# Záznam o průběhu obhajoby disertační práce

Akademický rok: 2022/2023

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| **Jméno a příjmení studenta:** | Pavel Ilinov |
| **Identifikační číslo studenta:** | 82105433 |

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| **Typ studijního programu:** | doktorský |
| **Studijní program:** | Ekonomie a ekonometrie |
| **ID studia:** | 557468 |

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| **Název práce:** | Eseje o endogenním získávání ínformací v ekonomii |
| **Pracoviště práce:** | CERGE (23-CERGE) |
| **Jazyk práce:** | čeština |
| **Jazyk obhajoby:** | čeština |
| **Školitel:** | doc. Mgr. Jakub Steiner, M.A., Ph.D. |
| **Oponent(i):** | prof. Eugen Kováč, Ph.D. |
| | Fabio Michelucci, Ph.D. |
| **Datum obhajoby:** | 13.04.2023    **Místo obhajoby:**    Praha |
| **Termín:** | řádný |

**Průběh obhajoby:**

The Defense Committee Chair initiated the defense by verbal statements confirming (i) that a satisfactory number of Defense Committee Members were present, (ii) that the student Pavel Ilinov fulfilled all the requirements as listed in the Study and Examination Code of Charles University including showing the appropriate documents.

At the beginning, the curriculum vitae of the Student was presented. Following this presentation, the Student started the presentation of the dissertation "Essays on Endogenous Information Acquisition in Economics", presenting the main topics, methodologies, and findings of the dissertation to the Defense Committee. After reading the referees' comments, an open discussion followed. During the discussion, Student satisfactorily answered all the questions from the audience.

Krešimir Žigić: Pavel, I want to say that the sum of the two externalities cancels out, doesn't it?
Pavel Ilinov answered.

Yiman Sun: You assume heterogeneous prior beliefs, which is different from the classic delegation model with heterogenous preferences but common prior. Would your results hold in the classic delegation model?
Pavel Ilinov answered.

Marek Hudík: Does the principle create incentives for the information acquisition? What is the rationale for timing?

I guess agent could acquire information before he or she was hired by the principal.
Pavel Ilinov answered.

Yiman Sun: Ok, imagine an alternative model, the principal delegates information acquisition to the agent but not the final decision, and then asks the agent to report the information back to the principal. Did you consider this?
Pavel Ilinov answered.

Jakub Steiner: So, we assume that the principle delegates to the agent the information acquisition, provides a signal and then asks to choose the reaction.
Pavel Ilinov commented.

Yiman Sun: I thought the curves are not exactly 0 and 1 at the points close to the extreme points, because the agent doesn't acquire information and may choose the incorrect action. Is it so?
Pavel Ilinov answered.

Eugen Kováč: Let me start with chapter 1. You use entropy cost function and you refer a lot to its property, how strong is this assumption, how would it work without such an assumption?
My second question is slightly related to the first one. You have shown an equivalence between the decision problem and the Nash equilibrium. How do you expect real players will play this game? Players may have some biases and in the decision problem the person may not proceed all the alternatives correctly, because of bias. In strategic game he may play differently than the Nash equilibrium predicts. What would you expect to happen in real life?
In the second chapter I have a concern to grasp from where do misaligned preferences come from? When agents make inferences where their beliefs come from? Would it be possible to think about it as a difference in information? So that their beliefs come from private information and everybody has private signal.
And let me also ask briefly about the third paper. What is the relation between learning and remembering? How do you relate these in the model?
Pavel Ilinov answered.

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| **Výsledek obhajoby:** | prospěl/a (P) |
| **Předseda komise:** | doc. Krešimir Žigić, Ph.D. (přítomen) ............................ |
| **Členové komise:** | doc. Ing. Marek Hudík, Ph.D. (přítomen) ............................ |
| | Yiman Sun, Ph.D. (přítomen) ............................ |