

Abstract

This work deals with reasons why Germany have not seen, or rather have not wanted to see, Russia as a dictatorial regime, with which Germany have been building dependent energy relations for decades threatening Germany's energy security. The aim of the work is to reveal motives of democratic Germany leading to energy dependence on an authoritarian country. The work analyzes German-Russian relations, which had been started during the Cold War as part of Brandt's Ostpolitik and strengthened regardless of political parties and wars provoked by Russians in Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine, as well as by extorting of customer countries when disagreement with Russian international policy.

The first chapter looks at Germany from a perspective of an international actor, because unhealthy relationships lead to the limitation of democratic decision-making in domestic and foreign policy, which was evidenced by Germany's reserved attitude to the war in Ukraine 2022.

The next chapter explores the length and depth of German-Russian relations. Under heavy lobbying, Schröder pushed for close ties between German and Russian energy industries for a purpose of the economic prosperity of Germany and himself. Although after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Germany's rhetoric towards Russia was harsh and Germany declared a change, in 2015 it launched a second direct gas pipeline, Nord Stream 2. Merkel's politics influenced by Energiewende, Fukushima and the Climate Action Plan 2050 had tied relations with Russia even more by closing nuclear power plants. In addition to renewables, Germany has invested in energy produced from gas.

The last chapter analyses the development of energetics and dynamic of consumption. Germany is a split geo-economic power focused on its realpolitik regardless of multilateralism. Pragmatism is affected by personal interests of leading representatives as well as the mutual admiration of nations related to propaganda influencing public opinion.