



FAKULTA
SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD
Univerzita Karlova

Záznam o průběhu obhajoby disertační práce

Akademický rok: 2023/2024

Jméno a příjmení studenta: Maxim Senkov, M.A.
Identifikační číslo studenta: 94368344

Typ studijního programu: doktorský
Studijní program: Ekonomie a ekonometrie
ID studia: 521304

Název práce: Essays in Strategic Information Provision
Pracoviště práce: CERGE (23-CERGE)
Jazyk práce: angličtina
Jazyk obhajoby: čeština
Školitel: PhDr. Jan Zápál, Ph.D.
Oponent(i): Maxim Ivanov, Ph.D.

PhDr. Ludmila Matysková, Ph.D.

Datum obhajoby: 06.12.2023 **Místo obhajoby:** Praha
Termín: řádný

Průběh obhajoby: The Defense Committee Chair initiated the defense by verbal statements confirming (i) that a satisfactory number of Defense Committee Members were present, (ii) that the student Maxim Senkov fulfilled all the requirements as listed in the Study and Examination Code of Charles University including showing the appropriate documents. At the beginning, the curriculum vitae of the Student was presented. Following this presentation, the Student started the presentation of the dissertation “Essays in Strategic Information Provision”, presenting the main topics, methodologies, and findings of the dissertation to the Defense Committee. After reading the referees’ comments, an open discussion followed. Maxim Senkov answered many questions raised by the referees (he submitted all his answers in a written form to the defense committee).

Ctirad Slavik: The fact that the chosen prior of the agent is going to be between 0.5 and the principle’s prior is a theorem or a quantitative result?

Why don’t we have to worry about the other direction? The investor. You have just said that we are going to compare the utility of the investor following the recommendation relative to stopping before. Why not stopping after? If I understand it correctly what can happen is that the prototype has been completed, and me as a startup telling the investor that you should actually stop now. So, how is it obvious that the investor is not going to stop?

Why should the startup disclose? I am asking why there is no disclosure policy that is also optimal? Multiple optima?

Can I ask something about the second chapter? There is a commitment here, right? So, what do we know about no commitment outcomes here? I understand that the incentives of the startup are going in both directions, so what if there is no commitment?
Maxim Senkov answered.

Yiman Sun: So, you assume that the action of the receiver can be anything in the real line, but is the number of states finite? It seems the finite number of states is only a technical assumption.
I like this approach. I just wonder if it is possible to generalize it to a model with an infinite number of states.
Maxim Senkov answered.

Ctirad Slavik: Any questions? So, now it is my job to summarize the comments of the referees. Do you have the response on the slides or not?

My reading of the reports and from the presentation is that for the third paper you need to position it better in the literature and emphasize your contribution.

Is there any issue with the assumptions in the first and the second paper?

Maxim Senkov answered.

Ctirad Slavík: The general public may ask questions.

Sergey Slobodyan: The general public would be interested in the situation when the politicians appoint people from the other part of the political spectrum to important positions, like right wing President appoints the chairman of Federal Reserve Board who was supported by the left-wing President previously. Whether this has anything to do with your setup?

Maxim Senkov answered.

Výsledek obhajoby:	prospěl/a (P)	
Předseda komise:	PhDr. Mgr. Ctirad Slavík, Ph.D. (přítomen)
Členové komise:	Yiman Sun, Ph.D. (přítomen)
	doc. RNDr. Miroslav Zelený, Ph.D. (přítomen)