

Abstract

The "bomber gap" crisis is not well known in the general Cold War consciousness. In addition, the generally accepted and, from my point of view, simplified course of the formation of the "bomber gap" can be questioned using relevant sources, and the same is true of the dating event, which is also treated very loosely. If the course of this event was questioned, it is necessary to look for the cause of the "bomber gap" in a different, than generally accepted plane, referring to the observation during the air show. Some authors thus offer an explanation of the "bomber gap" both from the point of view of political economy and from the point of view of the human factor in the secret services. The second view of the "bomber gap" concerns both crises taking place at the end of 1956, the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Uprising. Although it would seem that strategic air power and nuclear bombs will be a key factor and play a more important role in solving both crises, where both strategies and doctrines of the two great powers, the doctrine of the liberation of Eastern Europe from communism and the Soviet doctrine of penetration into the countries of the Third, indirectly clashed world. At first glance, the strategic air force here played a secondary role, the capacities of both countries for a nuclear strike were not yet sufficient at the time, and the mutual deterrent force prevented a direct clash between the two superpowers. Both crises thus took place on a diplomatic level from the point of view of the mutual relationship between the great powers.