

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to compare the current legal regulations of political party funding across selected EU countries and to formulate *de lege ferenda* proposals, based on the "good practice" in these countries, for the construction of state contributions and for the regulation of private financing of political parties in the Czech Republic.

The author first presents the basic problems related to public and private financing of political parties. He describes how the financing of political parties has changed over time, what are the advantages and disadvantages of private and public financing, what principles govern both approaches to financing, and how to find a balance between them. While private funding has existed in various forms for as long as political parties, the origins of public funding in Europe date back to the 1950s. The share of public funding in political parties' income has gradually increased, which has reduced many of the problems associated with private funding, and often contributed to more equal electoral chances, but on the other hand, new problems have emerged, in theory associated, for example, with the concept of the cartel party.

In the second part of the thesis, the author compares the current legal regulation of public and private financing of political parties in the Czech Republic, Latvia, France and Germany using a comparative method. He presents both the general approach of these countries to political party financing and the characteristics of these regulations. In the case of state contributions, the author mainly examines the way they are constructed and the conditions for their provision. In the case of private funding, he compares the overall strictness of the regulation – in particular the legal limits on donations from a single person, the regulation of corporate donations, foreign donations, anonymous donations and loans.

In the final part of the thesis, the author first presents the position taken by the Czech Constitutional Court on the issue of political party financing. He then proposes a *de lege ferenda* regulation that will meet the recommendations of the Constitutional Court rulings, adopt a number of interesting institutes from foreign regulations, and at the same time carefully balance the principles presented in the theoretical part. In particular, the author proposes changes in the design of state contributions, including a shift from a mandate contribution to a vote valuation; he also tries to find ways to support parties before elections rather than afterwards; and he proposes a number of changes to the regulation of private financing.