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***Brexit's Echo: A Discursive Analysis of The
Securitisation of Migration, 'the Hostile
Environment' and Right-Wing Extremism.***

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Glasgow: 2692995c

Dublin; 21109036

Prague 67548478

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Supervisor: Dr Sarah Léonard



CHARLES UNIVERSITY

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Chapter 1: Introduction:

This dissertation will investigate how the Hostile Environment policies have been justified by the Conservatives. It aims to answer this question and evaluate how this is done pre- and post-Brexit to determine if there is a difference. It also evaluates the policy's effectiveness and possible impact on facilitating right-wing extremism. This essay will argue that securitising practices is how the Hostile Environment is justified and that the Conservative veer towards right-wing populism and the framing of the migrant as a threat for over a decade has facilitated an environment where right-wing extremism can flourish. It will do this by reviewing literature related to the Securitisation of Migrants and the Hostile Environment, where research gaps are identified. Secondly, it will outline the theoretical framework of this thesis, which is a Bourbeaudian framework of securitisation that allows for a duo-analysis of securitising discourse and practices. It will then outline the methodological approach, which utilises a Discursive Practices Analysis to analyse textual mechanisms to supplement the theoretical analysis. The analysis will then follow, where Cameron-to Sunak's government's practices and discourse are analysed. Finally, the results and discussion will follow, answering the question outlined.

Chapter 2: Literature Review:

Firstly, as the Hostile Environment is generally defined as a set of practices and policies aimed at reducing migration, some definitions of what a migrant is will be outlined; this is useful in this context as some of the literature refers back to the 1951 UN Refugee Declaration, and the Conservative's willingness to undermine this agreement and fundamental human rights if it results in 'controlled migration' (Bale & Patros, 2014; Paterson & Mulvey, 2023). As this research question addresses the Hostile Environment (which has become ubiquitous for the UK's Migration Policy); and argues that it is justified by securitising practices and rhetoric that has caused the "other-isation" of refugees, the literature on the securitisation of migrants will be evaluated, as well as the impacts securitisation has. The review will then outline the literature on the securitisation of migration in the United Kingdom and the Hostile Environment. It will identify the pertinent literature gaps, and end by discussing the research question. Securitisation theory will be outlined more conclusively in the Methodological section, but for context going forward, securitisation is generally when an existential threat is identified to a referent object of security and exceptional politics is enacted to mitigate said threat (Waever, 1995). A further description of the Conservatives and the development of Brexit will now be presented.

i. The Conservative Party, Migration, and Brexit:

The Conservative Party had traditionally considered itself as the 'natural party of government', with the ability to metamorphose itself into the 'National Party' (Heppel & Seawright, 2012). Whilst variation amongst party members exists, with varying degrees of alignment with the right, what unites them is the idea of fiscal conservatism and small government – and a championing of low tax, free market economy politics, internalist economy, nationalism and since the Thatcher years, an affinity for neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism; and

recently ‘long populism’ (ibid, Shrimpsly, 2023)¹. Populism is a political approach that aims to engage with ‘ordinary people’ whose concerns are ignored by the political elite; in recent years right-leaning governments have been adopting populism and leaning towards the right (ibid). Long populism is slowly engrained and long-lasting populism (ibid). However, since Cameron and May, there has been somewhat of a ‘modernisation’, where social inclusion is incorporated (evidenced by the legalisation of gay marriage in 2013; however, the ‘shrinking state’ and fiscal conservatism are still the backbone of the modern Conservative Party (Williams, 2017; Mason, 2016).

Migration has been increasingly harsh since the Labour Government (1997-2010); however, it has been catalysed by Cameron and May, who implemented the ‘Hostile Environment’ and Cameron pledged that net migration would be under 100,000 (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 522; Lewis, Dwyer, Scullion & Waite, 2012). Generally, it is acknowledged that harsher Conservative policies and rhetoric pre-Brexit, were to compete with Nigel Farage and UKIP²; but due to in-party fighting, there has been a general shift of the Conservatives further to the right, where we see particularly harsh policies after Brexit enacted (Bale, 2022, Pickard, 2019; Shamsie, 2022. Before Brexit, hostility to immigration became linked to EU membership because of the expansion of the EU in the early years of the twenty-first century, which Tony Blair’s 2004 Labour government permitted ‘*unfettered access to the UK for citizens of the 8 central and east European newcomers*’ (Laverick & Joyce, 2019, 312; Geddes 2016). Between 1997 and 2010, an ‘*increasingly Eurosceptic Tory Party had ‘used asylum and immigration as a stick with which to beat a Labour government that, despite its tough rhetoric, had, since the 2004 accession to the EU, presided over an unprecedentedly rapid influx of foreign workers (and in some cases their families)*’ (Bale, 2022, 438). There is a robust and varied literature on why Brexit happened; however, much of the literature recognises two key facts underlying Brexit:

² UKIP; United Kingdom Independence Party.

1. that Cameron had ‘gambled’ by trying to appease his Eurosceptic members and to starve the oxygen from their Far-right, anti-EU rivals - UKIP; and
2. that migration was the underpinning motivator for voters to depart from the European Union (Glencross, 2016; Bale, 2022; Holbot, 2016).

This was a failed gamble on Cameron’s part as he vastly underestimated the rise of UKIP, Euroscepticism and worries towards migrants caused by media sensationalism and rhetoric towards the 2015 Refugee Crisis; whilst overestimating his bargaining power within the EU (Bale, 2022)³. Thus, between the two camps, ‘Vote Leave’ had proposed a stronger solution than ‘Vote Remain’ to ‘*take back our country*’ from the very migrants that Cameron and his party had been problematising for decades (Bale, 2022, 2022, Glencross, 2016). On the 23rd of June, the UK public voted to leave the European Union by 51.9% to 48.1%, which left the United Kingdom divided (BBC News, 2016).

Thus, the focus on migration has been a cornerstone of Conservative ideology since 2010 (and it was important to the general public), and the continuation of the Hostile Environment exemplifies these policies from Cameron to Sunak – which is over a decade of the same migration approach (Bennet, 2018). Generally, it is acknowledged that the Conservatives have successfully securitised migration (however, Paterson and Mulvey argue this has been less successful in Scotland) (2023; Bale & Patros, 2014, Seidman-Zager, 2010). This dissertation also follows this view, and Seidman-Zager argues that one of the ways main ways the Conservatives have successfully securitised migration is by conflating migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees as ‘economic migrants’ (2010; Duffield, 2022; Johnston, 2022, Walsh, 2022). The security-immigration nexus is illustrated in which the categorisation of foreigners, immigrants, refugees and ‘suspicious’ minorities have been conflated as the same, despite different citizen and legal definitions (ibid, 252; Feller, 2005). These will be defined using UN definitions, and the problematic conflation of these groups will be highlighted, which will be useful as stated previously, the Conservatives

³ This will be expanded upon in the next chapter detailing Cameron’s Leadership.

have shown a willingness to undermine the agreement – particularly in recent years (Bale & Patros, 2014, Seidman-Zager, 2010; Walsh, 2022; Zetter, 2010).

I. Migrants, Refugees, Asylum Seekers and their Related Rights Defined:

Neoliberal governments and populist governments have tended in recent decades to conflate these three groups together; this has led to problematic policy, which has portrayed migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers as threats to economic, cultural, and national security (Feller, 2005). This is a process that has been completed in Britain, argues Seidman-Zager (2010) and Zetter (2010).

The Migrant Defined:

Within social sciences, often finding a consensus on a definition of terms is difficult; and there is no legal definition of migrant either. Unlike Refugees, they do not have special protections qua migrant, but like every other citizen on this planet, they are entitled to unalienable human rights (UN, 2023; UNHCR, 1948; Feller, 2005, 28). For ease, the UN definition will be utilised:

‘Most experts agree that an international migrant is someone who changes his or her country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status.’ (UN, 2023)⁴.

Thus, migration may take place for several reasons: family, economic, cultural, conflict, environmental, education and so on (ibid). However, the citizenship of the migrant arriving in the host country will often impact their rights and experience (Carens, 1987). For example, a UK citizen who applies for a working holiday visa to Australia will be received differently and gain different rights than a migrant worker from the Middle East. Indeed, depending on passport and citizenship, rights vary amongst states and acceptance of certain nationalities over others is commonplace. This causes great stratification as to who can migrate and where, depending on the country of origin (ibid, 1987). This is what

⁴ The author acknowledges that there is a scholarship on the appropriateness of the 1951’s definitions, however, in this context these suffice, as it is evaluating how Conservatives often try to bend these definitions and break the related rights and laws; [See Shacknove (2016), Marshall, (2011) and Lister (2013)].

Carens denotes as '*Luck Egalitarianism*'. Luck Egalitarianism states that where we are born gives us access to different life prospects and is an act of mere lottery; it is a functioning nationally inherited class system (Carens, 2013, 225; Wellman, 2013, 13). A further category of migrant to consider, which has some overlap with refugees, is the 'Irregular Migrant':

Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit, or destination. Moreover, categories of migrants who may not have any other choice but to use irregular migration channels can also include refugees, victims of trafficking, or unaccompanied migrant children (IOM, 2023: UHCR, 1951, Article 33).

Irregular migration is often targeted for securitisation. In the 2015 migrant crisis; migrants were seen as the referent objects of security to begin with; and the pictures of Alyn Kurdi – the three-year-old boy who drowned trying to reach refuge; were met with sympathy as he was humanised by identification (Hintjens, 2019, 2017; Bleiker, Campbell, Hutchison & Nicholson, 2013). As the crisis continued, there was an attempt at securitising people smugglers and blaming them for migrant deaths; however, when the EU publics or media did not accept this, the securitising speech targeted refugees instead, and the 'West' and the 'EU' became the referent object of security (Hintjens, 2019). Indeed, Cameron himself advocated for tighter solutions in fear of being '*swarmed*' by (irregular) migrants regarding the 2015 Refugee crisis (BBC, 2015b).

Refugee defined:

Article 1 of the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as:

'Someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social

*group or political opinion, is outside the country of [their] nationality and [...] is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return’.*⁵

A particularly key refugee right is non-refoulment which is:

‘Prohibits States from transferring or removing individuals from their jurisdiction [...] when there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return, including persecution, torture, ill-treatment, or other serious human rights violations (UNHCR, 1951; Article 33).

Additionally, some key human rights articles will be outlined as they are relevant to all groups outlined:

UNHCR Rights:	Articles:
<i>The Right to non-discrimination</i>	<i>[Articles 3, 5]</i>
<i>The Right to Access to Justice</i>	<i>[Article 16]</i>
<i>The Right to Decent Work</i>	<i>[Articles 17, 18, 19, 24]</i>
<i>The Right to Housing</i>	<i>[Article 21]</i>
<i>The Right to Public Education</i>	<i>[Article 22]</i>
<i>The Right to Social Protection</i>	<i>[Article 23, 24]</i>
<i>The Right to Freedom of Movement in the Territory</i>	<i>[Article 26, 31]</i>
<i>The Right non-punishment for irregular entry</i>	<i>[Article 31]</i>

Figure 1: Rights (UNHCR Declaration, 1951)

- *‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’.*
[Article 1]
- *‘No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.* *[Article 5]*

⁵ Additionally, all who apply for refuge in a foreign state are ‘asylum seekers’, asylum seekers do not always graduate to officially recognised refugees (UNHR, 2006; IOM, 2023)

- ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile’.
[Article 9]
- ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’. [Article 14] (UNHCR, 1948).

Despite refugees (and asylum seekers to an extent) being legally protected with distinct rights; refugees are often generally regarded as a subgroup of irregular migrants; and whilst there is some overlap, these nuances are not often considered in migration policy (Feller, 2005). This means that states will prioritise the fortification of borders and controlling of bodies, rather than opting for the humanitarian approach (ibid, 28; Foucault, 1979). Misconceptions and misinformation as to who refugees are, and why they seek refuge are fuelled by politicians deliberately commingling the definitions, and this is a tactic which has been utilised in the UK and has contributed to their framing as a threat (ibid, 28). As stated, the white, working migrant from privileged citizenship (like the UK) is not going to be securitised in the same way that a poor, brown refugee will be, and this is an element of securitisation of migration that must be recognised. This is ‘Security Driven Racism’, which is often the background influence of the securitisation of migration (Chebel d’Appollonia, 2017, 254).

II. The Securitisation of Migration:

The International Relations literature utilising the concept of securitization (Waeber, 1995) has exemplified the procedure in which migrants have been construed as the ‘others’ and labelled by elites as existential threats to citizens and national safety and continuity (Bigo, 2002; Bourbeau, 2011; Franck & Grey, 2019; Huysmans, 1995; 2000; Ibrahim, 2005). This literature has widely acknowledged that migration has been securitised in the West and has exemplified how securitising moves⁶ cast migrants as a threat and they become scapegoats for societal problems and thus, their exclusion and otherness is justified from normal politics, and their transition into threat and ‘exceptionalism’ politics

⁶ An attempt to securitise an issue by a securitising actor; this will be further explained in the next chapter.

takes place (Parker, 2023, 749). This work has indeed been furthered by scholarship on how securitising moves can impact the psychology ('the ontological security') of those who are deemed 'under threat' in such narratives (Mitzen, 2006, Parker, 2023, 748). This highlights the way that the securitisation of non-citizens breeds anxiety and suspicion amongst citizens, and their sense of 'home' is corrupted; this is often done purposely by securitising actors who want to create individual and collective unease so that further moves can be justified and to distract from other political and societal failures (Parker, 2023, 748). Generally, the securitisation of migration has been amplified post-9/11, the Arab Spring, the 2015 Migrant Crisis and the rise of populism in Europe and the US (Rumbaut et al., 2019; Givens, 2020). The securitisation of migration is a process in which actors construct migrants and ethnic/religious diversity as a domestic, sovereign threat (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017, 252; Candappa, 2019).

'Security is a transversal political technology used to make the mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease or to encourage if it does not yet exist, to affirm their role as providers of protection and security' (Bourbeau, 2014, 190; Bigo, 2002, 66).

Stringent immigration controls are typically enacted to '*secure the homeland*', accompanied by harsh speech, which results in minorities being overly policed and constructs the state/politician as the supposed protector (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017, 252). Within the literature, it is noted that migration is often securitised in three key ways: Economically; Culturally and Criminally (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017, 254).

Economically: Xenophobic claims of Western countries being invaded by malingering asylum seekers who are actually economic migrants is a common securitising narrative (ibid.). This narrative is often paired with the advocacy of migrant bands/quotas, only giving visas to 'skilled migrants' or deportation of current migrants so that there are 'jobs for citizens' and the welfare state will be less burdened (ibid, 254). Bisch, Favaretto & Sanchez Carrera argue populism and austerity policies tend to rise in times of economic crisis (2020). Thus, the idea of resource competition and scarcity is often portrayed in conjunction with the representation of 'fake refugees', which panics

aggrieved citizens (ibid). This is particularly seen in governments that implement economic-austerity policies, and thus, nationalistic-populist rhetoric becomes more commonplace – which is seen in the Conservatives (ibid; Bale, 2022).

Culturally: Securitising actors may present migrants and refugees as a threat to national identity and societal coherence as ‘ethno-religious groups’ that will not integrate with larger society (ibid, 256). Also, an assumption that these groups share inherently different values due to religious and cultural influences (this is normally aimed at Muslims and Arabic individuals, as opposed to, white refugees, like Ukrainians⁷) (ibid, 256). Nationalist and Colonial politics have created the opposition of the ‘developed west’ as a place of civilisation and the ‘backwards east’ as a place of savagery, and the mere association will impact the ‘advanced’ culture negatively (ibid, 256). Additionally, when integration takes place, fears of the dilution of white, Christian norms are espoused - which is rooted in white supremacy and benevolent sexism - and fears of ‘taking our women’ are parroted (Razack, 2022; Wade, 2015; Givens, 2020). This speech may not be explicit, typical rhetoric espoused by a Prime Minister, but there may be alluded-to undertones and tabloids and populist, right-wing parties may exclaim this more clearly. This is closely tied with the third way that migrants are securitised, which is criminally or as a national security threat.

Criminally: Sovereignty is a key factor in understanding the justification of border politics. Allowing foreigners – particularly ‘illegal’ migrants – within borders without ‘permission’ can be viewed as an assault on state sovereignty and national security which undermines state power (Candappa, 2019; Garland, 1996). Migrants – particularly Muslim or brown men – are constructed as terrorists, ‘potential’ terrorists or criminals (Feller, 2004). A racial and gendered portrayal of these men as rapists as neoliberal international policy has perceived a relationship between Muslim men as perpetrators of terrorism and sexual

⁷ The author acknowledges that in the past white refugees and migrants were not always welcome, such as the Irish or Polish in the UK context (Dunin-Wasowicz, 2016). However, in the UK, with wide islamophobia, Muslim migrants/refugees are currently at the brunt of hostility (Muslim Council of Britain, 2023).

violence, otherwise known as the '*sexual jihad*' (Gray & Franck, 2019, 271, Zaleski & Runyan, 2015, 455). Gendered violence and oppression then become a discourse of border control (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017, 254; Feller, 2004). This is also known as the criminalisation of migration (Frack & Grey, 2019; Jansen & Spijkerboer, 2011).

It must also be noted that much of the literature cited thus far has viewed securitisation and harsh migration policy in negative terms, but it is not a unilateral view within the literature. Wellman, for example, argues that legitimate states have the right to close borders based on the right of self-determination and freedom of association (Wellman, 2013 & 2015, 3). He argues that states – like individuals – have the right to freedom of association, so a group of citizens and states can decide who they can include/exclude regarding their political community – this includes immigrants and refugees (ibid, 2015). He and others have outlined; cultural preservation, economic sustainability, welfare protection and political functioning as four reasons that justify closed borders and are inherent to states' right to self-determination (Wellman, 2013; Miller 2005; Macedo, 2007). These are indeed often how securitising actors utilise securitising speech to justify extreme measures and practices; particularly right-wing, neo-populist and neo-liberal politicians (Candappa, 2019).

In these three ways, the groups outlined above get 'tarred with the same brush' via language by securitising actors. Politicians frame narratives around the language of '*queue jumpers*', '*illegals*' or '*suspected terrorists*' and such narratives are uncritically disseminated via the media; this is particularly applied to undocumented/irregular migrants (Dougherty, 2015). For example, EU and British newspapers have called refugees '*Vermin*', '*Cockroaches*', and '*Filthy*' as well as showing pictures of faceless, unidentifiable groups of people on boats – dehumanising them (ibid; Williams, 2015; Blieker et al, 2013). Additionally, political actors often overlook the facts of migration; refugees and irregular migrants are often escaping terrorism, poverty, conflict; and migrants tend to vastly contribute more to the economy via tax than they withdraw (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017, 254; Feller, 2004; Carens, 2013).

In consideration of the scholarship outlined, this dissertation advocates for a humanitarian and justice approach to border politics. It is influenced by the idea that every individual has a right to a good life, and if immigration of any sort is necessary to obtain such, then it is justified. Movement is particularly justified in the face of injustices such as global poverty, climate change and conflict; which Westerners have often benefited from at the expense of the global south (Candappa, 2019; Carens, 2013; Oberman, 2011; Fine, 2010; Parker, 2023; Givens, 2020).

III. Impacts of the Securitisation of Migration:

Firstly, within the literature, it is acknowledged that the securitisation of irregular migrants has a trickle-down effect on refugees, asylum seekers, ordinary migrants, and minorities; anyone that can be identified as a potential non-national ‘other’ (Feller, 2005, Candappa, 2022; Gray & Franck, 2019; Bourbeau, 2014). Thus, the securitisation of migrants tends to disregard nuances within debates and categorisations of outlined groups become unclear, which means stigma rooted in ignorance can be exacerbated, which may infringe on already vulnerable individuals’ rights and privileges (ibid, 28)

Secondly, as Chebel d’Appollonia, argues; speculative concerns regarding the ‘other’ inform restrictive immigration and refugee policies and then reinforce the spiral of suspicion and fear (2017, 261). This manifests in the escalation of border controls (ibid). For decades, Western governments have attempted to restrain illegal migration by building walls, funding further border controls such as Frontex and increasing securitising border practices (ibid, 2017; Candappa, 2019). However, as attempts at control proliferate, migrants and people smugglers will concoct new (and often more treacherous) methods of movement as borders may remain penetrable (ibid, 2017). A state’s inability to curb illegal migration then inflates public scepticism regarding the government’s measures for addressing an ‘uncontrolled threat’, which in turn confirms the belief that the threat is urgent (Chebel d’Appollonia, 2017, 256; Candappa, 2019). This process causes a vicious cycle where migrants are perceived as threatening based on fear fuelled by speculative concerns and securitising speech that justifies security-based migration policies [See *Figure. 1.* below] (Chebel

d'Appollonia, 2017, 261). Often this focus on dealing with migration as a security threat means that security priorities are misguided and other security threats can be neglected (Zedner, 2021; Laverick & Joyce, 2019). Overall, this leads to a suspicious attitude towards migrants and ultimately, their portrayal as threats results in their dehumanisation:


'Political parties talk about migration as something to attract or repel, a tango between economic and political expediency. Human beings have no innate value in this worldview: there is no pride in representing the country that is safe and generous enough to offer a haven. Refugees arriving with nothing, are worth nothing'. (Williams, 2016).

Further, the dehumanisation of migrants - via securitisation and alienating rhetoric – exacerbates 'intergroup tension', and hate crimes increase due to a perceived threat by a subordinate group to the dominant group's resources, privileges, and security (Blalock, 1967; Piatkowska & Stultz, 2022, 650). This false association of asylum seekers as terrorists or scroungers then only serves to vilify refugees and religious minorities and legitimises them as targets for discrimination and hate-based violence (Feller, 2005, 29; Bove & Böhmelt, 2016). This was examined in Piatkowka & Lantz's study of hate crime in the aftermath of Brexit; they found a rise in hate crimes in England towards minorities after months of disparaging rhetoric in the Brexit campaign (2021, 648). In a separate study completed by Piatkowka & and Stults, hate crime post-Brexit was compared between England and Scotland (2022). The findings found that in Scotland - where the rhetoric was much softer towards migrants and the EU - hate crimes did not see a rise in the aftermath of the vote (Piatkowka & Stults, 2022, 659).

Rhetoric that demonises and securitises minority groups then confirms negative bias and grievances towards said groups, thus, legitimising violence, which causes violence to rise – which Galtung calls '*Cultural Violence*' (ibid, 663; Galtung, 1990). Thus, there are links between hateful speech and rising violence, as similar phenomena were seen in the Rwanda Genocide and the Capitol Riots (Travers, 2023; Williams, 2018; Zedner, 2021). Now that the literature related to the securitisation of migrants has been surveyed the Hostile

Environment will be outlined, and epistemic gaps within its literature will be highlighted.

Figure 2: Cycle of Securitisation of Immigration.



IV. Literature on the Securitisation of Migration in Britain & The Hostile Environment:

As stated, it is acknowledged that the Conservative government has successfully securitised migration, and this has been largely due to the Hostile Environment in which the policies created a stratification between asylum seekers in which rights to work, and benefit systems, are different from citizens; and deportation, detention is more likely, with limited options to appeal (Paterson et al, 2023, 13; Yeo, 2020). As argued by El-Enany, the UK immigration system was developed as an extension of colonialism when the British Empire collapsed; it highlighted a political desire to continue to control the entry of racialised and dispossessed former colonial peoples (2020; Griffiths & Yeo, 2021). The migration system and its origins, then, have set the precedent of restrictive regulations, unreasonably intricate and ever-changing bureaucratic rules,

arbitrary decision-making, criminalisation of movement and indefinite detention and these practices have been exacerbated by the continued Conservative government and their '*Hostile Environment*' migration approach (Goodfellow, 2019; Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 524). Generally, it is acknowledged that the Conservatives have successfully securitised migration (however, Paterson and Mulvey argue this has been less successful in Scotland) (2023; Bale & Patros, 2014, Seidman-Zager, 2010). The Hostile Environment is the embodiment of that securitisation in motion.

'*The Hostile Environment*' was originally used by the previous Labour government concerning terrorism related to the Iraq war, however, it was repurposed by Theresa May (the Home Secretary) by utilising a term related to terrorism to deal with migrants; "*The aim is to create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration*' (Kirkup and Winnett, 2012; Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 524). May supplemented this statement by stating that foreign nationals believe '*that they can come here and overstay because they're able to access everything they need*' (Kirkup and Winnett, 2012). As part of a framework to limit migration figures, May described a new approach that became known as '*the Hostile Environment*', which was a set of policies intended to dissuade illegal attempts of residency by preventing people from accessing basic services, such as banking, housing and healthcare (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 522). By repurposing a term used to refer to war, terrorism and criminality, May extended the policy approach from the home office (Organised Crime and Counter Terrorism) to another (Borders and Immigration) (ibid, 524). This is an example of expanding the field of security and creating a security continuum (Blazacq, Léonard & Ruzicka, 2015,505; McConnon, 2022).

However, despite the clear intentions outlaid by May for the Hostile Environment, it is difficult to define (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 529). It is customary in the UK that when major policy, law or parliamentary changes are proposed or enacted, a 'White Paper' is released (ibid, UK Parliament, 2023). There is no accessible central policy document, no official definition, nor clear aims and objectives outlined, aside from May's speech – which is to make the lives of undocumented migrants as difficult as possible (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 529; Kirkup and Winnett, 2012). This 'smoke and mirrors' approach '*might*

suggest that the policy approach is 'propelled less by practical considerations around cost, resources and numbers, than 'feeling rules' appealing to notions of belonging, fairness and national sovereignty' (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 529; Hochschild, 2003). The clandestine approach suggests that public cognition was deliberately poorly informed (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021; Bourbeau, 2014, 195). May and other Senior Home Office officials have stated that if the policies were ineffective, the approach would not be deserted as it is based on 'fairness' and that the public would not accept that irregular migrants have the same privileges as the citizens (ibid, 2021, 530).

The Hostile Environment is defined as a sprawling web of policies through different sectors that enact immigration controls through practices that would not typically deal with migration controls (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021; Liberty, 2018, 6). These policies operate independently but share a core aim and function cumulatively to produce the Hostile Environment (ibid, 2021). The policies aim to make the lives of undocumented migrants as difficult as possible, and the Home Office hoped that the policies would encourage more voluntary departures - however, this has not been the case (ibid). Further, Griffiths & Yeo argue that it is best viewed as an ideological stance, as opposed to an *'evidence-based, ends-driven, policy approach'*, as the lack of impact of the policy has not limited it, but expanded into further securitising moves (2021, 530). Overall, it is a punitive and disciplinary political stance that creates 'deportable' targets that uphold racialised, colonial hierarchies (El-Enany, 2020; Griffiths & Yeo, 2021). It deliberately diffuses the management solely from border control agents to wider aspects of the public, where migrants must consistently prove their right to exist within these borders (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021). This requires excessive policing by residents and the state gives tacit consent to citizens to enact state violence, hostility, and harm in the name of citizenship and sovereignty (ibid).

Much of the literature on the Hostile Environment, is not evaluated through the security lens. When the Hostile Environment is analysed, it is often regarding the impacts of the policy, on specific sectors such as Language Testing (Harding, Brunfaut & Unger, 2020), Health Care (Essex, Riaz, Casalotti, Worthing, Issa, Skinner & Yule, 2022) and Education (Candappa, 2019). The

impacts of the Hostile Environment range from homelessness, deportation, mass detention, death, debt, ill-health, and poverty, amongst other consequences (McCann, 2021; Klein & Williams, 2012, Waterman, Pillay, Katona, 2022; O'Connor, 2022). Additionally, despite aiming to deter migrants, irregular and asylum seekers, all are at high points (BBC, 2023). The Office for National Statistics showed *net migration in 2022 was at 606,000; more people arriving long-term than leaving. This was an increase of 118,000 compared to the 2021 numbers (488,000) and nearly double that of pre-coronavirus pandemic levels, with net migration estimated to be 333,000 in 2018'* (2022). Additionally, the French Channel border crossings have continued to rise, despite policies trying to deter irregular migrants (BBC, 2023). Despite these negative impacts of the policies, non-reduced migration rates, and several legal challenges over the UK's plan to send irregular migrants to Rwanda, the Conservatives continue to enact such policies (Africa Research Bulletin, 2023; Freedom from Torture Organisation, 2023; Walsh, 2023). Sovereignty is often credited as a reason in the literature for increasing border controls – which this dissertation views as a key reason – however, further justification must be needed to continue to enact such policies (Candappa, 2019; Garland, 1996).

Whilst these papers were applicable in analysing the impacts of the policies, they do not add to the security literature and security is often not considered when evaluating the Hostile Environment justifications. Despite the extensive scope and impacts of the Hostile Environment policies, until 2018, there was *'remarkably little governmental monitoring, political scrutiny, media concern or public or parliamentary debate'* – and this is further reflected in the literature. (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 529). It was not until the Windrush Scandal - where many UK citizens who legally came from the Caribbean, were not properly documented and did not have papers to prove their right to remain, were wrongfully deported - that a critical eye was turned to The Hostile Environment policies in the Media (Gentleman, 2018).

Three key academic papers on the Hostile Environment will be built upon for this dissertation by advancing a security approach. Firstly Griffiths & Yeo, 2021 paper *'The UK's Hostile Environment: Deputising Immigration Control'*, argues that immigration has been 'deputised' by the hostile environment

policies (ibid). They argue that the UK government has pursued policies that bring local government officials, public servants, police officers, private companies, and laymen into controlling migration; this is deputisation, where *'A medley of actors are made 'street level bureaucrats' and are de-facto immigration officers'* (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 522; Lipsky, 1980; Walsh, 2014). Whilst this is a fair analysis, it is not viewed through the lens of security, so it will be adapted and built upon within this dissertation by arguing that is securitisation, with the expansion of the field, habitus, and actors on the Paris School's conception of security. A second important paper relating to the scholarship on the hostile environment is Candappa (2019) who utilised a Foucauldian analysis of power applied to Hostile Environment practices and how they have been applied to education. Whilst again this was not through the securitisation lens, with the Foucauldian approach, it has related literature and analysis of some of the key Hostile Environment policies. This dissertation will again, build upon this analysis by applying the security lens, and additionally evaluating securitising speech alongside policies. This is known as a Bourbeaudian Securitisation approach, which will widen the analysis. Further, these papers are limited in time scope to 2019, but this dissertation will create a more contemporary window of analysis until 2023. A further important contribution, which evaluates the securitisation of migration, asylum seekers and refugees in the UK through a security lens is by Paterson & Mulvey (2023). They also utilise a dual framework Paris & Copenhagen school of securitisation however, they use it to evaluate the success of securitisation of refugees in England compared to failed securitisation in Scotland (ibid). Thus, my approach to pre- and post-Brexit justification via the Bourbeaudian approach still highlights a gap in the literature. Whilst all three papers touch upon some of the securitising practices up to 2019-2022, this paper will have a wider scope until 2023, in which an escalation of securitisation has been seen under Sunak's premiership. For all papers, specifically, Conservative actors' speech has not been focused upon – particularly in later years - which this dissertation aims to do.

As for the securitisation of migration literature related to the UK, it is generally focused pre-Brexit, and the literature is varied and plentiful, but it is particularly

related to Nigel Farage, the Media and the Brexit campaign (Geddes, 2016; Glencross, 2016; Gray & Franck, 2019; Laverick & Joyce, 2019, McGuire, 2018; Moore & Ramsay, 2017; Morrison, 2016; Watson, 2018). This dissertation will touch upon Brexit with Cameron and May, it is not looking to contribute to the wide causes of Brexit literature - and it will mainly focus on the associated migration speech in a depth that has not been done so before. Pre-Brexit will, however, be utilised as the starting point as this dissertation argues that Cameron's securitising speech and practices are the first step of '*path dependency*' in which we see increased securitisation of migrants from pre-Brexit until the present time (Bourbeau, 2014). Further, it does not focus on the Hostile Environment as a phenomenon. As I will be focusing on Conservative speech, it is best to look at discourse analyses that have been completed on their actors.

Cameron's securitising migration speech was briefly analysed by Paterson & Karyotis utilising the Copenhagen School method, where they argue that Cameron securitises migrants by arguing that the British identity of tolerance is being pushed by migrants, who are making us intolerant; thus, by our nature, it is wrong to believe that public discourse is rooted intolerance (2022, 113). Further, a thematic analysis related to May's discourse on Brexit was completed by Leung (2018). However, this was not via the security lens or heavily related to migration. A paper where discourse analysis is utilised as the main method is completed by Kirkwood, where humanising speech in the 2017 Parliamentary Debates related to the 2015 Migrant Crisis was analysed (2017). In the 38 times refugees were referred to as '*human beings*' within the debates, the Conservatives were only responsible for one of the referrals and it was related to human traffickers, not refugees themselves (ibid, 117). Again, whilst not in the lens of securitisation, it is related via migration and the method applied. Overall, there was surprisingly little analysis on the securitising speech of Conservative actors. Thus, this dissertation aims to supplement the securitisation literature by contributing further to May and Cameron's analysis, and including Johnston and Sunak, whose Prime Ministerial tenures are too recent to have been analysed within the literature. Thus, this dissertation aims to give a more robust analysis of the securitising speech of Conservative

Securitising Actors (Prime Ministers and Home Secretaries). Further, there have been several hate-crime analyses pre- and post-Brexit that have been completed relating to hateful rhetoric and right-wing mobilisation which will be utilised within this dissertation (Durrheim et al., 2018; Creighton & Jamal, 2020; Piatkowka & Lantz' 2021, Piatkowka & Stults, 2021). It must be noted that hate crime has steadily been on the rise since 2012 and 2021/22 saw the highest amount of hate crime since records began, which is useful to contextualise alongside the Hostile Environment and the Conservative Party leaning further towards the right as their leadership continues (Home Office; Hate Crime Statistics, 2022) [See Figure 7 below]. Further, since 2016, there has been a rise in right-wing attacks and arrests pertaining to right-wing terrorist groups; with referrals from the UK's counter-terrorism programme, Prevent to the interventionist Channel Programme of right-wing extremists outstripping Islamic terror referrals in 2021 (Protect UK, 2023; Syal & Dodd, 2023; Davies & Davies, 2023).

Overall, there was no definitive answer within the literature, as to how the Hostile Environment is justified and why it continues to be enacted; *'despite not appearing to have meaningful impact on immigration numbers, and serious questions arise over their ethics, efficiency, effectiveness, and logic. There are high costs for the public purse, health, safety, security, and society, including by erecting barriers to healthcare and undermining equality'* (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 537). Thus, this dissertation aims to find further justifications for the Hostile Environment; which will be done by utilising Bourbeau's securitisation theory, and 'path dependency' within securitisation to investigate and answer the question *'How did the Conservative Government Justify the Hostile Environment?'*. This dissertation hopes to contribute to the literature in a variety of ways. It will apply a Bourbeaudian approach to the securitisation of migration via the Hostile Environment in the UK pre- and post-Brexit. This is a method that has not been utilised widely regarding the Hostile Environment, and it has rarely been analysed through the security lens. Further, an in-depth analysis with this widened time frame and pre/post-Brexit comparison has not been completed. Thus, this dissertation hopes to fill epistemic, theoretical, and content gaps within the literature. The theoretical framework will now be

outlined, which is Bourbeau's duo theory of securitisation; as well as the Methodological Approach, which is critical discourse analysis.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework & Methodology

This dissertation's theoretical underpinning is securitisation theory, which will be outlined, particularly Bourbeau's method will be utilised. Then, critical discourse analysis will be outlined, and the method utilised will be explained.

i. Securitisation Theory:

Securitisation theory underpins this dissertation; which argues that 'The Hostile Environment' is justified through securitisation speech and practices; this is a Bourbeaudian approach, that advocates for a theorisation which combines both the Copenhagen and Paris Schools (Bourbeau, 2014). This was selected as the analytical tool as it is useful for analytical explanatory value and is commonly applied to migration; therefore, it is the most fitting for this dissertation. Securitisation theory and the Paris and Copenhagen schools' approaches will be outlined. Bourbeau's conception will follow, which hopes to address some of the limits of the traditional securitisation theorisations. Then it will look at the literature on how securitisation has been applied to migration and indeed, Brexit and the Hostile Environment.

Within the literature of security studies, the concept of 'security' does not have a consensus on how security should be defined; this is not unusual within political sciences, and it facilitates wide and varied debates (Baldwin, 1997). Further, there is debate about what security should be applied to; but regardless, of what it is or what it should be; it is acknowledged as a significant aspect of the state contract. This is particularly salient as states continuously widen their powers in the name of security – or 'securitisation' (Wæver, 1995; Tauber & Banks, 2019, 452; Ormand 2014).

Whilst there are different academic approaches to how something is securitised; what unites the schools is that generally, when an issue that is not currently viewed as a security risk is then declared as a threat to a referent object of security, that declaration then advances the supposed threat from normal politics to the security realm (Blazacq, et al, 2015, 496; Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

As a theory, it emerged as a tool when the scope of security was being widened in International Relations and was seen as a challenge to traditional theories of security such as liberalism and realism (Floyd, 2007). Depending on the method one adopts, securitisation is achieved via speech or practices (Blazacq et al, 2015). Securitisation theory is associated with social constructivism, post-structuralism, sociology, and speech act theory; securitisation is a performance that can transfigure the reality of what is threatening and what is not (Blazacq et al, 2015, 495, 496; Balzacq, 2010). A subject of securitisation is deemed as a threat if a securitising actor’s attempt to influence society is effective; and securitisation theory exists to try and understand ‘*why and how*’ this occurs; and the impacts of such securitisation (ibid, 2016, 495). The ‘security-ness’ then, of an issue is not necessarily reliant upon objective, corporal threats – such as a military threat - but is instead created by an actor in a time and context-specific ‘*intersubjective agreement*’ that the object of security poses a vital threat to the referent object (ibid, 495). Core concepts of the theory which shall be utilised in this dissertation are outlined and defined in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: Core Concepts of Securitisation Theory.

Core Concepts:	Definition:
Securitising Actor:	An agent who presents the threat (who can be a securitising actor is debated; but for the purpose of this dissertation; I mean politicians and media, who are deemed the traditional actors). (Balzacq et al, 2015, 495)
Referent Object/Subject:	The entity that is threatened. This can be a state, refugees, a group, like women, the economy, and so on (ibid, 495).
Audience:	Who accepts the securitisation; there can be different audiences; the public, parliament, fellow politicians etc.; it is an underdeveloped aspect of the theory (ibid, 495).
Securitising Move:	An attempt to securitise an issue; to be successful the move must be accepted by an appropriate audience which justifies an extension of powers to a securitising actor which would not ordinarily be legitimate (Neal, 2009, 335). Securitising moves then may fail depending on audience; in this sense securitising moves may be seen as ‘ <i>dramaturgical action</i> ’; such as chess moves which may not succeed in intended outcome if they fail (Hintjens, 2019, 186).
Context and adoption of distinct policies:	The context can be exceptional (Copenhagen School) or non-exceptional (Paris School) (Balzacq et al, 2015, 495)

Within the literature on Securitisation, there tends to be two contending sides.

1. **The Copenhagen School - the logic of exception**, where the securitisation process is completed via speech identifying an existential threat and exceptional measures are justified to mitigate the threat (Bourbeau, 2014, 188).
2. **The Paris school - the logic of routine**; everyday practices address the threat, and these practices are completed by bureaucratic professionals such as police officers, border security; technologies become key instruments of enforcement (ibid, 188).

In the following section, both theories will be outlined; however, a Bourbeaudian conception of securitisation will be advocated for and utilised within this dissertation; This integration framework of the logics has been labelled as the *'Analytics of Government'* by Balzacq et al, (2015, 517; Bourbeau, 2014). In the following section, Copenhagen School will be outlined.

ii. The Copenhagen School:

The Copenhagen School {The Logic of Exception} is an approach developed by Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, (1998); who developed their theory of securitisation via speech-act to ensure the definition of security was more robust without over-expanding security (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Within their conception of what security is, they state that security is fundamentally about survival (ibid, 94). Within their analytic framework, the securitisation process is initiated when a securitising actor *'speaks security'* and they depict an issue - such as migrants - as an existential threat to the referent object of security - e.g., the United Kingdom; thus, exceptional measures must be invoked to address the threat (Buzan et al, 1998, 28; (Bourbeau, 2014). Thus, a securitising speech does not solely describe the supposed state of affairs, but it also determines an appropriate way to approach such state of affairs (Bourbeau, 2014, 190). Context of the threat also matters; a previous threat ensures an issue is easier to securitise than a newly constructed threat as there is a historical precedent (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 94) This conception of securitisation is based upon Austin's *'Speech Act Theory'* (ibid, 2015, 94; Austin, 1962).

Speech Act Theory Applied to Securitisation:

Austin's speech act theory posits that there are categories of utterances which are *actions* and certain speech acts are *performative* whereby they accomplish a social act (ibid 2015, 94). These acts are designated an '*illocutionary force*'; as the speaker intends to achieve something from such utterance. (Austin, 1962).

Securitisation is a performative speech act or a combination of illocutionary forces that aims to achieve a goal with said speech; which is to securitise (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015). For Wæver then, '*The utterance itself is the act [...] By uttering security, a state representative moves a particular development to a specific area and thereby claims a special right*' (1995, 35).

However, as Bourbeau states, the securitising actor cannot amble towards successful securitisation; security acts must follow the '*grammar of security*' whereby securitising actors must process the social capital and power to legitimise such securitising moves; and the audience of such speech must accept the proposed solutions as justifiable and valid (ibid, 2014, 190). Thus, the speech act is the anchor of the process of securitisation: persuading the audience to accept that the issue is a threat is obligatory to successful securitisation as an intersubjective perception of threat between speaker and an audience, which must be reciprocal before an issue is 'securitised' and emergency measures can be justified (McInnes & Rushton, 2011, ibid, 120). Accordingly, securitising speech is contingent on fulfilling felicity conditions (ibid, 2015, 96; Buzan et al, 1998, 25). The felicity conditions are as follows:

1. *The speech-act follows typical plot of securitisation; an existential threat is outlined and utilised to propose a legitimate use of extra measures in the context of a threat* (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 96).
2. *The securitizing actor must be in a position of authority and have enough social capital to convince a relevant audience* (ibid, 2015, 96).

3. *It is fruitful - but may not be necessary - if the object can be generally viewed to be threatening and there is a historical context pertaining to the threat (ibid, 96; McInnes & Rushton, 2011, 120).*

However, proponents of the Copenhagen school do not consider securitisation and security as inherently positive (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 98). The securitisation of an issue can accelerate the implementation of emergency measures which may not be ethical or justified and the consequences of such measures may not have been fully considered (ibid, 98). Whilst the Copenhagen School's approach may be advantageous in analysing securitising speech, it lacks some robustness which undermines its explanatory value and usefulness of the theory.

Weaknesses of The Copenhagen School:

The Copenhagen school has been criticised on some key fronts. Firstly, this conception of security only explains the pinnacles of security, and it does not account for everyday securitising routines (Bourbeau, 2014, 191). Secondly, whilst it is useful to analyse how speech can create security, it is limited in scope as it fails to include other forms of speech and expression – such as images, moving images etc, which may be utilised in amplifying and highlighting fear (Macdonald, 2008 576). Lastly, it is charged with state-centrism and elitism; as its securitising actors tend to be elites within a state-centric setting (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Floyd, 2007). For the latter problem, state-centrism and elitism; some theorists have developed different actors who can be securitising actors, such as religious leaders etc (Balzacq et al, 2015; Buzan et al, 1998). However, for this dissertation, it will not be an issue, as it will focus on the state and elite actors such as politicians. Typically, the state and its actors are some of the only entities that can successfully securitise due to the power and resources that they command (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). To address the first two issues, Bourbeau's combination of the schools addresses these issues, by incorporating the Paris School which has corresponding issues to the Copenhagen school (2014). The Paris School will now be outlined.

iii. The Paris School:

The Paris School of securitisation is influenced by Foucault and Derrida; the theoretical roots of this conception are based on post-structuralist thought, and it is considered a more sociological approach to securitisation as it is socially and politically formulated via ‘bureaucratic elites’ (Skelparis, 2016, 93). This process of securitisation is associated with Bigo, who states that securitisation is ‘*an attempt at insecuritisation of daily life by security professionals and an increase in the strengths of policing action*’ (Bourbeau, 2014, 190; Bigo, 2002). In Foucault’s words, ‘*Power is everywhere and comes from everywhere; [it is] a regime of truth that pervades society*’ (1998, 105). Security when framed this way is sacrificial; the security of one entity ensues the insecurity of another (e.g., the security of the state ensures the insecurity of the migrant) (Bigo, 2002). Thus, an atmosphere of insecurity is created; what follows is further securitising practices – which often utilise technology – such as surveillance and a general increase in policing (ibid). This will be expanded upon by outlining the relevant Foucauldian and Derridean concepts.

The Paris School & Post-Structuralism:

As stated previously, the Paris School is associated with post-structuralism and the particularly relevant concepts are ‘*Governmentality*’, ‘*Dispositif*’, ‘*Biopolitics*’ and Derrida’s ‘*Field*’ and ‘*Habitus*’ (Gutting, 1998; Candappa, 2019, 417; Bourbeau, 2014). Foucault outlines ‘*Governmentality*’ as:

‘A conceptual architecture of the modern liberal state and all its strategies, techniques and procedures as they act on the human body and social behaviour, through many and varied capillaries of power’ (1978, 105).

Governmentality then, is how the modern state utilises authority and governs through the ‘*administration of life*’; via bureaucratic practices such as laws, documentation, etc., by which states govern conduct to ensure that citizens act in aligned ways (Strömmer, 2021, Foucault, 1979,140; 2009). Coexisting alongside governmentality is the concept of the ‘*dispositif*’; which refers to the

complex amalgamation of discourses, practices, and regulations that facilitate the governing of individuals (Agamben, 2009; Foucault, 2009a, Strömmer, 2021). Thus, the *dispositif* relates to governmentality, especially regarding the formation of the habitus - which is the '*system of enduring behaviours and discourses of the agents within a given field*' (Balzacq et al 2015, 505). Thus, the '*dispositif shares a mutually constitutive relationship*' with the concept of '*field*' via the habitus (ibid, 505).

Within the logic of routine, the securitisation process is conducted within a field (Skelparis, 2016, 93). Under the lens of securitisation, a field is a collective of related agents who possess certain amounts of social capital which designates them with a kind of authority (such as cultural or bureaucratic power) (Balzacq et al, 2015, 505). The agents within a field possess a set of mutual aims - such as security - and they enact shared practices to ensure they deal with potential threats or problems (*the habitus*) (ibid, 505; People's and Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 80). Current neoliberal governments have expanded what is dealt with under the security lens (Martín Rojo & Del Percio, 2019). For example, migration is often dealt with under the same jurisdiction as drug trafficking and terrorism; and in the UK, development-security policy became utilised as a form of migration control (Balzacq et al., 2015; 505; McConnon, 2022). This creates a '*security continuum*', where different problems are unsuitably united in the same field - which excludes a potentially more fitting approach, such as social inequality (Balzacq et al, 2015, 505). This is exemplified in Britain where healthcare professionals and police officers must check and report visa status before treatment or logging of a crime of a 'non-citizen', allotting them in the same field as border patrol agents (Candappa, 2019; Griffiths & Yeo, 2021). Thus, agents - such as a nurse - are acquired into the same field as border officers; they share practices (checking visas), and they play a role in the securitisation of migration; despite health being an unrelated social issue (Balzacq, 2015, 505). So, within the same field, a habitus is contextualised (ibid).

Lastly, *'Biopolitics'*, supplements and works in conjunction with Governmentality. Biopolitics is defined as; *'The numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations'* (Wright, 2011, 708; Foucault, 1979, 140; 2009a, 2009b). It is the physical embodiment of securitising practices and technologies which control bodies; such as tracking devices used on migrants, and detention centres (Klein and Williams, 2012). A further supplement of biopolitics is *'Necropolitics'*. Mbembe argues that necropolitics insidiously deepens biopolitical practices since governments protect the lives of some, whilst justifying the deaths of others (Mbembe, 2002; 2003). This ensures the security of some, whilst ensuring the insecurity of others and is thus consistent with the Paris School's conception of securitisation. This concept is particularly relevant to this dissertation as it discusses the securitisation of migration in the name of state security. For example, the deaths of 27 migrants in the English Channel in 2021 and more recently; the Messenia Migrant boat disaster off the coast of Greece, where 78 are confirmed dead and up to 500 are still missing (Murphy, 2023; Beake & Kallergis, 2023). When migrants for example are deemed a threat to state borders (the referent object of security for example), bureaucratic, 'security professionals' such as coast guards can ultimately choose the security of the state over human lives justified by their apparent threatening status. This is necropolitics utilised within a Paris School framework.

These concepts are the theoretical backbone of the Paris Schools securitisation process. Paris school's process of securitisation – in opposition to the Copenhagen School – is incremental, daily practices that create an atmosphere of insecurity; these practices then are utilised and performed by security professionals to prevent security threats - such as illegal migrants, terrorism and so on (Skelrparis, 2016, 96; Balzacq et al, 2015). These are best exemplified post- the 9/11 terror attacks; where securitisation of terrorism was enacted within airports, such as further visa and passport checks and screening of passengers (Blalock, Kadiyali, Simon 2007, 42). Post-9/11, air travel was 'secured' but at the cost of privacy and more bureaucratic processes (ibid). These practices create a culture of fear and suspicion and have citizens on high alert, policing themselves and others so that particular behaviours do

not go on unchecked; creating what Foucault would theorise as ‘*the panopticon*’, which he defines as:

‘An omnipresent Surveillance is utilised as social control; the state and spies are the main tower of surveillance in this panopticon and the permanent visibility of citizens (who are in the cells; alone in a sea of people on the internet) is used to police behaviour and keep tabs; all the while citizens know they are being watched but cannot see the watcher [...]Power; in this way is automated, deindividualized and arbitrary (Foucault 1977, 455; Arendt, 1973, 148). [See below, Figure. 4 for a visual example of Bentham’s conception of the panopticon].




Figure. 4 Bentham’s Panopticon; Source; The Guardian, 2015.

These kinds of practices (which are examples of biopolitics, governmentality and the habitus) are *authorized and institutionalised instruments of permanent, exhaustive, and omnipresent surveillance*’ (Foucault, 1977, 455). This is exemplified in the ‘*See it, Say it, Sorted*’ campaign implemented in the UK where any kind of suspect behaviour on public transport needs to be reported to the police (UK Transport Police, 2023).

‘We’ve all got a role to play in keeping the rail network safe, and we rely on you to be our eyes and ears. Please remain vigilant for anything

that seems out of place or unusual on trains or at stations. This could include:

- *Someone being somewhere they shouldn't be, [...] trying to get through a door marked 'no entry'.*
- *An unattended bag.*
- *Someone checking security arrangements [...] filming CCTV cameras at a station.*
- *Someone avoiding rail staff and police officers.*
- *Someone who could be concealing something under their clothing.'*

(ibid, 2023).

This, for example, shows how transport staff have been brought into the same field as the police and these practices imprint onto the public, which creates a tense atmosphere that is constantly threatening, counter to practices that are meant to be productively positive (Skelparis, 2016, 96). These examples highlight how Paris School's securitisation process transpires in our daily lives; this has been particularly noted with the rise in surveillance and technology, with Foucault's theorisation of the panopticon becoming more pertinent as social media and surveillance proliferate (McMullan, 2015). Preventative, daily practices are justified illiberal practices within liberal states in the guise of security (Skelparis, 2016, 96). Insecurity then; is routine practices enforced by insecurity professionals, as opposed to exceptional politics (ibid).

Thus, Paris School's process of (in)securitisation is practical and explains everyday phenomena to which individuals are subject, highlighting its applicability and explanatory power. Insecurity then; is routine practices enforced by insecurity professionals, as opposed to exceptional politics (ibid). Whilst it explains ongoing securitisation well, it does not paint the full picture of the securitisation processes.

Weaknesses of Paris School:

The Paris school is useful and insightful when explaining every day, routine security practices; however, it lacks robustness when explaining exceptional, unprecedented security changes; this is the opposite issue that the Copenhagen school has (Bourbeau, 2014, 190). The ‘Logic of exception’ perceives the security process as a ‘binary’; ‘pinnacles of securitising or non-existing securitisation’ (ibid, 190). This is the opposite issue of the Copenhagen school.

Due to the theoretical gaps shown by the Paris and Copenhagen school; I will employ a combination of the theories which is advocated for by Bourbeau (2014). This combination of the schools has also been named ‘*Analytics of Government*’ (Balzacq et al, 2015, 497). This theorisation widens what securitisation *is* and offsets both schools’ theoretical gaps (Bourbeau, 2014).

iv. Merging the Schools:

As both logics have theoretical gaps, Bourbeau argues that they work better simultaneously, which addresses their weaknesses (2014). Separating securitisation theories into two camps limits their applicability and academic usefulness (ibid, 2014, 190). He argues that the theories have two things in common which is that they both argue that security is a performance, and they are time analytical (ibid, 190). These commonalities eclipse their differences, and when utilised simultaneously, their theoretical gaps are negated (ibid, 190). Ultimately, for Bourbeau, security is about performance, about doing something (ibid, 193).

Theoretical gaps in the logic of exception are that the theory only considers speech performance and only analyses the highs of security; yet it disregards the everyday plateaus of security (ibid, 191). Conversely, the logic of routine exclusively explains the consistent securitisation practices but cannot account for fundamental changes to the security environment (ibid). Further, Foucault’s conception of discourse includes speech and phenomenon, which ensures that it is compatible with Copenhagen’s framework (Bourbeau, 2014; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 79; Balzacq, 2015). Thus, if we unite the frameworks of securitisation – it offsets and mitigates the shortcomings of the other

(Bourbeau, 2014). This provides a more robust conception of securitisation with a further explanatory value. Security is a multifaceted phenomenon; thus, a speech or physical performance solely does not explain the process. Therefore, a more robust theorisation is required, which Bourbeau's framework provides. This theorisation can be utilised in two ways:

1. We may suggest that speech ignites the securitisation process; whilst practices 'lock in' the practices (ibid, 195). The logic of exception can be utilised to identify discourses that became prevalent in certain periods; and the logic of routine can underline the '*reproductive mechanisms*' once securitisation has been put in motion via speech (ibid, 195).
2. Alternatively, we can view security practices that are implemented before the securitising discourse takes place; where we can analyse how the discourse is used to legitimise and normalise the securitising practices (ibid, 195). This application is useful when understanding clandestine securitising moves, where they occur away from the public eye and securing discourse is utilised to convince the public that these measures are justified in dealing with an identified threat (ibid, 195). Further, the discourse can be a way of quelling possible public resistance to unjust practices; as these practices are in theory, enacted to ensure the security of the population (ibid, 190).

Whilst both are possible, it is common for law and policy to be enacted or proposed by governments and politicians, who use their majority vote as tacit permission to enact such laws (Christiano, 2020). This is common among politicians who propose law and policy changes without fully informing the public of the consequences; in this way, the securitising process is enacted in banal and ordinary law-making procedures (and by bureaucratic agents) (Basaran, 2011; Arendt, 1973). Afterwards, speech and rhetoric are employed to justify such measures. However, it does not have to be one or the other, it can be a symbiotic process (Bourbeau, 2014, 195). E.g., a practice may be advocated for by speech, it may be accepted; if it is a long process of

securitisation, practices may be enacted, speech may justify it; more practices may be argued for, they may be accepted and implemented and so on.

Further, by advocating for such a dual approach, Bourbeau argues that this is part of the ‘path dependency’ of securitisation; which means that once securitisation has been successful, it is difficult to desecuritize or retreat from such securitisation; even if discourse is softened and the threat is ‘neutralised’, practices tend to have a lingering impact (Bourbeau, 2014, 195, 196). For example, once Cameron securitised EU migration before Brexit via laws and discourse, it was difficult for him to retreat from this narrative when advocating for the United Kingdom to stay in the European Union (Bale, 2022).

Thus, this dissertation will utilise a Bourbeaudian approach to securitisation and ‘*path dependency*’ is acknowledged as a crucial part of the securitisation of migration pre-Brexit; which has resulted in increasingly draconian discourse and practices weaponised against migrants and refugees post-Brexit, (Bourbeau, 2014). It will argue that this trigger of securitisation is a key aspect of the justification of the hostile environment. Now that securitisation theory has been outlined, the methodology will now be outlined.

v. Methodology:

To address the research question of ‘*How did the Conservatives justify the Hostile Environment?*’, critical discourse analysis will be utilised and underpinned by a Bourbeaudian-Securitisation theory; it will be utilised as a qualitative research method. Critical Discourse Analysis is a problem-orientated interdisciplinary research school/field (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, 3). The objective is to examine critically the relationship between language, ideology, power and social structures: for example, migration as it is constructed, re-produced, legitimised and resisted in language and other modes of communication (Catalano & Waugh, 2020, 2). This research method is in the critical/post-positivist research paradigm. The ontological positioning of this paradigm is that realities are socially constructed entities under constant internal influence (ibid, 164).

Several beneficial reasons exist to utilise forms of Critical Discourse Analysis within research. Firstly, it explains the everyday phenomenon of language and the utilization of certain types of language regarding particular topics (Catalano & Waugh, 2020, pp. 2). Engagement with language is relevant to most humans and thus, it is important to study it academically. It additionally provides an analytical framework of language used by powerful actors, which is fruitful in evaluating securitization for example (ibid.). This dissertation will utilise Doty's '*Discursive Practices Approach*', to analyse the speech practices, which employ 'textual mechanisms' - Prepositions, Predication and Subject (1993, 307, 308). This approach facilitates an understanding of how discourse/speech practices constitute subjects and objects via textual mechanisms; and then be able to organise them into a 'grid of intelligibility' with the data collected at the end (Doty, 1993, 307). This approach is useful for evaluating implicit meanings in texts; as language is often taken to be explicit in its meaning (Doty, 1993). But, as Fairclough argues, this assumption hides the ideological and social work that language produces, reproduces, and transforms social relations and identities (1992, 211). The social construction and power analysis aspect will be highly useful as an approach within this research in terms of narratives about migrants since the development and evolution of the Hostile Environment, and *how* such narratives have been used to justify further practices. As Bourbeau states, by analysing language, trends in securitising discursive practices can be identified, and they can be seen as the ignitor of the process; then securitisation is 'locked in' by practices (Bourbeau, 2014, 195). As the dissertation utilises a Bourbeaudian-Securitisation approach which includes a Foucauldian interpretation of 'discourse', includes language as well as physical behavioural practices in the context they are enacted in, thus, CDA is a fruitful analytical tool in the context of the Hostile Environment (Bourbeau, 2014, 193). Further, Doty utilises this method to look at how discourse was produced and attached meanings to various social objects/subjects, which was used to justify intervening in the Philippines via foreign policy; thus, it is compatible with what this dissertation aims to do (1993). Further, it will utilise Copenhagen School's methodology, which is simply analysing speech for securitising language that fulfils felicity conditions (Paterson & Mulvey, 2023).

The discursive practices approach highlights the *'linguistic construction of reality; language is seen as a set of signs which are part of a system for generating subjects, objects and worlds'* (Doty, 1993, 302; Shapiro, 1984). A discourse or a set of statements produces interpretative spaces –. i.e., concepts, categories, metaphors, connotations, and analogies by which meanings are created (Doty, 1993, 302). *'The textual mechanisms of presupposition, predication, and subject positioning provide analytic categories'* that allow for an analysis of how discursive practices constitute subjects and objects and organize them into a *'grid of intelligibility'* (Doty, 1993, 306). When one uses language, one is implying something about the existence of subjects, objects, and their relation to one another (Doty, 1993).

Presuppositions: A presupposition, is a statement that beholds implicit assumptions that are taken to be true (Beaver, Geurts & Denlinger, 2021). Presupposition, therefore, is an important textual mechanism that creates background knowledge and in doing so constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true (Doty, 1993). For example, In Cameron's Immigration speech in 2011, addressed to the Conservative party members, he stated:

'This is our island story: open, diverse and welcoming' (Cameron, 2011).

This statement assumes that Britain has historically been open and accepting to others outside of 'our' country, and this is assumed to be true. It is also assumed that the receiver of this speech is part of the same community that Cameron invokes in 'our country'.

Predication involves the linking of certain qualities to particular subjects through the use of predicates and the adverbs and adjectives that modify them (Doty, 1993). A predicate denotes a quality, attribute, or property of a person or thing (ibid, 306). If we analyse Cameron's speech above, we can say that the United Kingdom is *'welcoming, open and diverse'*; it establishes Britain as a *particular kind* of subject that possesses such qualities. Attributes attached to subjects facilitate the construction of their identities and these attributes inform us what subjects can do (Doty, 1993, 306).

Subject Positioning: Discourse/Texts function to ‘produce a reality’ by associating particular subjects and objects to each other and often, in opposition to one another (Doty, 1993, 307).

‘Production of subjects and objects is always ‘vis-a-vis’ to one another; and what defines a particular kind of subject is largely the relationship that subject is positioned in relation to other kinds of subjects’ (ibid, 306).

However, other important kinds of relationships that position subjects are those of can additionally be; identity, similarity, and complementarity (ibid). Discursive tools construct social types of member categorisations – self and others – as fixed groups that are classified hierarchically (Angel & Kubota 2021). Cultural codes in rhetorical operations of texts/conceptual systems are organised around key oppositions and other relations, such as men (subject) in opposition to women (object) and have different connotations and attributes attributed to each (Beauvoir, 1949). Women may be attributed as ‘weak’ in opposition to men as ‘strong’ (Doty, 1993). This - can be seen in migration-related speech, for example:

‘I’ve always understood the concerns the genuine concerns of hard-working people [...] who worry about uncontrolled immigration. They worry about the pressure it puts on public services [...] that some people might be able to come and take advantage of our generosity without making a proper contribution to our country.’ (Cameron, 2013).

Here, Cameron positions the UK citizens and legal migrants as ‘hard working’ in opposition to ‘illegal migrants’ as people who unjustifiably take, and do not give to the country. This suggests a good (UK) vs. bad (Migrant) dichotomy. This is a subject positing in action.

If we apply Copenhagen securitisation speech analysis to this, it can be seen how securitising actors linguistically construct migrants as a threat (economically, criminally or culturally) in comparison to the threatened United Kingdom. Subjects may be natives and citizens; ‘our country’; an object may be foreigners; the subject may be ‘threatened’ vs the object, which

may be ‘threatening’ and so on. Let’s analyse a further set of statements Cameron made within the same statement:

‘We’ve discovered there was a loophole that allowed migrants who no longer have a right to work here, and in some cases don’t even have the right to be here at all, to carry on claiming some benefits. Now, we are using a power under our 2012 Welfare Reform Act to close this. And by taking radical action to deal with this completely out of control system, we’ve begun to get net migration down radically (Cameron, 2013).

This particular statement, paired with the previous statements from the same speech, presupposes that the UK was generally open; and that this is being taken advantage of by migrants. It presupposes that migration is out of control. It predicates the UK; its citizens and services as being ‘taken advantage of’, as ‘hard-working’ and ‘worried’. It predicates ‘illegal migrants’ as ‘claiming benefits’ (which they may not have the right to), ‘not contributing to the country’ and ‘uncontrolled’. Subject positioning, as stated above, is done in two ways: of one of the good UK, who is being taken advantage of, by the bad, exploitative migrant; which also portrays the migrant as a threat, and the UK as vulnerable to this threat. This is securitising language and is seen in the subject positioning. As stated in the literature review, migration is often securitised economically; this speech is an example of such.

Firstly; a threat is outlined;

‘Concerns about [...] uncontrolled migration [...] about the pressure it puts on public services [...] without making a contribution to our country’. (Cameron, 2011). Here, it suggests that uncontrolled migration is a threat to public services by people who are ‘scrounging’ from the United Kingdom. Secondly, Cameron is a securitising actor as he is the prime minister and the leader of the Conservative Party. Lastly, exceptional measures are proposed and utilised to deal with the threat. *‘We are using a power under our 2012 Welfare Reform Act [...] taking radical action to deal with this completely out of control system, we’ve begun to get net migration down radically’* (ibid). Thus, speech fulfils the

necessary felicity conditions and follows ‘the grammar of security’ to be deemed securitising speech (Bourbeau, 2014).

Following Bourbeau (2014) and Doty (1993), once speech is analysed and contextualised (such as with migration statistics or political context), justification as to why such practices are enacted can be inferred from speech. In the above excerpt, it is clear that a harsher policy was enacted, as migrants were portrayed as scroungers who were threatening the UK’s services, and it was unfair to those who were rightfully there. For brevity, the practices related to the 2012 Welfare Reform Act will not be analysed here; but they will be in the following chapters. This methodology then satisfies the Bourbeaudian approach to securitisation, and utilising Doty’s method allows for a better understanding of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ narrative which is so often seen in securitisation and aids in the understanding of how such practices are justified. This will be paired with the analysis of laws/policies/practices; so that securitising actor’s speech can be analysed in conjunction with the securitising practices that have been enacted in law and policy which explains how the Hostile Environment policies have been justified.

Data will be gained from securitising actors’ speeches, in this case, the Prime Ministers and Home Secretaries. A list of attributes assigned from nine speeches will be collated and shown in the results. But one speech per era will be analysed fully in the same way as above in conjunction with laws that are enacted to the full securitisation process. To further supplement speech and practices and justification, migration statistics from each era will be utilised, as it will be used to evaluate if the hostile environment is effective in reducing migration (irregular and irregular). These will be from the Home Office’s statistics themselves. By evaluating speech and practice, we can evaluate if they have escalated; if similar ‘eras’ had similar rhetorical justifications; or if it is different due to apparent migration levels. Further, hate crime statistics, deportation statistics and right-wing terror attacks will be utilised to provide further analysis of the success and impact of the Hostile Environment policies.

vi. Limitations:

As the knowledge creation of this dissertation is largely interpretative - as an author, self-reflection is needed, as all scientific and research methods can be influenced by research bias (Losifides, 2018). This is particularly salient if a researcher has an emotional and political investment in the matter, which the author of this dissertation is, as a politically franchised British citizen.

The verbal, primary sources of data from this dissertation are from public speeches made by prime ministers and home secretaries, which can be found online either published by the House of Commons if said speech was made in Parliament; or often published by news sources in full if speech was performed elsewhere. Primary sources regarding legal acts are accessible on the UK's GOV.uk, the UK Parliament website, the Commons Library, and the government legislation website⁸. Such analysis is assuming a level of transparency in securitising moves; but the author acknowledges that there is further discourse and practices that may be acting clandestinely, which cannot be analysed, and this limits data and analysis. It must also be acknowledged that there are other securitising actors within the Conservative party, but the prime ministers and home secretaries are the individuals who advocate verbally for further practices (such as acts), and they propose them to Parliament to get such acts accepted, thus, their discourse is the most appropriate for answering the research question. Further data pertaining to migration statistics, hate crime etc. will be utilised from government statistics, news sources and academic sources.

Lastly, there are indeed other research methods that could have been utilised, such as process tracing or mixed methods; indeed, which may have provided a more robust analysis. However, the CDA supplemented with securitising theory should be sufficient for answering the outlined research question, and by critically analysing the primary sources outlined via the Bourbeaudian approach, it should highlight the practical development of securitisation of migration pre- and post-Brexit and show how justifications of the Hostile


⁸ <https://www.gov.uk>; <https://www.parliament.uk>; <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk>; <https://www.legislation.gov.uk>

Environment has advanced and has further been justified since this monumental political change.

Chapter 4: Data Collection & Analysis

This chapter will survey Conservative speech and practices from 2010-2023 which will aid in answering the research question ‘*How has the Conservative Government justified the Hostile Environment?*’. Speech data is compiled from speeches from securitising actors (Prime Ministers and Home Office Secretaries). One speech per era will be analysed for securitising speech, however, further speeches will be analysed to search for presuppositions attached to Migrants/Migration, the UK/UK Citizens and The Conservatives which will be referenced in an annexe. With the data collected, a table of the presuppositions will be presented as results (Doty, 1993). By era, practices will be analysed alongside the speech and then a justification will be extrapolated. To analyse if the Hostile Environment is effective in its aims; references to migration numbers, and deportation numbers will be referred to; the figures are below. Further, to consider a potential impact, hate crime statistics will be utilised, and the chart is included below. These figures will be referred to throughout the analysis.

Figure 5: Source; *The Migration Observatory at The University of Oxford (2023)*.




Source: LTIM: for 1991 to 2010: ONS, Table 2.00: Long-term international migration time series; and for 2011 to 2020: ONS, provisional estimates of long-term international migration, year ending March 2020, Table 1. Modelled estimates: ONS Long-term international migration, provisional: 2018 to 2022, Table 1.

Note: Figures are for calendar years. All estimates come with substantial uncertainty.



Figure 6: Source: *The Migration Observatory at The University of Oxford, (2020)*



Source: Migration Observatory analysis of Home Office Immigration Statistics, Returns Mar 2020, Ret_D01.
 Notes: The 2019 count of voluntary returns is provisional because it is subject to substantial upward revision, particularly for the last 12 months, while matching checks are made on travellers after departure.





Figure 7: Source: *Home Office (2022); Hate Crime Statistics, England & Wales, 2012-2022.*

Figure 8: Source: Home Office (2023), National Statistics: UK Detention Numbers 2014- 2023



People crossing the English Channel in boats Cumulative total people detected by year



Note: Data to March 2023 is monthly totals, more recent figures are daily totals. Some data from the latest week may be unavailable

Source: Home Office/Ministry of Defence, latest data 9 Jul



Figure 9: Source: BBC News, (2023).

i. Cameron & Clegg Coalition: 2010-2015:

Context:

In 2010, Cameron became prime minister in a historic coalition government with the Liberal Democrats - Centrist-Left – with Nick Clegg as deputy prime minister (UK Government, The Coalition, 2010). And it was under Cameron's first premiership and Home Secretary, Theresa May's rule, that the Hostile Environment policies towards irregular migrants were developed in 2012 (Kirkup and Winnett, 2012). This Coalition, whilst on differing ideological ends agreed that 'big government' was a failure and power must be dispersed more locally; that the national deficit must be dealt with by public funding cuts; no further EU power will be transferred; and the immigration and asylum system will be overhauled (HM Government, The Coalition, 2010). An immigration-related speech from this time by Cameron related to immigration will now be analysed and highlighted as securitising speech.

Speech:

'I'm going to argue how I believe this government can act in a way that will genuinely tackle the problem [...] of mass migration [...]our communities just can't cope with the demands of ever greater numbers flooding in. [...] excessive immigration brings pressures, real pressures on our communities up and down the country. Pressures on schools, housing and healthcare and social pressures too. When large numbers of people arrive in new neighbourhoods, perhaps not all able to speak the same language as those who live there, perhaps not always wanting to integrate, perhaps seeking simply to take advantage of our NHS, paid for by our taxpayers [...] And there's an even bigger reason for addressing immigration too. It's about fairness, [...]. We're also going to rewrite the immigration rules to reinforce the public interest in seeing foreign criminals and immigration offenders removed from this country and help prevent Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights being misinterpreted [...]. I want everyone in the country to help with this, including by reporting suspected illegal immigrants to

our Border Agency [...]. Together I do believe we can reclaim our borders and send illegal immigrants' home. Real limits, proper enforcement, real control over how many people come here and who they are' (Cameron, 2011).

Presupposition: In this speech, Cameron presupposes that migration is a problem, that it is impacting the UK services negatively, that the public has an interest in the removal of criminal migrants and that borders require controlling and he presupposes that he is speaking to his community [*our NHS*] (Cameron, 2011; Doty, 1993). It is taken for granted that the Brits are superior, and are subjects, whereas migrants need to be controlled and are inferior [objects].

Predications: The predications attributed to the [object] migrants/migration as; pressuring British services communities; [perhaps] unable to speak English, [perhaps] taking advantage of the NHS, as 'flooding in' (Cameron, 2011; Doty, 1993). He predicates citizens [subjects] as taxpayers and whilst this is not said explicitly – it is implied they are suffering from an injustice due to immigrants. In this relation of identity, they are created as opposites.

Subject Positioning: There are two ways that migrants and UK Citizens are positioned relationally to each other; this is as migrants taking advantage, in opposition to Britain (and its citizens, as being exploited – which is 'unfair', which is a common justification of Conservative harsh immigration and asylum policies (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021, 529; Doty, 1993). Further, by analysing the speech through the Copenhagen securitisation lens, we see the not explicitly stated: Migrant; Threat vs UK; Threatened, subject position emerges.

Cameron portrays 'floods' of migrants as imposing on the British services and neighbourhoods; which securitises migrants and irregular migrants in two ways; culturally [not speaking the language, not integrating] and economically [pressures on schools, housing etc.] (Cameron, 2011; Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017). This further, contributes to the subject-positioning as migrants as a threat, and the United Kingdom's services, culture and borders are verbally constructed as threatened (Doty, 1993). To mitigate such threat, Cameron proposes exceptional measures of rewriting migration rules to avoid the 'exploitation' of

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and calling upon the public to report illegal migrants – which is reminiscent of calling upon citizens to report something suspicious in a war effort and production of power from ‘everywhere’ (Foucault, 1998, 105). Indeed, this speech fulfils the felicity conditions of securitising speech; Cameron is a key securitising actor, and he outlined a threat and proposed exceptional measures to try and mitigate it (Bourbeau, 2014; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 96). This speech was made in 2011, before the Hostile Environment was announced, however, the referencing to wider public policing was indicative of such securitising practices which were to come in the Hostile Environment enacted by May. Within the table which will be presented at the end, further presuppositions were assigned to the UK & Migrants; these were drawn from the above speech from Cameron, 2011, (which in the appendix and table is marked as (1)), Cameron, 2013 (marked in the appendix and table as (2)), and a speech from May, 2012 (Marked in the appendix and table as (3)). Further analysing these speeches, found that justification of harsh migration policies was often related to the UK services and economy – which in a time where austerity policies began to be enacted, this logic follows, and the securitisation of migrants on economic grounds would be accepted Conservatives (UK Government, The Coalition, 2010) As Bourbeau argues, speech can often be the instigator of the securitisation process, and this speech by Cameron was an example of this, and the beginning of the Conservative securitisation of migrants (irregular and regular) and is the start of the ‘Path Dependency’ pre-Brexit, which has continued escalating practices since (Bourbeau, 2014, 195). This securitising speech is ‘locked in’ by the first practices and policy enacted by May under ‘The Hostile Environment’.

Practice/Policy:

After Cameron verbally constructs migrants and immigration as a threat to the UK, securitising practices that follow the Paris School’s conception of securitisation followed, ‘locking in’ the securitisation by creating an environment of fear and surveillance (ibid). One of the first practices that was enacted in the Hostile Environment was ‘*Operation Vaken*’, which is more commonly known as the ‘*Go Home Vans*’ (BBC News, 2013, Candappa,

2019). This was part of a wider campaign which included news adverts and postcards portraying similar messages (BBC, 2013). As stated in the theoretical framework, a securitising move must be accepted by an audience to be deemed successful; this campaign had large public backlash, however, it was initially accepted by the Conservative party, thus, it will be discussed (Balzacq et al, 2014). It is emblematic of securitising practices enacted by the Conservatives since 2010.

With the ‘Go Home Vans’, the Home Office and state established themselves as the ‘sovereign’, who always knows where you are – enacting a wider range of surveillance which enacts Foucault’s usage of Bentham’s Panopticon⁹ (Foucault, 1977, 455). It drove around the most multicultural areas of London, and it was credited for getting 11 individuals to voluntarily leave (BBC 2013). It is biopolitics in action as the state tries to control the bodies by creating such fear the migrant voluntarily leaves (ibid, 1977, 455; Candappa, 2019). This campaign was coupled with ‘Stop & Search’ powers for police officers being widened - which caused minority youth in the London Underground to be overly targeted (Candappa, 2019, 419; Townsend, 2021). Again, this is securitisation on the Paris School’s account; where daily practices (surveillance and policing) caused a targeted ‘suspect group’, to feel unease (ibid; Mitzen, 2006; Bigo, 2002). In this case, the suspect group was migrants [as highlighted in the subject positioning above]; which trickled down to minorities who are assumed as being in the UK illegally. This was also the beginning of the expansion of the ‘field’, as police officers were now becoming de-facto border control agents (Balzacq et al, 2015).

Further practices were enacted in this era of government, via an aspect of Governmentality via the ‘2014 Immigration Act’, where further extension of the field and dispositive ensues (Balzacq et al, 2014). After this act came into force, private landlords now had to check renter's migration status; banks had to check visas before opening accounts; temporary migrants such as students had to contribute financially to the NHS Family Reunification Visas were harder to

⁹ As outlined in the Theoretical Framework.

obtain; Home Office powers were extended so that passports and fingerprints of suspected irregular migrants could be checked; it was easier to deport migrants and it was harder to appeal the decision (Home Office, Immigration Bill, 2014). This bill was said to benefit British Citizens by deterring irregular migrants from arriving - which will save taxpayer money as it reduces pressure on services, *thus 'freeing up capacity for lawfully resident population'* (Immigration Bill Fact Sheet, 2014, 3).

In this era, the Hostile Environment was mostly justified for due to economic reasons, and this was achieved by securitising both migrants and irregular migrants who 'put pressure' on key UK services such as the NHS; whilst portraying the taxpayer as being taken advantage of. By positing migrants as taking advantage of the UK, it justified harsher practices. In the three speeches, - reclaiming borders - is only referred to once by Cameron (2011; (1)). Thus, sovereignty is not the main factor, however, fairness is referred to consistently which is in line with normal justification with harsher migration controls (Griffiths & Yeo, 2021; Candappa, 2019). If migration and deportation statistics are evaluated, we can see the Hostile Environment was somewhat successful in this period. There was a drop in EU migration in 2011, however, it continued to rise until 2015 (Sumption, Brindle, Walsh, 2023). There were indeed reductions in non-EU migration from 2010-2014, until a rise was seen again in 2015, but it did not reach pre-2010 levels (*ibid*) [*See figure 5 above*]. Further, 'enforced' returns (deportations) continued to rise from 2010-2014, where a dip was seen in 2015, and 'voluntary departures' increased between 2011-2014, and then a decline took place in 2014 [*See figure 6 above*] (Walsh, 2020). Further, hate crime started to increase slightly [*see figure 7 above*] (Home Office; Hate Crime Statistics, 2022).

Whilst rhetoric and practices were becoming harsher, the Conservatives could justify the Hostile Environment as they were somewhat successful in its aim, which was to reduce migrants and increase voluntary departures; and it was the only way to deal with the threat that migrants posed to the UK's services, culture, and border (Cameron, 2011, 2013; Liberty, 2018). This era instigated the process of securitisation of migration which has caused escalating practices

and speech, which will now be seen in Cameron's second term, where the issue of migration underpinned Brexit.

ii. Cameron & Brexit; 2015-2016:

Context:

In his Manifesto, Cameron pledged the Brexit referendum, to control EU migration, reduce irregular migration and keep net migration at the 'tens of thousands' (The Conservatives, 2014, 4, 27). He was successful in the 2015 election and won a small majority for the Conservatives (Mason, 2016). It is generally acknowledged that Cameron proposed the referendum to appease his further right, Eurosceptic party members, and to undermine UKIP's new growing popularity (Bale, 2022, 438, Glencross, 2016). Due to the Brexit campaign and the 2015 EU refugee crisis, migration became the issue of Cameron's second premiership (BBC, 2015a; Spindler, 2015). Migration and refugees then, became the ideological battleground of Brexit between the 'Remain Camp' and 'Leave Camp' (Bale, 2022). It caused further splintering amongst the Conservatives, as high-ranking Conservative ministers Boris Johnston and Michael Gove aligned with Nigel Farage and UKIP in the 'Leave' campaign (ibid). The Leave campaign bred fear of Turkey joining the EU, which would cause further migrants and links for 'terrorists to come from Syria'; additionally, the UK Media often depicted the migrants as threats (Bale, 2022, Glencross, 2016, Erlanger, 2016; Gray & Franck, 2019). In this period, the Hostile Environment policies were advanced, and Cameron's speech and rhetoric followed similar logic as the years before, but it was more alarmist and dehumanising, which was indeed to compete with Farage and 'Leave' (Bale, 2022, 438).

Speech:

*'The people of Britain spoke. They voted for a majority Conservative government. [...]: they wanted a government that was on their side; that backed them; [...] a government for working people [...] **if you have uncontrolled immigration, you have uncontrolled pressure on public services [..][it] can damage our labour market and push down wages.***

*[...]. And people are **fed up** with a system that allows those **who are not meant to be in our country to remain here**. Our ‘one nation’ approach will be **tougher, fairer, and faster**. That starts next week, with a new Immigration Bill [...] That Bill, and the further measures we’ll pursue, will focus on 3 big things:*

1. *[...] rooting out illegal immigrants and boosting deportations.*
2. *Reforming our immigration and labour market rules, so we reduce the demand for skilled migrant labour [...].*
3. *Addressing the spike in EU migration by renegotiating in Europe.*

*It will put an end to **the houses packed full of illegal workers**, stop people stalling deportation [...], **give British people the skills to do the jobs we need** and deliver what people want [...]* (Cameron, 2015)¹⁰.

Presupposition: What background knowledge is assumed by this excerpt? It is presupposed that the British people have a voice [by voting], that the British people are fed up with migrants, that British people are part of the same community as the Conservatives [‘our one nation’]. ‘*British people*’ infers ‘Natives’ and are subjects. Immigrants, ‘particularly illegal migrants’ are objects, and it presupposes that they are not part of the same community as ‘our’ or ‘the people of Britain’, they are the; ‘other’ objects of this speech (Cameron, 2015; Doty, 1993). It is also assumed that EU migration has become a problem. It presupposes that there is an in-group that belongs and an out-group that does not.

Predications: British people are predicated as ‘fed up’, ‘working people’, ‘needing skills’ (Cameron, 2015). The Conservatives [and their approach] is predicated as ‘firm, fair and fast’ (Cameron, 2015). Immigration and migrants

¹⁰ This speech is [4] on the appendix and table.

[Irregular and regular] are described as ‘uncontrolled’ and as putting pressure on services (ibid).

Subject Positioning: Cameron is in the group of ‘British people’; thus, the speech being spoken by him [a subject] regarding migrants [object]; discursively situates these subjects as vis-à-vis to one another (Doty, 1993). This is further exemplified by the ‘British people’ (who belong here) in opposition to irregular migrants - ‘*those who are not meant to be in our country*’ Cameron, 2015). Further, he creates the threatened / threatening subject position by suggesting that migrants [objects] put pressure on UK services such as jobs, whilst the rightful citizens [subjects], are struggling to get jobs. Following securitisation theory, this is economically securitising speech by suggesting that due to migrants [EU, regular and irregular], there is a scarcity of resources for the British people (Chebel d’Appollonia, 2017). By constructing migrants [EU, regular and irregular] as a threat to the British people, services and economy [referent object of security], Cameron creates a world where extra measures must be enacted to deal with the threat, which he refers to the 2016 Immigration Act which follows this speech a week later (Cameron, 2015). This speech additionally fulfils the felicity conditions of securitising speech (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 96). As Bourbeau states, securitising speech and practices is a process that often works in conjunction and osmosis with each other (Bourbeau, 2014). The practices which are enacted in the 2016 Immigration Act were discussed before, and this speech is used to justify and further securitise migrants, which justifies these extra measures. However, Cameron has been securitising migrants and positioning the UK as under threat since 2010; therefore, securitisation is an accumulative process where speech and practice reinforce escalation (ibid).

Practice/Policy:

Cameron and May enacted the 2016 Immigration Act in May 2016, mere months before Cameron resigned after he lost the Brexit Campaign (Bale, 2022; Home Office, Immigration Bill, 2016). This bill built upon the 2014 Immigration Act discussed in the previous section. It provided further powers so that; landlords could readily evict illegal migrants; prosecution of landlords

who housed illegal migrants; it made access to bank accounts and driver's licences more difficult; working illegally was criminalised; ensured all frontline workers speak English fluently; foreign offenders could be electronically tagged and other measures which expanded immigration officer's powers (Home Office, Immigration Bill, 2016). This bill further securitised migration/migrants as it was an act of governmentality, and biopolitics that aimed at a deviant population through surveillance of bodies (tagging foreign offenders) and added daily bureaucratic checks to the lives of many – not just migrants – but anyone who was perceived as 'not belonging' (Bourbeau, 2014; Balzacq et al 2015). This was to invoke fear and subservience amongst migrants - both regular and irregular - and public declarations and practices were there to ensure the safety of 'British people' (Cameron, 2011). This expansion of the field is clear as it aligned the police closer to border agents, where they become double enforcers.

Thus, securitising agents were framing migrants/immigration as a threat and the UK was the referent object of security, particularly an economic threat; this was achieved by securitising speech and securitising practices. However, whilst economic reasons were the dominant justification for the Hostile Environment in this period, there was an aspect of prioritising the natives more explicitly (which right-wing parties often appeal to when competing with populist far-right governments – like Brexit) (Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021). The Hostile Environment was somewhat successful; as EU migration began to decline, however, non-EU migration increased [See Figure. 4]; and both voluntary and involuntary returns decreased [see. Figure 6] (Sumption, Brindle Walsh, 2023; Walsh, 2020).

Within this 'era' of government, an act of right-wing terrorism took place. The murder of the Labour Remain MP, Jo Cox – whose murderer was a far-right extremist and declared '*Britain First*' before killing her (Cobain, 2016). Racial and religious hate crimes dramatically rose in the aftermath of the vote (however, the months after the Brexit vote saw the highest rise, which is in May's premiership) (Piatkowska & Lantz, 2021; Piatkowska & Stults, 2022) [see figure 7]. This was in the context of the Conservatives utilising dehumanising language and UKIP using increasingly racist language towards refugees and migrants (ibid, 2021; Bale, 2022). Whilst it is difficult to draw

relations between speech, hate crime and terrorism; arguably, the dehumanising and securitising language and policies facilitated an environment for right-wing extremism to grow (Piatkowska & Lantz, 2021; Piatkowska & Stults, 2022; Zedner, 2021).

iii. May: Post-Brexit Vote and Negotiations: 2016-2019:

Context:

Despite being a Brexit Remainer, May was selected amongst conservative party members to deliver Brexit after Cameron resigned. Her reputation as tough was established due to her staunch, ‘no-nonsense’ approach to migration, security, and terrorism in her role as the UK’s longest-serving Home Secretary (BBC, 2019). As the previous home secretary, it was expected that the Hostile Environment policies and harsh immigration controls would expand and she reiterated Cameron’s goal of achieving net migration of the ‘tens of thousands’ (The Conservatives, 2017). May called for an unscheduled, snap election in 2017, in which the small majority that Cameron had achieved in 2015 was lost; they had to form a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement with the Christian-right Northern Irish Party the Democratic Unionist Party (Hunt, 2017). In her attempted Brexit negotiations - all of which failed, and she was ousted as Prime Minister due to - May opted for a ‘hard Brexit’, which meant she prioritised reducing EU migration above access to the single market (Walker, 2016). After the Brexit vote, the Conservatives were concerned about regaining sovereignty from Brussels and fulfilling the democratic will of the people, which included controlling EU and other immigration (The Conservatives, 2019). Additionally, in this time frame, Europe and the UK suffered several high-profile terrorist attacks, so the linking of migrants to terrorism rose (Piatkowska & Stults, 2022). May had two Home Secretaries during this time. First, Amber Rudd, who resigned due to the Windrush scandal – where Caribbean migrants who had lived their whole lives in Britain, could not satisfy the bureaucratic requirements of proof that the Hostile Environment implemented - were wrongfully deported and targeted by immigration control (Stewart, Gentleman & Hopkins, 2018). Second, Sajid Javid. In this section, Rudd’s speech will be analysed as she was

Home Secretary for longer, and much of May's speech during this time pertained to Brexit, so there was a lack of data regarding only migration-focused speech.

Speech:

[Uncontrolled Immigration] led to legitimate concerns around the pressures put on housing, public services and wages. [...] But I also come here today with a warning to those that simply oppose any steps to reduce net migration: this Government will not waver in its commitment to put the interests of the British people first. [...], particularly those measures to tackle crime and terrorism. So we are going to overhaul our legislation to make it easier [...] to deport EU criminals, and stopping people coming here that threaten our security [...] As your Home Secretary, my primary concern is protecting our way of life, and delivering the security measures we require to ensure this [...] And with this in mind, the Investigatory Powers Bill will [...] ensure that our police, and security and intelligence agencies, have the powers they need to keep us safe [...] We have a strong Conservative-only Government. One that puts the greatest value on protecting our way of life [...] one that will do whatever it takes to defend it from those who seek to destroy it. [...] that is 100% committed to putting Britain's interests first, delivering both the security of our borders, and control of who comes in (Rudd, 2016).

Presupposition: Like previous discourse, it is assumed that there are two distinct groups; British people - which the Conservatives are part of, [*'our country'*], they are the prioritised and thus, more relevant, superior group (Rudd, 2016). Then there are others, [*'people coming here'*]. This assumes they are inferior subjects (Rudd, 2016; Doty, 1993). Further, it is assumed that these inferior people intend to threaten Brits and 'our way of life' (Rudd, 2016).

Predications: The Conservatives are predicted as '*strong*', and '*committed to protecting Britain's interests*' [security of borders, 'our' way of life] (Rudd,

2016). This is in opposition to *'people coming here'* [aka – migrants/refugees etc.] are predicated as *'threatening'* [to our security]; EU migrants are also associated with criminality [*'EU criminals'*] (Rudd, 2016). It also indirectly predicates the UK as being under threat (*'threaten our [Britain and its citizens] security'*), by predicating the migrants as *'threatening'* (Rudd, 2016).

Subject Positioning: This positions migrants as a threat and the UK, and its citizens as threatened. Further, this speech positions the Conservatives in conjunction with the UK, as it is strong in the name of threat (which The UK faces) (Russ, 2018; Dotty, 1993). Therefore, the UK is threatened whilst the migrant is a threat. The Conservatives are strong in the face of threat. By positioning the Conservatives this way, it denotes them with agency and power, which it aims to utilise to clamp down on migrants to protect the UK. This discursively highlights and reproduces power of state here. This speech additionally explicitly fulfils the felicity conditions of securitising speech by deeming *'people who come here to threaten our security'*, which calls for further exceptional *'security measures [...] the Investigatory Powers Bill will [...] ensure that our police, and security and intelligence agencies, have the powers they need to keep us safe'* (Rudd, 2016). Rudd during this period was Home Secretary. Thus, she was a securitising actor, and she constructed an existential threat to a referent object of security. Further, this speech was accepted by the audience, which was the Conservative Party, and further practices were justified. However, there was some public backlash to this particular speech from other audiences (Travis, 2017). This speech explicitly linked migration to terrorism and security more so than previous securitising speech. Further, the securitising speech previously, mostly securitised migrants on economic grounds with hinted at cultural securitisation (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017). However, this speech utilises the three most typical angles of securitises of migrants. Economically: *'pressures put on housing, public services, and wages'*; Culturally: *'Protecting our way of life'*; Criminally: *'Put the interests of the British people first. [...], particularly [...] crime and terrorism. So, we are going to overhaul our legislation to make it easier [...] to deport EU criminals and stopping people coming here that threaten our security'* (ibid; Rudd, 2016).

However, security is the most prevalent theme of the securitising speech, which highlights an escalation in Conservative speech and a shift in justification for the Hostile Environment compared to the discourse analysed previously. It is more alarmist in its approach and as the Brexit vote took place, Cameron's speech escalated to compete with Farage, and the Conservatives desired to capitalise on the rise of populism and nativist sentiments; thus, it follows that Rudd's speech is escalatory in nature (Bale, 2022; Rudd, 2016). This highlights the 'Path Dependency' in which Bourbeau argued securitisation follows, which was kickstarted by Cameron and as he continued to escalate discourse and practices, the Conservatives could not justifiably deescalate securitisation (2014). Otherwise, it undermines their manifesto, their last five years of government, Brexit motivations; and it could allow space for UKIP to gain influence from the Conservative's more right-leaning voters and MPs. This was coupled with further securitising practices that expanded policing and further connected migrants to the risk of terrorism.

Practices:

Surveillance and policing advanced greatly during this phase of government, which is securitisation on the Paris School's conception of security. Firstly, the bill mentioned in Rudd's above speech - is the Investigatory Powers Act (2016). This bill allowed mass surveillance of digital technologies by police and intelligence officers (ibid). It was meant to limit terrorism which in this period, migrants were increasingly associated with terrorism, thus, it is likely migrants and 'suspect populations' were subjects of surveillance. Again, this is enacting the panopticon; wherein it makes the population feel they may be watched constantly; which is a securitising ritual (Foucault, 1977). Further, this expanded the field and habitus; wherein, the police, border control and intelligence agents were now sharing practices in the name of securing Britain (Balzacq et al, 2015). Further, the Policing and Crime Bill (2016), was a vital part of police reform; which promoted data and information sharing between police and other emergency service workers such as paramedics; this further expanded the role of public servants to be de-facto border control agents. Another act that expanded the field and practices was the 'Counter-terrorism and Border Security Act' which gave police officers and border officers the

power ‘to stop, question, search and detain an individual at a port or border area to determine whether they are, or have been, involved in hostile state activity’ (Home Office, 2019). Additionally, the EU Resettlement Scheme was enacted on the 30th of March 2019, to allow EU citizens to continue to reside in the UK post-Brexit by a ‘settled’ or ‘pre-settled’ status (Home Office, 2020). This increased bureaucratic processes for EU citizens and generally ensured that they were ‘accounted for’ within the UK in a way that was not done previously.

These acts and practices they sanctioned further securitised migrants of all kinds; all outsiders were viewed as a potential threat to national security, and there was a general atmosphere of fear, surveillance, and suspicion. This is the Paris School’s conception of securitisation in action. These bureaucratic acts are examples of governmentality that expanded the field and impacted the practices and discourses of those within the now-expanded security field (Balzacq et al, 2015).

The Bourbeaudian approach again highlights that many of these ‘Hostile Environment’ practices were justified via rhetoric and under the guise that they were counter-terror measures and necessary for protecting Britain’s borders and ensuring sovereignty. However, the policing of migrants dramatically increased, as well as securitising language towards them. Religious crime towards Muslim men rose, and racial hate crime towards Arabic men and EU citizens (particularly Polish migrants), rose in this era of government [*See figure 7 above*] (Dunin-Wasowicz, 2018; Piatkowska & Stults, 2022, 659) Piatkowska & Stults argue that this rise was due to the demonising rhetoric utilised in the Brexit campaign and the Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe and Manchester and London (2022). Additionally, the Finsbury Park attack was a right-wing terror attack that took place near a mosque, which was enacted in revenge against ‘Muslim grooming gangs’ and Islamic attacks that had taken place in England in recent years (Dodd & Rawlinson, 2018). As for the success of the Hostile Environment policies it found that deportations declined; EU migration declined, but non-EU migration rose [see figures 5 & 6 above] Sumption, et al., 2023; Walsh, 2020). After the Brexit vote, a concern for sovereignty, terrorism and securing borders becomes more prevalent in securitising actor’s discourse and practices.

iv. Johnston: Post Brexit Negotiations 2019-2022:

Context:

Johnston represented a 'bluer' form of Conservatism, which appealed to the 'rightward swing' that had been seen since Cameron's premiership (Purnell, 2019). He won the Conservative Leadership race to replace May on the 23rd of July and he aimed for Brexit to be complete by the 31st of October, which he failed to achieve (Walker, 2021). For the 2019 Election campaign, Johnson ran his campaign on his ability to '*get Brexit done by 31 January 2020*', which he said he was fit to do as an avid campaigner for the cause from the offset (Wheeler, 2023; Walker, 2021). His approach to migration was to extend the Hostile Environment policies, where the 'Rwanda Plan' and a points system were to be aggressively pursued by the new Home Secretary, Priti Patel (The Conservatives, 2019; Shamsie, 2022). Patel is said to have taken 'the baton' from May in implementing the Hostile Environment (ibid, 2022). With this manifesto, he won a majority with the largest voter mandate that the Conservatives had seen in 30 years and reaffirmed his commitment to '*Get Brexit Done*' (Walker, 2021). EU Migrants were focused on at the start of his term due to the Brexit migrations, where he stated EU citizens who made Britain their home had '*treated the UK like "their own" country for too long*' (O'Carroll, 2019). Johnston was successful in his pledge, and on 31 December 2020, the UK officially left the EU single market and customs union (ibid). Now that the UK had left the EU, they were liberated from EU free movement, which they argued would curtail migration numbers and allow them to assert sovereignty. EU migrants were now deemed the same as all migrants and had to apply formally to migrate into the UK (The Conservatives, 2019). Due to much of Johnston's early speeches relating to many aspects of Brexit and then the Covid-19 pandemic, there was not a published speech that was solely on migration until 2022, which the author will use for analysis. Further, it allows for a better analysis after the post-Brexit. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic largely altered migration rates and saw the UK state mass release individuals from immigration detention [*see figure 8*] (Waterman, 2022). However, once the pandemic threat was 'over', Johnston escalated practices and rhetoric, but with a particular focus on 'illegal migration' (Johnston, 2022).

Speech:

It is controlled immigration, [..], which enables us to make generous offers of sanctuary while managing the inevitable pressures on our public services [...] It's a striking fact that around seven out of ten of those arriving in small boats last year were men under 40, paying people smugglers to queue jump and taking up our capacity to help genuine women and child refugees. [...] The British people voted several times to control our borders, not to close them, but to control them. [...] These vile people smugglers are abusing the vulnerable and turning the Channel into a watery graveyard, [...]. So, we must halt this appalling trade and defeat the people smugglers. That is why we are passing the Nationality and Borders Bill, which allows us for the first time to distinguish between people coming here legally and illegally, [...] it will also allow us to prosecute those who arrive illegally, with life sentences for anyone piloting the boats [..] from today the Royal Navy will take over operational command from Border Force in the Channel, [...] At the same time, we are expanding our immigration detention facilities, to assist with the removal of those with no right to remain in the UK. (Johnston, 2022).

Presupposition: In this excerpt, it is assumed that irregular migrants come via smuggling and that they are exploited. As usual, within these speeches, there is an assumed superior subject [British people and legal migrants]; and inferior objects [illegal migrants] (Johnston, 2022). Further, it is assumed that the UK and the Conservatives have agency and a voice 'British people voted [..] to control borders'. This further infers that there are people who have the right to be here (British people, voters), and there are those who do not have rights in the UK.

Predications: Migrants¹¹ are predicated as ‘*illegal*’, ‘*no right to be here*’, and ‘*vulnerable*’. Migrant men specifically are predicated as ‘queue jump[ers]’ who ‘*take from the capacity to help women and children*’. The UK is predicated as ‘*voted to control borders*’ (Johnston, 2022).

Subject Position: British people [subject] have a voice and rights [*‘voted several times to close borders’*]; whereas ‘*illegal*’ migrants [objects] are positioned as without agency nor right [no right to be here]. This is positioning them vis-à-vis one another. This further enacts the superior versus inferior subject positioning which is common in this type of official discourse (Doty, 1993). There is additionally an explicit legal and illegal positioning. The threat and threatened subject position emerge here also, but in two ways. Britain’s services and borders are constructed as threatened, and illegal migrants as well as gang members are constructed as the threat. Johnston, however, also positions gangs as a threat to the migrants, causing some conflicting subject positioning and relations (*‘These vile people smugglers are abusing the vulnerable and turning the Channel into a watery graveyard’*) (Johnston, 2022).

Johnston securitises illegal migrants particularly here, but he reiterates the common Conservative statement that migration must be controlled (Johnston, 2022). He securitises irregular migrants economically by stating that they put ‘*inevitable pressures on our public services*’ (Johnston, 2022; Chebel d’Appollonia, 2017). Further, he securitises migrants and ‘smugglers/gangs’ criminally (*‘No right to be here’*) and here; he proposes extreme measures (*‘we are passing the Nationality and Borders Bill, which allows us for the first time to distinguish between people coming here legally and illegally’*). Johnston (a securitising actor with social power), then securitises both smuggling gangs and illegal migrants as a threat to the UK, and he proposes extreme measures (criminalising migrants and militarising the Channel, offsetting migrants to Rwanda) (Johnston, 2022). Thus, the felicity conditions are satisfied to be

¹¹ The Author acknowledges these individuals as refugees but is using the language that the securitising actor utilises. Further, the disruption between these groups is an aspect of the Conservative's securitisation over time (Feller, 2005).

deemed securitising speech – and the third condition¹² (which is optional, but optimal) is satisfied, as he refers to past immigration problems [*controlled immigration*] to show that there has been an ongoing immigration aims which the Conservative government has been dealing with (since Cameron) (Johnston, 2022; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 96). In the past discourse, movement generally was securitised, migrants (irregular and regular; EU migrants during the Brexit referendum and negotiations); however, Johnston shifts the focus more concretely to ‘illegal migrants’ in the post-Brexit negotiation period (Johnston, 2023; Indeed the vernacular has changed; the Cameron and May eras often referred to undocumented migrants/refugees as ‘irregular’; whereas Johnston utilises the term ‘illegal’, which is more threatening. Further, he also securitises ‘gangs’ as threatening to both the UK and said ‘illegal migrants’; thus, migrants are both a referent object of security and a threat – this was a common securitising move during the 2015 migrant crisis also (Hintjens, 2019). Thus, expansion of the Hostile Environment in this period is justified for economic and security reasons, but also apparently for the good of the ‘illegal migrant’ also. This is seen in further attempted securitising moves enacted by Johnston and Patel. In the table of intelligibility and appendix, Patel’s speech is (7).

Practices:

Some of the securitising moves referenced in this section have not been successful; for example, the British Navy refused Johnston’s request to ‘push back’ migrant boats in the channel, and they threatened to withdraw due to ethics and by finding numbers of migrant boat crossings rose since militarising the channel in 2021 [*see figure 9*] (Syal & Sabbagh, 2022; Townsend, 2022). The Navy states that they rescue lives at sea, and by pushing back boats, the death toll would likely rise (Syal & Sabbagh, 2022). This is a practice of biopolitics and necropolitics by Johnston & Patel; as the lives and security of

¹² The third felicity condition is optional but beneficial; it is a historical context pertaining to the threat (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 96), 96; McInnes & Rushton, 2011, 120).

some (UK citizens) are prioritised over the deaths and insecurity of others (migrants on small boats) (Mbembe, 2002; 2003, Wright, 2011). The bill that Johnston references in the speech is the Nationality & Borders Act (UK Government, 2022), which makes deportation easier and requires further proof of human trafficking and modern slavery. Another securitising move attempted by Johnston and Patel was the ‘UK and Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership’, more commonly known as the ‘Rwanda Plan’ (House of Commons Library. 2022; Walsh, 2022). This proposal was an extreme proposal to deport and resettle migrants who came from small boat crossings to Rwanda, or the option to return home (ibid). This act of biopolitics and governmentality construct migrants as so threatening to the UK’s resources and borders, that bodies must be offset to another country (Paterson, & Mulvey (2023). Whilst the policy was accepted by the UK government, parliament, and House of Lords; the plane with the first planned deportations was intercepted by the European Court of Human Rights (Adams, 2022). It violates many of the rights outlined in the 1951 Refugee Declaration [articles 3, 5, 31] and Human rights [articles 5, 9, 14] [See figure 1 on page 10] for reference (UNHCR, 1951; 1948). Further, more detention centres were opened, and detentions increased during this time [see figure. 8] (Johnston, 2023). Hate crime rose during this period, as well as right-wing arrests; and an attack on a migrant detention centre in Dover in November 2022, in which the perpetrator was motivated by far-right ideology and expressed sentiments that those who could not speak English were getting benefits [see figure 7] (BBC, 2022; Piatkowka & Lantz, 2021). Again, it is hard to confirm causation, but after years of escalating rhetoric, particularly towards ‘illegal migrants’ within the year of this attack, it is arguable that alienating, securitising rhetoric and practices validates far-right grievances (ibid, 2021). The Hostile Environment policies did not deter illegal crossings, as they were at their highest in 2022 [see figure 9] and as net migration numbers were at 606,000; it was a record high (House of Commons Library, 2022). The Hostile Environment policies in this era were justified by the Conservatives for Britain for economic and security reasons, but fairness and ethics were a secondary justification. Further, Johnston justified the extreme measures of the Rwanda plan under the guise of the safety of the migrants who cross the channel. Johnston then resigned due to Covid-19 rule

breeches and was replaced by Lizz Truss; who was not evaluated due to the promptness of her premiership (James & Middleton, 2022).

v. Sunak: Post-Brexit 2022-Present:

Sunak became Prime Minister on the 23rd of October 2022, by winning the fourth Conservative Leadership race since 2016 after Lizz Truss was ousted by the Conservatives (BBC News, 2022). Sunak states that he will enact the 2019 Conservative Manifest and his priorities as on the Conservative Website (2023) [see figure 10 below]. He is continuing Johnston’s immigration policies which aim for more controlled migration and less ‘illegal migration’ (Elgot, 2022). Outlined are Sunak’s priorities as seen on the Conservative Website (2023):

OUR 5 PRIORITIES:

- 1 HALVE INFLATION**
- 2 GROW THE ECONOMY**
- 3 REDUCE DEBT**
- 4 CUT WAITING LISTS**
- 5 STOP THE BOATS**

YOUR PRIORITIES ARE OUR PRIORITIES

Figure 10: Source: The Conservative Website (2023)

His Home Secretary - Suella Braverman – is an example of ‘The New Conservatives’, who are further a right populist faction of the Conservatives who prioritise law and order, reducing immigration and ‘woke issues’ (Dawson, 2023; Walker, 2023). In the table of intelligibility and appendix, Braverman’s speech is (8). Sunak and Braverman have aggressively targeted irregular migration through attempted securitising moves.

Speech:

*‘This morning, I’ve been out in the Channel with our new Small Boats Operational Command.) And the whole experience just reinforces how tragic, **morally wrong, and profoundly unfair this situation is.** We’ve got organised criminals risking people’s lives in makeshift dinghies. **Gangs trying to usurp the role of government; taking it upon themselves to decide who comes to our country.** Our **asylum system is being overwhelmed with people travelling from safe countries, taking away our capacity to help those in the greatest need.** [...] **And the British people are having to spend £6 million a day putting up illegal migrants in hotels.** [...] **And arrests here of illegal workers have more than doubled. Third, I promised to stop people spuriously using modern slavery claims to frustrate their removal.**[...] **To reduce pressures on local communities, we’ll also house people on ships.**[...] **So, we’ve introduced unprecedented legislation to make clear that if you come here illegally you will be detained and removed in weeks** – either to your own country or to a safe third country like Rwanda. [...] I am ensuring we have more detention capacity to hold those who arrive illegally [...] **My policy is very simple: it is this country – and your government – who should decide who comes here, not criminal gangs.** **I will do what is necessary to achieve it. I said I would stop the boats and I meant it’** (Sunak, 2023).*

Presupposition: This discourse creates presupposed knowledge of illegal migrants arriving by being smuggled, that they are from safe countries, and that people utilise claims of modern slavery falsely. In this excerpt the assumed in-group is ‘this country’ – so Britain [subject], and the out-group is smugglers and migrants [object]. Also, it is assumed that the UK has agency and whilst gangs also are given this agency, it is not justified (*this country and government who should decide, not criminal gangs*) (Sunak, 2023). Further, there is a moral righteousness assumed of the UK compared to the ‘gangs’ and ‘illegal’ migrants (Sunak, 2023).

Predication: Sunak predicates migrants as ‘illegal’¹³, and ‘*spuriously using modern slavery claims*’, and as ‘*overwhelming*’ [the British asylum system] (ibid).

Subject Position: Firstly, Sunak positions the UK and the Conservatives as the subjects and ‘rightful’ group; whereas ‘illegal migrants’ and gangs are the out group, who are infringing upon the UK’s sovereignty. Further, there is an ethical (UK State) versus unethical (gangs) subject positioning. Like the previous Johnston discourse analysed, there are clear legal subjects and illegal objects positioned vis-à-vis to one another. Interestingly, Sunak positions migrants as threatened in comparison to gangs (*‘Criminals risking people’s lives in makeshift dinghies’*); but also positions them both as a threat to the UK. So, the UK is the threatened subject, whilst gangs and illegal migrants are the threatening objects. However, gangs are also positioned as a threat to the migrants, causing some conflicting subject positioning.

Sunak securitises illegal migrants as a threat economically; *‘British people are having to spend £6 million a day putting up illegal migrants in hotels’*; culturally; *‘to ease pressure on local communities’* and criminally: *‘illegal migrants’ & ‘criminal gangs’* (Sunak, 2023; Chebel d’Appollonia, 2017). However, he also constructs ‘illegal migrants’ as a referent object of security from the threat of gangs whilst simultaneously constructing them both as a threat to Britain (Sunak, 2023). The gangs are constructed as a threat to Britain’s sovereignty/borders/ agency (*‘it is this country – and this government – who should decide who comes here, not criminal gangs* (ibid). This speech fulfils the felicity conditions for securitising speech; Sunak as prime minister is a securitising actor, he constructs both ‘illegal migrants’ and ‘criminal gangs’ as an existential threat to a referent object – Britain, its sovereignty, borders and services (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015).

¹³ Whilst not shown in this excerpt, he particularly targets Albanians, who are ‘from a safe country’ (Johnston, 2022).

Practices:

Firstly, whilst the Rwanda Plan was brought to a halt by the EHCR, Braverman has vowed to legally challenge the decision and has also stated would withdraw from the EHCR if necessary to facilitate the plan (Gregory & Seddon, 2023). This is a securitising move in motion, but whether it will fully be accepted and enacted is yet to be determined. Whilst it has been accepted by the Conservatives and British Courts; there has been public backlash and it has not been fully enacted yet (Walsh, 2022). Further, flying the migrants to ‘Ascension Island’, a British territory in the remote South Atlantic which has little infrastructure is also being considered if the Rwanda Plan fails, ensuring some form of biopolitics of moving bodies elsewhere is in motion (Rawlinson, Taylor & Adu, 2023). Sunak further utilises an image with text that states ‘*Stop the Boats*’ on his podium in which he gives public addresses [see figure 11 below]; which is routinising the phrase and the practices attached to it, which includes a new ‘Illegal Migration Act’ (Parliamentary Acts, 2023).



Figure 11; Stop The Boats: Source: The Guardian (2023)

The bill gives further powers to immigration officers to search and see electronic devices from those who come to the UK illegally (ibid, 2023). Lastly, in a further act of governmentality and biopolitics, Sunak started housing migrants offshore on boats and barges, including the Bibby Stockholm, which is planned to house 500 male migrants (despite being built for around 200) and concerns

have been raised over fire safety and inhumane, jail-like conditions (Syal & Taylor, 2023; Foucault, 1977). These securitising practices highlight the escalating biopolitics and governmentality of the Conservatives post-Brexit. These practices seek to herd and police migrants and impose surveillance, bureaucracy, and containment in the name of security at the cost of human dignity and human/refugee rights. These practices and attempted securitising moves aim to criminalise, and control ‘illegal’ migrants and they exemplify the pinnacle of accumulation securitisation since Cameron in 2010. This further shows Bourbeau’s dual school method to be useful in analysing the securitisation process and how securitisation indeed has a ‘path dependency’. This year’s migration, small boat, hate crime and statistics are not complete. However, between the years 2021-2022, there was a 26% rise in hate crime; which is the biggest rise since 2017 (when there was a 29% rise) (Home Office, National Statistics, 2023). As in previous years, the majority of hate crime was racially motivated and rose by 19% between 2021-2022 (ibid). Migration is predicted to reach a record high of over 700,000 (Sparrow, 2023). Deportations and detentions have also declined [*see figure 8*] (Home Office, National Statistics, 2023). Small boat crossings are somewhat lower than this time last year [*see figure 9*] (BBC, 2018). Further, there is a rise in right-wing extremist-related arrests (Davies & Davies. 2023). Thus, it seems the Hostile Environment aims are not being satisfied, as illegal and regulated migration has not declined; and borders are not protected in the way the Conservatives desire. Results and discussion will now be presented.

Chapter 5: Results & Discussion:

After analysing the nine speeches of the securitising actors over thirteen years, and following Doty's methodology, a grid of intelligibility of predicates was created (1993) [See *Figure 12 on page 79 below*]. The speech is collated in order of time frame, thus, escalation and shifts in securitisation can often be seen in the predication that is ascribed to migrants. However, there is indeed overlap between themes. When evaluating the discourse, there are clear patterns of object and subject positioning and many different types of positioning existing. Just some examples: UK: exploited, generous, legal, vis-à-vis to the Migrant; abuses loopholes, takes advantage, illegal.

As stated, Cameron when he came to power was the instigator of the 'path dependency' of the securitisation process where an escalation in practices and speech was established (Bourbeau, 2014). Utilising the Bourbeaudian securitisation model allowed for an explanation of how securitising speech often justifies the practices and they reinforce one another whilst simultaneously securitising migrants, which was done by Conservative securitising actors (ibid).

In the Cameron to May years, migrants were often positioned as taking advantage of the UK's services and constraining said services, whilst the UK is portrayed as being exploited. In the pre-Brexit years, immigration and migrants were securitised culturally and particularly economically (*'Do not want to integrate, hurt low-paid workers'*) (Cameron, 2015; Rudd, 2016). However, Cameron's speech and practices began to rise in 2015, when he was not limited by the Liberal Democrats and to compete with his populist competitors, UKIP (Bale, 2022). After the Brexit vote - before a deal - predicates related to security threats begin to become more frequent, and the Conservatives begin to link migration to terrorism and sovereignty more explicitly. The Conservatives also begin to predicate themselves more assertively, *'firm'*, and *'will do whatever it takes to defend Britain'* (Rudd, 2016). This positions themselves as the dominant and enforcing subject. In the pre-Brexit deal years, when using the

term migration – it often entailed all groups and both regular and irregular were securitised economically. In Cameron’s second term to the pre-Brexit deal era of Johnston, EU migrants were also problematised and securitised. May’s term saw wide expansion of policing and surveillance via acts of biopolitics and bureaucracy, which was justified under the guise of security from terrorism. However, after the Brexit negotiations were successful, the securitisation of migration/migrants shifted mostly towards ‘illegal migrants’ (who often are refugees/asylum seekers). This may be due to securitising actors desiring to portray regular migration as under control due to regaining border sovereignty from the EU (however, this was not the case). The post-Brexit deal attempted securitising practices/moves were rooted in biopolitics and governmentality and criminalised irregular entry. These attempted securitising moves show a complete disregard for refugee and human rights; however, both Johnston and Sunak justify these practices in three ways. Firstly, they were justified as illegal migrants are pressuring the United Kingdom’s services. A second justification is that criminal gangs were undermining border security and sovereignty and lastly, justified for the good and safety of the ‘illegal migrant’, whose rights and lives they are willing to disregard in the name of border fortification and security.

By analysing the discursive practices of the Conservatives for the past thirteen years, and utilising the Bourbeaudian approach, this dissertation argues that Cameron started the process with securitising speech and then used practices to lock in the securitising speech (Bourbeau, 2014). This pattern was replicated by his following Conservative securitising actors. When the practices failed to yield results in reducing migration (of any form), actors would propose and justify further securitising practices via securitising speech, framing migrants as threatening and causing anxiety and division between the ‘threatened’ (UK, subjects’, and the threatening (Migrants) [*see figure 2*] (Chebel d’Appollonia, 2017, 261). By pledging to control immigration, the Conservatives had to politically compete with the UK in the 2010s, however, as it gained them popularity and they veered further right as a party, they could not veer back on the Hostile Environment policies that Cameron initiated. The Hostile Environment is a set of cumulative securitising practices, which is enacted

through governmentality and biopolitics and the policies have widely expanded the field and altered the dispositif; which ensures migrants, minorities and 'others' are widely policed, controlled and observed. Conservatives justified the Hostile Environment in several ways and did so by verbally constructing migrants as a threat to the UK in several ways. An underlying theme for the thirteen years was economic securitisation – that migrants, refugees etc., were taking resources from British people (who were positioned as more entitled). A second theme of securitisation is criminality; however, this rose during the May/Rudd years, when immigration was often rhetorically tied to terrorism and securitised. By suggesting migrants could be terrorists, it justified a wide expansion of practices that advanced policing. A third, less prominent theme was cultural securitisation, which was more explicit pre-Brexit, however, it is still alluded to throughout the eras. Thus, the Conservatives justified the Hostile Environment by securitising migrants (regular, irregular, illegal etc.). They did so by utilising typical patterns of securitising rhetoric, which is economically, criminally, and culturally (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017). By evaluating *Figure 12*, two other common themes emerge; and that is fairness and sovereignty, which are common justifications for harsh migration policy (Candappa, 2019, Garland, 1996; Griffiths & Yeo, 2021; (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017, 261). Lastly, they somewhat justified harsh migration policies under the impression that they would protect migrants whilst simultaneously securitising them and positioning them alongside smugglers and criminal gangs as a threat to the UK, despite being threatened by the gangs themselves.

Despite the Hostile Environment being justified for these reasons; the policies do not seem to be effective in achieving their aim, which is to deter migration by making the UK unbearably hostile to them (Liberty, 2018). It also does not seem to be financially cheaper for the taxpayer and has caused great harm to migrants and minorities in the UK; and there is a particular worry about long-term detention on mental health, particularly children (Klein & Williams, 2012; O'Connor, 2022). Particularly, the Waterman et al. study found that when migrants were mass released during COVID-19, integration and well-being were promoted, suggesting that detention is unnecessary, and that community hosting may be a more fruitful option. (2022). Further, as the Conservatives veer

further right and adopt populist politics and rhetoric, there has been a rise in right-wing extremism and hate crimes related to race and religion particularly after the Brexit vote. Whilst it is hard to draw conclusions and causality, it has been argued that populist rhetoric facilitates an environment where grievances are validated, and violence is a side-effect of this. (Piatkowka & Lantz, 2022). The Conservatives have constructed the migrant (and any outsider) as a threat to the UK for the last decade, thus, it is not surprising that after a decade of portraying the UK citizens as threatened, there has been violence enacted upon the supposed existential threat. Indeed, the Conservative government may not be the only factor, but it is indeed arguable that they facilitated an environment that has allowed far-right attitudes to flourish. Thus, the Hostile Environment policies must be reconsidered due to the harm they have caused without benefit.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation argued that the Conservatives justified Hostile Environment by securitising speech and practices. Firstly, it surveyed the literature regarding the securitisation of migration, and the Hostile Environment, and identified key gaps in the literature that this dissertation hopes to address. To answer the question ‘*How did the Conservatives justify the Hostile Environment?*’ This dissertation utilises a Bourbeaudian approach to securitisation and Doty’s Discursive Practices Approach to critical discourse analysis. The dual analysis allowed for an analysis of practices and speech, which was applied to the Conservative government from 2010-2023 within this dissertation. It was seen that Cameron instigated the securitisation process and it has only escalated since. It was seen that economic, cultural and criminal justifications were the most utilised, with fairness and sovereignty supplementing these. Further, this thesis argued that the Hostile Environment policies are ineffective and unjustified and have facilitated an environment where hatred and right-wing extremism can flourish.

Figure 12: Grid of Intelligibility:

Cameron 2011 Speech (1) in appendix; Cameron 2013 speech (2) in appendix; May, 2012 Speech (3) in appendix; Cameron 2015 Speech (4) in appendix; Rudd, 2016 (5) in appendix; Johnston (2022), (6) on appendix); Patel 2021Speech (7) in appendix, Sunak, 2023 Speech (8) on appendix; Braverman, 2023 Speech (9) on appendix. Abbreviation: ILM [Illegal Migration].

Immigration/Migrants [regular, irregular, and illegal]	Britain/UK Citizens	Conservatives
Some is good (1)	Communities cannot cope (1)	Has obligation of fairness, to UK citizens (1, 4)
Benefited Britain (1, 2, 4, 5)	Open to those fleeing persecution (1, 2, 6, 7)	Cannot allow system to be abused (1)
Uncontrolled (1, 3, 4)	Worried (1)	Reclaim borders (1)
Putting pressure [...] on schools. Housing and healthcare, social services (1, 4, 5, 6)	Benefitted from Immigration (1,2, 5, 6, 7)	Sending illegal migrants' home (1)
Take advantage/abuses of welfare & NHS (1, 2, 3, 8).	Paying taxpayers (1, 8)	Reduces and Controls Immigration (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7)
[Immigration] Needs to be controlled (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)	Should attract the brightest, best, and high skilled (migrants) (1, 2, 3, 4, 7)	Controls EU migration from newly ascended countries (2)
Flooding in (1)	Needs foreign investors and entrepreneurs, and business (1, 3)	Restlessly drives to control migration (4)
Do not want to integrate (1)	Has best some of the best schools in universities in world (1, 5)	Obligation to train 'own people' and give 'Brits' work and skills (2, 3, 4, 5, 7).
Do not speak the language (1, 5)	UK did not have choice of migrants (1)	Reducing Incentives for people coming from the EU (4, 5)
Hurt low paid workers whilst reaping benefits (1, 3)	[We] cannot carry on like this (1)	Are a Party for everyone (4, 5)
Do low skilled roles (1, 3)	Suffer from unfairness of mass movement (1, 3, 6)	Are for Working People (4)
Fraudsters (1)	Open (1, 6)	Tough (4, 8)
Come to do low level work that those on welfare in the UK should actually be trained for' (1)	Is a soft touch (on migration) (2)	Fair (1, 2, 4, 7, 8)
Cannot replace training 'our' workforce' (1, 2)	Is a soft touch (on illegal migration) (6).	Faster (4)
[EU] migrants come here because they want to contribute (2).	Compassionate (4, 5, 6)	Has duty to less fortunate (5)
Abuse loopholes (2)	One of the most successful multiracial democracies in world (4)	Puts the greatest value on protecting 'our way of life' (5)
Not making meaningful contribution to our country (2)	Proud of our diversity (4)	
Have choice to come (1)		

<p>Impacts Social Cohesion (3, 5)</p> <p>Cause housing demand and more expensive house prices (3)</p> <p>Bogus students (1, 2, 3, 4)</p> <p>Recent migrants and ethnic minority Brits lose the most [from mass migration] (3)</p> <p>Speak English as a second language (3)</p> <p>Trafficked (4, 5)</p> <p>Live in poor conditions (4, 5)</p> <p>Exploited (4, 6)</p> <p>Damage our labour market and push down wages (4, 5)</p> <p>(Uncontrolled Migration) Entering UK Legally but staying illegally (4)</p> <p>Take jobs British people could do (5).</p> <p>Threat to our security (5)</p> <p>Challenges local areas (5, 7, 9).</p> <p>[illegal migrants] Men under 40, paying people smugglers (6)</p> <p>[IIM} queue jump[ers] (6)</p> <p>[ILM] Take up capacity to help genuine women and child refugees (6)</p> <p>[ILM] Not Fleeing imminent peril (6)</p> <p>[ILM] Unfair (6, 8)</p> <p>Vulnerable (6)</p>	<p>Need Skills (4)</p> <p>Sent clear message in referendum (5)</p> <p>Make their wishes clear (5, 6)</p> <p>Has to adapt (5)</p> <p>Has unequivocal rule of law (5)</p> <p>Led the global effort in responding to the online threat of child sexual exploitation (5)</p> <p>Proud, democratic country (5, 8)</p> <p>Generous (6, 7, 8)</p> <p>Capacity is not infinite (6)</p> <p>Voted to control Borders (6, 7, 8)</p> <p>Is not haven for 'all of them' [asylum seekers] (6, 7)</p> <p>Public rejects open borders (6)</p> <p>Compassion and goodwill. towards refugees (6)</p> <p>British people open homes [to Ukrainians] (6).</p> <p>Withdrew consent to be governed by EU (7)</p> <p>Provides leadership in preventing lives being lost (7)</p> <p>Wants fair immigration system (7)</p> <p>Stands up for what is right (7).</p> <p>Must not forget to do things for ourselves (9)</p> <p>Led the way in abolishing slavery (9)</p>	<p>Will do whatever it takes to defend Britain (5)</p> <p>Protective of 'our' society and the most vulnerable in it (5).</p> <p>Has to adapt (5)</p> <p>Committed to put interests of British people first (5, 9)</p> <p>Has ambitious social reforms (5)</p> <p>Removing opportunities from criminal gangs (5, 6, 7)</p> <p>Prepared to explore legal reforms [regarding migration law] (6)</p> <p>Generous to France and the EU (6)</p> <p>Reject open border (6)</p> <p>Doing more to resettle vulnerable people than other governments (6)</p> <p>Are not anti-immigration (7)</p> <p>Firm (7)</p> <p>Wants refugees here to integrate and thrive (7)</p> <p>Reducing incentives for people coming illegally (7)</p> <p>Provides leadership in preventing lives being lost (7)</p> <p>Rational (7)</p> <p>[As EU Members]; Could not control who came to country (6, 7)</p>
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<p>[Irregular/Illegal migration] caused human suffering (6)</p> <p>[Discussions of] immigration met with accusations of racism (7)</p> <p>Abuses [British] generosity (7)</p> <p>[ILM] Overwhelming [the British asylum] (8)</p> <p>[Albanians] From safe European country 8)</p>		<p>Relentlessly pursuits improvements to society and security (7)</p> <p>Prioritises safety of British people (7)</p> <p>Enforcers (8)</p> <p>Should be sceptical of experts and elites (9)</p>
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Appendix:

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