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ABSTRACT

This master thesis investigates the securitisation of migration, taking as a case study the context of Brazil. Whilst criticisms of EU asylum and migration policy have consistently demonstrated the negative impact on the protection of these group's human rights, Brazil is often praised as a good model of migration and asylum management. Aiming at contributing to the literature on securitisation, this study proposes to explore both the concepts developed by the Copenhagen School and the revised version of the securitisation theory proposed by the Paris School. Hence, it seeks to analyse the relation between speeches and routine practices. The case study presented will provide perspectives on the narratives constructed by political actors and the instruments mobilized by security experts in their handling of the migration issue. Covering the period from 2000 to 2020, the rhetorical elements of four governments and their respective representatives will be explored through discourse analysis. In addition to that, an overview of the legal-institutional framework concerning human mobility in Brazil will be provided. The study identified key bureaucratic instruments that are used to deal with the migration issue in an "exceptional" condition. By contrasting these two perspectives, rhetoric and bureaucratic, the study concludes that securitisation has been institutionalized over time in Brazil and it is now mobilized as technical actions, rather than as a political construction. The logic behind the bureaucracies and routines of security experts during this period demonstrates that migration has been dealt over time through the lens of criminalization and securitisation in Brazil.

List of abbreviations:

AtD: Autonomy through Diversification

CNIg: National Immigration Committee

CONARE: National Committee for Refugees

CS: Copenhagen School

CSO: Civil Society Organisations

EU: European Union

FARC: Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces

ILO: International Labour Organisation

IO: International Organisation

IOM: International Organisation for Migration

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilisation Mission for Haiti

MJSP: Ministry of Justice and Public Security

NML: New Migration Law

PL: Liberal Party

PSL: Liberal Social Party

PMDB: Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

PT: Partido dos Trabalhadores, Workers' Party

PS: Paris School

UNESCO: United Nations

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Refugee Agency

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

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1. Introduction

Asylum and migration have been at the heart of political debates around the globe, particularly after 9/11 (Lazaridis & Wadia, 2015). Because of the increased concern over security and violent non-state actors, Global North countries put into place several restrictions to migration flows reaching their territory. Some authors refer to this phenomenon as “migration-security nexus” (Bourbeau 2017; Pinyol-Jimenez, 2012; Karyotis 2003). In order to analyse this nexus, a variety of scholars departed from the concepts developed by the Copenhagen School (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al, 1998; Waever, 1993; Waever, 1995). They argued that migration had left the political realm and entered the security realm, thus justifying “exceptional measures” against migrants and human mobility (Bigo, 1998; d’Appollonia, 2015; Huysmans, 2000, 2006).

While migration has been successfully securitised in Europe and the United States, Global South countries are expected to absorb most of these flows. The fact they are generally neighbours of humanitarian crisis has impacted the imbalance in responsibility share when it comes to hosting refugees. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 72% of refugees displaced abroad live in countries neighbouring their countries of origin. In fact, 38% of the total refugee population is hosted in only 5 countries: Turkey, Colombia, Uganda, Pakistan and then, the only European country with over a million refugees, Germany (UNHCR, 2021). This scenario indicates the increasing importance of South-South route as an element of the reconfiguration of migrations and their destinations in the world today.

South-South migration demonstrates the complexity and heterogeneity of international immigration. Mixed-migration patterns have become the main characteristic of South-South migration, combining modalities of international students, qualified migrants, refugees, economic migrants, among others. It ultimately builds a mosaic of population displacement trends in contemporary times (Baeninger et al, 2018). Hence, they denote theoretical and methodological challenges for explanations and analysis of migration among the countries of the region.

Babié (2017) points out that this topic has been mostly absent from the academic production on migration. The author highlights the role of data and information that can bring South-South migration into the understanding of new international migrations. Babié emphasizes that historical aspects, definition of South, bilateral causes and policies

are constitutive to the understanding of such flows. On the other hand, Securitisation theory has been mainly studied in Europe, with authors often arguing that this theoretical lens could only be applied in that region (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013; Holbraad & Pedersen, 2012; Wilkinson, 2007).

Wilkinson (2007), for instance, argues that the securitisation theory, as put forward by the Copenhagen School, is not suited for the study of non-Western states for two main reasons: (1) European understandings of society and the state are not universal; and (2) emphasis on the speech act does not consider societies where there are limitations to speech. Securitisation moves, therefore, can only be defined as such when they are originated in a context of democratic societies, where measures to tackle securitised issues are exceptional, outside normal politics, thus need “convincing”. Conversely, authoritarian societies do not operate under normal politics, but through a constant state of exception (Arantes, 2014).

Although Brazil is not considered and does not consider itself a Western country (Stuenkel, 2011), it has emerged from its colonial past as one of the largest liberal democracies in the world. Its current political system and government policies are established under the principles of democracy, separation of powers, free trade, free speech, and the defence of human rights. Ultimately, liberal democracy is not a uniquely Western value (Mahbubani, 1993), rendering Brazil the status of a coherent case study to identify securitisation moves and exceptional measures.

Brazil entered the South-South migration route more prominently in the 2010s, especially by the presence of Haitian immigration and due to the anti-immigrant policies of the United States and Europe. In 2018, with the worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, the government developed a “three-party structure” (Leão, 2003) to conduct border management and humanitarian protection to the increasing number of migrants reaching Brazil. This structure was named Operation Welcome and operationalized by the government, United Nations and Civil Society Organisations. Insofar as Brazil’s role as a destination for international migrations took on greater proportions, so did the visibility of its national humanitarian reception policies among academics and practitioners.

Whilst criticisms of EU asylum and migration policy have consistently demonstrated the negative impact on the protection of these group’s human rights, Brazil is often praised

as a good model of migration and asylum management. The international community agrees that the country's legal framework to protect migrants and asylum seekers is modern and progressive, as well as Brazilian politicians are known to be quite vocal in their commitment to welcome international migration. Nonetheless, recent literature has pointed out some contradictions between speech and practices in relation to migration management in the country (Zamberlam, 2004; Furtado, 2014; Vasconcelos & Machado, 2022), denoting elements of security concerns over human mobility to country, specially through the lens of countering transnational crime. This opens the question on whether Brazil securitises migration and, if it does, how securitisation happens.

This research focuses, therefore, on the question of international migrations understood in International Security studies, through the localisation of this issue in a Global South perspective. Departing from this new perspective, the study will analyse how the relationship between the migration phenomena and the security phenomena occurs. It seeks to analyse the process of construction of certain groups of immigrants whose presence is treated as a threat to the state and society. Departing from the understanding that Brazil's migration management demonstrates contradictions, this study draws upon both the Copenhagen School's and Paris School's securitisation framework to answer the following research question:

To what extent do practices of securitisation reflect the content of political speeches?

Aiming at contributing to the literature on securitisation, this dissertation proposes to explore a case study in which "speech acts" (Buzan, 1998) position migration as a humanitarian issue, while migration management practices may translate a concern with the threat migration may pose to the country. It highlights the importance of the "sociological" approach to securitization (Balzacq, 2010) pioneered by Bigo (1998; 2002; 2008; see also Bigo and Tsoukala 2008), which perceives security as being located on a continuum (Léonard, 2010).

By analysing three major events in Brazil's migration management policies, it was found that political speeches on migration do not represent the "speech act" conceptualized by the Copenhagen School, as they do not work to construct an image of migration as a threat. Rather, they work as the opposite, constructing the image of harmony between migrants and nationals. Studying the logic behind the bureaucracies and routines of security experts during the same periods, it was found that migration was in fact

securitised. A suggested reason behind contradictions between speech and practice involves Brazil's historical migration management policies, its cultural identity and foreign policy interests. These topics will be further explored in the findings section.

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This section will provide an overview on studies on migration and security, as well as the theory of securitisation through two different approaches, the Copenhagen School and the Paris School. In the first part of this review, recent research and publications addressing the issues of migrant flows and securitisation are included to provide an overview of recurrent debates across the literature. In the second part, the literature presented will offer a more detailed understanding of key elements of migration and security in the country of study, Brazil. This section will also present the elements that inform the official narratives surrounding Brazil's relationship with migration, which will then be further explored and analysed in order to answer the research question.

2.1. Debates on migration, protection, and security

2.1.1 Defining migration: Volunteer and forced migration

Literature traditionally makes distinctions between migration flows - there are those that are voluntary and those that are forced (Jubilut & Apolinário, 2010; Castles, 2003). Voluntary migration relates to all cases in which the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual, for reasons of personal convenience and without the intervention of an external factor. Forced migration, on the other hand, occurs when the volitional element of displacement is non-existent or minimized and encompasses a wide range of situations that can put one's life in danger (Jubilut & Apolinário, 2010).

The Constitutive Charter of the International Organization for Migration, for instance, refers at separate times to migrants and refugees, displaced persons and other individuals in need of international migration services, as follows:

Article 1. The purposes and functions of the Organization shall be: to make arrangements for the organized transfer of migrants, for whom existing facilities are inadequate or who would not otherwise be able to move without special assistance, to countries offering opportunities for orderly migration; to concern itself with the organized transfer of refugees, displaced persons and other individuals in need of international migration services for whom

arrangements may be made between the Organization and the States concerned, including those States undertaking to receive them (...). (IOM, 1954)

Recent productions have increasingly demonstrated how the boundaries between voluntary and forced migrants are blurred (Erdal & Oeppen, 2018; Bernardon, 2021; Castles et al, 2014; Fussell 2012; Richmond, 1993). Voluntary migrants may feel the need to seek new homes because of pressing problems in their country of origin (Castles, 2006), at the same time forced migrants may choose to seek asylum in a particular place because of social networks and economic opportunities that they could benefit from (Martin, 2001). Nonetheless, international law provides different protection dispositive for different types of migrants. For instance, refugees count with certain rights, which are not extended to those deemed as voluntary migrants.

The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was created to respond to the humanitarian crisis originated by the Second World War and to establish protection mechanisms for those in need. According to the 1951 Convention, therefore, refugees are those forced to flee their homes. After the 1967 Protocol amendment, the current Convention text establishes that individuals that left their country of origin due to “well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, as well as serious and widespread violations of human rights and armed conflict” (UNHCR, 1967) are entitled to claim asylum.

Countries have responsibilities towards asylum-seekers and refugees, the most important being the *non-refoulement* dispositive, which states that refugees should not be returned to their own country forcibly. Another norm establishes that full economic and social rights should be extended to refugees and that states are obliged to try to provide lasting solutions for refugees, allowing them to integrate into the host country. States are sovereign and thus have the prerogative to deny or return “volunteer” or “economic” migrants, as they are not protected by the 1951 Convention. Nonetheless, they have obligations to ensure safe and orderly migration that protects the rights of migrants according to the International Humanitarian Law.

There is no current comprehensive international instrument that regulates the conduct of States with respect to all the existing variables in migration. What there are international norms that, by regulating issues such as security, nationality, statelessness, freedom of movement of persons, family unity, human rights, health, trafficking in persons, refuge,

asylum, touch on the subject of migration; or, in addition, norms of general protection of human beings that also apply to people on the move.

The basic document of the modern international human rights regime is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. States have the duty to extend protection to migrants, ensuring everyone within their territory – documented or not – has their basic human rights respected and secured, such as the right to life, liberty, security, and property. In addition to those, the Declaration is clear on the right of every person to be treated equally before the law, prohibiting arbitrary arrests, detention, or exile. Ultimately, states should ensure basic human rights such as access to education, health, and a fair trial, as well as the right to work and have social security.

Treaties have also been adopted within the framework of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to address the situation of migrant workers, and in 1990, the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families was adopted within the framework of the UN human rights system. This last document, in force since 2003, is very comprehensive and guarantees rights to migrant workers, whether they are regular or not in the host country. Thus, with regard to migration, the international instruments enshrine freedom of movement, which can only be restricted in the face of due process of law, and the right to asylum.

Nonetheless, the number of undocumented migrants has been increasing in the past decade due to aggravating conditions in several countries, unrelated to conflict or political persecution, such as climate change, environmental degradation, natural disaster, or serious economic and social distress. As a consequence, further protection needs arise as a result of the movement of undocumented migrants. They may recur to smugglers to travel to their destinations, making them vulnerable to human trafficking (Laczko & Thompson, 2000; Aradau, 2004; Erez et al, 2004). Countries, such as Libya, which are transit routes, may have strict laws on undocumented migrants, detaining people indefinitely (Andrijasevic, 2006, 2010; Mountz et al, 2012). Ultimately, irregular migration is a dynamic process and people's circumstances can change dramatically during transit between the country of origin and their destination (Matilla, 2003). International mechanisms have not accompanied the need for protection and managing international migration has been left to discretion of the countries.

2.1.2 The construction of threats: a look into the Copenhagen School

Security is a multifaceted term (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). It can mean different things depending on the place and the context observed. It can be an individual feeling, the probability of a particular threat occurring, a condition a group of individuals is in, or perceive themselves to be in (Rigterink, 2015). In Security Studies, traditionalist theories understand security as the absence of a threat to the survival of the state.

The Realist and Neo-Realist schools of thought depart from a perspective that the social truth is predominantly a result of material factors' influence. For Waltz (1979), the structure of the international system and its consequent phenomena are defined and explained by the relative distribution of material capacities among the units of the system. Thus, state security was at the centre of concern in these studies and was perceived as directly related to the anarchic nature of the international system and the effort states make in order to survive.

With the Cold War coming to an end, academia was once again looking at the various possibilities of defining security, seeking to broaden and deepen the concept. Until that point, security had primarily been understood through the perspectives of Classical and Neo-Realism. However, the end of the bipolar world, the prevalence of intra-state conflicts around the globe, and the nuclear threat modified the security environment in this new era¹.

Some examples of this new wave of threats that should be combated by States are international terrorism; illegal arms trafficking; environmental degradation; religious fundamentalism; extreme poverty; international organized crime; drug trafficking; and international migration; drug trafficking, and international migration (López, 2007). In response to these changes, the international security literature has also started to analyse themes that were previously marginalized and that now share space with traditional military threats (Vauhan-Williams, 2010). The Schools of Paris (inspired by Pierre Bourdieu's ideas), Wales (critical and emancipatory security studies), and the

¹ With American superiority and the transformation of bipolarity into a new balance of power, whether unipolar (Krauthammer, 1990), multipolar (Layne, 1993), or uni-multipolar (Huntington, 1999), the imminence of a state conflict had become more difficult. In this way, the new perceptions of danger came from within the National States themselves, from civil wars and the so-called "New Wars" (see Kaldor, 2001), which in fact are mostly long-standing.

Copenhagen School (study of securitisation) are exponents of European security studies that challenged traditional research.

The post-Cold War period in Security Studies particularly saw the contributions of philosophical constructivism and critical theories challenging the fundamental ontologies of Realism. Alexander Wendt, an exponent of constructivism, states that in agent-structure relations, the meanings (ideas and values) are constituted by social relations. Hence, he argues that the anarchy characteristic of international politics would, in fact, be a social construction: “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992). The understanding that the construction of 'reality' was strongly influenced by the linguistic structures used, was reflected in security studies by authors Walker and Richard Ashley, by demonstrating that “threats” were socially constituted by means of discursive devices – “to constitute something as threatening meant evoking ‘discourses of danger and security’ and situating that ‘thing’ as particularly important to the given self”. (Buzan & Hansen, 2012: 225).

The Copenhagen School (CS) has developed on these critiques. The school challenged the traditionalist conception of security by viewing threats as being constructed through the power of security discourse (Balzacq, 2005), demonstrating the subjectivity that permeates the definition of security. Initially led by Barry Buzan, Lene Hansen, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, CS emerged out of dissatisfaction with the plastering of traditionalist theory: realist theory that kept only the state and its military issues as the focus of security questions. This dissatisfaction was stimulated by the international environmental and economic agendas during the 1970s and 1980s (Silva, 2019).

In this sense, the CS promotes both the broadening and deepening of the security agenda. By broadening, the school means the expansion of the scope of security threats to include non-traditional threats such as politics, society, and the environment (Buzan et al., 1998). By deepening, it means that the referent object may be not only the state, but also organisations, individuals, transnational groups. (Huysmans, 2006; Villa & Santos, 2011; Silva, 2019). To better understand securitization, operational categories were created: 1) Referring objects 2) Securitising agent; and 3) Functional actors.

A referent object is an issue that is perceived as an existential threat. The securitising agent is the actor who claims the existence of a threat to the referent object, who identifies this object as a threat. Finally, the functional actors, who do not belong to either of the

two previous groups, but participate directly or indirectly in the security dynamics of a sector. CS presents the concept of securitisation as a social construction: if an object is seen as a security issue, it means there was an argument that a certain object is more important than others:

In the case of security, textual analysis suggests that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority. This is the reason we link the issue to what might seem a fairly demanding criterion: that the issue is presented as an existential threat (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998:24).

The “speech act” is a fundamental concept in CS. However, a discourse that presents an existential threat alone cannot create securitisation. Discourse is part of the securitisation movement. The agent's discourse is necessary, but not sufficient. For the process to fully occur it is necessary that the agent's audience accept it as such. Securitisation is not imposed. The crucial point is that the referent object must be discussed, debated, to gain sufficient resonance for it to acquire legitimacy (Silva, 2019). This movement gives public authorities additional powers that make it possible to carry out activities that would otherwise be considered illegal.

The literature raises two important characteristics of securitisation. First, it is an auto-referential practice, which means that it is this practice that turns something into a security issue (Diskaia, 2013). Second, the existential nature of the threat is different from the traditional security perception. Threats are constructed, brought from the initial condition in which they have a given nature (political or non-political, for example), and are transformed to acquire a new nature. Thus, in this process, securitisation may refer to real threats or not. According to the authors, the way to study securitisation is to examine discourses and policies, because it is necessary to understand when an argument with this particular structure - threat and political effects - reaches a sufficient audience to tolerate rule violations.

2.1.3 Intersections of migration and security: a look into the Paris School

Over two million people sought asylum in Europe in 2015 and 2016, the majority coming from the Middle East and Africa. It was considered the biggest migration flow of our times (UN, 2016). The so-called “migration crisis” or “refugee crisis” classified migrants and refugees as a problem (Georgi, 2019; Rodríguez, 2018), and based securitising discourses. The distinction between voluntary and forced migrants, for instance, was

brought up by European politicians to imply that asylum seekers were simply economic migrants, generating public debates about the protection of national economies and labour markets from foreigners (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2015).

In several EU member states, anti-migrant rhetoric based its arguments on claims of national identity protection and national security against criminals and terrorists infiltrated among those arriving in Europe (ENAR, 2016). These narratives prepared the ground for states denying to comply with international protection rules and European Union (EU) agreements, such as the refugee quota system approved by the Commission in 2015 (Astorri, 2018; Martin, 2017; Rankin, 2020), which established a responsibility share between EU members in welcoming refugees to their countries².

Authors identify several root causes for anti-migrant narratives. First, it can be seen as a counter-reaction to political, cultural, and social gains migrant communities have achieved (Georgi, 2019). These “post-migrant societies” have become more diverse in terms of religion, colour, and ethnicity (Foroutan, 2015) and not only do communities mobilize to claim more equal opportunities, immigrants as well attain positions of power, prestige and influence (Espahangizi et al. 2016). According to Abou-Chadi et al (2022), anti-immigration attitudes in Europe rose in relevance *even in the period immediately before* the “migration crisis” in 2015, adding to the evidence that the European social fabric was already pervaded by nativist sentiment (Guia, 2016).

A second issue, which is closely related to the first one, involves projecting one’s frustrations on minority groups (Adorno, 1993; Cornelis and Van Hiel 2014; Georgi, 2019; Gordon 2016; Hall, 2012). Europe and the United States, particularly, have experienced profound economic changes due to the 2008’s crisis. As Georgi (2019) points out, “unemployment or underemployment with precarious, low-wage, jobs”, “the actual experience of social descent and poverty” or even “high-pressure competition, unpaid overtime and stress” have generated collective psychological effects on these populations.

The media, in turn, has had a key role in directing people’s frustrations onto a targeted “enemy” (Critchler, 2003; Jewkes, 2015; Kidd-Hewitt and Osborne, 1995; Rodríguez, 2018). Feelings of insecurity due to social and economic deprivation were continuously attributed to outsiders in different societies and throughout times. These narratives aim at creating a consensus among the population, drawing its attention away from domestic

² Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia refused to take in refugees.

political failures or contested reforms (Rodríguez, 2018)³. Cohen (2002) refers to this phenomenon as “moral panic”.

Moral panic entails a collective reaction to events that are portrayed as threatening to the existing social, political or cultural order. Cohen (2012) has argued that “anything connected with immigration, migrants, multicultural absorption, refugees, border controls and asylum seekers’ will be the most important site for moral panics, not least because ‘[t]his subject is more political, more edgy and more amenable to violence’”. Authors have linked the construction of moral panics to securitising “speech acts” (Androvičová, 2016; Danewid, 2021; Brancante & Reis, 2009; Moreira, 2020).

Therefore, the process of criminalizing the immigrant and making them an enemy can be related to the new social nuances of the contemporary era (Wermuth, 2011: 168), in which the fear that permeates the so-called “risk society” (Beck, 1992) is rooted in the uncertainties of the future, which globalization can present, and in this sense, the State needs to reaffirm its sovereignty through the decision of who should be considered a citizen and who should not (Bauman, 2011; Alves, 2015).

The literature tends to agree that 9\11 was a point of inflection when it comes to the securitisation of migration in the “western world” (Guild, 2003; Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008; Karyotis, 2007). Scholars following the Copenhagen School point out how political actors have constructed the narratives of migrants as potential terrorists and criminals to allow “exceptional measures” to be taken to prevent them from entering their countries (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; d’Appollonia, 2015; Huysmans, 2000; Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008; Van Munster, 2009).

Departing from the original securitisation framework, the Paris School (PS) constitutes a political sociological approach to thinking critically about securitisation of migration. In his work, *Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease*, Didier Bigo (2002) argues that securitisation does not fully explain why migration is referred to as a security object. Rather than explaining this issue through the

³ For instance, during Thatcher’s dismantling of the welfare state in the late 1970s, conservative media built Caribbean men as threats to white Brits (Hall et al, 1978); amidst the Hungarian government’s large-scale corruption scandals in 2014, online media had a key role in framing migrants as terrorists (Hornýák, Willot, 2016); prior to Australian elections, the “No Visa” campaign directed to asylum seekers is seen as an attempt by the Labour Party to recover its decaying popularity after years of economic slowdown (Martin, 2015); after the blast in Beirut, discrimination against Syrian refugees in Lebanon was only exacerbated with TV Channels and online media contributing to fake news (Lawley, 2020; Omar, 2021).

prism of the “speech act”, the PS perceives the process of securitisation occurring through institutionalised and bureaucratised practices (Bigo & McCluskey, 2018).

As seen before, in order for the “speech act” to be successful it depends on the acknowledgment of an audience. However, critics have pointed out that this element has not been explicit. Little is known about who is the audience, what is the size of an audience for a speech act to reach sufficient interlocutors, and whether this audience is passively or actively engaged in the securitisation discourses (Stritzel, 2014; Salter & Piche, 2011; Balzacq, 2005). Authors have pointed out this under-formulation and questioned whether the speech act can constitute a securitising act alone (Salta & Piche, 2011).

Strongly influenced by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, the Paris School brings a sociological point of view to securitisation. From Foucault, the PS recovers the concept of governmentality that is concerned with the relationship between the state and its subjects and how the state controls its citizens (Reid, 2014). From Bourdieu, the PS mobilizes ideas about the importance of observing routine practices, symbolic structures, and arenas of conflict that highlight diverse actors, rather than focusing only on states. Bourdieu further allows for exploring how normal people at various levels create international relations in their daily routines (Alder-Nissen, 2012).

Therefore, the PS understands that exceptional measures are not really an exception, rather they are a form of governmentality (Diez and Squire, 2008; Bigo, 2011; Neal, 2009). These measures involve a technocratic policy “embedded in training, routine, and technical knowledge and skills, as well as technological artifacts” (Huysmans, 2010: 9). The incorporation of security dispositive into day-to-day life (Bigo, 2011), such as biometrics, CCTV, and risk assessments, characterizes the technologies of control that govern our lives and consequently, the management of migration. Much more than set off by elites, securitisation involves day-to-day practices.

Bigo (2008) shows that when an issue is securitised, in addition to defining who is to be protected from existential threats by extraordinary means, it is also defined who must be sacrificed in order for the threat to be eliminated or contained. Thus, practices that aim to secure certain individuals are, simultaneously, actions that cause insecurity for others. Security and insecurity interact, therefore, in a process of (in)securitization, since both grow together and generate self-sustaining dynamics. If on the one hand, citizens have

their security protected in the Nation-State, migrants are exposed to techniques and procedures of containment simply because they are foreigners (Rego, 2017).

The process of in-securitisation is the result of a series of decisions made by the *professionals of unease*, who may be politicians, military, patrol agents, private companies, and intelligence agencies (Bigo, 2002). The choice to categorize an element as a threat may then reflect their interests (Reid, 2014). Thus, through detailed and empirical investigations of the practices of security actors, the PS showed that political actions often deviated from official discourses and that certain social positions are privileged with respect to “doing security” (Waever, 2004; Alves, 2015).

2.2. *The case of Brazil*

2.2.1. *Historical overview of migration flows to Brazil*

Brazil is recognized as one of the most miscegenated nations in the world (Pereira, 2012; Santos & Silva, 2017; Visentini, 2016) due to the role migration flows played in the construction of the country’s identity. The first major migration flow took place between the 16th and 19th centuries. Over 4 million Africans were forced into labour in Brazil (Wesja & Lesser, 2018), either at sugar cane plantations in the Northeast region or in the gold mines cutting across the Southeast territory. The Portuguese Colony, and later, as the Brazilian Empire, held on to slavery longer than any other territory in the Americas. When the abolition was signed in 1888, the government initiated a volunteer migration program. More than 2.6 million immigrants entered the country between 1890 and 1919, coming from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Germany (Wesja & Lesser, 2018).

At the time, Europe was experiencing the consequences of its Industrial Revolution such as mass unemployment, demographic explosion, facilitation of means of transport and communication, and political unrest. People sought the “New World” in search of better living conditions. Brazil, on the other hand, was at the height of the expansion of coffee farming in the Southeast. Coffee plantations were the country’s main agricultural activity, dependent on slave labour, already scarce due to the prohibition of the slave trade. The flow of migrants served the purpose of replacing the recently abolished slave labour (Gebara, 1986; França, 2008; Lamounier, 1988). On the other hand, the Brazilian government sought an agricultural colonisation project with the objectives of defence and

settlement of the land, based on small polyculture, attracting migrants to the disputed borders in the Southern region (Barroso, 1990; Zarth, 1999; Patarra, 2012; Dezordi, 2013). Ultimately, historiography highlights the centrality of Brazil's elite project to "whiten" Brazilian society, using the volunteer migration programme as means to this end (Schwarcz, 1993; Munanga, 2008; Stepan, 2005).

Between 1930 and 1950, migration flows were reduced. Authors agree that the Second World War and the Quota Law, passed during Getúlio Varga's dictatorship, were central influences on the access of migrants to Brazil. The law restricted the entry of immigrants into the country and it was inserted into a wider ideological momentum of Brazilian and international politics. During the *Estado Novo* dictatorship⁴, repressive measures became more frequent mainly against foreigners of Japanese, German and Italian origin, as well as secretive measures were created to prevent the entry of Jewish refugees (Geraldo, 2009).

In the 1960s, migration flows to Brazil were almost non-existent. From 1964 to 1985, Brazil endured a military dictatorship, which corresponded to the wider international developments of the Cold War. Latin America observed several coup d'états in an attempt of the military and conservative forces to tackle the expansion of communist ideology in the region. Consequently, the new guidelines of the Brazilian National Security Doctrine perceived certain migrants as threats, particularly those from leftist parties and from socialist states (Fernandes, 2012).

Although migration flows remained low until the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, it was possible to identify patterns. According to Macedo (2019), regional and international events informed these migration flows: the political fugitives of authoritarian regimes in other South American countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay); refugees coming from African countries facing civil wars (Angola, Mozambique, and Congo); Colombians fleeing the conflict between the government and the FARC; and, by the end of the decade, Afghans fleeing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Migrant workers also arrived in Brazil to work at multinational companies,

⁴ The *Estado Novo* ("New State") period began in November 1937, when the president Getúlio Vargas granted a new Constitution and decreed the closure of Congress, and was finalised when Vargas received an ultimatum from the military and was forced to resign the presidency in October 1945. As Braga (2010) argues, the *Estado Novo* seems to have been born, lived and died under the aegis of global transformations. If the flourishing of authoritarian regimes in Europe encouraged President Vargas to establish an authoritarian political regime in the country, this same regime experienced its peak and fall under the influence of the Second World War.

particularly coming from the Global North. Bolivians and Peruvians workers also migrated to Brazil to seek better jobs and life conditions.

The re-democratization period eventually put the Foreigner's Statute in contradiction with the 1988 Constitution, according to which all are equal before the law, without distinction of any nature. The new Constitution guaranteed to Brazilians and foreigners the inviolability of the right to life, liberty, equality, safety, and property.

As Patarra (2005) observes, the immigration of foreigners from other developing countries, particularly from South America, represented a new type of immigration, mostly undocumented and non-qualified (Patarra, 2005). The profile of the migrants at the beginning of the 20th century, who were fleeing war, was replaced by migrants reaching Brazil seeking access to public services and integration in low-level jobs in the incipient industry sector and service sector (Macedo, 2019).

Simultaneously to the increasing of South American economic migration to Brazil, another type of migration modality emerged in the region, impacting the perspective on human mobility and border management. In 1980's, Brazil became the most prominent transit route for drugs leaving the Andes for the United States and, above all, Europe (Lago & Almeida, 2017). Foreigners, mostly South Americans, arrived in Brazil as "drug mules", utilizing especially the fluvial and land borders in the North of the country, where the Amazon Forest provided some cover for the activity (Feldman-Bianco, 2018). This caused the government to increase the contingency of the Federal Police and the Armed Forces at the border, tightening control and intensifying surveillance of migrants.

In the 21st century, the restrictions imposed by Global North countries on the entry and stay of international migrants are an important element in the reconfiguration of migration flows in today's world. Narratives that linked terrorism and migration were institutionalized in Europe and the United States post 9/11, as we have seen above. Hence, South-South migration has become more intense. By 2008, with the outbreak of the global financial crisis, as well as the increase in Brazil's projection on the international scene, the country began to have greater external visibility. With the maintenance of a certain degree of economic growth in a model based on job generation, not only Brazilians stopped going abroad, but many returned to Brazil due to the financial crisis effects on their host countries (Câmara, 2014). Significant migrant flows took place as well, not

only in terms of quantity but also in terms of the diversity of countries of origin of migrants:

These were flows that have provided over time an increase in immigrants to Brazil, and a considerable diversification of their origins (Haitians, Bengalis, Pakistanis, Syrians, Senegalese, Congolese, and Ghanaians, among others), of the routes used (in great part, by land border, crossing border points in localities in the North of the country) and of the motivations to migrate (search for better employment and income conditions, conflict zones or natural disasters in the countries of origin, fleeing from situations of unemployment, instability, risk or social vulnerability) (Câmara, 2014:71)

By 2009, there were between 1 million and 1,5 million documented and undocumented migrants living in Brazil, the majority located in São Paulo as the city represented a “land of opportunities” due to its fast-growing economy and industry sector.

The biggest migration flow to Brazil in the 21st century is still taking place. Since 2017, thousands of Venezuelans reached Brazil through the border between the two countries, fleeing from deteriorating political and social contexts in Venezuela. The Brazilian army launched the *Operação Acolhida*⁵ at the Brazilian-Venezuelan border and, together with international organisations and NGOs, has put into place 8 shelters spread between Pacaraima (Roraima state), Boa Vista (Roraima state) and Manaus (Amazonas state) to receive asylum claimers. Currently, Venezuelans are the biggest migrant population, with over 300 thousand people living in Brazil (UNHCR, 2021).

Currently, 60 thousand refugees and 1.3 million immigrants are legally residing in Brazil. The largest flows of the past decades were from Venezuela, Haiti, Bolivia, Colombia, and the United States (Agência Brasil, 2020).

2.2.2 *Brazilian legal framework to protect migrants*

Between the 19th century and the first half of the 21st century, Brazil had 287 norms of various hierarchical levels that dealt with the subject of international migration (Claro, 2015). The main ones are the Foreigner’s Statute (Law No. 6.815/80), the Refugee Statute (Law 9474/1997) and the New Migration Law (Law 13.445/17), which replaced the Foreigner’s Statute in 2017.

⁵ Translated to English as Operation Welcoming.

In order to present Brazil's legal framework regarding migrants, Câmara (2014) argues it is opportune to briefly highlight the attributions and responsibilities that characterize the performance of governmental bodies in the area of immigration.

a) Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP): Processes related to the permanence of foreigners in the national territory, naturalization, and compulsory removals, among others, ordinarily instructed in the decentralized units of the Federal Police Department (DPF), are sent to the MJSP for ministerial decision. Also part of the structure of the Ministry of Justice is the National Committee for Refugees (CONARE), whose work is relevant to the regulation and processing of refugee requests in Brazil.

b) Ministry of Labour and Welfare (MTP): It is responsible for granting work permits to foreigners. Part of this Ministry is the the National Immigration Council (CNIg), a collegiate body, involving representatives of various public agencies, employers, trade union centrals and civil society, responsible, among other attributions, for formulating immigration policies and for opining on proposals to amend the legislation regarding immigration.

c) Ministry of External Relations (MRE) or Itamaraty: It maintains in its structure the Department of Immigration and Legal Affairs (DIJ), which also includes an Immigration Division (DIM). The DIJ is responsible for controlling the issue of entry visas granted by Brazilian consular offices abroad and the legalization of documents in Brazil, among other activities.

The current division of administrative powers in migration matters dates back 1960s. Lopes (2009) points out that this division of competencies coincides with the historical moment in which colonization by means of importing foreign labour ceased to be a priority for the country, at the same time that the quantitative importance of immigration was declining and national security concerns were growing in relation to the foreign context.

In the 1980s, the period in which the Cartagena Declaration was signed, Brazil was in the process of transitioning from a regime of exception to a democratic country. The fact that Brazil ratified the Declaration made it possible for a large number of migrants to be recognized as refugees. In 1997, Brazil enacts specific legislation defining the concept of refugee: Law 9474/1997. It was the first specific legislation for refugee protection in South America. In Article 1, the definition of refugee takes into consideration the Refugee

Statute, as well as rectification of the Protocol of 67, and the Cartagena Declaration. In the terms of this legal act, it is considered refugee every one that:

I - due to well-founded fears of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinions finds himself outside his country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to welcome the protection of such country;

II - not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, he is unable or unwilling to return to it due to the circumstances described in the previous clause;

III - due to grave and generalized violation of human rights, is forced to leave his country of nationality to seek refuge in another country. (Brazil, Law No. 9474, Article 1)

According to Jubilut (2007), although Law 9474 expands the concept of refugee present in the Convention of 51, as well as in the Protocol of 67, it is limited as to the Cartagena Declaration. This is because there is a subjective understanding to recognize as refugees in what refers to people fleeing from serious and widespread human rights violations. This leaves the “issue of refugee protection once again subject to the political will and discretion of individual states” (Jubilut, 2007:135).

Only in 2017 the New Migration Law, Law No. 13.445/17, was sanctioned. This law replaced the Foreigners’ Statute and highlights in its scope the prevalence of constitutional treatment of migrants’ rights in Brazil in line with international human rights treaties in force in the country. Among the achievements of the new law are the definition of immigrant categories, in particular the definition of statelessness, facilitating the acceptance of a growing number of people without nationality; and the creation of principles and guidelines of migration policy based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the commitment to establish guarantees for migrants and their family (Brasil, 2017; Lima et al., 2017; Correa, 2020).

Although recognized as a modern law, based on principles of human rights protection, and progressive compared to the previous framework, the New Migration Law received several critiques. The reason for that relates to the fact that the original text suffered 20 important vetoes. Some of the vetoed articles provided amnesty for foreigners who were undocumented in Brazil when the law came into effect and gave indigenous peoples freedom to transit across Brazil’s borders with other countries. The justification for removing these two articles from the original text is that they violated the State’s

discretionary power to regulate migration, and affronted national sovereignty respectively (Brasil, 2017; Lima et al., 2017).

In relation to temporary visas, it is worth mentioning the veto to paragraph 10 of article 14 of the law, which prescribed that “[...] regulations will determine the other hypotheses for granting temporary visas and the specifics of their categories, defining conditions, deadlines and requirements” (Brasil, 2017). This clause opened the possibility that other hypotheses of temporary visa could exist besides those defined in the law. The argument for this veto was that it would not be advisable to allow the existence of new possibilities created by regulation, in view of the risk of undue discretion and with the potential to create legal insecurity. This denotes a concern with national security, similar to that present in the revoked Foreigners’ Statute (Mendes & Brasil, 2017).

The New Migration Law established a temporary visa for humanitarian purposes, which was an innovation and an important achievement to support migrants who did not fit in the refugee category established by the 1951 Convention, but still, were coming from vulnerable contexts. This point was not regulated by the Decree 9.199/17⁶, which prescribed, in article 36, that “[...] a joint act of the State Ministers of Justice and Public Safety, of Foreign Relations and of Labour will define the conditions, deadlines and requirements for issuing the visa mentioned in the caput for nationals or residents of countries or regions specified therein”. The innovation brought by the humanitarian visa, therefore, lacks regulation:

[...] the new regulation should be concerned with establishing an exemplary list of hypotheses for granting humanitarian reception. In addition, it should establish the competence of the internal authority to decide whether a specific case qualifies for humanitarian reception. It would facilitate the process if there were parameters for identifying a humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the hypotheses of humanitarian reception cannot be restricted to the hypotheses of refuge. In other words, if humanitarian reception were to be granted in the same situations as refuge, there would be a denial of this right and a clear violation of what is established in article 14, paragraph 3 of the New Migration Law (Vedovato, 2018: 739).

Decree No. 9.199/17 also allowed the arrest of the irregular immigrant contradicting the principle inserted by Law No. 13.445/17 of “non-criminalization of migration”, provided in Article 3, item III.

⁶ The Decree 9.199/17 had the function to regularize the New Migration Law.

The New Migration Law contains more positive language than the Foreigner's Statute, departing from replacing the term "foreigner" with "migrant" in its title, offering a more humanitarian view of the individual. Several authors celebrate the law for its progressiveness, however, they also point out that the vetoes de-emphasize its humanitarian character (Claro, 2015; Sugimoto, 2017; Silva et al, 2020).

2.2.3 *Brazil as a welcoming place for migrants*

Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre explained that it was exactly the interactions between racially and culturally diverse societies that have built the Brazilian identity. In "Casa Grande & Senzala"⁷, Freyre (1933) sees the "mulato" – the mixed-race – as the realization of the "antagonisms balance", i.e., the "harmonic fusion of antagonistic and diverse traditions" (1933:52). Freyre argued that the Portuguese and their descendants from the "casa-grande", together with the Africans and their descendants from the "senzala", founded "the greatest modern civilisation in the tropics" (Freyre, 2002: 214). There is an element of vitality and superiority in the "way of Brazil". The author sees the vital core of Brazilian culture in the fraternal duality between master and slave, bachelor and illiterate, European and African culture.

The best of Brazil would come from a zone of fraternization and intercommunication between social opposites in permanent equilibrium. The balance seen in Brazilian society was linked to the idea of a society without "colour lines", that is, a society without legal barriers that prevented the social ascension of people of colour. In theory, by enjoying the same rights and civil status as the white population, black and mixed-race populations in Brazil lived a different condition from what was observed in the United States and South Africa at the time. This idea gave way to the mythical construction of a society without racial prejudice and discrimination.

The term "racial democracy", however, was never found in Freyre's main work. Nonetheless, Freyre's work participates intensely in the pact of racial democracy, serving as a true intellectual ballast for the functioning, however possible, of this pact. The idea of racial harmony in Brazil, for instance, motivated the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the mid-twentieth century, to finance

⁷ The book title was translated to English as "The Masters and the Slaves". The original title in Portuguese, however, is a reference to two contrasting spaces in the plantations during colonial times. *Casa Grande* meant the main house where the settler and his family lived and *Senzala* was a reference to the slave quarters.

research on racial relations in Brazil. According to Silva (2006: 33), the objective “was to show the world an example of peace between races”.

The narratives of Brazil as a multicultural nation, built on the intersection of different societies, constructed the image of the perfect host country for migrants (Jatoba & Martuscelli, 2018; Wejsa & Lesser, 2018). The absence of colour lines would make it impossible to distinguish Brazilians from other nationalities. In other words, anyone could be Brazilian, and, precisely because of that, xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiment would not find fertile soil to grow.

As Sprandel (2015) observes, Brazilians have a proud self-image as a hospitable and welcoming country. Here, it is found the biggest Lebanese community in the world, bigger than in Lebanon itself (G1, 2017)⁸; the biggest Japanese community outside Japan (Agência Brasil, 2022)⁹; and the biggest African community outside Africa (DW, 2013)¹⁰. Countries like Brazil, which were former colonies, made the decision to recognize nationality through the criteria of *jus soli*, due to the necessity of integrating the descendants of immigrants. European countries, on the contrary, were countries of emigration. The majority of them adopted the criteria of *jus sanguinis* in order to protect the descendants of their nationals who migrated to the New World (Bonani, 2014). The concept of *jus soli* has also been responsible for the idea of Brazil’s multiculturalism, integration and hospitality, which are even recognized internationally.

More recently, the *Operação Acolhida* and the creation of a specific public organ for refugee protection (CONARE), with civil society participation, have made Brazil be seen as a pioneer in handling asylum claims in a humanitarian and dignified manner (Borgen, 2021). The interiorization programme to integrate refugees, implemented in partnership between the government, private sector, and civil society organisations, is often regarded as one of its kind (Shamsuddin et al, 2021). The accreditation and ratification of several international treaties have been seen as building an ideal domestic legal system for migrant and refugee protection (Ionue & Nascimento, 2018). Brazil is even touted by

⁸ There are 12 million Lebanese people and descendants in Brazil and 4.5 million in Lebanon. More than 12 thousand Brazilians live in Lebanon.

⁹ More than 2 million Japanese people and descendants live in Brazil, which represents the largest Nikkei community outside Japan in the world. The second country with the largest number of Japanese and descendants is the United States, with one million people.

¹⁰ Half of the Brazilian population identify themselves as black or brown, being African or having African descendants. Salvador, in the state of Bahia, is known as the “most African city outside Africa” (DW, 2017).

some as a “model refugee law for Latin America” (UNHCR, 2003; Fischel De Andrade & Marcolini 2020) and a leader in Latin America’s migration governance (Jatoba & Martuscelli, 2018).

According to Mora (2016), the timing of the 1997 Refugee Statute and the 1988 Constitution are compelling evidence that the symbolic importance of accepting refugees and migrants following Brazil’s authoritarian rule is an important factor in explaining the country’s open refugee policy. The transition to democracy was marked by a growing public awareness of human rights issues, including refugee policies. As the author notes, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso was a former political refugee in Chile. It was during his government that the Refuge Statute was approved.

Authors note that Brazil seeks to comply with the international obligations of solidarity and protection of human beings, due to a moral standard (Jubilut, 2006; Mora, 2016; Seixas & Lima, 2020) According to Jubilut (2006), this ultimately makes Brazil a model in South America, and, as a consequence, a contributor to the evolution of International Refugee Law and protection at large.

2.3 Conclusion

This literature review has thus addressed the key aspects and debates surrounding the securitisation of migration. Additionally, with a look at the context of Brazil. First, defining migration was fundamental. This dissertation acknowledged the differences between forced and voluntary migration, however, based on several authors’ productions on the topic, it challenges the boundaries between these two concepts. Looking into the specific case of Brazil, there is an understanding that South-South migration many times entails complex, mixed migration patterns. Ultimately, migrants, either voluntary or forced, documents or undocumented, are entitled to having their human rights acknowledged and protected by their host countries. Therefore, in this research, migrants entail everyone that has left their country and entered a new one to study, work, or fleeing persecution, violation of human rights, poverty, extreme climate events, and lack of better opportunities and quality of life.

A second task involved defining security and presenting the main debates concerning the topic brought up by this dissertation. The concept of securitisation will be explained

through the perspective of the Copenhagen School, which coined the term, and later will be deepened and challenged through the contributions of the Paris School. There is a fundamental difference in the approach of these two schools to securitisation. While the Copenhagen school believes securitisation occurs through the “speech act”, the Paris School proposes that it happens through the routines and daily practices of security actors, not only a “political elite”.

Finally, this literature review set the main debates regarding the case study. An overview of historical migration in Brazil provides background information about what is said to be the constitutive element of Brazilian identity. In order to understand the narratives surrounding Brazil’s hospitality toward migrants, looking into whether Brazil has a history of welcoming migrants is key. Combined with an overview of the development of legal-institutional frameworks in migrant and refugee protection, the historical overview points out the main events that will be further explored in the next pages.

3 Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Research Design

Securitisation is a theory applied almost exclusively to the reality of Europe. In regards to migration, the Paris School only affirmed the European origin of this approach by exploring the issue of securitisation of migration from this local perspective. However, it does not mean this phenomenon cannot be observed elsewhere. This is, therefore, a qualitative, exploratory case study that departs from a well-documented theory to see how it applies in a new, different setting.

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the ways in which migration and security converge, departing from the securitization theoretical framework. The study’s research question is

to what extent do practices of securitisation reflect the content of political speeches?

It seeks to understand how migration is rhetorically constructed through the speeches of a political elite and how administrative and routine practices address migration.

The epistemological position is interpretivism, which is a feature of qualitative research where the emphasis is put on context and process (Bryman, 2012:280). The interpretivist

perspective emphasizes the importance of subjective and socio-political meanings and symbolic actions in the way people construct and reconstruct their own reality. Reality is reproduced through social interactions; it is not something “given” (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

On this note, this study acknowledges that the securitisation of an issue is a social construction. According to the Copenhagen School, a certain issue is designated as a security problem and is accepted by an audience as such through a construction between actors (Buzan et al, 1998). The theoretical framework adopted here, therefore, fits into a constructivist ontology and distances itself from a traditional realist approach to security issues.

The Paris School advocates the rational operationalization of security from the Weberian logic of domestic security technologies and agencies. This proposal makes the search for security lead to a constant and conveniently constructed condition of insecurity. The analysis of this theory is done in an empirical way, which provides two effects. If, on the one hand, the empirical basis limits theorization, on the other it provides a close dialogue with the practices that lead to the securitization of certain issues and with the mechanisms that promote their insertion into the ordinary routine of society. As noted by Bigo (1998), comparing the discourses and practices of securitisation can reveal interesting differences between what is said and what is done.

The research design chosen for this study is critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA is a theory/methodology, created by Norman Fairclough, that aims to study and recognize discourse as an irreducible element of social life. By understanding language as social practice, it is possible to unveil textual resources that contribute to the maintenance or transformation of power relations. Therefore, CDA was considered the best method to explore and interpret the narratives surrounding migration and security.

Discourse cannot be seen as an independent entity, but rather as a set of relations, informed by socio-historical, ideational and contextual factors. Therefore, the literature review exposes the perspectives on migration according to the experiences of different societies in the last centuries, as well as demonstrates the historical development of legal frameworks and institutions created to deal with this phenomenon. This overview is crucial in order to uncover the interests and objectives behind speeches and practices of securitising agents.

Power is a central concern of CDA. Fairclough understands power as a relational force. It is not something exercised solely by some agents over passive subjects, but a force spread across social practices. Discourse is then a key tool that influences power relations and contributes to sustaining inequality between social groups (Fairclough, 2018). Ultimately, CDA is a method that examines how power is exercised, aiming at the political purpose of emancipation (Phillips-Winther Jörgensson, 2000).

3.2 Case selection

To answer the research question, this study selected a case study that has not been explored previously. Nonetheless, the specificities of Brazil's historical migration management make it a relevant location to be studied. As demonstrated through the literature review, Brazil is a post-colonial space built on the intersection of different ethnicities.

The concept of *jus solis*, a principle by which nationality can be attributed to an individual according to his place of birth, was established aiming at the colonization of New World. Therefore, Brazil was constituted as a nation where generations of migrants eventually became Brazilians. This alone makes it a distinct case from Europe, where traditionally the *jus sanguinis* principle has not recognized the location where an individual is born, but its ascendency. This has drawn a clear line between nationals and foreigners.

The fact that Brazil is a developing country, an emerging power and a distant location from the epicentres of several critical migration flows in the past decades also provide a new perspective other than the traditional European one. Hence, studying securitisation of migration in this new setting provides a challenging and complex set of dynamics to be analysed.

This study makes use of the historical-deductive research method. It starts from a generic situation - the relation between security and migratory flows - to a particular reality - the situation of the Brazilian migration policy as an example of securitisation of migration (Alves, 2015). The research presented here occurs from a temporal perspective, in which the socio-political and economic changes that occurred in a certain historical period (2000-2020) are analysed.

The literature review offered an overview of the history of migration flows, the development of legal frameworks to deal with the question of migration, and the general

understanding of Brazil's relationship with migration. It demonstrated how migration flows drastically changed in the 20th and 21st centuries in Brazil (Patarra, 2015). This setting was chosen to understand whether Brazil securitises migration. Therefore, in order to understand the legal, institutional and political developments of the period, this study defined three main events.

They are (1) the Resettlement in Solidary programme, which responds to the first main change in migration flows in Brazil, addressing the new migration patterns in South America; (2) the Haitian migration flow, the first main migration flow to Brazil connected to a humanitarian crisis in the 21st century; (3) the Operation Welcome, the first collective effort of Brazil's government, Armed Forces, CSOs and IOs to address border management. From these events, speeches and practices were selected to help reflect whether there are elements that inform a securitisation move.

3.3 Collection and operationalization of theoretical framework

Consistent with the securitisation theory proposed by the Copenhagen School, the events selected were exposed, firstly, through the "speech acts" of the Brazilian political elite. For the securitisation to take place, three elements are needed: (1) the securitising actor; (2) the referent object; and (3) the audience. The securitizing actor is the political actor who is able to convince that a certain issue needs to be recognized by the public as an existential threat (Buzan et al, 1998).

The more "social capital"¹¹ the political actor possesses, the easier will be the legitimization of their discourse. According to Santos (2018), the social capital that empowers the securitising actor results from the structure that confers on the state and its representatives the authority and duty to protect the citizens against threats to their survival. On this note, presidentialism is the political system in Brazil and the figure of the president translates this legitimized political actor.

As mentioned before, the timeline of the study starts in 2000 and goes until 2020, covering four different governments: Luís Inácio Lula da Silva of Worker's Party (PT) (2003-2010); Dilma Rousseff of PT (2011-2016); Michel Temer of Brazilian Democratic

¹¹ According to Bourdieu (1998), social capital entails the set of actual or potential resources that are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual inter-knowledge and inter-knowledge, or, in other terms, to membership in a group, as the set of agents that are not only endowed with common properties (capable of being perceived by the observer, by others, and by themselves), but also that are united by permanent and useful links.

Movement Party (PMDB) (2016-2017); and Jair Bolsonaro, former Social Liberal Party (PSL), now Liberal Party (PL) (2018-). Relevant speeches from the key actors of each party, with a focus on each president, were found on the official digital platform for the citizen’s relationship with the Brazilian federal government¹². Presidential speeches are important vehicles of communication with national and international audiences, thus studying them can provide an account of presidential priorities during their presidency (Hughes, 2009). Moreover, by examining presidents’ rhetoric, researchers are able to identify whether these discursive priorities influenced legislations and practices that have concrete effects in the routines of a society.

To collect relevant speeches, the “Content Central” of the *Gov.br* platform was identified as the official “library” where speeches delivered by presidents since the re-democratization are registered. There, I found the option for “Publications”, then “Speeches” and finally “President of the Republic Speeches”. In the search bar, I entered the name of the respective president and the keywords (1) *migração*; (2) *refúgio*; (3) *migrantes*; or (4) *refugiados*¹³.

Table 1 – Results from speech selection

President	Number of relevant speeches found
Luís Inácio Lula da Silva	5
Dilma Rousseff	3
Michel Temer	2
Jair Bolsonaro	2

Source: Gov.br

In order to understand the context of each speech, the study is also based on secondary research on news articles of the period and academic articles focused on exposing each president domestic political platform and foreign policy. Additionally, the secondary research exposed other actors that corroborated presidential speeches, such as Itamaraty’s diplomats and military involved in Operation Welcome, which have the role to reverberate the president’s agenda to a broader audience. International organizations operating in Brazil are also mentioned in this study as they must dialogue constantly with

¹² gov.br

¹³ Translated to English as (1) migration; (2) asylum; (3) migrants; and (4) refugees.

the government. By studying the combination of these voices, it becomes clear that the elements of rhetoric found in presidential speeches are part of a broader perception of migration in Brazil.

A second part of this research is related to understanding whether discourses and practices reflect each other in a securitisation move. First, it is needed to define “practices”. As acknowledged by the CS, there are cases that no securitising discourse is uttered in the public sphere, although the logic of security is at play (Buzan et al, 1998). Balzacq (2008) suggests looking into “empirical referents of policy” to understand how securitisation could be possible through practices. To the author, “empirical referents of policy” are translated to the concept of “tool of securitization” or “instrument of securitization”. Tool of securitization, therefore, is “an identifiable social and technical ‘dispositif’ or device embodying a specific threat image through which public action is configured in order to address a security issue” (Balzacq 2008:79).

The next step is then to identify these devices in the Brazilian context. According to Léonard (2011), if these devices embody “specific threat images”, it means they possess characteristics that allow those who become aware of them to know that their deployment aims to tackle a security threat. Moreover, this study departs from Bigo’s (2002) suggestion that securitisation is a form of governmentality. The author explains that, in case of securitisation of migration, there is a transversal political technology, used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease. Therefore, this study will look into the agents that “have an administrative-management knowledge of threats and risks” (Bigo, 2002:82).

As demonstrated by the literature review, there are three main public organs designated to deal with the question of migration in Brazil. The Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty) and the Ministry of Labour have a secondary role in migration management, operating under the designations of the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety (MJSP). It is exactly the MJSP that receives, analyses, and decides over the requests for immigration through the action of the Federal Police. Following Bigo’s definition, the MJSP and the Federal Police act as the main security experts in the case of migration. Although the MJSP does not change approved legislation, it does have the prerogative to publish ordinances to inform new instructions and priorities. On the other hand, the Federal Police, under the MJSP, is the institution responsible, among other designations, to operationalize the legal framework designed to address migration in Brazil.

Hence, it is the work of the MJSP and particularly, the activities of the Federal Police that will be analysed in order to identify securitising practices. Through a preliminary collection of MJSP activities during the period of 2000 to 2020, the study identified 36 ordinances that included new instructions for the work of the Federal Police regarding asylum seekers, refugees and migrants¹⁴. When it comes to specific legal frameworks addressing the migration question in Brazil, the literature review identified three main ones: the Foreigner's Statute (1980-2017), the Refugee Statute (1997-) and the New Migration Law (2017-). As analysing all elements would not be feasible due to time and space restrictions, the study elected the Foreigner's Statute and the Ordinances 660/770 to analyse.

The justification for these choices is related to (1) the long period the Foreigner's Statute was in force, allowing to explore its consequences to migration flows through different political, social and economic contexts of Brazilian society and; (2) due to the "exceptional" character of these ordinances, which implicate in violations of the New Migration Law. As these dispositive inform the work of the Federal Police, the study will also present events that demonstrate the operationalization of these principles into concrete actions.

4 Case study

4.1 The solidary diplomacy

Solidary diplomacy is a term hardly found in the International Relations literature (Correa, 2009). Its definition can be traced back to Ricardo Senteifus, a university professor, one of the idealizers of Mercosur, Former Vice President of the Inter-American Juridical Committee (CJI) of the Organization of American States (OAS) and OAS representative at the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). According to Seitenfus (2006):

Solidary diplomacy can be defined as the conception and application of international collective action, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council (SC), by third-party states intervening in an internal or international conflict, devoid of motivations deriving from their national

¹⁴ They are available at the gov.br platform, under MJSP's folder: <https://portaldeimigracao.mj.gov.br/pt/portarias-2>

interest and moved solely by a duty of conscience. Material and/or strategic disinterest is the hallmark of this model of the external action of the subject-state. For this lack of interest to be undeniable, it is also necessary that the subject-state has not had in the past any special relationship with the state which is the object of intervention (Seitenfus, 2006:6).

This solidary interference can be read as a Kantian moral act. The spontaneity of the act of a moral nature emerges from the motivation of the individual who performs it; he/she is convinced that his action is good. The same happens when a state acts through solidary diplomacy – it does not act in order to fulfil any interests. On the contrary, it does so contrary to the fundamentals of the realist theory of international relations, out of simple solidarity.

This is how Seitenfus specifically characterized the Brazilian intervention in Haiti. The author pointed out that Brazil accepted the leadership of MINUSTAH without any external or internal pressure: either material, political, or of public opinion. This seemed to be the essence of Brazilian foreign policy in the decades governed by the Worker's Party. Although the “solidary diplomacy” was named during Brazil's mission in Haiti, elements of it can be found in several other political positions, including the migration issue. As well as it can be found during other governments post-1985, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC)¹⁵, Dilma Rousseff, Michel Temer, and Jair Bolsonaro, which may demonstrate an *ethos* of Brazilian politics.

In this section, I will focus on three main events that translate the concept of solidary diplomacy: the resettlement in solidarity policy of the early 2000s, the Haitian migration flow in 2010, and the Operation Welcome from 2018 to 2021. These encompass the governments of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2002-2010), Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), Michel Temer (2016-2018) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-).

4.1.1 Resettlement in Solidarity

In 1999, Brazil and UNHCR signed an agreement for a refugee resettlement policy, with an emphasis on South America. In 2003, already during Lula's government, 16 resettled Colombians arrived in the country (Jubilut & Carneiro, 2011). In the following year, a meeting was held in Brasilia between representatives of civil society and Argentina,

¹⁵ In 2001, addressing the UNGA, FHC defended a “solidary globalization” against the “asymmetric globalization” in place. In 1998, FHC institutionalized the Refugee Law and signed an amnesty for irregular migrants in Brazil, allowing them to regularize their stay and access their rights. These were important steps toward policies that respected migrants' human rights.

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, in which Brazil laid the foundations for the proposal of a “solidary” resettlement in the region.

The initiative was based on “the regional tradition of refugee protection in Latin America; the resurgence of resettlement as a durable solution; the international principle of solidarity and shared responsibility” (Moreira, 2015). Representatives of the Brazilian government, with support from UNHCR, suggested the establishment of a regional resettlement program, taking into consideration Colombia’s situation at the time¹⁶.

According to President Lula, welcoming and resettling migrants from South America was part of Brazilian history and tradition. During his speech, he highlighted that “over many decades, Brazil has always welcomed Europeans, Asians, Arabs, Jews, Africans and, more recently, we have received strong migratory currents from our brothers in South America, African countries, and Latin America” (da Silva, 2009) (A).

In 2007, Lula’s government signed, through the resettlement in solidarity programme, an agreement to receive Palestinian refugees from the Ruwesheid refugee camp, which was being closed by the UNHCR. The decision to welcome the group of Palestinians was based on “humanitarian reasons, reflecting Brazil’s commitment to the International Law and Refugee Law, as well as the solidarity of the Brazilian government with the Palestinian people” (da Silva, 2007) (B). Members of UNHCR affirmed that the Brazilian decision was linked to the “sympathy of the Lula government for the Palestinian cause” (Hamid, 2012).

Addressing the 60th session of the UNHCR Executive Committee, the Brazilian Delegation in Geneva reinforced the image of a welcoming and solidary country through the resettlement programme:

Asylum is a state policy in Brazil. It is an important element of Brazil's democracy and its tradition of openness. It is one of the pillars of human rights policy. (...) We hope to increase resettlement opportunities in Brazil. Brazil's long experience of having a tripartite body in which government, civil society, and UNHCR work together on refugee policies has been successful (Itamaraty, 2009) (C).

During the commemorations of the World Refugee Day, CONARE, UNHCR and other Civil Society Organisations (CSO) celebrate Brazil’s resettlement programme:

¹⁶ In the early 2000s, over 2 million people were internally displaced in Colombia due to the conflict between the government, paramilitary, and the FARC.

The attraction for Brazil is due to the diversity of the cultural background and hospitality (...). The refugees are unanimous in saying that Brazilians welcome the immigrant. Brazil coexists well with several cultures different from ours (...). If this refugee comes from a different social group, he integrates very easily (...). Brazil is considered an 'almost exemplary' country in the treatment of refugees and has progressive legislation (...). Since the 1950s (after World War II), the country receives refugees. The exception occurred during the 21 years of military regime (1964-1985), of 'generalized violence' on the South American continent violence' in the South American continent, when Brazil closed itself even to Argentine refugees, Uruguayans, Chileans and Paraguayans (Hamid, 2012).

Besides resettling Palestinians, Lula defended that Brazil had an important role in contributing to peace agreements in the Middle East altogether. Departing from the idea of Brazil as a disinterested party, Lula argued “We are coming to understand that people and countries that are involved in the Middle East crisis are realizing that Brazil can help, because of the good relationship Brazil has with all the countries and all the political factions in the Middle East” (da Silva, 2010a) (D).

Foreign Affairs Ministry Celso Amorim, in a speech at the *Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro* highlighted Brazil’s solidarity through Lula’s foreign policy, including its position about Palestine:

[The] ‘non-indifference’ [concept] is not exactly a principle, but it is a humanistic guideline of our foreign policy. It was this spirit of solidarity that, for example, animated our decision to lead in the military arm of the Stabilization Mission in Haiti or supplies to the population of the Gaza Strip. In several situations in South America - whether internal conflicts or conflicts between countries - Brazil has shown itself to be an active and supportive interlocutor (Amorim, 2009) (E).

By 2008, Brazil had resettled 373 people of seven different nationalities and became the 12^o country that most resettled refugees in the world (UNHCR, 2009).

4.1.2 *The Haitian migration flow*

In 2010, President Lula visited Haiti in aftermath of the earthquake in Port-au-Prince that victimized over 200 thousand people, including eighteen Brazilian soldiers that were part of MINUSTAH, and two civilians¹⁷. In his speech, Lula said how “each of these [soldiers] reaffirmed, during their lifetime, the peaceful and solidary vocation of the Brazilian

¹⁷ Zilda Arns, physician, paediatrician, creator of the most important Brazilian NGO working towards child protection, the *Pastoral da Criança*; and diplomat Luiz Carlos da Costa, deputy head of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti.

nation” (da Silva, 2010b) (F). The president added that the Haitian people were not alone and they are always welcomed in Brazil (Brasil, 2010; Magalhães, 2017; Morais, 2018; Pinheiro, 2018).

Lula’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, addressed the Council of Human Rights in Geneva two weeks after the earthquake. Amorim had returned from Haiti that same week and pleaded with the international community to work together for the country’s reconstruction. In this speech, he makes references to Brazil’s position of non-indifference and solidarity towards all people:

Respect for self-determination in conjunction with the decision to help those in dire need is what we call “non-indifference”, a principle that does not affect non-intervention but brings a new perspective to it. Having visited Haiti nine times since 2004, I can assure you: non-indifference has brought results in terms of increased security, strengthened democratic governance, socio-economic progress, and increased self-confidence (Amorim, 2010) (G).

President Dilma Rousseff took office in 2011 and made her first visit to Haiti in 2012. In her speech in Port-au-Prince, Dilma mobilized the narrative of Brazil’s hospitality: “as is the nature of Brazilians, we are open to receive Haitian citizens who choose to seek opportunities in Brazil” (Rousseff, 2012) (H). A year after, Brazil hosted the Regional Coordination Meeting on the Migration of Haitian Citizens to South America. In a note to the press, the Itamaraty highlighted “the need to treat Haitian migrants who wish to come to South America, in all circumstances, in a humanitarian spirit, with full respect for their human rights and their legitimate intention to start a new life in another country” (Itamaraty, 2013) (I).

In 2015, the world followed the unfolding of the “migration crisis” in Europe. At the opening of the 70th Session of the General Assembly in 2015, Dilma argued that “in a world where goods, capital, information, and ideas circulate freely, it is absurd to impede the free transit of people” (Rousseff, 2015a) (J). In contrast to the strict migration policies in Europe, Dilma refers to Brazil as “a land of welcoming”:

Brazil is a land of welcoming, a country made up of refugees. We receive Syrians, Haitians, men and women from all over the world, just as we have sheltered, for more than a century, millions of Europeans, Arabs and Asians. We are with open arms to receive refugees. We are a multi-ethnic country that coexists with differences and knows how important they are to make us stronger, richer, more diverse, culturally, socially and economically (Rousseff, 2015a).

In an article published on the Worker's Party website and signed by Dilma, a few days before the opening of UNGA, the president mentions Brazil's welcoming of Haitian migrants: "We are proud to be a people of diversity. That is why tolerance and respect for differences are hallmarks of our identity. With this spirit, we currently receive more than 28 thousand Haitian citizens, and we will continue to do so in solidarity" (Rouseff, 2015b). (K) During the same period, in her annual speech celebrating Brazil's Independence Day, Dilma once again stressed that "Brazil was with open arms to receive refugees" (Rousseff, 2015c). (L)

According to the Federal Police, between 2010 and 2017, 93 thousand Haitians entered Brazil (Moura, 2021). The crisis in Haiti was perceived by the international community as a climate event, generated by the earthquake in Port-au-Prince, therefore, Haitians were not recognized as refugees according to the Brazilian Refugee Law, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Although the Cartagena Convention foresees international protection in cases of "generalized violations of human rights", the mainstream interpretation is related to violations perpetrated by the state. In that sense, in order to regularize the stay of Haitian migrants, the CNIg authorized, in 2012, Resolution n. 97/2012, which provides for the granting of humanitarian visas¹⁸ to nationals of Haiti.

4.1.3 *The Operation Welcome*

In 2018, the Brazilian government, with the assistance of the Armed Forces, initiated the Humanitarian Logistics Task Force (FTLogHum), better known as *Operação Acolhida*. The operation is responsible for (1) border management of the Venezuelan influx; (2) reception and shelter of Venezuelan migrants; and (3) operationalizing the interiorization of Venezuelans to other Brazilian states.

The initiative came from President Michel Temer as the Venezuelan migration flow increased at the border of the Roraima state, in Northern Brazil. In his speech to the 73rd Session of the General Assembly, Temer addressed the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Venezuela and the role Brazil has performed in welcoming Venezuelans:

In South America, we are in the midst of a migratory wave of great proportions. It is estimated that more than a million Venezuelans have already left their

¹⁸ Initially, the visa - of a special character - was created to deal with the Haitian situation but it was extended to Venezuelans, Syrians, Afghans, and now Ukrainians. Although the latter nationalities are recognized as refugees in Brazil, the humanitarian visas are issued by Brazilian Embassies abroad and facilitate those nationals to travel to Brazil when they do not have any other travel documents. The New Migration Law (Law 13.445/2017) foresees the humanitarian visa in Article 14.

country in search of decent living conditions. Brazil has received all those who arrive in our territory. There are tens of thousands of Venezuelans to whom we try to give all the assistance. With the collaboration of the High Commission for Refugees, we have built shelters to shelter them in the best way possible. We have promoted their interiorization to other regions of Brazil. We issue documents that allow them to work in the country. We offer schooling for the children, vaccination and health services for all (Temer, 2018) (M).

Additionally, the President mentions the New Migration Law, sanctioned in 2017. According to him, the law translates the solidary and welcoming spirit of the Brazilian people toward migrants:

In Brazil, we are proud of our welcoming tradition. We are a people forged in diversity. There is a piece of the world in every Brazilian. Faithful to this tradition, last year we instituted a new Migration Law - a modern legislation that not only protects the dignity of the immigrant, but recognizes the benefits of immigration (Temer, 2018) (M2).

In note to the press later that year, Temer countered rumours that Brazil would close its borders to Venezuelans. According to the president, he “never considered closing the borders” and that Venezuelans “are received with dignity”. He highlighted: “this is Brazil - a country of solidarity, with a tradition of welcoming all the peoples of the world and fulfilling its international commitments at all historical moments” (Temer, 2018). (N)

When President Jair Bolsonaro took office the following year, general public opinion was surprised by his policies toward migrants and refugees in Brazil. Bolsonaro, who is notable for his disdain for international consensus, has consistently highlighted Brazil’s hospitality and efforts to support the Venezuelan people in Brazil. In his speech at the opening of the 74th General Assembly of the United Nations Bolsonaro argued that, because of Operation Welcome, Brazil “stands out in the humanitarian and human rights field and has become an international reference for its commitment and dedication in supporting Venezuelan refugees arriving in Brazil through the border with Roraima” (Bolsonaro, 2019). (O)

In a visit to Roraima state in 2021, Bolsonaro stressed that “Brazil is a humanitarian country” that “works to welcome and integrate” Venezuelans (Bolsonaro, 2021). (P) Addressing the Venezuelans refugees at the shelters run by the Operation Welcome in Boa Vista, the president said that “Brazil is a country that has a deep respect for one’s suffering” and the government “will do everything possible to integrate [Venezuelans]

into society” (Bolsonaro, 2021). (P2) Moreover, Bolsonaro has changed the slogan of Operation Welcome to “Socialism excludes, Brazil welcomes”.

According to General Antonio Manoel de Barros, Operational Coordinator of Operation Welcome, the success of the Army operation translated the principles and essence of the Brazilian identity: “It starts with us, we seek solutions [to the Venezuelan migration flow] that express our essence, either through the laws or through our national formation, due to how we position ourselves as Brazilians” (Barros, 2021). (Q) In the interview, the General highlighted three important factors that inform Operation Welcome. He mentioned the country’s legal-institutional framework, the continuity of important policies, and Brazil’s national formation:

Why is Operation Welcome working so well? I have three important factors: first, we have a legal base within migration that is inclusive, not every country has this; second, the institutional maturity of the governments. You see, the decree was in the previous government, if the government changed and Operation Welcome was maintained, this is a governmental institutional maturity; and the third is our nationality, our nationality formation, how we are as Brazilians. We are mixed, of course we have problems, so we are in essence a welcoming people. Our formation was this miscegenation. So, when we go to the legal base, to the base of institutional maturity and in the essence of our nationality, we can build this solution that evidently has to continue to be worked on, this is an extremely important aspect (Barros, 2021). (Q2)

On the occasion of the 2021 World Refugee Day, the Chief of Logistics and Mobilization of the Armed Forces Joint Staff, Air Lieutenant Brigadier Heraldo Luiz Rodrigues, stressed the “noble task” the Armed Forces are carrying in Northern Brazil: “Brazilians, in themselves, are already good-hearted people. We want to serve everyone in the best way possible (...) Helping these people is a differentiated work, no doubt” (Rodrigues, 2021). (R)

Throughout 2019, the Brazilian state recognized the refugee status of 21,515 people. The total number of requests granted last year is almost double the 11,231 refugees that the Brazilian state recognized by December 2018. And it brought the total number of recognitions to 31,966 foreigners by December 2019, the majority being Venezuelan nationals. In 2020, UNHCR congratulated the Government of Brazil for recognizing some 17,000 Venezuelans as refugees. By 2021, Brazil had become the country with the largest number of recognized Venezuelan refugees in Latin America, reaching over 48 thousand people (UNHCR, 2022).

4.2 Behind the solidary diplomacy

4.2.1 The myth of Brazil's racial democracy

As mentioned in the previous section, the 19th-century society was marked by the promotion of its “whitening”. This belonged to a wider Scientism ideology that informed the massive biologization of race in the 19th century and the obsession with degeneration. The understanding that some races were superior to others formed strategies of eugenics that spread around the world in the first half of the 20th century (Rabinow, Rose, 2006). The Brazilian elite believed in the superiority of the white, European gene. As well as that white genes were dominant and, with miscegenation, a process of whitening would occur.

This way, the black population was in fact denied the possibility of social inclusion through work after the abolishment of slavery. In their place, millions of Europeans were “imported”, with part of the tickets paid for with public money. According to Annoni (2009), Brazil went through an incomplete process of abolition. Without any investment from the State in their integration, this population faced several challenges in order to access education, health and employment. In this period, organized black movements focused on the struggle against racial prejudice through an eminently universalist policy of social integration of blacks into modern society, which had Brazilian racial democracy as an ideal to be attained (Guimarães, 2001).

The military coup of 1964 destroyed the populist pact and shattered the links of black protest with the political system, which had mainly come about through left-wing nationalism. During this period, the political elite mobilized the concept of racial democracy in order to completely suffocate black and indigenous discontent. In this sense, Freyre’s contribution to the discussion on racial democracy is accused to have served the purposes of the political elite that wanted to “solve” the racial issue in Brazil (Pires, 2018).

As an ultra-nationalistic and anti-communist project, the military dictatorship stated that the communist activity encouraged division by highlighting struggles that opposed social groups. The nation in the organicist conception of the military should be preserved in its integrity. This way, the political elites “solved” the racial question by making the concept of racial democracy unquestionable. Whoever dared to point out the discrepancies between races in Brazil, was accused of, in fact, plotting against the nation’s unity and prosperity.

The reconstruction of democracy in Brazil occurs simultaneously with the revival of black protest and culture. It takes place in a context in which the idea of multiculturalism, that is, of tolerance and respect for human rights, is dominant. Nonetheless, by 2021, 72,9% of unemployed in the country identify as black or mixed-race. Only 22% of the leadership positions in the country are occupied by black people. Among the occupations that do not require qualifications, black and mixed-race workers represent 67% of the workers (Instituto Locomotiva, 2021). The chance of a black person being murdered in Brazil is 2,6 times superior to a white person and 78% of police lethal victims are black (IPEA, 2021).

Schwarcz (1996) conducted a research about racism in which 97% of the interviewees claimed they were not racist, while 98% claimed they knew racist people, such as friends, spouses, partners, and close family. The author concluded, “each Brazilian feels like an island of racial democracy, surrounded by racists from all sides” (Schwarcz, 1996:155). One of the characteristics of discrimination practices in Brazil is that it has a unique nature, subtle, masked and concealed. Authors call it *racismo à Brasileira* (Silva, 1986; Camino et al., 2001; Pólvora, 2014), a racism “made in Brazil”.

Other ethnicities such as Asians and Middle Easterners that immigrated to the country in the last century also faced and still face the effects of “racism made in Brazil”. Precisely because of the obsession with race superiority, any non-white ethnicities were not desired in the volunteer migration programmes of the 19th century. The entry of Japanese migrants into Brazil suffered oscillations, characterising the acceptance of Japanese immigrants only “to fill the gaps left by European immigration” (Leão Neto, 1989:30). The Japanese immigrant was always seen as being of difficult assimilation and was only accepted as a substitute.

In the 19th century, Middle Eastern migrants were also seen as unwanted in Brazil’s society formation. They were not perceived as white nor were farmworkers, but rather urban merchants known as *mascates*. Referred to as *turcos* (Turks), this general designation was used to denigrate Middle Eastern immigrants as economic pariahs, who did not contribute to the Brazilian agro-exporter economy (Karam, 2009). Ultimately, the presence of non-European migrants was seen as detrimental to the whitening and standardisation of Brazilian society.

More recently, Pucci (2019) conducted interviews with Syrian refugees in Brazil and demonstrated that the subtle and concealed way in which Brazilians discriminate is perceived as a “mean joke” by those victims of it. The interviewees mentioned how Brazilians often refer to them as “Bin Laden”, “suicide bomber”, and “terrorist”. Although Brazilians do so in form of humour, their narrative contains the elements of persecution, xenophobia, and discrimination Syrian refugees face in other countries. Pucci identified a mixture of cordiality and prejudice in the relationship between Brazilians and Syrians (2019:60), the translation of a “racism made in Brazil”.

4.2.2 The political gains of humanitarian narratives

Upon taking office in 2003, many of the initiatives of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva’s government were directed to international trade negotiations and the search for political coordination with developing and emerging countries. Vigevani & Cepaluni characterize Lula’s foreign policy as “autonomy through diversification” (AtD). This meant emphasising South-South cooperation to seek greater balance with the countries of the Global North (2007: 283).

The impact of the AtD policy on migration flows was clear. In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay established the Southern Common Market (commonly known as Mercosur or Mercosul). Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela later became associate members. After 2003, however, Mercosur consolidation gained a wider significance in the region: the emergence of the so-called “new left” movement in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Chile¹⁹, which Lula aspired to lead (Maior, 2003). In 2004, Mercosur agreed on relaxing migration restrictions for nationals of Member States. The movement of people and goods naturally increased.

In a globalized world, where conflicts arise in one corner of the world and reach the others, where international workers and people seeking better lives circulate, international migrations started to be perceived as a strategic issue in the 21st century. Therefore, addressing this matter was key from the perspective of Brazil’s international projection. Brazil’s foreign policy started to contribute to the discussions on migrations - and more specifically the issue of human rights for immigrants - in international and regional forums.

¹⁹ In Argentina, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Kirchner (2007-2015); in Venezuela, Hugo Chavez (1999-2013); in Bolivia, Evo Morales (2006-2019); in Chile (2006-2010 and 2014-2018).

Through the “resettlement in solidary” programme, UNHCR came to recognize the capacity of Brazil as a regional leader and its role in helping to prevent the intensification of conflicts in the region that could provoke new migratory flows (UNHCR, 2005). The actions adopted by Brazil in relation to refugees led to closer relations with UNHCR, and consequently, to the UN System. However, as Menezes (2013) points out, the number of Colombian resettles in South American countries was minimal compared to the total demand for resettlement.

When it comes to the resettlement of Palestinians through the programme, there was an increasing interest of Lula’s government in portraying itself as the mediator of international conflicts, including the Israel-Palestine one, aiming at demonstrating the capacities of Brazilian diplomacy and leadership (Hamid, 2012). Ultimately, the resettlement of Palestinians was connected to the dimension of South-South cooperation, enabling closer relations with the UN agency for refugees (meeting their demands), while at the same time not representing a heavy socioeconomic burden for the country as the UNHCR would assume the role of funder of the programme.

The AtD policy also led the country to participate in the debates regarding the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Together with India, Japan, and Germany – the G4 – Brazil criticized the Council’s structure, marked by the presence of five permanent countries with veto power (the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China), and ten countries provisionally elected by the General Assembly. This structure did not reflect the current political and economic order, as it would still be based on the post-war power structure. The G4 thus argued that the new world order, termed “multipolar” or “multilateral”, would indicate the need to review such structure, enabling the inclusion of countries in Africa and South America as permanent members.

In order to present itself as an important regional player with the capacity to represent South America in a renewed Security Council, Brazil developed regional and international strategies both in the economic-commercial realm as well as in the political-humanitarian realm. It became more involved in peace missions, lead the formation of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and acted as a mediator for the nuclear deal²⁰ and for the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. By 2010, the country had

²⁰ The Nuclear Deal, formally named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and the United States in 2015, concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. In

assumed tasks of military coordination and command in important peace operations, such as in Haiti (MINUSTAH/2004) and Lebanon (UNIFIL/2011).

Pimental & Reis (2016) analyse Brazil's decision to take the leadership of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), demonstrating that this decision meant an abrupt change in the Brazilian decision-making process. It was the first time that the country commanded a peace operation based on Chapter VII²¹, whose resolution authorises sanctions and the use of force by troops. This way, Brazil did not follow its tradition of rejecting the use of force in conflict resolution.

Ferreira (2012:3) demonstrates that the command of an operation of international importance such as MINUSTAH emerges from Brazil's quest to project itself internationally and regionally "expanding, mainly, its legitimacy in the South and Latin American region". According to Cervo & Lessa (2014), Brazil had become a country that does not limit itself to only presenting the appearance of an emerging power, but seeks to act in such a way, adopting practices and responsibilities that match its aspirations. The authors indicate a close relationship between activism for the renewal of the UNSC and Brazil's participation in peace missions, especially MINUSTAH.

The political stabilization of Haiti and assistance to its population intensified after the earthquake that hit the country in 2010, which resulted in catastrophic consequences, destruction of cities and many deaths, and finally a severe cholera crisis. In this process, the country has invested around US\$1 billion (Hamid, 2012). It was clearly an important project for Brazilian international and regional projection and president Dilma took this effort forward as Lula's heir to the government.

Fernandes (2014) points out that the presence of troops in Haiti contributed to the incorporation of Brazil in the route of the Haitian migratory process. When Haitians arrived in Brazil later that year seeking international protection, the Brazilian government suspended the issuance of refugee protocols to this population under the allegation that they did not fit into the category, as the Refugee Statute does not foresee environmental refugees. Here, Brazilian solidary diplomacy and humanitarianism encountered their

2010, Brazil's diplomacy led by Lula, in partnership with Turkey, convinced Iran to sign a nuclear agreement.

²¹ Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter sets out the UN Security Council's powers to maintain peace. It allows the Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to take military and nonmilitary action to "restore international peace and security".

practical limits. Despite the speech, the Brazilian government was neither interested nor prepared to receive this influx of migrants.

It was only with the pressure from CSOs that Brazil found a “solution” for the Haitian migration flux, when CNIg allowed the concession of a humanitarian visa (Conectas, 2012). Nonetheless, a quota was institutionalized through the Normative Resolution 97/2012²², in an effort to curb the influx of Haitians to Brazil. Decentralized immigration posts were also implemented as an attempt to reduce access by land, the main way of entry to the country (Garcia, 2015).

When Michel Temer, Dilma’s vice-president, took office after her impeachment in 2016, there was an expected distancing from the AtD policy. Temer belongs to the PMDB (today MDB) party, the biggest party in Brazil. In 2016, after PMDB actively participated in the impeachment, Temer’s strategy was to reject the perspectives, ideologies, and positions of the Worker’s Party, in particular, Worker’s Party aspiration of leading South American integration through the “new left” movement. Once seen as an autonomy through diversity strategy, Lula’s and Dilma’s proximity with other leaders in South America was then accused of sympathy toward communist and socialist countries and was strongly rejected by the Brazilian elite.

During Temer’s mandate, the narrative of Brazil as a welcoming country for migrants was still explored. Simultaneously, the Venezuelan government was consistently blamed and criticized for the mass migration flows of individuals from that country. Unlike the Haitian migratory crisis during the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, it was not observed any counterpart assistance in relation to Venezuela by the government of Michel Temer, but rather the adoption of repeated condemnatory positions without effective pragmatic action (Uebel & Ranincheski, 2017).

This was only exacerbated during Bolsonaro’s government. Known as a far-right politician who forged his way into the presidency as the strongest critique of the Worker’s Party government, Bolsonaro used the situation in Venezuela and the migration flows as an important political platform. In 2015, as an MP, Bolsonaro called the migrants arriving in Brazil “scum of the earth” and that they represented a threat to the country’s security

²² The Normative established that “up to 1,200 (one thousand and two hundred) visas may be granted per year, corresponding to an average of 100 (one hundred) concessions per month, without prejudice to other modalities of visas provided for in the legal provisions of the country”.

(Exame, 2015). This time, as president, classifying such migrants as refugees implied denouncing the country of origin - that is, Venezuela - as a state that does not respect the most basic rights of its population and therefore does not constitute itself as democratic.

In this sense, the refuge cause was mobilised as part of the strategy of political positioning before the international community in relation to the neighbouring country and policies aligned with the left-wing political-ideological spectrum (Moreira, 2019; Pereira, 2019). In 2020, Jair Bolsonaro gave a speech in favour of the need to guarantee protection to “Venezuelan brothers” who fled “misery”, “populism” and the “crisis of [President Nicolas] Maduro's regime”. He also said that the opposition, represented by the Workers' Party (PT) government, would not have welcomed Venezuelan migrants due to its political alignment with Venezuela's regime. He ended his speech with “Brazil and Venezuela above all. God above all”, a slogan of his presidential campaign (Brasil, 2020).

4.3 *Securitising migration in Brazil*

In Brazil, the tendency toward the securitisation of migration can be observed as early as the First Republic until the recent justifications for the vetoes of the new Migration Law. Throughout those years much has been implemented highlighting national sovereignty and discretion, demonstrating the great concern that the migration would harm national security and cohesion.

Through the historical overview of migration flows in Brazil it was demonstrated that the volunteer migration programmes of the early 19th century were designed to fulfil Brazilian interests regarding land occupation, replacement of labour force, and whitening of the population. As Andrade (2005) points out, the government preferred migrants it considered of easier “assimilation” into the Brazilian culture, such as Spaniards, Portuguese, and Italians. The logic of welcoming migrants was therefore attached to eugenicists' and nationalists' perspectives.

As seen previously, the *Estado Novo* period (1937-1945) deepened the perception of the dangerousness of the foreigner already present in migration and colonization legislation since the nineteenth century. After a century of mass immigration to the country, the Quota Law was concerned with avoiding ethnic enclaves and establishing a common Brazilian identity. In that sense, the anthropologist Giralda Seyferth (2002), analyses the trajectory of the categories of immigrants, foreigners, settlers, and aliens mobilized during Brazilian history and shows how migration laws and policies in Brazil have always

dialogued with criminalization and with eugenics, in a scenario marked by nationalism and its intolerance towards cultural or ethnic differences.

Until 2017, the Foreigner's Statute was in force in Brazil. This legal framework dictated the lives of migrants through a securitising perspective, as will be demonstrated below.

4.3.1 The Foreigner's Statute

The migratory police of military dictatorship (1964-1985) established the Foreigner's Statute, with a clear securitising objective. After the consolidation of the statute, the migration policy would be "oriented in the sense of reducing the influx of foreigners to those strictly useful and necessary to our development" since it was not plausible "to national interests the indiscriminate immigration to Brazil" (Fraga, 1985).

Throughout its original 141 articles, the Statute mentioned concern for national security in five of them (arts. 2, 21, 65, 68 and 71), including two in which it mentioned the participation of the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (SG/CSN) as an observer in the CNIg (arts. 128, §2 and 129, §2). The "national interests" terminology was expressly mentioned in ten articles (articles 1, 2, 3, 7 II, 21, 57 § 2, 65, 67, 110 and 130). The rights of immigrants, however, were limited to the right of defence of those to be expelled from the country (art. 71) (Claro, 2019). Moreover, "the Foreigner Statute [...] gave a treatment to the migrant that was far from human dignity, as it denied him basic rights, such as those related to the manifestation of thought and the right to assembly" (Simioni & Vedovato, 2018: 304).

The Statute foresaw deportation for those who in "any way" attempted against national security, as seen below:

Art. 73. A foreigner who in any way violates national security, political or social order, public tranquillity or morality and the popular economy, or whose conduct renders him harmful or dangerous to national convenience and interests, is liable to deportation.

The vague concepts used, such as "convenience", "national interest" and "public morality" leave a wide margin for discretion in selecting which foreigners are to be classified as dangerous. The expression "in any event", for instance, removes the necessary application of proportionality. On the other hand, any activity deemed as political was completely forbidden for migrants, portraying them as carriers of dangerous ideologies:

Art. 107. Foreigners admitted into the national territory may not engage in activities of a political nature, nor interfere, directly or indirectly, in Brazil's public affairs, and they are especially forbidden

I - to organize, create or maintain a society or any entities of a political nature, even if their sole purpose is propaganda or the dissemination, exclusively among compatriots, of ideas, programs or rules of action of political parties of the country of origin;

II - to carry out individual actions with fellow countrymen or not, in order to obtain, by means of coercion or constraint of any nature whatsoever, adherence to ideas, programs or action norms of political parties or factions from any country

III - to organise or participate in parades, marches, rallies and meetings of any nature whatsoever, for the purposes referred to in items I and II of this article (Foreigner's Statute, 1980).

The text was also opened the possibility of the kidnapping and rendition of foreign citizens to the repressive organs of their countries of origin (Zamberlam, 2004). These modifications are based on the cooperation between dictatorial regimes in the South Cone, known as the *Operação Condor*²³, which was officially and formally implemented in November 1975. From 1975 to 1989, thousands of people were kidnapped, tortured, and killed in allied countries or transferred to their countries of origin to be executed (McSherry, 1999).

Sprandel (2015) points out that through the Foreigner's Statute, the military dictatorship deepened the perception of the dangerousness of foreigners already present in migratory and colonization legislation since the 19th century. During the re-democratization period, the migration policy in Brazil experienced the paradox of living with a regulatory framework based on national security in the middle of the democratic order.

Although many of the articles of the Statute came in contradiction with the 1988 Constitution, their permanence in the legislation served as "legal" justification for arbitrary measures of coercion of immigrants, for example: in May 2016, an Italian professor of law at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Maria Rosária Barbato was summoned to the Federal Police to provide clarification on her political activities regarding her participation in the elections of the Union of Professors of the Federal Universities of Belo Horizonte and Montes Claros (Amaral & Costa, 2017).

²³ Operation Condor was a campaign promoted by the United States involving intelligence operations and assassination of opponents. It was officially and formally implemented in November 1975 by the right-wing dictatorships of the Southern Cone.

In the same way, and with the aim of intimidating the participation of foreigners in political demonstrations against the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the National Federation of Federal Police Officers (FENAPEF), released a note to “inform about the legal prohibition of the participation of foreigners in political demonstrations in Brazil” and that “the foreigners found taking part in the mobilisations for presidential impeachment should be arrested and sent to the Federal Police” (FENAPEF, 2017).

In 2015, the journal *O Globo* conducted an investigation about the “migrants of the Connector”. The “Connector” is a security area in the Guarulhos International Airport that connects the international arrivals to the airport area. There, stay, almost always with only the clothes on their bodies, foreigners who could not enter Brazil, those who were prevented by the airlines to continue their trip to another country, and those who do not want or cannot go back to their country of origin. These people can spend weeks and months, without a lawyer or contact with their family and under the surveillance of the Federal Police, before they are able to continue their trip or request refuge in Brazil. Without towels or soap, many do not take showers.

According to Sanches (2015), the migrants in Connector are pieces of a dispute between two concepts (and their representatives): national security and human rights. And they expose Brazil’s delicate situation in dealing with its recent status as an international migration destination. Although Brazil signed the relevant international agreements for migrant and refugee protection, and the Refugee Statute was in force since 1997, the situation in Guarulhos International Airport was not an exception, but a recurrent scenario over the years, informed by the logic of the Foreigner’s Statute.

In this “grey” area of the airport, Federal Police agents often decide on the spot whether the migrant classifies as an asylum claimer, according to the complaints accessed by the International Migration Organization (IOM, 2017). This violates the *non-refoulement* principle, as well as Brazilian law which allows asylum claimers to have their claim reviewed by the CONARE organ and foresees their right to appeal the decision, in case their claim is denied. There have been reports of passengers who were forced to board and return to their origin, in situations that can even be considered refuge cases. Moreover, many have denounced the precarious conditions of service and facilities, as well as cases of abuse and arbitrariness.

With the replacement of the Foreigner's Statute in 2017, the idea defended by jurists and the government was to move forward with more humane and progressive legislation on migration management. As exposed below, Ordinances 666/19 and 770/19 brought back many dispositive found in the Foreigner's Statute which were excluded in 2017, maintaining the status of the migrant as a "threat" to national security. Due to its conflicting nature with the current New Migration Law and 1988 Constitution, these Ordinances possess an "exceptional" nature, justified to protect Brazil against foreign threats.

4.3.2 The 666/770 Ordinances

In 2019, only two years after the achievement of the replacement of the Foreigner's Statute by the New Migration Law, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security published Ordinance 666. It intended to regulate the processes of expulsion, repatriation, and entry ban, establishing new parameters to interpret the New Migration Law. The new rule authorized the summary deportation of people who are "dangerous to the security of Brazil" or who have "committed acts contrary to the principles and objectives set forth in the Federal Constitution".

It established very interpretative criteria to legitimize expulsion and entry bans. Besides listing a series of reasons, all related to international criminality, drug trafficking, human trafficking, etc., the ordinance authorized Federal Police agents to refuse entry based on suspicion and mistrust (Machado, 2019).

The ordinance states that "information from Brazilian or foreign intelligence agencies" can be the basis for a decision to deny entry or expulsion or repatriation. The agents, however, are not required to present this information in the process, characterizing a true bureaucratic labyrinth that allows the Federal Police absolute power to determine who enters or not, without proper accountability to society. In other words, for the definition of a dangerous person, it was not necessary to present a formal accusation or conviction.

Ultimately, Ordinance 666 denied access of basic rights, such as the presumption of innocence and ample defence. It established a deadline of 48 hours for the individual to present their defence, which is generally considered insufficient (Figueira & Ortiz, 2020). The rule comes into contradiction with the New Migration Law, which demands respect for the conduction of the proper legal processes and the rights of ample defence and presumption of innocence. Moreover, the New Migration Law prohibits pre-trial

detention of migrants, which was permitted through this new dispositive, also violating the principle of non-criminalization of migration.

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security received several complaints and critiques from CSOs regarding the new rule, especially the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB), which pointed out the Ordinance's contradictions with the Brazilian law. The Ministry eventually came to revoke the Ordinance two months after its publication, replacing it with Ordinance 770 in October 2019.

Among the main achievements of the modified Ordinance was the recognition that the 48-hour time limit made any possibility of defence unviable, and the clarification that the rule would not apply to migrants with residence in Brazil and to refugees. It extends from two to five days the deadline for the migrant subject to deportation to present a defence or appeal, and includes notification to the Public Defender's Office of the Union about the process - in case the target of the action does not have a lawyer. The term "summary deportation" has disappeared in the new ordinance.

The term "person suspected of being dangerous" was also replaced by "dangerous person who falls under suspicion for serious reasons". To define serious reasons, the Ordinance indicates the involvement in:

- terrorism, pursuant to Law No. 13.260 of March 16, 2016;
- organized criminal group or armed criminal association or that has weapons at its disposal, under the terms of Law No. 12.850, of August 2, 2013;
- trafficking in drugs, people or firearms;
- pornography or sexual exploitation of children and youth.

Under the New Law Migration Law, migrants have 10 days to respond or appeal any decision related to their stay in the country. Extending the deadline from two to five days in Ordinance 770 is still much shorter than the rights already established. Moreover, the criteria to classify a dangerous person are still sufficiently vague to allow arbitrations. Although the text was modified to define "serious reasons", the Ordinance still mentions that "suspicion" and "indicatives" are sufficient to decree the migrant's expulsion.

The manner in which information will be gathered to base the understanding of "serious reasons" is still fragile, given that the ways to acquire this information listed in the Ordinance include intelligence information, ongoing investigation, and a first-degree

criminal sentence, in clear violation of the presumption of innocence. Additionally, although article 8 establishes that the new instructions do not apply to individuals with recognized refugee status in Brazil, it does not specify the treatment of asylum claimers. Nonetheless, asylum claimers are protected by international and national dispositive, the most important being *non-refoulement*. In the case of applying the news instructions indiscriminately, Ordinance 770 may violate the 1951 Convention.

The COVID-19 pandemic demanded increased border control for epidemiological purposes and this scenario made it possible for the federal government to take up some controversial points of Ordinance 666/2019, especially those concerning the summary deportation of immigrants. The Federal Police does not provide public specific information on deportations and repatriations, nor the legal dispositive referenced to base these decisions. However, media vehicles requested, through the Law of Information Access (12.527/11), the percentage of deportations from 2019, when Ordinance 770 was published. From 2019 to 2020, the number of deportations has increased 5.708% (Sousa & Leite, 2021).

In 2020, agents of the Federal Police conducted an operation at an informal shelter in Pacaraima, state of Roraima, at the border with Venezuela. Although they did not possess a search warrant, the agents justified their entry under the suspicion of an offense under article 268 of the Penal Code: “infracting a determination by the public authorities to prevent the introduction or spread of a contagious disease”. The shelter housed over 50 Venezuelan women and children who had recently arrived in Brazil to claim asylum. The Federal Police declared the summary deportation of 6 of them (Fernandes & Oliveira, 2020). From 2019 to 2020, 159 Venezuelans were expelled from Brazil (Folha BV, 2020), even though Brazil recognizes that Venezuelans are facing a grave and generalized violation of human rights in their country of origin.

According to a report from the *Instituto Terra, Trabalho e Cidadania* (2022), 41% of migrant women do not understand the administrative process of their expulsion. Some of them report having been surprised by some requests made without prior notice or explanation when they arrive at the Federal Police to deal with other issues. An interviewee shared that, when she went to the Federal Police to collect her ID card

(CRNM)²⁴, she was informed of an expulsion decree in her name. The agent threatened to arrest her for deportation purposes after the 05-day appeal period (ITTC, 2022).

5 Findings

The analysis indicates that migration is a securitised issue in Brazil, although mainstream political narratives construct the image of Brazil as a welcoming country for migrants. The first finding demonstrates that, in the past decades, politicians tend to frame migration and asylum as “humanitarian issues” in their speeches, as securitisation has already been institutionalized over time (Buzan et al, 1998). The second finding contributes to the study of securitisation as it demonstrates that exploring speeches uttered in the public sphere may provide an incorrect perception of the existence of securitisation moves. Exploring the role of institutions and their practices is, therefore, key to identifying possible elements of securitisation, as securitisation is a form of governmentality (Bigo, 2002).

The humanitarian narrative identified in Brazilian political speeches has two main backgrounds: (1) the myth of racial democracy that has been mobilized throughout history to “solve” the racial issue; and (2) the political gains for different party’s platforms, either Worker’s Party’s new left movement or Jair Bolsonaro’s crusade against left-wing movements. This study has found that highlighting Brazil’s positive relation to migration has, on the one hand, worked to deny Brazil’s structural racism and xenophobia, benefiting those located in the status quo. And on the other hand, provided ground for Brazil to stand out as an emerging power, aligned with the values of the international community and with the capacity to take the lead in contemporary strategic issues.

As pointed out by authors (Optiz, 2012; Laval & Dardot, 2016), the Western world produced contemporary forms of liberal rationality that organize limits and establish manners and rules of illiberal government. This is found to be the case of Brazil. The country performs the principles of the “liberal peace framework”, in other words, the principles of democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free globalised markets and the implementation of neoliberal development in the economy (Richmond, 2006). At the same time, it exercises non-liberal practices that discipline the bodies and controls the populations (Foucault, 2008), including biopolitical racism and segregation.

²⁴ CRNM (National Card for Migration Registry) is the official identification document of migrants in Brazil.

An analysis of the speeches performed by presidents, diplomatic bodies, and other key political party actors demonstrates the element of the liberal peace framework in how Brazil proposes to deal with the migration issue. More than that, it is through this framework that political discourses criticize other states and the opposition's actions, denouncing human rights violations and attacks on democratic values, hence Dilma's 2015 speech at the opening of UNGA and Bolsonaro's Operation Welcome slogan "Socialism excludes, Brazil welcomes". The migration issue, therefore, has been mobilized to the centre of Brazil's foreign policy and helped to base the country's campaign for a more prominent role in the international community.

Although PT, PMDB, and Jair Bolsonaro represent contrasting political platforms and ideologies, they sustained strategies to elevate Brazil to the position of emerging power and regional leadership. Either campaigning for a Security Council reform or as the leader of an anti-globalist movement in Latin America, these political parties benefited from humanitarian discourses on migration management as the international community began to recognize Brazil's potential to deal with crises and lead to solutions.

As seen previously, denying Brazil's structural racism has become part of the national ideology. The racial democracy myth is a societal pact that political parties either refused to completely dismantle or ended up mobilizing for their own benefit. PT's governments are known to have incorporated many of the demands of racial movements in Brazil. However, a central part of the domestic strategy of Lula's government was known as "class conciliation", in which PT guaranteed to the Brazilian elites that no major structural changes were going to be attempted in the economic, social, and political realms (da Silva, 2002). In order to maintain class conciliation, it was necessary to demobilize its bases, which eventually led to the denial that Brazil's economic system and labour relations are intimately connected to the historical exploitation of black, poor communities (Carvalho, 2016; Fernandes, 2018; Martínez, 2020). Ultimately, black social movements that were part of the PT's bases were greatly damaged by this strategy as they demanded more structural and profound changes in Brazil's economic system.

PT not only refused to conduct structural changes when it comes to racism in Brazil to maintain the "class conciliation", as it reverberated the myth of racial democracy in regard to its management of migration and refuge. The party often used rhetorical elements found in the narratives of racial democracy, referencing to the absence of colour lines, or the harmony between races and cultures. In his turn, Bolsonaro's political platform

revives the logic behind the myth of racial democracy of the military dictatorship. A former military himself, Bolsonaro is aligned with the conservative stands that surround the Brazilian Armed Forces and consequently, inspires himself in initiatives of the military government.

Bolsonaro has always defended the politicization of the armed forces during his political career and considers their role in the 1964 coup d'état as a necessary step in order to tackle the communist ideology in the country. Under Bolsonaro's presidency, the federal government more than doubled the presence of military personnel in positions previously held by civilians (Borges, 2021). Additionally, the Office of the General Counsel for the Federal Government requested Brazilian justice, in 2021, the permit to celebrate the anniversary of 1964's coup d'état, in a recognition of the centrality of this era to current political affairs in Brazil.

The president has repeatedly denied the existence of racism in Brazil and considers any debate on racism in the country connected to an attempt, from left-wing parties, to import tensions that do not belong in Brazil (Camazaro, 2020). This position is a direct reproduction of the logic behind the National Security Doctrine that did not allow the concept of racial democracy to be questioned and transformed any attempt to do that into a critical threat to Brazil's security and unity. The essence of the Operation Welcome slogan translates this idea: left-wing and socialist parties tend to exclude, divide and threaten the population. Stressing the idea that Brazil does not contain structural racism or any form of discrimination corroborates the campaign of Brazil as a welcoming place for migrants without having to deal with the practical contradictions of receiving these groups.

For Bourdieu (1996), discourse can only exist as long as it is socially acceptable. Therefore, the Brazilian social imaginary is populated with the idea of the absence of discrimination in the country, while the majority of the population performs acts of discrimination themselves. This contradiction is possible through the concept of "racism made in Brazil", which allows racism to exist in concealed levels of humiliation and segregation. The idea of the myth of racial democracy is therefore a national ideology and exported as a national principle to the international community, which often reverberates it and celebrates it.

Ultimately, the analysis of political parties and their key actors' speeches determine the *why* behind their humanitarian discourses, which later compared with concrete practices, are known to serve more a rhetorical purpose than concrete actions. The study has found that parallel to Brazil's opening for migration flows throughout its history, securitisation moves have taken place. This has been observed in the development of the Brazilian migration policy, which has always aimed at the selection of "desirable" migrants. There were explicit measures to avoid the entry of those who did not fit in the racial, cultural and political imaginary of the Brazilian Nation, hence the Quota Law, and the Foreigner Statute and the strategy to whiten the Brazilian population. These regulatory dispositive translate the action of biopolitics.

The principles of liberal governance adopted by Brazil in its re-democratization period did not lead to the abolition of its *raison d'état* that informed the country's historical relation with migration. On the contrary, according to Foucault, the liberal art of governing constitutes the principle of the maintenance of this logic, "and of its fullest development" (Foucault, 2008:28). The essence of governmentality operates through a security calculus that guarantees the "conditions for the creation of a formidable body of laws and an incredible variety of governmental interventions" (Foucault, 2008: 64). In this sense, even though the Foreigner's Statute is recognized as a symbol of an authoritarian period, it was kept in force for 32 years after the end of the military dictatorship. Its contradictions with the 1988 Constitution, Brazil's liberal democracy symbol, served as ambiguous security dispositive, enacted whenever security experts saw fit.

This study has shown that the recurrent formulation of dichotomous categories to distinguish between immigrants is part of Brazil's history. These policies classified as undesirable the Japanese and the Arabs, the physically and mentally ill, the "subversives" - namely the anarchists, the leftists, the delinquents, outcasts, and transgressors of legal and moral laws, such as prostitutes or drug traffickers. In the 21st century, along with the regionalization process of migration policy linked to the constitution of a global regime of control over international migration, the technocratic regulation policies of migratory flows engendered new ways of organizing and classifying migratory flows, which were also adopted by Brazil. The old categories and classifications of undesirables were subsumed into the "new threats" established by the international community, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking and undocumented migration.

A key factor of securitisation of migration in Brazil is found in the Federal Police's role. The bureaucratic procedures related to immigration and the first assistance to those seeking asylum or refuge are the responsibility of the Federal Police, a public security agency also responsible for the intelligence gathering and repression of transnational crime. Brazil, as the main route for drugs from South America to Europe, exercises a central role in the renewed "war on drugs". The Federal Police is the responsible institution for recognition of "threats" and "enemies" at the countries' borders. It seeks drug mules, international traffickers and smugglers.

This creates a condition where migration is often treated as a police matter. Ordinances 666 and 770, of 2019, translate this idea by linking migration to "dangerous" individuals that may commit or have committed crimes. Although the provisions of the law determine the conditions for the admission of foreigners, as well as their departure and conditions for deportation, expulsion, and extradition, the Federal Police have relative discretionary power with respect to deciding who may enter and remain in Brazilian territory.

Moreover, Ordinances 666 and 770 operate under the logic of Arendt's (1989) definition of "bureaucratic government". To rule by bureaucracy is to ignore the law and rule by decrees, "[...] which means that force, which in constitutional government only enforces the law, becomes the direct source of all legislation". In this sense, there is a predominance of technique, of the logic of security and order by which everything is regulated. In accordance with both Bigo (2002) and Arendt (1989), this study has found that dispositive such as decrees, instructions, and ordinances reflect a supposed change of circumstance in which only the security expert understands the details and therefore, is the one capable to decide on the measures. Ultimately, the inclusion of migration in the security theme is part of direct interests of professionals in this area, such as national police forces, intelligence services and security industries (Bigo, 2002), and in the case of Brazil, particularly the MJSP and the Federal Police.

The approval of the New Migration Law was, first, an achievement of the social movements that had long demanded legislation focused on human rights. But, in an apparent paradox, the formulation of legislation that conceived transnational migrants as subjects of rights occurred in a period in which the policies of technocratic regulation of migration flows engendered new ways of organizing and classifying migration flows (Feldman-Bianco, 2018). This has created a condition that, although migrants would be properly documented in Brazil, their legitimate status can be abruptly cancelled, with a

deadline of 5 days to leave the country. Thus, the current Ordinance 770 makes the condition of being a migrant in Brazil a condition of insecurity.

The *how* behind securitisation practices in Brazil, therefore, is linked to both the history that institutionalized the securitisation of migration over time in Brazil, as early as the 19th-century legislations, as well as it was impacted by the broader criminalization of migration due to transnational terrorism, and particularly in the Latin American region, crime (Domenech, 2015). It is important, firstly, to highlight how during PT's government the Foreign Statute was still active. Secondly, it was during the PMDB government that the New Migration Law was published in parallel to the establishment of the Armed Forces as the main actor to lead the humanitarian operation at the border with Venezuela. Finally, Bolsonaro's presidency brought up the spectre of the old Foreigners Statute through the new Ordinances and, consequently, the old securitization agendas. This study thus places these new regulations in the framework of a policy of increasing securitization and militarization, however, following a trend that already was consolidated in the country.

6 Conclusion

This dissertation investigated the phenomenon of securitisation of migration, departing for the perspectives of both the Copenhagen and Paris schools. The CS focus on the discursive construction of threats by a political elite, arguing that an issue becomes securitised through the speech act of the securitising agent. The PS, on the other hand, argues that security cannot be solely understood through speech acts. There would be other elements outside the speech that have substantial impact on securitisation, such as technological, strategic and practical issues emerging from the routines of security experts.

By identifying these two different takes on how securitisation may take place, the study was guided by the research question "to what extent do practices of securitisation reflect the content of political speeches?". This question was built on the Paris School assumption that speech acts may have an impact on securitisation, but sociological and criminological lenses are better fit to the study of the security phenomenon. Therefore, the case study presented here contributed to the study of securitisation by allowing to analyse political speeches through their social and cultural contexts.

The aim is to understand how speeches and practices impact securitisation, suggesting to what the extent one corroborates the other and the importance speeches have over practices and vice-versa. Overall, the present study identified that although securitisation of migration is a reality in Brazil, speeches and practices are contradictory in this realm. In this case study, the empirics have shown that speeches have little impact on security practices in the period studied.

Having identified the elements that make up the historical development of the migration issue in Brazil, this study points out to the centrality of migration in the narratives of Brazilian identity and national formation. Brazilian's society imaginary understands its essence as a multicultural country, where harmony prevails, and prejudice does not exist. Nonetheless, the historical overview combined with the study of the development of legal-institutional frameworks in this field demonstrate the first contradictions between the social imaginary and rhetoric, with the day-to-day practices. A further look into three major events related to migration and asylum in the country and two main bureaucratic instruments shed light on the securitisation of migration phenomena in Brazil.

Firstly, it was found that political speeches on migration do not represent the “speech act” conceptualized by the Copenhagen School, as they do not work to construct an image of migration as a threat. Rather, they work as the opposite, constructing the image of harmony between migrants and nationals. Secondly, bureaucracies and routines of security experts during this period demonstrates that migration has been dealt over time through the lens of criminalization and securitisation in Brazil, as proponents of the Paris School argue. The study concludes that securitisation has been institutionalized over time in Brazil and it is now mobilized as technical actions, rather than as a political construction. Because securitisation of migration has already been part of Brazil's history, political speeches dating from 2000 to 2020 tend to emphasize the narratives that bring political gains in the current international regime – a regime that privileges the “liberal democracy” and “liberal peace” principles. The use of this discursive elements does not impact the logic behind security experts' practices, which tend to see migrants as dangerous to the country's security.

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Appendix 1: Table of translations

Code	Original	Translation	Source
A, p. 36	“(…) durante muitas décadas, Brasil sempre acolheu Europeus, Asiáticos, Árabes, Judeus, Africanos e, mais recentemente, nós recebemos fortes correntes migratórias dos nossos irmãos na América do Sul, da África e da América Latina”	“(…) over many decades, Brazil has always welcomed Europeans, Asians, Arabs, Jews, Africans and, more recently, we have received strong migratory currents from our brothers in South America, African countries, and Latin America”	(da Silva, 2009)
B, p. 37	“(…) razões humanitárias, refletindo o comprometimento do Brasil com o Direito Internacional e o Direito dos Refugiados, assim como a solidariedade do governo Brasileiro com o povo Palestino”	“(…) humanitarian reasons, reflecting Brazil’s commitment to the International Law and Refugee Law, as well as the solidarity of the Brazilian government with the Palestinian people”	(da Silva, 2007)
C, p. 37	“Refúgio é uma política de estado no Brasil. É um importante elemento da democracia brasileira e da sua tradição de acolhimento. É um dos pilares das políticas de direitos humanos. (...) Nós esperamos aumentar as oportunidades de reassentamento no Brasil. A longa experiência do Brasil em possuir uma estrutura tripartite na qual governo, sociedade civil e ACNUR trabalham juntos em	“Asylum is a state policy in Brazil. It is an important element of Brazil's democracy and its tradition of openness. It is one of the pillars of human rights policy. (...) We hope to increase resettlement opportunities in Brazil. Brazil's long experience of having a tripartite body in which government, civil society, and UNHCR work together on refugee policies has been successful”	(Itamaraty, 2009)

	políticas de refúgio tem sido bem sucedida.”		
D, p. 37	“Nós estamos entendendo que as pessoas e os países que estão envolvidos na crise do Oriente Médio compreendem que o Brasil pode ajudar, por causa da boa relação que o Brasil tem com todos os países e as facções políticas no Oriente Médio”	“We are coming to understand that people and countries that are involved in the Middle East crisis are realizing that Brazil can help, because of the good relationship Brazil has with all the countries and all the political factions in the Middle East”	(da Silva, 2010a).
E, p. 38	“[A] “não-indiferença” não é exatamente um princípio, mas uma orientação humanista para nossa política internacional. Foi com esse espírito de solidariedade, por exemplo, que animou a decisão de liderar um braço armado da Missão para a Estabilização do Haiti ou de enviar suprimentos para a população da Faixa de Gaza. Em várias situações na América do Sul – tanto em conflitos internos ou em conflitos entre países – o Brasil se mostrou um interlocutor ativo e solidário”	“[The] ‘non-indifference’ [concept] is not exactly a principle, but it is a humanistic guideline of our foreign policy. It was this spirit of solidarity that, for example, animated our decision to lead in the military arm of the Stabilization Mission in Haiti or supplies to the population of the Gaza Strip. In several situations in South America - whether internal conflicts or conflicts between countries - Brazil has shown itself to be an active and supportive interlocutor.”	(Amorim, 2009)
F	“(…) cada um desses [soldados] reafirmou, durante sua vida, a vocação pacífica e solidária da nação Brasileira”	“(…) each of these [soldiers] reaffirmed, during their lifetime, the peaceful and solidary vocation of the Brazilian nation”	(da Silva, 2010b)

G, p. 38	<p>“O respeito pela auto-determinação em conjunto com a decisão de ajudar aqueles que precisam é o que chamamos de “não-indiferença”, um princípio que não implica a não-intervenção mas traz uma nova perspectiva a ela. Após visitar o Haiti nove vezes em 2004, eu posso garantir à vocês: a não-indiferença trouxe resultados em termos de maior segurança, fortalecendo a governança democrática, progresso socioeconômico, e o aumento de mais autoconfiança”.</p>	<p>“Respect for self-determination in conjunction with the decision to help those in dire need is what we call “non-indifference”, a principle that does not affect non-intervention but brings a new perspective to it. Having visited Haiti nine times since 2004, I can assure you: non-indifference has brought results in terms of increased security, strengthened democratic governance, socio-economic progress, and increased self-confidence”</p>	(Amorim, 2010)
H, p. 38	<p>“(…) como é a natureza dos brasileiros, nós estamos abertos para receber os cidadãos haitianos que escolherem o Brasil para buscar oportunidades”</p>	<p>“(…) as is the nature of Brazilians, we are open to receive Haitian citizens who choose to seek opportunities in Brazil”</p>	(Rousseff, 2012)
I, p. 39	<p>“(…) a necessidade de tratar os haitianos como migrantes que desejam vir à América do Sul, em todas as circunstâncias, com um espírito humanitário, com respeito aos seus direitos humanos e à sua legítima intenção de começar uma nova vida em outro país”</p>	<p>“(…) the need to treat Haitian migrants who wish to come to South America, in all circumstances, in a humanitarian spirit, with full respect for their human rights and their legitimate intention to start a new life in another country”</p>	(Itamaraty, 2013)

J, p. 39	“(…) em um mundo onde bens, capitais, informação e ideias circulam livremente, é um absurdo que se impeça o livre trânsito de pessoas”	“(…) in a world where goods, capital, information, and ideas circulate freely, it is absurd to impede the free transit of people”	(Rousseff, 2015a)
J2, p. 39	“Brazil é uma terra de acolhimento, um país feito de refugiados. Nós recebemos sírios, haitianos, homens e mulheres de todos os lugares do mundo, assim como nós também acolhemos, por mais de um século, milhões de europeus, árabes e asiáticos. Nós estamos de braços abertos para receber refugiados. Nós somos um país multiétnico que coexiste com as diferenças e sabe quão importantes elas são para nos fazer mais fortes, ricos e diversos culturalmente, socialmente e economicamente”	“Brazil is a land of welcoming, a country made up of refugees. We receive Syrians, Haitians, men and women from all over the world, just as we have sheltered, for more than a century, millions of Europeans, Arabs and Asians. We are with open arms to receive refugees. We are a multi-ethnic country that coexists with differences and knows how important they are to make us stronger, richer, more diverse, culturally, socially and economically”	(Rousseff, 2015a)
K, p. 39	“Nós somos orgulhosos de sermos um povo da diversidade. É por isso que a tolerância e o respeito pelas diferenças são marcas da nossa identidade. Neste espírito, nós já recebemos mais de 28 mil cidadãos haitianos, e nós continuaremos a receber em solidariedade”	“We are proud to be a people of diversity. That is why tolerance and respect for differences are hallmarks of our identity. With this spirit, we currently receive more than 28 thousand Haitian citizens, and we will continue to do so in solidarity”	(Rousseff, 2015b)

L, p. 39	“Brasil está de braços abertos para receber refugiados”	“Brazil was with open arms to receive refugees”	(Rousseff, 2015 c)
M, p. 40	“Na América do Sul, nós estamos em meio à uma onda migratória de grandes proporções. São estimados mais de um milhão de venezuelanos que deixaram seu país na busca de condições de vida mais decentes. O Brasil recebeu todos aqueles que chegaram em nosso território. Existem dezenas de milhares de venezuelanos para quem nós oferecemos toda a assistência. Em colaboração com o Alto Comissariado para Refugiados, nós construímos abrigos para os acolher da melhor maneira possível. Nós promovemos a interiorização para outras regiões do Brasil. Nós oferecemos documentos que os permitem trabalhar no país. Nós oferecemos escola para as crianças, vacinação e saúde para todos.”	“In South America, we are in the midst of a migratory wave of great proportions. It is estimated that more than a million Venezuelans have already left their country in search of decent living conditions. Brazil has received all those who arrive in our territory. There are tens of thousands of Venezuelans to whom we try to give all the assistance. With the collaboration of the High Commission for Refugees, we have built shelters to shelter them in the best way possible. We have promoted their interiorization to other regions of Brazil. We issue documents that allow them to work in the country. We offer schooling for the children, vaccination and health services for all”	(Temer, 2018)
M2, p. 40	“No Brasil, nós temos orgulho de ter uma tradição de acolhimento. Nós somos um povo forjado pela diversidade. Tem um pedaço de mundo em cada brasileiro. Fiéis à	“In Brazil, we are proud of our welcoming tradition. We are a people forged in diversity. There is a piece of the world in every Brazilian. Faithful to this tradition, last year we instituted	(Temer, 2018)

	essa tradição, no ano passado nós instituímos a Nova Lei de Migração – uma legislação moderna que não apenas protege a dignidade do imigrante, mas reconhece os benefícios da imigração”.	a new Migration Law - a modern legislation that not only protects the dignity of the immigrant, but recognizes the benefits of immigration”	
N, p. 41	“(…) esse é o Brasil – um país de solidariedade, com uma tradição de acolhimento de todos os povos do mundo e de cumprimento dos seus tratados internacionais em todos os momentos históricos”	“(…) this is Brazil - a country of solidarity, with a tradition of welcoming all the peoples of the world and fulfilling its international commitments at all historical moments”	(Temer, 2018)
O, p. 41	“(…) se destaca no campo humanitário e dos direitos humanos e tornou-se uma referência internacional pelo seu comprometimento e dedicação em apoiar refugiados venezuelanos que chegam ao Brasil pela fronteira com Roraima”	“(…) stands out in the humanitarian and human rights field and has become an international reference for its commitment and dedication in supporting Venezuelan refugees arriving in Brazil through the border with Roraima”	(Bolsonaro, 2019)
P, p. 41	“Brasil é um país humanitário” que “trabalha para acolher e integrar venezuelanos”	“Brazil is a humanitarian country” that “works to welcome and integrate Venezuelans”	(Bolsonaro, 2021)
P2, p. 41	“Brasil é um país que tem um respeito profundo pelo sofrimento de outros” e o governo” vai fazer tudo que é possível para integrar [Venezuelanos] na sociedade”	“Brazil is a country that has a deep respect for one’s suffering” and the government “will do everything possible to integrate [Venezuelans] into society”	(Bolsonaro, 2021)

Q, p. 41	<p>“Começa com a gente, que buscamos soluções [para o fluxo migratório Venezuelano] que expresse a nossa essência, seja através de legislações ou através da nossa formação nacional, por conta da nossa posição como brasileiros”</p>	<p>“It starts with us, we seek solutions [to the Venezuelan migration flow] that express our essence, either through the laws or through our national formation, due to how we position ourselves as Brazilians”</p>	(Barros, 2021)
Q2, p. 41-42	<p>“Por que a Operação Acolhida trabalha tão bem? Eu vejo três fatores importantes: primeiro, nossa legislação de migração é inclusiva, nem todo país tem isso; segundo, a maturidade institucional dos governos. Você vê, o decreto foi na lei anterior, se o governo mudou e a Operação Acolhida foi mantida, esse governo tem uma maturidade institucional; e terceiro é a nossa nacionalidade, nossa formação nacional, como nós somos como Brasileiros. Nós somos miscigenados, claro que temos problemas, mas em essência somos um povo acolhedor. Nossa formação é essa mistura. Então, quando vamos para a base legal, para a base da maturidade institucional e para a essência da nossa nacionalidade, nós podemos construir uma solução que evidentemente precisa ser</p>	<p>“Why is Operation Welcome working so well? I have three important factors: first, we have a legal base within migration that is inclusive, not every country has this; second, the institutional maturity of the governments. You see, the decree was in the previous government, if the government changed and Operation Welcome was maintained, this is a governmental institutional maturity; and the third is our nationality, our nationality formation, how we are as Brazilians. We are mixed, of course we have problems, so we are in essence a welcoming people. Our formation was this miscegenation. So, when we go to the legal base, to the base of institutional maturity and in the essence of our nationality, we can build this solution that evidently has to continue to be worked on, this is an extremely important aspect”</p>	(Barros, 2021)

	continuada, esse é um aspecto muito importante”		
R, p. 42	“Brasileiros, neles mesmos, já são pessoas de bom coração. Nós queremos servir à todos da melhor forma possível (...) Ajudar essas pessoas é um trabalho diferenciado, sem dúvidas”	“Brazilians, in themselves, are already good-hearted people. We want to serve everyone in the best way possible (...) Helping these people is a differentiated work, no doubt”	(Rodrigues, 2021)