Charles University

Faculty of Social Sciences

Institute of Political Studies

# Department of Security Studies

**Master's Thesis**

# DETERRENCE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

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# Content

# Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AU | African Union |
| AGF | Attorney General of the Federation |
| BH | Boko Haram |
| CT | Counterterrorism |
| CSV | Comma Separated Values |
| COT | Counterterrorism |
| COIN | Counterinsurgency |
| CJTF | Civilian Joint Task Force |
| DSS | Department of State Service |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| GTI | Global Terrorism Index |
| I-ACT | Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force |
| IEDs | Improvised Explosive Devices |
| (IDP) | Internal Displaced Person's |
| JSTPA | Justice System and Terrorism Prevention Act |
| JTORO | Joint Military Task Force Operation Restore Order |
| JTF | Joint Task Force |
| MNJTF | Multi- National Joint Task Force |
| NIA | National Intelligence Agency |
| NASOC | Nigerian Army Special Operations Command |
| NFIU | Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit |
| NIS | Nigerian Immigration Service |
| NACTEST | The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy |
| NCTC | National Counter-Terrorism Centre |
| NAF SFR | Nigerian Air Force Special Troops Regiment |
| ONSA | Office of the National Security Adviser |
| PCVE | Preventing and Combating Violent Extremism |
| SOF | Special Operations Forces |
| SBS | Special Boat Service |
| TPA | Terrorism Prevention Act |

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| TPAA | Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act |
| UN | United Nations |

# Abstract

To assess the effectiveness of deterrence measures, we adopt data from the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The GTI provides comprehensive assessments of trends and patterns of terrorism across different regions and countries and offers a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies. Our analysis will evaluate the impact of deterrence measures on reducing terrorist activities in Nigeria and identify the key factors that contribute to the success or failure of deterrence.

This study's findings will be of significant interest to policymakers, security experts, and the broader Counter-terrorism has been a critical issue in Nigeria over the last decade, with terrorist groups such as Boko Haram posing a significant threat to the country's security and stability. In response, the Nigerian government has implemented various strategies, including deterrence, to combat this menace. Deterrence refers to the use of measures aimed at discouraging potential terrorists from engaging in violent activities. The effectiveness of deterrence in Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy between 2009 and 2019, with a case study of Boko Haram, is the focus of this study. The period under review is significant as it marks the rise of Boko Haram and its transformation into a formidable terrorist group that has caused significant damage to Nigeria's economy and society.

Academic community. Understanding the effectiveness of deterrence measures will provide valuable insights into the efficacy of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy and identify areas for improvement. It will also contribute to the existing body of knowledge on counter-terrorism strategies and provide a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of such strategies in other countries.

The study finds that the Nigerian government has used a range of deterrence strategies, including deterrence by punishment, deterrence by denial, and deterrence by delegitimization. However, the effectiveness of these strategies has been limited due to various factors, such as weak infrastructures within the Nigerian security forces, inadequate resources, and a lack of political will to address the underlying causes of Boko Haram's insurgency.

The study also examines the validity of using deterrence as a concept in countering terrorism in Nigeria, highlighting the need for a nuanced understanding of the context in which it is applied. The paper concludes that while deterrence can be an effective strategy in countering terrorism, it should be combined with other strategies such as negotiation, dialogue, and addressing the root causes of terrorism.

Finally, the study highlights the importance of using data analysis tools such as Python to analyze terrorism data, including data from the Global Index on Terrorism, to gain insights into terrorism trends and patterns and improve decision-making processes.

Keywords: Deterrence, Security, Counter terrorism, Strategy, Denial, Punishment, Delegitimization, Boko Haram, Nigeria, Government, Military.

# Abstrakt

Aby bylo možné vyhodnotit účinnost odstrašujících opatření, jsou data přebírána z globálního indexu terorismu (GTI). GTI poskytuje komplexní hodnocení trendů a vzorců terorismu v různých regionech a zemích a nabízí rámec pro hodnocení účinnosti protiteroristických strategií. Analýza v této práci vyhodnotí dopad odstrašovacích opatření na snížení teroristických aktivit v Nigérii a identifikuje klíčové faktory, které přispívají k úspěchu či selhání odstrašování.

Zjištění této studie bude velmi zajímavé pro tvůrce politik, bezpečnostní experty. V širším měřítku byl boj proti terorismu v Nigérii v posledním desetiletí kritickým problémem, přičemž teroristické skupiny jako Boko Haram představují významnou hrozbu pro bezpečnost a stabilitu země. Nigerijská vláda v reakci na tuto hrozbu zavedla různé strategie, včetně odstrašování. Odrazováním se rozumí použití opatření, jejichž cílem je odradit potenciální teroristy od násilných činností. Tato studie se zaměřuje na účinnost odstrašování v nigerijské protiteroristické strategii v letech 2009 až 2019 s případovou studií Boko Haram. Sledované období je významné, protože znamená vzestup Boko Haram a její přeměnu v impozantní teroristickou skupinu, která způsobila značné škody nigerijské ekonomice a společnosti.

Z pohledu akademické obce, pochopení účinnosti odstrašujících opatření poskytne cenné poznatky o účinnosti nigerijské protiteroristické strategie a určí oblasti, které je třeba zlepšit. Přispěje rovněž ke stávajícímu souboru znalostí o strategiích boje proti terorismu a poskytne rámec pro hodnocení účinnosti těchto strategií v jiných zemích.

Studie zjistila, že nigerijská vláda použila řadu odstrašovacích strategií, včetně odstrašování trestem, odstrašování odpíráním a odstrašování delegitimizací. Účinnost těchto strategií však byla omezena v důsledku různých faktorů, jako je slabá infrastruktura v rámci nigerijských bezpečnostních sil, nedostatečné zdroje a nedostatek politické vůle řešit základní příčiny povstání Boko Haram.

Studie také zkoumá platnost použití odstrašování jako konceptu v boji proti terorismu v Nigérii, přičemž zdůrazňuje potřebu jemného porozumění kontextu, ve kterém se používá. Dokument dochází k závěru, že ačkoliv odstrašování může být účinnou strategií v boji proti terorismu, mělo by být kombinováno s dalšími strategiemi, jako je vyjednávání, dialog a řešení základních příčin terorismu.

Nakonec studie zdůrazňuje důležitost používání nástrojů pro analýzu dat, jako je Python, k analýze dat o terorismu, včetně údajů z Globálního indexu terorismu, k získání náhledu na trendy a vzorce terorismu a ke zlepšení rozhodovacích procesů.

KLÍČOVÁVA SLOVA: odstrašování, boj proti terorismu, strategie, popírání, trestání, delegitimizace, Boko Haram, Nigérie, vláda

# Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

The concept of deterrence that "aimed at increasing the costs for the would-be perpetrator or at reducing the gains that the would-be perpetrator could achieve",[1] has been a prominent feature of counter-terrorism strategies deployed in various parts of the world In the Nigerian context, the threat of terrorism and violence extremism has continued to challenge Nigeria security force over the last decade,[2] and deterring approach has also been used as a tool to combat the Boko Haram insurgency. Deterrence seeks to prevent terrorist attacks by threatening severe consequences for such acts. In this case, it aims to discourage the Boko Haram group from carrying out attacks by making them believe that the costs of doing so will outweigh the benefits. Furthermore, the conceptual framework of deterrence in counter-terrorism is based on the idea of using various measures to dissuade potential terrorists from carrying out attacks that include several key elements that are designed to prevent, detect, and respond to terrorist threats. While the basic premise of deterrence as persuasion of a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of activities,[3] and that the threat of punishment or the use of punishment will discourage individuals or groups from engaging in activities that may be detrimental to themselves or others.

Deterrence can be applied in a variety of contexts, including criminal justice, international relations, and counter-terrorism. In the context of criminal justice, deterrence is often used as a means of discouraging individuals from committing crimes by imposing penalties or sanctions on those who do. In international relations, deterrence may be used as a means of preventing or deterring aggression between nations by threatening the use of military force or other forms of retaliation. However, deterrence is often used as a means of preventing or deterring terrorist activities by imposing penalties or sanctions on those who engage in such activities, and deterrence strategies may involve a range of measures, including increased security measures, targeted strikes, economic sanctions, or the use of harsh prison sentences or the death penalty. Moreover, the deterrence concept involves the use of threats or punishments to discourage individuals or groups from engaging in harmful behavior, to prevent such behaviors from occurring, or to minimize their impact if it does occur. The effectiveness of deterrence strategies may vary depending on the context and specific circumstances in which they are applied which includes the general deterrence approach that involves the use of punishment or the threat of punishment as a means of deterring potential terrorists from engaging in terrorist activities. For example, the use of harsh prison sentences or the death penalty may serve as a deterrent to individuals considering joining a terrorist group, also the Specific deterrence approach involves the use of punishment or the threat of punishment as a means of deterring specific individuals or groups from engaging in terrorist activities. For example, targets against known terrorists may serve as a specific deterrent to those individuals.

The denial deterrence approach(s) involves the use of security measures and other strategies to deny terrorists the opportunity to carry out attacks. For example, increased security within the

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[1] Van der Putten, Frans-Paul, Minke Meijnders, and Jan Rood. "Deterrence as a security concept against non-traditional threats." *depth study Clingendael Monitor* (2015): 7. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/deterrence_as_a_security_concept_against_non_traditional_threats.pdf

[2] Nigeria Security Strategy: Federal Republic of Nigeria (December 2019). p.8. https://ctc.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ONSA-UPDATED.pdf

[3] Alex Wilner, *"Targeted killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,"* Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010), p. 314. https://cve-kenya.org/media/library/Wilner_2010_Targeted_Killings_in_Afghanistan_Measuring_Coercion_and_Deterrence_in_Counterterrorism_and_Counterinsurgency.pdf.

environments and potential targets of terror may serve as a denial deterrent to potential terrorist(s). and the compellence deterrence approach that involves the use of punishment or the threat of punishment to compel terrorists to abandon their goals or cease their activities. For example, the use of economic sanctions may serve as a compellence deterrent to terrorist groups by limiting their ability to fund their operations.

In this study, the following are some of the key components of the conceptual framework of deterrence in counter-terrorism as the first step in deterrence is to identify and assess potential threats which involve gathering intelligence and analyzing data to determine the level of risk posed by terrorist groups. Then Develop a comprehensive response plan after the identification of threats has been identified, a comprehensive response plan should be developed that includes various measures aimed at preventing attacks, and this includes measures such as increased security, surveillance, and intelligence gathering.

In the Implementation of preventive measures and strategy(s), the main objectives of deterrence are to prevent attacks from occurring in the first place and can be achieved through measures such as border controls, surveillance, and intelligence sharing. Another important aspect of deterrence is to establish consequences for those who engage in terrorist activities that include criminal prosecution, imprisonment, and other penalties, and addressing the underlying causes of terrorism is also a critical component of deterrence. which could include efforts to reduce poverty, promote economic development, and address political grievances. While the conceptual framework of deterrence in counter-terrorism is based on the idea of using a range of measures to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring. These measures are designed to identify and assess potential threats, develop a comprehensive response plan, implement preventive measures, establish consequences for terrorist actions, and address the root causes of terrorism. Furthermore, terrorism is viewed as an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reason.[4]

Boko Haram is one among other cases over time, how has Nigeria's security posture been utilized in the fight against aggressors is an important event for the study. The international community became concerned e.g., about the suicide bombing of the United Nations office in Abuja,[5] the abduction of over 200 schoolgirls from the government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State on April 14, 2014,[6] and multiple bombings and killing of farmers, attacking places of worship, attacking local communities, and as well as a car bombing in cities, etc. Therefore, the dissertation will seek to analyze how states deter terrorists? The case of Boko haram will be used as an empirical event in the study between 2009 to 2019. And adopting data from the global terrorism index (GTI) has been utilized as a methodological tool in analyzing the various pattern of attacks and activities of terror against the Nigeria state, moreover, deterrence concepts are generally considered as preventive measures which aim at deterring aggressors, these threats have necessitated policy framework for countering terrorism in Nigeria. In order to illustrate the graphic patterns of various strategies and data collected over a time period in analyzing the possible relations, furthermore an attempt the analyzing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategy formulated with the aim of deterring terror capabilities

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[4] Alex Peter Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, and Sociaal-Wetenschappelijk Informatie-*en Documentatiecentrum, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases, and Literature,* no. 12 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984), p.28. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/political-terrorism-research-guide-concepts-theories-data-bases-and.

[5] Shehu Sani, "*Boko Haram: History, Ideas, and Revolt*," Vanguard, July 8, 2011. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-4/

[6] BBC News, (2014). Chibok abductions in Nigeria: 'More than 230 seized'. [online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27101714

are processed as: - The first step was the collection and analysis of data on the activities of Boko Haram and the counter-terrorism strategies that have been implemented in Nigeria which involved gathering information on the number of attacks, the locations of these attacks, the number of casualties, and the different counter-terrorism strategies that have been used during the period of study. Then used the data from (GTI) to assess the behaviors of terrorism capabilities in Nigeria state, calculating the (GTI) score for Nigeria and comparing it with various counter-terrorism strategy (s) from 2009- 2019. Furthermore. In analyzing the effectiveness of different counter-terrorism strategies, the data collected are used for analyses of the possible effectiveness of different counter-terrorism strategies that have been implemented in Nigeria as it involves comparing the data on the number of attacks, casualties, and the economic impact of terrorism before and after the implementation of different strategies.

Furthermore, the data are used in identifying possible areas where the counter-terrorism strategies need improvement while identifying the strategies that have been less effective in reducing the impact of terrorism and finding ways to improve them. The analysis can be used to inform policy and decision-making on counter-terrorism in Nigeria involves using the data to identify the most effective strategies and prioritizing resources to implement them.

And the data from the (GTI) is a vital and useful methodological tool deployed in analyzing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies against Boko Haram in Nigeria, it provides a comprehensive overview of the impact of terrorism that can be used to inform policy and decision-making on counter-terrorism measures.

Additionally, it will consider the limitations and challenges associated with deterrence strategies and provide recommendations on how to improve the deterrence approach to counter-terrorism in Nigeria.

Over the years, the Nigerian government has also sought to collaborate with neighboring countries, such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, in the fight against Boko Haram. In addition, the international community has provided assistance to Nigeria in the form of training, equipment, and intelligence sharing.

Moreover, the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria remains a complex and challenging issue, with no easy solutions. The root causes of the group's emergence and persistence are deeply rooted in Nigeria's political, social, and economic context, and any successful strategy to combat the group will require a long-term, multifaceted approach.

Nigeria is a country located in West Africa, with a population of over 200 million people, making it the most populous country on the continent. Nigeria gained independence from British colonial rule in 1960 and has since struggled with political instability, weak infrastructure capabilities, and economic challenges. Nigeria is home to over 250 ethnic groups, with Mwaghavul as one ethnic group among the three largest being the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. English is the official language of Nigeria, but over 500 other languages are spoken throughout the country.

The economy of Nigeria is largely driven by the oil and gas industry, which accounts for over 90% of its export earnings. However, the country is also rich in other natural resources such as gold, coal, tin, and limestone. Despite its abundant resources, Nigeria has struggled with poverty and income inequality, with a large portion of its population living below the poverty line. Nigeria is known for its vibrant culture, including its music, fashion, and cuisine. It is also home to many important historical and cultural landmarks, such as the ancient city of Benin, the Yoruba city of Ife, and the Nok culture, which produced some of the earliest known sculptures in Africa.

Terrorism is a serious problem in Nigeria, particularly in the northeastern part of the country. The terrorist group Boko Haram has been responsible for many attacks in Nigeria since 2009, including suicide bombings, assassinations, and mass abductions.

Boko Haram, which means "Western education is forbidden," aims to establish an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria and opposes Western education and culture. The group has killed thousands of people, including civilians and members of the Nigerian military, and has displaced millions of people from their homes. The group has also been known to target schools, especially those that provide Western-style education and has abducted schoolgirls and boys. ISWAP is an offshoot of Boko Haram and has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization. The group has been responsible for attacks on military bases and villages in north-eastern Nigeria, as well as kidnappings and suicide bombings. The Nigerian government has been working to combat terrorism in the country, but progress has been slow. The government has implemented a number of measures, including increased military presence in affected areas, but these measures have not been sufficient to fully address the problem. The government has also tried to negotiate with the terrorists, but these efforts have not been successful.

Despite the challenges of defining terrorism, most definitions tend to include some key elements, such as the use or threat of violence, the intention to still fear or create a climate of intimidation, and the pursuit of political or ideological goals.

Furthermore. Because the violence is often conducted by a known group of non-state actors who are quickly gaining influence and notoriety on par with actual governments, the case of Boko haram raises significant worries about domestic, regional, and international stability. On the other hand, according to other media, "Boko Haram was dubbed the deadliest terrorist organization the same year it created the alliance." It is important to note that the activities of Boko haram took place between 2002 and 2004. In addition, this study seeks to analyze the various attacks between 2009 and 2019 using the Nigerian government's counterterrorism strategy. This has necessitated the existence of a strategic framework aimed at countering terrorist activities and attacks in Nigeria.

# Chapter 2: UNDERSTANDING BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram is an Islamic extremist group that operates in northeastern Nigeria and the surrounding countries. The group was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, who aimed to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria based on Sharia law. Boko Haram gained international attention for its violent tactics, which have included suicide bombings, assassinations, and mass kidnappings. The group's name, "Boko Haram," means "Western education is forbidden" in the Hausa language, reflecting its opposition to Western culture and education. Boko Haram's attacks have targeted civilians, government officials, and security forces, and have resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the displacement of millions. The group has been designated as a terrorist organization by several countries and has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). The Nigerian government has been engaged in a long-running conflict with Boko Haram, with the support of regional and international partners, to neutralize the group's threat and restore peace to the affected regions.

Moreover, it is important for this research study to first understand the background of Boko haram's early formation, while few details are known about the sect's founding leader, Aminu Tashen-Ilimi, who went by that name in the Yobe State town of Kanamma and built the group's headquarters in 2004. They also resulted in the killing rather than the shooting of rivals. The sect's exact founding year is still unknown, but most analysts, including Nigerian security forces, place it between 2002 and 2004. They also attacked foreigners and targeted base stations for communications.[7] However, Yusuf is regarded as a peasant who came from a poor family in the Jakusko region and founded a local mosque and Islamic study center that drew many of the town's underprivileged residents as well as those from nearby areas like Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and lived a very different lifestyle than his supporters. Additionally, Yusuf had expensive cars purchased for him and had legal and medical professionals take care of him. [8]

When it first emerged, Boko Haram was known as the Taliban, and it functioned as a place for immigrant Muslims to read the Quran. This attracted young people, who made up the great majority of the sect's recruits, and the group drilled them in military training and physical combat techniques.

Furthermore, investigations reveal that trouble began when some of the sect members were stopped by Operation Flush patrol teams while traveling on motorbikes and questioned about why they were not wearing crash elements as they made their way to a cemetery to bury four of their members who had died in a car accident on the Biu-Maiduguri Road the previous day. [9] Some sect members were shot to death as a result of the group's members' violence against the security forces. The whole Boko Haram group demanded that the government express its apologies. It vowed to wreak retaliation if the government did not issue an apology for what happened to its members. Both government officials and security personnel were ineffective in responding to this threat.

In response to the shooting of his men, the preacher Sheik Yusuf said in a widely read Friday sermon in Maiduguri that his group would be prepared to confront both the government and the State security personnel, which he referred to as the enemies of Islam. Official sources claim that General Abdullahi

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[7] Muhammad Abdulkareem and M. Haruna, *"The Paradox of Boko Haram"* (Moving Images Ltd, Kano, 2010). pp.27-60
https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers15-04/010064362.pdf

[8] Muhammad Abdulkareem and M. Haruna, "*The Paradox of Boko Haram*" (Moving Images Ltd, Kano, 2010). pp.27-60
https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers15-04/010064362.pdf

[9] Shehu Sani, "*Boko Haram: History, Ideas, and Revolt*," Vanguard, July 8, 2011. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-4/

Sakin Muktar, the NSA, and President Umaru Yar'Adua were given enough information about Mohammed's threats. [10] The attack that started at a Maiduguri police station was another incident that occurred at the time. The group's commander, Yusuf, was apprehended that year following a joint police and military operation. After a catastrophic encounter in 2009 between Boko Haram and Nigerian security troops. Boko Haram, an Islamist organization that rose to prominence in 2009, is based in northeastern Nigeria. A vengeful native of Maiduguri named Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, who had not totally embraced violence until 2009, Boko Haram was violently put down in July 2009 after being subjected to covert and overt pressure that led to the group's leader being brutally murdered by Nigerian security forces. After regrouping and going into hiding, Boko Haram made a catastrophic comeback in 2010.

Furthermore, beginning in 2010, Boko Haram took the step to use asymmetrical conflict to display its capabilities and then made a stunning prison break at Bauchi in October 2010. Its strategies have now evolved to include targeted killings, drive-by shootings, suicide bombings, the extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs, and, most recently, kidnapping and hostage-taking, and these attacks have been extremely difficult for the Nigerian people, particularly in the northeast, where churches, mosques, schools, prisons, and police stations have been bombed, the Boko Haram sect gained global attention as a terror group following the attack on the United Nations building in Abuja, Federal Capital Territory. [11]

Since its inception and growth, the organization has tried to imitate and incorporate the ideologies and practices of other global Salafist groups, such as Al-Qaeda. There have been attempts to link regional aggravations to globally significant events that were originally localized, despite being significantly motivated by the current activities of Al-Qaeda outside of Africa and the claims of Boko Haram in Mali and other locations.

They were led by Mohammed Yusuf, who had a reputation for empowering the weak. Such a time period was characterized by proselytization (dawah), which included rhetorical attacks on traditional and modern-democratic secular authority. The "dawah phase" was a period during which members were heavily recruited, radicalized, and indoctrinated. There is a lot of criticism of the secular system that is currently in place during this phase, as well as disagreements with rival ulama (clerics), discussions about whether Western education, Westernization, democracy, and secularism are appropriate or not, and ongoing criticism of Borno State Governor Ali Modu Sheriff's (2003–2011) corruption and poor leadership, as well as their outrageous consumerism and extravagance in the face of extreme poverty. Owing to this, the claims of Kharijism first appeared in conversations and audio-taped statements before the Maiduguri outbreak of violence in July 2009; it is important to note that the Kharijism claim was primarily a local one. They all exhibit Khariji traits, including a propensity for violence, a desire to kill for relatively minor offenses and a comfort level with calling other Muslims as infidels. [12]

Considering this, Muhammad highlighted that the group attracted young Nigerians who had completed their schooling but were unable to find employment due to the nation's high unemployment rate. Even though the majority of the sect's members relocated to Maiduguri, the group did not disband but instead split into the northern region. The group used intimidation in the

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[10]    Shehu    Sani,    "*Boko    Haram:    History,    Ideas,    and    Revolt*,"    Vanguard,    July    8,    2011. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-4/

[11] Steve Olufemi Ojelade, "*Counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015*" (Ph.D. diss., Walden University, 2018). p.141. https://www.proquest.com/openview/9c893e264d491c9d743e90f713fd1e80/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y

[12]    Muhammad    Abdulkareem    and    M.    Haruna,    "The    Paradox    of    Boko    Haram"    (Moving    Images    Ltd,    Kano,    2010).    pp.27-60 https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers15-04/010064362.pdf

same manner to recruit new members, but some people accepted the group's teachings and burned their diplomas or sold their valuables to join. [13] Additionally, as the events progressed, the organization began embracing violence to spread its principles and ideas by using weapons such as guns, grenades, and other explosives. The sect members attacked a police station in Bauchi state on July 26, 2009, and 39 Boko Haram terrorists, two police officers, and one soldier were killed.[14] According to Mohammed, the Borno State Government allegedly appointed sect member Buji Foi to the position of commissioner of water resources and chieftaincy affairs in return for the sect's political support. Buji Foi then rose to become the sect's primary financier before being assassinated by security forces in the cult's onslaught in 2009, and further sources of money are claimed to have come from covert financial donations such as Wealthy people, 2. The organization successfully carried out armed robberies during operations against wealthy people and commercial banks, describing all its stolen money as spoils of war and asserting that doing so is permissible according to their understanding of Islam, and 3. Al-Muntada al-Islami, a Saudi Arabian Da'awa organization with a presence in England, is led by Dr. Adil ibn Mohammed al-Saleem. [15]

The group reappeared in 2010. Abubakar Shekau was in command this time, and following the previous leader's demise, he was able to bring the group back together. In Yobe state, Shekau was also born. After Yusuf's passing, he wed a wife of his and adopted all his kids. The group's structure changed drastically under his leadership from Yusuf, becoming much more decentralized. However, the formation of the new group was not planned; rather, it came about as a result of the group's disintegration following the 2009 attack. But none of the group's opinions changed. As "Darul Tawheed," Shekau is referred to by his adherents as an Imam. However, since the insurgency's launch in 2002, a large number of academic books, journals, and studies have been produced on the case study.

Additionally, they went after members of the ruling All Nigeria Peoples Party, security personnel, and perceived rivals (ANPP), Since Boko Haram's activities have become more sophisticated, the terrorist group turned to attacking important Abuja targets between June and August 2011, including the Nigerian Police Headquarters and the UN headquarters. Nigeria's first suicide assault was committed in August when a car bomb exploded at the UN offices in the nation's capital Abuja, killing 26 people.[16] A further argument made by the leadership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) is that the insurgency is an effort to impose Sharia law and Islam on Nigerians. Human Rights Watch, which discovered the discovery around 2012, claims that between 2010 and 2012, Boko Haram attacked at least 18 churches and killed 127 Christians. Furthermore, it was claimed that these numbers might be inaccurate because, according to a Christian leader who spoke with Human Rights Watch, at least 142 Christians were killed in Borno State alone between June 7 and June 30, 2011, and January 17, 2012, in what appeared to be a premeditated campaign of violence.

Consequently. The Federal High Court in Abuja recently heard the introduction of evidence in the trial of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, also known as "Kabiru Sokoto," the perpetrator of the 2011 Christmas Day church bombing in Madalla, Niger State. Apparently, Sokoto "revealed in his statement information of financing received by the terrorist organization, Musilimi Yaa'maa, located in Algeria

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[13] Muhammad Abdulkareem and M. Haruna, "The Paradox of Boko Haram" (Moving Images Ltd, Kano, 2010). pp.27-60 https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers15-04/010064362.pdf.

[14] Shehu Sani, "Boko Haram: History, Ideas, and Revolt," Vanguard, July 8, 2011. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-4/

[15] Muhammad Abdulkareem and M. Haruna, "The Paradox of Boko Haram" (Moving Images Ltd, Kano, 2010). pp.27-60 https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers15-04/010064362.pdf.

[16] Joe Brock, "*In Nigeria's northeast, some sympathy for Islamists,*" Reuters, November 14, 2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-islamists-idUSTRE7AD0SZ20111114

and how the payments led to the division of Boko Haram, after arguments over the sharing of the money,"[17] according to one of the prosecution's witnesses.

Nevertheless, according to Adesoji, Boko Haram emerged in response to the failure of Nigeria's political system to address these issues. The group's ideology is based on a rejection of Western-style education and a desire to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria and argues that Boko Haram's tactics, which have included bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations, are a reflection of the group's desperation and frustration with the Nigerian government, and such support could be driven by a conviction in the sect's purpose, a desire to advance religion, or by sowing the seeds of reciprocal friendliness in the future. The givers can be Yusuf's followers, admirers, partners, or associates. They may also be underestimating the sect's potential ramifications (though this is doubtful), but by supporting them, they become part of the Islamist agenda to launch a revolution that would entrench Islamic doctrine in Nigeria, like jihadist organizations outside the country. [18] discussing the implications of Boko Haram's rise for Nigeria and the wider region, however, views such actions as exacerbating tensions between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria and have the potential to destabilize the country. He also notes that Boko Haram's links to Al-Qaeda and other militant groups could make it a significant threat to regional security.

conclusively link the organization to northern political groups, as many have claimed, it is believed that during its early years, the group had the backing of powerful northern elites. while pointing out narrative details. The swift radicalization of Islam in these regions, also known as religious terrorism, and the use of violence for political ends by groups whose motivations and justifications are couched in religious convictions, terms, and symbols—was justified by the decision of a few northern states' governors and legislatures to impose Sharia in their respective jurisdictions. [19]

The use of violent methods has resulted in a better understanding of how religion could appeal to organizations that spread terror, as in the case of Boko haram. Moreover, some of the information about the group will contribute to the development of conceptual viewpoints.

Moreover, the contributions of Onapajo and Usman's considerations of Christianity as equivalent to Western civilization are associated with the cause of the group's multifaceted societal crises. As a result, they declared Christians to be one of their main targets because they considered them infidels.[20] These studies illustrate the variety of viewpoints that intellectuals have previously had on the terrorist group Boko Haram. The Yan Izala movement, which is most notably reflected by this article's historical assessment of Boko Haram, is known in Arabic as Jama'at izalat al bid'a wa-iqamat al-sunna, which roughly translates as the community for the eradication of un-Islamic innovations and the establishment of the Sunna.

Thus, according to Adesoji, there may not be an operational connection between Boko Haram and these more established northern religious groups, but both have the same or a similar philosophy. The Maitatsine rebellion, the Tijaniyya Sufi order, and the Jihad led by Usman Dan Fodio are a few historical northern groups that come to mind. Even though many people consider Boko Haram primarily anti-Christian due to its early attacks on Christians. While "Boko haram have perceived

[17] T. Soniyi, M. Bello, and Akinsuyi, *"Kabir Sokoto trial: Sharing of funds split Boko Haram"* (2013).

[18] Abimbola Adesoji, "*The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria*," Africa Spectrum 45.2 (2010). p.101. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/000203971004500205

[19] Brigitte Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (Routledge, 2016), p.8. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315641270/terrorism-counterterrorism-brigitte-nacos

[20] Hakeem Onapajo and Abubakar A. Usman, *"Fuelling the Flames: Boko Haram and Deteriorating Christian–Muslim Relations in Nigeria,"* Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 35:1, (2015)., p.111. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2015.1007667

Christians and those Muslims who do not share their world view as enemies, and therefore legitimate targets of the attack, Boko haram has been attacking Christians and their places of worship while also causing social tension and disharmony between Christians and Muslims in the northern states of Nigeria."[21] And argues that Boko Haram's message is based on a radical interpretation of Islam that seeks to establish a pure Islamic state in Nigeria through the use of violence and coercion. The group's name, which translates to "Western education is forbidden," reflects its rejection of secular education and its desire to impose a strict Islamic code of conduct on society, as well as noted that the group's tactics have evolved over time, with an increasing emphasis on suicide bombings and a shift towards attacking soft targets such as markets and mosques. Which have provided an in-depth analysis of the ideology and tactics of Boko Haram, a terrorist group that operates primarily in northeastern Nigeria.

An important source for this study is the Nigerian government's strategy approach, which uses the index and other research publications to interpret the data in the context of its ongoing fight against Boko Haram using various security strategies. The decision-making process is also outside the scope of this study's main objectives. As many as six explosives detonated on Christmas Eve 2010 in two different parts of Jos, Plateau state, close to churches and a market, killing numerous people. Boko Haram thus "antagonizes almost the entire spectrum of Muslims in its region, committing atrocities with any other sizeable Muslim constituency, save other jihadi groups - Boko haram brutality could at some point repulse even the Islamic State"[22]. It was not initially believed to be a Boko Haram attack but rather a negative development in the protracted ethnopolitical conflict.

Furthermore, in the understanding of Boko haram activities, view the various percept as political conflicts, religious clashes, and socio-economic dynamics, The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is a complex issue that involves political conflicts, religious clashes, and socio-economic factors. Firstly, the political conflicts on the one hand are the key factors fuelling the Boko Haram insurgency as Nigeria is a country with diverse ethnic and religious groups, and there have been tensions between different groups over political power and resources. The Boko Haram insurgency has been a sense of political marginalization, particularly in the northern part of the country, where many members of the group come from. Religious clashes have increased the insurgency justification, and have a strong religious dimension. Furthermore, the group is an Islamist militant group that seeks to establish a strict interpretation of Islamic law in Nigeria which has put the group at odds with the largely Christian South and other Muslim communities that do not share its extremist views.

The group has carried out attacks on churches and mosques, as well as on civilians who do not adhere to its strict interpretation of Islam. Socio-economic factors are also important in understanding the Boko Haram insurgency, and the group has taken advantage of widespread poverty and unemployment in the northern part of the country, where many of its members come from. The group has promised to provide jobs and opportunities to young people in the region, many of whom are disillusioned with the government and traditional political structures.

In addition, the poor situation of public services and mismanagement in the Nigerian government has contributed to the group's rise. The government has failed to provide basic services and infrastructure

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[21] Kyari Mohammed, *"The message and methods of Boko Haram,"* in Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, 2014),p.19. https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/42552544/Boko_Haram_5.1-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1666780293&Signature=hS1XFguPczkJIue98dsI0hhFCmaZ-PrLkJD64FqDO~IRMj4rhKUAKTvgR4XaxM4WgaKtkD9FC6CDN5PrDNMDJwtZYDqcyloFtAkhvzxpXiDe2uJGcRN9WzGIw~Gu8tVlAxxF1VpWc9I PTVyzFDJ2PdBbjKWK6~fPD7VhR~TqGNDYPc308z-~nxR2ehAcPDvWovYPOA6KI09SEqDgB6gYlUIFNKquk7VqZNi957GfAiImbdMkA-Ra2d-2Tef1RhK19yIn7W4~QUS95mRsmyluI9G4LHLa7NarnLVyhAHiUJCBJjtUc1eUhjds~YimFXXbz9-WJXEETKx06UckPXb6Pw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA#page=223

[22] Thurston, Alex. *"'The disease is unbelief': Boko Haram's religious and political worldview."* (2016). p.24. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/brookings-analysis-paper_alex-thurston_final_web.pdf

to many parts of the country, particularly in the north, and this has created a sense of frustration and resentment among many Nigerians.

However, the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is a complex issue that involves political conflicts, religious clashes, and socio-economic factors. Addressing the root causes of the conflict, including political marginalization, religious tensions, poverty, and corruption, will be key to resolving the crisis and ensuring peace and stability in Nigeria.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF BOKO HARAM'S RISE

The socio-economic dimensions of Boko Haram's emergence and growth can be traced back to several factors. One of the key factors is the economic inequality and poverty that has persisted in Nigeria, particularly in the northeastern region where Boko Haram originated. The region has long been neglected by the central government, with high levels of unemployment, limited access to education and basic services, and few economic opportunities. This has created a breeding ground for social discontent and unrest.

Boko Haram has exploited this situation by offering economic incentives and support to vulnerable individuals and communities. They have provided financial assistance, food, and shelter to individuals who have been disenfranchised by the government's policies, and in return, they have recruited members and gained support for their cause. Therefore, A counterterrorism strategy that effectively dismantles terrorist organizations must be developed, and the socio-economic perspective (SEP) is essential. Others contend that Boko Haram is motivated by ambition from a socioeconomic perspective, contradicting claims made by some that grief and greed are the terrorist group's driving motivations. According to Alozieuwa 2012, All beings have basic needs with which they aim to satisfy, and failure caused by other individuals or organizations to satisfy these requirements could be conflict. The sect's politics and doctrine, therefore, go beyond simple opposition to Western influences; rather, its viewpoint incorporates two more important ideas. The first is doctrinal exclusivism, which rejects all competing moral systems, including those that reflect different branches of Islam. Because of this exclusivism, Muslims are required to choose between Islam and several allegedly incompatible activities, such as democracy, a constitutional government, partnerships with non-Muslims, and Western-style education. Victimization politics come in second. When it comes to Boko Haram, their terroristic deeds serve as vengeance for the group's long-standing, continuous oppression of Muslims in Nigeria. Furthermore, Boko Haram claims that the most recent incident of this persecution involved State crackdowns on the sect.

Additionally, Boko Haram has targeted and attacked schools and universities, which they view as symbols of Western influence and education. By attacking education, the group has further perpetuated the cycle of poverty and illiteracy in the region, making it easier to recruit vulnerable individuals who lack the skills and knowledge to challenge the group's extremist ideology. Increased understandings, such as the South's higher socioeconomic status, political influence, and generalization that the educated and professional elite in the South is exceptional to the peasant farmers in the North, had also made it easier for people to harbor grievances against the government and the predominantly Christian South, whether they are justified or not. The Middle Belt or the North Central region brought a novel element to the situation. In addition to the problem of racial and religious conflict in the state, notably inside the Plateau State, it has grown more difficult to study Religion and its geopolitics.

Furthermore, the misappropriation of resources and weak governance have also contributed to the socio-economic dimensions of Boko Haram's emergence. Corruption in the government and security

forces has undermined public trust and legitimacy, making it difficult for the government to effectively address the root causes of the conflict. Additionally, the lack of transparency and accountability has fuelled grievances and mistrust among the population, providing an opening for extremist groups like Boko Haram to exploit. However, when attempting to establish a direct correlation between security and advancement, it is important to keep in mind the challenges of maintaining order and peace in most societies where there are fundamental contradictions in their economic landscape. These contradictions, more often in the third world, provide nurturing and sustain feelings of alienation, marginalization, frustration, and resentment among the poor class of society, which ultimately translate into anger, radicalization, and violence. In addition, emphasize the need for the government to provide adequate infrastructural benefits, welfare benefits, and perhaps other measures for social development. It should come as no surprise that the group's long-term prospects are greatly dependent on how the Nigerian economy is run. Sadly, it is probable that the way the government has dealt with Boko Haram has occasionally made the war on terrorism more complex.

In summary, the socio-economic dimensions of Boko Haram's emergence are rooted in economic inequality, poverty, and weak governance, and addressing these underlying factors will require a comprehensive approach that involves improving economic opportunities, education, and basic services, strengthening governance and accountability, and countering extremist ideologies.

## UNDERLYING POLITICAL CONFLICTS

The group's activities have led to significant political conflicts in Nigeria and the broader region as well as political instability, and threats to constitutional order manifest as political intolerance, electoral malpractices and violence,[23] with the group attacking government and military targets as well as civilians. This has led to a sense of insecurity and instability, making it difficult for the government to maintain order and stability. One of the main sources of political conflict stemming from Boko Haram's activities is the response of the Nigerian government and security forces. The government's attempts to quell the group's activities have often been criticised for being heavy-handed, leading to allegations of human rights abuses and exacerbating the conflict. Additionally, the government's perceived lack of progress in dealing with the group has led to widespread frustration and anger among many Nigerians, particularly those in the north-eastern region.

The conflict has also had a significant impact on regional security, with neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger facing their own security challenges as a result of Boko Haram's activities. This has led to tensions between Nigeria and its neighbours, particularly over issues such as border security and cross-border attacks.

In addition to these political conflicts, Boko Haram's activities have also had a profound humanitarian impact. The group's attacks have resulted in the displacement of millions of people, and have led to widespread poverty and economic instability in affected areas. This has further exacerbated existing social and economic divisions, leading to tensions between different ethnic and religious groups.

Furthermore, the political conflicts stemming from Boko Haram's activities are complex and multifaceted, and will likely require a sustained and coordinated effort from governments, civil society organisations, and other stakeholders in order to be effectively addressed. According to this interpretation, Boko Haram is seen as a political movement against corruption and in support of sharia law, whereas the multiple attack attempts are driven by misconceptions from religion. However, there are not many political events, which highlight how Boko Haram is a rebellion against the local

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[23] Nigeria Security Strategy: Federal Republic of Nigeria (December 2019). p.12. https://ctc.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ONSA-UPDATED.pdf

administration in the north. Furthermore, the group "believes northern politics have been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage war against them, as well as the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a pure Islamic state ruled by sharia law."[24]One may make the case that one of the causes of Boko Haram is the combination and alliance of the Fulani power with the Hausa aristocrats. observing that the attacks against politicians and religious scholars in numerous Northern regions must have been caused using the Hausa partners in the Fulani monarchy as propagandist tools, Moreover, "Since 2009, the group has been motivated by a desire for vengeance against politicians, police, and Islamic authorities for their part in the violent suppression of the group that year, but the group has proven itself to be very adaptable, evolving its tactics quickly and changing its targets at the behest of charismatic leadership."[25]

The historical Jihad conducted by Usman Dan Fodio in the 19th century, which served as the catalyst for the reformation to free the religion from the norms of the Hausa rulers of the time, came into greater perspective through time. The campaign's success led to the Nomadic faction assuming control of the Sokoto caliphate. The Fulani and Hausa grabbed control of Nigeria after it gained its independence from British colonial authority in order to advance the one-north philosophy and advance their political interests. The notion of a united north was put in jeopardy when Nigeria was split up into smaller states to satisfy the concerns of minority communities. It can seem from the outside that religious differences and hostility between Muslim and Christian communities are the main causes of these confrontations.

Further research found that politics, or more specifically, the management of political influence, is the primary reason for many of these confrontations. According to national polling conducted in 2011, politicians could further increase hostilities between Muslims and Christians. Additionally, the group and "many Northerners were indeed offended by the 2011 electoral victory of President Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian who originally ascended to Presidency on the death of President Umaru Yar'adua, a Northern Muslim".[26]

Because of how complicated Nigerian politics are, it has been difficult to understand the group. For instance, President Goodluck Jonathan claimed that Boko Haram had gotten into the top ranks of the military and the government. The president gave a portrayal of an imaginary group that those dissatisfied northern lawmakers were using to topple his southern government.

According to several experts, the Boko Haram ideology criticises both the failure to provide chances for the poor and Western education in general. Thus, this sentiment among the populace serves the Boko Haram movement, which uses it as a tool to indoctrinate and mobilise the unemployed, unskilled, and impoverished youths to join its cause and overthrow the secular state, while other perception's view Boko Haram as logically positioned as an alternative and plausible solution to their misery. Consequently, the organisation makes use of "the force of religion to stereotype and demonize other adherents of the faith as well as Muslim brothers and sisters who support or work for the state"[27].

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[24] Andrew Walker, *what is Boko Haram?* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2012), p.2. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf

[25] Andrew Walker, what is Boko haram? (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2012), p.2. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf

[26] Thurston, Alex. "'The disease is unbelief': Boko Haram's religious and political worldview." (2016). p.7. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/brookings-analysis-paper_alex-thurston_final_web.pdf

[27] K. I. Muhammed, "*Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria,*" in Militias, Rebels, and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 314-315.

## RELIGIOUS CLASHES AS ADDITIONAL CONTEXT

The group's ideology is based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, which rejects Western education and culture and seeks to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. From the perspective of Boko Haram, the group sees itself as a defender of Islam against what they perceive as the corrupting influence of Western values and culture. They believe that Western education and culture are incompatible with Islam and are a threat to the moral and spiritual well-being of Muslims. The group's attacks are often targeted at government institutions, security forces, and civilians whom they view as collaborators with the government. They also target Christians and other religious minorities, whom they see as enemies of Islam.

However, from the perspective of those who are opposed to Boko Haram, the group's ideology and actions are seen as a perversion of Islam and a threat to peace and stability in Nigeria. Many Muslim leaders and organizations have condemned the group's violence and called for an end to the conflict. Furthermore, according to many scholars, it criticizes both the failure to provide opportunities for the citizens and Western education in general. This sentiment among the populace thus becomes beneficial for the Boko Haram movement, which utilizes it as an instrument to indoctrinate and mobilize the underemployed, unskilled, and impoverished youths to join its cause and oust the secular state. In contrast, other perceptions view Boko Haram as logically positioned as an alternative and plausible solution to their anguish. [28]

Nonetheless, the Islamic State attracted Boko Haram for strategic reasons in addition to ideological ones. It is possible to see the intellectual ties between the two movements in Yusuf's debt to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, which helps put Boko Haram's future ties to the Islamic State into perspective. It should come as no surprise that Boko Haram and the Islamic State hold many of the same political and religious principles. On March 7, however, Abubakar Shekau, the head of Boko Haram, produced an audio message in which the group declared its allegiance to ISIS. Given that Boko Haram has long lauded ISIS's acts and that the commitment was made at a time when Boko Haram was under intense strain, the news was not particularly startling.

Boko Haram's objectives currently represent a significant threat to the safety of Muslim citizens in northern Nigeria, who are the largest group being targeted for attacks, as well as the Christian population there, including economic migrants and local tribes. It can be quite difficult to comply with some of Boko Haram's stated demands because they are frequently incompatible. It declares, for instance, that it wishes to divide Nigeria into the north and the south and that Sharia law and Islam should be imposed across the board. It has additionally requested that Goodluck Jonathan convert to Islam, Certain needs, however, might be contested given that the group has made a number of political demands, such as the release of senior members who are being detained by the government, the return of all property that has been taken from its members, and the prosecution of those in charge of Mohammed Yusuf and other group members' deaths furthermore "put into the mix the resurgence of Islamism in northern Nigeria, and across the Sahelian belt, and the political clout of urban evangelical Christianity across the southern oil-producing conurbations and one has the makings of a perfect storm of violence and conflict."[29] Furthermore, the clash of perspectives in the Boko Haram conflict revolves around differing interpretations of Islam and conflicting beliefs about the role of religion in society.

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[28] Muhammed, K. I. *"Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria."* Militias, Rebels, and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (2010). pp. 314-315

[29] Michael Watts, *"Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict & Violence in the Niger Delta,"* Review of African Political Economy 34, no. 114 (2007): pp. 644. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20406448.

## SECURITY CHALLENGES OF BOKO HARAM ACTIVITIES

Boko Haram is a terrorist organization that operates primarily in Nigeria, with some activities extending into neighboring countries like Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The group has posed significant security challenges to the Nigerian state, including Attacks on civilians. Boko Haram has carried out numerous attacks on civilians, including bombings of markets, schools, and places of worship. These attacks have resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, including women and children, and since 2009, terrorism has constituted a major national security challenge in Nigeria,[30] as the experience from the various capabilities in terror such the kidnappings Boko Haram and abduction of women, and children, particularly schoolgirls.

In 2014, the group kidnapped over 200 schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria, sparking international outrage. And recruitment of fighters, as Boko Haram has been able to recruit fighters, including young men and women, who are willing to join the group's ranks and carry out attacks.

Use of suicide bombers, as Boko Haram has used suicide bombings at the UN office in Abuja the nation's capital, was also targeted, and the organization claimed responsibility for a string of bombings that occurred in and around Abuja shortly after President Goodluck Jonathan's inauguration on May 29, 2011. On June 16, twin explosions struck the Nigeria Police Headquarters in Abuja,[31]carry out attacks in crowded areas in Jos and other parts of the country which includes markets and bus stations, numerous bombings and farmer deaths, attacks on places of worship, attacks on local communities, as well as car bombs of cities all caused worry among the international world and has targeted security forces in Nigeria. The group has also attacked prisons and freed its members.

The Control of Territory, and ungoverned spaces especially around the international boundaries, forests and game reserves provide opportunities for criminal networks to fester and general promote crime.[32] While Boko Haram has been able to gain control of territory in Nigeria, particularly in the northeastern part of the country and the attempts to set up its own administration and has imposed its own version of Islamic law. However, Boko Haram's activities have posed significant security challenges to the Nigerian state, with the group's attacks leading to the deaths of thousands of people and the displacement of millions of others. The Nigerian government has been working to counter the group's activities, but the security situation in the country remains fragile.

The light of the above security issues that arose from Boko Haram's capabilities; the dissertation will examine the various strategies adopted by states to deter terrorism. As an empirical case, the study will examine the Boko Haram attacks as it relates to the various counterterrorism strategy deployed in the fight against terror activities over the period of the analysis, furthermore, in responding to the threat posed by terrorism, Nigeria enacted the terrorism prevention act 2013, developed the National Counter Terrorism Strategy 2016 (NACTEST) and established the Counter Terrorism Canter to coordinate the national counter terrorism efforts.[33]

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[30] Nigeria Security Strategy: Federal Republic of Nigeria (December 2019). p.23. https://ctc.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ONSA-UPDATED.pdf

[31] Bombing in Abuja: *On Nigeria's Boko Haram."* Crisis Group, September 6, 2011, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/bombing-abuja-nigerias-boko-haram-0

[32] Nigeria Security Strategy: Federal Republic of Nigeria (December 2019). p.32. https://ctc.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ONSA-UPDATED.pdf

[33] Nigeria Security Strategy: Federal Republic of Nigeria (December 2019). p.23. https://ctc.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ONSA-UPDATED.pdf

# Chapter 3: DETERRENCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: SEEKING CONCEPTUAL OVERLAP

## CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT OF DETERRENCE

The literature that has been utilized in this research works on deterrence concepts, and counter-terrorism, as well as exploring the background study. The study also highlighted the need for a multi-faceted approach to counter-terrorism, including military, political, religious, and socio-economic measures.

Another study by Onuoha (2016) examined the role of deterrence in counter-terrorism in Nigeria, with a focus on the use of military force. The study found that the use of military force alone was not sufficient to deter terrorist activities. The study emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach that includes intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and socio-economic measures. And a further study by Bello and Mohammed (2017) examined the impact of deterrence on the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The study found that the use of force alone was not effective in deterring terrorist activities. The study recommended the use of soft power strategies such as education, job creation, and poverty reduction to complement military forces in the fight against terrorism.

In addition, a study by Nnaji and Nwankwo (2019) examined the role of deterrence in counter-terrorism in Nigeria from a psychological perspective. The study found that individuals who perceive a high level of deterrence are less likely to engage in terrorist activities. The study recommended the use of psychological operations to increase the level of deterrence among potential terrorists.

Furthermore. Deterrence is an important strategy in counter-terrorism in Nigeria. The literature suggests that deterrence, when combined with other strategies such as intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and socio-economic measures, can be effective in reducing terrorist activities in the country. However, the use of force alone is not sufficient to deter terrorist activities.

Deterrence is a concept that has evolved for a quite long time; also, the Romans understood that "if you want peace, make prepare for war." [34] Through the nuclear revolution, the idea of deterrence was brought to the microscopic study of international politics. Classical deterrence theory first emerged during the Cold War, a conflict in which the development of nuclear weapons made war prevention more crucial than ever. As the nature of terrorist acts changed from being committed by states to being carried out by non-state actors, deterrence came to be understood as "involves threatening to push someone to persuade them not to take some action." [35]

According to Thomas Schelling, who popularized the concept, deterrence implies "persuading a potential enemy that he should in his interest avoid certain courses of activity."[36] In consideration of this definitional context, it is important to keep the essential difference between the use of force and a threat of force. Deterrence is concerned with the use of potential force, according to Thomas Schelling, who emphasized that a pertinent distinction may be made between using force and

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[34] "Michael Quinlan, "*Deterrence and deterrability*," *Contemporary Security Policy* 25.1 (2004), pp. 11-17.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/1352326042000290470?scroll=top&needAccess=true

[35] "Michael Quinlan, "*Deterrence and deterrability*," Contemporary Security Policy 25.1 (2004), pp.11-17.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/1352326042000290470?scroll=top&needAccess=true

[36] Alex Wilner, "*Targeted killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,*" Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010), p. 314.
https://cve-kenya.org/media/library/Wilner_2010_Targeted_Killings_in_Afghanistan_Measuring_Coercion_and_Deterrence_in_Counterterrorism_and_Counterinsurgency.pdf

threatening to use it. It is focused on persuading a potential adversary that certain actions are not in his best interests. Deterrence is still a crucial weapon for maintaining global security. The deterrence concept's application to combating terrorism will need to be revised, though, given that significant changes in the global and regional international systems are occurring because of prolonging aftershocks from the end of the Cold War, and how the state(s) are rethinking an extensive range for upholding order and thwarting terror threats even as that order is itself being reinvented.

Deterrence aims at "inducing an adversary ... not do something," and compellence - "inducing someone to do something," [37] are the two processes that go into influencing behavior through fear. The former addresses the "don'ts" of inter-unit relationships, whereas compelling behavior, as its root, "compel," suggests, addresses the "does." The defender must explain the intended course of action and how inaction will result in reprisal. Comparing the two to the status quo is a helpful approach to telling them apart. While he further stated that, "deterrence is simpler- the command to do something requires a date or deadline; to keep on not doing something is timeless." [38] On the other hand, the assumption is claimed that a "Compelling threat invites another demand; complying with a deterrent leaves things unchanged and leads to on sequel".[39]

Deterrence seeks to dissuade an adversary from taking an action that is contrary to one's interests by increasing the perceived cost of that action. The goal of deterrence is to influence the adversary's decision-making process by convincing them that the benefits of the action they are contemplating are outweighed by the potential costs or risks. Deterrence is a strategy that is commonly used in international relations and security to prevent conflict or aggression by demonstrating the capability and willingness to respond with force or other punitive measures. In essence, deterrence seeks to prevent an adversary from taking an action by convincing them that the costs of doing so will be too high. According to Wyn Bowen, deterrence seeks to "preserve the status quo" by preventing someone from "initiating a course of action,"[40] however, compellence is focused on strengthening an existing relationship. In either case, the intention is to put a stop to unacceptable behavior as well as compel an adversary to act in conformity with one's preferences. Glen Snyder distinguished between "deterrence by the threat of punishment and deterrence by denial,"[41] within his two categories of a deterrent, and strategic adaptability is essential for the counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria. The foundation of deterrence through punishment is the threat of harm to an adversary's values-based object. Whenever an attack was threatened against the Soviets or America during the Cold War, for instance, both were dissuaded from advancing given that it would be costly to launch one. As asserted by Frank P. Harvey, the anticipated net cost of the threatened sanction "should be greater than the expected net gains from noncompliance because the punishment, if carried out would prevent the challenger from achieving intended military, political, or economic goals."[42] While participating in negative conduct could lead to punishment, embracing a deterrent might come at a price. For the

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[37] Thomas C. Schelling, "*Thinking about nuclear terrorism*," *International Security* 6.4 (1982). p72. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538678?seq=13#metadata_info_tab_contents.

[38] Thomas C. Schelling, "*Thinking about nuclear terrorism,*" International Security 6.4 (1982). p72. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538678?seq=13#metadata_info_tab_contents.

[39] "Thomas C. Schelling, "*Thinking about nuclear terrorism,*" International Security 6.4 (1982). p72. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538678?seq=13#metadata_info_tab_contents.

[40] Bowen, Wyn Q. "*Deterrence and asymmetry: non-state actors and mass casualty terrorism."* Contemporary Security Policy 25:1, (2004). p.58.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1352326042000290506

[41] Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 14-16. https://baylor.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay/alma991020370769705576/01BUL_INST:BAYLOR.

[42] Harvey, Frank P. *"Practising Coercion: Revisiting Successes and Failures Using Boolean Logic and Comparative Methods."* The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 43,6, (1999), pp.733–758. JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/174607. Accessed 22 Sep. 2022.

penalty to be meaningful, it must have a cost that is more significant than the weight of inaction in the challenger's calculations.

Deterrence by denial strategy operates via decreasing overall expected benefits from behavior and strengthening the nation's infrastructure by reducing the chance that an adversary will succeed in attaining their goals, Defense, or what Sir Lawrence Freedman refers to as "passive" defense raises the cost of an attack. Whereas punishment deters an offender, denial discourages action by making the victim feel "hopeless."[43] Additionally, deterrence may be achieved by punishing an opponent or by convincing him that his goals will not be fulfilled. Punishment involves threatening to demolish the opponent's values. Denial entails convincing an opponent that the purpose will not be achieved. In both cases, it is assumed that the adversary should be capable of performing advantage evaluations and basing choices logically on such assessments. Denying tactics, Similar outcomes are produced by both stance and defense strategy, but defense differs from denial in that, if deterrence is failed, it focuses on cost-cutting rather than trying to influence other people's behavior. The fundamental idea behind deterrence notions is to persuade a target that the costs of choosing a specific action outweigh any possible benefits. Consequently, deterrence produces a cost-benefit analysis in which the expected value of taking a particular action is lesser than its expected cost. During the Cold War and other interstate conflicts generally, deterrence was most usually associated with the threat of retaliation. The growth and spread of nuclear weapons contributed to the primacy of punishment-based deterrents.

According to Freedman, during the 1960s "the role of nuclear weapons" became essential for controlling state behavior."[44] This is due to the argument that both sides (of a conflict) would be able to achieve a broader political equilibrium if they thought they could inflict absolute hell on the other. However, conventional punishment deterrence makes up a very minor part of the deterrent strategy. The logic behind the concept is consistently related to non-punishment-based strategies that have deterrent effects since deterrence is concentrated on manipulating an adversary's actions, preventive measures, and strategically employed resources. Although it is not customary for academic writings to have included positive inducements as a process of deterrence, Paul Huth and Bruce Russet argue that their omission "cannot be justified on grounds of pure logic," [45] since they consider how rewards and recognition of an opponent can contribute to changes in behavior that become beneficial to the defensive strategy. Ted Hopf concludes that non-punishment variables were an important component in determining deterrence achievements when analyzing the credibility of Great Powers in Third World wars because deterrence principles make sense if rewards are meant to alter behavior. According to the author, the deterrence theory needs "extend its scope to incorporate an array of deterrent instruments that the theory's concentrate on military tools omits." [46] Therefore, even while threats account for a significant percentage of deterrence, punishment only comprises a minor

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[43] David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, *"Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment"* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, (2003).p.17 https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1494.html.

[44] Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), p.6. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip046/2003015346.html.

[45] Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," World Politic. 36,4, (1984), pp. 496–526. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010184.

[46] Ted Hopf, Peripheral visions: *Deterrence theory and American foreign policy in the third world, 1965-1990* (University of Michigan Press, 1994). p. 233. https://books.google.cz/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_wzay4OEWBEC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&dq=Hopf,+Ted,+Peripheral+Visions:+Deterrence+Theory+and+American+Foreign+Policy+in+the+Third+World,+1965%E2%80%931990&ots=sWJl8eR_B2&sig=fkHOcLAmv1RE_6PXtXTyezUiJtg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Hopf%2C%20Ted%2C%20Peripheral%20Visions%3A%20Deterrence%20Theory%20and%20American%20Foreign%20Policy%20in%20the%20Third%20World%2C%201965%E2%80%931990&f=false ".

portion of what is conceptually and practically essential to creating deterrent relations between actors.

Non-kinetic deterrents that rely on positive encouragement and assurance, denial and prevention, dialogue and delegitimization are not usually associated with deterrence, but they nonetheless function, enshrine the theory's fundamental principles (changing behavior), and depend on its logical processes (manipulating cost-benefit calculations). Non-kinetic deterrents are utilized in conjunction with traditional ones rather than as a replacement, a component of a larger strategy Regarding asymmetrical conflicts between governments and terrorist opponents, these unconventional deterrent strategies take on a wider relevance.

## DETERRENCE FEATURES

In conflict situations and settings, deterrence presents compelling justifications for state actions as Achen and Snidal argue that "its propositions are contingent if the expected punishment exceeds the gain, then opponents will be deterred," implying that "some possible punishment would deter, but not that any particular one will."[47] Deterrence conceptual failure and failure in practice must be distinguished, though. Deterrence may fail in operation if, and when threats seem inadequate, unclear, confusing, or withdrawn, or if it is felt that engaging would be more advantageous in a strategic manner. Although deterrence succeeds conceptually, this could break down where threats seem weak, ambiguous, unrealistic, or neglected as a strategy. Keith Payne is a scholar who has written extensively on the issue of nuclear deterrence. He has argued that the traditional assumptions about deterrence, which were developed during the Cold War, may no longer be applicable in the current international context.

According to Payne, the traditional model of deterrence assumed that both sides in a conflict were rational actors who were primarily concerned with their survival. The threat of mutually assured destruction was thought to be sufficient to deter any aggressive actions, as both sides understood the catastrophic consequences that would result from a nuclear war. However, Payne argues that the current international context is much more complex and uncertain than it was during the Cold War. There are now many more actors with nuclear weapons, including non-state actors such as terrorist groups, and there is a greater potential for accidents or miscalculations that could lead to a nuclear exchange.

Furthermore, Payne notes that some state actors may not be solely concerned with their survival, and may be willing to take risks that could lead to nuclear conflict if they believe that it serves their strategic or ideological goals. This makes the assumptions of traditional deterrence models much less reliable. Furthermore, Payne suggests that we need to rethink our approach to nuclear deterrence considering these changing conditions. He advocates for a more nuanced and flexible approach that considers the complex motivations and behaviors of different state and non-state actors in the international system. While arguing that most of what we believed to be true about deterrence is now misleading because international conditions have changed dramatically.[48]

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[47] Harvey, Frank P. "*Rigor mortis or rigor, more tests: Necessity, sufficiency, and deterrence logic.*" International Studies Quarterly 42.4 (1998), pp.151-162.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010405?seq=10#metadata_info_tab_contents

[48] Keith Payne, *Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Force*s", Washington DC, 18 July 2007.
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Payne.

Nonetheless, the current argument is centered on the perception that "there are also situations in the event conventional military retaliation might be harmful."[49] A review of the terrorist group's various strikes has sparked a debate about whether the strategy is sufficient in preventing Boko Haram, and whether the organization correctly absorbed and assimilated the deterrent capabilities. In both cases, the outcome appears inadequate.

In other to explore the underline perspectives, First, in early 2009, "hundreds die in Maiduguri, in north-eastern Borno state when members set fire several churches, a police station, and a prison on fire." [50] The security organization responded to the attack by apprehending Boko Haram's leader, "Mohammed Yusuf was killed in police custody in 2009 in the aftermath of one of Boko Haram's deadly confrontations with Nigerian security forces, and the sect has vowed revenge for the killing of their leader," [51] but the strategy does not appear to be working to stop other attacks, such as those on the force headquarters and the UN headquarters in Abuja. The kidnapping of schoolgirls is yet another significant event in the Nigeria Security Apparatus combat.

Second, attacks on politicians and preachers have suggested the institution's inability to combat terrorist capabilities over time, even though Abba Anas bin Umar was killed in May 2011, secular opposition figure Modu Fannami Godio "was killed in October 2010, and non-violent preacher Ibrahim Ahmad Abdullahi was killed in January 2011."[52] Due to the threats to people and property, it appears that Boko Haram is capable of surviving through some of the various strategy postures on the Nigerian security approach, which may be considered as having limits in the practical understanding and application of the concept in counterterrorism. Boko haram has been involved in killing, abduction, and changing the geographical settlement pattern by forcing entire communities to relocate throughout the years.

## NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE

Deterrence requires a complex set of conditions to be in place, and some of the key conditions that are generally considered necessary for deterrence to be effective are credibility, the deterring power must have the ability to carry out the threatened action if the adversary does not comply. If the adversary does not believe that the deterring power will follow through on their threat, then deterrence will not be effective.

Communication, the deterring power must communicate the threat to the adversary in a way that is understood and believed, the message must be unambiguous, and the adversary must be able to recognize the consequences of their actions. Capability, the deterring power must have the military, economic, or political capability to carry out the threatened action. If the deterring power lacks the means to enforce the threat, then the adversary may not take the threat seriously.

Willingness, the deterring power must be willing to carry out the threatened action if the adversary does not comply. If the deterring power is seen as weak or indecisive, the adversary may not take the threat seriously. Escalation control as deterrence requires a delicate balance between the threat of force and the risk of escalation to a nuclear war, the deterring power must have a strategy for

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[49] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "*The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research*", Contemporary Security Policy, (2010). p.27. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523261003640819?needAccess=true.

[50] The Guardian, "*Boko Haram attacks – timeline,*" The Guardian News, September 25, 2012, Boko Haram attacks – timeline | Boko Haram | The Guardian.

[51] Bombing in Abuja: On Nigeria's Boko Haram." Crisis Group, September 6, 2011, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/bombing-abuja-nigerias-boko-haram-0.

[52] "John Raymond, *"History of Boko Haram in Nigeria,"* Infobusstop, last modified August 24, 2021, https://nigerianinfobusstop.com/history-of-boko-haram-in-nigeria/

managing escalation and avoiding unintended consequences. Stability involves that deterrence requires a stable and predictable international environment. If there is too much uncertainty or instability, deterrence can break down.

Moreover, successful deterrence requires a combination of credible threats, effective communication, military, economic, or political capability, willingness to follow through on threats, a strategy for managing escalation, and a stable international environment.

Over the years the application of deterrence concepts have be adopted in various threats from different actors, for instance during the 1950s and Cold War eras of bipolarity and mutually assured destruction, deterrence was widely discussed as a method of "manipulating [an adversary's] cost-benefit calculus." [53] Indeed, despite multiple regional conflicts, the international relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were regulated by the logic of deterrence, which prevented direct military and nuclear conflict. Nevertheless. So far, the two countries have averted nuclear war and specific military confrontations by employing logic, furthermore, the applications of the deterrence concept to asymmetric threats such as Boko haram are aimed at manipulating terrorists through a strategic framework of state policies.

Schelling's conceptual perspective of deterrence is a "persuasion of a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of activities" [54] and three fundamental conditions must be met for this to be accomplished. First, "a deferrer must have adequate capabilities; second, the threat must be credible; and third, the threat must be conveyed to the opponent. Furthermore, to influence an opponent's behavior, the deterrence technique requires the adaptation of two items in its arsenal: an implied or explicit offer of an alternative state of affairs if the adversary refrains from that behaviour, and second, a threat or action intended to increase an adversary's perceived cost of engaging in that behaviour."[55] Nonetheless, the considerations for a successful deterrent strategy are if and when a potential attacker, fearing unacceptable punishment or denial of victory, chooses to abandon a planned attack.[56] As little more than a result, the scope of this research is limited owing to the nature of terrorist activities as well as the concealment.

## EXPANDING DETERRENCE

Deterrence is a strategy that seeks to dissuade an adversary from taking a particular action by creating the perception that the costs of taking that action outweigh the benefits. Different types of deterrence strategies can be employed, such as deterrence by punishment that seek to involve deterring an adversary by threatening to use force, whether nuclear or conventional, and terrorist in response to their aggression. The goal is to make the adversary believe that the costs of their action, such as loss

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[53] Alex Wilner, *"Targeted killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,"* Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010), p. 314.
https://cve-kenya.org/media/library/Wilner_2010_Targeted_Killings_in_Afghanistan_Measuring_Coercion_and_Deterrence_in_Counterterrorism_and_Counterinsurgency.pdf.

[54] Alex Wilner, "*Targeted killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,*" Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010), p. 314.
https://cve-kenya.org/media/library/Wilner_2010_Targeted_Killings_in_Afghanistan_Measuring_Coercion_and_Deterrence_in_Counterterrorism_and_Counterinsurgency.pdf.

[55] Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorchen, *"Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,"* International Security 30, 3 (Winter 2005/06): 87-123.
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/is3003_pp087-123.pdf.

[56] Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorchen, "*Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,*" International Security 30, 3 (Winter 2005/06): 87-123.
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/is3003_pp087-123.pdf

of territory or significant damage to their military or economic infrastructure, would outweigh the benefits.

Deterrence by denial strategy aims to deter an adversary by preventing them from achieving their objectives. It involves using defensive measures such as Defense systems, military fortifications, or economic sanctions to deny the adversary the benefits of their action. The goal is to make the adversary believe that the costs of their action would be too high and that they would not be able to achieve their goals. And deterrence by delegitimization strategy aims to deter an adversary by undermining the legitimacy of their actions or their political system. This can be achieved through economic restrictions or other forms of international pressure. The goal is to make the adversary believe that the costs of their action would include significant damage to their reputation or international standing. In a nutshell, the success of any deterrence strategy depends on several factors, including the credibility of the threat, the ability to communicate the threat effectively, the willingness to carry out the threat if necessary, and a combination of these different types of deterrence strategies may be necessary to achieve a desired outcome, and the choice of strategy will depend on the specific circumstances and objectives of the parties involved.

To use deterrence against terrorism, the existing emphasis on punishment and nuclear weapons must be widened. Deterrence is a broader paradigm than has been proposed. Although deterrence in counter-terrorism activities is viewed as too limited and too naive, critics assert that perhaps broadening the notion and adding a persuasion layer presents a remedy. Certain critiques have evolved, though, because of broadening the conceptual tool of deterrence towards threat management of terrorist activities and the strategic posture of the state apparatus in combating non-state actors.

According to Paul Davis and Brain Jenkins, the notion was too narrow to be employed as an organizational principle, and they argued that "the tactic of crushing terrorists to deter future actions deserves elaboration."[57] Deterrence requires both manipulating enemies and is not solely based on issuing threats. Presenting deterrence in a simplified way and then conceding that the tactic cannot be leveraged to combat terrorism because it is too limited is an unfounded bear. Furthermore, as David Johnson and colleagues, the ideal definitions of deterrence are "broad ones, which acknowledge that such activities as aggression may be deterred by many means."[58] These developments have sparked a shift toward a broader view in which either "military or non-military means, or a combination, could be considered of a deterrence strategy,"[59] following most academics that study deterring terrorism. Michael Quinlan thereby offers a solid, academic foundation. His position is supported by a simple paradigmatic understanding, and he further stated that deterrence is fundamentally anchored in human affairs and is relevant to all different forms of collectives, from the state and nation to the terrorist organization, deterrence also comes in part from fundamental truths about human behavior, like how we weigh potential outcomes when making decisions and how we refrain from carrying out actions whose negative effects seem to outweigh their positive effects.[60]

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[57] Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, *Deterrence, and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002). p.9.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1619.html .

[58] Johnson, David E., Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, (2003). p.9.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1494.html.

[59] Jeffrey W. Knopf, *"The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research"*, Contemporary Security Policy, (2010). p. 27.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523261003640819.

[60] Michael Quinlan, "*Deterrence and Deterrability,"* Contemporary Security Policy, 25,1, (2004). pp.11-17.
DOI: 10.1080/1352326042000290470.

It is not that the deterrence concept and practice have failed to stop terrorism; rather, it is possible that more restrained, precisely defined ideas of the concepts of deterrence by Denial, deterrence by punishment, and Classical deterrence concepts, could prevent terrorism. However, According to Doron Almog, the strategy of cumulative deterrence developed to fight against terrorism would build on successes over short, medium, and long durations that steadily weaken the adversary.[61] As a result, the military's strategic stance would also need to be more technologically advanced to enable its operational capabilities in countering terrorists. Herein lies the essential contrast between rejecting the deterrence tenants as a whole and expanding its logical scope to question only some of the applications while advancing other logically essential components.

The arguments made by academics over time have had a significant impact on the conceptions that have emerged in different waves of deterrence study. Expansion on Robert Jervis's earlier analysis of the topic, Jeffrey W. Knopf has identified three waves in deterrence applications, however, the fourth wave represents a shift away from mutual deterrence circumstances that were usually symmetrical toward threats that are now alluded to as asymmetric threats. Additionally, "the most important result has been to reveal the value of adopting a broader concept of deterrence that is not exclusively military in nature." [62]

The broadest interpretations of deterrence suggest that numerous principles of deterrent strategic approaches can have an impact on a variety of terrorist actions, including suicide attacks against both civilians and non-civilians. To effectively apply broader deterrence to counterterrorism, the traditional "values" associated with state-based deterrent interactions, such as sovereign control, territorial integrity, and socio-political and economic survival, must be expanded.

The consensus is that most terrorists will not prioritize these values over others, such as publicity, operational and tactical success, achieving strategic and tactical goals, social cohesion, trust and camaraderie, public support and acceptance, religious legitimacy, prestige, personal glory and martyrdom, freedom of movement, and running safe havens, for instance, like Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko haram.

Since there are many presumptions that terrorists do have other values that can be threatened, even when they lack geographical assets that deterrents could be issued against, non-kinetic deterrent components that target these non-physical assets should also exist. This is because these values fall outside the scope of what can be punished by military action. Once they have been uncovered, terrorists can be prevented by employing a less traditional deterrence strategy that goes beyond punishment-based methods. The notion of whether it is "appropriate and would be effective to target the families and communities that suicide terrorists originate from",[63] is also up for discussion, however, this is outside the scope of this research work.

Furthermore, combines concepts from the second and third waves, such as how assurances can make deterrence more effective and how deterrence must be included in a toolkit that encompasses other policy tools. As a result, deterrence is no longer understood purely in terms of nuclear or even regular military capabilities. Furthermore, the fourth wave's broader definition of deterrence is evolving, which includes, but is not limited to, threats of military consequence.

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[61] Doron Almog, *"Cumulative deterrence and the war on terrorism,"* The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 34.4 (2004). pp.5-7. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2222&context=parameters.

[62] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "*The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,"* Contemporary Security Policy 31,1, (2010). p.1. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523261003640819.

[63] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "*The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,"* Contemporary Security Policy 31,1, (2010). p.2. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523261003640819.

The fourth wave has resulted in a broader notion of deterrence that still involves threats of military punishment but goes beyond it. Glenn Snyder's exploration of the concepts of deterrence by denial is appreciated in the context of his writings that deterrence by denial is a "contrast to deterrence by punishment, which threatens to inflict cost through retaliation after an attack, Daniel's strategies aim to dissuade a potential attacker by convincing them that the effort will not succeed and they will be denied the benefit they hope to obtain",[64] while advancing further approaches that aim at "challenging terrorist justifications for violence, an approach that has been labeled both deterrence by counter-narrative and by delegitimization"[65]. These three strategies are comparable to the broader trend discussed herein in that they rely on deterrence from non-nuclear and non-military factors.

They developed and subsequently expanded on two tactics as Davis and Jenkins view that fit this pattern of deterrence. The first approach is to increase the likelihood that individual attacks will fail and further state that even seasoned terrorists dislike prospective losses and may be put off by them. This implies that the security strategy and other measures adopted to restrict the likelihood that terrorists will launch a spectacular attack also have deterrent effects. These adaptations look at the nature of the posture that "requires credibility, and the rising costs and denial of successes, and better measures can help to deter or deflect, even if they are decidedly imperfect" [66].

A study of the practice analysis also suggests that "a terrorist who may be willing to sacrifice his life for his cause may not be willing to do so if he thinks he will not succeed",[67] notwithstanding disputes over the years about whether the concept of deterrence is fool-proof. Scholarly contributions to its application entail, moreover Robert Anthony's view on concepts which "provided empirical support for the notion that anything that reduces the estimated probability of operational success could deter."[68] As a result, intelligence is crucial to the efficacy of security, punitive action, deterrence, denial, and the capacity to prevail. Until they are used, no one will completely comprehend their presence or our faith in their functionality. Only when they show off their capabilities in strategic application can measurement be examining from the outcome of the situations it designed to prevents as well deter.

The study by Dutter and Seliktar identified the operations strategy as one of the most important. The fact that terrorists believe they will be successful in achieving their main goals shows the strategy's limitations in combating terrorism, and "the risk of tactical or operational failure might not be sufficient to deter them from trying to launch further attacks".[69] Proponents of strategic deterrence through denial argue that it is essential to prevent a state or public against terrorism since terrorists are capable of doing more than just instilling fear among the populace or state authorities. Furthermore, one potential shortcoming of this method is that it may be difficult to resist responding "because elected officials feel public pressure to take dramatic visible measures to minimize the

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[64] Jeffrey W. Knopf, *"The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,"* Contemporary Security Policy 31,1, (2010). p.10. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523261003640819.

[65] Jeffrey W. Knopf, *"The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,"* Contemporary Security Policy 31,1, (2010). p.10. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523261003640819.

[66] Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, *Deterrence, and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002). pp.59.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1619.html.

[67] Poppe, C., et al. *"Whither Deterrence? 'Final Report of the 2001 Futures Project*. No. UCRL-ID-149402. Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (US), 2002. pp.25. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/15002881

[68] Jeffrey W. Knopf, *"The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,"* Contemporary Security Policy 31,1, (2010). p.12. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523261003640819?needAccess=true.

[69] Lee E. Dutter and Ofira Seliktar, *"To martyr or not to martyr: Jihad is the question, what policy is the answer?"* Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30,5 (2007). pp. 429-443. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701258601.

terrorist threat in the short term",[70] as Davis and Jenkins stressed the importance of demonstrating that even effective terrorist attacks do not have wide-ranging consequences.

Thus, despite some early scepticism, the logic of coercion is being utilised to influence the behaviour of terrorists, insurgents, and other violent non-state actors. Deterring terrorism is a discipline of study that includes at least two distinct analytical branches. The first branch looks into the use of military threats as a method of persuasion against terrorist leaders, groups, and individuals as well as the societies and governments that support them, targeting terrorists' priorities is the strategy. Ultimately, the penalties for encouraging or assisting terrorism are increased to the point that participants opt to alter their conduct rather than run the risk of getting punished.

Thus, despite some early skepticism, the logic of coercion is being utilized to influence the behavior of terrorists, insurgents, and other violent non-state actors. Deterring terrorism is a discipline of study that includes at least two distinct analytical branches. The first branch looks into the use of military threats as a method of persuasion against terrorist leaders, groups, and individuals as well as the societies and governments that support them, targeting terrorists' priorities is the strategy. Ultimately, the penalties for encouraging or assisting terrorism are increased to the point that participants opt to alter their conduct rather than run the risk of getting punished.

Deterrence by denial is the foundation of the second approach to thinking. In contrast to how punishment increases costs, denial decreases predicted benefits, and how players manipulate the benefit side of adversarial cost-benefit calculations. Even though conceptions of denial were created during the Cold War, these seemed generally swamped by the prospect of a nuclear exchange and hence limited to regular military operations. Although in studying counterterrorism, scholars have exhumed, burnished, and given new importance to concepts of denial.[71] Furthermore, state posture is displayed in the strategic approach of security deployments in flashpoints.

## DETERRENCE BY DENIAL

Deterrence through denial methods tries to deter action by making it impossible or unlikely to succeed, denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its purpose, and deploying sufficient local as well as international military forces to prevent an attack. At their most extreme, these strategies, for instance, can expose a potential aggressor to the threat of massive failure. As a result, deterrence by denial involves nothing more than the use of intent as well as an effort to carry out a commitment. The power to deny is synonymous with the ability to protect.

Another approach to putting pressure on terrorists is the deterrence by denial strategy. Denial manipulates an adversary's behavioral calculus by preventing the desired effects of an attack, and the strategy understanding focuses on preventing terrorists from achieving their tactical and strategic

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[70] Joseph Lepgold, *Hypotheses on Vulnerability: Are Terrorists and Drug Dealers Coercible?*, in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998),pp. 136, 145 https://books.google.cz/books?id=8dBJuDfvK4gC&pg=PA41&lpg=PA41&dq=Joseph+Lepgold,+%E2%80%98Hypotheses+on+Vulnerability:+Are+Terrorists+and+Drug+Dealers+Coercable?%E2%80%99,+in+Lawrence+Freedman+(ed.),+Strategic+Coercion:+Concepts+and+Cases+(New+York:+Oxford+University+Press,+1998),+pp.+136,+145&source=bl&ots=nHNFk3inJb&sig=ACfU3U2kup-OG4K7S5Ike58GkOcYDOrhow&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiZ6YXozJD7AhVL2aQKHXbfBw4Q6AF6BAgIEAM#v=onepage&q=Joseph%20Lepgold%2C%20%E2%80%98Hypotheses%20on%20Vulnerability%3A%20Are%20Terrorists%20and%20Drug%20Dealers%20Coercable%3F%E2%80%99%2C%20in%20Lawrence%20Freedman%20(ed.)%2C%20Strategic%20Coercion%3A%20Concepts%20and%20Cases%20(New%20York%3A%20Oxford%20University%20Press%2C%201998)%2C%20pp.%20136%2C%20145&f=false.

[71] James M. Smith and Brent J. Talbot, "Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial," in Terrorism and Homeland Security—Thinking Strategically About Policy, ed. Paul R. Viotti, Michael A. Opheim, and Nicholas Bowen (London: CRC Press, 2008), Terrorism and Homeland Security: Thinking Strategically About Policy - Knihy Google.

aims, limiting their capacity to act in their preferred methods, and denying them the rewards of their labor, as well as denial, seeks to reduce the perceived benefits of engaging in terrorism.

Furthermore, the way denial methods work in terrorism prevention makes it appear as if goals are unattainable. When tactical or strategic alternatives are blocked by denial mechanisms, terrorists are compelled to adopt less-preferred acts, plans, and outcomes. Counterterrorism denial strategies exist. To begin, defensive denial constraints and controls terrorist processes. A state can successfully tighten the security environment and reduce the ease with which terrorists can carry out attacks by improving structural protections surrounding potential targets. Limiting availability urges terrorists to re-evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of a particular course of action. While in use, a denial strategy will necessitate carefully identifying the targets that terrorists seek to attack and creating countermeasures that render those targets less useful. For example, Boko Haram began by attacking security facilities, places of worship, and foreign organizations with suicide bombers aimed at hard and soft targets. Markets, commercial centers, bars, pubs, and funeral gatherings were frequently attacked during the first half of the fight. In response, guards were placed outside of bars and restaurants, anti-bomb and metal detectors were installed at building entrances, and the operation's visible appearance of security personnel stations in communities and public spaces, and roadways was reinforced by the installation of checkpoints and security barriers.

The strategic approach in structural-based defensive strategies does not always suffice to maintain the posture of denial. Behavior barriers are successful when environmental uncertainty is created during terrorist preparation, and "variability and unpredictability must be consciously injected into flexible preventative measures"[72] as in the fight against the threats posed by Boko haram in Nigeria. The tactical balance of forces in the contested area is the most popular metric for assessing the health of a deterrent threat based on denial capabilities, but as will be explained, it is not the only or even usually the most crucial one. It is incorrect to associate deterrence by denial with military capabilities alone.

As additional ambiguity makes planning terrorist operations more challenging, the deterrent's goal is to prevent terrorism from occurring in the first place. Denial is a defensive mechanism that arises from uncertainty. This involves conducting surprise inspections at busy intersections for public transportation, stationing police officers at randomly selected intersections, and/or designating security personnel within communities to deter any attack on civilians.

These sets of elements put terrorism to the test, which lessens its appeal. Terrorism will be less successful when its consequences are transient by emphasizing how hopeless it is. Colin Gray concludes that "if we are to perform properly in deterrence, we need to address empathetically the issue of how, by our policies, we can negate the political effects of tactically successful terrorism".[73] Terrorism, not merely violent acts, according to Jerry Mark and Alex S. Wilner, is violence carried out with a goal and rationale. Terrorists utilize some types of violence because they are congruent with their chosen ideologies or socio-religious beliefs, values, and narratives, attacking these narratives has the potential to change people's behavior by empowering ideas and beliefs that challenge the justification for terrorism, and it has the potential to affect both the socio-religious communities that support such groups' activities and individuals and groups considering specific types of violence".[74]

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[72] US Dept. of Homeland Security, *Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force* (Washington DC: Jan 2007). pp.5-7. https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-future-terrorism-010107.pdf.

[73] Colin S. Gray, *"Thinking asymmetrically in times of terror,"* The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 321 (2002). p.5. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2079&context=parameters

[74] Colin S. Gray, *"Thinking asymmetrically in times of terror,"* The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 321 (2002). p.5. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2079&context=parameters.

Additionally, by not supporting terrorism, we reduce its effectiveness. Denial can also involve limiting a group's long-term ideological objectives.

Terrorism, not merely violent acts, according to Jerry Mark and Alex S. Wilner, is violence carried out with a goal and rationale. Terrorists utilise some types of violence because they are congruent with their chosen ideologies or socio religious beliefs, values, and narratives, attacking these narratives has the potential to change people's behaviour by empowering ideas and beliefs that challenge the justification for terrorism, and it has the potential to affect both the socio religious communities that support such groups' activities and individuals and groups considering specific types of violence.[75] The strategy is to raise the expense of accomplishing deterring aims. States can prevent terrorists from achieving their objectives by offering financial and military support to other states targeted by a common enemy, discouraging states from caving into terrorist demands, supporting sub-state and regional organisations working against terrorist agendas, and outright prohibiting terrorist activity. When violence proves ineffective, groups may adopt more peaceful methods of attaining their goals. The Palestinian case is informative.

According to Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva perceptive is that one of the most essential purposes of counterterrorism policy is to break up "the global terrorist network,' so being able to 'hold political ends at risk' is critical from a 'policy perspective' standpoint.' Policymakers need to be mindful of the main goal of a grand strategy which is to 'prevent terrorist adversaries from cooperating ".[76] Max Abrahms illustrates how terrorism against Israeli people as It is clear that terrorism has not served to advance Palestinian national aspirations or quality of life, even though it may have enabled the accomplishment of a small 'number of short-term goals, such as fostering a sense of national identity, making the Palestinian people's situation a global concern, persuading Israel of the dangers of Zionism, and possibly even aid in the recruitment of supporters for various terrorist-affiliates.[77] However, Boko haram seeks to call for Sharia law as well as affiliation with some global networks of terrorists, such as the Islamic State in West Africa and its internal crisis of breaking away factions.

However, it is difficult to identify the elements that suggest whether denial methods will influence terrorist behavior. One lesson from Israel's 1980s encounter with suicide terrorism in Lebanon is that the denial mechanism put in place on stage may have been critical in persuading Hizballah to reconsider its goal. According to testimony given before the US House of Representatives by Ariel Merari, "suicide attacks against Israeli targets dropped very, very significantly after 1986, actually after 1985, because measures adopted by the Israel Defense Force, IDF, proved effective in preventing most of the suicide attacks, so that the rate of successful attacks dropped very, very significantly, which led to the organization involved in perpetrating these attacks to decide that they should stop because it is simply not bringing any results".[78] Although this case is interesting and informative to the study of terrorism globally, many recent cases in Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy contradict expectations about denial, and theoretically, Boko haram should have been discouraged from focusing its energy on the state due to the effort required and the extraordinarily high risk of operational failure. As a result, the group's murderous activities spread to other important northern Nigerian states such as

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[75] Jerry Mark Long and Alex S. Wilner, *"Delegitimizing al-Qaida: Defeating an "Army Whose Men Love Death ",*" International Security 39.1 (2014). p.128. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/is/v39i1/f_0032343_26314.pdf.

[76] Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorchen, *"Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,"* International Security 30 (Winter 2005/06), p. 89. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/is3003_pp087-123.pdf.

[77] Max Abrahms, *"Are terrorists really rational? The Palestinian example,"* Orbis 483 (2004). p.542. https://www.academia.edu/1593647/Are_Terrorists_Really_Rational_The_Palestinian_Example.

[78] Terrorism and Threats to U.S. *Interests in the Middle East* ..., Volume 4 (July 13, 2000). p.6. https://books.google.cz/books?id=WrMfAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_book_other_versions_r&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false.

Kaduna, Bauchi, Katsina, and Plateau. More recently, Abuja, the nation's capital, was also targeted, and the organization claimed responsibility for a string of bombings that occurred in and around Abuja shortly after President Goodluck Jonathan's inauguration on May 29, 2011. On June 16, twin explosions struck the Nigeria Police Headquarters in Abuja,[79] as well as the high degree of security activities within the surroundings.

The advantages of focusing on a single target transcend beyond its reach and likelihood of accomplishment, as both examples demonstrate. Due to the intensity of the attack as opposed to the attack's outcome, targeting soft targets that have become hardened may have more value. Boko haram has frequently attacked military barracks, outposts, checkpoints, local government secretaries, police stations, prisons, and offices of international institutions despite security deployments, giving the perception that success is a bonus rather than a requirement and raising the cost of defender preferences and reducing threats. They could undermine state capacity and resolve by dissipating, reversing, and minimizing the impact of a specific deterrent technique. Nonetheless, failed assaults are often viewed as deterrence failures since tiny strikes result in disproportionate security losses in resources.

The difficulty is that deterrence is not static in applications, in which the challenger only considers the benefits and downsides of absorbing certain threats while the defender plans and deploys a deterring strategy. To manipulate the defender's willingness to seek specific deterrents, he can act and behave in ways that impact the defender's utility calculus of denial capabilities.

Understanding how different groups prioritize assaulting specific targets, how they define tactical achievements, and how they prioritize unprofitable assaults into specific benefit considerations would be crucially the most efficient method of discouraging terrorist visa denial.

It would also necessitate a deep understanding of terrorist preferences. Until then, denial operations will not be adequately and specifically constructed to consistently confront certain terrorist values. The enemy will know for sure that we value the area if we have a sufficient denial capacity, which is best if it is located in or close to a threatened area, according to Snyder view of the conceptual strategy is "to have an adequate denial capability, preferably one situated near or in a threatened area, is the surest sign we can make to the enemy that the area is valued highly by us".[80] However, there are some threats that a state would prefer not to carry out, or in considerations as Thomas Schelling highlighted that "weakness in deterrence can emerge when an aggressor believes the defender will ultimately prove unwilling to carry out its threats".[81]

## DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT

Punishment techniques are one way to influence terrorist behavior. This is a method of deterrence approach in which a terrorist organization and its network are threatened with punishment to persuade them to withdraw from engaging in the forms of terrorism that the Defender considers unacceptable. On the other hand, deterrence by punishment threatens serious consequences in the event of an attack. These consequences are related to the local conflict and the greater community. Threats of harsher punishment that would increase the cost of an assault are the main goal of

[79] Bombing in Abuja: *On Nigeria's Boko Haram."* Crisis Group, September 6, 2011, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/bombing-abuja-nigerias-boko-haram-0

[80] Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence by Denial and Punishment* (Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Center of International Studies, 1959). pp.4-6. http://books.google.com/books?id=MTIZAAAAIAAJ.

[81] Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms, and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). p.123. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300253481.

punishment-based deterrence rather than the direct Defence of the contested commitment. Nonetheless, other suggestion

The degree and nature of credibility in curtailing the aggressor's activities is a critical aspect in determining the efficacy of punishment-based deterrents and Compellent on terrorists, as well as their sponsorships. Furthermore, deterrence goals often coincide with each other, such that those responsible for the terrorism will pay the price while others will be taught a lesson[82].

## DETERRENCE BY DELEGITIMIZATION

Delegitimization argues that states and non-state actors can exert influence over behavior by appealing to the same religious or ideological justifications that underpin terrorist activity. By contesting the validity of the ideas that guide the challenger's behavior, the intention is to decrease the likelihood that he will succeed in accomplishing his aims and is the race for the mind, nonetheless, terrorists deploy specific styles of violence that match a particular ideological, or socio-religious religious views, and value systems, and characterizations. Furthermore, "targeting these narratives may theoretically speaking alter behavior, strengthening opinions and positions that contradict the legitimization of terrorism may influence individuals and groups contemplating particular forms of violence, along with socio-religious communities that facilitate their efforts''.[83]

Ideology has the potential to influence the political, intellectual, and religious justifications for terrorist acts. The goal is to lower the chances that the attacker will succeed in accomplishing their aims by challenging the dialectic validity of the assumptions that guide the contender's behavior. According to David Lake, "Terrorists lack moral stricture of the use of violence - they often target civilians".[84] Many terrorists base their activities on a set of fundamental principles, as terrorists' behavior is influenced by their ideological and socio-religious beliefs, as are their objectives because of perceptions of society's ability to convey the message that utilizing such a strategy will not enable terrorist groups to achieve their goals.

For example, Boko haram's use of suicide bombing as a terror tactic is based on religious rules that condone and legitimize taking one's own life, and similar directions impact Boko haram's socio-political objectives. However, it is critical to emphasize that, according to Islamic law, suicide is blasphemous, and that a vast majority of Muslims oppose Boko Haram's goals. When these inherent characteristics are viewed through the lens of deterrence, it is simple to see specific levers being developed to scorn and reject the reasons and purposes behind terrorist attacks.

In addition to the socio-religious organizations that support terrorist activities, this practical strategy aims to reinforce and propagate views, arguments, and knowledge that challenge the justification of terrorism to prevent or persuade people from considering or engaging in violent acts. While the goal of delegitimizing terrorism is separate from traditional concepts of deterrence and prevention, the

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[82] Ganor Boaz, *"The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers"* (Israel: ICT, e Institute, 2005). p.104. https://books.google.cz/books?id=dzCHvTTPgZYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Counter-Terrorism+Puzzle:+A+Guide+for+Decision+Makers&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjRyIqAhNP7AhUQyaQKHfyPDzQQ6AF6BAgBEAI#v=onepage&q=prevention&f=false.

[83] Jerry Mark Long and Alex S. Wilner, *"Delegitimizing al-Qaida: Defeating an 'Army Whose Men Love Death',"* International Security 39,1 (2014). p.128. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/is/v39i1/f_0032343_26314.pdf.

[84] Lake, David A. "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century." *Dialogue IO*, vol. 1,1, (2002), p.17. https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge core/content/view/BF1544EC14CAEB60B0118EFB9D0B6E5C/S777777770200002Xa.pdf/rational-extremism-understanding-terrorism-in-the-twenty-first-century.pdf.

utilization of the strategy in the ongoing fight against terrorist activities is considered deterring approach since the aim is to counter narratives and deter its acceptance among citizens.

Delegitimization, like deterrence, aims to influence an adversary's behavior by manipulating the explanations and justifications that shape perceived aggressor (terrorist) choices, and consequently, by weakening the justifications that drive and direct an opponent's behavior, rather than threatening punishment or denying goals, the goal is to get them to change or abandon the desired action. Delegitimizing terrorism also entails swaying public opinion.

Delegitimizing processes raise the costs of terrorist participation by challenging the moral, religious, and socio-political arguments that terrorists employ to legitimize their use of violence.

However, according to Alex S. Wilner, "deterrence by delegitimization starts by tapping into terrorist self-restraints and then magnifying their role, mass-casualty suicide strikes against civilians, its behaviour appears bound by some self-restriction."[85] There are numerous sources of restraint inside the network or movement of violent Islamic radicals, and occasionally the main goal of an influence strategy may be to simply reinforce the existing restraints. In this ideological context, their work occasionally has a stable platform, on other occasions, it merely occasionally leverages that background to conveniently advance a convenience idea under the guise of morality, as a result, the defenders might show how a challenger's actions are contrary to religious principles and cultural values.

This can be done by outlining how and why Boko Haram's terrorist activities harm Nigeria's development and counterterrorism efforts rather than attaining their terrorist goals, with an emphasis on the reality that both Muslims and non-Muslims are killed by the group's terrorist actions. This would go beyond what is permissible in terms of religion, triggering a Muslim movement against terrorism rather than in support of it, and compelling religious leaders to deny the justifications for those who use violence.

These strategies were used by Boko Haram when they targeted some Islamic academics and preachers who were seen as being opposed to terrorism. Alex Thurston added that for the conflict to be won, there must be more than just military success; there must be a broad effort to address the socioeconomic issue, refute the idea that the government is anti-Islamic, and constructively engage Northern Nigeria's rapidly changing religious landscape.[86] However, to transform widespread uproar into terrorist self-restraint, defenders must emphasize the unintended negative consequences of terrorism, discuss them, and persuade members of the terrorist group's political and social community to refute violence. Several, Muslims have unequivocally condemned terrorist attacks.

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[85] Donald Holbrook, "Deterring Rational Fanatics. By Alex S. Wilner. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press," Perspectives on Politics 13.4 (2015). p.68. https://doi:10.1017/S1537592715003126.

[86] Alex Thurston, *"The disease is unbelief': Boko Haram's religious and political worldview,"* (2016). p.6. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/brookings-analysis-paper_alex-thurston_final_web.pdf.

# Chapter 4: METHODOLOGY

The Methodology that is being adopted in this dissertation is first the collection and analysis of data from the various counter-terrorism strategies of the Nigerian Government from 2009 to 2019, these are vital in order to answer the research questions in the dissertation. It outlines the framework that guides the research process and helps ensure that the results are valid, reliable, and relevant. Therefore, the dissertation will seek to analyze what are counter-terrorism strategies adopted in deterring terrorism in Nigeria and the case of Boko haram, thereby using empirical data that relates to deterrence strategy and counter-terrorism. The study of how credible, and how effective is the deterrence strategy in reducing acts of terrorism, and deterrence policy. However, Security and threats perceptions are mostly not static with time, but rather changes and challenges are common attributes in the field of security studies, as well as most social science, nonetheless, the research work will consider some obstacles to deterrence application to counter-terrorism so far and in policy.

The study would be adopting the qualitative method of data analysis, thereby using the secondary source of data analysis of empirical data that relates to deterrence strategy and counter-terrorism. This will entail deliberate and vigorous interrogation of already existing works of literature including journals, books, newspapers, magazines, seminar reports, government publications, conference papers, and other useful online sources, with strict adherence to the objective of the study.

The concept that will be utilized in this paper is the Deterrence concept, how the dynamics in adopting this approach to modern threats such as terrorism by a state actor(s), how to counter the threats using other approaches toward reducing the activities, furthermore compellence will be evaluated in various application aim at the dismantling of terrorism networks, the study of how credible, and how effective is the deterrence strategy in reducing acts of terrorism, and deterrence policy, and research paper will examine the role of state and non-actor(s) in countering terrorism as part of the deterrence strategy deployed in various features, in doing so, the research work will be structured as follows. The first part will be the introduction, then an understanding of Boko haram's rise and a complex issue that involves the socio-economic dimension in the rise of Boko haram, underlying political conflicts, and the religious clashes as additional context, socioeconomic, and challenges of Boko haram activities. Additionally, the third part will focus on deterrence and counter-terrorism that is seeking conceptual overlap, furthermore, the feature of deterrence and the necessary condition for successful deterrence and expanding deterrence into various strategies for application and the concept of deterrence by punishment-denial and delegitimization, and the review on the government the various government strategy and counter-terrorism approach adopted in combating the threats, and security challenges of Boko haram activities. The third part will be deterrence and counter-terrorism seeking conceptual overlap and the conceptual context of deterrence, and deterrence features, then expanding deterrence application in denial, punishment, and delegitimization, following will be deterring terrorism in Nigeria and analyses of data from the global terrorism index from 2009 to 2020 as it related to the tenants of deterrence concept, and the use of python software to systematically study the impacts of the various strategy policies deployed, and the compellence in reducing the capabilities of terror operation in Nigeria within the time period of the case study, and the analyzing the sample size and selection of individual years with the cumulative summation of the number of attacks for all year's totaling about 3343 attacks from 2009 till 2020, over 25,000 fatalities with the average death as between 7 and 8 people per attack.

The data are furthermore coded based on each incident of terrorism according to a set of criteria that includes the number of deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by the attack, the incidents are also coded by the type of attack, the target of the attack, and the location of the attack. Furthermore,

the data is then Imported in CSV format read_csv function from Pandas. Furthermore, data is analyzed using various Python libraries that can be used for statistical analysis, while Matplotlib is used for data visualization in graphical tables.

And, the final part will attempt to make a graphic analysis of each strategy from the data, and compare the data, then use Python to import counter-terrorism data from the Global Terrorism Index involves a combination of data manipulation, statistical analysis, and data visualization techniques, which enable researchers to display the base of the effect on the time frame, then comparing each policy to the frequency of attacks for the summary and the conclusion.

The ethical consideration impacting research works since the information from the military is limited to the public as well as secrecy in data availability is mostly from secondary sources, also the distance is an additional factor in getting primary data from the field of security operations, in addressing these obstacles, the research work dependent on open sourcing of data within and out Nigeria. As while the sample size is limited since the fight is ongoing in comparison to the twenty of the case study periods.

However, the study takes measures to ensure the validity and reliability of the findings through the involvement of established secondary sources and instruments from academic, government, and global index on terrorism to test the validity and reliability of the data collection, furthermore adopted the analysis methods from various software applications in interpreting the data.

Furthermore, the methodology section of a dissertation is critical to ensuring that the research is conducted in a rigorous and systematic manner and that the findings are valid, reliable, and relevant to the counter-terrorism strategy being used.

# Chapter 5: COUNTERING TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: REVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGIES

Terrorism is the use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims. Counter-terrorism deterrence strategies is "either obliterate the terrorist organization or the enemy's incentive to commit terror acts ",[87] and its aim at prevent or reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks by deterring potential terrorists from carrying out their plans. One aspect of counter-terrorism deterrence strategies is to make it more difficult for terrorists to carry out attacks by improving security measures such as increased surveillance, physical barriers, and improved intelligence gathering. Another approach is to target the financial networks and other resources that terrorists use to fund their operations.

In addition to these defensive measures, counter-terrorism deterrence strategies may also focus on addressing the underlying causes of terrorism, such as social and economic inequality, political instability, and religious extremism. This may involve efforts to promote dialogue and reconciliation, support for human rights and good governance, and efforts to counter extremist ideologies through education and outreach programs, and counter-terrorism deterrence strategies are aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist attacks by making it harder for terrorists to carry out their plans, and by addressing the root causes of terrorism.

However, Terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts have been ongoing in Nigeria for several decades, with various groups and government agencies involved in the conflict. In the 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria witnessed several incidents of religious and ethnic violence, particularly in the northern part of the country. These conflicts were often fuelled by socio-economic and political factors, as well as competition for resources and power.

The emergence of Boko Haram in the early 2000s marked a new phase in the country's history of terrorism. The group, which initially operated as a small Islamic sect in north-eastern Nigeria, began to carry out attacks on civilians, security forces, and government installations in 2009. Boko Haram's ideology is based on a rejection of Western education and a desire to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. The Nigerian government has responded to Boko Haram's activities with a range of counter-terrorism measures, including military operations, intelligence gathering, and collaboration with international partners. The government has also implemented policies aimed at addressing some of the underlying issues that contribute to the group's appeal, such as poverty, unemployment, and corruption.

However, the conflict has continued to escalate, with Boko Haram expanding its reach and carrying out attacks in other parts of the country. The group has also splintered into different factions, some of which have aligned with international terrorist organizations such as ISIS. In addition to Boko Haram, Nigeria has also faced threats from other terrorist groups, such as the Niger Delta militants, who have engaged in violence and sabotage of the country's oil infrastructure.

Furthermore, terrorism and counter-terrorism remain significant challenges for Nigeria, with the conflict having devastating consequences for the country's people, economy, and stability. The

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[87] Wardlaw, Grant. Political terrorism: Theory, tactics, and counter-measures. Cambridge University Press, (1989). P.64. https://books.google.cz/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QwMdC3hoezEC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Wardlaw,+Grant,+Political+Terrorism:+Theory,+Tactics,+and+counter-measures+(Cambridge:+Cambridge+University+Press,+1986)&ots=rbEEVwSeB-&sig=E9SYw8oBmN64mVU3MlWTKt8cjmc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Wardlaw%2C%20Grant%2C%20Political%20Terrorism%3A%20Theory%2C%20Tactics%2C%20and%20counter-measures%20(Cambridge%3A%20Cambridge%20University%20Press%2C%201986)&f=false

government and its partners continue to work towards finding a sustainable solution to the conflict, including addressing the root causes of terrorism and promoting peacebuilding initiatives.

The relevancy of the team terrorist is required in others to explore the field of countering the capabilities of terror, the perception of terrorism as a type of violent action that is intended to still fear, terror, and panic in a targeted population or government. It involves the use of violence, intimidation, and coercion to achieve political, religious, or ideological goals. Terrorist acts can take many forms, including bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, hijackings, and cyber-attacks. The targets of terrorist attacks can be civilians, government officials, security forces, or infrastructure.

Terrorism is often characterized by its indiscriminate nature and the use of violence against innocent civilians. It is typically carried out by non-state actors, such as extremist groups, rather than by conventional military forces. And the use of terrorism is universally condemned by governments and international organizations, who consider it a threat to peace, security, and human rights.

Counter-terrorism efforts aim to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist activities, with the goal of minimizing their impact on innocent civilians and maintaining the stability of the targeted society.

Consequently. There have been several attempts in the literature to reach an agreement on the terrorist discourse. The deliberate targeting of civilians, non-combatants, and unarmed civilians, the intentional creation of fear, terror, and anxiety in a community, the use of violence or the threat of violence as a means of communicating violent acts to a larger audience, the pursuit of intimidation and/or propaganda, and a predominately political agenda are some of the key characteristics of terrorism. Furthermore, Terrorism is characterized by Schmid and Jongman (1988) as "an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reason."[88]

The difficulty in developing a definition that excludes any justification for terrorism is that history offers too many examples of groups and leaders who were initially branded as terrorists but later became respected governments. This is especially true for national liberation forces that are opposed to foreign or authoritarian governments, who frequently resort to violence within their own countries as a last resort. An illustration. Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of Kenya, spent years lobbying the British government prior to his involvement in the Mau Mau revolt. Nelson Mandela, a hero both within and outside of his own continent, is another convicted "terrorist" in this group, Tore Bjorgo asserts that "terrorism is a set of combat methods rather than an identifiable ideology or movement, and involves the premeditated use of violence against (primarily) non-combatants in order to achieve a psychological effect of fear on others than the immediate targets."[89]

The definition of terrorism is still open to debate, and no agreed international definition has been found among policy or analytic communities. Despite the lack of consensus on a definition of terrorism, it is obvious that modern terrorism presents, or is perceived to present, "a potential threat to the stability and, in the extreme, the existence of democratic states".[90]

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[88] Alex Peter Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, and Sociaal-Wetenschappelijk Informatie-*en Documentatiecentrum, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases, and Literature,* no. 12 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984), p.28. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/political-terrorism-research-guide-concepts-theories-data-bases-and.

[89] Tore Bjorgo, ed., *"Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward"* (Routledge, 2004),https://opev.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/BJ%C3%98RGO-Tore.-Root-Causes-of-Terrorism-.pdf .

[90] Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), P.64. https://books.google.cz/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QwMdC3hoezEC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Wardlaw,+Grant,+Political+Terrorism:+Theory,+Tactics,+and+counter-measures+(Cambridge:+Cambridge+University+Press,+1986)&ots=rbEEVwSeB-

Counter-terrorism encompasses a variety of approaches, tactics, and policies used by governments to "either obliterate the terrorist organization or remove the enemy's incentive to commit terror acts." [91] It is very challenging to develop a definition of terrorism that is broadly accepted, that concentrates on a specific form of violence rather than (all its forms and manifestations), that empowers terrorist acts to be reported to the international court alongside genocide and other war crimes, and that prevents individual countries from outlawing activities they choose to label as terrorism perhaps for their own political interests.

The concept of counterterrorism is a key area of study in security studies and other related scholarly disciplines. Counterterrorism refers to the policies, strategies, and tactics employed by governments, law enforcement agencies, and military forces to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist activities. Counterterrorism efforts often involve a combination of measures, including intelligence gathering, law enforcement activities, border control, military operations, and international cooperation. These measures are designed to disrupt and dismantle terrorist networks, prevent the planning and execution of terrorist attacks, and mitigate the impact of attacks when they do occur.

Scholars in security studies and related fields often examine the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures and strategies, as well as the ethical and legal implications of these measures. They also explore the role of non-state actors, such as private security firms and civil society organizations, in counterterrorism efforts. Counterterrorism is a complex and constantly evolving field, as terrorist groups adapt their tactics and strategies in response to countermeasures. As such, ongoing research and analysis are critical to the development of effective and sustainable counterterrorism policies and strategies. Boaz Ganor's perceptive on the concept of counterterrorism has proposed three alternative policy objectives for counterterrorism efforts as the prevention objective that seeks to proactively identify and neutralize terrorist threats before they materialize.

This can involve a range of measures, including intelligence gathering, surveillance, and pre-emptive action against suspected terrorist groups and individuals, and the objective places a high priority on the proactive identification of terrorist threats and the disruption of terrorist networks.

Deterrence, the deterrence objective seeks to dissuade terrorists from carrying out attacks by making the costs of such attacks too high to bear. This can involve a range of measures, including increasing the risk of detection and capture, increasing penalties for terrorist acts, and ensuring that terrorists do not achieve their strategic objectives. Furthermore, the deterrence objective places a high priority on creating a credible and effective deterrent against terrorist activity.

Mitigation, the mitigation objective seeks to minimize the harm caused by terrorist attacks, should they occur. This can involve a range of measures, including improving emergency response capabilities, strengthening critical infrastructure, and ensuring that the public is prepared to respond to terrorist attacks. The mitigation objective places a high priority on minimizing the damage caused by terrorist attacks and facilitating a quick recovery. [92] Nevertheless, each of these objectives has its strengths and weaknesses, and different countries and organizations may prioritize different objectives depending on their circumstances and capabilities. However, all three objectives are critical

&sig=E9SYw8oBmN64mVU3MlWTKt8cjmc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Wardlaw%2C%20Grant%2C%20Political%20Terrorism%3A%20The ory%2C%20Tactics%2C%20and%20counter-measures%20(Cambridge%3A%20Cambridge%20University%20Press%2C%201986)&f=false

[91] Pia Therese Jansen, *The Consequences of Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy,* (PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2008), p.23. https://researchrepository.standrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/439/Pia%20Jansen%20PhD%20thesis.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y

[92] Boaz, Ganor. "The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers." Israel: ICT, e Institute (2005). pp.25-26. See Appendix 1. https://books.google.cz/books?id=dzCHvTTPgZYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Counter-Terrorism+Puzzle:+A+Guide+for+Decision+Makers&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjRyIqAhNP7AhUQyaQKHfyPDzQQ6AF6BAgBEAI#v=onepage&q=prevention&f=false

components of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Accordingly argued that terrorism is a form of violent conflict in which violence is intentionally utilized against civilians to further political objectives which include nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, or religious.

For the purposes of the empirical literature, Fernando Reinares distinguishes terrorism into three categories. First, it is a violent act that causes widespread, excessive emotional reactions like fear and anxiety, which are likely to have an impact on attitudes and behavior.

Second, the violence is systematic, somewhat random, and frequently directed at symbolic targets. Thirdly, threats and messages are communicated through violence in order to gain social control.[93] These considerations have a close place in the characteristic of Boko haram's target over the years, from state institutions and security structuring in Northeastern Nigeria, the federal capital territory, as well as the Nigeria Police Headquarters and International Organisations like the United Nations, have been attacked by the sect.

An act must target civilians in order to be considered terrorism. The violence that is particularly and purposely targeted at civilians is what is referred to by the term "terrorism," as opposed to random harm done to civilians who just so happen to be present in contested areas.

These three counterterrorism objectives demonstrate the potential for variation in the range and aims of government anti-terrorism strategy, with each requiring a different amount of dedication and complexity. The goal of completely eradicating terrorism is the most expensive and ambitious—some might even argue that it is impossible. In theory, this goal can only be accomplished when all parties involved in a conflict are satisfied with its strategies, terrorist groups organization lose motivation in fighting, and they are unable to plot and carry out an attack, might even argue that it is impossible In theory, this goal can only be accomplished when all parties involved in a conflict are satisfied with its strategies, terrorist groups organization lose motivation in fighting, and they are unable to plot and carry out an attack,[94] might even argue that it is impossible In theory, this goal can only be accomplished when all parties involved in a conflict are satisfied with its strategies, terrorist groups organization lose motivation in fighting, and they are unable to plot and carry out an attack.[95]

A variety of conceptualizations of terrorism have been proposed, but none of them have received widespread acceptance. It makes sense that one of the most contentious expressions in the modern political lexicon is controversial. Given the difficulty of the term, it is understandable that the concept is debatable, particularly if one adopts the ideological perspective that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter has been used to justify violent acts by both state and non-state actors in order to contrast one side's legitimate killing with another side's illegitimate killing and to fudge the distinctions between non-state terrorism and state terrorism. However, According to the General Assembly resolution, "terrorism in all its forms and manifestation, committed by whomever and whatever purpose, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and

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[93] Bjorgo, Tore, ed. *Root causes of terrorism: Myths, reality, and ways forward*. Routledge, (2004). p.120. https://opev.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/BJ%C3%98RGO-Tore.-Root-Causes-of-Terrorism-.pdf

[94] Boaz, Ganor. "*The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers.*" Israel: ICT, e Institute (2005). p.31 https://books.google.cz/books?id=dzCHvTTPgZYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Counter-Terrorism+Puzzle:+A+Guide+for+Decision+Makers&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjRyIqAhNP7AhUQyaQKHfyPDzQQ6AF6BAgBEAI#v=onepage&q=prevention&f=false

[95] Boaz, Ganor. "*The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers*." Israel: ICT, e Institute (2005). p.31 https://books.google.cz/books?id=dzCHvTTPgZYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Counter-Terrorism+Puzzle:+A+Guide+for+Decision+Makers&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjRyIqAhNP7AhUQyaQKHfyPDzQQ6AF6BAgBEAI#v=onepage&q=prevention&f=false

security".[96] In order to advance countermeasures that will benefit democratic governments and society, agreement on definitions of terrorism will be helpful.

Even though there is no uniform, universally accepted definition of terrorism, it is apparent what it is considered to stand for currently as "a potential threat to the stability and, in the extreme, the existence of democratic states"[97], and due to its developing trend in the modern world, terrorism is becoming a subject of discussion both nationally and internationally. The modern definition of terrorism is intrinsically debatable since it is impossible to come to an agreement on a basis for determining whether the use of violence (directed against whom, by how for what goals) is acceptable. Both state and non-state actors frequently utilize violence to further their political objectives. The bulk of definitions now in use were drafted by organizations with ties to the government and are purposefully slanted to omit mention of governments. The term "terrorist" today is quite derogatory; it implies a lack of morals and legality. Practically speaking, so-called acts of "terrorism" or terrorism are frequently used as a tool by the actors to further their own military or strategic goals.

The UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60, "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," adopted on December 9, 1994, contains a clause characterizing terrorism as criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons, or particular persons individuals for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them. Furthermore, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), terrorism is defined as crimes, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or great bodily injury or take hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons, or person intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

Any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act was described as terrorism by a UN panel on March 17, 2005. And the Oxford Reference definition of terrorism stated as "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear – terrorism is intended to coerce or intimidate government or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological".[98] The spread of terrorist organizations around the globe is one of the major challenges to international peace and security, of which Nigeria is not exceptional in the threat perceptions, and the use of violence is one of the most enduring things in a world that is growing more and more dynamic.

Others make the case for an objective and universally recognized definition of terrorism, such as Ganor (2002). As a set of guiding principles and a moral compass for the definition of terrorism that will apply to both domestic and international terrorism, he looks to international laws and conventions and offers the following objective definition of terrorism as the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets in order to attain political aims based largely on the means employed as well as the objective which must be political to qualify as terrorism, also well

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[96] UN General Assembly, *"Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006. 60/2888,"* The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.*: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement*

[97] Grant Wardlaw, "*Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures*" (Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.65. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598821

[98] Oxford Reference (2022). https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803103209420;jsessionid=638BC5715C6621C95AD5F60ABA47003 E#:~:text=The%20calculated%20use%20of%20violence,political%2C%20religious%2C%20or%20ideological.

beyond the fundamental definition of terrorism, there is a vehement disagreement about how to define the phenomena, especially when it comes to deciding whether particular violent groups or campaigns should be included or omitted under the umbrella term "terrorism."

Moreover, as of the debate across scholar perceptions in relation to the nature and structural interplay of institutional formations of government, Boaz Ganor has argued that democracies are especially susceptible to terrorism due to several factors. First, democracies tend to have a high degree of openness and accessibility, which makes them vulnerable to attack. Unlike authoritarian regimes, democracies allow for greater freedom of movement and speech, which can make it easier for terrorist groups to plan and execute attacks.

Second, democracies have a decentralized decision-making process, which can make it harder to respond quickly and effectively to terrorist threats. In contrast, authoritarian regimes can more easily mobilize their resources and respond to security threats. And third, democratic societies value individual freedoms and civil liberties, which can make it difficult to implement certain security measures that may be necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. For example, increased surveillance and monitoring may be seen as a violation of privacy and civil liberties, and can be met with opposition from civil society groups and political opposition.

Finally, democracies are often seen as legitimate targets by terrorist groups, who view them as representing values and ideals that are antithetical to their own. Terrorist groups that are motivated by religious or ideological goals may see democracies as promoting values that they view as immoral or corrupt, despite these challenges, democracies have also shown resilience in the face of terrorist threats, and have developed sophisticated counterterrorism strategies that balance security concerns with civil liberties and democratic values. Additionally, the study examines ten specific dilemmas that confront democratic countries, including defining the threat, defining counterterrorism, employing intelligence, implementing a deterrence strategy, selecting offensive and defensive actions, public opinion and ethics, legislative and punitive policies, media coverage, societal morale damage, and dilemmas involving international cooperation, [99] and consequently stated that " terrorism is a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political goals".[100] While some definitions expressly include states, others specifically exclude states as potential terrorists.

The limited idea of terrorism to simply assaults on civilians, whereas others encompass military and police targets in non-wartime scenarios. However, various research perspectives have viewed terrorism as acts of violence committed for political reasons only, while some included terrorism committed for criminal ends. The criminal justice approach tries to uphold the rule of law and gives the police a prominent role in preventing terrorism, classifying acts of terrorism as serious crimes and violations of public order. The law enforcement strategy for countering terrorism, as emphasized by Wilkinson, is focused on "(1) the intelligence agencies, (2) the police, and (3) the legal system," as well as uncovering terrorist threats early and eliminating terrorist cells or organizations operating within the borders of the state, security forces need reliable signals and human intelligence. It is obvious that "the primary objective of an efficient intelligence service must be to prevent any insurgency or

[99]    Jeffrey H. Norwitz, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers* (2006). pp.145-147. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss1/11

[100]   *Jeffrey H. Norwitz, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (2006)* p.146. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss1/11

terrorist developing beyond the incipient stage."[101] The concept of counterterrorism describes a diverse variety of "techniques, strategies, and measures that governments employ with the aim of removing such threats and preventing other terrorist attacks against the state."[102] As a result, several scenarios could be risky, and for them to be considered security threats, they must satisfy the requirements that distinguish them from everyday occurrences. Since the start of the twenty-first century, it has become commonly accepted that terrorism is the main cause of concern when it comes to issues relating to global security, and strategic approaches adopted by states in preventing terror attacks and the protection of life as well infrastructures.

Nigeria has faced significant challenges with terrorism, particularly from the extremist group Boko Haram. The government has implemented various strategies and counter-terrorism approaches to address these challenges. Some of the key strategies and approaches used by the Nigerian government include Military intervention, as the Nigerian government has deployed its military to fight against Boko Haram and other extremist groups, and the military has carried out numerous operations aimed at neutralizing the groups' capabilities and disrupting their operations.

The Intelligence gathering as a strategic approach of the Nigerian government has focused on intelligence gathering to identify and disrupt terrorist networks which have involved the use of intelligence agencies and collaboration with international partners to gather information on the groups' activities. Counter-radicalization or narrative is aimed at implementing programs for preventing radicalization and countering extremist ideology. These programs target vulnerable individuals and communities and seek to provide them with alternative narratives to extremist ideology thereby delegitimizing citizen views on the activities of terror

Border control by the Nigerian government has focused on strengthening border control measures to prevent the movement of terrorists and their weapons across the country's borders. And the Community engagement sought to engage with local communities to gain their support and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This has involved working with traditional and religious leaders to promote peace and tolerance. Legal measures adopted by the Nigerian government aim at implementing various legal measures and strategic frameworks aimed at prosecuting terrorists and their supporters. These measures include the Anti-Terrorism Act, which criminalizes terrorism and provides severe penalties for those found guilty.

An overview of the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism strategies and approaches is focused on a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach that involves military, intelligence, community engagement, and legal measures.

The main objectives of a counterterrorism strategy are to reduce the threat posed by terrorism and to make it harder for terrorists and their allies to carry out terrorist activities. Between 2009 and 2019, the Nigerian government deployed a variety of counterterrorism strategies. Even though certain approaches appeared to be effective, others fell short in lowering the frequency and fatality rate of attacks.

The use of force and persuasion to run a country's or a society's affairs is referred to as "government" in a wide sense. Governance is the process of making decisions and carrying them out in accordance with standards like public input, adherence to the rule of law, respect for human rights, transparency,

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[101] *Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response. Routledge, (2006).* p.73. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203087336

[102] Pia Therese Jansen, *The Consequences of Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy*, (PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2008), p. 23. https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/439/Pia?sequence=6

open availability of information, prompt responses to human needs, accommodation of various interests, equity, inclusiveness, successful outcomes, and accountability.

The phrase "counter-terrorism strategies" refers to both the identification of potential terrorist attacks and the response to them within a framework, as well as strategic policy instruments. It also refers to the practice, tactics, and procedures (sometimes expressed in the specific strategy) of countering terrorist or insurgent threats, which can take the form of implied, actual, or planned activities.

During a police operation against Boko Haram terrorists in Borno state in 2009, fighting broke out. On July 26, 2009, a police station in Bauchi state was attacked by sect members, resulting in the deaths of two police officers and one soldier. It further sparked a five-day standoff between Boko Haram and security forces, which led to horrifying attacks and clashes that swept over four states in northern Nigeria: Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Maiduguri in Borno state. The state security forces raided the enclave of the radical Boko haram sect in Maiduguri in an effort to crush the group, whose supporters' violence sparked conflict in five states and resulted in deaths.[103] The battle of Maiduguri was supposed to put an end to the terrorist capabilities when Nigerian security forces executed Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of Boko Haram, on July 30, 2009, in what human rights organizations have considered an unlawful execution.

In addition to using force, the north-eastern strategy to combat Boko Haram has attempted to deny the organization the resources it needs to continue its insurgent operation. As a result, farmers have been prohibited from cultivating tall crops, presumably to deny fighters the best hiding places, and commercial activity has been severely curtailed. In addition, the military has forced people to move from their communities to IDP camps, where they are allegedly tortured. If the government is unable to resolve the issue on a long-term basis, this has increased local people's displeasure with security forces and is likely to precipitate the radicalization of the most vulnerable.

The statement highlights the importance of addressing the underlying social and economic factors as contributing factors to the rise of extremist groups like Boko Haram, and how the Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram should not only focus on military and security measures, but also address issues such as poverty, inequality, and marginalization in the northern region of the country, a comprehensive political, economic, and security strategy that including initiatives which aimed at creating economic opportunities, improving access to education and healthcare, and promoting good governance and democratic institutions are some vital instruments in denying the terrorist organizations it breeding ground for recruitment, furthermore countering the terrorism legitimacy in public supports

Such efforts could help address some of the root causes of the insurgency and limit the appeal of extremist groups among vulnerable populations, additionally, the government's response to Boko Haram should be sensitive to the needs and concerns of local communities, such as the involvement and engagement with local leaders and community organizations to develop strategies that are tailored to the specific needs of each community. And ultimately, a comprehensive approach to addressing the threat posed by Boko Haram will require a sustained commitment from the Nigerian government, as well as support from the international community, therefore, By addressing the underlying social and economic factors that contribute to extremism and promoting inclusive and

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[103] Shehu Sani, "*Boko Haram: History, Ideas, and Revolt,*" Vanguard, July 7, 2011 .https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-5/

equitable development, the government can help build a more resilient and secure society for all Nigerians.[104]

Additionally, in response to calls from Nigeria and the international community, the federal government of Nigeria "took a cursory look at the posture of its various counterterrorism strategies in theory and practice."[105] As a result, the approaches were divided into two main categories: tactical and strategic, and they covered the development, deployment, and coordination of various power mechanisms, including military, political, socioeconomic, and informational ones. More significantly, the Boko Haram crisis triggered an evaluation of Nigeria's security framework, which led to the establishment of an Office of Counter-Terrorism Advisor to the President as well as various other physical security measures. It thus suggests that the situation in Nigeria's security and intelligence institutions displays scant signs of consistency or uniformity.

A difficult scenario has resulted from the nature of the episodes, including the killing of Mohammed Yusuf and the organizational changes. There is no assurance that when someone speaks for the organization, they are speaking for all its members because the cell-like structure allows for fractions and splits among its members. To deal with the Boko Haram problem, the Nigerian government adopted several actions. The government initially believed that violence was a passing trend that could be curbed by police intervention, much like earlier events in Nigeria. Sadly, despite an increase in military tactics, the situation has not changed. Many believe that the strategy is vague and hampered by political issues, which may have rendered the actions insufficient.

Consequently. While security operations are a common toolkit for the statecraft and an instrument for the use of force, Nigeria's security policy has over the years been focused on the worries of insecurity brought on by Boko haram terrorists. Various strategies have been adopted in the ongoing fight against terrorist operations within and outside its borders, and the responsibilities of the government in protecting its citizens against threats both internal and external have been put to the mission.

## LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ASPECTS OF NIGERIA'S COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

Nigeria has been facing serious terrorism threats from various groups, such as Boko Haram, and other militant groups, however, the Nigerian government has responded to these threats with both legislative and executive counterterrorism strategies. The Justice System and Terrorism Prevention Act (JSTPA) is a Nigerian legislation that was enacted in 2011 to strengthen the country's legal framework for combating terrorism. The act aims to enhance the capacity of law enforcement agencies to prevent, investigate, and prosecute terrorism-related offenses. Under the JSTPA, terrorism-related offenses include acts committed with the intention of causing death, serious bodily harm, or significant damage to property, among others. The act also provides for the establishment of a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts across different agencies and levels of government.

In addition, the JSTPA introduced measures to enhance the capacity of the justice system to effectively prosecute terrorism-related offenses. These include the creation of specialized courts to handle

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[104] Jennifer Cooke, Statement before the US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, "*Hearing on Boko Haram - Emerging Threat to the U. S. Homeland,*" November 30, 2011, http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-boko-haram-emerging-threat-ushomeland.

[105] Ojelade, Steve Olufemi. *Counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015*. Diss. Walden University (2018). p.144. https://www.proquest.com/openview/9c893e264d491c9d743e90f713fd1e80/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y

terrorism cases, the admissibility of electronic evidence, and the protection of witnesses and victims, and the JSTPA represents a significant step towards enhancing Nigeria's capacity to prevent and combat terrorism. However, there have been concerns about the act's potential for abuse, particularly in terms of the restriction of civil liberties and the targeting of political opponents. As such, there have been calls for the act to be reviewed to ensure that it strikes an appropriate balance between national security and the protection of fundamental human rights.

Legislative Counterterrorism Strategy included the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011. As Nigeria passed the Terrorism Prevention Act to provide a legal framework for combating terrorism, and the act criminalizes acts of terrorism, provides measures for the prevention, detection, and response to terrorism, and establishes special courts to try terrorism cases.

The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Act: The NFIU was established to combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and other financial crimes. The act empowers the NFIU to collect, analyze, and disseminate financial intelligence to relevant authorities and agencies. Also, the Nigerian Immigration Act empowers the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) to screen and monitor individuals entering and leaving the country to prevent terrorists from entering the country.

Furthermore, the Executive Counter-terrorism Strategy enables military operations against terrorist groups in the country and is aimed towards disrupting the activities of terrorist groups and to dismantling their operational infrastructure through adaptations of various approaches that included counterterrorism Intelligence and improvement of its intelligence capabilities to gather information about terrorist activities and prevent attacks. This has increased the partnership with other countries and intelligence agencies to share information and intelligence.

In the aspect of community engagement, the government has been engaging with communities affected by terrorism to encourage them to share information and intelligence with security agencies. The government has also been working to provide economic opportunities and other incentives to communities to discourage them from supporting terrorist groups.

Rehabilitation and Reintegration, the government has established rehabilitation and reintegration programs for individuals who have been radicalized and are willing to renounce terrorism, and the programs provide vocational training, education, and other support to help individuals reintegrate into society. However, Nigeria's legislative and executive counterterrorism strategies include a range of measures, from legal frameworks to military operations to community engagement and rehabilitation programs. While progress has been made in combating terrorism, there is still a long way to go in achieving lasting peace and stability in the country.

The Nigerian government has taken several steps to undermine the sect's operational capacity, including the prosecution of those who have been apprehended, the use of special security forces, the temporary closure of parts of the northern Nigerian border, the deportation of illegal immigrants, the training of security forces in counterterrorism (COT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the installation of surveillance technology, and cooperation with foreign governments. Nevertheless, the sect's escalation of violent assaults after the uprising in July 2009 was an important factor in Nigeria's first anti-terrorism law, the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011.

The National Assembly passed the Terrorism (Prevention) Act in 2011 to address and more effectively battle the terrorism problem afflicting Nigeria (TPA). The stated objectives of the Act were to put policies into place for the prevention, prohibition, and combating of terrorist acts, the financing of terrorism in Nigeria, and the efficient implementation of the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of

Terrorism. The establishment on June 12, 2011, of a Joint Military Task Force named "Operation Restore Order" (JTORO) with a base in Maiduguri, Borno State, to battle the sect's growing terrorist potential was a key component of the government's response to the Boko Haram threat. The JTORO's deployment has had some success, especially when utilizing military patrol cars that have a 50-meter range for finding hidden bombs and other weapons. The elite security forces have also been successful in apprehending and killing Boko Haram operational commanders and strategists.

The deployment of special security forces in northern Nigeria, such as the Joint Task Force and Operation Lafia Dole, has been effective in countering the Boko Haram insurgency in the region. However, there have been concerns about the tactics used by these forces, which have at times been criticized for being heavy-handed and abusive towards local communities. Sampson's argument highlights the importance of balancing security objectives with respect for human rights and the rule of law. While the use of force may be necessary for certain situations, it should be proportionate and avoid harming civilians or destroying property unnecessarily. In particular, there have been reports of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and other forms of human rights violations by security forces in the course of their operations in northern Nigeria.

To address these concerns, the Nigerian government has taken steps to reform the security sector and improve the accountability of security forces. These efforts include the establishment of human rights desks in security agencies, the training of security personnel on human rights and the rule of law, and the investigation and prosecution of security personnel who commit abuses.

Ultimately, the JTF has come under fire from a segment of the Nigerian public for its violent counter-terrorism operation, and its use of excessive force has forced people who would otherwise be critical of the sect's activities to back down from their positions, the effectiveness of the Nigerian government's response to the Boko Haram insurgency will depend on its ability to address the underlying social, economic, and political factors that contribute to the conflict, as well as its commitment to upholding human rights and the rule of law in its security operations. By balancing security objectives with respect for human rights, the government can build trust and cooperation with local communities and help create a more stable and secure environment for all Nigerians.

The security forces must strike the correct balance between using the "carrot" to win the locals' hearts and minds by providing security and the "stick" to use arrests and legal action to decrease Boko Haram's operational capacity if they are to take advantage of the opportunities. After finding that Boko Haram transports weapons and militants over Nigeria's precarious international borders in the north, the Federal government launched a vigorous crackdown on illegal immigration, repatriating roughly 11,000 foreigners as of February 28, 2012.[106]

Furthermore, Ojelade's claim is consistent with the timeline of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Boko Haram, which was founded in 2002, began carrying out more frequent and deadly attacks in 2009, leading to the declaration of a state of emergency in three northeastern states in 2013. During this period, the Nigerian government was forced to develop new policies and strategies to address the growing threat posed by Boko Haram. One of the key policies developed during this period was the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which was launched in 2014.

The strategy was designed to provide a framework for the Nigerian government's response to terrorism, including Boko Haram, and emphasized a comprehensive approach that integrated military, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, other policies and strategies developed during this

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[106] "*Nigeria repatriates 11,000 foreigners over terror fears,*" Vanguard, February 27, 2012.
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/nigeria-repatriates-5000-foreigners-overterror-fears/

period included the Emergency Rule, which was declared in three north-eastern states in 2013 and allowed for increased military intervention in the region, and the Safe Schools Initiative, which aimed to improve security and educational opportunities for children in areas affected by the insurgency. However, the rise of Boko Haram terrorist attacks in Nigeria during 2009-2015 highlighted the need for an appropriate counterterrorism policy that became serious in 2009, when Boko haram turned violent and began to unleash unprecedented attacks on the Nigerian state.[107] While these policies and strategies have had some successes, the insurgency remains a significant challenge for the Nigerian government and the international community.

## MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established in 2015 to combat the threat of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region, which includes Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin. The MNJTF is a joint military force comprising troops from these countries and is mandated to conduct military operations against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the region. The MNJTF's role in combating Boko Haram in Nigeria includes cross-border operations against Boko Haram operates in the Lake Chad region, which spans across Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The MNJTF facilitates cross-border operations, allowing troops from different countries to operate on the other side of the border and pursue terrorists who have crossed over.

The MNJTF facilitates intelligence sharing among its member countries, which enables them to identify Boko Haram's operational bases, training camps, and supply routes. The intelligence also enables the member countries to coordinate their efforts and conduct targeted operations against Boko Haram. The enhancement of other military capabilities of its member countries by providing training, equipment, and logistical support. This enables the member countries to conduct effective military operations against Boko Haram, and work to disrupt the flow of arms and finances to Boko Haram by conducting targeted operations against its supply chains and by sharing intelligence on its financial networks, protecting civilians from Boko Haram's attacks and provides humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict. These approaches have made significant progress in combating Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. It has weakened Boko Haram's operational capacity and disrupted its supply chains. However, Boko Haram still poses a significant threat, and the MNJTF's efforts are ongoing. The MNJTF's success depends on the continued cooperation and coordination of its member countries, as well as their sustained efforts to combat terrorism.

Regional and international counter-terrorism cooperation has been a crucial component of Nigeria's efforts to combat terrorism. Given the transnational nature of terrorist groups like Boko Haram, cooperation with other countries and international organizations is essential to effectively prevent and respond to terrorism. And Nigeria has been working closely with other African countries, particularly those in the West African sub-region, to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts. One notable initiative in this regard is the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which was established in 2015 to coordinate military operations against Boko Haram across Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin. Nigeria has also been cooperating with international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to enhance its capacity to combat terrorism. For instance, the UN has been providing technical assistance

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[107] Ojelade, Steve Olufemi. *Counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015.* Diss. Walden University (2018). pp.140-1. https://www.proquest.com/openview/9c893e264d491c9d743e90f713fd1e80/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y

to Nigeria to strengthen its legal framework for combating terrorism, while the AU has been providing support for the MNJTF.

In addition, Nigeria has been receiving military assistance from countries such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities. The US, for example, has been providing training and equipment to Nigerian security forces, while France has been providing intelligence and logistical support. However, there have been concerns about the effectiveness of regional and international counter-terrorism cooperation in Nigeria. Some critics argue that cooperation has been undermined by distrust and competition between countries, as well as the lack of effective coordination mechanisms. As such, there is a need for more concerted efforts to enhance cooperation and coordination among all stakeholders involved in Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts.

The government of Nigeria has also embraced cooperative alliances with other countries and international organizations to improve Nigeria's capacity to address the danger posed by Boko Haram. These include collaborative efforts aimed at preventing the development of terrorist groups operating in Nigeria with organizations like the UN, EU, and International Civil Aviation Organization as well as countries like the US, France, South Korea, and Israel. For instance, Nigeria and the UN established the Integrated Assistance on Counter-Terrorism framework for cooperation under the auspices of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (I-ACT).

These joint projects include events like programs for equipment support, intelligence exchange, and capacity building of the security forces. In other operations where government security forces frequently employed brutal and unproductive tactics to combat Boko Haram, and security forces have frequently employed harsh and counterproductive methods to combat Boko Haram, as seen in other operations where "brute military force against the insurgent group and deployment of over 8000 troops into affected parts of northern Nigeria, but with no clearly defined Military Code of Justice for the operation,"[108] in Borno state's Baga hamlet, for instance, Nigerian forces invaded and killed locals on Sunday, April 21, 2013. The Nigerian army executed a single operation during an attack, killing over 200 people thought to be Boko Haram militants. In order to obstruct Boko Haram's operations, the federal government has dispatched a specially trained anti-terrorism combat force to terrorist hotspots, while others "with Boko Haram and related actors committing hundreds of attacks, reportedly resulting in a thousand casualties in 2013 alone ".[109]

The Terrorism Prevention Act, which was passed on February 17, 2013, formalized the effort to provide Nigeria with a comprehensive legal framework for combating terrorism. The Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act of 2013 (TPAA) strengthens terrorist financing offenses, provides for extraterritorial applicability of the Act, and addresses difficulties. In order to "seek to expand the definition of the offense of terrorism and strengthen the sanction regime, as well as the power of the court to act more expeditiously on terrorism-related cases,"[110] the TPAA made a number of significant changes, including broadening the definition of terrorism, expanding the number and spectrum of offenses, significantly increasing the penalties for terrorist offenses, and expanding the adjunct

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[108] Solomon Adebayo Adedire, Modupe Ake, and Olakunle Olowojolu, *"Combating terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria: an international collaboration against Boko Haram"* Fountain University Journal of Management and Social Sciences: (2016). pp.67-79. http://eprints.lmu.edu.ng/1433/1/COMBATING%20TERRORISM%20AND%20INSURGENCY%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf

[109] Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, *"Country Reports on Terrorism 2012"* (Washington: United States Department of State Publication, 2013).
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm

[110] Fatima Akilu, *"Sixty-seventh Session of the UNGA Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (AGENDA ITEM 105)"* (8 October 2012), p. 3. https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/67/pdfs/statements/int_terrorism/nigeria.pdf

powers' jurisdiction. Most importantly, the document entrusts the ONSA with the responsibility of coordinating counterterrorism efforts among security and law enforcement organizations, including the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF), which, in turn, ensures that Nigeria's CT framework complies with international counter-terrorism legal instruments. These include the Office of the national security adviser (ONSA), the Department of State Service (DSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the police, the Armed Forces, and other governmental organizations are some of the security services engaged in counterterrorism. And it is important to note that it has been the primary responsibility of the NSA to coordinate these security forces and ensure their interoperability.

The Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013 (TPAA) was adopted for relevant issues in order to address the concerns from threat perception of successfully deterring the actions of Boko haram. As a result, significant amendments were made. The TPAA expanded the definition of terrorism, increased the severity of the punishments for terrorist offenses, increased the number and coverage of offenses, increased the number and scope of additional authorities, and more. 38 new parts were added by the TPAA, 8 sections underwent changes, 21 sections were abolished, and 11 sections from the original TPA are still in effect without modification.

In accordance with the TPAA's amendments to the TPA, the following structure of duties, rights, and obligations are set forth: The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is responsible for coordinating all security and enforcement agencies covered by the Act, according to Section 1A. (1) of the TPA, which was introduced by Section 2 of the TPAA. Powers and obligations are outlined in Section 1A.(1)(a)-(d). The Attorney-General of the Federation shall be the authority for the proper execution and administration of the Act, as provided in Section 1. A(2) of the TPA, which was added by Section 2 of the TPAA.

Nigeria approved the Terrorism Prevention Act 2013 and established the National Counter Terrorism Strategy 2016 (NACTEST) to coordinate national counterterrorism efforts. The Terrorism Prevention Act, as amended, provided the country with the legal structure it needs to confront terrorist threats, and the NACTEST mainly sets the counterterrorism policy framework. The document was first adopted by President Goodluck Jonathan in April 2014, and a second version was later released by President Buhari's administration in August 2016. Furthermore, the incorporation of new counter-tools in reacting to Boko Haram, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and its affiliates, significant denial strategies, and preventive measures in partnership against the capabilities of terrorist organizations, as well as the necessity of deterring others from attempting the act of terror, thereby discouraging attacks, and denying the gaol its possibilities of the target, consequently the strategic approach has equipped the country with a legal and counterterrorism (CT) framework in accordance with international counterterrorism law instruments.

The five main work streams that make up the national CT plan each have unique medium- and long-term objectives. The five pillars are as follows: Prevent, Secure, Identify, Prepare, and Implement 1. Forestall wants to lessen the likelihood of radicalization. 2. The term "secure" refers to the process of strengthening the nation's security posture in the face of terrorist threats. 5. Implement aims to promote coordination and cooperation at the operational and strategic levels both within and across national boundaries. 3. Identify goals for prevention through detection, early warning, and the strengthening of the legal system. 4. Prepare aims to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks by strengthening the government's capacity to respond to such an occurrence.[111]

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[111] Office of the National Security Advisor, *"National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), 2016"* (2016), pp. 15-16. http://ctc.gov.ng/onsa-reviews-national-counter-terrorism-strategy-nactest/

The military strategy also addresses operational, geographical, and structural weaknesses that Boko Haram and its affiliates can exploit, making it a crucial goal of the National CT Strategy. In terms of structural and operational inadequacies, despite the Federal Government of Nigeria's commitment to encouraging operational synergy across all agencies involved in border security, cross-border crime, and CT, this has not quite generated significant long-lasting results in the past few years. Additionally, the military keeps a watchful presence on various home fronts. For instance, following issues with the oil supply and an increase in pipeline sabotage efforts in 2016, soldiers are being stationed in the Niger Delta to disrupt the lucrative kidnapping business of so-called "oil militias" and in the central Plateau state to reduce ethnic or religious tensions.[112]

The policy framework aims to strengthen current government measures to reduce the threat of violent extremism, including "Operation Safe Corridor," a 2016 program to rehabilitate and reintegrate Boko Haram defectors.[113] While encouraging youth empowerment and lowering unemployment in the community are major goals of this strategy, it also works in collaboration with other international organizations to offer social infrastructures to communities who have been displaced (IDP). In response to President Buhari's 2015 amnesty program for Boko Haram affiliates, the reintegration plan' consisted of setting up a rehabilitation camp' in Gombe state where former Boko Haram functionaries go through four months of vocational training before being reintegrated into Nigerian society. In March 2018, 95 ex-insurgents graduated from the military operation Safe Corridor scheme in Mallam Sidi, Gombe state. Consequently. The coordinator of the program, Brig. Gen. Bamidele Shafa stated that the graduates are just the first step in the process of reintegrating former Boko Haram fighters into society, and over 254 ex-militants undergoing four months de-radicalization and training program in Gombe,[114] he added that the administration has not offered a clear plan for reintegrating them, and many of them remain in detention cells.

The Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) was established in the early months of 2014 in response to partnerships at the operational/tactical level of the Nigerian Ministry of Defense, with the goal of carrying out CT/COIN operations against Boko Haram and its offshoots. In order to integrate into the present special operations forces (SOF) framework, the NASOC works together with the Special Boat Service of the Nigerian Navy (SBS). The establishment of the Nigerian Air Force Special Troops Regiment (NAF SFR) also enables SOF "the ability to protect expeditionary landing sites as well as support ground and marine forces with CAS and a CSAR capability."[115] President Muhammadu Buhari's commitment to dismantling Islamic extremist networks in the northern states is evidenced by Abuja's assumption of command of the Multinational Joint Task Force in June 2015. (MNJTF). The MNJTF is made up of contingents from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin. It replaced and formalized the earlier ad hoc military alliance and Benin was one of the participant nations. The military can oversee, coordinate, and monitor its operational activities from the conflict's epicenter owing to the building of a command and command center (MCCC) in Maiduguri at the beginning of 2015.

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[112] Office of the National Security Advisor, "*National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), 2016*" (2016), p.5.
http://ctc.gov.ng/onsa-reviews-national-counter-terrorism-strategy-nactest/

[113] A. Jummai, *"Amnesty: Nigerian Military Launches 'Operation Safe Corridor' For Boko Haram Terrorists'",* The Trent, 6 April 2016.
https://www.thetrentonline.com/amnesty-nigerian-military-launches-operation-safe-corridorboko-haram/

[114] Dario Mentone, *"The Counterterrorism Framework in Nigeria: Strategic and Operational Pitfalls,"* European Eye on Radicalization Report (2 October 2018),
*https://eeradicalization.com/the-counterterrorism-framework in Nigeria-strategic-and-operational-pitfalls/*

[115] Jane's Sentinel, *Security Assessment – Central Africa, Defence Budget Overview,* 2018c, p.2
.https://my.ihs.com/Janes?th=JANES&callingurl=https://janes.ihs.com

Furthermore, internal military restructuring and perseverance in increasing the Defense expenditure to have better-equipped troops on the ground have led to the capture of Boko Haram's strategic strongholds, including most of the Adamawa State, Chibok in southern Borno State, and the vast Sambisa Forest, as well as the arrest of militant leaders. Despite these accolades, the operations against Boko Haram really have not attempted to seize territory since March 2015, when the Nigerien military defeated the organization, and with NGN 574 billion (USD 1.6 billion) — or 0.4% of Nigeria's GDP — the Defense spending increased nominally by 22% in 2018 over 2017.[116] It is important to note that the EU financially and politically supports the MNJTF, having previously contributed more than 200 million euros to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and promote development in north-eastern Nigeria The military's Joint Investigation Committee continues to play a pivotal role in acquiring information for counterterrorism goals both inside and outside the country. The Federal Government's capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorist criminals is severely constrained by the limited cooperation between the military and law enforcement agencies and the fact that the majority of the intelligence collected is used for tactical goals. To obtain intelligence for their activities, the military and police continue to rely heavily on neighborhood militias like the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). The CJTF accusations, in Felbab-words, Brown's "are frequently the major, if the not exclusive, basis of raids and arrests, however, such intelligence is frequently utterly inaccurate, unconfirmed, and arbitrary, driven solely by the desire for further money payments or as a form of intimidation".[117]

Nonetheless. In accordance with a 2015 Amnesty International report, more than 1,200 people have been extrajudicially executed by Nigerian military forces, at least 20,000 people have been arbitrarily detained (mostly young men and boys), countless acts of torture have already been committed, hundreds or even thousands of Nigerians have been forced into the disappearance, and at least 7,000 people have perished in military detention from starvation, extreme overcrowding, and other causes, In terms of criminal justice, intelligence sharing, and efficient strategic and operational cooperation/coordination, law enforcement agencies continue to have limited capabilities. For instance, police, customs, and immigration officials collect information and conduct operations without the use of a comprehensive national information database system at various control points, border crossings, and significant terminals. Clearly, in order to successfully identify flaws and remove potential threats, the war against Boko Haram and its offshoots necessitates an ongoing method to acquire, assess, and exchange information and intelligence. Furthermore, the submission of Amnesty International concluded that these acts, perpetrated in the context of a non-international armed conflict, constitute war crimes for which military commanders bear individual and command responsibility, and may be among crimes against humanity. [118]

Border security is a shared duty of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), police, the military, and customs. The main barrier to a government trying to implement efficient border control is the nation's challenging security environment. This becomes even more challenging when considering the security constraints placed on a government in charge of more than 5,000 kilometers of land borders, such as the absence of suitable border crossing sites. Most data are gathered manually, which makes it subject to bias and errors, and it is not frequently integrated for analysis. Personnel from border management

[116] Jane's Sentinel, *Security Assessment – West Africa. Non-State Armed Groups* (2018a). pp.5-6.
https://my.ihs.com/Janes?th=JANES&callingurl=https://janes.ihs.com

[117] Vanda Felbab-Brown, *"Nigeria's Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy Against Boko Haram: How the Military and Militias Are Fueling Insecurity,"* Foreign Affairs, March 30, (2018)
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2018-03-30/nigerias-troublingcounterinsurgency-strategy-against-boko-haram

[118] Amnesty International, *Stars on their shoulders. Blood on their hands: war crimes committed by the Nigerian military* (Amnesty International, 2015).
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/1657/2015/en/

organizations lack sufficient operational and analytical experience with new equipment to efficiently monitor vast open spaces. Attempts to reduce the threat of cross-border crimes, terrorism, and other potential vulnerabilities are severely limited by this, in addition to a lack of technological equipment and the government's inability to exert any sort of power in vast regions of the country.

The National Action Plan for Preventing and Combating Violent Extremism was introduced by the Nigerian government in August 2017. (PCVE). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has supported the ONSA in developing the policy framework, which aims to "build capacity, improve coordination, strengthen the justice system, and by integrating communication, provide alternative narratives to violent extremism."[119] Furthermore, the strategy adaptation focuses on four major goals. To begin, institutionalize, mainstream, and coordinate PCVE programs at the national, state, and local levels. Second, strengthen accessibility to justice as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law. Third, enhance individuals' and communities' ability to prevent and counter violent extremism, as well as recover from violent incidents. Fourth, institutionalize, mainstream, and integrate strategic communication into all levels of PCVE programs.[120]

Although the PCVE was implemented with robust rhetoric, the strategy continued to be hindered by impunity for the security forces harsh treatment of citizens, inadequate trust between security agencies and locals, and insufficient economic possibilities in the northeast. Nigerian security forces have been described as "sources of insecurity, dislocation, extensive human rights abuses, and radicalization".[121] However, as a result, it adds another obstacle to the struggle against violent extremism. More than 1,200 people have been extrajudicially executed by Nigerian military forces, at least 20,000 people have been detained arbitrarily (mostly young men and boys), uncountable acts of torture have already been committed, hundreds or even thousands of Nigerians have been forced into the disappearance, and at least 7,000 people have died in military detention from starvation, extreme overcrowding, and other causes, according to a 2015 Amnesty International report.[122] In addition to using force, the approach to stop Boko Haram intends to deprive the terrorist group of the resources it needs to continue the operation. Farmers have been unable to grow tall vegetation as a result, apparently depriving fighters of ideal hiding spots, and commerce and economic activities have been severely constrained. Additionally, it is claimed that the military mistreated people in IDP camps who had been forcibly removed from their homes in their home communities. Local people had grown increasingly frustrated with the security forces, and as the government was unable to permanently resolve the conflict, this had accelerated radicalism among the most vulnerable.

Late in 2016 and early in 2017, when security circumstances improved, the government of Nigeria and its international allies started to talk more about stability. The Nigerian government unveiled its post-conflict recovery goals in the northeast in the so-called Buhari Plan, which covers everything from emergency aid to stability and early recovery. In 2018, the African Union and Lake Chad Basin

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[119] Office of the National Security Advisor, *Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism* (PCVE) (2017). p.5.
http://ctc.gov.ng/pcve-nsa-book/

[120] Office of the National Security Advisor, *Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism* (PCVE) (2017). pp.12-13.
http://ctc.gov.ng/pcve-nsa-book/

[121] Vanda Felbab-Brown, *"Nigeria's Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy Against Boko Haram: How the Military and Militias Are Fueling Insecurity,"* Foreign Affairs, March 30, 2018.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2018-03-30/nigerias-troublingcounterinsurgency-strategy-against-boko-haram

[122] Amnesty International, *Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands. War crimes committed by the Nigerian military* (London: Amnesty International, 2015), p.40.
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4416572015ENGLISH.PDF

Commission created a regional stability strategy. Programs to lay the foundation for a move to longer-term development and governance activities started to take form.

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), which has allegedly used child recruiting in their operations to combat Boko Haram and protect local communities, also engages in the practice. According to estimates, the CJTF is made up of 25,000–27,000 individuals who are spread among different militia organizations. The "Borno Youth Empowerment Schemes" (better known as BOYES), which has a few thousand members and aids the military's CT operations by being trained, armed, and equipped, is undertaking studies by the Nigerian government. Due to the Nigerian government's lack of resources, Vanda Felbab-Brown (2018) observed that "there is a significant chance that the rivalries between the groups may give rise to violence and that at least some of the militias may resort to predation, extortion, and criminality".[123]

These strategies have had varying degrees of success in countering terrorism in Nigeria. To be effective, these strategies need to be integrated into a comprehensive and coordinated approach that addresses the root causes of terrorism and promotes long-term stability, development, and security in the country.

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[123] Vanda Felbab-Brown, "*Nigeria's Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy Against Boko Haram: How the Military and Militias Are Fueling Insecurity,*" Foreign Affairs, March 30, (2018).
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2018-03-30/nigerias-troublingcounterinsurgency-strategy-against-boko-haram

# Chapter 6: DETERRING TERRORISM IN NIGERIA? DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

An extremely important section of the thesis is being covered for the practical component. This is the data analysis section of two significant elements, namely the total number of attacks carried out Boko haram terrorist organization, and the number of fatalities in the attacks as the adaptations of deterrence in counter-terrorism aims at deterring, preventing, and denying an aggressor the potential of success of operations, moreover, the strategic measures are a useful framework for understanding the patterns of attacks, while denying the terrorism the enabling environment for its capabilities in increase terror against citizens and infrastructures, due to the limited data on Nigeria security operations against terrorist to the public, the study has more or less depends on secondary sources of data as captured in the global terrorism index for its analysis of the country counter terrorist effectiveness to deter terror attacks.

In the context of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy between 2009 to 2019, the success and lack of success in adopting deterrence concepts are being evaluated using data from the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) on the total number of attacks carried out by Boko Haram and the number of fatalities resulting from the attacks. Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy during this period included the use of military force, intelligence gathering, international collaboration, and community policing, which all have elements of deterrence. The military operations conducted by the Nigerian Armed Forces against Boko Haram were aimed at destroying the group's capacity to carry out attacks and deter them from future attacks.

According to the GTI, there was a significant increase in the number of terrorist attacks carried out by Boko Haram in Nigeria between 2009 and 2014 and during this period the total of attacks indicated that 1,312. Nigeria experienced 496 terrorist attacks, and fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks revealed 7561 and the fatalities mean show 15.24 at its peak in 2014. Despite the implementation of various counter-terrorism measures during this period, the number of attacks and fatalities continued to increase with a decrease afterward in July as the graph indicated in table 3.1. Furthermore, the GTI data shows that the number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram in Nigeria increased between 2009 and 2014, suggesting that the earlier operations aimed at deterring terrorist capabilities may not have been effective during this period, as the Nigerian government launched several military operations, such as Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Safe Haven that aimed at combating Boko Haram, and the Law enforcement strategy deployed by the Nigerian government has used the various military forces in deterring terrorism which resulted in the capturing and killing some terrorists, also seeks to deter individuals from engaging in terrorist activities through punishment or the threat of punishment. However, the data from (GTI) shows that there was a steady increase in the number of terrorist incidents and fatalities in Nigeria between 2009 and 2014, despite the government's law enforcement efforts. And the group's ability in adapting to military operations by becoming more decentralized and relying on guerrilla tactics has made it complex to completely eradicate the group and deter its attacks.

However, from 2015 onwards, there was a gradual decline in the number of attacks and fatalities resulting from Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria. This decline can be attributed to the implementation of deterrence concepts in Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy, such as the increased military operations against Boko Haram and the successful collaboration with international partners to provide intelligence support and technical assistance. Therefore, the success of these efforts was mixed. While the number of terrorist attacks carried out by Boko Haram shifted slightly indicating 48 points upwards from 2014, the group continued to carry out attacks throughout the period, and the number of fatalities resulting from the attacks decreased to 6027. One possible reason for this could be that the

Nigerian government's focus on military operations and the use of force may not have addressed the underlying grievances and root causes of the conflict, such as poverty, unemployment, and political marginalization. Without addressing these issues, deterrence alone may not be sufficient in countering the threat of terrorism.

And GTI data shows that in 2015, the number of fatalities in attacks began to decline which coincides with the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) aimed at combating Boko Haram across borders, suggesting that expanding deterrence in counter-terrorism such as the international cooperation may have had some success in deterring Boko Haram's cross-border activities have further put the question of state territorial status and non-state actors that requires more study, however, this is considered outside the study limits.

The GTI data shows that the number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram began to decline after 2015, which suggests that denial may have been effective in reducing the group's capacity to carry out attacks. Additional denial strategy adopted in countering terrorism is the economic sanctions by the government to deny resources to terrorists and deter them from carrying out attacks, and the strategy aimed at denial that seeks to prevent terrorists from accessing the resources they need to carry out attacks suggesting that economic sanctions had some success in Nigeria, with the number of terrorist incidents and fatalities declining steadily toward the end of 2015 onwards and conceptual views in non-kinetic approach on values that may fall outside the scope which could be punished by military components and denial approach as a strategy which aimed at preventing terrorists from accessing the resources, they need to carry out attacks. In Nigeria, the government has attempted to implement denial by targeting the group's financial resources by freezing bank accounts and seizing assets. The GTI data shows that the number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram began to decline in late 2015, which suggests that denial may have been effective in reducing the group's capacity to carry out attacks.

The data representations from GTI in 2016 show that the total number of attacks and fatalities attributed to terrorist attacks declined to suggest that the preventive approach of diplomacy strategy which aimed at resolving conflicts through peaceful means, the government also attempted to engage in dialogue with Boko Haram leaders as well the implemented de-radicalization programs that aimed at rehabilitating former Boko Haram members and reintegrating them into the society which also coincides with the implementation of de-radicalization programs, however, it is difficult to assess the impact of de-radicalization programs on deterrence, as they are typically focused on preventing re-radicalization and recidivism, rather than directly deterring attacks.

However, the successes and lack of success of deterrence concepts in Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy from 2009 to 2019 by analyzing the data from the global terrorism index (GTI) on the total number of attacks carried out by the Boko Haram terrorist organization and the number of fatalities resulting from these attacks revealed some successes which as the reduction in the number of attacks by the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism efforts by the deployment of troops and intelligence sharing with neighboring countries have contributed to a decline in the number of Boko Haram attacks in the years following 2015. And the government's targeted approach to deterrence in counter-terrorism such as the imposition of stricter penalties for terrorism-related offenses and the launch of military operations to target Boko Haram's leadership and infrastructure was successful in weakening the group's operational capabilities. While the Increased collaboration with neighboring countries such as Cameroon and Chad and outside Africa was successful in disrupting Boko Haram's cross-border activities.

The Lack of success given the high number of attacks and fatalities despite the Nigerian government's efforts, Boko Haram was responsible for over 3343 terrorist incidents and 25566 fatalities in Nigeria during the period from 2009 to 2019, and the fatalities mean showing 7.65 indicating that deterrence measures were not entirely successful in preventing attacks.

However, Human rights violations particularly in military operations, have been criticized for human rights violations which including extrajudicial killings and torture, which may have undermined the effectiveness of deterrence measures, and because the country fails to address the root causes of terror in the counter-terrorism strategy that focused primarily on military operations and deterrence measures did not sufficiently address the underlying social, economic, and political grievances that contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram in the first place.

Furthermore, while the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism efforts had some successes in reducing the number of attacks and weakening Boko Haram's capabilities, there were also significant lacks of success, including the high number of attacks and fatalities, human rights violations, and the failure to address root causes.

Therefore, the success of deterrence in Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy from 2009 to 2019 is difficult to determine definitively, as it is dependent on several factors, such as the effectiveness of the measures employed, the motivations of the individuals or groups being targeted, and the socio-political and economic conditions that give rise to terrorism.

This decrease in the number of incidents may suggest that Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy may have been effective in deterring Boko Haram from carrying out terrorist attacks. However, it is important to note that the decrease in incidents may also be attributed to other factors, such as the split within Boko Haram and the formation of a new group, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

Despite the decrease in the number of incidents, Nigeria continues to be one of the countries most affected by terrorism, with Boko Haram and ISWAP remaining significant security threats. This suggests that while Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy may have been effective in deterring Boko Haram from carrying out attacks over the period, a slight shift in 2019 as indicated by 245 in the total number of attacks and fatalities in 2019 coincide with the slipping of the terrorist group as well as the election year in Nigeria of which the people democratic party lost the presidential seat to all progressive congress could be possible factors, however, the counter-terrorism strategies may not have been entirely successful in addressing the underlying factors that give rise to terrorism.

Additionally, while there may have been some success in deterring terrorist attacks by Boko Haram during the period from 2015 to 2019, the effectiveness of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy overall is difficult to determine. A comprehensive analysis that takes into account a range of factors, including the impact of terrorism on society and the success of community engagement programs, is needed to fully understand the success and limitations of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy from 2009 to 2019.

Although overall analyses are made collectively and for individual years, the targeted years and periods are mainly focused on those before and after major counterterrorism laws were passed by the country such as the first counter-terrorism law passed in 2011, the introduction of the terrorism prevention act on February 17th, 2013, and the formation of Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) in early 2014. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2014 (NACTEST), and the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) 2017 to the validity of the case under study.

For making analysis, data was scrapped from the global terrorism database, GTD website (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd). The dataset used for analysis contains information about the date, city, perpetrator group (Boko Haram), fatalities incurred, and the targets of the attacks, with the years of the attacks spanning from 2009 to 2020 and contains 3343 rows of entries and 8 columns. It is important to note as stated on the website that the data contains all attacks reported as Boko haram attacks regardless of doubts.

Analysis was carried out with Excel and the Python programming language (using jupyter notebook).

```python
import pandas as pd
import matplotlib as mpl
import numpy as np
import seaborn as sns
from pandas import Series, DataFrame

df = pd.read_excel ('C:\\Users\\Admin\\Downloads\\gti_bokoharam_dataset.xlsx')
```

*Fig.1.0 Python library imports and data reading (Source: own work)*

Due to the incompletion of certain data mainly for variables such as the number of injuries and especially the fatalities suffered, these missing data have some relatively minor effects and as such do not change the overall information derived from the analysis of the dataset. Such, unknown or null data (Na / NaN) were assigned the value of zero.

```
df_clean= df.fillna(0)
print (df_clean)

             GTD        DATE  COUNTRY      CITY       PERPERTRATOR  \
0      202012290026  2020-12-29  Nigeria   Kayamla          Boko Haram
1      202012290025  2020-12-29  Nigeria   Kayamla          Boko Haram
2      202012290023  2020-12-29  Nigeria   Tungushe         Boko Haram
3      202012280023  2020-12-28  Nigeria   Logomani         Boko Haram
4      202012260015  2020-12-26  Nigeria     Azare          Boko Haram
...             ...         ...      ...       ...                ...
3338   200907270026  2009-07-27  Nigeria  Maiduguri  Boko Haram (suspected)
3339   200907270025  2009-07-27  Nigeria  Maiduguri  Boko Haram (suspected)
3340   200907270017  2009-07-27  Nigeria  Maiduguri  Boko Haram (suspected)
3341   200907270016  2009-07-27  Nigeria  Maiduguri  Boko Haram (suspected)
3342   200907270015  2009-07-27  Nigeria   Gambaru   Boko Haram (suspected)

      FATALITIES  INJURED                               TARGET TYPE
0            9.0      7.0                 Terrorists/Non-state Militia
1            0.0      0.0                 Terrorists/Non-state Militia
2            3.0      2.0        Private Citizens & Property,Military
3            3.0      0.0                                    Military
4            2.0      1.0           Police,Private Citizens & Property
...          ...      ...                                        ...
3338         0.0      0.0  Government (General),Private Citizens & Property
3339         0.0      0.0          Police,Private Citizens & Property
3340         0.0      0.0                 Private Citizens & Property
3341        77.0      0.0          Police,Private Citizens & Property
3342         0.0      0.0          Police,Private Citizens & Property

[3343 rows x 8 columns]
```

*Fig.1.1 Data cleaning (Source: own work)*

| YEAR | TOTAL NUMBER OF ATTACKS | FATALITIES | FATALITIES (MEAN) |
|------|------------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| **2009-2020** | 3343 | 25566 | 7.65 |

*Table.2.0 Cumulative number of attacks and fatalities (Source: own work)*

The overall data obtained from the analysis for all years as well as those for individual years with the cumulative summation of the number of attacks for all years and that of individual years in the table below were from our data, there has been a total number of 3343 attacks from 2009 till 2020 and has

resulted in over 25,000 fatalities, therefore resulting in average death of between 7 and 8 people per attack.

| YEAR | TOTAL NUMBER OF ATTACKS | FATALITIES | FATALITIES (MEAN) |
|------|------|------|------|
| **2009** | 10 | 304 | 30.4 |
| **2010** | 18 | 72 | 4 |
| **2011** | 127 | 350 | 2.76 |
| **2012** | 426 | 1259 | 2.95 |
| **2013** | 235 | 1731 | 7.37 |
| **2014** | 496 | 7561 | 15.24 |
| **2015** | 542 | 6027 | 11.12 |
| **2016** | 253 | 1493 | 5.90 |
| **2017** | 342 | 1590 | 4.65 |
| **2018** | 245 | 1327 | 5.42 |
| **2019** | 348 | 1954 | 5.61 |
| **2020** | 301 | 1898 | 6.31 |

*Table 2.1 Cumulative number of attacks and fatalities per year (Own work)*

From the total number of attacks each year in table x below, we can see that the number of attacks as well as the fatalities suffered by Nigeria at the hands of Boko haram terrorists was at the highest between 2014 and 2015. Possible reasons for this would be highlighted in the latter pages when the effects of counter-terrorism laws will be looked at concerning when they were passed and what consequences followed. Also, it must be said that there has been an unfortunate rapid rise after the first 2 years of the beginning of acts of terrorism by Boko haram in Nigeria and considering the earlier threats of retaliation for killing the leaders by security, and since 2009, it has been driven by the desire for vengeance against politicians, police, and Islamic authorities for their role in the brutal suppression of the group that year, but the group has proven itself to be very adaptable, evolving its tactics swiftly, and changing its targets at the behest of charismatic leadership.[124]

For better visualization, the data is further visualized in a line chat diagram which provides a better overall view of the changes made in the number of attacks each year.

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[124] Andrew Walker, *what is Boko Haram?* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2012). p.2. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf

THE FIRST COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW (2009-2012)



*Graph. 3.0 Attacks-Date Line chat between 2009-2012 (Source: GTD)*

The diagram translates the activity of the actor's capabilities which included both (state and non-state actors), however, 2009 and 2010 was intense period of insecurity as the security organization responded to the attack by "apprehending Boko Haram's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and killed in police custody in 2009 in the aftermath of one of Boko Haram's deadly confrontations with Nigerian security forces, and the sect has vowed revenge for the killing of their leader, "these factors in July indicated a percent higher on the chat and dropping to its earlier levels, and one of the aspects that culminated in the Boko Haram insurgency has been cited as the brutality with which Mohammed Yusuf was murdered.

Another Event on July 26, 2009, at approximately six in the morning, a small group of roughly 30 youths marched into the Dutsen Township Police Station in Bauchi Town. Machetes, bows and arrows, daggers, and a Dane gun were among the various weapons they all carried. And the retaliations that the group threatened to carry out revealed a challenging period with the frequency of flows indicator shows.

As a result, Abubakar Shekau assumed command of the group in 2010, and the "Darul Tawheed" reinforcement was successful in bringing the group back together after the death of the previous commander. As a result, the number of attacks kept increasing, as shown by the chat data, which shows higher frequencies in Boko haram's total number of attack capabilities, fatalities decreased, as well as the mean, but the number of attacks shows 10, and the total fatality indicates 304 as capture.

This number of attacks increased in 2010, and the data recorded the total number of attacks indicates 18; however, the fatalities decreased to 72, and the fatalities mean recorded indicated a decrease to 4, thereby indicating a decrease when compared to the number in 2009 where the fatalities mean indicated 304. During 2010, the sect evolved into a more adaptable, dynamic, and decentralized group that may combine various tactics and expand or reorganize target selection due to the indicator that characterized the rising patterns in the charts. Up to six bombs exploded on Christmas Eve 2010 in some of the attacked locations in Jos, Plateau state, near churches, and a market, killing multiple people.

Nigeria's first counter-terrorism law, the Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011, was enacted to provide legal and institutional frameworks for the prevention and combating of terrorism in the country. The law has had several effects since its enactment.

One of the main effects of the law has been the strengthening of Nigeria's legal system to deal with terrorism-related offences. The law provides for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of individuals and groups involved in terrorist activities. It also includes provisions for the freezing of assets, forfeiture of property, and the prosecution of financiers of terrorism. The law has also led to increased cooperation between Nigerian security agencies and their international counterparts in the fight against terrorism. The Act provides for the exchange of intelligence and other relevant information with foreign governments and international organizations, which has helped to identify and apprehend terrorists and their sponsors.

However, the implementation of the law has not been without challenges. There have been concerns about the misuse of the law to stifle dissent and target political opponents. There have also been criticisms about the lack of transparency and accountability in the implementation of the law, particularly concerning the detention and prosecution of suspects.

Moreover, The Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011 has had a mixed impact on Nigeria's efforts to combat terrorism. While it has provided a legal framework for the prevention and prosecution of terrorist activities, there have been concerns about its implementation and potential abuse.

Furthermore, The Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA), and the cumulative total number of attacks indicate an increase of about 127, and fatalities suffered 350 while the mean revealed decreased by 2.76 when compared to the 2009 and 2010 representation of data.

In June 2011, the Joint Military Task Force in Nigeria, known as Operation Restore Order (JTORO), was launched in response to the increasing security challenges in the country, particularly in the northeastern region. The task force was composed of military and security personnel from various agencies, including the Nigerian Army, Air Force, Navy, Police, and State Security Service.

The primary objective of JTORO was to restore law and order in areas affected by terrorist activities, such as Boko Haram and other insurgent groups. The task force was given the mandate to conduct operations aimed at neutralizing terrorists and their networks, as well as securing communities affected by the insurgency. JTORO's operations were carried out through a combination of intelligence gathering, targeted raids, and joint military patrols. The task force also engaged in civic activities, such as providing medical care, education, and other forms of assistance to affected communities.

While JTORO has achieved some successes in its operations, including the capture of key terrorist leaders and the recovery of weapons and explosives, it has also faced criticisms and allegations of human rights abuses. There have been reports of extrajudicial killings, torture, and the arbitrary detention of suspects.

And, the effectiveness of JTORO has been a subject of debate, with some stakeholders calling for a review of the task force's operations and strategy. The Nigerian government has continued to support JTORO and other security agencies in their efforts to combat terrorism and other security challenges in the country. Furthermore, the group turned to attacking important Abuja targets between June and August 2011 as a case of reference among other sensitive security structures attacked, including the Nigerian Police Headquarters and the UN headquarters.

The attack frequency in graphic displays revealed irregularities in flow patterns. And one of the key steps taken by the government to dissuade Boko haram was the creation of a Joint Military Task Force called Operation Restore Order (JTORO) in June 2011.

Although records for 2012 show a total of 246 attacks, 1259 fatalities, and a mean of 2.59 fatalities per attack, these representations show an increase in attack frequencies as well as fatality figures; however, the mean decrease shows a pattern of change based on the earlier impacts of attacks with previous years.

The Nigeria counter-terrorism strategy in 2013. The strategy was called the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) and was developed by the Nigerian government to address the growing threat of terrorism in the country, particularly from the militant group Boko Haram. The strategy was a multi-agency approach that involved the military, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other stakeholders.

As a result, the data for 2013 showed that there were 235 attacks overall, which is fewer than 2012's total of 246, and that there were 1731 fatalities, which is more than in previous years. Additionally, the mean shows that there has been an increase in the effects of terrorism on citizens, with Boko Haram and affiliated groups carrying out hundreds of attacks in 2013 and killing 1,000 people.

The NACTEST had several key objectives, including the prevention of terrorist attacks, the disruption of terrorist financing and recruitment, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the prosecution of terrorist suspects. The strategy also emphasized the importance of community engagement and the promotion of interfaith dialogue to counter extremist narratives.

It is worth noting that the NACTEST was later updated in 2016 to reflect changing security threats and to improve its effectiveness in countering terrorism. However, the 2013 version of the strategy was an important step in Nigeria's efforts to address the challenge of terrorism in the country. These include the military operations that conducted several operations aimed at tackling terrorist activities in 2013. These operations led to the capture of several high-profile terrorists, the destruction of terrorist camps, and the recovery of weapons and explosives. And counterterrorism laws by the government also implemented several counterterrorism laws aimed at preventing and combating terrorism. These laws include the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, and the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act. These laws provided legal frameworks for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of individuals and groups involved in terrorist activities.

Furthermore. Increased international cooperation with international partners, including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, in the fight against terrorism. This cooperation included the provision of training, equipment, and intelligence sharing. However, there are challenges despite the government's efforts to the implementation of the counterterrorism strategy in 2013.  These challenges included allegations of human rights abuses by security forces, insufficient resources for military operations, and inadequate coordination among security agencies. Nonetheless, there were some successes in the implementation of the counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria in 2013, as well as significant challenges that needed to be addressed.

THE COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY (2014, 2015, and 2016)



*Graph.3.1 Attacks-Date Line chat between 2014-2016 (Source: GTD)*

Despite early 2014 initiatives like the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) to conduct CT/COIN operations against Boko Haram, the 2015 multinational force tasks led by Abuja state, and additional law amendments and military operations carried out, the years 2014 and 2015 saw the highest rise of both the total number of attacks and fatalities suffered with a total of 496 and 7561 for each feature, respectively, for each feature for 2014 and 542 and 6027 for 2015 as well.

The years between 2014 and 2015 saw one of the highest peaks and the greatest number of Boko haram attacks occurring in a year, as can be seen from Graph 3.1 above. This increase in the overall number of attacks to 496 and 542 illustrates the success of neither the operations carried out by the Nigerian army nor, more importantly, the laws and policies put in place to combat Boko haram terrorism, and there were 7561 more fatalities overall. while the mean for the time covered by the analysis also showed a record high of 15.24 fatalities impacting the citizenry.

In the 2015 capture, there were a total of 542 attacks, although there were 6027 fewer fatalities than in previous years and a mean that was 11.12 less than the record-breaking high of 2014.

OVERVIEW OF GRAPH PATTERN OF ATTACKS IN NIGERIA

The accumulative pattern of attacks from 2009 to 2019 is presented for a summary of events in the graphical overview below.



*Graph.3.2 Attacks-Date Line chat per year (Source: GTD)*

The attacks carried out in 2016 totaled 253, down from the 542 attacks carried out by Boko haram in 2015, while the number of fatalities showed 1493, up from 2015; the mean data also revealed 5.90, a decrease in Boko haram capabilities effects after attacks, as the figure of the previous year was 11.12.

In 2017. Threats from Boko haram have increased, as has the overall number of attacks, which now totals 342. The number of fatalities has increased to 1590, up from 1493 the year before, while the mean has reduced to 4.65 from 11.12 in 2016.

The information visualization from 2018 revealed the total number of attacks by the terrorist group to be 245. However, these indicate a decreasing number of Boko haram capabilities in attacks when compared to 2017 records of the activities, which were 342. Correspondingly, a decreasing number of fatalities, 1327 against 1590 in 2017, and an increase in the mean, 5.42, when compared to 11.12 in 2017, are also revealed.

However, the data recorded from 2009 to 2019 as the graphic translates the activity of Boko Haram's attacks against the state's ability to deny the terrorist the opportunity, constantly as the frequency in the chat stated. Since the research was conducted over 20 years, it has been necessary to adopt numerous counterterrorism strategies to counter terrorist threats and activities. The table showed a rise in attacks, and one factor that can be attributed to this is that Boko Haram was brutally put down in July 2009 after being forced into an open conflict with the Nigerian government through both covert and overt threats of force and that the group's commander was tortured and killed by Nigerian security forces after being tortured to death.

The group has demonstrated itself to be very adaptable, evolving its tactics rapidly, and changing its targets at the behest of charismatic leadership as some events to be considered for punishment. This method of punishment is considered among some findings of the Presidential committee, and threats

of using violence as retaliation against the killing of one of its members by security operatives, as well as the politicians, police, and Islamic authorities for their role in the brutal suppression of the group.

Previously, governments viewed Boko Haram as a nuisance that exclusively operated in the extreme northeast and attacked Christians with machetes and small guns. It is currently the most notorious terrorist organization in Nigeria. The frequency and severity of its attacks have increased, and a growing number of international institutions, including the UN complex, are now among its targets. The group finally introduced suicide bombers to its arsenal, starting with the attack on the Abuja police barracks on June 16, 2011, in contrast to 2009, when armed assaults gained a reputation. These changes during the research period from 2009 to 2019 show an increase in attack technique adaptability and expertise.

# Chapter 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Terrorism as an act of violence has engaged Nigeria's security force in combat operations within and around its borders to discourage the capabilities of Boko haram attacks, these have forced citizens into displacement camps, and have reduced the state's administrative status of the effectively delivering public service as a security of life and property,

Furthermore, the Nigerian government's counterterrorism measures have evolved and will continue to shape primarily around policies of deterrence through punishment and denial. Applying the deterrence concept to successfully prevent terrorism appears ineffective in the long run, as findings suggest that strategies of denial, such as target hardening, and punishment, such as the targeted killing of Boko haram figures, have a limited and short-term deterrent effect upon terrorist organizations as argued by Knopf conceptual views "the most important result has been to reveal the value of adopting a broader concept of deterrence that is not exclusively military in nature,"[125] Furthermore, this apparent inefficiency, however, can be linked to the predominance of a state-centric approach to counterterrorism, which has sparked rhetoric of illegitimacy that thwarts efforts to comprehend the socio-political circumstances of terrorism.

Extended counterterrorism policies must include attempts to disengage and disconnect terrorist movements from the socio-political milieu on which they depend to survive, in addition to effective denial and punishment measures. Counter-terrorism efforts are necessary to prevent terrorism, and it is important to concentrate on the underlying causes of terrorism in addition to the terrorists' actions as in the case of the various counterterrorism strategic frameworks deployed in Nigeria.

Consequently, Davis and Jenkins stated that other amendments examine the nature of the posture that requires credibility, and the rising costs and denial of successes, and better measures can help to deter or deflect, even if they are decidedly imperfect.[126] Furthermore, the clashes that resulted in Mohammed Yusuf's death in 2009 marked a pivotal turning point in Boko Haram's utilization of violence. However, Robert's views on deterrence perceptive that provided empirical support for the notion that anything that reduces the estimated probability of operational success could deter, The Nigerian authorities charged five police officers in connection with Yusuf's murder, and in August 2010 the court-martial for the military commander in charge of the troops that killed 42 sect members during the uprising in July 2009 officially began.

The most certain indication we can provide to the enemy is that the area is highly valued by the defendant, as Snyder's earlier view of having an adequate denial capability, preferably the one situated near to or in a threatened area,[127] furthermore, as the events escalated, the group started deploying violence to disseminate its principles and beliefs by using weapons such as guns, grenades, and other explosives. Several sect members attacked a police station in Bauchi state on July 26, 2009, and 39 Boko Haram terrorists, two police officers, and one soldier were killed.

Deterrence concepts, as argued that in concept may succeed, while in practice may be challenging in threat applications as the data from terrorist attacks revealed earlier in the study. Boko Haram was originally seen by governments as a nuisance that only existed in the far northeast and attacked

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[125] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "*The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,*" Contemporary Security Policy 31,1, (2010). p.1. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523261003640819

[126] Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence, and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002). pp.59. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1619.html.

[127] Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Canter of International Studies, Princeton University, 1959). pp.4-6. http://books.google.com/books?id=MTIZAAAAIAAJ

Christians with machetes and small arms and is the most notorious terrorist organization in Nigeria. Over the years, the group activities from the data suggest an increase in the frequency and sophistication of its attacks in Nigeria which have increased targets to include global organizations like the UN compound.

In contrast to 2009, when armed assaults gained popularity, the group finally introduced suicide bombers to its arsenal, as evident with the attack on the Abuja police barracks on June 16, 2011. These changes signified a broader scope of adaptability and sophistication. Nonetheless, as in the views of certain threats that the state would prefer not to carry out as been highlighted by Thomas Schelling, such factors could affect deterrence application thereby revealing the weakness in deterrence and can emerge when an aggressor believes the defender would ultimately prove unwilling to carry out its threats.[128]

Accordingly, the amended laws within the time frame of the case study were the establishment on June 12, 2011, of a Joint Military Task Force named "Operation Restore Order (JTORO) base location was in Maiduguri to battle the sect's growing terrorist potential as the key component feature of the Nigerian government responses to the Boko Haram threat. However, the JTORO's deployment has had some success, especially when utilizing military patrol cars that have a 50-meter range for finding hidden bombs and other weapons could suggest that adopting tactical technology are vital in situation awareness and earlier warning indicator in combating terror capabilities. Followed by the elite security forces which have recorded some success in apprehending and killing Boko Haram operational commanders and strategists. According to events trouble began when some of the sect members were traveling on motorbikes and were stopped by Operation Flush patrol teams and asked why they were not wearing crash elements as they made their way to a cemetery to bury four of their members who had perished in a car accident on the Biu-Maiduguri was a triggering event that leads to some sect members been shot to death. The Boko Haram group in response demanded apologies and warned of exact revenge if the government did not make an apology for what had transpired to its members. Neither public officials nor security personnel were ineffective in responding to this threat earlier.

The asymmetric combat strategy was revealed in 2010-2012 when Nigerian officials believed they had successfully put an end to the movement after the government's crackdown. However, under the command of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram re-emerged and began intermittent attacks in the northeast, which others suggest that it came about as a result of the group's disintegration following the 2009 attack, and Shekau was known as Darul Tawheed by his adherents, who address him as an Imam.

From the analysis of the data, the sect's increase in violent attacks after the uprising in July 2009 is seen as playing a significant role in Nigeria's adopting the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011. The Act's specific goals were to implement preventative measures, outlawing, and eradicating acts of terrorism as well as the financing of terrorism in Nigeria. It also aimed to effectively implement the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Acts of Terrorism.

Despite their successes, the special security forces' deployment in northern Nigeria has drawn criticism for their harsh tactics that have injured locals and destroyed property, as argued in Sampson's opinions. The JTF had come under heavy fire from a segment of the Nigerian public for its

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[128] Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms, and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) p.123. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300253481

violent counter-terrorism operation. It is said to have used excessive force that forced people who would otherwise be critical of the sect's activities to back down from their earlier positions.

The Nigerian government took a while to realize the severity of the issue despite its covert operations being increasingly sophisticated. Furthermore, when President Goodluck Jonathan was in office, the view of Boko Haram as a terrorist group with connections to global jihadist networks set the stage for a restrained counterterrorism response. Nigeria's government had explored cooperative alliances with other countries and international organizations in increasing its capability to confront the threat posed by Boko Haram, as well as deter the formation of terrorist organizations in Nigeria, which required cooperative measures with organizations like the UN, EU, and International Civil Aviation Organization, the US, France, South Korea, and Israel. The collaborations between Nigeria and the UN have established the framework known as the Integrated Assistance on Counter-Terrorism under the auspices of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (I-ACT).

The Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act of 2013 (TPAA) which was officially passed on 17 February 2013 has formalized the effort to provide Nigeria with a comprehensive legal framework for counterterrorism, and ensured that the Act is applicable outside national borders, strengthens the penalties for terrorist financing offenses, and deals with relevant concerns. The strategy authorizes the ONSA the responsibility of coordinating counterterrorism efforts between all security and law enforcement agencies, including the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF), and as a result, making sure that Nigeria's CT framework complies with international counter-terrorism legal mechanisms.

Moreover, it seeks to expand the definition of the offense of terrorism and strengthen the sanction regime, as well as power the court to act more promptly on terrorism-related cases, the TPAA made a variety of significant changes, expanded the number and applicability of offenses, significantly increased the penalties for terrorist offenses, and expanded the adjunct powers' jurisdiction.

The Nigerian military stepped up its fight against Boko Haram in 2013, as the activities involved brute military action against the Boko haram organization and deployed of nearly 8000 troops into affected portions of northern Nigeria, although there was no specifically stated Military Code of Justice for the operation, the federal government had deployed a specially trained anti-terrorism combat team to terrorist hotspots, which event follows with Boko Haram and associated actors performing hundreds of attacks, purportedly resulting in a thousand fatalities in 2013 alone.

The group's capacity as revealed by the data analyzed did not diminish, however, the region's civilian populace was severely alienated as a result of its indiscriminate tactics. The cycle of violence showed an increase when the Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States were placed under a state of emergency. Consequently, Boko Haram abducted over 275 female students from the town of Chibok in April 2014, the problem received more attention from policymakers and international concerns about the increasing threats of terrorist organizations.

Moreover, for assistance in locating the girls, several organizations, and governments, including the United States have provided technical support and intelligence-sharing for planning and coordinating swift responses to the crisis, the collaboration with the U.S. State Department has established the Nigeria Planning and Operations Group that brought together technical and regional expertise as well as a military liaison. Greater cooperation was impeded by worries and challenges that Nigerian security personnel was abusing human rights even as Boko Haram increased its influence over the countryside in the northeast.

The strategy of military cooperation between the Lake Chad nations and the use of the Global Security Cooperation Fund and the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund have increased security assistance to

Cameroon, Chad, and Niger as a result of growing concerns about Boko Haram's threat to regional stability. In addition, the formation of the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) in early 2014 to conduct CT/COIN operations against Boko Haram and its offshoots is another event that epitomized the posture in collaborations at the operational/tactical level of the Nigerian Ministry of Defence. Furthermore, the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) is working in collaboration with the Special Boat Service of the Nigerian Navy to integrate into the existing special operations forces (SOF) infrastructure (SBS).

Furthermore, SOF has increased the ability to safeguard expeditionary landing sites as well as support ground and marine troops with CAS and a CSAR capability by the recently established Nigerian Air Force Special Troops Regiment (NAF SFR). Yet the counter-terrorism strategy 2013 (TPAA) recorded the highest number of fatalities during the study period, as the mean revealed 15.24, however, Ojelade argued that the increase in the Boko haram terrorist attacks necessitated the development of the policy during 2009-2015. Moreover, deterrence's conceptual view is that if the anticipated punishment outweighs the anticipated reward, then opponents will be deterred, according to Achen and Snidal's argument, and do not specify which punishment will deter could depict the technicalities in the applications of deterrence concepts against terror.

its assertions are conditional, opponents will be deterred if the expected punishment exceeds the advantage, suggesting that various potential punishments may deter, but not necessarily anyone as evident in the data from the various counter-terrorism strategy deployed, in its earlier military posture as Boko Haram fought against the Nigerian government despite covert and overt pressure in July 2009, and the group's leader was tortured and executed by Nigerian security forces. Afterward being able to regroup while hiding suggested the limitation in the utilization of force alone as the data further revealed that Boko Haram made a catastrophic comeback in 2010.

The Denial approach suggests the lowest capturing in the data, the total number of attacks revealed is 10, while fatalities show 304, and the mean shows 30.4 as the highest in the study period, with lower attacks and an increase in both fatalities and means could reveal the impacts on casualties. Furthermore, punishment applications used to reduce threats of Boko Haram could reveal a short time necessity of utilization of state force craft against Boko haram, and the following frequency in 2010 revealed an increase in the total number of attacks as 18, fatalities 72, while the mean appears to lowest with 4, therefore, the first military responses recorded effective deterring capabilities.

The perspective of understanding the two tenets of deterrence conceptual failure as conceptual and practical. Deterrence may not be efficient if, and when threats are insufficient, nonspecific, ambiguous, or withheld, or if it is thought that engaging would be more beneficial from a strategic point of view. Although the principle of deterrence works, it may fail in situations where threats are perceived as being insufficient, vague, impractical, or not being taken seriously as revealed by the event of attack frequency, and the deployment of special military forces without a clear strategy in operations.

Additionally, the abduction of 276 female students from the town of Chibok by Boko Haram in April 2014 made international headlines and increased policy attention to the crisis as international organizations and regional powers, including the US, offered technical assistance and intelligence-sharing to assist in locating the girls. To plan and coordinate swift responses to the crisis, the U.S. State Department established the Nigeria Planning and Operations Group, which brought together technical and regional expertise as well as a military liaison. Greater cooperation was impeded by worries that Nigerian security forces were abusing human rights even as Boko Haram increased its hold over the northeastern region.

There is a straightforward concept that sums up deterrence notions. The criterion is, once more, perceptual, therefore Boko Haram must believe that the counterterrorism approach has the ability and motivation to carry out what it threatens. The issue is not whether the military truly possesses these capabilities or will use them; rather, it is whether the attacker thinks it does, the fight with Operation Flash in some of the conflicts where different operational techniques have been used. The perception of the threat's resolve to carry out the threat, if necessary, and, more crucially, the potential aggressor's conviction that the threat will be carried out, are both important factors in deterrence. Consequently, according to Bruce Russett, deterrence is ineffective "when the attacker decides that the defender's threat is not likely to be fulfilled. out. Therefore, it is necessary to have threat perceptions and denial capabilities. President Muhammadu Buhari's dedication to combating Islamic extremist networks in the northern regions is demonstrated by Abuja's assumption of command of the Multinational Joint Task Force in June 2015. (MNJTF). Contingents from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin constitute the MNJTF. Benin was a member nation, and it supplemented and established the earlier ad hoc military alliance. The military was given the ability to monitor, coordinate, and control its operational activities from the conflict's zone with the establishment of a command and command center, (MCCC) in Maiduguri at the beginning of 2015.

Consequently, the engagement of the surrounding nations also triggered a further regionalization of the problem and militarization of the reaction to the conflict. After Buhari was elected president in May 2015, relations between the Nigerian government and its Western allies improved, which made it possible for the West to provide more security assistance. In 2017, American and British military advisers were deployed, and light attack aircraft were sold, nonetheless, Boko Haram's deterioration during the past years has been uneven. As they were driven into increasingly isolated rural areas, the militants returned to their previous strategies, relying on guerrilla attacks and suicide bombs.

A defender's generally recognized set of capabilities, military and non-military must be sufficient in persuading a potential attacker that it would likely pay a high price for aggression, the immediate and local balance of forces is not necessarily a primary factor of deterrence success. Will is a far more intangible characteristic that is prone to misunderstanding. Particularly in situations of extended deterrence, attackers have frequently persuaded themselves that a defender lacked the resolve to defend citizens as the event of the fighting with Boko haram had some casualties rate on the Nigeria security personnel. And the approach of dialoguing with Boko haram members presents the concepts of will that sometimes are influenced by the national concerns at stake, if a prospective attacker perceives that a defender has important interests at risk, they are more likely to believe threats of punishment.

The various applications of counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the Nigerian government in deterring terrorism have involved the military to combat terrorism capabilities, intelligence gathering, and other military tactics that included the law enforcement agencies such as the police, and intelligence services to detect, prevent, and disrupt terrorist activities, and the approach was used alongside the military approach to address terrorism in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the Socio-economic approach focused on addressing the underlying socio-economic factors that contribute to the emergence of terrorism, such as poverty, unemployment, and social inequality that was adopted by the Nigerian government through the implementation of various social welfare programs and initiatives as presented earlier in the study, in addition to the political approach which is aimed at addressing political grievances that contribute to the emergence of terrorism, such as political exclusion and marginalization through negotiations and political reforms that are beneficial to the citizens.

The Nigerian government adopted a multifaceted approach to counter-terrorism, combining various strategies to address the various dimensions of terrorism in the country.

In addition, a comprehensive analysis of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies will need to involve an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach and their potential for success in addressing the evolving threat of terrorism in the country. This could include an assessment of the capacity and effectiveness of Nigeria's security agencies in implementing counter-terrorism measures, as well as the level of coordination and cooperation among relevant stakeholders, and a critical evaluation of the different approaches used over time and their effectiveness in addressing the underlying causes of terrorism in the country. Moreover, a detailed analysis of the various counter-terrorism strategies adopted by the Nigerian government over time, including their objectives, implementation, and outcomes, as well as considerations of each strategic benefit in addressing the root causes of terrorism in the country and preventing future attacks. And consider the role of external factors, such as regional and international dynamics, and the impact of these factors on Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts.

Therefore, a multidimensional and comprehensive approach would provide a more accurate and useful analysis of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies and their effectiveness in addressing the threat of terrorism in the country. The deterrence of terrorism in Nigeria involves a combination of these approaches to address the various dimensions of terrorism in the country, and the effectiveness of the deterrence concept should be measured by the reduction of terrorist attacks and the weakening of terrorist groups over time.

The validity of deterrence conceptual in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria is a matter of debate among scholars and policymakers. Some argue that deterrence has been effective in preventing or reducing Boko Haram's attacks, while others argue that it has not been successful in deterring the group from carrying out attacks. One of the challenges in assessing the validity of the deterrence concept in the case of Boko Haram is the complexity of the group's motivations and objectives. Boko Haram has a range of political, social, and religious grievances that have contributed to its emergence and growth. As a result, its actions cannot be fully explained by a single theory, such as deterrence.

Another challenge is the effectiveness of the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism strategies. The Nigerian government has implemented a range of measures to combat Boko Haram, including military operations, law enforcement, and community engagement. However, these measures have had mixed results, and Boko Haram has continued to carry out attacks, albeit with varying levels of intensity. Furthermore, the nature of Boko Haram's attacks makes deterrence a challenging strategy to implement. Boko Haram's attacks are often targeted at civilian populations and are intended to sow fear and panic. This makes it difficult to deter the group through traditional means, such as military force or law enforcement.

Additionally, the validity of the deterrence concept in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria is complex and context-dependent. While deterrence may have had some limited effectiveness in deterring Boko Haram's attacks, it is unlikely to be a complete solution to the problem of terrorism in Nigeria.

A more comprehensive approach that addresses the underlying socio-economic and political factors that contribute to the emergence of terrorist groups like Boko Haram may be necessary to achieve a lasting solution. However, the validity of deterrence conceptual in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria is a subject of debate among scholars and analysts. Some argue that deterrence has had limited success in countering Boko Haram's activities, while others believe that deterrence is an important

element of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy. The following are some arguments for and against the validity of deterrence in the case of Boko Haram

Arguments for the validity of deterrence should be in summary as, the Nigerian government has conducted several military operations against Boko Haram, which have weakened the group's capabilities and deterred some of its activities, and the Nigerian government has also implemented a range of socio-economic programs and initiatives to address the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty and unemployment, which could potentially deter individuals from joining Boko Haram, as well as the Nigerian government has worked closely with regional and international partners to combat terrorism, which has increased the pressure on Boko Haram and reduced its ability to carry out attacks.

Arguments against the validity of deterrence as Boko Haram has continued to carry out attacks despite the Nigerian government's efforts to deter its activities, suggesting that deterrence has had limited success. And Boko Haram has shown a high degree of resilience and adaptability in the face of military operations, suggesting that it may not be deterred by the threat of force.

The underlying causes of terrorism in Nigeria, such as political and economic marginalization, have not been fully addressed by the Nigerian government, which could limit the effectiveness of deterrence strategies.

Nonetheless, the validity of deterrence in countering Boko Haram in Nigeria is a complex issue that requires a nuanced analysis of the effectiveness of different deterrence strategies. While deterrence has had some successes in countering Boko Haram's activities, it is clear that more needs to be done to address the underlying socio-economic and political factors that contribute to terrorism in Nigeria

Furthermore, one of the challenges of using deterrence concepts in the ongoing fight against Boko Haram is that the group is highly decentralized, with numerous factions and cells operating independently. This makes it difficult to identify clear targets for deterrence and to gauge the impact of deterrence measures. Boko Haram must shown a willingness to adapt and evolve its tactics in response to counter-terrorism measures, which has changed its target selection, modus operandi, and tactics, which has made it difficult to predict and deter its activities.

However, it should be noted that there have been instances where deterrence measures have been effective in reducing Boko Haram's capabilities. For example, the Nigerian military's offensive against Boko Haram in 2015 and 2016 was successful in regaining control of some of the territories previously held by the group. This suggests that deterrence can be effective in limiting the capabilities of terrorist groups like Boko Haram.

The overall success of deterrence in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been limited, it remains an important element of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy that requires advancing the strategies, such as law enforcement, community engagement, and socio-economic development are also crucial in addressing the underlying causes of terrorism and preventing the emergence of new terrorist groups.

Finally, Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy from 2009 to 2019 aimed to tackle the threat of terrorism in the country, and the strategy focused on addressing the root causes of terrorism through a combination of military, law enforcement, and socioeconomic approaches.

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