

BACHELOR'S THESIS EXAMINER REPORT
PPE – Bachelor's in Politics, Philosophy and Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University

Thesis title:	Collective action problem in international climate governance
Student's name:	Nathanael Illies
Referee's name:	Jan Mazač

Criteria	Definition	Maximum	Points
Major Criteria			
	Contribution and argument (quality of research and analysis, originality)	50	50
	Research question (definition of objectives, plausibility of hypotheses)	15	14
	Theoretical framework (methods relevant to the research question)	15	14
Total		80	78
Minor Criteria			
	Sources, literature	10	10
	Presentation (language, style, cohesion)	5	5
	Manuscript form (structure, logical coherence, layout, tables, figures)	5	5
Total		20	20
TOTAL		100	98

Plagiarism-check (Turnitin) match score: 15 %

Reviewer's commentary according to the above criteria

The author crafted an outstanding and well-written bachelor's thesis addressing the collective action problem in international climate governance. The author employs game theory to determine what specific collective action problems countries face and what solutions can be implemented to mitigate them.

The author addresses a highly relevant topic in an innovative way. The subject of the study, used methodology (game theoretical models), and considered assumptions are clearly explained and described. On the one hand, the author supports his choice of game theoretical models with sufficient arguments. On the other hand, he realises their limitations.

The author selects a wide range of different game theoretical models. Their application is precise. The first country under study, China, and its climate governance is evaluated via two scenarios, namely the prisoner's dilemma that simulates a bipolar setting and challenges the liberal view of the world, and the stag hunt that posits China in a multipolar setting. The results are clear, China's climate policy will be insufficient in the coming years. In the second part devoted to the US, the author identifies the domestic politics and unsolvable ratification

process as the biggest obstacle. For India, a mathematical function reflecting marginal benefits/damage from emitting is employed and again shows that we might rather expect an unsatisfactory climate policy (free-riding). The model of the EU internal climate cooperation is also attractive, even though I am not sure about the assumption that all member states bear the same costs of additional emission reduction (although some/poorer member states have several funds and derogations at their disposal) or author's second suggestion for improvements to reward ambitious member states with greater leadership in EU policy. Both energy/climate policy where the EU shares competencies with member states follow ordinary legislative procedure with no space for new body (unless the Treaty change, which seems unlikely). However, this is only a minor comment. In all cases, the author comes with interesting and nuanced insights.

The thesis meets all formal parameters.

Based on the above, I can only state that the thesis is exceptional, and I have no critical reservations in principle. The parameters of the thesis largely meet the criteria of scientific work.

Proposed grade (A-B-C-D-E-F): A

Suggested questions for the defence are: In Chapter 3.8., you stated that due to the complexity of supply chains and dependencies on Chinese consumers, effectively and consistently penalising China as a solution may be unrealistic. However, what about CBAM (an example of a trade tariff) as a tool for punishing unilaterally polluting countries (i.e., China's trade with the EU)? What might be the effect of such a tool on relative gains in the PD?

I recommend the thesis for final defence.

Referee Signature