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FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

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Bc. Jiří Svoboda

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**The evolution of Far-Right political parties and
movements in the Czech Republic**

Master's thesis

Author: Bc. Jiří Svoboda

Study programme: Bezpečnostní studia

Supervisor: Mgr. Jonathan Collins

Year of the defence: 2023

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 31.07.2023

Bc. Jiří Svoboda

References

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Abstract

Following the Velvet Revolution in the Czech Republic, far-right political parties and movements began to emerge. Since the Republican party, the far-right scene in the Czech Republic transformed several times, changing key topics and communication approaches. The objective of this paper is to examine the ongoing security dilemma that has been present throughout the entire existence of the independent republic. This paper explores far-right actors by examining various aspects and identifying trends, in contrast to studies that only focus on one aspect of a particular actor. The main goal of this paper is to answer the research question *How have Czech far-right parties developed, changed, or stayed the same from 1993 to 2023?* This is done by the content analysis research method. The research shows that the contemporary far-right carries similar themes to its predecessors, but it managed to adapt to a democratic reality in the Czech Republic by becoming less extremist and carefully choosing topics that might attract more voters and sympathizers. Findings of the paper may help scholars or security actors prepare themselves for a potential future development.

Abstrakt

Krajně pravicové strany a hnutí se začaly v České republice objevovat po sametové revoluci. Od působení Republikánské strany se krajně pravicová scéna v České republice několikrát transformovala a změnila klíčová témata a způsoby komunikace. Cílem této práce je prozkoumat toto přetrvávající bezpečnostní dilema přítomné od vzniku nezávislé republiky. Práce se zabývá více aspekty krajní pravice a identifikuje trendy, na rozdíl od jiných prací, které se soustředí na jediný aspekt jednoho politického subjektu. Cílem této práce je zodpovězení výzkumné otázky *Jak se strany české krajní pravice vyvinuly, změnily nebo zůstaly stejné mezi lety 1993 až 2023?* K zodpovězení výzkumné otázky je použita výzkumná metoda obsahové analýzy. Výzkum ukazuje, že současná krajní pravice používá podobné narativy jako její předchůdci, ale zvládla se přizpůsobit demokratické realitě v České republice. Zároveň z jejich vyjádření postupně mizí extremismus a opatrně vybírá témata, která mohou přilákat širší okruh voličů a sympatizantů. Zjištění a výsledky této práce mohou pomoci akademickým pracovníkům a bezpečnostním složkám k přípravě na možný další vývoj.

Keywords

Far-right, radicalism, extremism, Czechia, development

Klíčová slova

Krajní pravice, radikalismus, extremismus, Česká republika, vývoj

Title

The evolution of Far-Right political parties and movements in the Czech Republic

Název práce

Vývoj krajně pravicových stran a hnutí v České republice

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Table of contents

INTRODUCTION	10
LITERATURE REVIEW	11
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	15
RESEARCHING CHARACTERISTIC.....	16
RESEARCH QUESTION.....	16
CONCEPTUALIZATION	17
<i>Nationalism</i>	17
<i>Racism</i>	19
<i>Xenophobia</i>	20
<i>Anti-democracy</i>	21
<i>Strong state</i>	22
<i>Populism</i>	24
<i>Anti-establishment rhetoric</i>	25
<i>Far-right</i>	25
Radical right.....	27
Extreme right.....	28
METHODOLOGY	29
THE SELECTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES	31
FAR-RIGHT POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS.....	32
<i>The Assembly for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia</i>	32
<i>Workers’ Party</i>	34
<i>Islám v České republice nechceme</i>	35
<i>Svoboda a přímá demokracie</i>	37
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS	38
THE ASSEMBLY FOR REPUBLIC – REPUBLICAN PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.....	39
<i>Nationalism</i>	39
<i>Racism</i>	40
<i>Xenophobia</i>	41
<i>Anti-democracy</i>	42
<i>Strong state</i>	43
<i>Populism</i>	43
<i>Anti-establishment rhetoric</i>	44
WORKERS’ PARTY	45
<i>Nationalism</i>	45

<i>Racism</i>	46
<i>Xenophobia</i>	47
<i>Anti-democracy</i>	47
<i>Strong state</i>	48
<i>Populism</i>	48
<i>Anti-establishment rhetoric</i>	49
ISLÁM V ČESKÉ REPUBLICE NEHCEME	49
<i>Nationalism</i>	50
<i>Racism</i>	50
<i>Xenophobia</i>	51
<i>Anti-democracy</i>	51
<i>Strong state</i>	52
<i>Populism</i>	52
<i>Anti-establishment rhetoric</i>	53
SVOBODA A PŘÍMÁ DEMOKRACIE	53
<i>Nationalism</i>	54
<i>Racism</i>	55
<i>Xenophobia</i>	55
<i>Anti-democracy</i>	56
<i>Strong state</i>	56
<i>Populism</i>	57
<i>Anti-establishment rhetoric</i>	58
SUMMARY OF FINDING	58
NATIONALISM	59
RACISM	59
XENOPHOBIA	59
ANTI-DEMOCRACY	59
STRONG STATE	60
POPULISM	60
ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT RHETORIC.....	60
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS.....	60
CONCLUSION	63
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	65

Introduction

After the Velvet Revolution, the Czech (at the time Czechoslovak) political spectrum started to create itself, and far-right political parties appeared. Since the Republican party, the far-right scene in the Czech Republic transformed several times, changing key topics and communication approaches. This paper seeks to research how each far-right hegemon communicated and behaved in its prime era, which might lead to understanding of the evolution of the far-right in the country. The paper focuses on the leading representatives of the far-right political spectrum, depending on the time of their operations and public interest. Although there is not a lack of academic literature regarding any of the political parties and movements discussed in this diploma thesis, there is a lack of connection and comparison of these political subjects. This paper aims to fill this gap and research the evolution of these parties and movements.

Given that the far-right has been a persistent security concern in the Czech Republic since its establishment, it's crucial to examine it from a security studies perspective. This will help us understand how it operates today, as well as its current trends, which may provide insight into its potential future.

The paper consists of three main parts. The first, theoretical part of the paper deals with how the research is conducted, including notes from the academic works this paper's research is inspired by. Additionally, the criteria for the party to be present in the paper are listed in this part. Political parties and movements are introduced in the second part of the paper. In the third, analytical part, the parties and movements are researched based on criteria given in the first part of the paper. At the end of this part is a discussion of the empirical findings.

The paper's primary goal is to research how the political parties or movements developed over decades of democracy in the Czech Republic. The research question for the paper is *How have Czech far-right parties developed, changed, or stayed the same from 1993 to 2023?* With the combination of gradual research, this research question which is focused not only on the first far-right actor or the last one, it enables us to see how the changes happened over time and determine whether there are some significant trends that show how the far-right might develop in the future. Furthermore, it might clarify what topics are important for the far-right actors now and which are being abandoned by these actors.

Literature Review

This paper's most crucial academic article is Cas Mudde's article *Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed. A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86)*¹ will be a bedrock for the methodological approach. *Far-Right Today*² by Cas Mudde introduces the far-right phenomenon and analyzes contemporary trends within it. Cas Mudde's methodology will be enriched by Elizabeth Carter's *Right-wing Extremism/radicalism: reconstructing the concept*³ paper, where she develops Cas Mudde's approach on their own. A key piece of literature on the topic is *Researching the far right: Theory, Method and Practice*⁴ by Ashe, Busher, Macklin, and Winter, who developed ways of researching the far-right.

The far-right has come through many evolutions to fit contemporary political realities. Especially after World War Two, when fascism and Nazism were rejected as an acceptable political regime, the far-right had to transform itself into a political direction that could work within the democratic theatre. One of these attempts was the *nouvelle droite*, which emerged in France in the late 1960s'; In his works *The Ambiguities of the Nouvelle Droite, 1968-1999*⁵ from 2001 and *Fascism to the Nouvelle Droite: The Dream of Pan-European Empire*⁶ from 2008, Tamir Bar-On details the evolution of far-right ideology from its origins in fascism to the contemporary "nouvelle droite." He explains how the goals of this movement have remained similar over time and how it has managed to bring together various political ideologies under one overarching theme. Stéphane François, in the work *The Nouvelle Droite and "Tradition"*⁷ from 2014, explains the example of the perception of the 'tradition' and how the nouvelle droite (and with it the far-right in general) managed to change its' thinking based on the changing society, but to keep its' main goals and ideas at the same.

¹ Cas Mudde, "Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed: A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86)," *European Journal of Political Research* 27, no. 2 (1995): 203–24.

² Cas Mudde, *The Far Right Today* (John Wiley & Sons, 2019).

³ Elisabeth Carter, "Right-Wing Extremism/Radicalism: Reconstructing the Concept," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23, no. 2 (2018): 157–82.

⁴ Stephen D. Ashe et al., *Researching the Far Right: Theory, Method and Practice* (Routledge, 2020).

⁵ Tamir Bar-On, "The Ambiguities of the Nouvelle Droite, 1968-1999," *The European Legacy* 6, no. 3 (2001): 1968–99.

⁶ Tamir Bar-On, "Fascism to the Nouvelle Droite: The Dream of Pan-European Empire," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 16, no. 3 (2008): 327–45.

⁷ Stéphane François, "The Nouvelle Droite and 'Tradition,'" *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 8, no. 1 (2014): 87–106.

Alexandra Cole in the work *Old right or new right? The ideological positioning of parties of the far right*⁸ from 2005 tries to determine whether the successful far-right political parties might still be labeled as ‘old far-right,’ which she perceived as a manifestation of protest politics or a ‘new suitable model’ far-right parties, which managed to adapt to the quickly changing voters’ demands. In 2016, Matt Golder, in work on

*Far-right parties in Europe*⁹ examined how far-right political parties and movements managed to be successful in elections by describing the far-right’s ability to change itself in the supply-demand spectrum to be more appealing to potential voters.

The Czech far-right did not take part in these changes in this period since Czechoslovakia was under the rule of a Communist regime; instead, as it is explained in the work of Vejvodová et al. *The Russian connections of far-right and paramilitary organizations in the Czech Republic*¹⁰ the Czech far-right are not so much concerned with tradition or pan-Europeanism, but it is instead connected to pro-Russian beliefs and ideas, including the perception of pan-Slavism as a better alternative to united Europe. Grigorij Mesežnikov, in his work *National and right-wing radicalism in the new democracies: Slovakia*¹¹ from 2009, managed to deliver a description of the Slovakian far-right political spectrum from the establishment of Slovakia, which formed based on a former Czechoslovakia such as far-right in the Czech Republic.

Regarding the literature that deals with the Czech far-right, Miroslav Mareš's work *Konstituování krajní pravice. v českém stranicko-politickém systému*¹² is one of the first academic articles regarding this topic, dealing with the first Czech far-right party, the Republicans, and how the far-right constituted itself after the Velvet Revolution. Similarly to Mareš’s work, Jan Charvát’s article *Dělnická strana: hegemon české krajní pravice v novém tisíciletí*¹³ introduces the successor party of the Republicans, the Workers’ Party. In the book *Krajní pravice a krajní levice v ČR*¹⁴ by Martin Bastl et al. from 2011,

⁸ Alexandra Cole, “Old Right or New Right? The Ideological Positioning of Parties of the Far Right,” *European Journal of Political Research* 44, no. 2 (2005): 203–30.

⁹ Matt Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 19 (2016): 477–97.

¹⁰ Petra Vejvodová, Jakub Janda, and Veronika Vichová, “The Russian Connections of Far-Right and Paramilitary Organizations in the Czech Republic,” *Political Capital Institute*, 2017.

¹¹ Grigorij Mesežnikov, “National and Right-Wing Radicalism in the New Democracies: Slovakia,” *Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* ([Http://Www. Ivo. Sk/Buxus/Docs/Rozne/Extremizmus_studie/Slowakei. Pdf](http://www.Ivo.Sk/Buxus/Docs/Rozne/Extremizmus_studie/Slowakei.Pdf), *Datum Pristupu* 8. 8. 2010), 2009.

¹² Miroslav Mareš, “Konstituování Krajní Pravice. v Českém Stranicko-Politickém Systému,” 1992.

¹³ Jan Charvát, “Dělnická Strana: Hegemon České Krajní Pravice v Novém Tisíciletí,” *Střední Evropa-Revue pro Středoevropskou Kulturu a Politiku* 28 (2012): 103–15.

¹⁴ Martin Bastl et al., *Krajní Pravice a Krajní Levice v ČR* (Grada Publishing as, 2011).

there is a thorough examination of the far-right and far-left in the Czech Republic, including the history of these movements and examples of these subjects. The book also emphasizes the connection of different actors in the political spectrum. Bastl's work could not take into account contemporary far-right development after 2011. However, it also provides the reader with a list of allies for discussed issues with examples of how these subjects cooperated or where they have ideological conformities.

Especially after the first formations of the Czech far-right, scholars focused on a single aspect of the newly formed political subjects, for example, in the work of Miroslav Mareš *Zahraničně-politické koncepce české krajní pravice*¹⁵ from 2000 explains how the Republicans did not have enough political might to influence the Czech international politics, even though they eventually with a more internationally powerful skinhead movement. The same approach is visible in another work by the same author *Přistěhovalectví a krajní pravice v ČR*¹⁶ from 2001, where Mareš analyses the course of the far-right towards immigration. A slight shift is visible in Josef Smolík's and Petra Papiežová Vejvodová's work *Nové trendy české krajní pravice*¹⁷ from 2013, where authors analyze new trends within the far-right subjects, including the pop cultures phenomena such as Casapound or Hardbass. However, authors still examine their contemporary far-right rather than seeking changes from the original issues. Zbyněk Tarant in 2019 in his work *Is Brown the new green? The environmental discourse of the Czech far-right*¹⁸ offers one of a few examples of comparison of various far-right subjects and their perception of specific topics (environmental problems in this case); furthermore, the author compares the discourses of these parties with the West far-right subjects.

It is also important to take into account works that deal with contemporary trends of the far-right along with their most popular discourses. Regarding new far-right political parties and movements, it is essential to mention *The radical right and Islamophobia*¹⁹ by Aristotle Kallis in *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, who researches the

¹⁵ Miroslav Mareš, "Zahraničně-Politické Koncepce České Krajní Pravice," *Středoevropské Politické Studie/Central European Political Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (2000).

¹⁶ Miroslav Mareš, "Přistěhovalectví a Krajní Pravice v ČR," *Středoevropské Politické Studie/Central European Political Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (2001).

¹⁷ Josef Smolík and Petra Papiežová Vejvodová, "Nové Trendy České Krajní Pravice," *Rexter-Časopis pro Výzkum Radikalismu, Extremismu a Terorismu* 11 (2013).

¹⁸ Zbyněk Tarant, "Is Brown the New Green? The Environmental Discourse of the Czech Far Right," in *The Far Right and the Environment* (Routledge, 2019), 201–15.

¹⁹ Aristotle Kallis, "The Radical Right and Islamophobia," *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right* 1 (2018): 42–60.

connection between far-right and islamophobia, typical for new European far-right political parties. For the distinguishment between radical and extreme right, the conceptualization by Andre Pirro in the article *Far right: The Significance of an Umbrella Concept*²⁰, develops the dichotomy presented by Cas Mudde. Josef Smolík's works regarding the Czech far-right are also crucial for conceptualizing the phenomenon in the republic, especially his paper *Far right-wing political parties in the Czech Republic: heterogeneity, cooperation, competition*.²¹ Regarding the 'traditional' topic of far-right nationalism, Tamir Bar-On deals with it in the article also presented in the *Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right and Nationalism*.²²

²⁰ Andrea LP Pirro, "Far Right: The Significance of an Umbrella Concept," *Nations and Nationalism*, 2022.

²¹ Josef Smolík, "Far Right-Wing Political Parties in the Czech Republic: Heterogeneity, Cooperation, Competition," *Slovenská Politologická Revue*, no. 2 (2011): 99–111.

²² Tamir Bar-On, "The Radical Right and Nationalism," *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right* 1 (2018): 17–41.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical approach for this paper will be inspired by Cas Mudde's work *Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed. A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86)* and Elisabeth Carter's work *Right-wing extremism/radicalism: reconstructing the concept*, in which Carter expands Mudde's work.

Just like Mudde did in the analysis of the right-wing extremist parties, this paper will work with five key characteristics given in his piece, based on critical features found in most of the 26 papers dealing with the far-right examined by Mudde – Nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and strong state.²³

Elisabeth Carter expands Mudde's work by adding populism as another critical characteristic of far-right political actors and combines the terms nationalism, racism & xenophobia as connected.²⁴ Carter explains that many scholars, apart from Mudde's five characteristics, work with populism and/or anti-establishment rhetoric.²⁵

Newer articles regarding the evolution of the far-right do not come with their theoretical framework but instead use Cas Mudde's, just like Anthony J. McGann's work *The radical right in the Alps: evolution of support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ*.²⁶ The work *Opportunities Matter: The Evolution of far-right Protest in Georgia*²⁷ by Tamta Gelashvili examines a similar phenomenon (the evolution of the far-right in a post-communist country) as this thesis with the usage of political and economic analysis. However, it focuses mainly on events that could strengthen the far-right instead of analyzing the gradual changes in the far-right subjects' rhetoric. Therefore, the theoretical framework is aimed more at the sociological factors of the far-right. Moreover, it is more concerned with a far-right as a social movement than a classical political actor.

This thesis is therefore based on Mudde's theoretical framework since it became the base of many other similar works as well; furthermore, Mudde's and Carter's

²³ Mudde, "Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed," 1995, 207.

²⁴ CARTER, Elisabeth. Right-wing extremism/radicalism: reconstructing the concept. *Journal of Political Ideologies*. Taylor & Francis, 2018, roč. 23, č. 2, s. 164, 165.

²⁵ Carter, 167.

²⁶ Anthony J. McGann and Herbert Kitschelt, "The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ," *Party Politics* 11, no. 2 (2005): 147–71.

²⁷ Tamta Gelashvili, "Opportunities Matter: The Evolution of Far-Right Protest in Georgia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 75, no. 4 (2023): 649–74.

framework is very complex and combines frameworks of many scholars who dealt with the far-right before, including Klaus Von Beyme and his work about European far-right post 1945 from 1988²⁸ or the Lowell Dittmer psycho-sociological analysis of Neo-Nazism²⁹. This framework also enables us to focus on the main far-right characteristics generally agreed upon by many scholars instead of picking a framework of a different scholar who would come with varying characteristics of the far-right, which are not present in the works of others. There could be a combination of more theoretical frameworks; however, especially regarding the attributes of the far-right, it would need to be determined why there were chosen characteristics given by the specific scholar, which Mudde does in his theoretical framework based on his research.

Researching characteristic

After selecting political actors that fulfill all four criteria listed in the methodology part, the research of seven characteristics of far-right political parties should occur. The primary sources for Mudde's five characteristics should be researched, mainly their political program and the official and unofficial statements of these parties. Carter's two characteristics should be examined by focusing on the form of communication of these parties and whether it corresponds with populism and anti-establishment rhetoric.

Moreover, based on the data collected for these parties, the thesis should be able to sort these political actors either as radical right or extreme right based on their approach to democracy and contemporary elites, however, it is not a goal of the paper to determine whether a selected party is radical or extremist right one.

Research question

It is essential to perceive the far-right as a security dilemma; the goals of the thesis are therefore connected with observing of potential future development of topics raised by the far-right, which might either destabilize society to some extent or be a threat to democracy in the Czech Republic.

As the diploma thesis deals with the gradual changes in far-right political actors over time, the main research question should be connected to the SPD as the contemporary leading actor of far-right in the Czech Republic and whether it uses a similar

²⁸ Klaus Von Beyme, "Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe," in *Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe* (West European Politics, 1988), 1–18.

²⁹ Lowell Dittmer, "The German NPD: A Psycho-Sociological Analysis of Neo-Naziism," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 1 (1969): 79–110.

approach as its predecessors. Therefore, the main research question should be: *How have Czech far-right parties developed, changed, or stayed the same from 1993 to 2023?* Even though this could be answered only by analyzing the first and the last far-right actor in the Czech Republic, examining other actors might enable us to see gradual trends in the far-right rhetoric.

By answering the research question, this paper should hint at which way the far-right in the Czech Republic is developing, for example, whether it is becoming more ‘interested’ in racism or anti-establishment rhetoric. This answer may serve as a forecast of the far-right development in the Czech Republic, which scholars or security actors might use to prepare themselves for future growth, and topics that the far-right actors might use in the future. An aspect that sets this thesis apart from others is its analysis of far-right rhetoric patterns. Through this distinctive approach, the research may yield valuable insights that can be applied in the coming years.

Conceptualization

Nationalism

The idea of nationalism started to appear with the growing strength and wealth of the third estate, especially in states where this estate had the most vital position in the eighteenth century, like France, Great Britain, and the United States.³⁰ Hans Kohn explains this as a consequence of the shift of importance from the first two estates and the growing importance for the political and economic identity of the third estate. In countries such as Germany, Italy, and among the Slavonic people, on the other hand, people expressed nationalism mostly in terms of their respective cultures.³¹ The shift from cultural to political nationalism describes John A. Hall on the example of Czech historian František Palacký, who was a part of the cultural movement called Czech National Revival. Palacký, at the beginning of his career, wrote in German and did not intend to appear in politics; however, Habsburg’s effort to make German the language of officialdom made him express himself to political questions. After the revolutionary year of 1848, Czechs refused to join the National Assembly in Frankfurt. Still, instead of the counter-assembly in Prague, they

³⁰ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (Transaction Publishers, 1967), 3,4.

³¹ Kohn, 4.

concluded that it would be safest for them to remain with Habsburg instead of being a state between Russia and Germany.³²

Gradual improvements in the position of the third estate in many European countries led to the more powerful part of nationalism in the first half of the 20th century. After the Versailles conference, many new nation-states emerged, and the emergence of democracy and extension of suffrage allowed more people to participate in politics and demand recognition and representation. Another vital factor for the emergence of nationalism in the 20th century was globalization and easier traveling between states – people started to be more aware of the ‘others.’³³

Most of the definitions regarding modern nationalism are similar to this one, found in *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, which used the definition of Roger Griffin – ‘*the sense of belonging to and serving a perceived national community.*’³⁴ Griffin also emphasized the importance of the second part of this definition for the radical right, which perceives it as they need to serve their respective nation first – for example, *Czechs must serve Czechs first*. Apart from serving the nation, nationalists, according to Griffin, believe that ‘*the nation possesses distinctive cultural identity... as well as...unique set of constitutional, historical, geographical, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and/or genetic realities.*’³⁵

Both Kohn and Griffin distinguish between civic and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism defines a nation by shared political values, such as the political system, individual rights, or the rule of law. Anyone in the state who shares the same values and is willing to participate in them might be perceived as a member of the national community. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism believes that the nation is defined by cultural characteristics, such as language and history; in this definition, only people born to this group are part of the nation.³⁶ This dichotomy might be quite well observed in the different conceptions of the German and French nations from the 19th century. In contrast, the French, based on *jus soli*, perceived citizenship as a privilege for anyone willing to

³² John A. Hall, “Nationalisms: Classified and Explained,” *Daedalus* 122, no. 3 (1993): 17.

³³ Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

³⁴ Jens Rydgren, *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right* (Oxford University Press, 2018), 21.

³⁵ Rydgren, 21.

³⁶ Rydgren, 21.

participate; Germany was based on the idea of *jus sanguinis*, which enabled only members of the cultural nation to become part of the nation.³⁷

Kohn describes a specific example of the connection between civic and ethnic nationalism – as Czechs are perceived as both populations of Bohemia and Moravia, who formed one ethnic group, even though they represent a link between Czech and Slovakia – Slovakia, on the other hand, remained ethnically separated and did not, as Moravians did, accept Czech as their primary language and culture.³⁸

In this paper, parties, and movements will be analyzed to determine whether they possess any discussed form of nationalism, especially whether they believe, based on their statements, in ethnic nationalism or civic nationalism.

Racism

Unlike when talking about nationalism, the essence and the perception of racism are commonly viewed as something morally wrong and reprehensible.³⁹ Dinesh d'Souza defines racism as '*racism is an ideology of intellectual or moral superiority based upon biological characteristics of race.*'⁴⁰ D'Souza expands this definition with quotes and definitions given by other people and scholars concerning racial hierarchy or the need to maintain the purity of the race.⁴¹ Subsequently, d'Souza comes with four steps a person has to take to become racist: the most crucial in this process is a person's ability to believe that there are quality differences between races and a person's willingness to rank these races in terms of superiority and inferiority, only later racist person can try to use these criteria to discriminate or segregate other races.⁴²

Institutional racism, used mainly in fascist regimes before and during the Second world war, led to new initiatives that should've prevented similar usage of state racism after 1945, primarily by UNESCO, which assembled groups of scientists who were asked

³⁷ John Coakley, "National Identity and the 'Kohn Dichotomy,'" *Nationalities Papers* 46, no. 2 (2018): 256.

³⁸ Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 721.

³⁹ Polycarp Ikuenobe, "Conceptualizing Racism and Its Subtle Forms," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 41, no. 2 (2011): 162.

⁴⁰ Dinesh d'Souza, *The End of Racism: Finding Values in an Age of Technoaffluence* (Simon and Schuster, 1996), 27.

⁴¹ d'Souza, 27.

⁴² d'Souza, 28.

to summarize scientific evidence that the Final Solution to the Jewish Question rested on ‘a scientifically untenable premise.’⁴³

A term that might be most relevant to this paper, however, lies in Paul Sniderman’s perception of the ‘new racism’, which has moved from original racism into a more refined form based on cultural and political differences concerning group characteristics that might differ from the characteristic of the major race in the country.⁴⁴

In this paper, parties, and movements will be analyzed based on their approach toward other races and whether their system might be marked as non-racist, racist, or as a new racism. Although there are few populous minorities in the Czech Republic,⁴⁵ the approach towards the Roma or the Vietnamese might indicate whether these parties deal with the discussed issue.

Xenophobia

Unlike racism, xenophobia does not represent the belief that one race is superior to another but rather fear or hate of any other person or group.⁴⁶ Xenophobia is driven mainly by fear of enough jobs and housing in the area, which might be taken away from foreigners. These migrants will naturally try to apply for the same jobs and housing as current inhabitants. Based on Wimmer’s work, xenophobia does not necessarily have to be connected with rising unemployment or lowering wages, but rather with a new influx of foreign workers⁴⁷, which might suggest it is an unreasonable fear rather than a real threat. Moreover, Wimmer states that there is a much more xenophobic approach towards people from different cultural backgrounds, such as the Middle East, compared to Eastern Europe for Western Europe or the USA.

In the paper, New Xenophobia, Tabish Khair states that, based on the *European Commission’s annual report against Racism and Intolerance* for 2005, the idea of ‘culture’ appears to replace the idea of ‘race increasingly.’⁴⁸ As well as racism gradually changed, xenophobia had a similar evolution. ‘*The old xenophobia was racist, anti-Semitic, and homophobic in largely open terms; new xenophobia tries, pretends, and*

⁴³ Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown, *Racism* (Psychology press, 2003), 60.

⁴⁴ Paul M. Sniderman et al., “The New Racism,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 1991, 423–47.

⁴⁵ “Ethnicity | Census 2021,” accessed April 5, 2023, <https://www.czso.cz/csu/scitani2021/ethnicity>.

⁴⁶ Jamie Bordeau, *Xenophobia* (The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc, 2009).

⁴⁷ Andreas Wimmer, “Explaining Xenophobia and Racism: A Critical Review of Current Research Approaches,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20, no. 1 (1997): 19,20.

⁴⁸ Tabish Khair, “The New Xenophobia,” 2016, 1.

*sometimes perhaps is genuinely not homophobic or anti-Semitic, even perhaps not racist in the old sense of a physically determined 'race' (let alone systemic, institutionalized racism), in its self-understanding.*⁴⁹

In conclusion, xenophobia might be associated with racism, but also it might be targeted toward people of the same race and culture. In this paper, many different types of immigration will be discussed, and approaches of specific parties and movements will be analyzed. There will be a difference between the type of immigrants during the 90s,⁵⁰ and the European migration crisis following the Arab Spring; therefore, the distinguishment between xenophobia and racism will be crucial.

Anti-democracy

Since this paper discusses political parties and movements when democracy in the Czech Republic was present, it might be challenging to mark a political party as anti-democratic since it competes in free elections. At first sight, political parties and movements might be seen as anti-democratic if they try to enforce anti-democratic principles or diminish democratic components as electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, or egalitarian.⁵⁰ However, the position of a democratic party might change if the political party believes that the needs and desires of the median voter shifted from democratic principles; since any political party seeks to win an election, it will naturally try to adopt the requirements of as many voters as possible⁵¹, even shifting towards anti-democratic principles. This median voter paradox might ensure that even democratic political parties represent certain anti-democratic positions since they are trying to win these votes and differ from the work of other parties or parties.

Furthermore, social groups that either strongly agree or disagree with a specific political direction might assimilate themselves with political parties that, in their eyes, represent their community. For example, pro-LGBTQ community laws adopted by the Democratic party in the USA ensure that community members politicize in favor of the party. Still, members of the evangelical Christian church will, on the other hand, support more Republican party.⁵² In multi-party political systems, such as in the Czech Republic,

⁴⁹ Khair, 141.

⁵⁰ Michael Coppedge et al., "Measuring High Level Democratic Principles Using the V-Dem Data," *International Political Science Review* 37, no. 5 (2016): 4,5.

⁵¹ Susan C. Stokes, "Political Parties and Democracy," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 258.

⁵² Leonie Huddy, "The Group Foundations of Democratic Political Behavior," *Critical Review* 30, no. 1–2 (2018): 6.

the dichotomy for social groups is not represented so heavily since social groups that are against specific policies only end up supporting a single political party if it represents its needs and beliefs. However, a more significant number of political parties enables them to choose certain social groups they want to address, such as Christians for KDU-ČSL and left-wing extremists for the Communist or right-wing extremists.

Cas Mudde describes in his work *The Paradox of the Anti-Party Party: Insights from the Extreme Right* that parties might view themselves as an *anti-party*. Mudde recognizes two types of anti-parties – extremist and populist. While extremist anti-party is primarily concerned with a single political issue or a protest against it, populist anti-party is more concerned about other political parties: either against their policies or their actions.⁵³ Since these parties usually do not seek to cover the whole political spectrum and all issues, they differ from the traditional political parties, which try to concern all the political problems. However, especially populist political anti-parties concerned with the current state of conventional political parties do not have to be anti-democratic necessarily.

In this paper, the political party or movement will be seen as anti-democratic if it meets the abovementioned requirements. This contains not only if it seeks to diminish the democratic political system and replace it with an authoritarian one but also if the party or movement could be classified as extremist anti-party, concerned only with a narrow political issue, with no intention to cover more than that. However, suppose the party might be classified as a populist anti-party. In that case, there will have to be a discussion about whether it does not seek to cover more political issues or eventually transform itself from an anti-party to a traditional political party over time.

Strong state

When talking about solid states, authoritarian or totalitarian countries are the best example of such states. Supporters of this political authority seek order, tradition, identity, and security rather than self-affirmation, informality, and libertarianism.⁵⁴ A strong state might often be connected to mass-based political parties, which emerged in Europe in the last century with the more remarkable power of low-class workers. Members of these

⁵³ Cas Mudde, “The Paradox of the Anti-Party Party: Insights from the Extreme Right,” *Party Politics* 2, no. 2 (1996): 267,268.

⁵⁴ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties: A New Typology,” *Party Politics* 9, no. 2 (2003): 189.

parties are associated with non-state activities even outside election terms.⁵⁵ The desire for a strong state comes from allowing the state to successfully counter dangers that the state might encounter, either internal or external. For example, Prussia started to seek rigid absolutism after the humiliation at Jena in 1806, when elites believed this would perpetuate military inferiority.⁵⁶

There is a lot in common between ultranationalist and Leninist political parties regarding the strong state; they both seek to form organizations that occupy the social life before they manage to usurp power, including party militia or youth organizations. When they seize power, they later used these organizations to influence and control everyday social life in the state.⁵⁷ In both cases, extremist parties need a solid state to control every aspect of citizens' lives.

Since a strong state is mainly connected to the idea of safety, far-right parties seek a strong state even in the Czech Republic. With the information listed above about xenophobia or racism, far-right parties need a strong state to implement their needs and desires regarding these issues since within weak state apparatus, they would not be able to accomplish their goals. Whether or not a party or a movement seeks a strong state will be determined based on their statements regarding how they want to solve their most important issues. For example, if the party seeks to ban immigration and implies that the state should be able to deny it because it is not right now, the party wants a strong state.

Furthermore, the party's or movement's approach toward international organizations will be discussed, whether the party requires withdrawal from an organization such as European Union or NATO. Especially in the NATO case, when a party or a movement must withdraw from NATO since every state should be responsible for its own safety, it implies that they seek a strong state. However, when the EU requires the state to implement its standards or, on the other hand, denies a state a choice on how to enforce certain laws, further discussion on whether it is a call for a strong national state or just a dislike of the particular EU's policy.

⁵⁵ Gunther and Diamond, 177,178.

⁵⁶ Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics" (JSTOR, 1984), 239.

⁵⁷ Gunther and Diamond, "Species of Political Parties," 181.

Populism

The following conceptualization of populism is taken from the Far-right Today course final paper, ‘*The Evolution of far-right political parties in the Czech Republic,*’ whose author is the same as the author of this paper.

The term populism might be viewed as widely as the term far-right; it might be seen in all of the political spectrum, including liberal left or far right itself; this makes the definition of the phenomenon quite hard to deliver. Cas Mudde, in his work *Populism: A very short introduction*, defines it as a *thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.*⁵⁸ The most vital position for populism is in the liberal democracies, especially in Europe and other states with strong free speech principles. Sheri Berman, in her work *The causes of populism in the West*, explains that this political movement counts on its ability to deal with topics that mainstream political parties did not aim for before populists started to use them.⁵⁹ According to Berman, contemporary populism is mostly connected to the far-right and works with the us-versus-them worldview, which sorts *them* mostly as liberal elites, immigrants, or minorities.^{60 61}

Benjamin Kramer explains in his work *Populist online practices: the function of the internet in right-wing populism* how right-wing populists work with the internet as a tool to deliver their worldview and how it became a place similar to classical right-wing use of the internet of similar thinking people where they can self-socialize and adopt beliefs of other members of the community.⁶² The internet has become an essential part of far-right populism, which might use it to deliver its’ topics to a broader sphere of citizens.
63

In this paper, whether a party or a movement could be seen as populist will be discussed, mostly based on the type of communication of the analyzed party or

⁵⁸ Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2017), 6.

⁵⁹ Sheri Berman, “The Causes of Populism in the West,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 24 (2021): 71–88.

⁶⁰ Berman.

⁶¹ Jiří Svoboda, “The Evolution of Far-Right Political Parties in Czech Republic” (Final Paper, Prague, Univerzita Karlova, 2023).

⁶² Benjamin Krämer, “Populist Online Practices: The Function of the Internet in Right-Wing Populism,” *Information, Communication & Society* 20, no. 9 (2017): 1293–1309.

⁶³ Svoboda, “The Evolution of Far-Right Political Parties in Czech Republic.”

movement. Typical examples listed above, especially the us-versus-them worldview and the view that politics should be a mirror of the general will, will be used.

Anti-establishment rhetoric

The anti-establishment rhetoric, even though it could be connected to the populism categorization, stand by itself in this paper. The reason for this is that populism might be targeted toward various topics, many of which do not target establishment elites at all; subsequently, a party or a movement that does not undermine the establishment position might be seen as populist, and does not have to use anti-establishment rhetoric. Furthermore, anti-establishment rhetoric does not necessarily mean that the movement is also anti-democratic; this would put the party or a movement somewhere between the semi-loyal or disloyal opposition⁶⁴ but not a threat to democracy.

Anti-establishment rhetoric is, therefore, a unique criterion in this paper, which will be determined by how much the party or a movement speaks out against the establishment of the state. As an establishment, in this paper, it is not perceived only as a ruling party or coalition but also every representative of a state, including other political actors such as the president, members of the Senate, and other opposition parties or non-political actors such as judges, police and economic elites. Since every opposition party must speak against the current ruling party to some extent, the level of the anti-establishment rhetoric will be discussed as well: whether it has anti-establishment rhetoric only against political actors it wants to replace, such as the current political party or whether it uses hostile rhetoric against all other state actors.

Far-right

Such as, in the conceptualization of populism, the following paragraph will be cited from the author's final paper of the Far-right Today course.

When we are talking about the far-right, a wide range of scholars deal with this term and how they approach it. E. Carter, in his work *Right-wing Extremism/radicalism: reconstructing the Concept*, tried to sum up various approaches and come up with a definition that would fit far right the best.⁶⁵ Carter, based on his research of existing literature, assumed that far-right is an ideology that is politically on the 'right' side of the

⁶⁴ Robert R. Barr, "Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics," *Party Politics* 15, no. 1 (2009): 32.

⁶⁵ Carter, "Right-Wing Extremism/Radicalism."

political spectrum, which in this definition, originally from N. Bobbio's work *Left and Right: the significance of a political distinction*⁶⁶ counts with '...it is attitudes towards (in)equality that distinguishes left from right...'⁶⁷. Additionally, Carter cites C. Mudde's work, which collected 26 definitions of far-right and found five key characteristics repeated in most of them – nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state.^{68 69} Based on these aspects, which Carter continued to elaborate on, Carter comes with a minimal definition of far-right, which is 'an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/ or holistic nationalism.'^{70 71}

Although many characteristics are connected to the far-right, probably the most important one is its' connection to the *homeland*, which is viewed not only as a territory where people of their respective nations were born alive but also as sacred soil which must be protected. The fear for the homeland is repeatedly expressed by far-right parties and movements through history, from Nazi Germany's need for ever-more living space to today's far-right fear of being replaced on the original territory, projected into conspiracy theories of 'great replacement' or 'Eurabia'.⁷² The connection to the homeland might be visible even in the non-far-right social groups, when the nation or a common territory, usually a country, is in danger, people who never met and do not know each other are often ready to enlist and fight for the safety of each other. For the far-right, however, there is a clear definition of who is and is not part of the territory and who might and must not come or live on it.⁷³

Another thing that the far-right is historically connected to is the usage of various conspiracy theories. From the nazi Germany belief that everything bad that Germany had to go through was because of the Jewish-Bolshevik plot whose main goal was to destroy Germany and all the Germans, conspiracy theories of the far-right evolved, so they would fit the more contemporary far-right scene, which is not globally connected to one nation.

⁶⁶ Norberto Bobbio, *Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction* (University of Chicago Press, 1996).

⁶⁷ Carter, "Right-Wing Extremism/Radicalism."

⁶⁸ Carter.

⁶⁹ Cas Mudde, "Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed: A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86)," *European Journal of Political Research* 27, no. 2 (1995): 203–24.

⁷⁰ Carter, "Right-Wing Extremism/Radicalism."

⁷¹ Svoboda, "The Evolution of Far-Right Political Parties in Czech Republic."

⁷² Cynthia Miller-Idriss, "Hate in the Homeland," in *Hate in the Homeland* (Princeton University Press, 2022), 29.

⁷³ Miller-Idriss, 29.

One of the contemporary conspiracy theories is *Cultural Marxism*, which originally came from the USA in the 1990s, but it became popular among far-right globally. ‘*Rather than the ‘classless society’ of classical Marxism, Cultural Marxism allegedly promotes a radical egalitarian vision of an emptied-out, soulless multicultural, replacing the proletariat of old with a ‘new proletariat’ made up of immigrants, multiculturalists, black nationalists, secular humanists, feminists, homosexuals, sex educators, and environmentalists. The purpose of the Cultural Marxist project is to destroy and replace the traditional institutions of Western civilization, such as Christianity, national identity, and the nuclear family, through the use of ‘politically correct’ ideology and the portrayal of ‘white men as evil.’*’⁷⁴

From the Cultural Marxism conspiracy theory, other conspiracy theories came to fit more into regional far-right appealing. The great replacement or Eurabia conspiracy theories believe that the original white population of Europe is being systematically removed and replaced by people from the Middle East through migration and a bigger birthrate.⁷⁵

Radical right

The radical far-right political parties and movements are defined by their ability to work in the classical democratic theatre with free election, where the radical right parties or movement do not seek to overthrow the regime and its’ elites, even though they heavily criticize them, but rather function as a classical political party or movement.⁷⁶ Radical right parties and movements are often targeted on migration and nationalist issues, particularly in Europe with Muslim immigration from the Middle East and Africa.⁷⁷

The radical right, as mentioned, is connected to not only the political parties but also movements and other social activities, which might be only loosely connected to the political party activities. Interestingly, with the spread of the internet, radical right groups became more internationalized, with the group staying in contact with other radical right

⁷⁴ Rachel Busbridge, Benjamin Moffitt, and Joshua Thorburn, “Cultural Marxism: Far-Right Conspiracy Theory in Australia’s Culture Wars,” *Social Identities* 26, no. 6 (2020): 725.

⁷⁵ Mattias Ekman, “The Great Replacement: Strategic Mainstreaming of Far-Right Conspiracy Claims,” *Convergence* 28, no. 4 (2022): 1127–43.

⁷⁶ Rydgren, *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*.

⁷⁷ Kallis, “The Radical Right and Islamophobia.”

groups abroad or with umbrella organizations. The internet made it easier for these groups to share ideas, sell merchandise or recruit new members.⁷⁸

In Europe, particularly in countries with multi-party systems such as the Czech Republic, radical right political parties have a bigger opportunity to participate in state affairs. European radical right parties adopted several concepts, which may be seen in many of them, one of which is *nativism*, which is an ideology that believes that ‘*states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state.*’⁷⁹

Extreme right

Another type of far-right political party and movement is the extreme right, whose members might be in accordance with the radical right ones. Still, they do not agree on how to solve the issues they are both targeted against. Where the radical right can work in the democratic theatre and, at most, seeks to implement illiberal democracy, the extreme right is not compatible with democracy at all. It seeks to replace it with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.⁸⁰

Although these political parties or movements might resemble fascist or nazi parties at first, in the *post-industrial* society, these actors are post-materialist since ‘*they do not seek to revive the palingenetic myth of fascism, but they strive to respond to the needs and demands of post-industrial society.*’⁸¹ Similarly to the radical right, the extreme right does not operate only as a political subject, its members can take part in various sociological groups.

⁷⁸ Rydgren, *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, 33.

⁷⁹ Tim Bale, “Supplying the Insatiable Demand: Europe’s Populist Radical Right,” *Government and Opposition* 47, no. 2 (2012): 256–74.

⁸⁰ Pirro, “Far Right.”

⁸¹ Paul Hainsworth, *The Extreme Right in Europe* (Routledge, 2008), 16.

Methodology

The methodology of the paper is based on conceptual content analysis research. The research will be a mixed qualitative and quantitative method, ensuring the qualitative research is explained better. The qualitative method, where all criteria are not labeled as equally important, Cas Mudde gives an example of the importance of the anti-democracy for German scholars to label a party as far-right extremist,⁸² is not used because the goal of the thesis is not to determine whether the party is far-right radical, extremist or nothing of these two. The quantitative method, where all criteria are equally important, and the number of instances is everything that matters, does not reflect how these instances occur and ignores the importance of the anti-democracy. Thus the mixed method, when there is a bigger emphasis on anti-democracy, but all criteria are analyzed as equal, should ensure that there will be visible trends in all categories and not only the growing or diminishing extremism.

The content analysis can be used for examining trends and patterns in documents or monitoring shifts in public opinion.⁸³ It does not work only with a counting of specific words, especially due to synonyms which could be used for stylistics reasons, but it rather works on a basis of categories, which no unit should fall in between.⁸⁴ The content analysis can be used, when applied on a large set of data, to predict future behavior of a subject, analyzing changes in subject's written expression.⁸⁵ These aspects make the content analysis method ideal for this thesis, rather than other research methods such as thematic analysis which is often aimed towards a specific topic rather than finding changes in an approach of various subjects.

The content analysis will be done by categorizing it into seven categories and then into code categories. This process should ensure there will be visible patterns in the rhetoric of the subjects if there are some. The content analysis was selected because it might be used in the large set of data which will be narrowed by the found codes; the possibility to use it as a mixed method makes it perfect for the final analysis. Furthermore, content analysis enables studying a large set of themes.

⁸² Mudde, "Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed," 1995.

⁸³ Steve Stemler, "An Overview of Content Analysis," *Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation* 7, no. 1 (2000): 1.

⁸⁴ Stemler, 2.

⁸⁵ Steven E. Stemler, "Content Analysis," *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource*, 2015, 6.

As many available sources as possible will be found and analyzed using the seven criteria. Each criterion has several subtypes with which the found statement is sorted. These subtypes of the criteria are as follows:

- Nationalism
 - National symbols and imagery, cultural identity, national identity, historical references, national unity & security
- Racism
 - Racial hierarchies, racial exclusion, cultural imperialism & biologically determined differences
- Xenophobia
 - Anti-immigrant sentiment, nativism, scapegoating & stereotyping
- Anti-democracy
 - Attacks on the media, opposition to civil liberties, militarism, conspiracy theories & anti-pluralism
- Strong state
 - Sovereignty, strong leadership, national security, statism & centralized power
- Populism
 - Anti-elitism, appealing to the people, simplistic solutions, distrust of the media & personalization of the politics
- Anti-establishment rhetoric
 - Criticism of political elites, rejection of traditional politics, promotion of direct democracy, emphasis on personal freedom & anti-globalization

The coding scheme is original by the author of the thesis. Every instance found in the data will be categorized into one of the seven criteria, and it must be one of the subtypes listed above; the coding scheme requires all codes to have: the number, author of the statement, date (at least approximate), type (criterion), subtype, source (where was it found), citation (the actual 'code') and link.

When the list of the found instances is made, it will be introduced in the thesis in the part empirical findings, where there will be introduced the instances and given a short explanation, for example, why the speaker used these words (whether it is connected to some event or it was a reaction on a different speech).

The last part of the paper will discuss the finding, including the evaluation and answering of the research question, *How have Czech far-right parties developed, changed, or stayed the same from 1993 to 2023*. As mentioned above, the total number of instances of a single criterion does not mean that the party is using the criterion more; it is important how the party does the criterion use, for example, if the total number of racism in the first party speeches is bigger than in the last party ones. Still, the last party is openly racist, and the first party is ‘only’ using vague racism; it will not be determined that the racism is gradually diminishing, but it will be explained how the usage of racism has changed.

This approach should ensure that not only the research question is answered but also various trends will be discovered, including short-term trends which might appear within a single subject, such as a reaction to a single phenomenon, such as a refugee crisis or terrorist attacks.

The selection of political parties

Political actors selected for the comparison in this diploma thesis should fulfill four key characteristics.

1. *The actor was politically active in some period between 1993 and 2022.*
2. *The actor is perceived as far-right by media or academic sources.*
3. *The actor was a leading force in the far-right political spectrum at the time.*
4. *The actor either contested elections with some success or had a notable public interest.*

Mudde’s selection of political parties inspired characteristics used for this diploma thesis⁸⁶, but it was edited to correspond with the Czech political system. The first characteristic was chosen to specify the examined period and corresponds with the Czech Republic's emergence as an independent state. The second criterion was chosen to exclude other political parties not perceived as far-right parties, including far-left parties such as Communist Party. The third criterion excludes minor political actors that often resemble its contemporary hegemon (Blok proti Islamizaci, Volný blok etc.). The last criterion enables us to choose not only political actors with remarkable success in elections but also those who worked more as a political movement than a political party.

⁸⁶ Mudde, “Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed,” 1995, 209.

Far-right political parties and movements

In the upcoming part of the paper, political parties and movements that meet the criteria given in the Theoretical framework part will be introduced. In total, there will be four political parties or movements: Republikáni, Dělnická Strana Sociální Spravedlnosti, Islám v České Republice Nechceme and Svoboda a Přímá Demokracie. Political parties and movements will be ordered when they are active or have the biggest influence on the far-right political spectrum.

The Assembly for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia

Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa (SPR-RSČ or Republikáni) was a political party established right after the end of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, becoming one of the first political parties in the democratic republic. The party managed to form the strongest far-right political body in the republic, assimilating people with different political views who were dissatisfied with both the communist regime and how Czechoslovakia started to transform after the revolution in 1989.⁸⁷

The beginning of the party in late 1989 is connected to the little assemblies of right-wing-oriented groups across the republic. The gradual unification of these groups was finished in December 1989.⁸⁸ The term ‘*Republicans*’ was chosen for several reasons, most notably because a part of the founder wanted to connect itself to the Agrarian party tradition during the First Republic,⁸⁹ and the party is still referring to this on its official website (it is, however, worth noting that the page was not updated since 2007).⁹⁰ The party was elected twice into Czechoslovakian and Czech Parliament in the 1990s’ with 5,98 % in 1992 and 8,01 % in the 1996 elections.⁹¹

The party's history can be divided into three main periods, the first being from its’ foundation in 1989 to the parliamentary election of 1992. The second period is the party existence in the parliamentary system between 1992 and 1998. The last period is

⁸⁷ Miroslav Mareš, “National and Right-Wing Radicalism in the New Democracies: Czech Republic,” in *Paper for the Workshop of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on “Right-Wing Extremism and Its Impact on Young Democracies in the CEE-Countries”* (Budapest, 2009), 9.

⁸⁸ Mareš, “Konstituování Krajiní Právce. v Českém Stranicko-Politickém Systému,” 161.

⁸⁹ Mareš, 161.

⁹⁰ “Republikani Miroslava Sládka,” November 20, 2007, <https://web.archive.org/web/20071120135149/http://www.republikani.com/historie.htm>.

⁹¹ Mareš, “National and Right-Wing Radicalism in the New Democracies,” 8.

characterized by the Republic Party's gradual disappearance from the Czech Republic's political life.⁹²

The entire period of operation of the party is connected to its' chairman, Miroslav Sládek, who was first elected on 24th February 1990.⁹³ Sládek was viewed as the first populist politician in the republic, whose speeches were targeted especially against the Roma minority and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. He also ran four times for the presidential office, including in 1997, when he was taken into custody for seventeen days, which made it impossible for him to run for the position in person, Sládek states that this was made by the former president Václav Havel and chairman of the House of Commons and the president during Sládek's last presidential run Miloš Zeman.⁹⁴

Since the party was successful in the 1992 elections, it gained a dominant position in the far-right political spectrum, including media coverage. During this period, the party started to support the independent republic, including independence from the Soviet Union, against which Republicans were quite hostile. During this period, Republicans wanted Carpathians Russia to be reintegrated into Czechoslovakia; solve *'once and for all the question of Sudeten Germans with that they do not have any entitlement for return or any material compensation.'*⁹⁵ Initial anti-Soviet rhetoric was gradually replaced by anti-German rhetoric, including refusal to join any international body like the European Union or North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁹⁶

The political downfall of the party began in 1998 when the party scored only 3,9 % of the votes for the House of Commons of the Czech Republic Parliament.⁹⁷ Since this election, the party was not able to restore its former position, the party was disbanded and reinstated several times, but it only managed to score up to 1 % of the votes in any elections.

⁹² Mareš, "Konstituování Krajní Pravice. v Českém Stranicko-Politickém Systému," 159.

⁹³ Mareš, 161.

⁹⁴ Jan Horák, "Sládkovo životní trauma: ‚Zavřel mě Havel se Zemanem.‘ Za mříže se však dostal sám | Domov," Lidovky.cz, August 20, 2017, https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/sladek-se-vyhybal-soudu.A170816_104700_In_domov_jho.

⁹⁵ Mareš, "Zahraničně-Politické Koncepce České Krajní Pravice," 3.

⁹⁶ Mareš, "Zahraničně-Politické Koncepce České Krajní Pravice."

⁹⁷ "Celkové Výsledky Hlasování - Results of 1998 Parliamentary Elections," accessed April 12, 2023, <https://www.volby.cz/pls/ps1998/u4>.

Workers' Party

Dělnická strana (or DS) was founded in late 2002 when people who remained in the youth organization of the Republican party established a new party called '*Nová síla*' (New Force), according the annual report of the Czech Ministry of Interior, where Workers' party had a small introduction, the first public presentation of the party happened during manifestation '*S občany o EU*' (with citizens about EU), which was organized by far-right nationalist group *National party*.⁹⁸

The Workers' Party followed up on the Republican Party in its aggressive political program against foreign nations, organizations, and domestic minorities, especially Roma. Josef Smolík, in 2011 summarizes DS's program statements and what the party fights '*for the restoration of the CR's sovereignty, withdrawal from NATO military structures, determination of the nationality of residents of the CR, deportation of illegal immigrants, direct election of the president of the republic, reinstatement of the death penalty, etc.*'⁹⁹

In 2004, the party introduced the logo with the black letters DS in the cogwheel, which is typical for far-right parties. In the same year, a motive of a man holding a hammer, which was copied by the NSDAP election leaflet.¹⁰⁰ The following year Workers' Party announced that it would be a part of a broad far-right coalition for the 2006 Parliamentary election called '*Národní pětka*' (National Five), consisting of DS, the Republican Party, or the National Party. The Workers' Party left the coalition in 2005, mainly due to Miroslav Sládek's engagement and strong National Party position.¹⁰¹ Even though the coalition's formation failed, it was a rare and notable attempt on this political spectrum in the Czech Republic to cooperate.

According to the 2008 *Strategy of the fight against extremism* of the Ministry of Interior, the Workers' Party started to be more extremist in 2008, when it started to cooperate with openly neo-Nazi groups and organizations such as National Resistance or Autonomous Nationalists, whose member DS let candidate in the Regional elections on their ballot.¹⁰² The same year on 1st February 2008, the DS founded their own armed

⁹⁸ "Výroční Zpráva o Extremismu Ministerstva Vnitřní České Republiky," Výroční zpráva (Ministerstvo vnitřní České republiky, 2002), 21.

⁹⁹ Smolík, "Far Right-Wing Political Parties in the Czech Republic," 104.

¹⁰⁰ Charvát, "„Dělnická Strana," 105.

¹⁰¹ Charvát, 106.

¹⁰² Ministerstvo vnitřní České republiky, "Strategie Boje Proti Extremismu," 2009.

organization, Workers' Party Defense Corps,¹⁰³ which was characterized as a '*security component of the party, which should not only protect party office-bearers and perform an organizing role in public events but also monitor local problems in the region and help citizens*'.¹⁰⁴

This new approach taken by the Workers' Party is associated with its' newly established connection with the German NPD and the DS's take-over of its' model of opening to the neo-Nazi agenda. This brought more media attention to the party and more space for the antisemitism propaganda presented by the DS and NPD.¹⁰⁵

The party's popularity peaked in 2009 after events at the demonstration at Litvínov's city part of Janov, which was highly anti-Roma concerned. This year, the party scored 1,07 % of the vote in the election for the European Parliament.¹⁰⁶ This election's success not only meant that the party was eligible for state financial support, but also the party was more popular among members of other far-right subjects, who wanted to get stronger political positions. This also included members of the Republican party.¹⁰⁷ In the same year, the Czech Minister of Interior Martin Pecina filed a proposal for the party's judicial dissolution of the party, which was successful, and the Supreme Administrative Court canceled the Workers' Party on 17th September 2010.¹⁰⁸

Islám v České republice nechceme

*'We like diversity; that is why we refuse Islam.'*¹⁰⁹ This is the first sentence that might be found on the website of the then-popular Facebook platform and movement. *We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic* (IVČRN). Originally, a Facebook page was established in 2009 and emerged from the far-right organization *Czech Defense League*.¹¹⁰

The Facebook page was characterized by its' cherry-picking method of showing off unpopular or criminal behavior of people from the Middle East or Africa, mostly

¹⁰³ Smolík, "Far Right-Wing Political Parties in the Czech Republic," 103.

¹⁰⁴ Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, "Strategie Boje Proti Extremismu," 3.

¹⁰⁵ Charvát, "„Dělnická Strana," 109.

¹⁰⁶ Charvát, 112.

¹⁰⁷ Václav Drchal, "Krajní pravice sílí. Část sládkovců je u „dělníků" | Noviny," Lidovky.cz, July 14, 2009, https://www.lidovky.cz/noviny/krajni-pravice-sili-cast-sladkovcu-je-u-delniku.A090714_000018_ln_noviny_sko.

¹⁰⁸ Charvát, "„Dělnická Strana," 112.

¹⁰⁹ Islám v České republice nechceme, "O nás," ivcrn.cz, March 31, 2023, <https://www.ivcrn.cz/o-nas/>.

¹¹⁰ Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, "Zpráva o Extremismu Na Území České Republiky v Roce 2015," 2015.

labeled as Muslims; this was made mostly by sharing pictures that lacked any reliable source other than a different Facebook page. The movement's popularity peaked in 2014 and 2015 when the European migration crisis peaked as well. At this time, the page had around 163 000 followers,¹¹¹ more than ten times more people than people who live in the Czech Republic and identify as Muslims, with only around 2000 living an active religious life.¹¹²

Even though the migration crisis did not affect the Czech Republic much, with only around 640 new applications from refugees in the first half of 2015,¹¹³ the page's popularity helped transform the mainstream topic from far-right parties and movements to anti-Islam propaganda. Interestingly, with this shift, the role of the antisemitism Czech far-right quite diminished since the movement took a strongly pro-Israel approach to the question of the Palestine-Israel conflict.¹¹⁴

The Facebook page was banned in 2016; at the time, still, influential leader Martin Konvička stated that this was due do to the activities of German chancellor Angela Merkel and Minister of Interior Milan Chovanec because ‘*we all know about a call from a bunch of European politicians, including chancellor Merkel and Czech minister of interior Chovanec for the censorship of social media.*’¹¹⁵

Eventually, the movement transformed itself from the initiative into a political party *Blok proti islamizaci* (Bloc against Islamization), which had the same goals as its’ predecessor but wanted to achieve them via elections. The party leader remained Martin Konvička, and the party started to cooperate with the first attempt for the political party by Tomio Okamura *Úsvit přímé demokracie*. However, the biggest success of this cooperation and the overall political existence of BPI was an assembly for support of the

¹¹¹ Pavel Doubek, “Islám Nebo Demokracii v České Republice Nechceme?(Omezení Svobody Projevu Na Internetu),” *DNY PRAVA 2015*, n.d., 26.

¹¹² Jakub Havlíček, “Kritika Islámu Na Českém Internetu–Možnosti Interpretace,” *Lidé Města* 17, no. 3 (2015): 480.

¹¹³ “Over 210 000 First Time Asylum Seekers in the EU in the Second Quarter of 2015,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed April 13, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STAT_15_5677.

¹¹⁴ Havlíček, “Kritika Islámu Na Českém Internetu–Možnosti Interpretace,” 492.

¹¹⁵ “Facebook zablokoval stránku Islám v České republice nechceme, šíří nenávist i xenofobii | Aktuálně.cz,” *Aktuálně.cz*, January 11, 2016, <https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/facebook-zablokoval-stranku-islam-v-ceske-republice-nehceme/r~1a4d60c6b89a11e5bc8c002590604f2e/>.

president on the 17th of November 2015 with around 2500 people, where beside Martin Konvička, president of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman, had a speech.¹¹⁶

The end of the movement's relevance happened in 2016, decreasing public interest in migration, disagreements with ÚNK (the 2016 title of Úsvit přímé demokracie), and inability to be seen on social media meant decreasing support for Martin Konvička and his organizations. The last bigger attention was given to Konvička when, during the anniversary of the 11/9 attack, he and his colleagues orchestrated a theatre of Islamic state conquering Old Town Square in Prague, when Konvička and his colleagues dressed as Muslim terrorists driven to the Old Town Square on the jeep with artificial guns.¹¹⁷

Svoboda a přímá demokracie

In 2015, when the migration crisis culminated, Tomio Okamura and Radim Fiala left their former political party, Úsvit přímé demokracie (Dawn of Direct Democracy or ÚPD), and founded a brand new political party, *Freedom and Direct Democracy* (or SPD), unlike the ÚPD, SPD was meant to be a classical political party with member base (ÚPD had only nine members), which this base would finance. Financial disputes were the main reasons why the first attempt failed since other members accused Tomio Okamura of bringing out many of the movements. From the beginning, the party aimed at migration and anti-Islam topics, and Tomia Okamura presented it as a '*Radical movement*.'¹¹⁸

As the title suggests, the main ideological anchoring of the newly established party lies in the principles of direct democracy, mostly inspired by the political system of Switzerland, which Tomio Okamura, in the beginnings of the party, often referred to. The proclamation of the newly established party happened during the arrival of the chairwoman of the French far-right political party *Front National* Marine Le Pen.¹¹⁹

During the first elections for the party in 2017, the SPD scored almost 10,7 percent of the vote, surpassing the election result of Tomio Okamura's former political party

¹¹⁶ Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, "Zpráva o Extremismu Na Území České Republiky v Roce 2015."

¹¹⁷ Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, "Zpráva o Extremismu Na Území České Republiky v Roce 2016," 2016, 11.

¹¹⁸ Česká televize, "„Jsme radikální hnutí.“ Okamura má novou stranu – SPD," ČT24 - Nejdůvěryhodnější zpravodajský web v ČR - Česká televize, accessed January 20, 2023, <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/1537546-jsme-radikalni-hnuti-okamura-ma-novou-stranu-spd>.

¹¹⁹ Jitka Venturová and Josef Kopecký, "Okamura vystoupil z Úsvitu, zakládá hnutí Svoboda a přímá demokracie," iDNES.cz, May 5, 2015, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/okamura-opustil-uvit-zaklada-hnuti-svoboda-a-prima-demokracie.A150505_101715_domaci_hv.

ÚPD, which scored only around 6,9 %. During this election, Okamura used different tactics; instead of the promotion of direct democracy and an easy way to punish politicians for their criminal behavior, he focused on migration topics and topics targeted against the EU.¹²⁰ Furthermore, since the election winner, Andrej Babiš, with his movement ANO did not manage to get a majority in the Chamber of Commons, Okamura, and SPD could have taken a place in the government. Still, since this would prevent the party from adopting anti-government rhetoric, SPD ended up in the opposition, and the government was formed from members of ANO and Social Democracy with support from Communist Party.¹²¹

During its first years in the parliament, the party faces similar problems as Okamura's former political party – dissatisfaction of the members with the party leadership. In 2019, the SPD dissolved its cell in Moravskoslezský region because of the rebellion of its chairman, Lubomír Volný, who wanted to challenge Tomio Okamura for the party's chairmanship.¹²² Volný, after this, founded his political movement *Volný Blok* and, for a short time, competed with Tomio Okamura for the biggest media coverage on the far-right spectrum. However, Volný scored only 1,33 % of the votes in the 2021 elections; compared to 9,56 % of the SPD¹²³, and gradually diminished from the public space.

Empirical findings

In this part of the paper, empirical findings of the research will be introduced, divided by all seven criteria given in the previous parts of the paper for each political party or movement this paper deals with. In total, 157 instances were found among all four subjects, the most common instance was anti-democracy with 33 instances followed by anti-establishment rhetoric with 31 instances. While collecting data, it became

¹²⁰ Robert Muller and Jan Lopatka, “Far-Right Scores Surprise Success in Czech Election,” *Reuters*, October 21, 2017, sec. Emerging Markets, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-election-farright-idUSKBN1CQ0T3>.

¹²¹ André Kapsas, “The Czech Left Is Being Punished for Its Disastrous Record in Government,” accessed April 13, 2023, <https://jacobin.com/2021/10/czech-republic-andrej-babis-social-democrats-communists-ano-election>.

¹²² Česká televize, “SPD zrušila svou moravskoslezskou organizaci. Poslanec Volný chce krok napadnout,” ČT24 - Nejdůvěryhodnější zpravodajský web v ČR - Česká televize, accessed March 21, 2023, <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/2739248-spd-zrusila-svou-moravskoslezskou-organizaci-poslanec-volny-chce-verdikt-napadnout>.


¹²³ “Celkové Výsledky Hlasování 2021,” accessed January 20, 2023, <https://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2021/ps2?xjazyk=CZ>.

noticeable that the latter subjects gradually reduced the intensity of their statements, resulting in an overall calming effect.

The Assembly for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia

Data collected for the political party, Republicans, were collected primarily from three types of sources – speeches of Republikáni’s members in the Parliament, the election program for the 1996 elections, and interviews with the head of the party Miroslav Sládek.

In total, 40 instances of one of the seven criteria were found. Five instances of anti-democracy, eight instances of anti-establishment rhetoric, three instances of nationalism, six instances of populism, five instances of racism, seven instances of the strong state, and six instances of xenophobia.



Nationalism

As for nationalism, the post-World War 2 sentiment can be seen within the Republicans speeches, especially events that relate to the expulsion of the Czech Germans from our territory shortly after the end of the war. Regarding the time of the Republicans’ presence in the Parliament, this might be seen only as a connection with the creation of the Czech-German Declaration about mutual relations and its’ future development from the 21st of January 1997.¹²⁴ The Republicans used historical references with a strong sentiment to either not repeat potential errors such as not defending the country in 1998

¹²⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, “Česko-německá deklarace,” accessed June 22, 2023, <https://prag.diplo.de/cz-cs/themen/politik/seite-deutsch-tschechische-erklaerung-cz/1126730>.

after the Munich Conference, which was quoted by Miroslav Sládek as *'I am sorry we did not defend ourselves in 1938 against nazi assault ... we would keep our honor'*¹²⁵ or to take the inspiration from what they thought was the best period of the Czechoslovak state, such as *'we will follow up on the best from all of our histories since 1918'*¹²⁶ in a reference of the First Czechoslovak Republic.

Apart from the historical references, there is a visible emphasis on national and cultural identity, represented by the fear of losing them. Apart from the fear of the return of German citizens expelled after 1945, Miroslav Sládek related the possible immigration crisis in 2016 with the question of *'Existence or non-existence of our nation and the Czech Republic.'*¹²⁷ Even though this interview and events are dated almost 20 years after the end of the Republicans' presence in the Parliament, it is by quotes given by the possible return of the Germans to the Czech Republic.

Other than these examples, there are not many nationalist tendencies in the Republicans speeches or programs. There are no examples of using topics of national symbols and imagery or national unity. Although the security topic is being discussed at least in the program, it is more connected to sovereignty since the main idea of these speeches is connected with the rejection of joining NATO rather than the need for a strong army.

Racism

Regarding racism, the Republicans were openly racist against Roma people, which they pejoratively call *'cikáni'*, which might be translated as a more offensive *'gypsies'* instead of the *'Romové.'* The Republicans targeted this group during their whole existence in the Parliament and aimed their speeches at meeting with citizens purposely against them. During one political meeting in Nový Bor in 1998, where Miroslav Sládek was purposely rhetorically attacking present Roma people, a small group of Roma attacked him.¹²⁸ Jan Vik, a member of the Parliament and member of the Republicans, then

¹²⁵ "PČR, PS 1996-1998, 8. Schůze, Část 62/114 (13. 2. 1997)," accessed April 19, 2023, <https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1996ps/stenprot/008schuz/s008062.htm>.

¹²⁶ "Volební Program," accessed June 22, 2023, <http://zpravodajstvi.ecn.cz/ENV/VOLBY/SPRRSC/page01.htm>.

¹²⁷ Lukáš Valášek, "Sládek se vrací. Raději cikán než přivandrovalec, razí nový program," iDNES.cz, February 8, 2016, https://www.idnes.cz/brno/zpravy/rozhovor-se-sladkem-vraci-se-do-politiky.A160208_2224166_brno-zpravy_vh.

¹²⁸ Economia, "Romové napadli na mítinku Sládka," Hospodářské noviny (HN.cz), May 11, 1998, <https://hn.cz/c1-951687-romove-napadli-na-mitinku-sladka>.

asked during his speech, *'I ask you, how do you rate, as a so-called 'minister for gypsy affairs', an attack of gypsy racists on the member of the Parliament Sládek'*.¹²⁹

Mentions of the Roma people can also be found in the program for the 1996 election (with which the Republicans made it to the Parliament), where they specifically state that *'we need to finish the question of maladjusted ethnicities, for example, Gypsies'* or *'solutions of problems of maladjusted ethnicities and groups of people, especially Gypsies'*.¹³⁰ In an interview in 2016 with Miroslav Sládek, there is probably the best summary of the Republicans' perception of the Roma people: *'There are problems with gypsies'*.¹³¹ The first three examples were mainly *racial exclusion*, the last one more *biologically-determined differences*.

Other than Roma people, Sládek also showed a willingness to order racial differences when he implied that the Czech Republic is worth a more expensive gift than some *'African natives, which are satisfied with a little mirror or beads for establishing friendly relations with them'*.¹³²

Xenophobia

In the period of the Republicans presence in the Parliament in the middle 90s', there was not a strong immigration, as we can see, for example, during the existence of SPD. However, there were some examples of nativism when the Republicans had in their program *'a stop of selling of the national property, our people should come first'*¹³³ or attacks on the Order of German knights.¹³⁴ In the follow-up of the previously mentioned speech regarding the Taiwanese gift for the Czech Republic, Sládek used stereotyping of the Taiwanese people as they probably gave the Czech Republic some *'reed souvenir'*.¹³⁵

Regarding the anti-immigrant sentiment, one of a few can also be seen in the 1996 elections program, where there is stated that the Czech Republic should *'prevent the influx of refugees by guarding the borders with strict laws...'*¹³⁶ During one of his many

¹²⁹ "PČR, PS 1996-1998, 25. Schůze, Část 276 (21. 5. 1998)," accessed June 22, 2023, <https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1996ps/stenprot/025schuz/s025276.htm>.

¹³⁰ "Volební Program."

¹³¹ Valášek, "Sládek se vrací. Raději cikán než přivandrovalec, razí nový program."

¹³² "PČR, PS 1996-1998, 3. Schůze, Část 17/24 (25. 7. 1996)," accessed April 12, 2023, <https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1996ps/stenprot/003schuz/s003017.htm>.

¹³³ "Volební Program."

¹³⁴ "PČR, PS 1996-1998, 11. Schůze, Část 23/95 (15. 5. 1997)," accessed April 19, 2023, <https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1996ps/stenprot/011schuz/s011023.htm>.

¹³⁵ "PČR, PS 1996-1998, 3. Schůze, Část 17/24 (25. 7. 1996)."

¹³⁶ "Volební Program."

comebacks, Miroslav Sládek, during the culmination of the European refugee crisis, stated that *'better a gypsy than wanderer'*¹³⁷, when Sládek refused to call incoming people immigrants and used more pejorative *'přivandrované'* because as he explains, *'an immigrant is one family or foreign specialist, not moving millions of occupation army'*.¹³⁸

However, there are no signs of visible scapegoating since the Republicans were more targeted toward local minorities than incoming groups of people.

Anti-democracy

The Republicans managed to work quite properly in the democratic system during its' existence in the Parliament. In its' speeches, there are no visible signs of an approach aimed against democracy in the Czech Republic. The only subtype of the antidemocracy present is its' alignment with conspiracy theories.

During the Parliament speech, the Republicans tried to come up with theories that would harm the at that time leading party ODS. For example, in its program for the 1996 election, 'it is highly likely that the ODS, etc., will try with any means and at all costs to prevent its' failure even at the cost of election frauds.'¹³⁹ During the presidential election in 1998, Miroslav Sládek, who was a candidate of the Republicans party, was arrested and was not able to be present at the vote in the Parliament (which was necessary for him to be elected at the time). Sládek since then believed that *'just like in 1998, when I did candidate against Václav Havel and all of the government leaders had me arrested.'*¹⁴⁰

Other than that, the rest of the conspiracy theories found in the sources are mostly soft type of them, for example, about the unconstitutional split of Czechoslovakia by Jan Vík¹⁴¹ or the apparent connection between the state and a print company by Miroslav Sládek.¹⁴²

The Republicans did not tend to introduce worldwide conspiracies but reacted to current political topics with controversial explanations. Even though Sládek, during his previously mentioned comeback, believed that immigrants were a part of the *'occupation*

¹³⁷ Valášek, "Sládek se vrací. Raději cikán než přivandrovalec, razí nový program."

¹³⁸ Valášek.

¹³⁹ "Volební Program."

¹⁴⁰ Horák, "Sládkovo životní trauma."

¹⁴¹ "PČR, PS 1996-1998, 3. Schůze, Část 17/24 (25. 7. 1996)."

¹⁴² "PČR, PS 1996-1998, 6. Schůze, Část 19/23 (31. 10. 1996)," accessed April 19, 2023, <https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1996ps/stenprot/006schuz/s006019.htm>.

army',¹⁴³ which might be a part of the Eurabia conspiracy theory, this was mostly an exception to the regular approach for this political party.

Strong state

The Republicans had a dual approach regarding a strong state; since the party was in the opposition, it criticized any strengthening of the executive power; however, it suggested in the election program some things that might relate to the term strong state, especially sovereignty. In its' elections program in 1996, the Republicans suggested '*ensuring sufficient production of food in the first place as an insurance of the sovereignty of the state*'¹⁴⁴ or '*proclaim neutrality and with it refuse the joining of NATO.*'¹⁴⁵ There are also calls for strong leadership, like in Sládek's speech in the Parliament, centralized power in the 1996 elections program regarding agriculture, or national security in the program, where they suggest that former prisoners should fear returning to the jail by strictly toughening prison environment.¹⁴⁶

There are visible similar phenomena regarding the strong state as there are regarding anti-democracy; the Republicans were able to work within a democratic environment and probably did not seek to undermine this system. The party did not suggest any big changes that would lead to an authoritarian state, nor did not suggest any changes that would enable the existence of a single-party system. Sometimes even heavily criticized previous communist regimes that worked as an authoritarian single-party system.

Populism

The election program for the 1996 elections consists of more or less realistic 'solutions', many of which might be labeled as simplistic solutions. However, they are not presented in the list since a large part of other election programs work on similar principles. However, there are visible signs of simplistic solutions even in speeches of party representatives, for example, when Miroslav Sládek demanded that financial yields from international visits should be determined in exact thousands of crowns or they are useless. Politicians should pay themselves for these trips.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ Valášek, "Sládek se vrací. Raději cikán než přivandrovalec, razí nový program."

¹⁴⁴ "Volební Program."

¹⁴⁵ "Volební Program."

¹⁴⁶ "Volební Program."

¹⁴⁷ "PČR, PS 1996-1998, 5. Schůze, Část 26/74 (3. 10. 1996)," accessed April 19, 2023, <https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1996ps/stenprot/005schuz/s005026.htm>.

There were also found three instances of trying to appeal to the people, two of them by Miroslav Sládek in the Parliament speech; the first is a continuation of the previously mentioned speech,¹⁴⁸ the other one by his ensuring that there is nothing else important for the Republicans than the wellbeing of the homeland.¹⁴⁹ The last one found to appeal to the people is from the 1996 elections program, where there is stated that ‘*most of the resources should stay at the municipality levels so citizens had concrete benefits from their money.*’¹⁵⁰

Only other instances of populism were found and listed as two instances of anti-elitism. Both of them were by Miroslav Sládek when he tried to stereotype a politician as an empty promise giver¹⁵¹ and criticized elites as being driven only by fear and hate.¹⁵²

Anti-establishment rhetoric

As a Parliamentary political party, the Republicans had an opportunity to ask ministers and other political parties’ representatives about anything; in most of these cases, the Republicans either disagreed with political elites or verbally attacked them. Therefore, instances of anti-establishment rhetoric are quite common in the list, especially from the head of the party Miroslav Sládek. Sládek most commonly verbally attacked people whom the speech was meant for, for example, the member of the Parliament, who, according to Sládek, ‘*came here only to shine in the live broadcast.*’¹⁵³ or against Václav Havel, at that time the president of the republic, who in Sládek’s eyes was disgusted, when people in the streets show different opinion than his own, and Václav Havel should therefore arrange the ranking of values.¹⁵⁴

There are two main subtypes of anti-establishment rhetoric which occurred frequently in the time of the Republicans’ presence in the Parliament: already mentioned criticism of political elites and the promotion of direct democracy. Other than that, there is also one instance of anti-globalization, when Miroslav Sládek spoke against the ‘exporting of statues, painting...robbery of churches’ connected to the transition to the free market.

¹⁴⁸ “PČR, PS 1996-1998, 5. Schůze, Část 26/74 (3. 10. 1996).”

¹⁴⁹ “PČR, PS 1996-1998, 17. Schůze, Část 2 (2. 12. 1997),” accessed June 23, 2023, <https://psp.cz/ek-nih/1996ps/stenprot/017schuz/s017002.htm#r3>.

¹⁵⁰ “Volební Program.”

¹⁵¹ “PČR, PS 1996-1998, 5. Schůze, Část 26/74 (3. 10. 1996).”

¹⁵² “PČR, PS 1996-1998, 8. Schůze, Část 62/114 (13. 2. 1997).”


¹⁵³ “PČR, PS 1996-1998, 5. Schůze, Část 26/74 (3. 10. 1996).”

¹⁵⁴ “PČR, PS 1996-1998, 17. Schůze, Část 2 (2. 12. 1997).”

The promotion of direct democracy is visible, especially in the 1996 election program, where the Republicans' suggested a *referendum for every important thing*,¹⁵⁵ revoking politicians¹⁵⁶ or a direct election not only for the municipality's major but also the local chief of the police.¹⁵⁷

Workers' party

Since the Workers' Party never managed to be elected in the Parliament, there are not many still available sources of the speeches of its members. Most of the instances found are from the archive of the official website of the Workers' Party and its' subsidiary political movement, Workers' Youth. Other than that, there are also some interviews with the party's head Tomáš Vandas.



Nationalism

The Workers' Party was commonly referred to as a nationalist or patriotic party in the articles previously mentioned regarding this political party. This is confirmed by several instances which correspond with nationalist rhetoric found in speeches and texts of this party. There were found ten instances of nationalist rhetoric, especially about national unity. The Workers' Party, in its introduction, commonly describes the current situation as serious and steps which it is willing to take as *'inevitable for the future of the*

¹⁵⁵ "Volební Program."

¹⁵⁶ "Volební Program."

¹⁵⁷ "Volební Program."

nation’,¹⁵⁸ defending the right of the nation for the ‘*national resistance*’,¹⁵⁹ which was on the other hand suspiciously connected to a similar movement in Germany in the 1920s’ to 1940s’¹⁶⁰ and also calls for the national unity against enemies represented either by the European Union¹⁶¹ or the Roma citizens.¹⁶²

There is also a visible call for strengthening national identity, either by representing Workers’ youth as a ‘*new culture, which will one day take over the responsibility for leading the country*’¹⁶³ or that the Czech nation is not ‘*worse than any other state and there is, therefore, no need to act trampled and frightened*’.¹⁶⁴ The party’s anti-western approach was also represented in the marches for the memory of the people who were ‘*during the end of the Second World War recklessly murdered by allied air squadrons*’; interestingly, the march was taken on the 120th anniversary of the birth of Adolf Hitler.

There are also instances of security connected to nationalism. One of the being the establishment of the ‘*security corps of the Workers’ party established ... by the decision of the presidency of the Workers’ party*’¹⁶⁵, reserving a right for the ‘*national resistance*’¹⁶⁶ which is ‘*the national resistance is a condition for the survival of the nation ... when there is endangered its’ wholeness, unity, future and traditional culture*’.¹⁶⁷

Racism

Just like the Republicans, the Workers’ Party representatives were heavily targeted against the Roma minority; all of the instances of racism are instances of the racial exclusion of this minority, especially in connection with the ‘*maladjusted Gypsies*’¹⁶⁸, especially one article, which deals with the event of the racially motivated assault on the Roma family in Vítkov, where a group of the Workers’ party sympathizers set on fire a house where the family lived and seriously injured the young girl named Natálka, which

¹⁵⁸ Dělnická strana, “Kdo Jsme,” April 22, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090422215527/http://delnicka-strana.cz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=73&Itemid=102.

¹⁵⁹ Dělnická Mládež, “Dělnická Mládež | Zpráva,” April 29, 2009, <https://web.archive.org/web/20090429122521/http://www.delnickamladez.cz/zprava>.

¹⁶⁰ Dělnická Mládež.

¹⁶¹ Dělnická Mládež, “Dělnická Mládež | Kdo Jsme,” April 12, 2009, <https://web.archive.org/web/20090412031306/http://www.delnickamladez.cz/kdo-jsme>.

¹⁶² Dělnická Mládež, “Dělnická Mládež | Zpráva.”

¹⁶³ Dělnická Mládež, “Dělnická Mládež | Kdo Jsme.”

¹⁶⁴ Dělnická strana, “Kdo Jsme.”

¹⁶⁵ Dělnická strana, “Ochranné Sbory Dělnické Strany,” April 15, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090415011905/http://www.delnicka-strana.cz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=116&Itemid=150.

¹⁶⁶ Dělnická Mládež, “Dělnická Mládež | Zpráva.”

¹⁶⁷ Dělnická Mládež.

¹⁶⁸ Dělnická Mládež.

later became a symbol of the racism problem in the Czech Republic.¹⁶⁹ The mentioned article advocated these assaulters and verbally assaulted the Roma minority several times, including instances of whataboutism.¹⁷⁰ In another instance, Tomáš Vandas verbally attacked ‘*humanistic ‘easy-livers’, Gypsy foremen, and bureaucrats from Brussels*’.¹⁷¹

Xenophobia

There was only a single instance of xenophobia found; this might be by the party’s approach targeted especially the domestic interests, but also because of the ‘calm’ period between the first migration wave in the early 1990s’ and the middle 2010s’. The only instance is when Tomáš Vandas called for ‘*we will deport illegal immigrants back to their home states.*’.¹⁷²

Anti-democracy

The Workers’ Party did not learn to work properly in the democratic system; it never managed to achieve any significant election success. Tomáš Vandas also criticized the contemporary political system as a ‘*new liberal totalities, which will be eventually worse than the communist one*’.¹⁷³ In a continuation of this speech, Vandas also came up with a conspiracy theory that the ‘*current regime has a full mouth of the democracy, but it prosecutes its’ opponents, bullies them, chases them in the STB (secret police during communism) style locks them just like its’ predecessor.*’¹⁷⁴

The Workers’ Party also verbally attacked the media quite often, mostly related to the incident in Vítkov, when the party accused the media of ‘*fabricating of a sensation*’¹⁷⁵ or ‘*we got used to similar excesses of local media*’.¹⁷⁶ On the 1st of September 2010, Tomáš Vandas also verbally attacked the media in the same opportunity, claiming that ‘*after the cause Vítkov, the media got a new and much-needed ammo, and spined a spiral of accusation of racism, xenophobia and non-tolerance towards the majority.*’¹⁷⁷

¹⁶⁹ Martin Melichar, “Žháří z Vítkova jsou s ultrapravicí spojeni dlouhodobě | Domov,” Lidovky.cz, September 8, 2009, https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/zhari-z-vitkova-jsou-s-ultrapravici-spojeni-dlouhodobem.A090908_162611_ln_domov_mel.

¹⁷⁰ Dělnická Mládež, “Dělnická Mládež | Zpráva.”

¹⁷¹ Tomáš Vandas, “Tomáš Vandas, archiv článků,” accessed June 28, 2023, <https://www.tomasvandas.cz/archiv/archiv-2008---2010>.

¹⁷² Tomáš Vandas.

¹⁷³ Tomáš Vandas.

¹⁷⁴ Tomáš Vandas.

¹⁷⁵ Dělnická Mládež, “Dělnická Mládež | Zpráva.”

¹⁷⁶ Dělnická Mládež.

¹⁷⁷ Tomáš Vandas, “TOMÁŠ VANDAS.”

Strong state

There are few instances of the call for a strong state in the data found. Since the party was sometimes associated with Nazism, one might expect more of these instances, but maybe election failures prevented the party from these calls. The Workers' Party was quite openly against our membership in the European Union, and *'we vigorously deny the Lisbon treaty and the politics of the union, which deprive the power of individual states in favor of the EU.'*¹⁷⁸ Also, the Workers' Party criticized international corporations for terrorizing their' employees in the Czech Republic.¹⁷⁹

The Workers' Party also came with at least one instance of a call for strong leadership, claiming that *'our republic is sick, it is visible on every single step. The treatment must be effective, radical, and uncompromising.'*¹⁸⁰ Especially the Workers' youth saw themselves as the only possible future of the republic and the strong leaders whom this republic was in serious need of.

Populism

As mentioned above, the Workers' Party had no significant election success. It lacked any major voting campaign or communication with potential voters; most of the communication was aimed towards already sympathizing members of the party and their gradual radicalization. The only instance of the appealing to the people found in the data was a part of the party introduction on their official website: *'We want to protect interests of so-called ordinary citizens (none of us is ordinary, since we are all unique human beings).'*¹⁸¹ There is also a single instance of the distrust of the media, which are afraid of the possible election success of the Workers' Party, according to Tomáš Vandas.¹⁸²

All other instances of populism are more associated with anti-elitism. Those anti-elitism statements were aimed at union bosses, who *'exchanged their struggle for rights of the working ones for warm places in the Senate'*,¹⁸³ specialists in their area,¹⁸⁴ or officials who *'do not want accept the defeat of their dream: united European states, and also they are scared of losing their troughs'*.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁸ Dělnická strana, "Kdo Jsme."

¹⁷⁹ Dělnická strana.

¹⁸⁰ Dělnická Mládež, "Dělnická Mládež | Kdo Jsme."

¹⁸¹ Dělnická strana, "Kdo Jsme."

¹⁸² "Rozhovor pro Dělnické listy," 2009, <https://www.tomasvandas.cz/rozhovor>.

¹⁸³ Dělnická strana, "Kdo Jsme."

¹⁸⁴ Dělnická Mládež, "Dělnická Mládež | Zpráva."

¹⁸⁵ Dělnická Mládež.

Anti-establishment rhetoric

The Workers' Party usually referred to the contemporary political parties as an after-November establishment, against which resistance must be made.¹⁸⁶ The party also accused the government of double standards; when minister Kocáb gave 100 000 Czech crowns to the family that the Workers' Party sympathizers attacked, the Workers' youth asked whether, if the roles were opposite, would '*minister Kocáb come to me and give me one hundred thousand crowns?*'¹⁸⁷ Tomáš Vandas also stated that, according to him '*the caretaker government of Jan Fisher was praised to the heaven for ... persecution of the 'evil extremist'*'¹⁸⁸ There were also instances of calls for a change as '*however we think that it is not possible only to oversee and be a puppet with which the government elite does what it wants*'¹⁸⁹ or '*there will be a zero-tolerance until we accomplish to expel this corrupted band from their chairs*'.¹⁹⁰

Islám v České republice nechceme

During the collection of data of the IVČRN, there emerged an issue with the availability of the data; since the movement operated especially on the social network the Facebook, most of its statements that could be analyzed came from this social network. However, this page was deleted by the social network itself for violating its rules.¹⁹¹ Even though more pages were made meant to substitute the original one, none exist today, and there are no available deposits of these pages like there are for the Workers' Party websites. Therefore, most of the data used are from interviews with the head of the movement Martin Konvička and official websites of the political movement.

In its' bachelor's thesis, Jakub Merc managed to find some posts of the Martin Konvička in one of the groups IVČRN and explains how these posts looked like based on the interview of Martin Konvička and Martin Veselovský, where there were some posts shown: '*... where this activist (Martin Konvička) publicized posts which deal with concentration camps for Muslims or grinding Muslims into meat and bone meal ...*'¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶ Dělnická Mládež.

¹⁸⁷ Dělnická Mládež.


¹⁸⁸ Tomáš Vandas, "TOMÁŠ VANDAS."

¹⁸⁹ Dělnická strana, "Kdo Jsme."

¹⁹⁰ Dělnická Mládež, "Dělnická Mládež | Kdo Jsme."

¹⁹¹ "Facebook zablokoval stránku Islám v České republice nechceme, šíří nenávist i xenofobii | Aktuálně.cz."

¹⁹² Jakub Merc, "“ Islám v ČR Nechceme’ Jako Politický Fenomén České Společnosti z Hlediska Teorie Extremismu a Radikalismu," 2017, 18.



Nationalism

Although IVČRN often stated that it protects the values and culture of Europe and Christianity, it also stated that *‘We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic stands for the protection of the democratic constitution.’*¹⁹³ There are also two historical references, one with Martin Konvička’s comparison of Islam with Christianity and causing atrocities: *‘...but Islam does not have a period, in which it would cause them (atrocities), except the short period between the 1850 and 1950’*¹⁹⁴ The other historical reference was also made by Martin Konvička when he states that *‘Oskar Schindler also identified with goals of Nazi ideology, but after the start of the Holocaust he realized horrible aspects of the ideology ... so I am not surprised that there exist Muslims, who realize where it (Islam) leads’*.¹⁹⁵

Other than that, there are no instances of cultural identity or national unity; there is a high possibility that they were presented in posts on Facebook. However, they are not able to be found nowadays.

Racism

Although racism is conceptualized especially as a belief in the racial hierarchy based on biological characteristics, there is a visible connection in the thinking of the IVČRN representatives between Muslims and Arabs, which they use as synonyms. There

¹⁹³ Islám v České republice nechceme, “O nás.”

¹⁹⁴ Josef Kopecký, “Můj cíl je zaplnit za rok Letnou, říká lídr protiislámské iniciativy,” iDNES.cz, January 21, 2015, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/rozhovor-s-mluvcim-uskupeni-islam-v-cr-nehceme-konvickou.A150121_160742_domaci_kop.

¹⁹⁵ Kopecký.

are two clear examples of racial exclusion, both in the interview with Martin Konvička for iTunes.cz, where he states that *‘the biggest victims of Muslims are Muslims’*¹⁹⁶ and *‘... We had already said before that it is correct that we would accept Syrian Christians, non-Muslims...’*¹⁹⁷ Martin Konvička also brought an example of cultural imperials *‘because it is necessary to realize that Crusades were counter-offensives after many centuries of Islam expansion and Islam assaults against Europe ... Europe finally stood up and in some way started to protect itself.’*¹⁹⁸

Xenophobia

Since the IVČRN was primarily targeted against immigrants, there are many instances of xenophobia. Their motto, *‘we like diversity, that’s why we reject Islam’*¹⁹⁹ or *‘then slow down immigration from these (Muslim) countries’*²⁰⁰ has signs of anti-immigrant sentiment, Just like stereotyping Muslims by affiliation with *‘the totalitarian ideologies and Islam, as the most aggressively expanding ideology nowadays.’*²⁰¹ Similar was Martin Konvička's statement that *‘Islam is, according to me, monstrous ideology’*.²⁰²

Some instances of xenophobia are associated with scapegoating, found twice in the available sources. Those instances include *‘we know those cases from Great Britain, where the driver of a bus rejects a blind woman because she has got a dog with her and because the dog offends his religion’*²⁰³, increasing number of rape in Sweden, which is, according to Konvička caused by the soaring immigration,²⁰⁴

Anti-democracy

Regarding anti-democracy, there is a visible association of IVČRN with conspiracy theories, especially Eurabia. There were four instances of conspiracy theories found in the available sources. For example, Martin Konvička stated that *‘Islam is made for when it sticks somewhere, it will be growing’*²⁰⁵ or a false statement that there was a school in England that was Islamized.²⁰⁶ There was also an accusation against the Central

¹⁹⁶ Kopecký.

¹⁹⁷ Kopecký.

¹⁹⁸ Demagog.cz, “Martin Konvička (Nez.),” Demagog.cz, accessed June 27, 2023, <https://demagog.cz/politici/martin-konvicka-355>.

¹⁹⁹ Islám v České republice nechceme, “O nás.”

²⁰⁰ Kopecký, “Můj cíl je zaplnit za rok Letnou, říká lídr protiislámské iniciativy.”

²⁰¹ Islám v České republice nechceme, “O nás.”

²⁰² Kopecký, “Můj cíl je zaplnit za rok Letnou, říká lídr protiislámské iniciativy.”

²⁰³ Demagog.cz, “Martin Konvička (Nez.).”

²⁰⁴ Demagog.cz.

²⁰⁵ Demagog.cz.

²⁰⁶ Demagog.cz.

Muslim Community of illegal actions, presented in the petition against recognizing Islam as an official religion.²⁰⁷

Some statements, such as ‘*we do not want Islam here*’,²⁰⁸ were also classified as anti-democratic, specifically as anti-pluralism, which was also identified in the criticism of the organization of the project, which introduced Islam in schools and aimed to explain its’ traditions.²⁰⁹ Another instance of anti-pluralism was found in the statement of Martin Konvička, ‘*the freedom of religion might be limited when it is in the moral interest*’; the last one was also targeted against the Central Muslim Community in the previously mentioned petition.²¹⁰

Strong state

In the introduction of the movement, there is a very similar quote to the Workers’ Party regarding protecting the constitution: ‘*We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic to stand for the protection of the democratic constitution*’.²¹¹ IVČRN also claimed that the Central Muslim Community represents a serious security problem for the Czech Republic,²¹² and there is a need to hold back political Islam.²¹³

However, there were no more calls for a strong state in the available sources; there is a high possibility that there were more instances of sovereignty since IVČRN often criticized the European Union. However, since there was a severe lack of data, there were none of them found.

Populism

There was only one instance of populism found in the available sources, represented by the statement ‘*IVČRN and people who post here inform about Islam ahead of several days compared to the mainstream media*’.²¹⁴ This statement was categorized as distrust of the media since it obviously disparages the media's role.

²⁰⁷ Islám v České republice nechceme, “Petice proti uznání islámu,” ivcrn.cz, March 31, 2023, <https://www.ivcrn.cz/petice-proti-uznani-islam/>.

²⁰⁸ Kopecký, “Můj cíl je zaplnit za rok Letnou, říká lídr protiislámské iniciativy.”

²⁰⁹ Demagog.cz, “Martin Konvička (Nez.)”

²¹⁰ Islám v České republice nechceme, “Petice proti uznání islámu.”

²¹¹ Islám v České republice nechceme, “O nás.”

²¹² Islám v České republice nechceme, “Petice proti uznání islámu.”

²¹³ Kopecký, “Můj cíl je zaplnit za rok Letnou, říká lídr protiislámské iniciativy.”

²¹⁴ Islám v České republice nechceme, “O nás.”

Besides this, IVČRN did not present populism in its' speeches. However, the desired ban on Islam might be marked as a simplistic solution.

Anti-establishment rhetoric

Martin Konvička criticized political elites with a statement, *'I don't think that Zeman (former president) is a right leader of the nation, which would lead the Czech Republic from the Islam danger'*.²¹⁵ There was also one instance of the emphasis on personal freedom: *'the freedom of one person ends where there starts freedom of the other one'*.²¹⁶

Political representatives of the Czech Republic were mostly like-minded as the IVČRN in the question of Islam immigrants (however not so radical). Therefore there was not a need to criticize political elites much at that time.

Svoboda a Přímá Demokracie


Sources regarding SPD are by far the most available from the four parties and movements discussed in this thesis. SPD managed to get to the Parliament in 2017 and is present there today. There are four main data sources for this political party: speeches in the Parliament, the party's political program, interviews and speeches of the party representatives, and posts on social networks.

Especially speeches in the Parliament are quite expensive since Tomio Okamura manages to speak for hours; the longest speech took place on the 28th of February, 2023, when he spoke for seven hours.²¹⁷ The party also extensively uses Facebook. Posts published on this social network resemble the same template of the IVČRN: a picture quoted with a few words in capital letters, mostly appealing to the emotions of the people and extensive text in the description.

²¹⁵ Kopecký, "Můj cíl je zaplnit za rok Letnou, říká lídr protiislámské iniciativy."

²¹⁶ Islám v České republice nechceme, "O nás."

²¹⁷ Josef Kopecký, "Okamura Zlomil Svůj Vlastní Rekord. Kvůli Penzím Mluvil Víc Než 7 Hodin - IDNES.Cz," accessed June 29, 2023, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/rekordne-dlouhe-vystoupeni-tomio-okamura-spd-deja-vu-rust-duchodu-pandemicky-zakon.A230228_173238_domaci_kop.



Nationalism

Although SPD labels itself as a ‘*patriotic and democratic movement*’,²¹⁸ it does not show many instances of nationalism. In a few instances, it praises the national and cultural identity, especially in connotation with a danger of its destruction, for example, ‘*we refuse dealing with the extinction of the Czech nation ... by an influx of immigrants*’²¹⁹ or ‘*NO to the liquidation of the national states and nation and the establishment of a single multicultural state of EU.*’²²⁰ There are also calls for security, especially on the borders, with calls like ‘*We have to protect our borders!*’²²¹

Regarding the cultural identity, it is either shown as a nostalgic depiction of the Czech national folklore or the national treasure which might be taken away by foreigners, for example like it is suggested in the Facebook post from 7th of November 2020, where there is a photo of people in traditional Czech folklore dresses depicted as ‘*we have our culture, we do not want different*’,²²² where the ‘different’ culture is probably meant the Muslim one, since on the second part of the picture there are women in hijab.

²¹⁸ SPD, “Program,” *SPD - Svoboda a přímá demokracie* (blog), accessed June 29, 2023, <https://www.spd.cz/program-vypis/>.

²¹⁹ Demagog.cz, “Volby 2017: Rozhovor Tomio Okamury,” Demagog.cz, accessed June 29, 2023, <https://demagog.cz/diskuze/volby-2017-rozhovor-tomio-okamury>.

²²⁰ “Ukazuje Se, Co Jsou Takzvaní „uprchlíci“... - Tomio Okamura - SPD | Facebook,” March 28, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/posts/2488496944494439?ref=embed_post.

²²¹ “Ukazuje Se, Co Jsou Takzvaní „uprchlíci“... - Tomio Okamura - SPD | Facebook.”

²²² Tomio Okamura, “Co Si o Tom Myslíte? :-)) - Tomio Okamura - SPD | Facebook,” November 7, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/posts/3632437060100416/?paipv=0&eav=AfZR4zPfeHEuSQW-BOZbNBN1nPnKTj5GBKoPUVWIFxHfau3fPbkrOu8tH6GKTZmWFNKI&_rdr.

Racism

There are only a few instances of racism in the speeches of main SPD representatives; the only instance which was found and could be labeled as racial exclusion is from the Facebook post from 7th of January 2016, in which it was stated that *‘Germany is shocked by massive assaults on women, which immigrants from Arabic and African countries carry out.’*²²³

There are no clear instances of verbal assault on the Roma people; there is no clear evidence that SPD representatives associate the word ‘maladjusted’ with any specific race. A notable topic that the SPD dealt with regarding the Roma people was when Tomio Okamura and Miloslav Rozner dealt with a Roma concentration camp, which will be discussed later in this thesis.

Xenophobia

Especially in the late 2010s’, early after the SPD was established, the fight against illegal immigration into the Czech Republic was one of the main topics of the party. Tomio Okamura himself came with a lot of anti-immigrant sentiment comments like *‘therefore we cannot be pro-Islamic immigration’*,²²⁴ *‘we do not want any Muslim migrants here’*²²⁵ or *‘it shows what these so-called ‘refugees are’: ordinary pirates and criminals.’*²²⁶ The anti-immigrant sentiment is even presented in the party’s political program, where there is stated that the *‘ongoing Islamization of European countries is incompatible with these (European) values’*.²²⁷ The quote *‘Germany is shocked by massive assaults on women, which immigrants from Arabic and African countries carry out.’*²²⁸ might also be categorized as scapegoating.

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, SPD slowly started to shift its focus onto refugees from Ukraine as well; for example, in the Parliament speech of Tomio Okamura, where he stated that *‘Which will be the specific locations for maladjusted Roma and Ukrainian refugees?’*.²²⁹

²²³ Tomio Okamura, “Arabský a Africký Teror/Facebook,” January 7, 2016, <https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/videos/1138872946123519/>.

²²⁴ Zdeněk Vopat, “Majitelem země je občan, míní v rozhovoru Tomio Okamura,” !Argument, December 7, 2018, <https://casopisargument.cz/?p=19511>.

²²⁵ Vopat.

²²⁶ “Ukazuje Se, Co Jsou Takzvaní „uprchlíci“... - Tomio Okamura - SPD | Facebook.”

²²⁷ SPD, “Program.”

²²⁸ Tomio Okamura, “Arabský a Africký Teror/Facebook.”

²²⁹ “PČR, PS 2021-..., 19. Schůze, Část 146 (10. 5. 2022),” accessed June 29, 2023, <https://www.psp.cz/ek-nih/2021ps/stenprot/019schuz/s019146.htm#r2>.

Anti-democracy

Even though the SPD manages to work quite successfully in the democratic system of the Czech Republic, there are quite many instances of anti-democratic rhetoric. Most of them are associated with conspiracy theories that resemble the conspiracy theory of Eurabia or cultural Marxism. One example might be seen in the political program of the party, where there is stated that *'governing elites have thrown decent citizens ... into an experiment on which end there should emerge a new multicultural Europe.'*²³⁰ Radek Koten, a member of the SPD, came up with a conspiracy theory that we live in the *'Eurofascist totality'*,²³¹ which is 'cheekily' presented as democracy. One of the most serious events in the SPD history was an allegation of SPD member Miloslav Rozner, who stated that the Roma concentration camp in Lety was only a *'pseudo concentration camp'*.²³²

There were also instances of attacks on the media, especially by Tomio Okamura, who, for example, accused Český rozhlas of *'flouting of a rape'*.²³³ Also, the SPD's strict approach toward the Islam shows a certain degree of anti-pluralism. In the political program, there are points like *'we refuse propagation and support of opinions a behavior, which endanger the function of families and upbringing of children'*²³⁴ or *'we strictly refuse multicultural ideology, which is a tool of Islamization'*.²³⁵ Similarly, there are many comments from Tomio Okamura, for example, *'NO to the toleration of the Islamization of Europe'*.²³⁶

Strong state

Regarding the strong state, there is also a projected strict approach toward Islam and immigration. Most of the strong state rhetoric is labeled as a call for sovereignty, especially sovereignty in terms of independence from the European Union. There are quotes like *'No to the giving of more power from the level state into hands of EU'*,²³⁷ *'the*

²³⁰ SPD, "Program."

²³¹ "Eurofašistická totalita a protektorát Česko. Bezpečnostní výbor má vést šířitel konspirací z SPD," Aktuálně.cz, November 20, 2017, <https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/eurofasisticka-totalita-a-protektorat-cesko-bezpecnostni-vyb/r~989f4aa2cdfb11e7adc2ac1f6b220ee8/>.

²³² Robert Sattler ČTK, "Neexistující pseudokoncentrák, míní Rozner o Letech. Míří na něj trestní oznámení | Domov," Lidovky.cz, February 5, 2018, https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/tomio-okamura-spd-miroslav-rozner-koncetracni-tabor-lety-romove.A180205_101937_ln_domov_rsa.

²³³ "Jen útočila, co jsem si prý dovolil, našel Okamura redaktorku Radiožurnálu. Nabízíme záznam i přepis dialogu," iROZHLAS, June 20, 2019, https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/tomio-okamura_1906201316_miz.

²³⁴ SPD, "Program."

²³⁵ SPD.

²³⁶ "Ukazuje Se, Co Jsou Takzvaní „uprchlíci“... - Tomio Okamura - SPD | Facebook."

²³⁷ "Ukazuje Se, Co Jsou Takzvaní „uprchlíci“... - Tomio Okamura - SPD | Facebook."

SPD movement fights for our sovereignty and the withdrawal from the EU,²³⁸ or that *‘the SPD requires the re-establishment of guarding of our national borders’*,²³⁹ which was determined as a national security subtype.

There was also one instance of a call for the state's strong leadership: *‘The state has to be a guarantor of their safety and a guardian of law and freedom’*.²⁴⁰

Populism

Regarding populism, there are eight instances found in the data. There are two instances of anti-elitism and distrust of the media, one instance of appealing to the people, and three instances of simplistic solutions. The instances of anti-elitism were targeted at the political godfathers²⁴¹ and Andrej Babiš.²⁴² The distrust of the media was targeted especially against the ‘mainstream’ media, which the SPD distrusts: *‘people who let themselves influenced to some extent by mainstream media.’*²⁴³

The simplistic solutions were found twice in the political program:^{however}, as already mentioned, since the election program and political programs are often made to be as simple as possible, it is not clear from the program whether the SPD has a more complex solution for given programs. However, most of the political marketing of the SPD focuses on the things that SPD disagrees with – for example, war, expensive things, etc. The SPD is one of a few parties that want to cancel sanctions against Russia because it might, according to Tomio Okamura, make energies cheaper: *‘Russians want to sell us gas, and the Nord Stream 1 is ready.’*²⁴⁴ The instance of appealing to the people is represented by the quote of Tomio Okamura from the same interview: *‘I have Czech interests in my heart.’*²⁴⁵

²³⁸ Tomio Okamura, “Pobavil Mě Premér Andrej Babiš/Facebook,” October 12, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/photos/a.185333081477515/3910750025602450/?type=3&locale=hi_IN.

²³⁹ Tomio Okamura, “Tomio Okamura - SPD | Facebook,” June 26, 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/posts/837992514357851>.

²⁴⁰ SPD, “Program.”

²⁴¹ SPD.

²⁴² Demagog.cz, “Volby 2017.”

²⁴³ Vopat, “Majitelem země je občan, míní v rozhovoru Tomio Okamura.”

²⁴⁴ Dominik Stein, “Nakupoval bych ruský plyn a zrušil sankce. To ze mě ale nedělá proruského politika, říká Okamura | Domov,” Lidovky.cz, September 14, 2022, https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/rozhovor-okamura-rusko-plyn-fiala-vlada-sankce-spd.A220913_225910_In_domov_hma.

²⁴⁵ Stein.

Anti-establishment rhetoric

As the Svoboda a Přímá Demokracie (Freedom and Direct Democracy) suggests, there are many instances of the promotion of direct democracy both in the speeches of the party representatives and the political program. Two main points made quite frequently are associated with the call for a referendum and the possibility of revoking the candidate's mandate²⁴⁶. Tomio Okamura sees the referendum as the *'exact opposite of that Euro fascism, which is here today.'*²⁴⁷

There are also instances of the emphasis on personal freedom, for example, *'NO to the further restriction of the right of citizens, including the right to bear a weapon.'*²⁴⁸ or *'citizens have a right of protection, privacy, identity, personal information and data from preventive spying of the state'*.²⁴⁹ There is also one instance of anti-globalization representing SPD's approach towards international organizations such as the EU and NATO: *'Let the EU stop turning us into a trash can!'*²⁵⁰

Summary of finding

The Republicans had the biggest portion of the racist statements in comparison to the other three subjects. Furthermore, from the finding, they were probably the most aimed against the Roma minority, along with the Workers' Party, which, apart from being openly racist like the Republicans, also introduced a strong nationalist sentiment to the political spectrum.

IVČRN and the SPD dealt, on the other hand, more with illegal migration both into the Czech Republic and European Union; both parties were strictly Islamophobic and, to a large extent, anti-democratic, especially by leaning toward conspiracy theories such as Eurabia. The Islamophobic approach was not present during the biggest power of the Republicans and Workers' Party. However, it is most likely because of the lack of Muslim immigration at their time, since Miroslav Sládek, during one of his many come-backs, verbally assaulted immigrants and even claimed that they are worse than the Roma people, against which he spoke out during his presence in the Parliament.

²⁴⁶ SPD, "Program."

²⁴⁷ Vopat, "Majitelem země je občan, míní v rozhovoru Tomio Okamura."

²⁴⁸ "Ukazuje Se, Co Jsou Takzvaní „uprchlíci“... - Tomio Okamura - SPD | Facebook."

²⁴⁹ SPD, "Program."

²⁵⁰ "Ukazuje Se, Co Jsou Takzvaní „uprchlíci“... - Tomio Okamura - SPD | Facebook."

Nationalism

The only truly nationalist far-right political party or movement from the four subjects was the Workers' Party. The party was inspired by the workers' movement of the last centuries and had an alarming amount of coincidences related to the German Reich. There was a strong national unity sentiment, especially from the youth organization Workers' Youth.

Both the Republicans and IVČRN lacked nationalism, even though some historical references were presented in both subjects' data. On the other hand, the SPD uses national identity and the presence of the Christian culture in the Czech Republic and Europe.

Racism

Racism is the only criterion, which faded over time. Both the Republicans and Workers' Party were openly racist, especially against the Roma minority. There were even some instances of physical assaults in the political meeting of the Republicans and the outcome of the march of the Workers' Party in Vítkov.

IVČRN and SPD do not show the same approach towards the Roma minority; even though they show significant hate towards the Islam religion and sometimes even against Arabs, instances of racism are far less frequent than at the first two parties.

Xenophobia

The only party that did not use xenophobia frequently was the Workers' Party, which dealt more with domestic minorities than potential immigrants like IVČRN and SPD did. However, the Republicans dealt especially with the economic foreigners who were present in the Czech Republic after the fall of the Communist regime. Their instances of xenophobia were aimed especially against foreign businessmen who, according to them, exported the cultural heritage of the Czech people. The approach towards xenophobia is quite similar between the IVČRN and SPD; both were targeted against the same group of people – the Muslims.

Anti-democracy

All four subjects indicate the presence of anti-democratic rhetoric. The Republicans, the IVČRN, and the SPD mainly due to their alignment to conspiracy theories, and the Workers' Party mainly because they attacked the media, especially its youth

organization. The Republicans mostly came up with conspiracy theories that tried to explain events that had already happened to the party. The IVČRN and the SPD seem like they tend to believe systemic conspiracy theories like the Eurabia one.

Strong state

Quite interesting is the approach towards the strong state: only subjects that managed to exist in the Parliament showed some will to introduce a strong state which would control the republic. All four subjects mainly advocated for the state's sovereignty, especially against the European Union.

Populism

Populism is visible, especially in parties that want to succeed in the elections in various ways, including distrust of the media and appealing to the people, probably trying to get more voters. The Republicans and the SPD also presented many simplistic solutions, especially in their election programs, which were not projected into the data since most the political parties most likely present simplistic solutions in their election programs.

Anti-establishment rhetoric

The anti-establishment rhetoric is present, especially within the Republicans, and the SPD had opportunities to speak in the Parliament, where they frequently criticized political elites, which is almost non-existent in the data of IVČRN. The Workers' Party criticized political elites mainly after the assault of their sympathizers on the Roma family; it is the only subtype of the anti-establishment rhetoric presented within this party. As mentioned above, IVČRN did not criticize the political elites much, especially the domestic ones, but criticized the European representatives quite often.

Both Parliamentary parties also worked with an idea of direct democracy, especially presented by the SPD. Both parties argued that the people should execute the power via referendums and direct elections of the representatives, including in the local municipalities, and the potential withdrawal of their mandate.

Discussion of findings

The research showed some interesting trends happening in the Czech far-right, especially its ability to work in the democratic environment, including success in various elections. The change of the rhetoric might be more appealing to the broader amount of

potential voters, including those who choose far-right political parties and movements as a protest party, effectively replacing the Communist party. Findings suggest that this trend might continue and the popularity of these parties might soar even more over time.

When findings are compared within the boundaries of Cas Mudde's research²⁵¹, there is a visible increase of anti-democracy instances in subjects' speeches. Especially SPD, with its' assaults against the European Union and its' alignment with the conspiracy theories such as Eurabia, could be labeled as the extremist right party. However, it is much less extremist in the speeches. When we look at instances of anti-democracy, they do not seem as serious as instances found in the speeches of the Republicans.

Furthermore, the number of instances of racism and nationalism did not only decrease, but instances of these categories are far less serious; the verbal assaults against the Roma minority and racial hierarchy practically disappeared from the speeches of the contemporary far-right. The instances of xenophobia, however, increased, which might confirm Tamta Gelashvili's findings in the work *Opportunities Matter*, where there is stated that '*Far-right protest erupts when political and discursive opportunities become available.*'²⁵² IVČRN and SPD exploited the European immigration crisis to gather more sympathizers and voters, however since the sole purpose of the IVČRN was targeted against Islam, its' importance rapidly decreased after new topics emerged, the SPD managed to open new topics and discourses, and it was highly relevant even after the refugee crisis ended.

Just like in Switzerland and Austria, where research was conducted by Anthony J. McGann and Herbert Kitschelt, the far-right political party, to have a longer-time success, must attract more voters by becoming less extremist.²⁵³ This is the case for the Czech Republic, too. The Republicans lost their political power and representatives when they started to express more aggressive racist and anti-establishment rhetoric. The SPD seems like it found boundaries between what might be too much for its' quite broad electorate and what still manages to bring attention to the party.

The SPD also managed to become confident in the economic and values politics. Based on the political program and statements, the party works especially on the principle

²⁵¹ Mudde, "Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed," 1995.

²⁵² Tamta Gelashvili, "Opportunities Matter," 671.

²⁵³ McGann and Kitschelt, "The Radical Right in the Alps."

of disagreeing with anything that either the European Union or the contemporary government suggests. Based on the research, it was rare to find anything that the SPD would agree on or to find the party to come up with its' own solution. This is visible even more when we compare the demonstration of 'disagreements' by the Republicans and the SPD in the Parliament. Where the Republicans delivered a harsh but relatively short speech and then stood back so the law could be passed, the SPD spent hours in the Parliament giving obstruction speeches hours long to at least postpone the vote.

Since the presence of the Republicans in the political sphere of the Czech Republic was so short and relatively marginal, there are no cases of the right-wing political party which would cooperate as a government party in high politics. McGann and Kitschelt delivered examples that the participation of the government is much harder for the far-right party than it is for it staying in the opposition.²⁵⁴ It seems like the SPD took advantage of these findings and does not seek cooperation on the Parliament level.

²⁵⁴ McGann and Kitschelt.

Conclusion

The diploma thesis dealt with the far-right political parties and movements. The thesis did not aim to determine whether subjects are truly radical or extremist right and were chosen by criteria given in the methodological part of the thesis. The first part of the thesis introduced the theoretical framework in which the thesis worked within, as well as the conceptualization of the main phenomena. In the second part, the subjects that meet the requirements are introduced. The third, empirical part, introduces the findings of the research, which are then discussed in the fourth, final part of the paper.

The theoretical framework was inspired by Cas Mudde's and Elizabeth Carter's works, which united the theoretical approaches of other scholars dealing with the far-right. The methodological approach was a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods based on content analysis. Unlike Mudde and most German scholars, there was no more importance given to the anti-democracy category. Still, all seven categories were considered equally important for the final evaluation.

There were four selected political parties and movements in this thesis: two parliamentary ones, the Republicans and the SPD, and two non-parliamentary ones: the Workers' Party and the anti-Islamic movement, the IVČRN. The Republicans and the Workers' Party operated in the late 20th century and at the beginning of a new millennium when the Czech democracy was being formed after the fall of the communist regime. Topics raised by those parties were mostly aimed against the Roma minority, and compared to the latter parties, there were almost no signs of xenophobia or hate against Islam. However, these two subjects seemed a lot more extremist than the latter.

The IVČRN and the SPD started to operate during the European immigration crisis, a main topic for those two parties in this era. They did not manifest instances of racism against minorities as their predecessors. The IVČRN did not manage to deliver any other strong topic outside of the anti-immigrant sentiment and eventually became a non-relevant movement, just like the Republicans and the Workers' Party. The SPD managed to adapt itself to the democratic reality of the Czech Republic, and it remains a relatively strong political actor.

To answer the research question *How have Czech far-right parties developed, changed, or stayed the same from 1993 to 2023?* the SPD really developed not only from

the Republicans party, but it seems it managed to find working themes for each of its predecessors and became a strong Parliamentary political party with a broad topic base.

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