Kirilakha et al., 2021, pp.19–20). In particular, the European Union witnessed a substantial increase in the share of total sanctions as it accounted for only 3.1% as of 2005 (Morgan et al., 2014, p.545).

This paper will adopt the division in typologies proposed by the European Union. According to their vocabulary, economic warfare in EU treaties includes arms embargos, restrictions on admission, freezing of assets, and economic sanctions (Council of the European Union, 2022b).

While the precise wording might differ along the literature on the subject, the division in these categories seems consistent. Arms embargos fall within the wider category of ‘exports controls’ (Morgan et al., 2014), ‘exports restrictions’ (Jeong, 2019), ‘export sanctions’ or ‘arms sanctions’ (Felbermayr et al., 2020), or even more widely ‘blockades’(Førland, 1993).

Similarly, restrictions on admission are often addressed as ‘travel sanctions’ (Felbermayr et al., 2020: 2) or ‘travel bans’ (Morgan et al., 2014: 543).

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<sup>1</sup> 2019 is the last year included in the dataset.

According to the EU's definition, the "targeted persons cannot enter the EU, or travel beyond their member state of nationality if they are an EU citizen" (Council of the European Union, 2022b).

The freezing of assets sometimes retains the same terminology (Council of the European Union, 2022b; Morgan et al., 2014; Kirilakha et al., 2021), or simply are presented with an inversion of the order of the words in 'assets freeze' (Jeong, 2019). The official definition of the Council reads that when an entity faces freezing of their assets 'all their assets in the EU are frozen and EU persons and entities cannot make any funds available to those listed' (Council of the European Union, 2022b)

Finally, economic sanctions are described by the Council of the European Union as "restrictions concerning specific sectors of economic activity, including import or export bans on certain goods, investment bans, prohibitions on supplying certain services etc" (Council of the European Union, 2022b). Then, it is used as a general term, to involve the typologies not covered by the others. The literature uses this term often, as interchangeable for 'economic warfare' (van Bergeijk and van Marrewijkb, 1995; Early and Bryan, 2015). In what regard datasets, 'others' are more effectively used to comprise tools beyond the ones listed (Morgan et al., 2014; Felbermayr et al., 2020; Kirilakha et al., 2021).

## **2.2 Effectiveness of sanctions**

The increasingly high popularity of sanctions that we discovered in section 2.1.1 can derive from several reasons. However, as the imposition of economic sanctions, or any kind of economic warfare is political, their effectiveness is not necessarily a reason. In this section, it will be analysed the reasoning behind the imposition of economic sanctions as well as their effectiveness. Some claim that a "sender-biased interpretation of sanctions effectiveness"

exists (Peksen, 2019b). Anyway, it is a popular belief that sanctions can influence the behaviour of the leaders of target states by denying them access to resources and impacting the wealth of their population and the establishment that supports them (Galtung 1967; Renwick 1981; Lindsay 1986; Nossal 1989). More recent literature has though challenged the real efficiencies of said sanctions (Pape, 1997). In particular, some have highlighted the domestic political costs of imposing sanctions (Allen, 2008). Furthermore, it has been noted how “the current understanding of sanctions effectiveness discounts the strong possibility that economic sanctions are counterproductive measures in the context of some crises by making a situation worse” (Peksen, 2019b). Even besides that, “major negative externalities of sanctions have regularly been disregarded by the research” (Peksen, 2019b).

#### 2.2.1 The meaning of effectiveness

While this issue is not vastly present in the literature, it is important to dedicate a short section to explaining what we mean by effectiveness. Because the meaning of this word may change in the mother language of the readers, it will be here clarified how is used within this dissertation. The most common misunderstanding comes from confusing effectiveness and efficiency. This misinterpretation is also present in the literature (Pala, 2021) 244. The word efficient would better be used to describe the proportion in which something, in this case, the sanctions, works in comparison to the costs it brings about. By contrast, the term effective is preferred to refer to the degree to which something is successful or achieving the results desired (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). In conclusion, the term ‘effective sanctions’ will be used with the meaning of ‘successful sanctions’ as it aligns with most of the literature on the topic (Pala, 2021) 244. A successful outcome is characterised by the sender country realise its policy goals partly or entirely thanks to a

substantial or decisive contribution of the imposition of sanctions (PIIE, 2016; Hufbauer et al., 2007) 49-50.

### 2.2.2 Supporting and questioning the effectiveness

Part of the literature supports the effectiveness of sanctions. It is argued that sanctions work at least sometimes (Hufbauer et al., 2007). However, the effectiveness of economic sanctions in sheer numbers is disputed. The most notable example of this lies in the debate between Hufbauer et al. and Pape, where the assessed effectiveness of sanctions ranges between 34% and less than 5% (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Pape, 1997, 1998). Nevertheless, the system used to count sanctions and whether they were effective was deemed flawed because of selection biases (Blake and Klemm, 2006), the few cases they studied, and more importantly not taking into account the threat of sanctions but only their fruitfulness once applied (Drezner, 2003). More recent databases revived the debate over the efficacy of sanctions. Papers based on the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset judge economic sanctions to work between 27.2% and 37.5% of the time to obtain total or partial quiescence from the target state (Morgan et al., 2014). In parallel, papers based on other datasets such as the global sanctions database find reinforcing evidence that the effectiveness of sanctions scores around 30% (Kirilakha et al., 2021; Felbermayr et al., 2020). This research has proven more reliable than the previous ones as they take into account noticeably more cases, and also the threat of sanctions among other variables (Felbermayr et al., 2020; Kirilakha et al., 2021; Morgan et al., 2014). Along all the literature there is agreement mostly on the fact that sanctions are always preferable to military interventions, even if little agreement is found on their effectiveness (Smeets, 2018).

Indeed, on the opposite side of the spectrum, a substantial part of the literature opposes the view that economic sanctions are an effective policy tool. It is

argued that the most common drawback of using sanctions is the risk of “noticeably larger losses on the part of the sanctioning state than on the part of the sanctioned one” (Pala, 2021) 249. Additionally, analyses concluded that sanctions are more likely implemented when they are less likely to succeed (Blake and Klemm, 2006).

On the other hand, a more constructive approach is offered by the research when it tries to identify the limitations of the sanctions. Some authors found that the public opinion of a receiving country is likely to support concessions only in the most severe hardships are imposed on them like in the case of comprehensive boycotts and when the sender is perceived as a strategically vital ally; such conditions are extremely unlikely (Grossman et al., 2018). Other critics underline the challenge of designing effective sanctions given that they depend on several multifaced factors. The more important ones lie within the political preference, economic wealth, ties to the sender and receiver, and more historical and cultural aspects of the single elements of public opinion (Frye, 2019). This is particularly relevant for our subject of study: the Russian Federation. In fact, countries with “certain forms of absolutist or authoritarian regimes” are more likely to present ‘rally around the flag effects’(Pala, 2021) 249. The population of such countries is indeed not known to follow the logic of numbers but rather the rule of honour, nationalism, identity, and religion (Pala, 2021). For some cultures, it is more important to hold onto those values rather than obtaining higher economic or living standards. Bearing in mind the example of Russia, in the literature, it is highlighted how these populations are often found in nations with strong historical and conservative traditions or which have faced economic scarcity and have been intensely exposed to ideologies like socialism or communism (Kaempfer et al., 2004). It follows that the reason for imposing economic sanctions on such countries must not lay in their effectiveness (Pape, 1997).

Further conditions that help the effectiveness of economic sanctions are that target states face high political costs for non-compliance and at the same time political costs for changing behaviour are low; this is often found when the political autonomy of the leaders is low, therefore in countries where there is the highest control over the mandate of the executive (Blanchard and Ripsman, 1999). Democracies are found to be the most successful senders of sanctions as “the more democratic a sender of economic sanctions is, the more likely is the success of a sanction threat relative to imposed sanctions – indicating the role of domestic audience cost in determining the relative effectiveness of threats” (Walentek et al., 2021) 443. Similarly, the political characteristics and the level of democratisation of the target state influence the duration of the sanctions regime; the more centralised and concentrated the power is, the easier it is for a state to resist the sanctions, extending their duration (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000). Moreover, it is argued that the threat or the effective termination of foreign aid is among the most effective forms of sanctions (Jeong, 2019). The reason lies behind the fact that these sanctions hurt particularly essential elites and crucial supporters which the government is likely to depend on. However, the effectiveness of sanctions stops depending on their type over time, as the state adjusts to them (Jeong, 2019). The best chance to impose successful sanctions does not lay in their number but rather in their strength (Whang, 2010). Hence, in order to obtain the best results with economic sanctions sender states should implement them “quickly and decisively before targets find effective measures to evade sanctions costs” and “attempt to reinforce the coercive power of sanctions by gradually adding moderate measures” (Jeong, 2019) 242. On the other hand, a gradual increase in the sanctions allows the receiver state to adapt to such measures (Hufbauer et al., 2007). This means that after a certain point, economic sanctions have diminishing returns (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Jeong, 2019). This is particularly true against countries that are rivals or neutral to the sender state (Whang, 2010).

Another relevant factor in determining the effectiveness of economic sanctions can be found in their timing. Unfortunately, how long the sanctions last is a relatively uncovered area of analysis (McGillivray and Stam, 2004) 157. Anyway, studies reveal how the most effective sanctions are imposed when there is the opening of a political regime, which reduces the duration of sanctions drastically (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000). By contrast, change of leadership in democratic states being the sender or receiver does not influence the duration of the sanctions (McGillivray and Stam, 2004). Relevant literature on this front attests that “imposing sanctions for too long may only bring about unnecessary costs for both the sender and the target without increasing the probability of compliance”, arguing that sanctions should stay in place only for a limited number of years (van Bergeijk and van Marrewijkb, 1995) 85. At the same time, most sanctions need two years or more to be effective (van Bergeijk and van Marrewijkb, 1995). However, this lower limit result might be faulted because of a selection effect as obtained through a limited dataset (Hufbauer et al., 2007) and does not discount the challenge that states face at the beginning of disputes in signalling their commitment (Wolford et al., 2011). When taking into account the practice, the average duration of a regime of sanctions scored 6.3 years between 1950 and 2019 (Bhusari et al., 2022; Felbermayr et al., 2020).

Unsurprisingly, the kind of relation sender and receiver states have impacts fundamentally the effectiveness of sanctions (Whang, 2010). Recent research shows that “the further the sender and the target are from one another on the diplomatic network, the less effective sanction threats are relative to imposed sanctions, pointing to the role of uncertainty” (Walentek et al., 2021) 443. More specifically, it has been discovered that countries are less likely to comply with the requests of sender states if they are non-allied or rivals compared to when they have positive economic and political relations (Drezner, 2003; Whang, 2010; Hufbauer et al., 2007). This might lead to think that the economic dependence of the receiver on the sender and the

expectation of them to be more likely to impose sanctions if they are rivals would play a role. On the contrary, both these claims have been countered by the research (Peksen, 2019b; Whang, 2010; Bapat and Kwon, 2014; Jeong, 2019). Moreover, it has been highlighted how the results on the matter are often counterintuitive as "the non-allied targets are usually unimpressed by the fact that the sender is resolute and willing to continue sanctions" (Whang, 2010) 572. A rational explanation that has been proposed for this behaviour is that "because non-allied targets have more opportunities to receive profitable aid and engage in trade with a greater number of actual and potential partners than allied targets", they are the ones less likely to be compliant with the threat or imposition of economic sanctions (Whang, 2010) 572.

Finally, the utilisation of targeted or 'smart' sanctions has gained popularity in the past two decades (Peksen, 2019b). Targeted sanctions were designed in the late 1990s when the negative externalities of comprehensive sanctions became apparent (Drezner, 2011) 96. They can comprise asset freezes, financial restrictions on international banking activity, denial of specific good sales such as luxurious items, sectoral sanctions among which arm embargoes and restrictions on dual-use technology, as well as travel restrictions (Peksen, 2019b). They "do not target civilian populations, but they can influence leaders" (Park and Choi, 2022) 446. According to preliminary research, they solve both the problems of 'doing something' when a target state misbehaves and lowering the negative home-oriented externalities of impeding trade flows, having a minimal cost for the sender (Drezner, 2011) 104. Some externalities, even if somewhat mitigated, remain present in receiver states, even when using targeted sanctions (Eriksson, 2016). The most crucial of those is an augmentation of corruption, criminality, and authoritarian rule, among other humanitarian issues (Eriksson, 2016; Biersteker et al., 2016). Interestingly, "effective sanctions episodes include the application of at least three types of targeted measures simultaneously. The most common



combination includes an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze” (Biersteker et al., 2018) 408.

Surprisingly, even though they are becoming increasingly popular, there is little proof of their effectiveness in comparison to conventional or comprehensive sanctions (Tostensen and Bull, 2002; Eriksson, 2016; Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2015; Drezner, 2011; Biersteker et al., 2018, 2016; Peksen, 2019b; Park and Choi, 2022). The databases that studied the effectiveness of UN- designed targeted sanctions found that they are effective in 22% of the cases (Biersteker et al., 2018) 408. This compares poorly with the datasets mentioned above, which consider all types of sanctions. As it has been seen, the TIES and the Global Sanctions Database (GSDB) find economic sanctions to be effective significantly more, from 22% of targeted sanctions to around 35% of sanctions in general (Kirilakha et al., 2021; Morgan et al., 2014; Biersteker et al., 2018). A relevant exception to the relative inefficacy of targeted sanctions is offered financial sanctions. According to the research, they peak in effectiveness, being successful in almost 41% of the cases (Rosenberg et al., 2016).

In conclusion, the ideal sanction sender happens then to be a country that holds the geopolitical upper hand is a superpower and thrives economically (Hufbauer et al., 2007). In this debate arises three main challenges in assessing the effectiveness of economic sanctions. The first comes from the unpredictability of the outcomes of wars, and ultimately of the political élites(Whang, 2010). Following this, it is challenging to measure the impact of the sender’s sanctions vis à vis the receiver state (Pala, 2021) 243. Finally, as it has been duly noted, each threat or event of sanctions happens in a very specific international and historical context, rendering comparison extremely complicated (Peksen, 2019b; Hufbauer et al., 2007; Panhwar et al., 2017).

### 2.2.3 Economic Sanctions in Autocratic States

The effectiveness of sanctions is dependent on several factors, as has been explained. Beyond the identity of the population, typology of sanctions, and their timing, we have seen how regime types are differently affected by sanctions (Blanchard and Ripsman, 1999). This section, it will be provided with an overview of the effects that sanctions can have on autocratic states.

Because this study is aimed at analysing the effort of the European Union against the Russian Federation, it is crucial to underline what the literature says about the imposition of sanctions on autocratic states. In fact, the Russian Federation led by President Vladimir Putin is considered an autocracy (Hassner, 2008).

Along the literature, it has been proven that the imposition of sanctions regimes is likely to reduce the political freedoms in target countries (Peksen, 2019a; Adam and Tsarsitalidou, 2019; Peksen, 2019b; Allen, 2008). It could be argued this happens because “to date, no technical review mechanisms to monitor humanitarian repercussions have been included in a sanctions package” (Tostensen and Bull, 2002) 381. In autocratic states, “many governments clamp down on public expression under sanctions, and this curtailment is accepted by the people who are fearful of the outside threat” (Allen, 2008). This is explained by the author through “the added risk of repression under sanctions” which sums to the fact that “average citizens in these states are already unlikely to engage in antigovernment[al] activity”(Allen, 2008). As a result, “successful sanctions regimes might help resolve the issue under dispute in the short term. But they might still lead to longer-term consequences for targets by instigating economic and political instability, poor governance, and widespread crime and illicit activities” (Peksen, 2019b). This feature is dangerously linked to both conventional and targeted sanction regimes, showing that economic warfare can be said to cause

more state repression in the receiving countries (Peksen, 2019a; Adam and Tsarsitalidou, 2019; Eriksson, 2016; Wood, 2008; Kaempfer et al., 2004). One of the aims of the sanctions is sometimes a regime change, however, while “it is apparent that sanctions can lead to an increase in mass political action, [...] that increase seems to be limited in autocratic states. Only in states with some degree of political openness and opportunity do sanctions increase the willingness of the public to take antigovernment action” (Allen, 2008). Therefore, while having negative variable economic externalities on the sender states, depending on the extension and width of the market involved, sanctions for target countries have greater implications. For them, evidence “shows that economic sanctions often lead to adverse economic conditions, poverty, political repression, societal violence, and systematic discrimination against citizens and that disadvantaged segments of society and opposition groups tend to disproportionately bear the burden of these negative effects” (Peksen, 2019b). This means the European Union should be careful when undertaking coercive measures such as sanctions, not only because of the negative externalities they have on the home businesses but also because of the long-term implications in terms of economic and political stability in the target states, which might bring about other, difficult to predict issues (Peksen, 2019b).

### **3. Research Design and Methodology**

This chapter is dedicated to presenting the research design and methodology of the research. This dissertation aims at assessing whether the actions of economic warfare of the European Union against the Russian Federation are obtaining the purpose for which they were undertaken. Secondly, this thesis will propose an analysis of what political implications these sets ‘restrictive measures’ carried in both the EU and the Russian Federation. Specifically, the research question that will be addressed is: ‘How effective were EU sanctions in achieving their political goals vis a vis the Russian Federation?’ To answer

the research questions, that are at the forefront of the literature on economic sanctions of the EU, this thesis utilises the case study as the core methodology. In addition, this analysis will allow us to understand what are the conjunctions that make the imposition of sanctions more or less likely to be successful, drawing a parallel with the case study selected in section 3.2.

First, this section will explain the main features of the selected research design and how it fits the research question proposed, discussing the philosophical implications. Following, the arguments in support of the selection of that specific case study will be offered. Third, the analytical methods will be explained. Finally, the last section will highlight the possible shortcomings and limitations of the research which can stem from philosophical as well as practical complications.

### **3.1 Research design**

The current research is based on a qualitative study, which adopts a case study design. This section will therefore provide the framework for discussing the handling the European Union had of the military operations of its neighbour: the Russian Federation.

For deciding the best approach to the study of this matter, Yin's parameters were followed. Fitting his discourse on the categories of research design, three main criteria should be met to select the case study approach (Yin, 2018) 9. They constitute the same key features that make the case study the preferable research design for this dissertation. In their book, Yin (Yin, 2018) 9 argues that case study research is better suited when the research question or questions begin with 'how' or 'why'. Moreover, the research should regard "a contemporary set of events [...] over which the researcher has little or no control" (Yin, 2018) 13.

In fact, in order to assess political reaction that the imposition of the coercive measures that the European Union has imposed on the Russian Federation received and consequently their effectiveness, a 'how' question was deemed the most appropriate. The secondary aim of this research lies in finding the motivations that led the EU into resolving to that tool of foreign policy. Consequently, a 'why' question was selected for the secondary research question. Therefore, given the form of questions, this dissertation is resolved to answer, this research design has been found the most suitable. Second, at the time of writing, nothing sounds more 'current' than a debate over the utilisation of economic warfare as a foreign policy measure, in particular for what concerns the EU and Russia. The selection of this specific set of events perfectly fits the way Yin conceives this word, pertaining not just to the present, but also to the recent past that seamlessly connects to it (Yin, 2018) 12. It seems safe to state how the set of coercive measures and disputes between the two actors still have implications to this day, and even do not cease to continue. Thus, they are worth the given attention for research as they influence the current policies of several actors, some of which have a global outreach, and shape the lives of the citizens of European states. Third and last, it is out of the question how the author of this research has no influence or control over the events. What is being studied has already been approved and implemented by the relevant institutions. What is analysed pertains at the period anterior to the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 2022. In light of this, the third criterion is also met, as the circumstances taken into account have had already happened (Yin, 2018) 13. Hence, having met the three criteria mentioned above, it can be deduced that the best approach to answer the research questions provided is to use a case study methodology.

However, a brief digression to explain what a case study is. The typical case study can "be considered a representative case, according to the terms of whatever cross-case model is employed" which has focus on an exemplificative constant cross-case relationship. (Seawright and Gerring,

2008) 299. Moreover, case study-based research has been defined as “a systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest” (Bromley, 1990) 299.

Another reason to opt for this type of approach comes from the higher degree of flexibility it allows for what regards the researcher’s political beliefs and vision of the world (Ragin, 1999). It should also be recognised how this methodology permits to account for a series of events that can be inscribed within the same case study, a perfect example of which are the sanctions of the European Union on Russia, which are divided into several episodes but all in the same framework (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). According to more relevant literature, as long as the author keeps internal coherence in their piece between method and epistemology; this allows for this research approach to be based on a variety of epistemologies (Takahashi and Araujo, 2019; Yin, 2018). What is more, this research methodology permits even more versatility: it does not require the researcher to stick to a particular technique for the collection of data and the interpretation of such information (Takahashi and Araujo, 2019). While stressing the versatility of this methodology and describing case studies as “all-encompassing” the most attention has been given to the postpositivist and constructivist stances (Yin, 2018) 16. The most notable representers of these two stances are Yin and Stake, which oppose each other in advocating in favour of these two approaches (Yin, 2018; Stake, 2008).

Because of the author’s views, this paper will be leaning towards the approach of critical realism. This approach is a form of post-positivism (Trochim, 2022). Even if it is not the most common method in modern-day research, it is found valid and should not be discounted for both deductive research and social sciences (Shanks, 2002; Panhwar et al., 2017). Postpositivist researchers believe that, for what concerns epistemology, “knowledge is perceived as being both socially constructed and an objectively verifiable” (Holliday and Macdonald, 2020) 629. In this view, the researcher is detached and neutral

from what is being observed, through their observation they will try to understand and gauge complex and real-life social phenomena, retaining their main characteristics (Boblin et al., 2013) 1269. However, when adopting a critical realism view, the author admits some features of constructivism in epistemology since “knowledge is a social product, which is not independent of those who produce it” (Bhaskar, 1975) 21.

On the other hand, this approach observes the world as a realist does (Yucel, 2018). As regards ontology, the postpositivist approaches such as critical realism envision the world as ordered and ruled by scientific and social laws; reality becomes, no matter how complex, objectively describable and often predictable (Holliday and Macdonald, 2020) 622-623. Finally, causal nexuses can be developed in two ways: to guide the research and as a result of the findings (Yin, 2018). All in all, critical realism means that while the reality is objective, our knowledge remains a social construct, bound to how we are educated. These ontological and epistemological assumptions are in line with the subject of this research. This can be explicated as the sanctions that are in place are a reality that leaves little room for debate and similarly for the results and response they get. However, this reality, and the political and economic implications they bring about, while factual, are described and divided in the categories humans constructed and defined arbitrarily, as the literature review has shown. Some examples of this regard regime type, different forms of economic warfare, their consequences, the definition of the terms used, and the morality of the policies analysed.

### **3.2 Case selection**

The case selected is the set of sanctions that the European Union has imposed on the Russian Federation since their occupation of Crimea on the 20<sup>th</sup> of February 2014. This set of sanctions faced an incrementation in 2022 when the Russian Federation began military operations around and within the territories

of Ukraine. The time frame analysed will be up to the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 2022 as an arbitrary limit dictated by the need of concluding the episode at some point while it is still occurring. However, because of the way this study has been designed, it can be easily expanded in the future in the event new measures are undertaken or a new course of action develops. Anyhow, the details of about the case and the contest in which it has developed will be presented in the following section, chapter 4 of this dissertation.

The selection of this case expresses the most suitable union of features that while perfectly fitting within the general literature on the topic, grant a relevant space in the advancement of the discipline in a direction that is less centered on the United States' perspective. The present research focuses in fact on the European Union as the sender of economic sanctions, while the United States are the most studied sender in the literature. In addition, the long history of EU-Russia relations lacks research about the most recent events and an overall analysis of the reactions of the EU over foreign territorial disputes. Finally, comprehensive studies as such are rare among the literature on sanctions in the old continent. This case study is set to contribute to this dearth bridging the theory above presented with the practice of today's world.

Because of structural, institutional, and political reasons, the European Union has been mostly relying on sanctions and conditionality for its coercive foreign policy, while allegedly designing the most advanced and effective economic sanctions thanks to its technocrats. Moreover, in 2014 when the sanctioning began, the European Union represented the major economic player in the region and Russia the second. Because of Brexit, this ranking changed as of 2022, with the EU remaining the main economic player even after losing one of its biggest member states, and Russia becoming the third economic power of the continent. Considering these records, it is easy to understand why studying this specific case is of high relevance. Hence, some of the packs of sanctions here analysed are among the most impressive in history.



Furthermore, these events appear of even greater magnitude given the high reliance of the two players on each other in the manufacturing, energetic, financial, and agricultural sectors.

As seen in the literature review, the inconsistent design and effectiveness of economic warfare have been a derivative of politically driven choices rather than scientifically designed. Assessing the effectiveness of the newest sanctions might help identify their weaknesses with benefits for the EU citizens and future politicians that might face the need of imposing them again.

Subsequently, it is vital to assess what has been put in place, and how Russia reacted each time. Another critical factor that makes this specific case necessary, is that it studies the evolution of European sanctions over Russia's territorial ambitions of expansion. In the chapter four of this dissertation, we will see how while it is not the first time that Russia illegitimately occupies parts of neighbouring countries, Ukraine represents the only country that woke the concerns the EU enough for them to intervene. The chronological order in which the escalation of the events invasion-no action, invasion-mild set of sanctions and invasion-drastic sanction measures could be an indicator of how the EU's political elites is learning and trying new answers to the same problem: Russia's geopolitical ambition in the region. By analysing what has been done and what reaction it obtained can be therefore a reminder of great value as well as an analytical tool to better identify the mistakes of the past and possibly of the current set of sanctions, to ameliorate future ones.

### **3.3 Methods of Analysis**

The present study is composed of three main sections. The first one will be presenting the set of sanctions that the European Union imposed on Russia vis a vis the occupation of Ukrainian territories since 2014 and the key statements or measures the Kremlin released in response to said sanctions. The second part is going to infer whether the set of restrictions the EU imposed achieved

the goal they intended produce, explicitly or implicitly. Lastly, this dissertation will explore to what extent the finding of the precedent sections is in line with the literature presented in the second chapter of the present study. In the findings, it will be discussed whether the described set of restrictive measures could have been more effective, and possibly what factors made the sanctions perform better and which ones did not. The main logic device this latest section will adopt is theory and evidence-based. Understanding what did not work, examining what did, and contemplating what the literature has shown, it will be deduced which restrictive measures worked and if a different implementation of economic warfare could have been more successful according to the definition provided in the section 2.2.1.

The case study here handled is of prime utility in answering the research questions provided at the beginning of this chapter. This case not only is of paramount importance for our time but represents an extremely representative example for assessing the effectiveness of sanctions for a set of features it embodies. First, while being a single case study, it is exceptionally diversified within itself, as the European Union imposed restrictive measures of varying typologies and intensity over time. Those will be presented in closer detail in the next chapter. Albeit, for how different the set of sanctions is, they share important consistencies that make them comparable the one against the other. Scilicet the sender and the target states maintain their inherent characteristics over time for what regards their political, economic, and institutional nature. In addition, these sets of restrictive measures remain to be implemented for similar aims, hinging around the violation of the territorial integrity of the sovereign state of Ukraine. Furthermore, the time frame considered, even if it is likely to be expanded in future studies, remains sufficiently long to be even above average. Since March 2014 when the first restrictive measure was imposed, more than eight years have passed as of July 2022. This means this specific episode surpasses the mean duration of 6.3 years that the literature provides. By the virtue of this fact, at least the first sanctions imposed have

had more than enough time to prove their effectiveness and surely most of them, even if not the latest ones, have passed the threshold negotiations and threats that precede their imposition and are considered among the most important challenges the states face when testing their commitment (Wolford et al., 2011). Moreover, the present case study symbolises a greater population of cases. Even beyond the European Union, authoritarian or not fully democratic regimes seem to be more likely to be sanctioned as even the most notable cases of our time evidence (Iran, Libya, North Korea, Belarus, Myanmar, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Venezuela, and more) (The Trustees of Princeton University, 2022; HM Treasury and Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, 2021; Masters, 2019). If the utmost relevance of this study case among the wider populace of similar examples was not sufficient at this point, another key feature can finally prove it. The European Union has tried to design the assessed group of measures in a way that they are addressed as ‘smart’ or ‘targeted’ (Finelli, 2020; Council of the European Union, 2022w). With an eye on designing their sanctioning regimes in the most effective way possible to maintain internal coherence, the Political and Security Committee agreed on some ground principles on how to use, implement, measure and control their sanctions as far back as in 2004 (Political and Security Committee and Council of the European Union, 2004). More recently, a more detailed guide was released updating older documents and covering in detail how to implement and evaluate restrictive measures among which can be listed ‘targeted measures’, sanctions on specific persons or entities, arms embargoes, travel bans, and financial restrictions, while providing their definition of them as well as grounding for exceptions, jurisdiction, and compliance (Council of the European Union and General Secretariat of the Council, 2018). Finally, the European Union after adopting the guidelines published around forty pages more containing a non-exhaustive list of recommendations for effective implementation of their restrictive measures, incorporating the best practices in the field of sanctions (Council of the

European Union and General Secretariat of the Council, 2022). Considering this attention to detail that has been put in place, the European Union offers a clear attempt in imposing research-backed sets of sanctions which are surely a rare case and might set the standard when speaking of a study-backed restrictive measures. Then again, the study of these sanctions is undoubtedly necessary for the advancement of the literature of this field.

Given the rationales proposed at the beginning of the chapter the selection of this methodology has already been academically motivated. The choice of using a case study methodology for this specific example was also driven by other factors. The first one consists in the fact that a case study methodology offered the opportunity of focusing on what the author knows best: the European Union, its institutions, and the security issues of Europe and the former Soviet space.

The present research will hinge on the following framework of analysis with the aim of having a consistent, replicable, and comparable set of features among the restrictive measures under examination. In order to investigate and present the collection of restrictive measures here under scrutiny a set of questions will guide the author in this task. The questions are:

- 1 *Why was this measure put in place?*
- 2 *Which one of the tools of economic warfare was emplaced? What or whom was the target of the measure?*
- 3 *What was the official response of the Russian Federation?*
- 4 *Was the imposition of the measure effective in obtaining its aim?*

Each one of the above-listed questions has a specific aim. The question one allows showing the official reason for the sanction was adopted, allowing for the first round of classification of the restrictive measures by their aim. The

second question permits a different kind of division through the typology of sanction and their target. Following the types of measures the EU can impose according to the EEAS, the Union can affect targets through asset freezes or travel bans, sectoral measures such as economic and financial measures (import and export restrictions, banking services restrictions...) or arms embargoes (Strategic Communications - the European External Action Service, 2021). More precisely, the set of restrictive measures in response to Russia's attacks against Ukraine can include "individual sanctions, economic sanctions, restrictions on media, [and] diplomatic measures" (Council of the European Union, 2022i). The third question allows the author to collect the data available regarding the official answer of the Kremlin, the persons directly involved, or other relevant officials. While there is a risk that not all the statements will be recorded, this should not invalidate the results as this mistake will be randomly distributed along the data collection.

Subsequently, the fourth and last question will be the one on which the researcher is going to perform his analysis. In that section the author aims at assessing to what extent the sanctions episode was successful in obtaining a shift in the Russian foreign policy. Evaluating success, as shown in the literature review, can be challenging. This step is however pivotal in answering the research question this paper revolves around. Because the author wished to simplify as much as possible the scheme there will be solely four degrees of success that will soon be described. The need for simplicity dovetails with the necessity of limiting the author's human error. This logic follows the principles of parsimony. This principle is precious and beneficial for research as simplicity allows for great empirical content and better testing for future researchers (Popper, 1977). This affirmation is known in philosophical and scientific disciplines as Occam's razor (Duignan, 2021).

When answering the last question, the author will be called in assessing the successfulness or effectiveness of the restrictive measure considered. To do so,

the following four-tiers scheme has been developed. This choice facilitates both consistency and repeatability. To perform this task, this dissertation documentation will be alimented by both primary and secondary sources, for instance, official government statements, press releases, and indirect confirmations in international newspapers. The tiers here listed will appoint the degree of successfulness, from the most to the least successful:

- I. Fully effective. This paper classifies a sanction as fully effective when an operational policy change of the target country in order to obtain the lifting of the sanctions.
- II. Partially effective. Officials release statements about the measure (or threats) and a change in the course of action. Alternatively a tangible reaction in the economic or military field (military exercises, economic measures, imposition of countersanctions, aids to the population, list of unfriendly states...).
- III. Barely effective. The official release of statements about the measure, but no change in the course of action. This assessment might be reinforced by the fact that the measure is extended or strengthened.
- IV. Not effective. No statement and no change in the course of action. In this case it will be assumed that since nothing changed tangibly and no statement has been made, the measure has been ignored or even went unnoticed. This assessment might be reinforced by the fact that the measure is extended or strengthened.

The choice of this specific scale of outcomes is guided by some empirical truths that are self-evident before conducting a thorough analysis of the restrictive measures. Some datasets, such as the TIES dataset rightfully comprehend an evaluation of the outcomes that considers acquiescence of the target or capitulation of the sender after the threat of economic warfare

(Morgan et al., 2014). Conversely, in this specific study case it can be seen how neither of the sides gave in after the EU foreign affairs ministers threatened Russia with escalating sanctions (EURACTIV with Reuters, 2014). For this reason, evidentiary standards that took threats into account were disregarded. Similarly, while negotiated settlements are a possibility in the pool of all the case studies and European leaders have kept contact with the Kremlin more than the United States did, in this case study a compromise between the Russian Federation and the European Union has not been reached thus far (Morgan et al., 2014; Montalti, 2022). This study finds an antecedent and guide in the Global Sanctions Data Base. This study also divides sanctions episodes in similar success scores them being full success, partial success, enhancement/failure, settlement by negotiations and ongoing (Felbermayr et al., 2020). For the same reason mentioned above, settlement by negotiations is not a characteristic that is interesting for this study. For what concerns the 'ongoing' nature of sanctions, in the time frame considered none of them was lifted for different reasons, while showing instead a tendency in bolstering or prolonging them (Council of the European Union, 2021b). This makes all of them still ongoing and the respective categorisation irrelevant for this dissertation.

### **3.4 Limitations**

Research like this one, based on the analysis of case studies is subject to some challenges or limitations. One of them, as identified by scholars is how they are comparatively less rigorous than experimental research (Seuring, 2008). Others highlight the potential pitfalls into which case studies might fall into. Some papers evidence how, when analysing behaviours, case studies are the primary mechanisms to identify evidence. However, this method is at risk of some researcher's rooted biases, the most important of which are the selection bias, the performance bias, and the detection bias (Reichow et al., 2018) 55. These biases are respectively described as follows. The selection bias can

involve both the sequence generation and the selection of the participants; this means that either “the procedures used to allocate participants to intervention conditions or the order of the conditions to which participants are exposed” are spoiled or “the criteria and process used to include and select participants appropriate for the research” are flawed (Reichow et al., 2018) 55. Performance bias is else defined as the “the conduct of a trial inadvertently introducing differences between randomized groups other than the intervention(s) being evaluated” with the consequence of causing departures from the intended study design that may compromise the “study aims by undermining capacity to make valid inferences about intervention effects” (McCambridge et al., 2014) 243. The detection bias is described as “the systematic differences between participants in how outcomes are determined” and can happen because of the blinding of outcome assessors, because of a selective reporting of the outcomes, caused by the dependent variable reliability, or because the data sampling was not extensive enough to identify patterns (Reichow et al., 2018) 57.

Yet, the four factors considered pivotal when assessing the quality of a study is addressed by the design of this research. These elements are construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin, 2018) 47. Meeting the condition of construct validity means adopting multiple sources as well as having the case study reviewed (Yin, 2018) 48. This research shall fulfil this requirement because of the wide base of literature it uses, while at the same time investigating the most relevant events of our time. Consequently, both the literature on economic warfare and the chain of events, even if recent, has already been put under scrutiny by a wide and diverse pool of sources. These will be critically mentioned, and the study reviewed.

The second condition, internal validity, requires the author to use an analytical approach (Yin, 2018) 50. This means the researcher must evaluate whether the study offers a base for inferring findings and building relationships among the



different factors analysed. This prerequisite is expected to be met both because of the clarity of the action-reaction chain of events taken into account and the following comparison to development of this relationship to the general literature on the matter.

The element of external validity is the one that grants the generalisation of the study case (Yin, 2018) 47. This is a point of high importance as it allows future research to apply the findings to different cases. This study perfectly incarnates the ideal of illuminating theoretical concepts with empiricism. This element raises some obstacles as this study case has little room for generalisation, as it has been noted above. That does not mean the research lacks usefulness and external validity, though. The present study allows to understand whether an instrument, economic warfare, fulfilled its aim and whether the relevant theory can explain the outcome. In addition, while the case probably cannot be used to design predictions of outcomes of sanctions in general, it might still be a supplement to research of the EU's ways of economic warfare and foreign policy, as well as Russia's.

The fourth and latter point, reliability needs to be considered. Economic warfare, like other events in the field of international relations, happens within a unique time-point in history, in a specific context that cannot be replicated in exact copy. On the other hand, "replicability is important for both natural and social sciences" and this case study recognises in its weaknesses that reproducing the same conditions in the future ought to be challenging because of the nature of history, international relations and consequently case studies of this kind (Degterev, 2020) 36. Other studies use the word reliability as "the extent to which measurements are repeatable" (Drost, 2011) 105. The same results must be obtainable by other researchers analysing other cases, but most importantly in the very same case, repeated multiple times (Yin, 2018) 47. Again, this might not be achieved due to the high susceptibility of social sciences to the influence of different ideologies (Degterev, 2020). Still, the

author is optimistic about the fact a neutral approach shall lead to the same, or similar results.

As further limitations, it must be acknowledged that the interactions between the two actors have been occurring for so long that they might have changed internally and their behaviours because of political change within the study case. In fact, while Russia maintained the same president and apparatus, it could be argued that the EU and all its member states underwent elections and some radically changed the composition of their governments or parliaments. This is also valid for the EU parliament and commission. However, these changes do not change the behaviours of liberal democracies, and in particular of the European Union as it is bound by a set of treaties in its policies and the same is valid for the EU member states, which have set objectives and behaviours within the international system.

Moreover, the analysed set of events is currently unfolding, with the risk of making the study outdated. This is although natural and the present paper will be structured in a manner that will allow a more up-to-date study to dive further on the topic, or to add data in chronological order. Once this has been done, the findings could be newly elaborated, if needed. This potential weakness is then mitigated by a net decision of the time frame observed rather than having the whole relation between the two countries under examination.

Finally, the research has been conducted without the direct involvement of human participants. This applies to the collection of data as well. This step was in fact unnecessary for the successful conduction of this study. Also, this choice allowed for less problematic results for what regards ethics. This choice was also facilitated by the relative novelty that this event constitutes, and other methods that rely on interviews and surveys should rather be adopted once the dispute is settled. The ongoing pandemic and the seldom availability of professionals make the originally planned expert survey methodology shift

towards the one chosen here. For these reasons, there was no need for ethical approval from the board, as provided by the universities' guidelines.

The author ultimately recognises more undetected bias may occur. However, thorough attention has been put in addressing the literature advice in designing research. Therefore, the study aims at reaching the highest standards possible by using the commonly shared academic benchmarks listed above. Through secondary and tertiary sources, the researcher has checked for potential ideological and data collection biases, verifying the reliability of the sources provided. The precision and objectivity have been the reference point of the author, who controlled their work with attention commit precise and rigorous findings.

#### **4. Presentation of the Data and Analysis**

The European Union's capability to strike abroad might seem today limited considering the kinetic attacks among which bombings and military occupation that the Russian Federation dared to operate against Ukraine. This set of measures, however, is evidence of the political will of acting collectively and severely for the first time against nuclear power.

##### **4.1. The Annexation of Crimea and Partial Invasion of Donbass**

Because of the consistency of the measures and the relative stable nature of the EU-Russian relationship in the years between 2014 and early 2022, this period is being analysed as one sole episode of sanctioning.

The first reaction from the European Union is witnessed on the 3rd of March 2014. On this date, a meeting of EU ministers of foreign affairs held the first extraordinary meeting over the situation arising in Ukraine (Council of the European Union, 2014d). In this setting, however, no restrictive measure was as a matter of fact imposed. Instead, the Council of the European Union went just as far as condemning the "clear violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and

territorial integrity by acts of aggression by the Russian armed forces as well as the authorisation given by the Federation Council of Russia on 1 March for the use of the Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine” and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the time, Catherine Ashton, declared that “without question this is in breach of Russia’s international obligations and its commitments” (Council of the European Union, 2014d). The Council also agreed on the freezing and recovering of assets of people responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds (Council of the European Union, 2022w). All in all, the EU called for a peaceful solution that respects international law, solicited Russia to immediately withdraw their troops, affirmed that its member states would not have participated to the G8 that was planned in Sochi for June 2014, and claimed they might suspend the bilateral talks that were in place regarding visa matters and the ‘New Agreement’ (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 2016; Council of the European Union, 2014d). The meeting concluded the EU’s reconfirmed support for Ukraine, confirming that they will help give their commitment to reforms and the promised improvements towards fair and constitutional amendments in Ukraine for free, fair and transparent presidential elections (Council of the European Union, 2014d). These first statements were followingly confirmed at the extraordinary meeting of EU Heads of State or Government on Ukraine, on the 6th of March 2014 (De Backer - Spokesperson of the President and Aamann - Deputy Spokesperson of the President, 2014; European Council, 2014c).

The first set of restrictive measures was officially introduced on the 17th of March 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2022w). On this date, the meeting of the Foreign Affairs ministers of the EU condemned the referendum in Crimea, not recognising its outcome (Council of the European Union, 2014f). To analyse the events consistently, the author will rely on the framework of questions presented previously in section 3.3 which covered the

methods of the analysis. The first feature to infer is why was the measure implemented (Question above). This is clearly stated in the press release of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 7764/14 of the 17th of March 2014. This press release states that the Council recalls the previously released statements “which set out that negotiations between Ukraine and Russia needed to start within a few days, including through multilateral mechanisms, and produce results within a limited timeframe. [Also, considering the] developments of last week, and in the absence of any such results, the Council has decided to introduce” a set of restrictive measures (Ramses A, 2014, p.7). The measure consisted of travel bans and asset freezes within the EU, targeting a group of twenty-one Ukrainian and Russian officials that have been identified as having a role in “threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine”, and the persons or entities associated with them (Council of the European Union, 2014f). On the 20<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>st</sup> of March, as a response to the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation, twelve more names were added to this list of targeted people, while the European Commission was tasked to prepare “broader economic and trade sanctions” (European Council, 2014a). Again, on the 15<sup>th</sup> of April, constating “recent surge of violence in the eastern part of Ukraine” and the void calls on Russia to “to repudiate lawless acts in Eastern Ukraine and pull back its troops from the Ukrainian border”, the council approved a strengthening of the sanctions precedingly in place while adding four additional persons to the list (Council of the European Union, 2014e). Additionally, on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 2014, the EU officialised the measures which allow the implementation of “the EU's policy of non-recognition of the illegal annexation of Crimea [under which] goods originating from Crimea or Sevastopol may not be imported into the EU unless they have been granted a certificate of origin by the Ukrainian authorities” (Council of the European Union, 2014g). In 2014, we also witnessed the reaching of an agreement between the Council’s Committee of

Permanent Representatives (Coreper). Following Russia's failure to take the four steps that the EU leaders set on the 26<sup>th</sup> of June (agreement on a verification mechanism monitored by the OSCE for respect of the cease-fire and effective border control, returning to the Ukrainian authorities of three border checkpoints, releasing hostages including all of the OSCE observers, launch of substantial negotiations on the implementation of President Poroshenko's peace plan), and the conclusion of their meeting on the 16<sup>th</sup> of July, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of July, the Council of the European Union decided to put into force a package of "targeted economic sanction" (European Council, 2014b, 2014d; Council of the European Union, 2022w). Specifically, European Union's citizens "and companies may no more buy or sell new bonds, equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued by major state-owned Russian banks, development banks, their subsidiaries outside the EU and those acting on their behalf. Services related to the issuing of such financial instruments" (Council of the European Union, 2014b, p.1). It was also agreed "an embargo on the import and export of arms and related material from/to Russia", a ban on "on exports of dual use goods and technology for military use in Russia or to Russian military end-users", and controls on the exporting of "certain energy-related equipment and technology to Russia" that might be used "for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia" (Council of the European Union, 2014b, p.1). Moreover, Crimea and Sevastopol obtained further restrictions on investments and exports of equipment that entail "infrastructure projects in the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors and in relation to the exploitation of oil, gas and minerals" (Council of the European Union, 2014b, p.1). Finally, more persons and entities were added to the "list of those subject to an asset freeze and a visa ban", bringing their total numbers to "95 persons and 23 entities" (Council of the European Union, 2014b, p.2).

On the 30<sup>th</sup> of August, a new President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and a new EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini, were appointed. Jean-Claude Juncker, was the newly elected President of the European Commission (European Council, 2014e). Under this new leadership, a package of restrictive measures was designed to reinforce the latest ones described above (Council of the European Union, 2022w). The newly disposed of restriction provided for denying “EU nationals and companies [the right to] provide loans to five major Russian state-owned banks” and prohibiting “trade in new bonds, equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued by the same banks”; the same restrictions were imposed on the “three major Russian defence companies and three major energy companies” (Council of the European Union, 2014h). Following the trend that was followed in the precedent months, even in this occasion the Council of the European Union extended the list of people involved in travel bans and asset freezes, including the newly appointed leadership of Donbas and Crimea, Russian decision-makers and oligarchs; this brought the total to 119 persons and 23 entities (Council of the European Union, 2014h). By the end of the year, the total of bodies under this typology of measures amounted to 132 persons and 28 entities (Council of the European Union, 2014c). all kinds of investments in Crimea and Sevastopol were outlawed as “Europeans and EU-based companies [could] no more buy real estate or entities in Crimea, finance Crimean companies or supply related services”, this was also valid for tourism services, that was piled to the measures that denied exports, technology, and technical assistance and construction services related to sectors related to “transport, telecommunications and energy [...] or the prospection, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources”(Council of the European Union, 2014a).

In the first months of 2015, the same sanctions remained in place, with little changes. The decisions that were taken by the EU, only regarded extensions of existing restrictive measures until September 2015 (Council of the European

Union, 2015d), and new inclusion to the sanctions list, which commanded asset freezes and travel bans for 150 persons and 37 entities now (Council of the European Union, 2015b, 2015e). The most notable addition regards the former President Viktor Yanukovich (Council of the European Union, 2015a). By the end of the year, the Council of the European Union decided to prolong the economic sanctions already in place until the 31<sup>st</sup> of July 2016, linking their duration “to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements” which had constantly failed (Lenzu, 2015; Council of the European Union, 2015c). Also the other measures remained almost identical, confirming the limitations imposed on Crimea and Sevastopol and the asset freezes and travel bans (149 persons and 37 entities) (Lenzu, 2015; Council of the European Union, 2022w; Lenzu and Kiefer, 2015).

A similar situation can be seen in 2016. The extension of EU sanctions over the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds involved 16 people for one more year (Lenzu, 2016b). The same restrictive measures (travel bans and asset freezes) remained in place against 146 people and 37 companies, in consideration of the continuing undermining or threatening of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (Lenzu, 2016c). The same can be said for the sanctions imposed in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol and the economic sanctions described above which were prolonged (Lenzu, 2016a; Lenzu and Council of the European Union, 2016). To be noted is the addition of “six members of the Russian Federation State Duma elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol to the list of persons subject to restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence” (Council of the European Union, 2022w).

Comparably, even 2017 was a year for mostly small adjustments and extensions for the restrictive measures. The EU sanctions over the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds were further extended involving 15



people (3 march), a similar destiny was appointed to the travel bans and asset freezes that were now covering 150 people and 38 entities by the end of the year(Lenzu, 2017c, 2017a). This happened after the merging of some companies and the addition of those which replaced them, the death of some of the involved persons and the addition of “Dmitry Vladimirovich Ovsyannikov, ‘Governor of Sevastopol’, to the list of those submitted to restrictive measures over actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (Lenzu, 2017b, 2017a; Azofra and Council of the European Union, 2017). The economic sanctions were further prolonged given the failure of the implementation of the Minsk agreements (Lenzu, 2017d).

This trend has continued in 2018. As in the year before, the EU sanctions that were imposed because of misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds, actions undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol were just protracted and slightly expanded to other persons or entities (Council of the European Union, 2018c, 2018a, 2018b). Remarkably, the extension of the lists was due to the so-called elections held in the newly created ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’, as “as they are in breach of international law, undermine the commitments taken under the Minsk agreements and violate Ukraine's sovereignty and law” and due to “the construction of the Kerch Bridge, connecting Russia to the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula” (Council of the European Union, 2018f, 2018e). These events, together with the constatation that the Minsk agreements were still not implemented, brought to a repeated renovation of the economic sanctions on Russia and brought the list of “targeted individual restrictive measures, namely a visa ban and an asset freeze, currently against 164 people and 44 entities” (Council of the European Union, 2018d).

The year after, 2019, opened with an escalation “in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov and the violations of international law by Russia, which used military force with no justification” (Council of the European Union, 2019e). The EU answered by sanctioning the officials involved such as “the head and deputy head of the border directorate of Russian federal security service for the Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol, three commanding officers of Russian border patrol boats and an anti-submarine ship” that were accused of having “actively participated in actions that prevented Ukrainian vessels from accessing their coastline on the Sea of Azov, two heads of service of Russian control points, and a Russian armed forces commander responsible for military forces in the region, including the illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol” (Council of the European Union, 2019e). On the other hand, sanctions that regarded the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds, actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol underwent only extensions and small adjustments (Council of the European Union, 2019b, 2019e, 2019c). At the end of 2019, the Council also approved the usual prolongation of the economic sanctions targeting specific sectors of the Russian economy already illustrated (Council of the European Union, 2019d). As a result of this small tweaking, asset freezes and travel bans applied to 170 persons and 44 entities (Council of the European Union, 2019a).

The year of the pandemic, 2020, shares some similarities to 2018 in regard to this case study. It is in fact true that, while the trend of small adjustments to preceding imposed sanctions continued, the construction of a railway bridge in Kerch triggered new additions to the list of the sanctioned entities, making it apply to 177 individuals and 48 entities (Council of the European Union, 2020f). Anyway, besides this event, all the other measures faced the same modifications of the other years, being prolonged until the following year (Council of the European Union, 2020d, 2020c, 2020e, 2020b).

In 2021, the last year before the full-scale war began, the trend that accompanied this study case in since 2014 continued seamlessly. So, as described until now, the restrictive measures that targeted “individuals identified as responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds or for the abuse of office causing a loss to Ukrainian public funds” were prolonged against one person and not extended against two (Council of the European Union, 2021a). Furthermore, the Council confirmed that sanctions that were “introduced in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation” would be renewed (Council of the European Union, 2021d). Finally, as the economic measures were confirmed and prolonged, the asset freezes and travel bans that regarded “the territorial integrity of Ukraine” would now apply to 185 persons and 48 entities (Council of the European Union, 2021f).

The year 2022 began with a similar opening to the other years, as in its early months no substantial change in the restrictive measures had occurred. In fact, all these years share the same features regarding the first two questions of the analytical framework proposed, and for the reasons elucidated in the designated paragraph, the same degree of success. The first feature regards the reasons why the measures were put in place (for the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds or for the abuse of office causing a loss to Ukrainian public funds [A], for undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine [B], in response to Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine [C], and for the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation [D]) (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2021d, 2021e, 2021a, 2022m). These features consisted also in the measures' target (the Russian Federation and persons or companies associated with it), the measures' type as in individual restrictive measures (asset freezes [A] and travel bans) [B], diplomatic measures (suspension of bilateral talks on visa matters and regarding the ‘New Agreement’, and the decision of the European G8 members and the EU

institutions to suspend their participation in G8 Summits from 2014) [B], economic measures (limit access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for certain Russian banks and companies, prohibition of financial assistance and brokering towards Russian financial institutions, prevention of the direct or indirect import, export or transfer of all defence-related material and establish a ban for dual-use goods for military use or military-end users in Russia, curtailment of Russian access to certain sensitive technologies that can be used in the Russian energy sector, for instance in oil production and exploration) [C], , and specific restrictions to Crimea and Sevastopol (forbidding the imports of products originating in Crimea or Sevastopol into the EU, and infrastructural or financial investments and tourism services in Crimea or Sevastopol, prohibiting the exports of certain goods and technologies to Crimean companies or for use in Crimea in the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors or for the prospection, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources) [D] (Council of the European Union, 2021c; European Council, 2014c; Council of the European Union, 2020a). By the 21<sup>st</sup> of February 2022, the asset freezes and travel bans regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine applied to 193 persons and 48 entities (Council of the European Union, 2022y). This covers typologies and targets (Question above).

Russia's recognition of Crimea as independent has been officialised as of the 17<sup>th</sup> of March 2014 and admitted into the Russian Federation the following day ('Executive Order on recognising Republic of Crimea', 2014; 'Executive Order on executing Agreement on Admission of Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation', 2014). As seen above, more restrictive measures were imposed after this event; this was though ridiculed by President Putin, who was on the other hand implicitly threatening consequences against visa sanctions from Ukraine (Luhn, 2014). As of 2014, analysts noted how there was an explicitly political decision behind a lack of answers to sanctions (Luhn, 2014). Throughout the year, the Russian President kept calling for

negotiations regarding Donbas, but denied involvement (President of Russia, 2014b). At the end of the year, when directly questioned about the admitted economic difficulties and Ukraine, the President of Russia continued blaming the Kyiv (to him) illegitimate government for their “forceful methods” and “economic blockade”, but when confronted about Crimea, he affirmed that “it is not about Crimea but about us protecting our independence, our sovereignty and our right to exist”, acknowledging that “out of all the problems the sanctions take up about 25 to 30 per cent” (President of Russia, 2014a). Some punitive measures were also undertaken by Russia, but concerning Ukraine, like the suspension of the Agreement on the Free Trade Zone while Crimea was regulated under Russian law and some minor economic measures were taken to adapt Russian economy (President of Russia, 2015; Russia, 2015b, 2015a). Limited legislation was produced to make up for European sanctions such as the support of the ICT sector (President of Russia, 2016b) while limited cooperation with some EU countries continued as of 2016 for the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (President of Russia, 2016a). Noticeable was the dismissal of “Alexei Ulyukayev of his duties as Economic Development Minister due to the loss of trust” (T. of the O. W. of the P. of President of Russia, 2016). More legislative efforts were made to integrate citizens in “certain districts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk regions” with the Russian Federation, diversify the exports of fossil fuels and ensure investments in the defence as well as “extending special economic measures to ensure Russia’s security” which seem to work in parallel to EU’s sanctions extensions (President of Russia, 2017c, 2017b, 2017a). Later on, in 2018 the Federation also adopted “special economic measures” against Ukraine for their “unfriendly actions that contradict international law and consist of imposing restrictive measures on citizens and legal entities of the Russian Federation”, but never mentioning the EU or its member states (T. of the O. W. of the P. of President of Russia, 2018). More executive orders were

signed to naturalise Ukrainian citizens, stimulate the oil industry and investments in the energy, transportation, ICT sectors, addressing economic issues, store more funds in national banks, all while visiting and governing the illegally annexed Crimea (President of Russia, 2019b, 2019a, 2021b, 2021a; T. of the O. W. of the P. of President of Russia, 2020). Finally, on multiple occasions, the Russian President addressed the sanctions on Crimea as senseless and those against Russia as counterproductive against their initiators, while blaming Ukraine for the tensions and claiming the economic situation in Russia was similar to the one in the US and main EU countries (Question above) (President of Russia, 2016c; T. of the O. W. of the President of Russia, 2018, 2020; President of Russia, 2021c).

The degree of successfulness at this stage is rated by this analysis as barely effective as per the framework proposed (above). This judgement is motivated by the fact that a small degree of effectiveness was achieved as the measure made the Russian Federation adopt some measures to shield some of the sectors targeted, but on the other hand did not refrain it from further integrating Crimea and Sevastopol into the country, while not explicitly recognising the effects of the measures. Finally, no measure was taken against the EU, but rather against Ukraine, showing that the role that the Union played was marginal in determining Russia's course of action. In line with this, the west was not involved in the 'special operation' (Question above).

#### **4.2 The Recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk**

A first drastic change eventually happens on the 21st of February 2022, when the Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the recognition of the independence of two breakaway regions of Ukraine: the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic (BBC News, 2022a). The following day, the State Duma (the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation) supported the ratification of the so-called "Treaties of

Friendship” with the self-proclaimed republics justifying the decision as “the only way to protect people, stop the fratricidal war, prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and bring peace” (the State Duma, 2022). The treaties were ratified by the President on the same day and among the “broad cooperation” areas they cover military assistance is mentioned (T. of the O. W. of the President of Russia, 2022; T. of the O. W. of President of Russia, 2022).

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of February 2022, the Council of the European Union adopted a package of sanctions to “respond to the decision by the Russian Federation to proceed with the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine as independent entities, and the subsequent decision to send Russian troops into these areas” and these decisions as the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell stated, are unacceptable and illegal since “they violate international law, Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, Russia’s own international commitments and further escalate the crisis” (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022e).

In light of the events, the EU decided to extend the restrictive measures already existing “to cover all the 351 members of the Russian State Duma, who voted on 15 February in favour of the appeal to President Putin to recognise the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk ‘republics’” (Council of the European Union, 2022e). The Council also decided to target “additional 27 high profile individuals and entities, who have played a role in undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine”. Among them we can find members of the Russian government, banks and oligarchs, and senior military officers (Council of the European Union, 2022e; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022ac). These entities were allegedly involved in illegal decisions, financial or material support to the operations led disinformation

campaigns or having benefitted from what had been happening in the Donetsk and Luhansk territories (Council of the European Union, 2022e). Question 1

These measures, as per usual included asset freezes and travel bans, but also the prohibition from making funds available to the listed individuals. Additional measures were also taken in order to target trade to and from the two non-government-controlled regions and the EU, in particular, “the import into the European Union of goods originating in the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine should be prohibited, with the exception of goods having been granted a certificate of origin by the Government of Ukraine”, restricting tourism and the transfer of goods and technology “by nationals of Member States, or from the territories of Member States, or using vessels or aircraft under the jurisdiction of Member States, whether or not originating in their territories” to any entity enlisted or for the use in the territories mentioned, in the sector of transport, telecommunications, energy, and the prospecting, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources, to this a ban on technical, training, and financial assistance was adopted (Official Journal of the European Union, 2022ac). Finally, the Council decided on the imposition of sectoral prohibitions to finance Russia, its government, and the Central Bank. The implementation of these further measures brings the listing of those receiving sanctions for violations of Ukraine’s territorial integrity to a total of 555 individuals and 52 entities (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022e). The EU also explicated their aim which corresponded to “limit the financing of escalatory and aggressive policies”, but also to

*“urge Russia, as a party to the conflict, to reverse the recognition, uphold its commitments, abide by international law and return to the discussions within the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group. We call on other States not to follow Russia’s illegal decision to recognise this proclaimed independence. [Also warning] Russia*



*against using the newly signed pacts with the self-proclaimed 'republics' as a pretext for taking further military steps against Ukraine” (Council of the European Union, 2022x).*

As the time frame between this and the next set of sanctions is limited, it is hard to determine the political impact of these sanctions, as the actions they were supposed to influence were probably already taken. In addition to the statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry that “sanctions pressure is not capable of affecting our determination to firmly defend our interests”, it is self-evident how Russia proceeded with their initial plans of using military force beyond its borders, and against Ukraine. (Associated Press, 2022; Khalid, 2022). Even if this was not an answer, it was made clear that the restrictive measures were not considered a restraint when on the 24<sup>th</sup> of February, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the renowned “special military operation”. In his speech Putin addressed the sanctioning regime, recognising that:

*“it is true that they [the sanctions’ senders] have considerable financial, scientific, technological, and military capabilities. We are aware of this and have an objective view of the economic threats we have been hearing, just as our ability to counter this brash and never-ending blackmail. Let me reiterate that we have no illusions in this regard and are extremely realistic in our assessments. (‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’, 2022)*

He also expressed his faith in being able to withstand the measures’ pressure as there was “no doubt that the government institutions at all levels and specialists will work effectively to guarantee the stability of our economy, financial system and social wellbeing” (Question above) (‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’, 2022).

In assessing the effectiveness of the sanctions, this paragraph takes into account the aims that the EU proclaimed to have. While the objective of making the financing of escalatory postures was probably met, the end of the sanctioning was not met, as the recognition of the two breakaways ‘republics’ was never reverted. Instead, the Russian Federation did exactly what they wanted to avoid: using the newly signed pacts as a pretext for a full-scale invasion. Playing on the argument of the effectiveness there are however two facts: the plans for the invasion were with all probability already set and ready to be executed and Putin in his speech did recognise the threat of sanctions. These two points are though not enough to render the restrictive measure sufficient: Finally, no measure was taken to mitigate the economic costs imposed. The author recognises that not enough time passed for the measures to have an impact, however, they were very soon replaced and strengthened which allow this analysis to claim these restrictive measures were also barely effective (above) (Question above).

#### **4.3 The Second Set of Sanctions and the invasion of Ukraine**

The so-called Second set of the restrictive measure was imposed to respond to the “unprovoked and unjustified military aggression carried out by the Russian Federation against Ukraine” (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022u).

As a consequence, the EU acted to impose a further package of sanctions against both individuals and entities. Most notably, the Council ordered further asset freezes and travel bans to Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation and Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “to the remaining members of the Russian State Duma, who ratified the government decision of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the two entities”, the members of the National Security Council of the Russian Federation who

supported their recognition, and others who facilitated the Russian military aggression of Ukraine (Council of the European Union, 2022u). More economic restrictive measures were added, concerning the financial, energy, transport, and technology sectors and visa policy (Council of the European Union, 2022u; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022l, 2022aa, 2022a, 2022y, 2022w). In detail, the financial sanctions build on the existing financial restrictions, cutting Russian access to the major capital markets, “listing and provision of services in relation to shares of Russian state-owned entities on EU trading venues”, limits significantly the financial inflows from Russia into the EU, confines the acceptance of deposits from Russian nationals or residents below a certain threshold, prohibits “the holding of accounts of Russian clients by the EU Central Securities Depositories, [and] the selling of euro-denominated securities to Russian clients” (Council of the European Union, 2022u). The energy sector is attacked by these measures as “the sale, supply, transfer or export to Russia of specific goods and technologies in oil refining, and will introduce restrictions on the provision of related services”, making it impossible for Russia to ameliorate its oil refineries (Council of the European Union, 2022u). The already sanctioned transport sector sees a ban on goods, services, and technology for the aviation and space industry, while further restrictions on exports of dual-use technology and goods for the defence and security sectors were sanctioned, including semiconductors. The update of the visa policy makes Russian diplomats and officials “no longer be able to benefit from visa facilitation provisions, which allow privileged access to the EU” while not affecting ordinary Russian citizens (Council of the European Union, 2022u; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022l, 2022aa, 2022a, 2022y, 2022w). In general, these measures brought the list of those hit by asset freezes and travel bans to 654 individuals and 52 entities, while targeting 70% of the Russian banking market and key state-owned companies (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022u).

Again, only a few days occur in between the imposition of this and the precedent sanctions package. Once again, one of the main sources available to determine Russia's political response, beyond the facts on the ground, is a statement of Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister of Russia. In his statement he denounced the behaviour of the EU, assuring that "the EU's continuing unfriendly steps against Russia and Russia's fraternal DPR and LPR will not be able to stop the progressive development of our states and the provision of assistance to them" and that "in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, which is fundamental to international law, we will take tough response measures" (Question above) (Russian News Agency, 2022).

The aim of this sanctions package, since it is so close in time to the one before, could be repeated. On the other hand, the EU also added as demand that "Russia immediately ceases its military actions, unconditionally withdraws all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respects Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders" but also "Russia and Russia-backed armed formations to respect international humanitarian law and stop their disinformation campaign and cyber-attacks." (Council of the European Union, 2022u). In respect of this latter point, little can be said at the time of writing. However, concerning the primary aim of reverting the military escalation, as well as the full-scale invasion, it is clear how this objective failed. The Russian minister for Foreign Affairs also dismissed the possibility of arresting the operation. While there is a mention of the EU's unfriendly behaviour, it was just touched upon. More importantly, the military operation continued and still no measure was put in place in Russia to counter the effects of this set of measures. In conclusion, the set of measures was upscaled by the Council itself, motivating the author to consider the effectiveness of this stage to not effective (above) (Question above).

#### **4.4 The Third Set of Sanctions**

The third package of sanctions was imposed shortly after, still for the same reason, the “Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine and the escalating situation”, with the proclaimed aim of imposing “severe consequences on Russia for its actions” (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022d).

On the 28<sup>th</sup> of February, the Council added 26 persons and one entity among which oligarchs and businessmen active in the oil, banking, finance sectors, government and high-level military officials and propagandists; this brings the restrictive measures of asset freezes and travel bans to apply to 680 individuals and 53 entities (Council of the European Union, 2022r; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022z, 2022c). The restrictive measures also curtailed the aviation and financial sectors, specifically “EU member states will deny permission to land in, take off from or overfly their territories to any aircraft operated by Russian air carriers, including as a marketing carrier, or to any Russian registered aircraft, or to non-Russian registered aircraft which are owned or chartered, or otherwise controlled by a Russian legal or natural person” and “it will be prohibited to make transactions with the Russian Central Bank or any legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of the Russian Central Bank” (Council of the European Union, 2022d; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022e, 2022d, 2022c, 2022b, 2022ab). On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March more sanctions were imposed on the Russian Federation, prohibiting namely “the provision of specialised financial messaging services, which are used to exchange financial data (SWIFT), to Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Rossiya Bank, Sovcombank, VNESHECONOMBANK (VEB), and VTB BANK” also applying to “to any legal person, entity or body established in Russia whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50% by the above-mentioned banks”, forbidding “to invest, participate or otherwise contribute to future

projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund” and to “sell, supply, transfer or export euro denominated banknotes to Russia or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, including the government and the Central Bank of Russia, or for use in Russia” (Council of the European Union, 2022t). Besides these financial measures, the EU implemented “a ban on the overflight of EU airspace and on access to EU airports by Russian carriers of all kinds [...] and the prohibition for state-owned media Russia Today and Sputnik' to broadcast in the EU” (Council of the European Union, 2022t; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022m). This decision was motivated by the “permanent direct or indirect control of the authorities of the Russian Federation [exercises on the broadcasters, which are] essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting the military aggression against Ukraine, and for the destabilisation of its neighbouring countries” (Council of the European Union, 2022g; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022f). In the while, other measures that were put in place before for the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds and over the territorial integrity of Ukraine were once again prolonged for six months more (Council of the European Union, 2022w; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022n, 2022g). Finally, before the implementation of the fourth package of sanctions, the EU agreed to sanctions the Belarusian financial sector too, amid their involvement in the military aggression (Council of the European Union, 2022s). However, these sanctions go beyond the scope of this study. The overmentioned restrictive measures on individuals and/or companies were imposed on further 160 people, among which fourteen oligarchs involved in the metallurgical, agriculture, pharmaceutical, telecom and digital industries and their families, and 146 members of the Russian Federation Council, who ratified the government decisions of the treaties that recognised the breakaways republics(Council of the European Union, 2022f). This brought the total of those subject to these measures to 862 individuals and 53 entities

(Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022f; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022o).

Following this set of sanctions, the office of the Russian president started releasing more legislation aimed at aiding the economy of Russia (with attention to boosting the IT sector and increasing financial stability) as well as punishing the unfriendly behaviour of western countries, among which there are EU member states (Question above) (President of Russia, 2022p, 2022b, 2022g, 2022f).

The effectiveness of this sanction package is rated as barely effective (above). While no statement was collected, Russia started implicitly recognising the at least partial effectiveness of the EU's restrictive measures by adopting legislation to alleviate their effects. By contrast, the military operation continued with no sign of compromise at this stage. Moreover, the following sanctions were shortly adopted reinforcing the choice made in measuring the effectiveness of this set of measures (Question above).

#### **4.5 The Fourth Set of Sanctions**

On the 15th of March 2022, the Council decided to impose a fourth package of restrictive measures both against individuals and of economic nature given Russia's continued aggression against Ukraine. This date signs an important statement by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, which commented on the measures revealing what the author considers a crucial turning point for what regards the sanctions aim. As the war continued, the fourth package of sanctions was still, in the words of Borrell "that President Putin stops this inhuman and senseless war", however they become explicitly a tool to "cripple the financing of Kremlin's war machinery" in a "major blow to the economic and logistic base upon which Russia relies on to carry out the invasion of Ukraine" (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022v).

Continuing the analysis through the framework of this paper, the Council widened the sanctions already in place before, barring now “all transactions with certain state-owned enterprises, [...] the provision of any credit rating services, as well as access to any subscription services in relation to credit rating activities, to any Russian person or entity”, imposing “tighter export restrictions [...] regarding dual-use goods and goods and technology [, prohibiting exports and] new investments in the Russian energy [...], technology and services” sectors and restricting further trade of iron, steel, and luxury items (Council of the European Union, 2022v; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022p, 2022q). in this package was also included the imposition of new travel bans and asset freezes on 15 more people such as “key oligarchs Roman Abramovich and German Khan as well as other prominent businesspeople involved in key economic sectors, such as iron and steel, energy, banking, media, military and dual-use products and services”, lobbyist and propagandists like Konstantin Ernst (CEO of Channel One Russia) and entities in the aviation, military and dual-use, shipbuilding and machine building sectors (Council of the European Union, 2022k; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022p, 2022q). The fourth package of sanctions brought the total enlisted to restrictive measures records to 877 individuals and 62 entities (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022k).

The response of Russia to this package of measures was quite like the precedent one. The Ministry of foreign affairs denied the atrocities in Bucha and other Ukrainian places, announcing a new phase of the operation (Seddon et al., 2022; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2022a). In addition, the gazette of the target country published new measures against the EU and their allies, some to control exports of goods and technologies and to sustain their economy and financial steadiness (President of Russia, 2022h, 2022e, 2022c, 2022q, 2022a, 2022i). A good summary of their position on sanctions is a statement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign



Affairs, which recognises that “the EU’s actions are not only driving the relationship with Russia into a deadlock but are similarly jeopardizing the well-being and security of its own citizens, as well as the stability of the global financial and economic system” (Question above) (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 2022).

This package of sanctions is judged to perform relatively well in reaching the aim that the EU was trying to achieve. Even though no compromise was reached vis a vis the military invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory, Russia recognised the economic consequences of the sanctions, even while projecting the consequences on EU citizens. Moreover, several decrees were emitted to mitigate the economic and financial consequences of the sanctions. Importantly, for the first time, the Russian Federation undertook active measures against EU unfriendly countries, listing them. Finally, the subsequent set of measures was put in place further from the one that came before this one, and mostly as an adjustment to emend the current one. For these reasons this set of restrictive measures is assessed as partially effective (above) (Question above).

#### **4.6 The Fifth Set of Sanctions**

The decision to impose the fifth set of sanctions arrived on the 8th of April, following the diffusion of news regarding the events of Bucha and other Ukrainian towns under Russian occupation. This fifth package has now openly and officially a double aim: “to reinforce pressure on the Russian government and economy, and to limit the Kremlin’s resources for the aggression” (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022c).

This package adds prohibitions on the import or transfer of “coal and other solid fossil fuels into the EU if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia” (worthy €8 billion per year) and of wood, cement, fertilisers, seafood and liquor (worthy €5.5 billion), denies access to EU ports to ships registered

under the flag of Russia (with the exception of agricultural and food products, humanitarian aid, and energy), bans road transport that carries goods into or through the EU (with derogations for pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural and food products, and for road transport for humanitarian purposes), and forbids the export of freights like jet fuel, quantum computers, high-end electronics, software, sensitive machinery and transportation equipment (valued at €10 billion) (Council of the European Union, 2022c). In addition, the financial measures already in place were deepened and adjusted in this fifth package of sanctions. The bans now included “participation of Russian companies in public procurement in member states, all financial support to Russian public bodies [...] prohibition on deposits to crypto-wallets and on the sale of banknotes and transferrable securities [in any EU currency] to Russia and Belarus, or to any” entity related to them (Council of the European Union, 2022c). Furthermore, a full ban on transactions was imposed on four Russian banks, which were ‘de-SWIFTed’ and are now cut off from EU markets (Council of the European Union, 2022c; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022r, 2022s). Finally, the Council added to the list of people targeted with asset freezes and travel bans 217 individuals and 18 entities with accusations consistent with the ones in the precedent package, totalling 1091 individuals and 80 entities (Council of the European Union, 2022j; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022t). Some adjustments have been made in the following days to facilitate humanitarian activities in Donbas and add two individuals to the restrictive measures (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022x, 2022h).

When addressing the third question of the analytical framework, the author constated rare comments coming from Russian officials on the period concerned. However, the Russian invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory continued (Live Universal Awareness Map, 2022a). The Russian measures designed to tackle economic issues, support government procurement, and maintain financial stability continued to increase (President

of Russia, 2022o, 2022n, 2022m). Similarly, new procedures to meet a financial obligation to certain foreign creditors had to be taken (Question above) (President of Russia, 2022d).

This set of measures was designed as a deepening and tweak of the precedent one. No compromise and few comments came from the Russian side. However, even though it was done implicitly, Russia recognised the economic consequences of the sanctions, by continuing to release measures to help investments and their economy in general. Two more indicators made this package to be judged as barely effective (above): keeping in mind the scarcity of official declarations by the Russian government on the sanctions, it is true that the date in which the full-scale invasion entered a new phase approached, making the two things more likely to be related. Finally, the following package of sanctions was once more released after a comparatively longer time (Question above).

#### **4.7 The Sixth Set of Sanctions**

The sixth package of sanctions was officialised on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 2022. Once again, the motive of the measures continued to be Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine (Council of the European Union, 2022o). This time, High Representative Josep Borrell was even more specific in his statements, affirming that "we are increasing limitations to the Kremlin's ability to finance the war by imposing further economic sanctions", but also adding "we are also sanctioning those responsible for the atrocities that took place in Bucha and Mariupol and banning more disinformation actors" elucidating the punitive nature of the individual sanctions in contrast with the practical one of the economic ones and those that regard disinformation (Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022o).

This final package of restrictive measures prohibits the import or transfer of crude oil and other petroleum products from Russia into the EU, however, the

gradual disposal of such imports will happen through the following six to eight months with some derogations (Council of the European Union, 2022o). The ‘de-SWIFTing’ of the Russian bank is expanded to three more institutions (Sberbank, Credit Bank of Moscow, and Russian Agricultural Bank). On the same line, three additional state-owned outlets (Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24 / Russia 24 and TV Centre International) were suspended from their broadcasting activity in the EU as are considered “instruments to manipulate information and promote disinformation about the invasion of Ukraine” (Council of the European Union, 2022o, 2022w). The consulting services are also banned from the EU to Russia. The restrictive measures were expanded with the 65 names of “who are responsible for enabling this unjustified war and the war crimes committed in Bucha and Mariupol” and 18 entities (Council of the European Union, 2022q; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022h, 2022u, 2022i). Later in the month, the EU renewed once again the restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the economic measures it first introduced in 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2022a, 2022l). Finally, on the 21<sup>st</sup> of July 2022, the EU decided to adopt a package of “maintenance and alignment” which introduces a new ban on the purchase, import, and transfer of Russian gold and jewellery into or through the EU ameliorates the precedent listing of items for technological enhancement or of dual use, and extends the precedent port access ban to locks, also clarifying other measures such as the ones on public procurement, aviation and justice, and emending “the prohibition to engage in transactions with certain state-owned entities as regards transactions for agricultural products and the transport of oil to third countries” (Council of the European Union, 2022n). Ultimately, the list of those affected by asset freezes and travel bans was lengthened with the addition of local politicians, military leaders, oligarchs, propagandists, and recruiters, totalling at 1212 individuals and 108 entities

(Question above) (Council of the European Union, 2022p; Official Journal of the European Union, 2022j, 2022k, 2022v, 2022x).

Between the 3<sup>rd</sup> of June and the end of July 2022, the edge of the period analysed the Russian invasion slowed down but never stopped (Live Universal Awareness Map, 2022b). The Russian government did not show signs of change in their determination towards the war as the claims that they were ready to negotiate a settlement were as significant as they were in 2014 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2022b). Putin himself commented the sanctions as “mad and thoughtless” and dismissed their effectiveness on Russia, underlying the high cost they have for the EU (BBC News, 2022b). Though, his office approved further aid to the Russian economy and more measures of retaliation against unfriendly EU countries. Some of these measures consist of restricting Russian investments abroad, procedures to meet state debt obligations, and more economic measures in the fuel and energy sector connected “with unfriendly actions of certain foreign states and international organisations” (Question above) (President of Russia, 2022k, 2022i, 2022j).

The present set of restrictive measures is assessed by the author as partially effective (above). One main argument still holds it from being fully successful, which is that no agreement for peace was yet reached and the political determination of Russia in its military operation missed evidence of being shaken. On the contrary, several indicators point towards at least partial effectiveness. President Putin condemned the sanctioning in a similar way to the other package that obtained the same score (paragraph 4.5). Additionally, legislation aimed at rescuing the Russian economy made explicit reference to the unfriendly actions of foreign actors. Finally, the author recognises that no hard evidence was provided to judge the effectiveness of the measures concerning propaganda and disinformation, however, they do not belong to the sphere of economic warfare here concerned. In conclusion, the set of measures

while failing the intention of forcing Russia to withdraw, showed its success in making the war more difficult to sustain for the Russian Federation, economically and materially (Question above).

## **5. Discussion**

As well evidenced through the literature review, many tried to understand what conditions make the sanctions more effective and what consequences they produce. Understanding when sanctions work best and generally if they are a viable foreign policy tool has been questioned by several authors. One of the main conditions that were identified as crucial for their effectiveness was economic dependence. In parallel, in the idea of the Former President of the US Wilson, it was the isolation from the world community that exerted the pressure necessary to bend a state's ambition to dominate (Wilson, 1919). This study case merges these features, as Russia faced increasing isolation while the EU sanctions that have been listed in section 4 were broadly shared by the west which accounts for a great share of Russian exports and imports. This section will gather the understanding of what has been happening between the Russian Federation and the EU regarding the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty. First, it will be summarised to what extent EU sanctions have been effective. Secondly, a parallel with the literature will be drawn, gathering an understanding of how or under which conditions such restrictive measures could be more effective.

### **5.1 The overall effectiveness**

The supreme importance of this study case lies in the targeted nature of the restrictive measures the EU put in place. While the effectiveness of such measures was investigated before, rarely it was done systematically for the EU. IN addition, this study constitutes a collection of all sanctions that the EU imposed on other European states in response to the war. Again, it is the first time these measures were implemented against a country so connected to the

Union. The preparation of effective targeted measures requires attention and time. On one hand, the EU can boast of high-level personnel for the preparation of such measures, on the other hand, it was often forced to prepare them in a matter of days, to quickly respond to Russia's actions.

According to the data gathered in chapter 4, the EU imposed several packages of sanctions, which were grouped into seven episodes consistently with their own classification (Council of the European Union, 2022w). Along the assessment of data, several observations can be made. First, the aim of the restrictive measures faced an evolution, also responding to the developments in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The primary aim of the sanctions can find consistency in stopping "Russian action against Ukraine, to restore Ukraine's sovereignty" (European Council, 2014a). However, the EU's path to this final aim moved from simply showing their concern (answer to the threat), to punishing Russia and the initiators, ending in punishing the initiators but disabling Russia's ability to support its warfare materially and economically. Second, in line with these aims, the effectiveness score has been appointed as III, III, IV, III, II, III, II chronologically. Consequently, the median result is III and the average score is also approximated to 3  $[(3+3+4+3+2+3+2)/7=2.86]$  out of 4, (with 4 being the worse) making their aggregated assessment as barely effective. Third, most of the measures were implemented as a continuation of previous sanctions or as strengthening of the same, bringing forward the challenge of assessing which type of measures brought the best results through qualitative analysis. In general, it can be observed how measures that regarded fossil fuels and the isolation of the Russian banking system triggered the most effective response. These are the two most prominent characteristics of the packages analysed in sections 4.5 and 4.7 which scored best (partially effective).

## **5.2 Limits and possibilities for economic warfare**

As explained in the section above, the set of measures here analysed did not achieve its initial political objective, which was rolling back the situation in favour of Ukraine's sovereignty. While the economic might and its consequences were recognised by the Russian Federation, their political elite, stood still in their decision of continuing the war. Finding the causes of this result is not an easy task. The imposition of the measure faced an increased rhythm after the invasion of 2022, giving a short time for a thorough political analysis of each package and bringing about the risk that multiple measures collide and mix their effects, challenging a selective assessment. Furthermore, a further challenge is brought about by the wide array of countries that joined the EU in its sanctioning. This probably boosted the overall effectiveness of sanctions but causes distortions in the Russian answers. First, it renders impossible, unless Russia admits why is answering in a certain way or adopts certain measures, to find out because of whom they decided to give in. Secondly, as the measures imposed by other countries might differ in scope, aim, reason, and timing, even the inherent characteristics of what makes one effective or not becomes difficult to isolate. Finally, the creation of multiple objectives for a vast array of measures makes it difficult to distinguish whether these aims were met, and to what extent they faced an evolution due to the changing nature of Russia's actions or because of the impossibility of obtaining the initial purpose.

In line with the relevant literature, the effectiveness of sanctions within this case study is influenced by several factors that will also limit the future developments of the episode. The limited degree of the successfulness of these measures has deep roots in both how Russia is made and how the EU decided to act. While the EU has been an important partner for Russia, the EU imposed relatively weak sanctions at the beginning of 2014, giving the target state the time to understand the political will of the sender, and adapt their economy to



the sanctions that arrived in 2022 (Hufbauer et al., 2007). At the beginning of the sanction episode, the EU did not follow what prominent authors suggest, but rather the contrary, imposing a high number of weak sanctions (Whang, 2010). By contrast, Jeong's recommendation of enforcing quick and decisive measures was followed in 2022 (Jeong, 2019).

Furthermore, Russia became increasingly less likely to comply. In contrast with the literature, sanctions were imposed when openings for regime change were difficult to achieve and Russia's perception of external threats was at its highest, increasing the likelihood they would last longer (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000). In addition, Russia was from the start a difficult candidate for economic sanctions. This country has several characteristics that prominent authors list as having negative effects on the effectiveness of sanctions such as low levels of democratisation, relatively little wealth, high political costs for compliance, high concentration of power, and strong historical traditions, a past of exposition to ideologies (Pala, 2021; Hufbauer et al., 2007; Kaempfer et al., 2004; Blanchard and Ripsman, 1999; Walentek et al., 2021). As others have found, the imposition of these measures also began to show how Russia is tightening its control over its citizens (Russia, n.d., n.d.; Hassner, 2008; Kaempfer et al., 2004).

Finally, "from a policy standpoint, it should not be discounted that short-term gains achieved at the expense of longer-term economic and political stability of target countries might bring about new and possibly bigger problems for targets, their neighbouring countries, and senders"(Peksen, 2019b). As others have found, the reason for imposing economic sanctions on authoritarian rival countries does not lay in their effectiveness but rather in the belief that something should be done and economic measures are a preferable option to war (Smeets, 2018; Pape, 1998). This must be done as the EU follows this ideal, even if "prolonged sanctions inflict greater costs on senders, which

compromises sanctions' utility as a foreign policy instrument" (Jeong, 2019: 242).

### **5.3 Future Research**

As discussed along the body, this study allows for further developments in the research of sanctions' effectiveness. However, the EU was not the only country that took part in this case and adopted coercive measures against Russia ('UK sanctions relating to Russia', n.d.; 'Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions', n.d.). Future research could investigate their role in making the restrictive measures more effective. Furthermore, a thorough investigation of which foreign policy tools were preferred for each country and their weight in the study case. Analysing these differences could identify patterns that might be culturally or economically motivated among different countries or political systems. Because of trends indicating the increasing popularity of coercive economic measures, this field has full potential to dive deeper into the subject.

The aim of this research qualitatively assessed the successfulness of changing the political influence these sanctions exercised. At all times this dissertation kept this point as a reference. Even if beyond the scope of this study, more research could be done when more sanction packages are released, or more developments on the Russian side unfold. Alternatively, investigations can dive into a detailed quantification of how these measures have impacted the Russian economy and its ability to finance the war, as well as fuel their industry, military and wide.

### **6. Conclusion**

The present dissertation focused on furthering the understanding of how effective a foreign policy tool economic warfare is. In addition, it tries to present some features that might have influenced the results of this specific episode which was the subject of the chosen case study. Given the political

nature of the decisions that lay between the imposition of sanctions and the one of waging war, a qualitative method was selected. The current research was based on an accurately selected framework to judge the various stages of the study case consistently. The mentioned framework, as explicitly motivated in the proper chapter of this writing, was built following specific criteria that were inspired by the work in the same field of prominent authors and the most relevant sanctions databases (Felbermayr et al., 2020; 'Global Sanctions Database - GSDB', n.d.).

The findings of this research evidence how the EU obtained an overall 'barely effective' result from the imposition of restrictive measures on Russia over its breach of Ukraine's sovereignty. In line with the relevant literature in the field, some factors were identified as holding back the political effectiveness of the sanctions under scrutiny. Some of these, like the timing and the entity of the measures, were under the control of the sender state. Others, like the inherent characteristics of Russia, and its relationship with the EU and the world, were not. The analysis also identified a shift in the aim of the restrictive measures imposed.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that more could have been done with timely responses, but it is difficult to assess the feasibility of the imposition of such drastic measures without a good reason before. Finally, it can be said that the imposition of sanctions on Russia by the EU, did not follow solely the principle of strategic interest and the research of effectiveness. These restrictive measures were imposed beyond these purposes, to show the European citizens that something was being done and even if they bring a cost on the sender and its population, costs must be borne for the ideal of peace.

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