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**Nowoczesna: A Transformed Entrepreneurial
Party?**

Bachelor's Thesis

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Declaration

1. I declare that I wrote this thesis using only the listed literature and sources.
2. I declare that the thesis was not used to obtain any other academic title.
3. I agree to make the thesis available for study and research purposes.

In Prague on May 2, 2023

Vojtěch Pohanka

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Abstract

Entrepreneurial parties are a relevant but overlooked topic in contemporary political science. This thesis seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on entrepreneurial parties with a case study of the Polish party Nowoczesna (*Modern*). The main research question that it seeks to answer is whether Nowoczesna, during its various stages of development, met the criteria of the entrepreneurial party model. The case of Nowoczesna was chosen primarily because the party underwent a leadership alternation, which is of theoretical relevance for the entrepreneurial party concept. For its theoretical framework, the thesis uses the definition of the entrepreneurial party concept developed by Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová in their 2020 book *The Rise of Entrepreneurial Parties in European Politics*. To operationalize the multidimensional concept, the thesis uses a variety of indicators, including von dem Berge and Poguntke's Assembly-based Intra-party Democracy index as well as measures of electoral and social media personalization. Semi-structured interviews with Nowoczesna's members provided additional insight into the party's origin and development. The analysis finds that Nowoczesna met the criteria and could be classified as an entrepreneurial party during its foundational period and then began to diverge from the concept. In this regard, the thesis provides more systematic and rigorous support for earlier research on Nowoczesna. As a secondary research goal, the thesis investigates Nowoczesna's ideological development. It finds that, from its start, the party had a coherent ideological position and used relatively little anti-establishment rhetoric, unlike what is expected from entrepreneurial parties in theory. Besides the empirical analysis, the concluding part of this thesis also includes a theoretical discussion of the conceptualization of the entrepreneurial party and how it could be linked to other strands of the literature on political parties.

Abstrakt

Podnikatelské strany jsou relevantním, ale přehlíženým tématem současné politologie. Předkládaná práce je případovou studií polské politické strany Nowoczesna. Hlavní výzkumná otázka, kterou se práce snaží zodpovědět, je, zda Nowoczesna během svého vývoje splňovala kritéria konceptu podnikatelské strany. Příklad Nowoczesne byl zvolen primárně proto, že ve straně došlo k výměně předsedy, což je z teoretického hlediska velmi relevantní pro koncept podnikatelské strany. Jako teoretický rámec slouží definice podnikatelské strany, která byla vyvinuta Hlouškem, Kopečkem a Vodovou v knize z roku 2020 *The Rise of Entrepreneurial Parties in European Politics* (Vzestup podnikatelských stran v evropské politice). Pro operacionalizaci tohoto multidimenzionálního konceptu bylo zvoleno několik indikátorů, mezi které patřily například index vnitrostranické demokracie od autorů von dem Bergeho a Poguntkeho nebo indikátory personalizace sociálních sítí a voleb. Semistrukturované rozhovory s relevantními členy strany sloužily k doplnění kvalitativních poznatků o vzniku a vývoji Nowoczesne. Výsledky analýz ukazují, že Nowoczesna splňovala kritéria podnikatelské strany v prvotních fázích svého vývoje a později se od konceptu vzdálila. V tomto ohledu práce systematictěji dokládá argumenty dřívějšího výzkumu o Nowoczesne. Dalším výzkumným cílem bylo zmapovat ideologický vývoj strany. Zde práce ukazuje, že Nowoczesna měla relativně koherentní ideologické zakotvení a používala málo anti-establishmentové rétoriky, v kontrastu s tím, co literatura předpokládá o podnikatelských stranách. Kromě empirické analýzy práce také obsahuje teoretickou diskuzi konceptualizace podnikatelských stran a navrhuje důslednější propojení konceptu s teoretickou literaturou o politických stranách.

Keywords

Entrepreneurial parties, party types, party organizations, development of political parties,
Nowoczesna

Klíčová slova

Podnikatelské strany, typy politických stran, stranické organizace, vývoj politických stran,
Nowoczesna

Název práce

Nowoczesna: Transformovaná podnikatelská strana?

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Introduction

European party politics have been going through significant changes in recent years. Rises in party system instability and the increasing number of new parties are some of the widely noted new phenomena (De Vries and Hobolt 2020; Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2020; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2022). In Central and Eastern Europe, part of these general trends has also been the emergence, and in some cases significant electoral success, of entrepreneurial parties (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020). Although scholars differ on their exact conceptualization, entrepreneurial parties are usually defined as parties founded as the personal initiative of one person, a “political entrepreneur” who also becomes the leader and exerts a large degree of control over the party. These parties also often eschew more traditional modes of organization and decision-making. On that basis, some scholars conceptualize the entrepreneurial party as a distinct organizational model or party type (Krouwel 2006, 2012; Hloušek and Kopeček 2017; Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020). The goal of this thesis is to examine whether the Polish political party Nowoczesna (*Modern*) could be classified as an entrepreneurial party. Nowoczesna presents an interesting case to study. It was first identified as an entrepreneurial party in 2017 by Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik (2017). Later in the same year, the party went through a change of leadership, which saw its founder and charismatic leader Ryszard Petru replaced as the party chair. Studying Nowoczesna may thus bring some insights about what leadership alternation means for an entrepreneurial party’s organization and development, an issue that has not yet been thoroughly explored. More generally, as an empirical study, this thesis seeks to contribute to the developing literature on entrepreneurial parties.

In developing their concept of the entrepreneurial party, scholars such as Krouwel (2006, 2012) and Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová (2020) have taken inspiration from one of the most prominent approaches to the study of political parties, which seeks to classify parties into different organizational models or types based on dimensions such as their origins and organizational characteristics. Importantly, these features are also theoretically linked to the specific political and historical context in which the different party types emerged.

This approach is often traced back to Maurice Duverger (1954) and his concepts of cadre and mass parties as well as to Sigmund Neumann’s (1956) distinction between parties of

individual representation and parties of social integration (Wolinetz 2002, 139). The catch-all (Kirchheimer 1966) and cartel (Katz and Mair 1995) party types are two oft-cited concepts that follow in this tradition. Starting from Duverger's theory, Katz and Mair (1995) viewed the elite, mass, catch-all parties and cartel party types as basically evolutionary models, each prominent in a specific time period. While entrepreneurial parties can be considered as a distinct party type (Krouwel 2006, 2012; Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020), they are most likely not an evolutionary model but rather one that coexists with other organizational models. Moreover, since the entrepreneurial party is a relatively new concept, it has not been as extensively theoretically developed as previous party types. There is thus no clear consensus on the precise conceptualization of the term.

While significant work has been done recently to alleviate the confusion (Hloušek and Kopeček 2017; Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020), some important questions remain unanswered about what the necessary definitional criteria of the concept are. The extant conceptualizations also tend to focus on the criterion of the parties' origins and their founding by the political entrepreneur. Important aspects such as entrepreneurial parties' organization and decision-making remain undertheorized (Gherghina 2022).

Case selection, research questions and thesis structure

This thesis is a case study of Nowoczesna. There were two main reasons for choosing Nowoczesna as the subject of analysis. First, work by Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik (2017, 2019) shows that the party seems to be a rather ambiguous case of an entrepreneurial party that went through a leadership alternation during which the founder lost control of the party. This allows us to explore what kind of an effect this change had on the party and what consequences it had for Nowoczesna's possible classification into as an entrepreneurial party. Second, besides the studies cited above, Nowoczesna has not been subject to any in-depth academic research, and analysing overlooked empirical cases could help solve some of the theoretical issues of the entrepreneurial party concept (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017).

Specifically, the thesis will seek to answer the following research questions:

1) Has Nowoczesna, throughout its various stages of development, fit the criteria of the entrepreneurial party concept?

2) If not, how has it diverged?

Drawing on the previous work of Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik (2017, 2019), I hypothesize that Nowoczesna mostly conformed to the entrepreneurial party type in the period immediately after its founding. It then likely diverged from the concept once its founder Ryszard Petru was replaced as party chair in November 2017. The interesting question in this regard will be how and to what extent the party changed its wider organizational model aside from the leadership alternation.

A secondary goal will be to examine the development of Nowoczesna's ideology. While ideology is not directly linked to the entrepreneurial party organizational model, Cirhan (2021, 118–50) notes that there is a significant overlap between parties that use anti-establishment appeals and those that have an entrepreneurial party organization. Another secondary goal was also originally to use survey data to see whether Nowoczesna experienced any shifts of its supporter base, however, a preliminary analysis showed that there was no significant change in this regard.

The first chapter of this thesis will review the literature on party types to provide the necessary theoretical context and introduce the entrepreneurial party concept. Next, I will differentiate the entrepreneurial party from the related concepts that belong to what André Krouwel (2006) has called the business-firm party cluster. I will also introduce Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodova's (2020) definition of the entrepreneurial party, which will serve as the main theoretical framework for this thesis. The first chapter will also review the complimentary theoretical approaches that can help understand the political context in which European entrepreneurial parties emerge. After the section on methodology and operationalization, the empirical chapter will be devoted to a case study of Nowoczesna. The party will be analysed using the criteria of Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová's (2020, 18) entrepreneurial party concept. The chapter will also analyse Nowoczesna's ideology as a secondary research goal. Lastly, the thesis will consider the entrepreneurial party concept from the theoretical point of view, followed by a conclusion summarizing the findings of the empirical part and pointing out the limitations of the analysis.

1.Theoretical introduction: classifying types of political parties

Over the years, political scientists have produced numerous categories and typologies for classifying political parties. These approaches have focused on a variety of dimensions, including aspects such as ideology, electoral characteristics, organizational structure as well as combinations of these and other features (Krouwel 2012, 9). As Krouwel (2006, 253) notes, much of the literature on party types has emphasized organizational structure. One of the key contributions in this regard was that of Maurice Duverger (1954, 17-40), who distinguished between party organizations based on caucuses, cells, branches, or militias. He also established influential organizational typologies that assessed, for example, the degree of parties' centralization or horizontal/vertical coordination (Duverger 1954, 48-60).

More importantly for this thesis, Duverger (1954, 62-67) developed the concepts of cadre and mass parties, which linked a party's origin (within or outside of parliament) with a specific organizational model. Closely related to Duverger's concepts of cadre and mass parties is Neumann's (1956) approach, which distinguishes between parties of individual representation and those of social integration on the basis of the main function that the party organization was meant to perform (Krouwel 2006, 253).

Building on Neumann and Duverger, authors such as Kirchheimer (1966), Katz and Mair (1995), and others developed their own party types. The number of these concepts is large, but many of them are quite similar, as authors sought to describe the same phenomena from a variety of perspectives. According to Krouwel (2006), the different concepts can be subsumed into one "meta-typology" consisting of five basic party types or models. These are distinguished on the basis of four dimensions of genetic origin, organizational model, electoral strategy, and ideology (Krouwel 2006, 262–63). The following section will review these concepts to introduce the entrepreneurial party type and distinguish it from other basic models of party organization.

1.1 Party types or organizational models

Duverger (1954) used the concept of the cadre party to describe the first political parties that emerged in Europe. Appearing first during the era of limited suffrage in the 19th century, cadre parties were founded by prominent individuals mainly for the purpose of electing candidates and coordinating their work in parliament (Duverger 1954, 64). Since they did not

need to generate the support of a wide electorate, cadre parties had little extra-parliamentary organization and were organized in closed local caucuses (Krouwel 2006, 254). Other terms used to describe this oldest modern type of party include caucus parties (Ostrogorski 1902), parties of individual representation (Neumann 1956), or elite parties (Katz and Mair 1995; von Beyme 1996) (Krouwel 2006, 251).

A second party type identified by Duverger (1954) was the mass party, which is basically the mirror image of the cadre party organization (Krouwel 2006, 254). In contrast to the latter, the mass party has a large, extensive organizational structure and emerged before, not after entering parliament (Duverger 1954, 63–67). As Neumann's (1956) corresponding concept of the party of social integration illustrates, the newer type of party sought to mobilize voters from heretofore excluded social groups and integrate them into the political process. The mass parties were thus typically deeply rooted in society, with large memberships and links to promoter organizations, such as trade unions (Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová 2020, 11–12). Again, Duverger's mass party type finds close correspondence with terms defined by other authors, such as Panebianco's (1988) mass-bureaucratic party (Krouwel 2006, 251).

The third main party type is the catch-all party, which Kirchheimer (1966) introduced in an effort to describe the changes in party organization that occurred in Western democracies after the Second World War (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 12). According to Kirchheimer (1966), catch-all parties were mass parties that placed less emphasis on ideology to appeal to a wider electorate (Kirchheimer 1966, 190; Krouwel 2006, 250). Some of the organizational aspects that Kirchheimer observed were further developed by Panebianco (1988) and his concept of the electoral-professional party. It focused primarily on the process of the professionalization of the party organization, whereby roles previously played by the old party bureaucracies were taken up by specialized experts, such as PR consultants or political advisors (Panebianco 1988; Krouwel 2006, 257).

A fourth widely cited party type is Katz and Mair's (1995) cartel party. It basically describes a professionalized party that becomes so reliant on state resources, mainly public funding, that it largely withdraws from civil society and abandons its representative function (Krouwel 2006, 258). According to Katz and Mair (1995), the emergence of such parties in European party systems would lead to a process of "cartelization", whereby established parties would

collude together and form a “cartel” that would allow them to extract resources from the state while protecting themselves against competitors. Nevertheless, the authors also predicted that this “cartelization” of party systems would lead to increased competition from new parties from “outside the cartel”. They saw this competition as manifested by the new “populist anti-party system parties” that placed criticism of established parties and political elites at the core of their electoral appeal (Katz and Mair 1995, 2018, 21).

According to Krouwel (2006) or Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová (2020, 13), the entrepreneurial party is the most recent distinct party type. At their core, entrepreneurial parties are highly personalized parties founded as the private initiative of a political entrepreneur who is also the party leader. Entrepreneurial parties lack “social roots” in the sense that they are not connected to social movements or promoter organizations, and they also do not emerge as splits from existing parliamentary parties (Hloušek and Kopeček 2017). A more detailed definition of the entrepreneurial party will be provided in the next section.

Before that, however, it is necessary to mention that the literature reviewed above must be taken with some reservations. First, the party types can at best be considered as ideal types which real parties will resemble only incompletely. Second, the types are not always conceptually clear and have been contested by critics. The cartel party in particular has drawn criticism for a lack of clarity and empirical validity (see e.g. Koole (1996) or Detterbeck (2005)). Moreover, van Biezen (2005) has pointed out that the literature on party types suffers from “transformation bias”, meaning that it focuses too much on how parties evolve over time instead of on their organization itself. According to van Biezen (2005), this is especially apparent in Kirchheimer’s catch-all party type, which is conceptualized as a transformation of the mass party. Similarly, Katz and Mair (1995) frame their cartel party as being a further evolution of the catch-all model (van Biezen 2005). Nonetheless, Katz and Mair (1995, 19) and Krouwel (2012, 267) emphasized that patterns of party transformation do not follow a simple linear trend in which one party type fully replaces another. Rather, different models of party organization co-exist with each other and do not necessarily represent “evolutionary phases” in the true sense of the word.

Another source of criticism of the existing literature stems from the fact that the older party types were developed on the basis of the West European context, which makes them hard to

apply to post-communist countries (van Biezen 2005). However, this critique has not been raised against the entrepreneurial party, which, as the newest concept, appears to be more of a Central and Eastern European phenomenon (Hloušek and Kopeček 2017; Cirhan 2021, 125). As regards the earlier cartel party thesis, some authors have claimed that many of Katz and Mair's (1995) predictions, such as increasing party-state symbiosis and the parties' lack of social integration, now appear across all of Europe or are even more pronounced in post-communist countries (van Biezen and Kopecký 2007; Bolleyer 2009; Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 13). Having reviewed the literature on the main party types and their criticism, the next section will provide a more detailed introduction into the entrepreneurial party and its related concepts.

1.2 The entrepreneurial party type, related concepts and types of entrepreneurial parties

According to some authors (Krouwel 2006, 2012; Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová 2020), entrepreneurial parties are the newest distinct party type that has emerged in Europe. According to Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová (2020, 14), this does not mean that all new or even most new parties emerging today fit the entrepreneurial party model. Rather, a significant number of new parties can be classified as entrepreneurial parties in the sense that they share a combination of similar characteristics that distinguish them from previous modes of party organization. These generally include a high degree of personalization of decision-making power in the hands of the party leader, extra-parliamentary origin, as well as a lack of social rootedness (Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová 2020, 14). Beyond those features however, there is not a clear consensus among scholars on the definition of the entrepreneurial party.

As Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik (2017) note, the confusion is partly due to the fact that different authors have put forward various conceptualizations independently of each other, with each author focusing on a particular aspect of party organization. Krouwel (2006, 2012) responded to this reality by introducing his “business-firm cluster” of party types, in which he grouped together concepts like Hopkin and Paolucci's (1999) business-firm party, Carty's (2004) franchise organization, or Beyme's (1996) party of professional politicians. Out of these, the business-firm party is probably the most comprehensive attempt at

conceptualizing parties led by political entrepreneurs as a distinct model (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 15). But while it is relatively detailed, the concept is strongly tied to the cases of Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia party and Adolfo Suarez's Union de Centro Democratico (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999). This why Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová (2020, 17) propose to view the business-firm party as a "maximal definition" or subtype of the broader entrepreneurial party concept. This also probably applies for Mazzoleni and Voerman's (2017) concept of the memberless party, which is defined as a more extreme version of the business-firm party. While these concepts are useful to describe the specific organizational characteristics of the parties they were developed on, they are probably unsuitable for application outside those few cases.

Other authors have taken a different approach, offering very parsimonious concepts mostly based on the criterion of party origin. The sole definitional criterion of Harmel and Svåsand's (1993) entrepreneurial issue party is that it was founded "not from a social movement but rather by one person who does not hold a position in government". In a similar vein, Bolleyer and Bytze (2013) distinguish between new parties founded by individual entrepreneurs and those that are rooted newcomers, started by a promoter or sponsor organization. Likewise, Krouwel and Lucardie (2008) write of parties founded as private initiatives of political entrepreneurs "without direct links to social movements, pressure groups or international organizations". Rahat (2022) has taken yet another approach. According to him, the significant personalization of politics in recent years calls for a wholly new party typology, which would distinguish between "personalized-centralized" and "collegiate" modes of organization. His personalized-centralized is furthermore divided into "personal parties", which are completely personalized (e.g., Forza Italia), and "leader parties", where the leader is still dominant but constrained by formal procedural rules (e.g., Rassemblement National) (Rahat 2022).

Most of the aspects mentioned above are included in the more comprehensive entrepreneurial party concept used by Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová (2020). Their conceptualization has the advantage of being detailed while at the same time broad enough to capture entrepreneurial parties in general, instead of just a few cases tied to a specific country or region (Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová 2020, 18). Therefore, I contend that this conceptualization of the entrepreneurial party is best suited to be the main theoretical

framework for the empirical part of this thesis. The authors define the entrepreneurial party using 7 criteria, which are presented in the table below:

Table 1: The definitional criteria of the entrepreneurial party according to Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová

Criterion	Description
Origin	The party is founded as the private initiative of the leader – the political entrepreneur.
Formation	The leader has crucial influence over the party program and organization
Maintenance and development	The leader maintains a central role in the party even after the foundation period and uses the party as a personal vehicle*
Managerial style	The inner workings of the party tend to follow managerial principles, intraparty democracy is minimized, and the party has defacto (though not necessarily according to the statutes) centralized and hierarchical management
Media	The leader is very important for attracting media attention and electoral support
Social connection	The party is not a product of a social movement and lacks social roots
Relationship to parliament	The party did not originate from parliament, for example from a group of MPs splitting off from an existing party

* According to Lucardie (2000, 177), the personal vehicle party functions to “solve the personal problems of the founders, rather than any significant social problems”

Source: (Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová 2020, 18)

Based on their definition, the authors have also developed a novel typology that distinguishes between entrepreneurial parties using two dimensions (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020,

19–23). The first dimension relates to the figure of the political entrepreneur and whether he uses an actual business firm to support the party. The second is concerned with party organization and whether the party has at least some territorial structures and membership. Thus, the typology groups parties into four categories: 1) those with a firm and without members; 2) those with a firm and with members; 3) those without a firm and without members; and 4) those without a firm and with members (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 23). The typology seems to categorize existing entrepreneurial parties in a mutually exclusive way. As far as this thesis is concerned, if Nowoczesna can be classified as an entrepreneurial party, then it would presumably fit into the “without a firm and with members and territorial structure” category – the one which most resembles the “standard” approach to modern party organization.

Table 2: Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová’s typology of entrepreneurial parties

		Entrepreneur	
		<i>“with a firm”</i>	<i>“without a firm”</i>
Organization	<i>With members and territorial structure</i>	Forza Italia (Italy), ANO (Czechia)	SPD (Czechia), Progress Party (Norway)
	<i>Without members and territorial structure</i>	Palikot’s Movement (Poland), OĽANO (Slovakia)	Party for Freedom (Netherlands), ÚSVIT (Czechia)

Source: Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová (2020, 23)

1.3 Entrepreneurial parties in the context of new party emergence and anti-establishment politics

Besides reviewing the literature on party types, it is also relevant to link this thesis with the more general literature on European and specifically Central and Eastern European (CEE) party politics. Doing so can help partially explain why entrepreneurial parties emerge and gain varying levels of electoral success. Hloušek and Kopeček (2017) refer to CEE as a “promised land for entrepreneurial parties”. According to them, the institutional weakness of parties, their symbiosis with the state, and the reduced salience of traditional cleavages combine to create an especially fertile ground for new parties and especially entrepreneurial parties. Cirhan (2021, 125) also notes that specifically anti-establishment parties are more widespread in CEE than in the West. As is relevant for this thesis, Poland in the 2010s saw the emergence of three entrepreneurial parties – Ruch Palikota (*Palikot's Movement*) in 2011, and Kukiz'15 and Nowoczesna in 2015 (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017). To understand the entrepreneurial party phenomenon, it is useful to consider some of the findings of the general literature on new parties in Europe as well as the literature on anti-establishment politics.

The CEE party systems are generally considered to be more fragmented and experience higher levels of electoral volatility than those in the West (Bértoa 2014; Enyedi and Bértoa 2018). This is also often associated with a higher rate of new party emergence and breakthrough. However, the situation differs between individual CEE states. In her valuable contribution, Tavits (2008) found that the emergence of new parties in 15 post-communist democracies, including Poland, was largely determined by three factors. These were: 1) costs of entry (measured by the strictness of party registration and electoral rules); 2) benefits of office; and 3) perception of electoral viability (theorized to be inversely related to the length of time that passed since democratic transition). Thus, more new parties emerged in the early years of democracy in systems characterized by low costs of entry and high benefits of office. Although Tavits found that the number of new entrants gradually decreased as a new democracy matured, the vote share of new parties did not follow such a unilinear trend. Rather, after steadily dropping in the first years after a transition, average electoral support for new parties levelled off and started to increase again as parties already in the system rotated through government positions (Tavits 2008).

A more recent alternative perspective on new parties in CEE is offered by Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2015, 2020). According to them, temporal patterns of new party entry and disappearance in the region add up to create “new party subsystems” that operate according to a logic distinct from the subsystem of established parties. This logic is based on a simple pattern. First, established parties tend to lose votes in favour of new entrants to the party system. However, the newly successful parties are fragile and thus likely to be replaced by even newer competitors, potentially feeding an accelerating cycle of new party failure and entry. An important driver of this pattern is the growing salience of anti-corruption appeals, whereby successful new parties inevitably become perceived as corrupt over time, making room on the electoral market for newer, “clean” parties (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015, 2020, 126–31).

According to the authors, evidence of the new party subsystem model was most strongly present in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, where a significant amount of voters appeared to consistently back ever newer parties at consequent elections over the last decade (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2020, 206). In Poland meanwhile, the situation was characterized by a system-wide change in party support at the 2001 election followed by relative stability before several small new parties broke through again in 2011 and 2015 (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2018).

The scholars mentioned above have also conducted research on the party-level determinants of party success and survival. Comparing parties in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Estonia between 1990 and 2007, Tavits found that parties’ organizational strength (measured by the size of party membership and staff, number of branches, and participation in local elections) was positively correlated with their electoral success (Tavits 2008). And results from a subsequent book-length study suggested that organizational strength was also likely to increase chances of party survival (whether a party gained parliamentary representation or not) (Tavits 2013, 63).

Similarly, Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2018) also see organization as important for party survival, but they also bring up the additional factors of electoral appeals and leadership. According to the authors, parties that take a “clear position on an enduring issue dimension” survive longer. In regards to leadership, Haughton and Deegan Krause (2018) note that while

charismatic leaders can bring electoral success in the short-term, they can also be a source of serious long-term risks for their party, since they can make leadership alternation more difficult. Thus, parties that are not leader-centric last longer than more personalized rivals. These findings correspond with Arter's (2013) claim about "resilient entrepreneurial parties", which are said to be successful because they invest time and resources in organization building instead of relying solely on their leader's charisma. The findings summarized above thus suggest that, all else being equal, entrepreneurial parties which invest into building a strong organization and at least partially depersonalize should be more successful and survive longer than those that don't.

A second relevant strand of the literature is the research on anti-establishment parties. As Cirhan (2021, 118) notes, parties that are anti-establishment in their rhetoric are often entrepreneurial parties by organization. The literature on entrepreneurial parties (e.g., Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020; Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017) indicates that the reverse is even likelier to be true, i.e. that most entrepreneurial parties use at least some anti-establishment appeals. This research is also especially relevant for the CEE region, where the emergence of new anti-establishment parties (AEPs) has been a long-running trend (Engler, Pytlas, and Deegan-Krause 2019).

Scholars of anti-establishment rhetoric often frame it as one of the three constituent elements of populism, along with people-centrism and the belief that politics should be an expression of the people's general will (Mudde 2004). Much like populism (Stanley 2008), anti-establishment appeals can be combined with a variety of ideologies (Pytlas 2022). Thus, AEPs can take a range of positions on cultural and economic issues, ranging from the extremes of the left-right spectrum to more moderate stances.

Indeed, according to Učeň (2007) and Pop-Eleches (2010), one of the main trends in Central European politics in the 2000s was the rise of "centrist populist parties", who presented themselves as cleaner alternatives to the corrupt elite. More recently, Engler, Pytlas, and Deegan-Krause (2019) have argued that many parties referred to as populist due to their anti-establishment appeal do not place much emphasis on the other two constituent elements of populism — people centrism and the general will. Therefore, it would be more accurate to group these parties into the more general category that Hanley and Sikk (2016) call anti-

establishment reform parties, which combine criticism of political elites with moderate stances on socio-economic issues (Engler, Pytlas, and Deegan-Krause 2019).

Another notable feature of some AEPs around Europe has been their technocratic messaging, which is commonly manifested in the emphasis on valence issues such as competence and expertise (Piquer and Jäger 2020; Bickerton and Accetti 2018). As Bickerton and Accetti (2017) point out, the technocratic appeal also lends itself to fusion with the seemingly contradictory rhetoric of populism, as both of these types of appeals can be melded together in criticism of established parties. In CEE, one of the most prominent examples of this “technopopulist” combination could be seen in the Czech ANO party (Buščíková and Guasti 2019; Havlík 2019).

The increased salience of anti-establishment and technopopulist rhetoric among new parties can be conceived of as part of the response to the trends first described by Katz and Mair (1995). As established parties grew increasingly ideologically convergent and withdrew from society, new entrants emerged and utilized anti-establishment appeals to criticize their older rivals. Moreover, as was noted above, there seems to be an overlap between ideologically anti-establishment populist parties and entrepreneurial parties in terms of organization. This is why a secondary goal of this thesis is to examine ideological positions in the specific case of Nowoczesna, and to see whether these changed with the party’s organizational development.

2. Operationalization and methods

The method of this thesis can be described as a descriptive case study (Gerring 2017, 56), with the main research goal being to determine whether Nowoczesna has fit the criteria of the entrepreneurial party type throughout its development. As was mentioned in the introduction, the main logic behind choosing Nowoczesna for the case study was that the party underwent a leadership alternation, which is of theoretical relevance for the entrepreneurial party concept.

The research relies on an analysis of party statutes and secondary sources. Nowoczesna's programs serve as a complementary source to help with the secondary goal of examining the party's ideological development. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with five members of Nowoczesna who occupy or occupied different positions at the national or regional levels of the party's organization. The respondents were chosen using purposeful sampling based on their potential to provide insights useful for answering the research questions (Zulianello 2021; Kvale 1996, 92,102; Seidman 2006, 52–56). The semi-structured interview form was chosen since it is the most prevalent interviewing technique in qualitative research and allows for follow up questions that can lead to useful findings (Kallio et al. 2016). The questions for the interviewees were developed using the definitional criteria of the entrepreneurial party and based on the gaps in information about Nowoczesna obtained from other sources (the general interview guide is attached as appendix No. 1 of this thesis).

Crucial for this thesis is the question of how to operationalize the entrepreneurial party. Just as there is no clear consensus on how to conceptualize entrepreneurial parties, there is also no agreed-upon operationalization of the concept. Scholars writing on the topic have used a variety of mostly qualitative approaches to empirically classify parties as entrepreneurial (see Krašovec 2017; Marušiak 2017; Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017). Thus, there is a lack of generally accepted standard measures for assessing conformance to the concept.

As stated above, the main theoretical starting point for the operationalization used in this thesis will be the definition set out by Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová (2020, 18). Table 3

below presents their seven definitional criteria, organized into three analytical dimensions. The operationalization seems to be straightforward when it comes to the three criteria related to party origin. First, I will use interviews and secondary sources to describe the founding of Nowoczesna and its context, in order to determine whether the party originated as the private initiative of its founder, Ryszard Petru (criterion 1). Although it is not explicitly mentioned by the criteria, it will also be relevant to assess Petru's personal history to determine to what extent he was a political outsider, as this is a common feature of many political entrepreneurs. Also part of the origin dimension are the party's social rootedness (criterion 2) and its relationship to parliament (criterion 3). These will also be qualitatively gauged through interviews and secondary sources. I will also take a qualitative approach in assessing whether Petru or his successors used the party as a personal vehicle (part of criterion 3).

Table 3: Definitional criteria of an entrepreneurial party according to Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová (2020,18) and the measures used for the purposes of this thesis

Dimension	Criteria	Measure
Origin	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The party is founded as the private initiative of the leader 2) The party is not a product of a social movement and lacks social roots 3) The party did not originate from parliament 	Qualitative assessment of data from interviews and secondary sources
Organization and decision-making	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4) The leader has crucial influence over the party program and organization during the party's formative phases 5) The leader maintains a central role in the party even after the foundation period and uses the party as a personal vehicle 6) The inner workings of the party tend to follow managerial principles, intraparty democracy is minimized, and the party has defacto (though not necessarily according to the statutes) centralized and hierarchical management 	Party's scores on von dem Berge and Poguntke's (2017a) Intra-party Democracy (IPD) index, complimented with qualitative data
Media and electoral strategy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7) The leader is very important for attracting media attention and electoral support 	Comparison of party and leader Facebook personalization, and comparison of preference votes received by the leader and other candidates

Source: own table, criteria based on (Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová 2020, 18)

The criteria belonging to the dimension of organization and decision making (criteria 4, 5 and 6 in the table above) can be partially assessed through an analysis of Nowoczesna's statutes. But the operationalization should also take into account defacto power relations and actual procedures inside the party. One way of doing this is by applying the Assembly-based Intraparty Democracy Index (AIPD)¹ developed by von dem Berge and Poguntke (2017a). This index is suitable because it combines analysis of the formal rules set by party statutes with variables that measure the actual reality of party functioning in a given year. It measures the inclusiveness (or exclusiveness) of internal party decision-making, whereby "inclusiveness" refers to "how wide the circle of party decision makers is" (as first defined by Scarrow (2005, 6)) (von dem Berge and Poguntke 2017a). The index can also serve as an indicator of "participation", "centralization", and "accountability" in a party (von dem Berge and Poguntke 2017a, 139). In this regard, the index seeks to measure precisely the indicators that are also theoretically relevant for the entrepreneurial party concept. Nowoczesna's scores on the index can thus indicate whether the party has a centralized and hierarchical organization with a strong leader. The lower the party's score is in a given year, the likelier it will be that the criteria are met, and vice versa.

The index is based on three components that capture the main aspects of party organization and activities: 1) decision-making about the program; 2) decision-making about personnel; and 3) organizational structure (von dem Berge and Poguntke 2017a, 142). During the coding process, each of the components receives a score on the scale from 0 (completely exclusive/undemocratic) to 1 (completely inclusive/democratic). The overall index score is then calculated using the arithmetic mean of the three components.

The coding itself works by assigning values ranging from 0 (least inclusive) to 1 (most inclusive) to a party's individual formal rules and actual procedures – these are the variables

¹ Besides the AIPD index, von dem Berge and Poguntke (2017a) have also developed the "Open IPD" (OIPD) and "Plebiscitary IPD" (PIPD) indices. The first measures the involvement of non-member supporters in a party's decision-making, the second measures the use of membership-wide plebiscites by the party. While these indices will also be calculated, I do not expect them to be very important in the case of Nowoczesna, since a preliminary reading of the statutes has not shown the party to make use of plebiscites or involve non-members. Therefore, whenever referring to a general "IPD score" for Nowoczesna in this thesis, I mean its score on the AIPD index. Scores for the other two indices will be referred to specifically as PIPD or OPID scores.

that form the three IPD components mentioned above. A rule or procedure is ranked 0 or 0.25 if it is exclusive – i.e. contrary to intraparty democracy – 0.5 if it is neutral with regards to intraparty democracy, and 0.75 or 1 if it is inclusive – i.e. pro intraparty democracy. In some cases, the variables are constructed from the scores of several rules and/or actual procedures, which are either averaged together or ranked. In the latter case, the highest valued score or procedure determines the variable score. As an illustration of the coding process, more detailed descriptions of the coding of one of the constituent IPD variables are provided as appendices No. 2 and 3 of this thesis.

The last definitional criterion of the entrepreneurial party is that the leader plays an important role in attracting voters and the attention of the media (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 18). In other words, this criterion refers to the electoral and media aspects of what is usually called the personalization of politics (Silke and Maier 2010; Pedersen and Rahat 2021). The role of the leader in attracting voters will be assessed in this thesis by leveraging the Polish Sejm's open-list electoral system, in which voters must cast a preference vote for one candidate from a chosen party list. In this system, the seats won by a party go to the candidates receiving the most preference votes, with the order on the candidate list playing no formal role (Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier 2015). This allows for comparing the share of votes received by the party leader and those of Nowoczesna's other candidates at elections. If the leader received a significantly higher share than the other candidates, this will be taken as indicative that the leader played an important role in attracting voters².

The second aspect of the criterion concerns the media. While a comprehensive content analysis of newspaper and other traditional media coverage of Nowoczesna would be beyond the scope of this thesis, it is possible to analyse the role of the leader in the party's social media communication. Although less ideal than considering the media in general, I contend that examining the personalization of social media can still provide a valuable insight, especially at a time when digital communication is increasingly politically relevant. It is also

² Another prevalent way of measuring electoral personalization is to compare voters' assessments of leaders and their assessment of the party as a whole (see, for example Bittner (2011). Unfortunately, this data was not available for Nowoczesna in the Polish election studies for the relevant elections.

connected to the aspect of electoral personalization because social media is now an important part of campaigning (Pedersen and Rahat 2021).

Following Rahat and Kenig (2018, 177–81), the analysis will first be done using two indicators that compare the activity and popularity of the party leader and the party as a whole on Facebook, the most widely-used social media sites in Poland throughout the studied period. The first indicator looks at how many posts the leader and the party made on their page. The second compares the number of accumulated likes received by the page of the leader and that of the party. Overall, eight time periods will be considered – the four weeks before and after the 2015 general elections, the four weeks before and after the 2018 local elections, the four weeks before and after the 2019 general elections, and the first two months of 2023. Selecting these periods allows for examining the social media activity of all three of Nowoczesna’s leaders up to now. It also allows for comparing patterns in social media activity before and after elections.

According to Rahat and Kenig (2018, 181) a party, as a collective organization, should have at least twice as many posts and likes than any of its individual politicians. Following this assumption, the social media of Nowoczesna can be seen as personalized if the party page has less than twice the posts and likes as the page of the leader in the relevant periods. It is also possible that the two indicators point in differing directions, for example with the party having twice as many posts but less than twice the number of likes of the leader. In that case, the result will be inconclusive.

Of course, the posts of a party leader may strongly focus on the party, and the posts of the party may, in turn, refer to the leader. Therefore, examining only the number of posts and likes could bias the analysis (Pedersen 2022). To deal with this, content analysis was used to judge how personalized or party-centred the social media communication of the party really was. Taking inspiration from Pedersen (2022) and Metz, Kruikemeier, and Lecheler (2019), the Facebook posts of the leader and the party were coded as personalized if they mentioned the leaders’ name or were written in the I-form. They were coded as party-centred if they mentioned the name of the party or were written in the we-form. Posts that combined the features of both personalized and party-centred communication were coded in an intermediary category. Furthermore, posts that related to general political issues or events,

but which did not explicitly promote the party or the leader were placed in their own indeterminate category.

A reliability test was conducted by asking a separate coder to code 50 posts which were randomly selected from the total sample of 548 posts made by the leaders and the party. The test showed significant intercoder reliability, with Cohen’s kappa between 0.73 to 1 for each of the separate categories. Crucially, there was 100% agreement (Cohen’s kappa of 1) on the personalized post category. The full results of the reliability test are shown in Appendix No. 4 of this thesis.

Table 4: Codes used for content analysis of Facebook posts

Code	Description
Personalized post	Is the post written in the I-form or does it mention the name of the leader?
Party-centred post	Is the post written in the we-form or does it mention the name of Nowoczesna?
Personalized and party-centred	Does the post use both the I-form/mention the name of the leader and use the we-form/mention the name of Nowoczesna?
Indeterminate	Posts that use neither form and do not mention the name of the leader or the party

Source: own table

This thesis also set itself the secondary research goal of examining Nowoczesna’s ideological positions and their development. This will be done using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), which provides estimates of parties’ positions on the general left-right dimension, the salience of anti-establishment rhetoric, and many other ideological aspects. As an expert survey, CHES has the potential to offer a more comprehensive view of Nowoczesna’s ideology than simply analysing the party manifestos. However, since CHES data for Nowoczesna is only available for 2017 and 2019, a qualitative content analysis of the party’s programs will also be used to cover the whole period of the party’s existence from 2015 up to the present. Programs were chosen for analysis since they are generally considered to be authoritative sources for estimating parties’ positions and ideologies and are comparable over time (see, e.g. Laver and Garry 2000; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014).

3. Nowoczesna's development through the lens of the entrepreneurial party concept

3.1 Origin as a private initiative

The origins of Nowoczesna trace back to April 2015, when Ryszard Petru founded the civic association Nowoczesna.PL (Gadek 2015; Krajowy rejestr sadowy 2023). Speaking about the association's founding, Petru, its chairman, said that the new organization's goal was not to become directly involved in politics. Instead, Nowoczesna.PL was to serve as a think tank advocating for free market economics and the rule of law (Gadek 2015). Referring to Nowoczesna.PL as his personal initiative, Petru told reporters that "if I wanted to start a party, then I would have just started a party right away" (Gadek 2015).

The association's founding committee had two other members, Mateusz Sabat and Michal Pihowicz (Krajowy rejestr sadowy 2023). They were political outsiders and acquaintances of Petru who both later took prominent roles in Nowoczesna after it became a party, with Sabat becoming the head campaign manager and Pihowicz the treasurer (Sabat 2023). In the spring of 2015, around twenty others became members of the Nowoczesna.PL association. Among them were future Nowoczesna politicians such as Pawel Rabiej, Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus, Joana Schmidt, or Adam Szlapka, who became the party's leader in 2019. Other members of the association, such as Wadim Tyskiewicz, a senator, or Leszek Jażdżewski, the editor-in-chief of *Liberté*, a liberal monthly, did not end up joining the Nowoczesna party (Krajowy rejestr sadowy 2023).

On May 31 2015, Nowoczesna.PL held an "inaugural congress" in a Warsaw sports hall. The event attracted a large audience of some 6 to 8 thousand people, according to various sources, and this was reportedly much more than the organizers had expected (Bankier.pl 2015; Lentsch 2019, 54-55). Petru was the main speaker at the event, and spent much of his speech emphasizing the need for structural economic reforms in Poland, such as removing the special retirement benefits of miners (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017; Szacki 2015). He also advocated for abolishing the public financing of political parties, introducing term limits for members of parliament, and online voting (Szacki 2015). According to Malgorzata Bonikowska, an external advisor who helped organize the congress, the event served as a test of Nowoczesna.PL's political potential (quoted in Lentsch (2019, 55)).

Two months later, at another meeting in Gdańsk, Petru declared that the association would become a party and run in the general elections scheduled for October 2015 (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017; Wojciechowska 2015). Petru also designated himself as Nowoczesna's candidate for prime minister and introduced 17 regional coordinators that would recruit other candidates and organize the new party's territorial structures.

In Mateusz Sabat's view, contrary to Petru's earlier public statements, standing for the general elections was the goal from the very beginning, and the reason behind the transformation from a civic association to a party was to gain access to public financing (Sabat 2023). This is because Polish law only allows registered political parties to be eligible for state subsidies (Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1997). Thus, on August 23 2015, Nowoczesna registered as a party under the official name Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru (which translates to "Ryszard Petru's Modern") (Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie 2023).

To understand the context of Nowoczesna's founding, it is also relevant to briefly examine the personal history of its leader. Interested in politics since youth, Petru became a member of the liberal party Unia Demokratyczna in the 1990s (Lato 2015). While studying economics in Warsaw, he worked as an assistant to the party's MP Władysław Fraszyński. In 1995 - after Unia Demokratyczna merged with the smaller Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny to form Unia Wolności - Petru began to work for the party chairman Leszek Balcerowicz. He became his advisor when Balcerowicz was minister of finance between 1997 and 2000. In 2001, Petru decided to run for office himself in that year's election to the Sejm but was unsuccessful as Unia Wolności failed to cross the electoral threshold. Instead, he joined the World Bank as an expert on Poland and Hungary. From 2004, Petru worked as an executive at several private banks in Poland and became a frequent economic commentator in Polish media, known for his wit and communication skills (Lato 2015). In 2011, however, Petru's banking career came to a halt, as his appointment as vice-director of the partially state-owned bank PKO BP was blocked by the then finance minister Aleksander Grad, allegedly because Grad disagreed with Petru's liberal economic positions. As a result, Petru instead became a partner at the PricewaterhouseCoopers consulting firm. Between 2014 and 2015, he was the chair of the supervisory board of the Solaris Bus & Coach company. These last two positions represented an untraditional career turn for an economist, and later led some to claim that Petru founded Nowoczesna because his private career had stalled (Lato 2015). Speculations aside, his early

involvement in Polish liberal politics was a formative influence for Petru, and also likely inspired Nowoczesna's economically liberal political appeal. Furthermore, Petru's reputation as a media "talking head" provided the name recognition useful for attracting attention to Nowoczesna.

In conclusion then, it can be said that Nowoczesna was founded as a private initiative of Petru, who established the civic association that preceded the party. Petru was also the key actor in recruiting the party's leading members, who were also his acquaintances in most cases. The fact that Petru's name was included in the official name of the party can be taken as a symbol of his important role.

3.2 Social connection

Having been founded as the personal initiative of Ryszard Petru, Nowoczesna is not a direct product of a social movement or sponsor organization. But, as Bolleyer (2013, 40) points out, party leaders can also attempt to build "social rootedness" after the party is started. According to Nowoczesna members Milosz Hodun and Andrzej Prendke, Petru used his contacts in liberally oriented segments of Polish civil society to help build Nowoczesna (Hodun 2022; Prendke 2022). The interviewees mentioned the role of the civic association Projekt Polska, which provided Nowoczesna with some of its early members, such as Hodun or the current party leader Adam Szlapka. The role of Projekt Polska in providing a personnel base for Nowoczesna is also described by Lentsch (2019, 24-25). Interestingly, Projekt Polska had been formed in 2004 by former members of the youth wing of Unia Wolności, the party with which Petru himself had also been associated.

Furthermore, Hodun mentioned in our interview that some of the people involved in Kultura Liberalna, an online magazine, also joined Nowoczesna (Hodun 2022). While Projekt Polska or Kultura Liberalna did not formally become affiliated with or endorse Nowoczesna, they provided a pool of people that were then recruited into the party. In terms of its origin, Nowoczesna thus resembles Bolleyer's (2013, 40) model of an entrepreneurial party that created some informal links to civil society organizations after being founded.

3.3 Relationship to parliament

Nowoczesna did not emerge as a split from or merger of parliamentary parties, and it is clearly a party of extra-parliamentary origin. It thus fulfils the relevant criterion set by Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová (2020, 18). Moreover, all 28 of the party's MPs elected in the 2015 Sejm election were elected to their first term in parliament, and, apart from two former regional politicians, had no experience with elected office (Juliusz and Wojciech 2015).

In this regard, it is interesting to note that Nowoczesna was not joined by any of the former parliamentarians of Unia Wolnosci, despite Petru's and Projekt Polska's affiliation with it. While the former Unia Wolnosci leader Wladyslaw Frasyniuk later publicly endorsed Nowoczesna, he stressed that he would not become involved in the party (Grochal 2017). Petru also emphasized that Nowoczesna was focused on "completely different topics" than Unia Wolnosci (Super Biznes 2015), which can be seen as an attempt to highlight the party's newness.

3.4 Personalization and organization in Nowoczesna's foundational period

As explained above, Ryszard Petru played a key role in founding Nowoczesna, having started the original civic association and initiating its subsequent transformation into a political party. The next task is to assess his role and power in the party once it was established. Applying von dem Berge and Poguntke's (2017a;2017b) coding scheme on Nowoczesna in 2015 turns up a very low overall IPD score of 0.132³, as a result of low scores on all three of the index's constituent components.

Table 5: Nowoczesna's IPD score in 2015

Component	Decision-making program	Decision-making personnel	Organizational structure	Overall index score
Score	0	0.2083	0.1875	0.132

Source: own calculations using von dem Berge's and Poguntke's (2017b) coding scheme

³ Besides the main IPD index, the Open IPD and Plebiscitary IPD indices have a value of zero, since the party did not use any membership-wide plebiscites or involve non-members in its decision-making.

The low scores are largely a result of the fact that party's statute did not come into force until March 2016. Until then, power was formally centralized in the national leadership, as Nowoczesna's transitional provisions allowed the ten-member national executive board to make all decisions for the party by decree (Nowoczesna 2015a). According to Mateusz Sabat, however, the actual decision-making was not done by the board, but rather by Petru and a team of his advisors (Sabat 2023). Sabat added that, in 2015, the only purpose of the official party organization was for Nowoczesna to gain eligibility for state subsidies for political parties. In his view then, the party executive board just confirmed Petru's personal decisions after he reached them. Similarly, Milosz Hodun said in our interview that Petru's influence on the board was large enough that he could effectively make all of the final decisions for the party himself (Hodun 2022).

Relevant for the decision-making personnel component of the index is that the executive board elected Petru as chairman shortly after Nowoczesna was officially registered as a party. Since a body of the national organization was responsible for the vote, Nowoczesna receives a score of 0.25 on the relevant variable. However, Mateusz Sabat explains that the leadership vote was only a formality, as there was no other candidate besides Petru and because all of the board members were close associates of Petru (Sabat 2023). The board itself was elected by the twenty formal members that the party had at this time, who were also handpicked by Petru. Thus, in 2015, Nowoczesna's organizational structure seems to have been only a formal vehicle for gaining state subsidies and legitimizing Petru's political decisions. However, it was not to stay like this forever, because Nowoczesna's leadership also initiated an effort of wider organization building at this time.

From the autumn of 2015, Nowoczesna's regional and local structures began being organized by the 17 coordinators (one for each of Poland's administrative regions) presented at the July congress. Hodun also pointed out that the organization building was not strictly a top-down process but that, in some parts of Poland, local organizations appeared spontaneously independent of the coordinators and the party leadership (Hodun 2022). However, since, the statutes were not yet in place, the new territorial structures and ordinary members did not

have any decision-making role, in fact, they were not even formally part of the party (Sabat 2023).

The 17 coordinators were also responsible for recruiting Nowoczesna's candidates for the 2015 general elections. The final candidate lists were then put together by the party's secretary general, Adam Szlapka, and approved by the executive board (Hodun 2022). In this regard, Antoni Kaluza mentions an episode that he says illustrated the centralized approach to candidate selection. The local organization in the city of Gdansk proposed its own candidate list for the election. The proposed list was then rejected by the leadership, with Petru replacing the original first-place candidate with his personal friend Ewa Lieder (Kaluza 2022). According to Kaluza, this pattern repeated itself in several electoral districts.

The limited roles of members and formal party bodies are the reason why Nowoczesna's scores for the decision-making personnel and organizational structure components in 2015 are only 0.2083 and 0.1875, respectively. The organizational structure score of 0.1875 is a result of the fact that the index views positively that Nowoczesna's transitional provisions did not provide for ex-officio seats on the national executive board. The decision-making personnel component has a score of 0.2083 instead of zero because, formally at least, candidate-selection was decided by the executive board as a body, as opposed to the party leader alone. Although the statements of interviewees suggest that it was mainly Petru himself who decided on candidate selection.

Nowoczesna's electoral program was created while the organization was still formally a civic association. Supporters were asked to suggest program ideas at the conventions held in the spring and summer of 2015, and members of the public could send input through an online questionnaire. However, the final document was put together and approved by a drafting committee appointed by Petru. Once Nowoczesna officially became a party, its members thus had no say in the electoral program. In fact, since the program was already approved by the program committee of the association, none of the new party's organs had any say. This is why Nowoczesna's score for the decision-making program component is zero.

To conclude, it appears that Ryszard Petru had significant influence over all aspects of Nowoczesna during the party's immediate formative phase after the 2015 founding. On the basis of its low IPD score and data obtained from interviews, the party seems to have met the

criterion related to organization during the foundational period. The next subsection will analyse how the organization and decision-making evolved throughout Nowoczesna's further development.

3.5 Organization beyond the foundation period

Nowoczesna fared well at the general election in October 2015, receiving 7.6% of the vote and 28 seats in the 460 member Sejm (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2015). A consequence of the election relevant for the party's decision-making was that Petru became the chair of Nowoczesna's parliamentary club, thus combining his influence over the party organization with that of the party in parliament. Otherwise, the party functioned in the centralized manner described above without significant changes until March 31 2016, when the party's statute entered into force. The statute meant that Nowoczesna's territorial structures and ordinary members became an official part of the party and gained formal powers. As a result, Nowoczesna's ranks increased from the original twenty members to around 6 thousand members by mid-2016 (Sabat 2023).

The statute also introduced a party organization based on four main decision-making organs: the congress (konwencja); the national council (rada krajowa); the executive board (zarząd); and the party chair, who was also a party organ in his or her own right (Nowoczesna 2015a). The congress was the highest party decision-making body, authorized to elect the chair and members of the other party organs, amend the party statute, and set the party's programmatic and strategic goals. Voting rights at the congress were held by regional delegates (one delegate for every twenty members in a region), MPs, MEPs and senators as well as members of the executive board including the chair (Nowoczesna 2015a). The national council served as the highest decision-making body in between congresses. It was composed of members of the executive board, Nowoczesna's lawmakers and chairs of regional organizations as well as 16 members selected by the congress. The executive board was tasked with the day-to-day management of the party, authorized to decide on all matters that the statute did not explicitly designate to other bodies. It was led by the party chair. According to the statute, the chair was tasked with managing and representing the party to the public. He could also convene the congress, the national council, and the executive board and manage their proceedings. The

chair had also the power to appoint the secretary general, treasurer and one to four vice-chairs (Nowoczesna 2015a).

The statute thus introduced a formal organization structure and decision-making rules that generally aligned with those of other Polish political parties. While Nowoczesna’s leader retained a significant role, his formal powers were comparable to those of other major Polish political party chairs. According to Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik (2019b), this was partly because Polish law sets the basic principles of political party organization, but also because Nowoczesna itself did not choose to deviate from the common standard. The statute entering into force is the main factor that caused Nowoczesna’s IPD score to increase fourfold in 2016 to 0.425.

Table 6: Nowoczesna’s IPD score in 2016

Component	Decision-making program	Decision-making personnel	Organizational structure	Overall index score
Score	0.25	0.438	0.588	0.425

Source: own calculations using von dem Berge’s and Poguntke’s (2017b) coding scheme

Key in increasing the score for the decision-making personnel component was the introduction of a more inclusive way of selecting the chair, who was to be elected by the congress. However, the variable measuring the candidate-selection process remained at the same score since candidate lists were still approved by the executive board.

Nowoczesna’s statute stated that the congress was to be held at least once a year, and this greatly improved the score on the organizational structure component. The lack of ex-officio seats on the executive board and the fact that the party chair did not dispose of special prerogatives were also positive towards the score. As was the explicit statement in the statute of the chair’s accountability to the congress. The IPD score was also improved by the new procedure for deciding on the manifesto, which was now to be approved by a vote of the national council. While the council was still a relatively exclusive, central-level organ, it was more inclusive than a drafting committee selected by the leader.

Overall, the IPD score for 2016 and its constituent parts appear to show that the levels of centralization and intraparty democracy in Nowoczesna began to get closer to those seen in other Polish parties. For comparison, Bolin et al. (2017, 171) found that the mean IPD score for mainstream Polish political parties between 2011 and 2014 was 0.48, with a standard deviation of 0.07. Judging by this measure then, Nowoczesna's 2016 score overall score of 0.425 was within the norm for Polish parties.

From the perspective of the IPD index, the situation in Nowoczesna remained the same until the party's November 2017 congress. Nowoczesna spent the eleven months leading up to the congress marred by Petru's personal scandal. The scandal centred around Petru's decision to fly to Portugal on vacation during a parliamentary crisis, in which the MPs of Nowoczesna and other parliamentary parties were occupying the Sejm to protest against new government rules for limiting media access to the parliament (TVN24 2017). The ensuing media interest was not handled well by the party, as several of its prominent members appeared to lie about the nature of Petru's trip in public (Prendke 2022, Sabat 2023). Moreover, it also came to light that Petru and fellow Nowoczesna MP Johanna Schmidt were in an extra-marital relationship together, and this resonated strongly with the tabloids and social media, leading to more negative attention for the party (Wroslinska 2017).

According to Andrzej Prendke, the party's current vice-chair, it was from this point that Petru's popularity and general charm started to decline, as the Nowoczesna leader made repeated gaffes during public appearance (Prendke 2017). This was accompanied by a steady fall in the polls, with Nowoczesna's popularity dropping from 14% in December 2016 to 5% in November 2017. According to the interviewees, a sizable chunk of Nowoczesna's members became disgruntled with Petru and began to have doubts about his leadership skills (Kot 2022; Hodun 2022; Prendke 2022; Kaleza 2022). Petru started to lose his dominant position in the party, and in April 2017 he stepped down as the head of Nowoczesna's parliamentary group, as part of a larger effort to separate the party in public office from the leadership of the party organization (Sabat 2023).

His term as the party's Chair was also coming to an end, and by the time the Congress was held in November, several rival candidates for the leadership emerged, including Katarzyna Lubnauer, the new head of the parliamentary group. In the end, Lubnauer won the leadership

election by a tight margin of 149 votes to Petru’s 140 (Bodalska 2017). The Congress also passed amendments to Nowoczesna’s statute, changing the party’s official name from “Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru” to just “Nowoczesna”, among other changes, which are described below (Nowoczesna 2017a).

The events of 2017 caused Nowoczesna’s IPD score to increase slightly to an overall value of 0.446. The increase was driven by an improvement in the personnel decision-making component to 0.5. The fact that, for the first time, the party chair was elected by a vote of all congress delegates resulted in a pro-IPD score of 1 on two variables measuring the party selection process. However, these scores were counterbalanced by variables measuring the rules on decision-making about the party leader and candidate selection. These received a negative score of 0.25 because they remained confined to bodies of the national organization (albeit the congress, which voted on the leader, was partly composed of delegates from regional organizations).

The fact that the congress took place also improved one of the constituent variables of the organizational structure component. At the same time, the new version of the statute reduced the frequency with which the congress had to be held from once a year to once every two years (Nowoczesna 2017a). As a result, the overall score of the organizational component remained the same. The decision-making program component also stayed the same, as the new statute left unchanged the procedure whereby the manifesto was approved by the national council.

Table 7: Nowoczesna’s IPD score in 2017

Component	Decision-making program	Decision-making personnel	Organizational structure	Overall index score
Score	0.25	0.5	0.588	0.446

Source: own calculations using von dem Berge’s and Poguntke’s (2017b) coding scheme

Beyond the variables measured by the IPD index, the fact that Nowoczesna dropped the name of its founder from the official name of the party seems to indicate a depersonalization of the party. Such a depersonalization and “democratization” of Nowoczesna was also one of the

main themes explicitly taken up by Petru's opponents at the 2017 congress. Speaking to the delegates, the new chair Katarzyna Lubnauer promised that her leadership would bring more inclusive decision making, with more participation and influence from the official party organs as well as leaders of regional organizations (Nowoczesna 2017b). Interestingly, the amended statute contained a whole new section on decision-making which was not present in the original version. It contained a more detailed description of the relationship between the different party organs, and set simple majority voting as the default decision rule for their decision-making (Nowoczesna 2017a). The fact that these rules were added to the statute could indicate that the collegial party bodies had gained a greater role in the party, since perhaps decision-making did not need to be so formalized when it was done by the leader and his advisors. In summary, Nowoczesna's 2017 congress and its results can be viewed as at least a formal democratization of the party's decision-making.

From the perspective of the IPD score, the situation in Nowoczesna remained relatively stable in the four years after 2017⁴. The formal decision-making rules then only changed again in 2021, when an amendment to the statute gave voting rights at the congress to all members, instead of just delegates from regional organizations (Nowoczesna 2021). Thus, the process of selecting the leader as well as the overall decision-making of the congress became more inclusive. According to Milosz Hodun, the reason behind this statute change was the decreasing size of Nowoczesna's membership, which made it practicable for all members to vote at the congress without any delegation (Hodun 2022).

⁴ Since the index counts the fact of a leadership election taking place as positive towards intra-party democracy, Nowoczesna's overall IPD score decreased in 2018 to 0.425. In 2019, when the next leadership election took place, the score returned to its 2017 level. Because these fluctuations were the result of the chair's reelection every two years in accordance with the statute, they are not indicative of any substantive changes in party organization or decision-making.

Table 8: Change in Nowoczesna's IPD index score between 2015 and 2022

Decision-making program	Decision-making personnel	Organizational structure	Overall index score
Δ0.25	Δ0.29	Δ0.525	Δ0.36

Source: own calculations using von dem Berge's and Poguntke's (2017b) coding scheme

Going beyond the variables considered by the IPD index, the biggest decision that Nowoczesna had to make in the period after 2017 regarded its future as a parliamentary party. Faced with poor performance in the polls, Nowoczesna formed a coalition with Poland's main opposition grouping Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) ahead of the 2018 local elections (Wprost 2018). In June 2019, the two parties formed a joint parliamentary club, and they then ran as a coalition again in that year's general election. Nowoczesna's decision to enter the coalition was proposed by chair Katarzyna Lubnauer and then approved by the national council (Polskie Radio 24 2019). This important decision was thus made in a relatively centralized way, without the involvement of the congress or rank and file members. According to Andrzej Prendke, this was despite the fact that joining the coalition was controversial and unpopular with a significant segment of the party (Prendke 2022).

It is also interesting to compare Nowoczesna's candidate selection process in the 2019 parliamentary election with the one in 2015. In accordance with the statute, the party's candidates were selected by the leader and approved by the executive board. According to Andrzej Prendke, the selection process was relatively straightforward, with the board approving the candidates proposed by the chair without any deliberation (Prendke 2022). This was because Nowoczesna could only nominate a small number of candidates on the joint Koalicja Obywatelska electoral lists. Thus, Prendke explained that it was clear that the few electorally viable positions would be reserved for Nowoczesna's incumbent MPs (Prendke 2022). In effect then, the 2019 candidate selection process was around as centralized as in 2015.

In conclusion, judging by the scores on the IPD index and the more general aspects of the party's development, it appears that Nowoczesna fit the entrepreneurial party concept in its formative phase, between 2015 and 2016. Once the statute entered into force in the spring of 2016, Nowoczesna's formal organizational structure and decision-making procedures began to resemble those of other Polish mainstream political parties. The 2017 leadership alternation also seemed to be a divergence from the entrepreneurial party concept, as the new leader explicitly spoke of the need to depersonalize the party. Nowoczesna's IPD index score also rose significantly throughout its development, reaching an overall score of 0.488 in 2022, which is around the average for Polish parties as previously measured by Bolin et al. (2017).

3.6 Electoral and media personalization


3.6.1 Role of the leader in the 2015 and 2019 general elections

The final definitional criterion of the entrepreneurial party is the importance of the leader for attracting voters and media attention. In effect, it refers to the electoral and media personalization of the party. Given the strong position of Ryszard Petru within Nowoczesna's organization in the early stage, it could be assumed that he also played an important role in attracting the party's voters in the 2015 election. Petru was Nowoczesna's only widely known politician in the lead-up to the vote, and the party's other candidates were political novices with minimum exposure in the media (Juliusz and Wojciech 2015). According to Mateusz Sabat, who headed Nowoczesna's electoral campaign in 2015, the party reflected this in its campaign strategy. Sabat explained in our interview that it was important to have Petru's name included in the official name of the party because this meant that voters could see it on candidate lists in every electoral district in Poland. Nowoczesna hoped that this would attract more people to vote for their party (Sabat 2023).

As was described in the section on operationalization and methods, the following part of the thesis will examine the distributions of votes for Nowoczesna's individual candidates at the 2015 and 2019 election. The goal is to compare the share of votes received by the party leaders and its other candidates, and from this infer how important the leaders were for Nowoczesna's electoral performance. The box plots below present the distribution of the votes for the candidates of Nowoczesna and the three other most successful parties in all of

Poland's 41 electoral districts at the 2015 election to the Sejm. Each dot represents one candidate, and candidates' votes are expressed as the proportion of the total votes cast for their party in their district. Since a large number for all parties received a very small share of the vote, a square root transformation was applied to the values to make the visualization clearer.

Figure 1: Distribution of votes for party candidates nationwide at the 2015 Sejm election



Source: own graph, based on data from National Election Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2015)

At first glance, the graph shows that only a relatively small number of candidates received high proportions of the party vote in their districts. Most candidates standing for the four parties received only a small number of votes. The median (untransformed) share of the votes received by the candidates was around 2% for each party. The box plot also visualizes the difference between the candidates with highest shares of the votes and the rest, which is relevant for our operationalization of electoral personalization. Nowoczesna's highest valued dot represents Ryszard Petru, who received 88% of the votes cast for the party in his Warsaw electoral district and was Nowoczesna's most electorally successful candidate in both absolute and relative terms. Petru's share of the total party vote in his district was around 26 percentage points higher compared to the next most successful candidate. This difference was

significantly larger than for the two most important established parties Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO), which both had a difference of around 11 percentage points between their first and second candidates. For Kukiz'15, another new entrepreneurial party bearing the name of its founder, the difference between the two most successful candidates was 33 percentage points. The table below compares the vote shares of the four parties' most successful candidates (their leaders in each case) to those of the next top 40 candidates.

Table 9: Shares of their party's district vote total received by the most successful candidates at the 2015 election to the Sejm

	Nowoczesna	PiS	PO	Kukiz'15
Party's most successful candidate	88.0%	72.2%	76.5%	90.3%
Average of next top 40 candidates	48.2%	29.4%	32.6%	36.2%


Source: own table, based on data from National Election Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2015)

This table shows that Petru's vote share was about 1.8 times higher than the average of Nowoczesna's next 40 most successful candidates, all of whom were at the top of the ballot in their electoral district. In this regard, Petru fared comparatively worse than the top candidates of PiS, PO and Kukiz'15, as their share was more than double the average of the next 40 most successful candidates. This finding seems to make sense in the context of studies on the Polish open-list system that emphasize the heuristic effects of ballot position (Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier 2015; Marcinkiewicz 2014). The fact that Nowoczesna did not have many well-known candidates besides its leader may have led more of its voters to simply vote for the candidate on the top of the ballot in their district. This effect could possibly account for the higher shares of Nowoczesna's top candidates compared to the established parties, where vote shares were spread out among more candidates.

The role of Ryszard Petru in the 2015 election compared to Nowoczesna's other candidates can also be examined at the district level. Figure 2 below presents the distribution of votes among candidates on party lists in Warsaw, the electoral district in which the leaders of all four major parties ran. Again, candidates' votes are expressed as the square root of their proportion of their party's total votes in the district. The figure shows that the vote for all four

parties was more or less personalized, although less so for PiS, whose leader received the lowest personal vote share compared to the other three parties. And the second and third most successful candidates for PO and PiS did slightly better than their counterparts in Nowoczesna and Kukiz'15.

Figure 2: Distribution of vote shares among individual candidates in the Warsaw electoral district, 2015




Source: own graphs based on data from National Election Commission (*Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2015*)

To assess the role of Nowoczesna’s leaders in attracting voters more fully, it is necessary to compare the 2015 results with the next elections to the Sejm, which were held in October 2019. At that time, Nowoczesna was led by Petru’s successor, Katarzyna Lubnauer. The comparison is complicated by the fact that Nowoczesna ran in the 2019 election as part of the broader Koalicja Obywatelska coalition along with Platforma Obywatelska, Zieloni (the Greens), and the smaller Incjatywa Polska. Due to its relatively weak position in the coalition, Nowoczesna did not have many places on the candidate lists (Prekde 2022). Therefore, the

party only had between one and four candidates on the candidate lists in the 38 electoral districts in which it was present. This makes the comparison with 2015 and other parties problematic since the candidates who had little to no intra-party competition on the ballot logically received a higher share of the party vote. In this context, it is more useful to compare the number of votes received by Nowoczesna's candidates as a share of the overall votes cast in their district, rather than as a share of the district party vote. When compared with 2015, this can help ascertain the importance of the leader for the party's overall electoral performance in both elections. Figure 3 below presents the distribution of votes among Nowoczesna's candidates in 2015 and 2019 expressed as a percentage of the total votes cast for all parties in their districts.

Figure 3: Vote shares of Nowoczesna's candidates in 2015 and 2019, expressed as share of total district vote



Source: own graphs, based on data from National Election Commission (*Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2015; 2019*)

The comparison shows that, when measured as a share of the total district vote, Katarzyna Lubnauer was in 2019 much less electorally successful than Petru was in 2015 in relation to Nowoczesna's other candidates. In Nowoczesna's first election, Petru was by far the party's most successful candidate, receiving nearly 12% of the votes cast in his electoral district. By

contrast, Lubnauer in 2019 was only the party's sixth most successful candidate, receiving some 2.04% in the same district in which Petru had ran four year earlier. This suggests that Lubnauer was comparatively less important to Nowoczesna's electoral success than her predecessor in the previous elections.

This is also true when the absolute number of votes is considered. With a little over 28 000 votes, Lubnauer was Nowoczesna's fourth most successful candidate, behind the party's other MPs. The table below compares the absolute electoral gains of Nowoczesna's most successful candidates in 2015 and 2019. It shows that Nowoczesna's nationwide vote was comparatively more spread out among several candidates in 2019, with the leader by herself having a smaller share of the party's overall nationwide vote.

Table 10: Comparison of the electoral results of Nowoczesna's most successful candidates in 2015 and 2019

2015			2019		
Candidate	Absolute no. of votes	% of nationwide party vote	Candidate	Absolute no. of votes	% of nationwide party vote
Ryszard Jerzy PETRU	129,088	11.2%	Adam Stanisław SZŁAPKA	51,951	17.5%
Joanna SCHMIDT	35,202	3.0%	Witold Maciej ZEMBACZYŃSKI	40,022	13.5%
Jerzy Witold MEYSZTOWICZ	26,164	2.3%	Barbara DOLNIAK	39,656	13.3%
Krzysztof MIESZKOWSKI	24,525	2.1%	Katarzyna Anna LUBNAUER	28,205	9.5%
Ewa LIEDER	23,220	2.0%	Paulina HENNIG-KŁOSKA	16,813	5.7%
Monika Anna ROSA	20,126	1.7%	Monika Anna ROSA	13,918	4.7%
Kamila GASIUK-PIHOWICZ	19,041	1.6%	Krzysztof MIESZKOWSKI	13,814	4.6%
Katarzyna Anna LUBNAUER	18,549	1.6%	Marcin Łukasz GOŁASZEWSKI	13,253	4.5%
Paweł Patryk PUDŁOWSKI	16,716	1.4%	Jerzy Witold MEYSZTOWICZ	8,253	2.8%
Barbara DOLNIAK	15,752	1.4%	Rafał Mariusz ZWOLAK	4,811	1.6%

Source: own table based on data from based on data from National Election Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2015)

In conclusion, we can summarize that Ryszard Petru played an important role in Nowoczesna's electoral success in 2015. Petru was more successful than the party's other candidates when measured by his share of the party's vote in the district, the total district vote, as well as Nowoczesna's vote nationwide. The opposite was true for Petru's successor Katarzyna Lubnauer at the 2019 election. These descriptive statistics seem to suggest that Nowoczesna was less electorally personalized in 2019 than in 2015. However, it must be noted that the value of these findings is rather limited. Most importantly, no election has taken place since 2019, and therefore the data cannot tell us anything about how the situation has developed after Katarzyna Lubnauer was replaced as Nowoczesna's chairman by Adam Szlapka. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Szlapka was Nowoczesna's most successful candidate at the 2019 election (Figure 3), receiving just under 13% of total votes cast in his district.

3.6.2 Nowoczesna and its leaders on Facebook

As was described in the section on operationalization and methodology, personalization can also be measured in the area of social media. Comparing the activity of the party and its leader on social media can indicate who is more popular for attracting new supporters. Based on the general literature on entrepreneurial parties as well as the communication of individual political entrepreneurs, such as Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic, it would be reasonable to assume that an entrepreneurial party should rely more on a personalized rather than party-based style of communication.

The table below presents the number of Facebook posts made by the official accounts of Nowoczesna and its leaders, as well as the number of accumulated likes that both pages received in the measured time periods. The table also includes scores for the online personalization index developed by Rahat and Kenig (2018, 179). This index was calculated by dividing the values (for likes and posts) for the party leader by the values for the party. Whichever value was higher was placed in the numerator, and a minus sign was added if the value for the party was higher (Rahat and Kenig 2018, 179). Scores for the index can thus be anywhere from -1 and lower and +1 and higher. Based on Rahat and Kenig's (2018, 181) assumption that a party should have values twice as high as the leader, values lower than -2

should indicate a lack of personalization, while values greater than -2 should be indicative of personalization.

Table 11: Number of Facebook likes and posts for Nowoczesna and its leaders

	Likes leader	Likes party	PL:P index (likes)	Posts Leader	Posts party	PL:P index (activity)
Pre-2015 election (Petru)	231,363	45,281	5.11	54	39	1.38
Post-2015 election (Petru)	147,000	11,278	13.03	17	8	2.13
Pre-2018 election (Lubnauer)	3,142	8,500	-2.71	17	35	-2.06
Post-2018 election (Lubnauer)	1,587	6,480	-4.08	12	35	-2.92
Pre-2019 election (Lubnauer)	17,905	4,458	4.02	90	61	1.48
Post-2019 election (Lubnauer)	11,243	6,091	1.85	34	39	-1.15
January 2023 (Szlapka)	23,767	3,381	7.03	21	26	-1.24
February 2023 (Szlapka)	14,674	2,562	5.73	14	20	-1.43

PL – Party leader, P – Party

Source: own calculations based on Facebook pages (Petru 2015; Lubnauer 2019; Szlapka 2023; Nowoczesna 2023), data presentation based on Rahat and Kenig (2018, 180)

Comparing the data on Facebook posts and likes for Nowoczesna and its leaders shows a mixed picture. Judging by the scores on the online personalization indices, Nowoczesna’s Facebook communication can be classified as personalized during and after the 2015 election campaign, when Ryszard Petru led the party. This is especially evident in the comparison of the leader and party’s popularity (measured by likes), as Petru received over five times as many likes as Nowoczesna in the month leading up to the election and a little over thirteen times as many likes in the month after the election. Petru’s account was also more active than the official party account, although the personalization score for posts was significantly smaller, at 1.38 before the election and 2.13 after it.

Based on the indices, Nowoczesna’s social media were no longer personalized around the 2018 election, which took place around a year after the party’s first leadership change. The new leader, Katarzyna Lubnauer, was much less well known by the public and not as popular online as Petru was, and the indices for likes and posts have values under Rahat and Kenig's

(2018) cut-off point of -2 both before and after the election. Nowoczesna was also more popular than Lubnauer when compared using the average number of likes per post instead of cumulative likes.

Moreover, the numbers show a dramatic decline in the absolute numbers of likes for Nowoczesna in 2018, which is not surprising given the party's decline in the polls since 2015. While the popularity of Lubnauer's account increased by the time of the 2019 general election, the number of likes on Nowoczesna's account again declined. Therefore, the personalization index for likes returned to positive levels in the months before and after the 2019 election. Lubnauer's account was also more active than the party's account in the pre-election period but not after the election.

The latest time periods considered in the analysis were the first two months of 2023, when no election took place. These data show that Nowoczesna's current leader, Adam Szlapka, is significantly more popular than the party, and this is due in large part to the sharp drop in Nowoczesna's popularity since 2015. Szlapka had seven times as many cumulative likes as Nowoczesna in January and over five times as many in February, even though the party's account was slightly more active during the two months. During the last two considered time periods, scores for the indices for both likes and posts were over the cut-off point, and Nowoczesna's Facebook during this time can thus be considered personalized. Overall, the data for likes and posts seems to indicate that Nowoczesna's Facebook was highly personalized around the 2015 election and became more party-centred in 2018, only to become personalized again after the 2019 general election.

However, a different story is revealed when we consider the content of the posts, rather than simply posts and likes. The results of the content analysis show that, of the posts made by Ryszard Petru before and after the 2015 election, none were purely personalized and over 70% were centered on Nowoczesna. 20% of the posts made before the election and 12% after it could be classified as using a combination of party-centred and personalized combination (for example, containing both the I-form and the name of Nowoczesna).

Party-centred posts were also preponderant on Katarzyna Lubnauer's Facebook page in the month before and after the 2018 local election. Interestingly, the share of personalized posts then increased dramatically in the month before the 2019 election, when they made up 78%

of Lubnauer’s posts. This may have been a result of the political situation at the time, in which Nowoczesna was standing in the election as a smaller party in a bigger coalition. Since Lubnauer was placed second on a candidate list together with many rival politicians, she may have opted for personalized communication in order to increase her chances of gaining more votes and securing a seat in parliament. Nonetheless, the share of personalized posts remained higher than before also in the month after election, in which Lubnauer was elected. Data from the latest time periods considered, January and February 2023, show that the share of personalized posts from Adam Szlapka, Nowoczesna’s current leader, decreased compared to Lubnauer in 2019 but still remained higher than it for Nowoczesna’s leaders until 2018.

Table 12: Content of Nowoczesna’s leaders’ Facebook posts

	Personalized posts	Party-centred posts	Combination of party-centred and personalized	Indeterminate
Pre-election 2015 (Petru)	0%	78%	20%	2%
Post-election 2016 (Petru)	0%	76%	12%	12%
Pre-election 2018 (Lubnauer)	12%	47%	12%	29%
Post-election 2018 (Lubnauer)	17%	17%	17%	50%
Pre-election 2019 (Lubnauer)	79%	3%	18%	0%
Post-election 2019 (Lubnauer)	67%	6%	18%	9%
January 2023 (Szlapka)	38%	19%	19%	24%
February 2023 (Szlapka)	29%	14%	0%	57%

Source: own calculations based on Facebook pages (Petru 2015; Lubnauer 2019; Szlapka 2023; Nowoczesna 2023)

The results of the content analysis suggest that the indicators of popularity and activity presented above overestimated the extent of the party’s online personalization, and this is in line with the findings of Pedersen's (2022) study from Denmark. While Ryszard Petru was

more popular and active on Facebook than Nowoczesna, it seems that he used this platform to promote the party rather than himself as an individual. Petru's Facebook communication was thus quite different from the more overtly personalized social media strategies of some other political entrepreneurs, such as Andrej Babiš. However, the fact that Petru's Facebook posts did not refer to him specifically may not be indicative of a lack of personalization. After all, in 2015, the party was officially named after Petru and the previous section showed that he was firmly in control of decision-making. In this context then, it could be argued that referring to Petru or referring to Nowoczesna may as well have been the same thing.

Interestingly, the share of personalized posts was higher for both of Petru's successors, Katarzyna Lubnauer and Adam Szlapka. This at a time when power in the organization became less centralized, as measured by the IPD index in the previous section. Contrary to what would be expected for a party that transformed away from the entrepreneurial party model, Nowoczesna's online personalization did not decrease significantly when comparing 2015 to 2023. And this holds when considering the measures for popularity (the number of likes) and by post content. The measure comparing activity (the number of posts) suggests somewhat of a depersonalization, but it could probably be argued that this simple measure of the number of posts made by the party and the leader cannot explain as much as the other two measures.

In conclusion, the analysis in this subchapter suggests that Nowoczesna was electorally personalized in the 2015 election but not in 2019, which would be in line with a divergence from the entrepreneurial party concept. Interestingly, Nowoczesna's most successful candidate in 2019 as measured by share of the district vote (the top dot in the bottom graph of Figure 3) was Adam Szlapka who two years later became the party leader. The fact that he was more personally electorally successful than Katarzyna Lubnauer, the leader at the time of the election, may have contributed to his subsequent election as party leader. Nowoczesna's pattern of leadership changes could potentially signify a more general phenomenon, in which entrepreneurial parties that go through a leadership alternation have difficulties determining which potential successor could replicate the momentum of personalized voter support generated by the party founder. As for media personalization, the combined analysis of Nowoczesna's and its leaders' Facebook communication did not point to a trend of depersonalization after Petru was replaced as the party leader. The analysis of

Facebook post content actually pointed to an increase in personalization. This could be because Petru was associated with the party as it was, and therefore did not need to overtly personalize his communication, or because politicians in general have started to use social media in a more personalized way since 2015. A systematic analysis of Nowoczesna's coverage in traditional media outlets would be necessary to provide a more definite conclusion about the leader's role in attracting media attention, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

3.7 Nowoczesna's ideological development


The previous sections analyzed Nowoczesna from the perspective of the entrepreneurial party type, and the party's overall conformance to the concept will be summarized in the conclusion of this thesis. This subchapter will focus on the secondary research goal, which is to assess the party's ideological development. As was mentioned in the literature review, some of the most successful entrepreneurial parties have used anti-establishment ideological appeals (Cirhan 2021, 17). At the same time, entrepreneurial parties are said to have very vague issue positions which are easily subject to change based on political expediency (Brunnerová 2020; Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 2). Since electoral success is paramount for them, entrepreneurial parties are theorized to be less ideologically coherent than other party types. Neither of these assumptions are probably true in the case of Nowoczesna, which presented itself as a firmly liberal grouping. While the party was certainly highly critical of the two main established Polish parties, it is questionable whether this constituted the "general anti-establishment rhetoric" (Engler, Pytlas, and Deegan-Krause 2019) referred to in the literature⁵.

Data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) can help examine Nowoczesna's ideological position more closely. The figure below displays Polish parties' ideological stances on the overall left-right axis, with 0 equal to an extreme left and 10 to an extreme right position. The figure also shows the salience of anti-establishment rhetoric for each party, ranked on a 0-10 scale with 10 indicating that anti-establishment rhetoric is very important for a party. The data seems to confirm the assumption that anti-establishment rhetoric was

⁵ Still Pytlas (2022) classifies Nowoczesna as a "centrist anti-establishment party", presumably precisely because of its strong criticism of Poland's established political parties during the 2015 election.

not a very important part of Nowoczesna’s ideological appeal. It also shows that the party’s position on the two measures hardly changed between 2017, when Ryszard Petru was still the leader for most of the year, and 2019.

Figure 4: Polish party positions in 2017 and 2019




0 = extreme left, anti-establishment rhetoric not important at all; 10 = extreme right, anti-establishment rhetoric very important

Source: own graph, data from the 2017 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017; Bakker et al. 2020)

The next figure compares two other aspects of Polish party’s ideological positions. The vertical axis plots parties’ stances on the GALTAN scale, which displays green, alternative political, and libertarian (GAL) positions on the one hand and traditional, nationalist, and authoritarian (TAN) positions on the other. The horizontal axis displays party positions on the left-right dimension as regards specifically economic – and not overall political – stances. Again, Nowoczesna’s position did not change much between 2017 and 2019, aside from a small shift towards more left and GAL values. In addition, the data shows that Nowoczena was closer to GAL values than Platforma Obywatelska, while being more to the right on economic values. This fits with the accounts of interviewees, who said that the goal behind founding Nowoczesna was to establish an economically liberal but socially more progressive alternative to Platforma Obywatelska (Hodun 2022; Prendke 2022).

Figure 5: Polish party positions on GALTAN and economic issues



0 = extreme left/GAL, 10 = extreme right/TAN

Source: own graph, data from the 2017 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017; Bakker et al. 2020)

It was also mentioned above that entrepreneurial parties are theorized to have a flexible and not completely coherent ideology. The extent to which this is true for Nowoczesna can also be examined using CHES, since the survey contains questions about how clear parties' economic and GALTAN positions are. The table below presents the scores for Polish parties, on a 0-10 scale where 0 equals not at all clear and 10 equals completely clear positions⁶. It shows that Nowoczesna's positions were relatively clear, with scores above the average for all the Polish parties considered by the survey. Interestingly, in 2017 Nowoczesna's positions were significantly clearer on both dimensions than those of the entrepreneurial party Kukiz'15 as well as those of PiS and PO. By 2019 however, Nowoczesna's clarity on economic issues went down significantly according to the data, and this was to a lesser extent also true for PiS and PO. Nowoczesna's position thus remained clearer than those of Poland's two largest parties but was now less clear than that of Kukiz'15. The clarity of the party's position on the GALTAN scale also declined, but only slightly. Together with the data on

⁶ The 2019 Chapel Hill Survey asked how blurry instead of clear parties' positions were. The scores for the 2019 question were therefore inverted so they could be compared with the data from the 2017 survey.

left-right economic positions, this suggests that Nowoczesna somewhat diluted its staunchly economically liberal stance.

Table 13: Clarity of party positions, 2017 and 2019

Party	Clarity on economic issues		Clarity on GALTAN issues	
	2017	2019	2017	2019
SLD	4.9	7.5	6.2	7.5
PO	6.3	4.7	5.0	5.285714
PiS	6.9	3.6	8.8	8.857143
PSL	5.8	5.1	6.0	6.666667
Twój Ruch	5.0	NA	7.9	NA
Kukiz'15	4.0	5.857143	6.5	7.166667
Nowoczesna	8.2	5.625	7.5	7.333333
Korwin	8.9	NA	8.2	NA
Razem	8.6	NA	9.2	NA
	6.5	NA	7.3	NA

Source: own table, data from the 2017 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2020; Polk et al. 2017)

In our interviews, Nowoczesna’s members said that the party was first focused mainly on economic issues before starting to place more emphasis on cultural issues such as LGBT rights (Hodun 2022, Kot 2022). This can be examined more thoroughly through qualitative analysis of Nowoczesna’s programs. The first programmatic document put out by the Nowoczesna were the “Programmatic Directions” (Nowoczesna 2015b), released in July 2015, a month before the party was officially registered. Since no other program was published before that year’s elections, this document effectively served as Nowoczesna’s electoral program in 2015. The document started with an introduction from Ryszard Petru, criticizing the state of Polish politics in general terms and emphasizing the need for reforms to increase economic growth and innovation (Nowoczesna 2015b, 2-3). Interestingly, the introduction included people-centric, anti-establishment and technocratic (Pytlas 2022) appeals. Petru stressed that the program was made using input from citizens, writing that

“they, and not the politicians, are the most qualified experts because they know what life in Poland is really like” (Nowoczesna 2015b, 2). Nowoczesna’s newness distinguished it from established parties and politicians who failed “to consider the people’s real needs” (Nowoczesna 2015b, 2). Since older parties had only made “false promises” it was time for “accomplished professionals” to “professionalize the political world and imbue it with a new quality” (Nowoczesna 2015b, 3). After the introduction, the core of the program was divided into seven sections with the first focused on reforms of the political system. The six following sections each dealt with one specific policy area. The proposed reforms to the political system included limiting MPs to two terms, abolishing the Senate, and cutting public financing of political parties. The second section, titled “Economic liberty above all else” advocated for deregulating the business environment and labour market, as well as simplifying and lowering tax rates. Growth was to be increased using various tax incentives and getting rid of excessive bureaucracy. While the next sections of the program were focused on other policy fields, these were approached from a strongly economic perspective. For instance, the section on foreign policy stated that “the economization of Polish foreign policy is key and must be strengthened” (Nowoczesna 2015b, 34). In general, the program focused on making the state and public services more efficient from an economic point of view, paying little attention to cultural or identity issues.

Nowoczesna put out its next program, entitled “Nowoczesna Polska dla każdego” (Modern Poland for Everyone) in 2016 (Nowoczesna 2016). It mostly expanded on the positions in the shorter 2015 program by proposing more detailed policy changes. But the program also introduced a new “decatalogue” of principles. Besides economic liberty and private property rights, these principles also included more cultural issues that were not included in the first program, like the separation of church and state and a “modern”, more inclusive form of patriotism (Nowoczesna 2016, 7). The program also proposed enabling civil partnerships for same-sex couples and reintroducing public funding of in vitro fertilization, which did not fit in with a strictly economically liberal approach.

The 2016 program was then used as Nowoczesna’s manifesto for the 2018 local elections. Since it ran in a coalition, Nowoczesna did not put out its own program for the 2019 general election. The party’s third and latest program was published in 2022 under Adam Szlapka’s leadership. Unlike the 2015 and 2016 documents, the 2022 program did not open with a

personal introduction from the party leader, but rather with a short summary of the party's main stances as well as a critique of Polish politics after 2015. In contrast to the general criticism of politics from 2015-16, the introduction focused specifically on the PiS government and its allegedly undemocratic and incompetent policies (Nowoczesna 2022, 2). In general, the program focused on a broader range of issues than the previous manifestos. While it proclaimed a similar commitment to economic liberty and deregulation, significantly more space was devoted to the rights of women, sexual minorities, tolerance, and cultural plurality in general. State funding for abortions, contraception and the introduction of full marriage equality were newly mentioned as policy goals. Judicial independence and the transition to clean energy were also new topics covered by their own sections (Nowoczesna 2022, 53–54, 70–73). In summary, while it does not distance itself from Nowoczesna's original economically liberal position, the newest program shows an increased emphasis on cultural liberalism, and, to a lesser extent, environmental topics.

To conclude, the analysis of Nowoczesna's ideological positions using CHES data indicated that the party did not use the strong anti-establishment rhetoric that is typical of some of Europe's most successful entrepreneurial parties. However, the analysis of Nowoczesna's first programs suggested that anti-establishment and technocratic critique of the Polish political elite played a role in the party's rhetoric. The analysis also showed that Nowoczesna's ideological positions remained relatively clear and stable, in contrast to the assumption that entrepreneurial parties should have fluid and incoherent positions. Still, the 2019 CHES data indicated a significant decline in clarity of the party's position on economic issues. In this regard, the analysis of the 2022 program suggests that Nowoczesna's commitment to spending on various social programs and public investments may be in tension with the party's otherwise minimalist approach to the state's role in the economy.

4. Reassessing the entrepreneurial party concept

The core of this thesis has examined Nowoczesna using the concept of the entrepreneurial party as defined by Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová's (2020) as a framework. This section will briefly reconsider the concept from a theoretical perspective. The goal will be to assess the justification and clarity of the definitional criteria of Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová's (2020) entrepreneurial party and suggest aspects that are perhaps undertheorized.

As was noted earlier, the concept consists of seven definitional criteria, which can be categorized into three general dimensions of origin, organization and decision-making, and the media and electoral strategy. The three criteria related to origin are relatively straightforward to operationalize and are mostly theoretically grounded. The criterion that the party should be founded as its leader's private initiative goes to the core of the entrepreneurial party concept. It is also related to the criterion that the party does not emerge as "a product of a social movement", and also "lacks social roots" (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 18). It certainly makes sense that parties founded as private initiatives will not be products of wider social movements. However, as Bolleyer (2013, 40) has pointed out, leaders can also attempt to establish links with wider civil society even after the party is founded, and this was also true in the case of Nowoczesna. While a general lack of social roots probably holds for most entrepreneurial parties, it is probably not a necessary criterion of the concept. Extra-parliamentary origin, in the sense that the party did not originate from an existing parliamentary party, seems to be a reasonable criterion, especially since entrepreneurial parties mostly emerge from outside the party system. On the other hand, it is possible to imagine that a party using an entrepreneurial party organizational model could emerge as a split from an existing parliamentary party, for example one that is also entrepreneurial. It is thus debatable whether extra-parliamentary origin is an intrinsic feature, common to all entrepreneurial parties.

Some of the more disputable definitional criteria relate to the dimension of organization and decision-making. In this regard, the authors emphasize the general central role of the leader in the party during the foundational and ensuing period. According to the authors, the leader is also supposed to use the party as a "personal vehicle" as defined by Lucardie (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 18; Lucardie 2000). This criterion is rather unclear, since in

Lucardie's original definition, the term personal vehicle is a synonym to the "idiosyncratic party" and relates to ideology, not organization (Lucardie 2000, 177). Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová use the term somewhat differently, in the sense that the entrepreneurial party is a vehicle for the leader's personal career and interests (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 8, 18). Such a criterion is difficult to operationalize. For instance, it will always be disputable whether a leader's goal to become prime minister stems from personal ambition or from the party's office-seeking strategy.

Another organizational criterion is the minimization of intraparty democracy and the use of centralized and hierarchical management. In this thesis, this criterion was operationalized using von dem Berge and Poguntke's (2017a) Assembly-based Intra-party Democracy index (otherwise referred to here as just the IPD index). In this regard, the conceptualization of the entrepreneurial party could also take into account that the leadership's influence over decision-making can be strengthened by ways other than just limiting intraparty democracy per se. As some scholars argue, introducing plebiscitary forms of decision-making, such as membership-wide ballots, can empower the leader by eliminating deliberation and reducing the power of intermediary structures (von dem Berge and Poguntke 2017a, 151; Rahat 2013; Katz 2002). Ignazi (2020) refers to this as the "dark side" of intraparty democracy. The entrepreneurial party concept should thus take a more nuanced view of intraparty democracy, which is otherwise undertheorized in the original conceptualization.

The last criterion introduced by the authors is that the leader should have a large role in attracting media attention and electoral support (Hloušek, Kopeček, and Vodová 2020, 18). It seems that this requirement is synonymous with the concepts of media and electoral personalization or, more specifically, with what Balmas et al. (2014) refer to as "centralized personalization", whereby media coverage and voter support focus on the party leader (Pedersen and Rahat 2021). Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová (2020) do not explicitly link their conceptualization with the personalization literature, but doing so could help explain how these features of entrepreneurial parties fit in the wider context of contemporary politics, in which almost all political parties seem to be succumbing to some form of personalization. The same also applies to the related concept of the presidentialization of political parties (Passarelli 2015), which is again said to affect parties with various organizational models, not just entrepreneurial parties.

Conclusion

Nowoczesna through the lens of the entrepreneurial party concept

This thesis set out to answer the question of whether Nowoczesna could be classified as an entrepreneurial party. The empirical analysis shows that Nowoczesna met the criteria related to origin – it was founded as the leader’s personal initiative outside of parliament and not as a product of a social movement. Using von dem Berge and Poguntke’s (2017a) IPD index as an indicator, it was found that Nowoczesna also fit the criteria related to organization and decision-making in the period of 2015-2016. This finding was also strengthened by information obtained from an interview with Mateusz Sabat, a former high-ranking party official, who claimed that, in the first year, Nowoczesna’s party structure was only a formal institution, with actual decision-making made by the party leader and his group of advisors (Sabat 2023). This situation changed somewhat once the party’s statute came into force in the spring of 2016. Nowoczesna diverged further from the entrepreneurial party organizational model in 2017, when the founder/leader Ryszard Petru was replaced as party chair by a rival party member. The analysis also showed that the party’s IPD scores improved steadily throughout its development. In 2022, the overall index score reached the average level for Polish political parties as measured by Bolin et al. (2017). These findings thus offer support for the hypothesis that Nowoczesna diverged from the entrepreneurial party concept, which was stated in the introduction. While this process of transformation was already started when the party formalized its structure and decision-making in 2016, the leadership alternation of 2017 also likely contributed significantly.

The last criterion of the entrepreneurial party concept is the large role of the leader in attracting electoral support and media attention. Here, the comparison of personal vote shares among parties in the 2015 election suggests that the electoral part of the criterion was met. In 2019, by contrast, Petru’s successor Katarzyna Lubnauer did not receive such a large share of the party’s votes, which were spread out among more candidates. On the other hand, the analysis of Facebook communication found that Petru’s posts were not particularly personalized, and that personalized communication increased in subsequent periods with the next two leaders of the party. This may stem from the fact that Petru did not need to

personalize his communication since the party was at the time strongly associated with him anyway.

To answer the research question, it can be said that, during its early stages of development, Nowoczesna generally fit the criteria of the entrepreneurial party as conceptualized by Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová (2020) and then diverged from the concept later on. In this regard, the original contribution of this thesis was to provide more rigorous and systematic support for the hypothesis that Nowoczesna no longer fits the entrepreneurial party model, which Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik proposed already in 2019 (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019a). As for the secondary research goal, the analysis shows that Nowoczesna was relatively stable and coherent in its ideological positions, contrary to what the literature expects of entrepreneurial parties.

Limitations and avenues for further research

It should also be noted that the operationalization of the entrepreneurial party concept developed in this thesis is novel and only roughly captures the concept's definitional criteria. For example, it is questionable whether von dem Berge and Poguntke's (2017a) IPD index is the best measure of the "centralized and hierarchical management" of the party mentioned by Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová (2020, 18). The thesis tried to account for this and get a more detailed insight into how the Nowoczesna worked through interviews with its relevant members. However, the fact that only five members were interviewed can be seen as a limitation.

Another limitation relates to measuring the role of the leader in attracting media attention and electoral support. Here the chosen indicators have probably the weakest theoretical grounding. The comparison of the shares of personal votes received by the party leaders was chosen as an indicator because the data for a more robust measurement, such as a comparison of voters' perceptions of the leaders vis-à-vis the party, was not available. In regard to the share of personal votes measure, Carella (2022, 98) and Crisp, Jensen, and Shomer (2007) suggest that the top ranked candidate's share of personal votes decreases in inverse relation to the number of seats a party is expected to gain. Therefore, the different personal vote shares of party leaders may be caused by the fact that entrepreneurial parties in Poland had lower seat expectations than the two established parties.

As for media personalization, a systematic study of the media's coverage would perhaps have been better than examining social media but was beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, the increasing share of personalized Facebook communication measured by the content analysis may be a result of the trends in personalized social media use by politicians in general (Pedersen 2022; Rahat and Kenig 2018) rather than any intraparty dynamics.

The limits of this thesis could also point to opportunities for further qualitative and quantitative research. For instance, a comparative study of more suspected entrepreneurial parties in Poland and elsewhere could help clear up some of the issues that this study had with assessing Nowoczesna's organization. Furthermore, a large-N comparison of media personalization in entrepreneurial parties and other party types could help determine how much personalization is present in parties of varying organizational models. More generally, causal studies are necessary to help explain why entrepreneurial parties emerge, succeed, and institutionalize with varying levels of success. At present, answers to such questions are sorely lacking.

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Interviews

Hodun, Milosz – International officer and former spokesperson of Nowoczesna. Online interview. September 5, 2022.

Prendke, Andrzej – Vice-chair of Nowoczesna. Online interview. September 29, 2022.

Kot, Aleksandra – Vice-chair of Nowoczesna’s regional organization in the Małopolska Region. Online interview. October 21, 2022.

Kaluza, Antoni – Member of Nowoczesna’s regional board in the Wielkopolska Region. Online interview. November 5, 2022.

Sabat, Mateusz – Former member of Nowoczesna’s executive board, Ryszard Petru’s team of advisors and manager of the 2015 election campaign. Online interview. February 7, 2023.

Bachelor's Thesis Summary

The entrepreneurial party can be seen as the newest distinct party type to have emerged in Europe. However, authors disagree on its exact definition, and, as a relatively new concept, the entrepreneurial party phenomenon is so far understudied. This thesis seeks to contribute to the growing literature on entrepreneurial parties through a case study of the Polish party Nowoczesna. This case was chosen because the party went through a leadership change around two years after its founding, with the founder and political entrepreneur Ryszard Petru replaced as the leader. Since leadership alteration is highly theoretically relevant for entrepreneurial parties, this made Nowoczesna an interesting case to study.

As a theoretical framework, the thesis uses the definition of an entrepreneurial party proposed by Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová, which is so far the most comprehensive attempt at a general conceptualization. The thesis also develops a novel operationalization of this multidimensional concept since there is no consensus on how to measure its definitional criteria. In this regard, the thesis uses a combination of indicators, including the Assembly-based Intra-party Democracy index developed by von dem Berge and Poguntke, measures of social media and electoral personalization, as well as qualitative assessments of data from interviews with Nowoczesna's members. The analysis found that while Nowoczesna fit the criteria of the entrepreneurial party concept in its foundational phases, the party diverged from the concept as it developed. In this regard, the thesis provides more systematic and rigorous support for the earlier argument made by the political scientists Kosowska-Gastol and Sobolewska-Myslik, who posited that Nowoczesna no longer resembles an entrepreneurial party. However, the analysis in the thesis was limited by the lack of available data for a more robust measure of electoral personalization and by the fact that a comprehensive analysis of the role of the leader in attracting media attention would be beyond the scope of this work. The chosen operationalization as a whole could also be disputed. The thesis also analysed the development of Nowoczesna's ideology. The results showed that the party had a coherent ideological position and used relatively little anti-establishment rhetoric, unlike what is expected from entrepreneurial parties in theory.

The thesis also includes a theoretical discussion of Hloušek, Kopeček and Vodová's entrepreneurial party concept. It argues that the criteria related to organizational structure and

decision-making could be more fully developed to capture different ways in which the role of the leadership could be theoretically strengthened in the party, such as by introducing plebiscitary measures that sidestep intermediary party organs. It also points out that the concept could be better theoretically linked to the literature on the personalization of politics, and this also presents a potential avenue for further empirical research.

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Appendices

Appendix No.1: Interview guide for interviews with Nowoczesna members (table)

Interview guide
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduction, background on research goals and purpose of the interview • Compliance with recording and quotation in thesis (anonymous or not)
<p>The party in its formative phases, role of the founder/leader</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To start, I'd like to ask you some questions about Nowoczesna's history. Your party's establishment in 2015 is most often associated with Ryszard Petru. From your perspective, what was his motivation for founding the party? • Was Petru the main initiator behind Nowoczesna's founding, or did other people and groups play a key role in getting the party started? • During his time as the party's chairman, how much influence did Petru have within Nowoczesna? Was he free to make important political decisions for the party by himself, or was he constrained by, for example, others in the party's central bodies? • Under Nowoczesna's original statutes, the chairman had the right to create the list of the party's candidates for national elections and put it forward to Nowoczesna's executive board for approval. Do you know how this process worked in practice? Was Petru successful in getting his candidates approved by the executive board? • In your opinion, was Petru using Nowoczesna to advance his personal political goals, or did he want the party to thrive independently of his individual success? • Could you describe to me the role that local structures and ordinary members played in the party in its first two years? How much influence did they have in shaping the party's decision making and overall political direction? • How would you summarize the political message with which Nowoczesna sought to appeal to voters? • What was the party's strategy for reaching out to voters with this message?
<p>The founder's departure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At Nowoczesna's congress in 2017, your party's delegates voted to replace Petru as chairman. Could you tell me about what went on in the party prior to that leadership vote? How did Petru lose his power in the party? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Did any groups supporting Petru emerge? What were their arguments? • Did the new chair bring with her significant changes to your party? For example in the decision-making process, in other aspects of Nowoczesna's internal functioning, or in the party's general political strategy...

Nowoczesna today

- Moving on to the present, I'd like to ask about the distribution of power in Nowoczesna today. How much decision-making authority does your current chair have vis a vis the party's other central bodies?
- Has the process of choosing candidates for national elections changed since Petru's tenure?
- What would you say is more important for the current chair, is it furthering his personal political goals, or ensuring that the party as a whole does well?
- How would you characterize the role that local structures and ordinary members have in the party now?
- What is the party's main source of financing? Has it changed over time?
- Has Nowoczesna's political message changed at all since its early days? If so, how?
- Is the strategy for reaching out to voters still the same?

Appendix No. 2: description of coding process of the variable

“Candidate_Selection_Vote_AIPD” (text)

As an example, the variable “Candidate_Selection_Vote_AIPD” measures which sections of the party organization have the final vote on candidate lists for national elections. The final vote can be taken either by the organization at the local, regional, or national level. These different forms of decision-making are ranked according to the most inclusive way of decision-making, so that if the final vote is taken by the local organizations, value equals 0.75, if it is taken by the regional organizations, it equals 0.5, and, if it is taken by an organ at the national organization (which is least inclusive), it equals 0.25. The final score for the variable then equals the highest value from the different possibilities. For example, if the local level takes the final vote along with the regional organization, only the higher value i.e., 0.75, goes into the index - See appendix no. 3 for a table presentation of this example. Of course, candidate lists could also be decided via a direct vote of all the party members, without deliberation in a local organization. This possibility is covered by the variable “Candidate_Selection_Vote_PIPD”, which equals 1 if all the party members vote without deliberation and 0 if they do not. This variable goes into Plebiscitary Intra-party Democracy (PIPD) index and therefore does not impact the AIPD index. For a detailed explanation of the coding scheme and quantification process, see von dem Berge and Poguntke (2017b).

Appendix No. 3: quantification of variable “Candidate_Selection_Vote_AIPD” (table)

PPDB item	value	Quantification logic
Which of the following have a final vote in the party’s candidate selection process?		The most inclusive way of decision-making (here local level organization) receives the highest value. In the case of this variable, the individual items are ranked by their value and the final variable score stems from the most inclusive way of decision-making present in the party.
Local level organization (delegate meeting and/or local leadership	Yes = 0.75 No = 0	
regional organization (delegate meeting and/or regional leadership)	Yes = 0.5 No = 0	
national organization (delegate meeting and/or national Leadership)	Yes = 0.25 No = 0	

Appendix No. 4: Reliability test of Facebook post content coding (table)

The test was conducted by using a second coder on 50 posts randomly selected from all 548 posts coded. The table below shows the reliability of each separate category.

Code	Description	Coding reliability % agreement/Cohen's kappa
Personalized post	Is the post written in the I-form or does it mention the name of the leader?	100%/1
Party-centred post	Is the post written in the we-form or does it mention the name of Nowoczesna?	88%/0.76
Personalized and party-centred	Does the post use both the I-form/mention the name of the leader and use the we-form/mention the name of Nowoczesna?	93%/0.73
Indeterminate	Posts that use neither form and do not mention the name of the leader or the party	92%/0.75

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