

Abstract

In the first chapter, we show that a biased principal can strictly benefit from hiring an agent with misaligned preferences or beliefs. We consider a "delegated expertise" problem in which the agent has an advantage in acquiring information relative to the principal. We show that it is optimal for a principal who is *ex ante* biased towards one action to select an agent who is less biased. Such an agent is more uncertain *ex ante* about what the best course of action is and would acquire more information. The benefit to the principal of a better-informed decision always outweighs the cost of a small misalignment.

In the second chapter, I study a game between an agent and a principal in a dynamic information design framework. A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible, and can design the flow of information about the progress of the project in order to persuade the principal. If the project is sufficiently promising *ex ante*, then the agent commits to providing only the good news that the project is accomplished. If the project is not promising enough *ex ante*, the agent persuades the principal to start the funding by committing to provide not only good news but also the bad news that a project milestone has not been reached by an interim deadline.

In the third chapter, we study an information design model in which the state space is finite, the sender and the receiver have state-dependent quadratic loss functions, and their disagreement regarding the preferred action is of arbitrary form. This framework enables us to focus on the understudied sender's trade-off between the informativeness of the signal and the concealment of the state-dependent disagreement about the preferred action. In particular, we study which states are pooled together in the supports of posteriors of the optimal signal.