Deploying French forces on French soil

Using the armed forces to combat domestic terrorism and the implications for civil-military relations

July 2023

2683817E

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree

of

International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies

Word Count: **24.067**

Supervisor: **Dr Marcin Kaczmarski**

Date of Submission: **25/07/2023**

Table of Contents

This page intentionally left blank

I. Acknowledgement

I am deeply thankful to Sieglinde, Michael, Gwendolin & Ricarda.

For their unconditional support, I am forever grateful.

II.   Abstract

For civilian observers, it is not always clear whether violence is a military threat or one that can be countered by traditional law enforcement means. Terrorism in its various manifestations contributes to this confusion, as the war on terror has been waged since 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, in a decisive and high-visibility military effort. But why it makes a difference to fight the same terrorist group in a different way in your own country is the subject of this paper. Using the case of France and its ongoing struggle against domestic Islamist terror, it shows what it means when a state uses its military not only to fight abroad, but also to protect its civilian population at home. The political decision to deploy 10,000 soldiers in Opération Sentinelle to protect the homeland is examined against the background of current civil-military relations in France, their origins, development and configuration. The impact of this decision on civil-military relations is carefully considered in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the situation. The analysis focuses on how this measure has affected the interactions and dynamics between civil and military power in France.

1 Introduction

On 16 November 2015, just three days after the Islamist-motivated attacks in Paris, French President François Hollande addressed a joint session of parliament. His introductory words were as follows:

> "France is at war. The acts committed in Paris and near the Stade de France on Friday evening are acts of war. […] They were carried out by a jihadist army, by Daesh, which is fighting us because France is a country of freedom, because we are the birthplace of human rights" (Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 2015).

These words were chosen for an undoubtedly exceptional situation. Three days earlier, a heavily armed terrorist squad had carried out simultaneous coordinated attacks on several public spaces in Paris. Among them were the Stade de France and the Bataclan concert hall in the city centre. 130 people died, several hundred were injured. Essentially, this confirmed a development that had begun in January that year with the terrorist attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, the murder of several members of the editorial staff and the attack on a kosher supermarket, Hypercacher, in which several Jewish citizens were killed. In 2015, the so-called Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) continued its territorial expansion in Syria and Iraq and was at the height of its self-proclaimed caliphate. Iraqi ground forces, with the help of US-led coalition airstrikes, had been fighting this territorial increase since 2014 (Lequesne, 2016, p. 314). The Paris terror acts were a centrally planned terror campaign by Daesh, aimed at inflicting major civilian casualties on one of the most heavily involved European countries in these airstrikes. Before and after the domestic terror attacks, French fighter planes flew continuous air raids against Islamist positions (Lequesne, 2016, p. 315). Following the Charlie Hebdo assault, which was claimed by AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), and the Daesh attacks in Paris, the threat assessment of various terrorist groups

had to be completely revised. France launched Opération Sentinelle – which translates to Sentry/Guard – deploying up to 10,000 soldiers on French soil to help law enforcement agencies deal with terrorist threats and guard sensitive locations. The military's involvement in counterterrorism is governed by the national emergency plan Vigipirate (Lutterbeck, 2005). Since the deployment of Sentinelle, questions have been raised about its effectiveness and impact, particularly as the operation continues albeit on a reduced scale.

Active internal deployment of large numbers of troops in peacetime is not the norm in Western European states and indicates a massive threat to security. It is therefore the aim of this paper to examine whether the exceptional measure of Opération Sentinelle is changing the well-established boundaries and patterns of civil-military relations in France. It also needs to be clarified what changing these boundaries and patterns might mean for military and civilian authorities.

For this purpose, the research adopts a qualitative approach, involving interpretive practices to study the impact on the civil-military relations in France. Primary data from semi-structured qualitative interviews with experts and secondary data from relevant academic publications, databases, and online sources are used to gain comprehensive insights into the topic. The choice of semi-structured interviews allows for a problem-centred approach, deeper insights, and policy-relevant evidence, enhancing the potential relevance of the analysis.

A broad and comprehensive description of the emergence of civil-military relations had to be given, particularly considering the historical significance in the French context. Aiming to ensure a broad understanding of the current developments, the origins and development of civil-military relations are outlined, focusing on the aspect of civilian control over military organisations. It will be explained how the emergence of the nation-state in the 17th century created the conditions for systematic research into civil-military relations. Furthermore, the state's role in setting objectives and controlling the military is highlighted, emphasizing the need for discipline and authority in military institutions. As an introduction to the

democratisation of relations in the civil-military sphere, the access to national armed forces in form of leadership positions and conscription is illustrated. However, this link no longer exists, and the transition from universal conscription to a professional army in post-Cold War France has dissolved the close relationship between society, civilian authorities and the military.

In order to examine these aspects within a theoretical framework, the academic field of civil-military relations and its significant development over time is outlined. It begins with the early classical theories, which focused mainly on the American context and its implications for foreign and defence policy. Notable scholars like Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Samuel Finer, and Peter D. Feaver were among the pioneers in this area. Huntington's work "The Soldier and the State" (1957) played a crucial role in shaping modern scholarship on civil-military relations. His systematic approach and theoretical framework challenged traditional assumptions about the military's role in society. Huntington introduced the concepts of subjective and objective civilian control to minimize military power and prevent military intervention in politics. The study of civil-military relations initially focused on the United States but later expanded to include other countries with unique military cultures. Certain theories remain influential, but their limitations need to be recognised and adapted to different contexts. Overall, the academic field has grown to explore new perspectives and gain a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics between civilian and military authorities. To understand the military's role in democratic societies, it is essential to move beyond traditional focused perspectives, e.g. on coups, and recognize its significance in serving the state and safeguarding citizens' interests. With the emergence of multi-faceted threats, it is not easy to adapt the use of the military to this optimal role model.

Looking at the French case in detail reveals a rich and complex history. Beginning from the French Revolution as a pivotal moment, the historical development ranges from creating institutions of public power separate from social status and

shifting the army's loyalty from the crown to the nation to the emergence of a professional military and the establishment of civilian authority over the armed forces (Blaufarb, 2002; Brown, 1993). After World War II, civil-military relations in the country were profoundly affected by the wars in Indochina and Algeria. The weak governance of the Fourth Republic, coupled with conflicting signals regarding military support and material needs, led to a civil-military crisis (Desch, 2001). A resulting coup attempt by generals in Algeria has shaped the way the military in France is handled to this day. As a result, civil-military relations are stable and characterised by a subordinate professional army. It is precisely for this reason that developments that threaten this stability must be monitored.

The growing threat of domestic terrorism and the state's response to it are testing the established arrangements. To better understand the wide range of research areas and their inherent complexity, including different theoretical perspectives, we briefly examine the study of terrorism. Thereby the focus lies on transnational jihadist terrorism, represented by Daesh. To understand this manifestation, it is necessary to examine their ideology, strategy and the changing context in which countermeasures are required. Because of its historical experience with various extremist groups and its role in counterterrorism operations abroad, France faces a significant domestic terrorist threat.

Against the background of links between the civil and military spheres in France, and in the face of terrorist tensions, a comprehensive analysis is made of the impact of the deployment of French soldiers on the future development of this relationship. In doing so, it also fills a gap in the literature, which doesn't sufficiently examine the impact of the military in domestic counterterrorism and explores civilian alternatives. Various factors are taken into account, including the changing role of the military, existing taboos and the effectiveness of existing state control. The main objectives and potential stabilising effects of the deployment are also critically examined. In addition, the role of civilian and quasi-military security

institutions, such as the national police and the national gendarmerie, is analysed in terms of their counter-terrorism capabilities.

2   Methodology

Through the following description of the research process, the derivation and interpretation of the material, an intersubjective comprehensibility is established that makes the results transparent. The data collected through the chosen method will serve to exhaustively answer the research question posed.

In its entirety, the question is as follows: What non-conventional domestic threats in France can be countered without or only with the help of the military, and what does an inappropriate domestic military deployment against such threats mean for civil-military relations? Due to the multi-layered structure of the question, it will be divided into two parts to build on each other for a coherent response. On the one hand, it is necessary to clarify which non-conventional domestic threats can be dealt with independently by civilian security organs such as the police and the gendarmerie, and when the assistance of the military is necessary. On the other hand, the consequences for civil-military relations of an inappropriate domestic military operation against such threats must be determined.

Denzin & Lincoln (2017) attempt to capture the complexity of the qualitative research approach in the following general definition:

> "Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. Qualitative research consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. […] They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. […] This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to

make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring
to them" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2017, p. 43).

Qualitative research's integration into the social sciences in the US in the 1970s led
to the establishment of a heterogeneous field distinct from quantitative
approaches, using non-numerical materials such as texts and interviews to gather
in-depth information and extend the data collection process (Moebius & Ploder,
2018, p. 736). The research questions posed by this thesis require a comprehensive
study of the current and past states of civil-military relations in France to identify
the external and internal factors that influence their development. The study is
based on both primary and secondary data. Relevant secondary data was
meticulously sourced from academic publications, databases, and online sources,
while primary data was collected through semi-structured qualitative interviews
with experts in the academic field. Data collection through interviews is not in itself
a particularly infrequently used means of generating information. However,
primary sources such as interviews, government sources and official documents
are rarely utilised in the field of civil-military relations (Olmeda, 2012, p. 72).
Therefore, interviews with experts add significant value to this research by enabling
a problem-centred approach through flexible questioning and allowing for follow-
up questions and changes of focus during the interview. In addition to the existing
literature, which serves as a stimulus and entry point, the interview is one of the
most effective methods for gaining a deeper insight into individual familiar topics.
Secondly, it is a dialogical process of reconstructing the social process to gain
knowledge and orientation in unknown or hardly known areas. Drawing on the
perspectives and experiences of experts in the field can identify key issues,
challenges and opportunities related to the topic, and explain policies and practices
in the area that would not be apparent from existing data. Thirdly, in terms of
relevance, this choice of method is also directly related to Munck and Snyder's
observation that too little research on civil-military relations is aimed at generating
evidence that is directly relevant to policy-making (Munck & Snyder, 2007, p. 12).
As the topic under study is one that is constantly evolving, and as the respondents

are experts who directly or indirectly influence policy-making processes through their academic work, there is an opportunity to participate in shaping this current knowledge and to enhance the potential relevance of the results of this analysis.

2.1   The Semi-Structured Interview

There are different ways of conducting an interview. The unstructured interview only provides the topic and rough key points and is not prepared by a guideline of questions. Hence, the interview is designed and conducted completely freely. The most important task of the interviewer in an unstructured interview is to listen and learn as much as possible from the interviewee without influencing the process too much (Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014, p. 139). This contrasts with the semi-structured interview, which follows a much more controlled process. Therefore, the exact location, time, setting, length and the rough course are established and form a clearly structured environment. Semi-structured interviews are organised around a set of pre-determined open-ended questions, with additional questions arising from the interview and allowing sub-aspects to be explored in depth (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, p. 315). These in-depth interviews are usually conducted only once and can last very short, between a few minutes, to extremely long, up to several hours. Semi-structured interviews represent the most popular interview format in qualitative research and are conducted with individuals or groups (Brinkmann, 2016, p. 520). For this project, the semi-structured interview was chosen.

2.2   Strengths & Weakness of the Semi-Structured Interview

The question arises as to whether the chosen methodology is appropriate for this research, especially given the modest number of expert interviews conducted. A larger qualitative survey would have provided greater data strength, but in this research, decisions had to be made based on the required level of detail of the data needed. The semi-structured interview method has significant advantages. Firstly,

it fosters reciprocity between the interviewer and participants (Galletta, 2020, pp. 75–118). Secondly, it allows the interviewer to spontaneously devise follow-up questions based on the answers (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 14). This means that qualitative material collected can be very detailed and much more pronounced in its depth compared to measured data. The research design developed is therefore considered appropriate. Nevertheless, anyone conducting qualitative research must be aware that their own experiences, feelings, political positions and social influences will shape the research. This is particularly important when using interpretive research methods. According to Cornelia Helfferich, the biggest mistake in conducting qualitative interviews is pretending, asking too much, and having an attitude of wanting to confirm what you already know (2014, p. 562).

2.3 Selection of Interview Partners

Since semi-structured interviews are pre-planned interviews, the selection of the individual interview partners represents a particularly important step that has a lasting influence on the quality of the data collected. The process of recruiting experts for the study proceeded systematically. Potential experts were identified through a careful review of the scientific literature, exchanges in professional networks and recommendations from colleagues. The expertise and qualifications of each potential expert were then assessed to ensure that they had the necessary knowledge and experience to provide valuable insight into the topic. This was based on Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr's description of experts as individuals who have knowledge of a specific role, are attributed with such knowledge, and claim special competence as a result (2014, p. 121). Important criteria for the selection of experts in the academic field were primarily a professional interest in basic research on civil-military relations with a focus on France. Previous publications and research projects, as well as teaching assignments in this field, were used to verify basic competence in this area. Specifically, the following priorities were important to increase the value of the information obtained: First, a deep understanding of the history and dynamics of French interventions in intrastate

conflicts, particularly in expeditionary operations by the participants was crucial. Second, their familiarity with the use of the French army in counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations was important. Third, suitable candidates should demonstrate broad knowledge in the civil-military institutions of the Fifth Republic and how policymakers can regulate the use of military force to achieve defined objectives. Finally, they should be able to show comprehension of the current security situation in France in relation to terrorism. The selected experts were relatively diverse in terms of their background, professional experience and perspectives, which allowed for a thorough and differentiated analysis. Overall, it was possible to find a group of highly qualified and diverse experts who made an important contribution to the understanding of civil-military relations in France.

The thematic specificity and the potential to take a position on political decisions severely limited the number of possible interviewees on the side of the military. Potential interviewees in the ranks of the French Armed Forces could not be persuaded to be interviewed, despite repeated attempts to do so. Because of the role of the researcher as a civilian outsider, it is particularly challenging to make contact and to establish a willingness to be interviewed. This is all the more so as soldiers have to maintain a particularly apolitical stance in public.

Once a pool of potential experts was identified, they were contacted and invited to participate in the study. In total, five of the selected participants were recruited for the research project. The potential experts were informed in detail about the objectives, tasks and methodology of the study.

2.4   Preparing and Conducting the Interviews

Under the premise of "as open as possible, as structured as necessary", the guidelines are based on a conscious methodological decision to allow maximum openness while at the same time restricting the topics for reasons of the research agenda (Helfferich, 2014, p. 560). Thus, to obtain usable material, the questions in

the interview guide refer to three systematic levels that need to be covered, particularly the civil authority level, the military establishment level and the societal level (population). Questions that are able to cover all three levels must, on the one hand, take into account that the civil authority level is a level of control, the military level is a level of subjugation and the societal level is a level that reacts to the actions of the previous two. On the other hand, it is not necessary to refer directly to the levels in the questions in order to generate an answer. Rather, each level, by its nature, representation or characteristics, finds a resonance that allows for freer, broader and deeper responses. In the case of civil authority, for example, it is the role of the other security forces, such as the police or the gendarmerie. In the case of the military, it is about changing the characteristics of action in the face of the internal terrorist threat.

These levels were taken into account when developing the interview guide. However, in order to allow the interview to flow as freely as possible, the interview guide was not divided into these categories, but into three sections covering the different levels. The first part of the interview included questions about the professional situation and the development of specific competences to better determine the specific positioning of the expert. For the further collection of thematically relevant quantitative data, the following focal points were used. The specific characteristics of the armed forces, asking about their (perceived) main function, how they differ from other security forces (police/gendarmerie), their specific training in counterterrorism and their suitability for domestic counter-terrorism operations. In addition, the ongoing domestic counterterrorism Opération Sentinelle was specifically addressed, including the advantages and disadvantages of a domestic military counter-terrorism operation, the expected events justifying such a large-scale operation, the benefits of the operation and the impact on military and civil-military relations.

By setting focal points in the pre-formulated questions, it is possible in the semi-structured interview to ask further in-depth questions to expand on the aspects raised. In addition, all questions were formulated in an open-ended way to encourage detailed responses and to avoid simple yes/no answers.

Due to the geographical dispersion of the interviewees, all interviews were conducted online using Zoom as the main communication software and thus were recorded separately. Since the design of the interview situation largely determines the design of the data collection, this was not the optimal option, but the most feasible one. The time limit was one hour per interview and was always adhered to. During the actual interview, several factors had to be considered to create a space in which the answers to the questions could be given in a protected and impartial environment. In particular, it was necessary to be aware of the researcher's bias and its influence. Through exposure to literature and theory, the researcher was aware of a body of information that contributed to the creation of the interview guide but should not significantly influence the respondents' answers. For follow-up questions and deeper exploration, caution was exercised to let the interviewee introduce descriptive information rather than the interviewer. Special attention must be paid to how statements are interpreted in the interview and used for further questions (Helfferich, 2014, p. 559). Situations that could lead to misunderstandings must be avoided and corrected if they occur. Therefore, in case of uncertainty, previous statements are clarified in order to be on the same level of understanding for follow-up questions. To avoid social desirability bias, there was extensive communication with the experts beforehand so that the interviews could be conducted on a trusting and open basis, minimising the impact of this problem.

2.5   Qualitative Content Analysis

All interviews conducted were individually recorded and then transcribed. Each interview was transcribed completely and verbatim using a transcription guide. Furthermore, each text was anonymised. Information about the exact use of language, pauses and non-verbal cues was taken into account. Where there were difficulties in understanding, the interviewee was contacted and asked for clarification.

For the subsequent analysis, qualitative content analysis according to Philipp Mayring was chosen, which has been continuously developed since the 1980s and offered suitable conditions for the planned analysis strategy (2019, p. 635). It is a structured, qualitative procedure for the evaluation of textual data. Its adaptability makes it appropriate for answering different research questions. It is a research method that allows subjective interpretations through systematic classification, coding and identification of themes or patterns in textual data. The anonymised and transcribed content of the interviews was processed using the qualitative data analysis software QCAmap. QCAmap is an interactive software co-developed by Mayring. It ensures a rule-compliant procedure for qualitative content analysis and facilitates the work with the entered text material.

Mayring identifies three central basic forms of content analysis for the analysis of textual material: Firstly, the summary (Zusammenfassung), where the material is condensed to extract its essential content. The aim of the analysis is to compress the material while retaining its essential meaning, resulting in a readable text that presents the source material in an abstracted form (Mayring, 2003, p. 58). The summary is part of the inductive category formation and formulates categories directly in the material (Mayring & Fenzl, 2019, p. 637). The second is explication (Explikation), where parts of the text are provided with additional material to enhance understanding. This analysis technique is primarily used to make elements of the material explainable (Mayring & Fenzl, 2019, pp. 637–638). Examples are ambiguous interview passages or expressions that are not common in everyday language. The third basic form is structuring (Strukturierung), in which certain aspects are filtered out of the material and then evaluated in a criteria-driven manner. Structuring qualitative content analyses are deductive category applications in which the category system is developed in advance in a theory-guided manner and then applied to the text (Mayring & Fenzl, 2019, p. 638).

After comparing the different basic forms as a suitable method for processing the material, the choice fell on the content-analysis technique, which aligns the

structure to be developed with the themes, content, aspects of the material as a whole (Mayring, 2003, p. 89). The decisive factor was its suitability for analysing interview data and thus for answering an open-ended, theory-based research question. The central element is the deductive use of categories to classify the collected data into a pre-defined category grid and to fully capture the structure of the entire material with the help of this category system.

In order to derive an appropriate category system from the theory, an intensive literature review was necessary prior to data analysis. After ensuring the accuracy of the transcribed data, the material was processed. This included reading the transcripts to gain an understanding of the texts. Furthermore, to make the classification of the individual fragments of material objectifiable in terms of the research intention, Mayring suggests the following procedure for structuring the content analysis: First, categories are defined. These categories were derived from the research question, were clearly defined and mutually exclusive. Secondly, so-called anchor examples were used, in which concrete text passages were named that fall under a category and are to be regarded as examples of this category. Thirdly, coding rules were formulated and enabled clear allocation in case of problems of demarcation between the categories (2003, p. 83).

In several iterations, the extent to which the previously formulated category definitions, anchor examples and coding rules were applicable to the material was reviewed. The possibility of extending or adapting the category system in several rounds of analysis minimised the risk of overlooking or omitting content. The categories, though initially applied from the outside, can be adjusted during the trial analysis to enhance understanding of the communicative processes and achieve better material structuring.

The next step represents the final coding of the data. In this process, each text segment is assigned to one of the predefined categories. Due to the size of the data set, the coding was carried out using the QCAmap software mentioned above. The analysis of the collected data involves examining the coded data to identify patterns

or themes that will eventually provide the interpretive framework. The interpretation of the data and final step involves drawing conclusions from the analysis and relating the findings back to the research question. The interpretation is based on the evidence of the data and supported by the analysis. In this process, the categorised parts of the text that are important for answering the main research question are divided into four categories (omission, paraphrasing, generalisation, integration) (Mayring, 2014, pp. 66–68). The transition from one category to the next is gradual. Omission is the text originally spoken by the respondent. Paraphrasing is reducing the original text to its essentials. Commonly, the spoken text is shortened and additionally generalised on a theoretical level. Finally, integration raises the text to an even more abstract level and integrates it into the theoretical meaning of the original sentences. Finally, the results of the analysis process are summarised and interpreted in relation to the research question.

In summary, qualitative content analysis according to Mayring represents a suitable method for analysing the textual data. The procedure for analysing the semi-structured expert interviews using the deductive method included transcribing the interviews, preparing the material, forming categories, coding the data, analysing the data and interpreting the data.

3   Literature Review

In this section, the research focus on civil-military relations is presented and discussed in the light of previous research. The beginnings of the basic positions of scholarly theory are traced chronologically and presented in their development. The aim is to provide a comprehensive overview of the central concepts and debates in the field. This will include an examination of the historical context in which these ideas emerged and developed. By understanding the development of the theory of civil-military relations, we also apply its current state and future direction to individual cases.

3.1 Origins of Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations refer to the interactions and relationships between civilian authorities and military organizations. At the centre of these relations is the question of control. Control is defined here by two dependent variables: Civilian control over the military and military intervention in politics. Although control is seen as a central feature of formative epistemological interest, there are quite different views about what can be considered effective control or what standards should be applied to assess control at all. It is these divergent conceptions that underlie the interdisciplinary nature of military studies. Hence, there is a need to take a step back and trace the emergence of the systematic study of civil-military relations to understand this pluralism of approaches.

3.2 Manifestation of the State & Access to the Military

The state has full control. It sets the objectives for the armed forces, and the armed forces process the information through their internal mechanisms to adjust their training and determine the equipment and personnel requirements needed to fulfil the tasks assigned to them. The armed forces may then request missing equipment, more personnel or a general increase in expenditure to meet the new task. However, in no case may it call into question the task as such, except in the case of legally inadmissible requests or if criticism is made in the context of an advisory opinion or with reference to operational difficulties. Even if the required support is lacking, equipment, personnel and funding are inadequate, the obedient armed forces will do everything to continue to fulfil their tasks. The best example of this is the German Bundeswehr, which has been struggling with massive reductions for decades and yet is engaged in complex missions and is able to cope with them under difficult conditions.

Systematic research into civil-military relations can be said to have begun in the 1950s. However, scientifically investigable structures of this relationship go back further. Two changes in the organisation and leadership of military structures in Europe since the 17th century have shaped subsequent armies and the civilian decision-makers engaged with them. Firstly, there is a need for an organized institutional body that can be treated as an object of research; civil-military relations only became possible through the formation of the nation-state. According to Kantner & Sandawi (2012), it was only with the emergence of the state monopoly on the use of force internally and externally in the modern era - the age of nation states - that the military became a reasonably reliable instrument of political rule (Kantner & Sandawi, 2012, p. 37). For Europe, the establishment of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, marked the beginning of civil-military relations in the modern sense. A European system of states based on the principle of "equality" or equivalence and equal rights of states is created by not interfering in each other's internal affairs, i.e. by recognising the supremacy of the sovereign as the main actor on the international stage (Voigt, 2016, p. 11). Thus, after the Thirty Years' War which preceded the Treaty of Westphalia, the standing army became the most important instrument of power alongside the state bureaucracy. Institutionalised as state armies, financed by taxes, they now waged war instead of mercenaries, lansquenets, war entrepreneurs or citizen militias (Voigt, 2016, p. 11). It is only through the assignment to a formally recognised nation state and its citizens that patterns of relationships between civilian political power and the modern mass army can be systematically examined.

This also constituted the commonly understood core task of national armed forces: The existence of the military profession depends upon the existence of competing nation states, according to Huntington the profession is to enhance the military security of the state" (Huntington, 1957, p. 63). Further, Carl Schmitt's assessment of the importance of decision-making power in a state of emergency is used to illustrate the hierarchy between civilian and military power: „The sovereign is the

one who decides upon the state of emergency." (Schmitt, 1922, p. 11) [Translation by the author].

With the formation of regular armed forces came a new need to systematise the training and organisation of these state soldiers. The ruling class created clear borders and now needed plannable military means with which these borders could be protected and expanded. Ulrich Bröckling (1997) connects this process of state formation and soldier fabrication as homologous processes in which the military drill encodes the body of the soldier in all its movements and reassembles it as a member of the troop body, thus creating the "political body" of the state - figuratively represented in the title copy of Hobbes' "Leviathan" - by defining and enforcing territorial borders, expanding legal regulations and controlling access to the population (1997, pp. 54–55).

Control in an institution, especially the military, is expected to be stronger when organisational goals are critical to both the survival of the institution and the larger social system to which it is linked, resulting in the emergence of discipline and authority as key features of military institutions (Martin, 1981, p. 211). This is why close civilian control is necessary, but its possibility is limited, as evident in the production of soldiers. A maximum of regimentation techniques is directed at the individual soldier (Bröckling, 1997, p. 10). Disciplining the body of troops and training them to be soldiers means not only producing a willingness to die and kill (Bröckling, 1997, p. 10), but also the direct control of this willingness to die and kill by those who produce it. The direct control over the executive activity of the armed forces lies with the officer corps, whose special skill lies in the management of violence, not in the use of violence itself (Huntington, 1957, p. 13). This direct control within the military over the use of force is necessary for the efficient performance of the tasks assigned to the military, and only if this direct control is guaranteed by the command structures can successful execution be expected.

The study "Supreme Command" by Eliot Cohen (2003) argues that civilian statesmen can indeed be brilliant commanders in wartime and effectively maintain civilian control of the military although civilian leaders need a deep understanding of military strategy. There are two reasons why this assumption does not really

hold. First, the close, full-scale warfare that took place under the four statesmen studied - Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben-Gurion - stands in stark contrast to modern conflicts. Full-scale wars have become rarer, and the operational theatres of Western European states run parallel to everyday political life, mostly unnoticed by the public. The French army may be operating in the Sahel, but this does not affect the day-to-day political business in France to the extent that the president would have to take more direct control. Secondly, it is about the comprehensive procedures of modern warfare that must be mastered. Huntington (1957) elaborates by pointing out that before the management of violence became the extremely complex task that it is in modern civilisation, it was possible for someone without special training to practice officership. Today, however, only those who devote all their working time to the task can hope to develop an adequate level of professional competence (Huntington, 1957, p. 13). Since this statement, military leadership has not simplified, but on the contrary has become even more multilayered.

Therefore, as a recognised superordinate power, civilian authorities exercise their decision-making ability up to a certain line, as defined, according to Huntington's citation, in the 1936 publication of the Command and General Staff College: "Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where politics ends. All that soldiers ask is that once the policy is settled, strategy and command shall be regarded as being in a sphere apart from politics. […] The line of demarcation must be drawn between politics and strategy, supply, and operations. Having found this line, all sides must abstain from trespassing." (Huntington, 1957, p. 308).

A second factor in the formation of a modern understanding of civil-military relations in Europe was access to national armed forces, especially access to leadership positions. The political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote extensively on the relationship between aristocracy and democracy, distinguished between aristocratic and democratic armies in his work Democracy in America (1835/40). In aristocratic societies, the military is closely associated with the ruling

class and is seen as a means of maintaining social order. The officers come from the aristocracy and have a strong connection to civil society, while the soldiers are often serfs or members of the lower classes who have little connection to civil society. This creates a hierarchical relationship between the military and civil society, with the military serving as a tool of the ruling class (Tocqueville, 2009). In France, the Revolution removed the aristocratic restrictions on access to the officer corps, both in terms of wealth and birth (Barber, 1969, p. 20). According to Barbara Kuchler (2013), the "de-stratification" of the military took place in two sub-movements: First, the process of restructuring the military involved different movements. The direction of advancement was different depending on whether it involved higher ranks (officers) or lower ranks (common soldiers). The role of officer, reserved for the aristocracy during absolutism, gradually became accessible to people from non-aristocratic backgrounds. This inclusion started from the bourgeoisie and included members of all classes, including the non-rich. Second, the purchasability of officer's patents played an important role, but it underwent a change in meaning. Originally, the purchase of an officer's patent was seen as a progressive element that allowed commoners to enter the officer corps. However, when it became associated with wealth, it had an exclusionary effect. As a result, this practice was abolished in favour of a universalist approach that emphasized merit-based recruitment, training at officer schools, and promotion based on merit (Kuchler, 2013, p. 508).

For Huntington, the abandonment of the privileged access rights of the aristocratic system simultaneously represented the beginning of the professionalization of military leadership (Huntington, 1957, pp. 19–58). A further step in military egalitarianism was the idea of the armed nation, i.e. the model of mass armed forces. The origins of conscription can be found in France. The decree "Levée en masse" of August 1793 advanced the idea of mobilizing an entire nation - its citizens in various capacities as well as the national economy - to support the war effort (Pfaffenzeller, 2010, p. 487). In Michel Martin "Warriors to Managers," the historical development of the mass armed forces occurred through the

conscription and mobilization of citizens, institutionalized through a system of obligation. This system tied citizens to service for the state for much of their adult lives. The expansion of military obligations was accompanied by the universality of conscription and the availability of reserve forces for mobilization. Following the major military laws, notably those of Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Soult, Niel, as well as those of 1872, 1889, and 1905, this development reached its peak in the 1920s and took a new course after World War II (Martin, 1981, p. 118). Especially after 1945 and the transformation of the international order, Western European democracies have developed systematic structures to establish civilian control over the armed forces. Although in all these countries the principle of subordination of the military to civilian institutions and authorities legitimized by democratic procedures applies, there are fundamental differences in the models of relations between the civilian sphere and the military in these complex political systems. In particular, a distinction could be made between countries in which civilian political control is exercised through a professional army, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, and those that pursue the concept of the mass force, a model that has been found in many Western European states. The case for mass conscript recruitment during the Cold War remained surprisingly strong, despite tensions based on superpower stalemate and mutual assuredness of nuclear destruction (Pfaffenzeller, 2010, p. 486). The priority given to conscription during the Cold War was ridiculed by some commentators, but it represented an appropriate response to the fragile internal situation in Europe after 1945: There was political instability, with coups in Greece and Spain and a revolution in Portugal (Black, 2004, p. 145). Conscription made it possible to raise large numbers of troops domestically to counter the Eastern Bloc and created the expectation that citizens would commit to defending their country.

The abolition of conscription in many European countries after the end of the Cold War was primarily due to an orientation toward new military challenges, but it also fundamentally showed that policymakers no longer viewed a professional army as a threat, as they had in the previous century. The new goals of the post-Cold War era required a change in the French army as well. In 1996, the transition

was made from a conscript army to a professionalized and downsized army (Irondelle, 2003, p. 158). The doctrines of the Cold War era had to give way to a much more flexible approach in which the army had to fight not against conventional opponents but against irregular forces in unknown terrain. Overall, the force was reoriented primarily toward expeditionary capabilities. The visibility and interaction between civilian life and members of the military lost its original proximity. Historically, conscription in France is seen as an important factor in social reality, which successfully corresponded to the republican values of equality, social cohesion and meritocracy (Military Action and Sovereignty, 2017, pp. 75–76). Domestically, a growing gap between society and the armed forces is becoming apparent in countries with professional and volunteer armies. This leads, among other things, to legitimacy deficits, the formation of military subcultures and recruitment problems (Hartmann & Von Rosen, 2018, p. 897). Jeremy Black (2004) saw conscription as an organizational form dictated by the broader context that creates a culture of behaviour, such as attitudes toward sacrifice and appropriate behaviour during domestic deployments, which can affect how tasks are formulated and executed. Similarly, attitudes toward conscription reflect, in part, perceptions about the extent to which and how best to ensure readiness and mission readiness (Black, 2004, p. 135). This culture of behaviour has been lost with the abolition of conscription and the even greater relocation of French soldiers to geographically distant areas. Given the massive French military presence in the country since 2015 and a new closeness between society and the military, an abstract force is turning into a real one.

3.3 Development in the Academic Field

Early classic theories of civil-military relations focused primarily on the American context and its implications for American foreign and defence policy. From the very beginning, Civil-Military Relations has been characterised by its interdisciplinarity, bringing together political, sociological, psychological, anthropological, and economic perspectives. Scholars such as Samuel P.

Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Samuel Finer and Peter D. Feaver were among the most important early contributors to the field. Modern scholarship on civil-military relations has been largely shaped by Samuel P. Huntington's "The Soldier and the State" (1957). Hungtington's book outlines a theoretical framework and challenges old assumptions and ideas about the role of the military in society. He was not the first to write on the subject, but he was systematic and theoretically more ambitious than those who had come before (Feaver, 1996, p. 174). Previously, there had been neither a general theory of civil-military relations nor a thorough historical analysis of the subject. Neither cross-country comparisons nor the definition of effective forms of civil-military relations had been studied. Nor was there a clear definition of what was meant by 'military profession', 'military spirit' or civilian control. His nomothetic approach replaced the previous ideographical explanations. A general social science theory of civil-military relations was thus developed and subjected to a historical analysis, in which the general theory of "military profession", "military spirit" and civilian control were presented. He gives two options for subordinating the military to civilian control: "Subjective" or "objective" civilian control. According to Huntington, the most direct way to minimise military power is to maximise the power of civilian groups in relation to the military. This subjective, civilian control consequently affects the power relations between civilian groups. In this form of control, the military is directed to carry out a variety of operations that normally fall under the jurisdiction of the state (Huntington, 1957, pp. 80–82). Objective civilian control, on the other hand, is, according to Huntington, the more suitable model for minimising the danger of military intervention. Objective civilian control is thus in direct contrast to subjective civilian control. While subjective civilian control achieves its goal by civilising the military and turning it into a mirror of the state, objective civilian control achieves its goal by militarising the military and turning it into a tool of the state (Huntington, 1957, pp. 83–84). Objective control thus means making the military a tool of the state by granting the military a certain degree of autonomy in return for non-interference in the political arena. "The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is

the denial of an independent military sphere." (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). During the Cold War, when Huntington wrote his work in 1957, his analysis of civil-military relations was highly influential. However, critics argue that his framework may not fully account for the complexities of asymmetric international conflicts that emerged after the Cold War. Desch suggests that although Huntington's framework remains influential in studying civil-military relations, it lacks a clear explanation of the impact of international factors (Desch, 2001, p. 10).

Several subsequent works drew on Huntington's theories and offered new insights into the then developing understanding of how military and civilian authorities relate to one another. Samuel E. Finer's "The Man on Horseback" (1962) and Morris Janowitz's "The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait" (1960) are arguably two of the most influential works of their time on civil-military relations following Huntington.

Samuel E. Finer's (1962) book on military intervention in civilian governments uses historical examples to illustrate the role of the military in politics and to examine the relationship between military and civilian authorities. In it, he argues that civilian government structures that are less developed or mature offer greater vulnerability to a military coup than those with strong ones. He also notes that neither the ability to intervene, the motivation to do so, nor the mood to act would be sufficient without certain "opportunities for intervention". Such opportunities would arise from increasing civilian dependence on the military, especially in latent or overt crisis situations, and from the creation of a power vacuum combined with the popularity of the military (Finer, 2002, pp. 72–85). While these aspects provided important food for thought at the time the work was written, in a modern context it lacks consideration of new developments in civil-military relations beyond military interventions. In particular, the focus on the role of the military in politics and the lack of clear solutions to the problem of military involvement in politics limit the work to a specific area of research dealing with military interventions (Finer, 2002).

Morris Janowitz's "The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait" (1960) follows Huntington's concept that the military profession is distinguished from other (civilian) professions by unique characteristics such as the purposeful use of force, a hierarchical culture, authoritarianism, and discipline. However, while Huntington presents the military as a unique actor that should be clearly separated from the outside (civilian) world, Janowitz argues that the military and society should not be separated, but rather form an integral whole. The timing of his sociological analysis coincided with the post-war period when the question of the balance between military power and liberal democratic society arose. Unlike Huntington, who saw the key to more effective civilian control of the military in its professionalisation, i.e. in a strict separation, Janowitz saw the solution in a closer link between the military and society, i.e. in a complete integration of civilian and military decision-making processes. By asking who people in the military profession are, what they do and what they believe, Janowitz also updated the role, image and function of the military in a liberal democracy. In particular, he emphasises the role of military operations in a globalised context in which "the use of force in international relations has been so altered that it seems appropriate to speak of constabulary forces, rather than of military forces" (Janowitz, 1960, p. 418). A restrained role should enable sustainable international relations with minimal use of force, rather than helping to defeat the adversary. Changing roles in this way also affected the demands on the soldier's profession. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of the armed forces and at the same time ensure adequate civilian control, this change had to be achieved through political integration and the training of the officer corps. For Janowitz, the professional officer is an officer who "is sensitive to the political and social impact of the military establishment on international security affairs. He is subject to civilian control, not only because of the "rule of law" and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values (Janowitz, 1960, p. 420). Treating the military as an institution that is not part of

society, or alienating the military from society, is a threat to effectiveness and effective control (Janowitz, 1960, p. 270).

The systematic study of civil-military relations suffered in its early stages from the weakness that, in addition to studying coup-prone political systems, it focused largely on the United States in the case of democratic systems (Olmeda, 2012: 68f.), rather than looking more broadly at other countries, their military cultures and particularities. There are several reasons for this imbalance. Soon after the end of World War II, the US dominated the military rearmament of the West. For example, it was instrumental in rebuilding the French and Italian arms industries (Geiger, 2008, p. 347). Moreover, the world's largest defence alliance, NATO, was and still is heavily influenced by doctrines of American origin (Kaplan, 1984). Thus, for European militaries thinking about modernisation and force transformation, the US military is the socialiser (Galbreath, 2014, p. 396). As a result, the strong military dominance has also been reflected in academia. Key processes for functioning cooperation in the military field are thus subjected to American standards and procedures. Despite this visibility, it is difficult to extrapolate general hypotheses about civil-military relations formulated in the American context to the conditions of other armies. This is mainly because armies are unique in their history and organisational structure and are subject to specific national security policies and military strategies in their missions.

In other countries, there are no de-individualised armed forces or fundamentally americanised civil-military relations. Apart from the similarity in military procedures and the equipment required to optimise them, each armed force has specific characteristics that distinguish it from others. This also makes civil-military relations special relations with their own national character. However, theories such as Huntington's, Finer's and Feaver's can be used to examine contemporary and non-American cases. The key is to be aware of the limitations of these publications and to incorporate new findings.

3.4 Coups D'état & Weakening of Democratic Control

This section discusses the contentious issues involved in the further development of civil-military relations research. In particular, the view away from the danger of coups d'état is considered and more attention is given to the appropriate role of the military within established democracies.

In her study, Polina Beliakova (2021) expands the potential loss of civilian control in democratic regimes beyond coups d'état and explores what weakening is possible below the threshold of regime overthrow. Given the considerable potential for physical violence of national armed forces, it is important for both democratic and autocratic political systems to maintain effective control over the armed forces. The essential difference in civil-military control is that in democracies civilian dominance in the exercise of political decision-making is essential, whereas in autocracies it is optional, depending on the type of authoritarian regime (Beliakova, 2021, p. 1394). For instance, Perlmutter (1969) describes how the increasing role of the military in politics is not a new phenomenon, but rather a natural occurrence in developing states. To this end, he examines Egypt in particular as a praetorian state in which the military has the potential to dominate the political structure and the political leadership is mainly recruited from the military (Perlmutter, 1974). Since the focus of this analysis is on civil-military relations in a democracy, it will concentrate on this aspect and not on autocratic models of civilian control over the military. In fact, in most established democracies, the fundamental challenge of civil-military relations is not so much to prevent a military takeover, but rather to manage relations in terms of the preparation and use of force so that they best serve policy goals. Thomas C. Bruneau & Florina C. Matei (2008) point out that it is necessary to expand the conceptual breadth of the literature on civil-military relations beyond control to include two other dimensions - effectiveness and efficiency - which constitute contemporary civil-military relations in democracies.

However, the assumption that civil-military relations cannot be seriously disrupted as long as there is no threat of a coup is one of the biggest obstacles to reflective engagement with this issue (E. A. Cohen, 2003, p. 242). Instead, new challenges have been identified that have come with a change of perspective. For a long time, the conceptualisation of civil-military relations, used exclusively by US authors, was based on a democratic-political context linked primarily to the military confrontation between the 'West' and the 'East' during the Cold War (Bruneau & Matei, 2008, p. 911). According to Andrew Cottey, the primary role of most Western European militaries during the Cold War was to defend their own territory and the NATO alliance. This initial situation led to a model of civil-military relations in most Western European states based on conscription and preparation for a possible war with the Eastern Bloc, in which foreign deployments and actual combat operations were rather rare (Cottey, 2008, p. 309).

In the face of new global challenges, the previously so inseparable link between the military and the nation state appears questionable. In particular, the merging of national armed forces into supranational structures such as the EU, cooperative peace operations through the UN and membership of alliances such as NATO call into question the established character of national armed forces. This leads to the situation that civil-military relations are no longer bounded by a nation-state's domestic politics (Segell, 2001, p. 135). Certainly, the NATO alliance has been around for a long time, and militaries have long been involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations around the world. But providing peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia, parts of Africa and elsewhere has become more important, and more countries have chosen to participate in such operations (Bruneau & Matei, 2008, p. 915). In addition, according to Timothy Edmunds, attacks by international terrorists, and in particular the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the "war on terror" declared by Washington, have also had an impact on the evolution of the role of European armed forces. They have increased the existing pressure towards the development of expeditionary capabilities in the reform of armed forces (Edmunds, 2006, p. 1063). The increase in multilateral military operations

abroad, including the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, is symbolic of the increased use of alliances such as NATO's extended territorial defence.

France has largely avoided this partial denationalisation of its armed forces. Scepticism about close interdependence in security matters has long been part of the French understanding of sovereignty. Under Charles de Gaulle, France withdrew from NATO's integrated command structure in March 1966 and was only fully reintegrated into NATO's integrated military command structure in 2009 (Nuenlist, 2011). Overall, France's national independence has always been strongly emphasised in world politics. France's quest for autonomy was manifested in its independent nuclear development program, ultimately making it a nuclear power. Nevertheless, this unilateralism only worked to a certain extent, and French foreign policy also had to reorient and adapt itself in the face of post-Cold War threat scenarios. This was particularly evident in the new type of multilateral engagement triggered by the Rwandan genocide in 1994, which had significant and lasting changes for the French attitude towards cooperation in crisis resolution approaches (Chafer et al., 2020). France's military interventions in Mali and the Sahel are indicative of this new path in French military policy, especially on the African continent. Moreover, difficult operations such as the one in Afghanistan have not further distanced France and NATO from each other, but have strengthened many ties and contributed to a kind of normalisation, even if relations continue to be marked by many uncertainties (Fescharek, 2015).

Several publications have addressed this apparent contradiction by broadening the scientific horizon. For instance, in their work on civilian and military actors in the consolidation of democracies, Thomas C. Bruneau & Florina C. Matei (2008) found that the analytical focus exclusively on civilian control and armed forces in national defence is neither empirical nor sufficient for the conceptual development of comparisons (Bruneau & Matei, 2008, p. 915). The move away from exclusive national defence and the expansion of humanitarian operations, peacekeeping or counterterrorism require new approaches that have not been considered in

previous theories. Therefore, they suggest that leaders must pay attention to matters both of control and outcomes, and with instruments beyond the armed forces; they must provide for security that today is both domestic and international, with the latter including at least peace support operations, as in providing troops to NATO in Afghanistan, and cooperation in intelligence to counter the threat of international terrorism. In short, the challenge today is not only to assert and maintain control, but also to develop effective militaries and other security instruments to implement a broad variety of roles and missions (Bruneau & Matei, 2008, p. 915). Furthermore, Anthony Forster (2002) describes the "old" research on civil-military relations as being characterised by several parallel developments that can be observed since the founding phase of the field. He describes a strong tradition in much of the literature on civil-military relations that made a virtue of avoiding explicit theoretical assumptions and favoured an empirical and often theory-free approach that merely described events and processes and offered deduction-based generalisations and insights. More specifically, he means that most of these approaches used descriptive inferences that offered empirical studies and "dense" descriptions with generalisations based on observations, among others, in some works by Janowitz and S.E. Finer (Forster, 2002, pp. 71–72).

Michael C. Desch (2001), for example, has formulated an approach, arguing that "the strength of civilian control of the military in most countries is shaped fundamentally by structural factors, especially threats, which affect individual leaders, the military organization, the state, and society" (2001, p. 11). Accordingly, the quality of civilian control depends on the specific combination of internal and external threats. Civilian control is expected to be strongest when the external threat is high, and the internal threat is low. When the external threat is low and the internal threat is high, civil control is at its weakest (Desch, 2001, p. 20). When there is an undefined threat situation, as was the case for France during the Algerian war, where there were significant external and internal threats, different aspects of the state's military doctrine play a more independent role in the development of effective civilian control. What matters in such cases is which threat the military perceives as more urgent. However, fixed guidelines, such as those laid down in a

doctrine, cannot be changed in the short term, but require long-term restructuring. Stanislav Andreski, to whom Desch also refers, argues that:

> "there exists an intrinsic incompatibility between the internal and the external uses of the armed forces. In other words: the more often the armed forces are used internally, the less capable they become of waging a war; and secondly (when the military participation ratio is high) the more intensively they are - or have recently been - involved in a war, the less amenable and dependable they become as tools of internal repression" (Andreski, 1980, pp. 3–4).

This view is shared by Desch, who recognises that the greatest threat to civilian control of the military is when the period of massive external threat is over and the state has a correspondingly large armed force, but there is no filling external mission for the armed forces. A subsequent decline in the level of threat combined with the presence of a large armed force is likely to lead to less agreement within and between civilian and military organisations, increasing the potential for tension and conflict. With this structural approach, Desch positions himself as an alternative to Huntington's theory of separation, although he also adopts an institutional approach and classifies the respective society and its individuals as "intervening variables" (2001, pp. 13–17), rather than examining these factors in more detail, as would be necessary to adequately assess the influence of the civilian population on civil-military relations.

Fear of the threat to democracy posed by a large standing army and the need to keep it under civilian control have given rise to professional armies that not only need to be controlled, but above all need to be led effectively and efficiently. However, the clear and binding role that was accepted by the public has become less obvious and has disappeared from public view due to the greater operational distances. Sending soldiers to another country and having them fight there for abstract objectives is also explored by Glen Segell's work "Civil-Military Relations

and Professional Military Identities After the Nation-State," (2001). Segell notes that a series of military conflicts that did not conform to the traditional pattern of nation-state versus nation-state further unsettled military thinking. For military leaders in the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces involved in these conflicts, the obvious question was, "I am fighting but why am I not defending my country?" (Segell, 2001, p. 124).

Simply because external threats, such as those posed by transnational Islamist terrorist groups, are routinely countered by democracies through their armed forces does not mean that civil-military relations are destabilised. However, cases of "pulling", i.e. the transfer of tasks from politics to the military outside the usual operational profile (Bove et al., 2020), have the potential of undermining a historically grown relationship.

In her book "The Warrior, Military Ethics, and Contemporary Warfare", military philosopher Pauline M. Kaurin (2014) examines the complex ethical challenges faced by military professionals in the context of contemporary warfare. Although Kaurin refers exclusively to American examples, her observations can also be applied to other armed forces in active combat. The book looks at the interaction between the warrior archetype, military ethics and the changing nature of warfare. It examines the existential notions of war, honour and meaning that underlie the warrior archetype. She examines how the warrior's code shapes the behaviour and actions of military personnel, highlighting concepts such as sacrifice, courage, honour, duty and loyalty. According to Joseph Soeters, countries such as the US, the UK or France, which spend significant percentages of their gross national income on defence, can be characterised as nations that uphold the warrior ethos and train their military personnel to be "dieux de guerre" ("gods of war"). Even under the pressure of NATO directives aimed at unification, and although the political colour of the governments of these nations changes from time to time, these differences remain more or less stable (Soeters, 2018, p. 258). Kaurin was asked in a discussion about the ethos of the warrior in the military: "If the warrior mindset helps someone do what they need to do in Fallujah, why do you care?". Her response was that she does care because it matters how we talk and what terms

we use because the terms we use constrain the ethical parameters of what we do. "Definitions are the foundations of action, knowledge, reality and Truth"(Kaurin, 2016). There is another reason why this question is so pertinent. What happens when we bring people back from Fallujah and ask them to do at home what they did there? How we place our soldiers in our society, what tasks we assign them and what that makes of them is something most ordinary citizens do not consider until they come into direct contact with their military. In the context of French soldiers' involvement in theatres such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania or Niger, there is a warrior ethos within the armed forces that is still relevant and wanted. Clarified by the statements of Former Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly that France's NATO burden-sharing 2 percent target is a "war-fighting 2 percent" and "not a headquarters percentage;" (Pezard et al., 2021, p. 19).

Although the French Armed Forces are dominated by professionalism, which has turned officers into competent managers (Daho, 2020), ground troops in direct combat operations nevertheless follow attributes that can be attributed to the warrior archetype. This is also required by the demands of the theatre of operations, with its high potential for violence (Dieng, 2021), where one must be able to learn from the environment and be flexible, as asymmetric opponents tend to adapt to the chosen strategy and adjust their strategies accordingly (Kaurin, 2014, p. 107). Such an ethos includes a battle-oriented mindset, the courage and willingness to take decisive action against the opponent (Kaurin, 2014, pp. 104–108).

However, the transition from foreign missions to the deployment of French soldiers within France, mainly for internal security purposes, requires a shift towards the guardian ethos. The guardian ethos represents a set of principles and values necessary for domestic operations, including the protection of critical infrastructure and the well-being of citizens (Kaurin, 2014, pp. 109–115). In contrast to the warrior ethos, which is currently focused on foreign theatres, the guardian ethos emphasises restraint, adherence to legal frameworks, protection of

civil liberties and effective cooperation with civilian authorities. Challenges arise when soldiers trained primarily in the warrior ethos in theatres such as Mali must adapt to the requirements of the guardian ethos at home in France. This transition requires a change in mindset, operational strategies and rules of engagement. Soldiers will need to redirect their skills and focus on intelligence gathering, community engagement, law enforcement cooperation and a preventive approach to counter-terrorism. The capability of the French armed forces to patrol their own cities and handle protection duties is not the primary concern. They possess extensive training that enables them to carry out such tasks effectively. However, a potential challenge arises from the unique influences that French soldiers bring with them due to their training primarily focused on expeditionary missions and the warrior ethos developed in theatres of operation like the Sahel. These influences may introduce unpredictability, making it challenging to assess their impact on domestic operations.

Summarised, the works discussed here show the evolution of civil-military research from its beginnings to recent decades. While the focus has shifted from the dangers of military intervention to the challenges of civilian control in different contexts, the importance of a professional military subject to civilian authority remains a central theme. As the security environment continues to evolve, it is necessary to register, document and classify changes within the established understanding.

4 Civil-Military Relations in France

After a non-specific and general presentation of the state of knowledge on civil-military relations, it is essential to take a closer look at the object of study, France. In the case of France, we are dealing with a rich and long history of civil-military relations. The French Revolution enabled the creation of institutions that embodied public power distinct from social status. The separation of powers of 1789 and the invasion of 1792 produced a fully democratic state elite and enabled the bureaucracy to emerge as an element of the state apparatus clearly separate from the executive (Brown, 1993, p. 12). After this event, the monarchy was no longer the sole bearer of state sovereignty, and the separation of powers initiated a process that completed the shift of the army's loyalty from the crown to the nation. (Brown, 1993, p. 33). As mentioned before the revolutionary government used conscription to create a mass army known as the "Levy en Masse" to defend the revolution and expand French influence (Pfaffenzeller, 2010, p. 487). The military developed an apolitical professionalism which had become the officers' antidote to the unpredictable shifts in power that had characterised the revolution (Blaufarb, 2002, pp. 10 & 162). A further step in the professionalisation of the French army was the development of the institution of professional military education, influenced by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, which led to the transformation of mass armies into larger and more complex armed forces (Libel, 2021, p. 125). This transformation required the expertise of higher level specialists who were able to integrate the different components of the military, leading to the emergence of a professional officer corps in France and other European countries (Libel, 2021, p. 125). The Revolution had removed the restrictions on aristocratic entry, and although there was strong pressure under the Restoration to return to the old methods, the military school Saint-Cyr succeeded in firmly entrenching the principle that entry could only be gained through competition from the military schools or through the ranks (Huntington, 1957, p. 42).

Despite a lack of constitutional stability and geographical invulnerability, France's large standing army remained politically neutral and did not attempt a military coup

between 1815 and 1939, despite frequent changes in leadership (Ambler, 1966, p. 4). From 1815 to 1939, civil-military relations in France were largely based on the premise of unconditional obedience to civil authority, as defined by the civilian political system (Ambler, 1966, pp. 3–92). It was above all the spirit of the officer corps that guaranteed the reliability of the armed forces as a political instrument. It was the events in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 that changed this basic attitude of obedience and continue to shape civil-military relations in France to this day.

4.1 Algeria

After World War II, the reconstituted French army engaged in conflicts in both Indochina (1946-1954) and Algeria (1954–62) to defend French colonial interests. In Indochina, the French fought against communist forces led by Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh, while in Algeria, they faced a nationalist insurgency seeking independence from French colonial rule. Having provoked the war in Indochina, the French military discovered that it was poorly positioned to fight it especially because hostilities in Europe exposed some serious French debilities (Porch, 2013, p. 164). "By 1946, the French mainland was focused on post-World War II economic recovery, itself at odds with redirecting Marshall Plan aid into Indochinese bogs and forests, and torn between fear of the USSR and trepidation over German rearmament. This put them increasingly at odds with France's colonial officer corps, politicized by civil-military fusion […] and by a nostalgic attachment to the grandeur of France's imperial past as an indicator for the future" (Porch, 2013, p. 162). An early reason for the dissociation of the army from the state was the belief that the war in Indochina would be endless and an extension of World War II (Domenach, 1961, pp. 185–186). When it eventually ended in 1954 the officers who left Indochina were faced with the prospect of fighting another war in Algeria. This transition triggered feelings of trauma, as the orders to evacuate and leave the population behind were devastating for those who had to carry them out (Zervoudakis, 2002, p. 55). The Algerian War of Independence, that followed, was also a guerrilla war waged by the National Liberation Front

(FLN) against French troops and the civil administration (Alexander et al., 2002, pp. 1–42). However, unlike distant Indochina, Algeria was constitutionally part of the French motherland and comparatively close to home (Alexander et al., 2002, p. 11). This experience in Indochina and Algeria left a deep impression on officers as they vowed never to betray those they had promised to protect, ultimately contributing to the radicalization of Algerian forces (Zervoudakis, 2002, pp. 54–56).

From the humiliation at the hands of Germany during World War II to the lack of support from French society during the Resistance in the colonies, the relationship between the military, French society and the civilian authorities became increasingly strained. This humiliations were, first and foremost, humiliations of the army and, as such, had a strong resonance within its ranks (Merom, 2003, p. 92). Additional, Douglas Porch (2013) notes that in the fourteen years following the end of World War II, France was overwhelmed by weak, partisan governments that essentially ceded control of colonial policy, strategy and operations to the military and its imperialist patrons. Desperate to win the war, the political leadership made the army the highest power in Algeria (Merom, 2003, p. 92). This led to increased civil-military fusion and the politicisation of parts of the French army (Porch, 2013, p. 154). According to Michael C. Desch, during the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), which witnessed seventeen prime ministers and twenty-two cabinets, the institutional weakness played a significant role in the civil-military crisis between 1954 and 1962. The conflicting signals from civilian leaders regarding support for military operations in Indochina and Algeria, as well as the Republic's inability to meet the military's material needs, including equipment and housing, further exacerbated the situation (2001, p. 80).

Many French military officers came to view the Fourth Republic as their adversary (Desch, 2001, p. 80). Subsequently, in 1958, the Fourth Republic was overthrown by a military coup aimed at protecting French control in Algeria, leading to the rise of Charles De Gaulle and the establishment of the Fifth Republic (W. B. Cohen,

2002, p. 221). At the latest 1960, De Gaulle decided to negotiate an exit from Algeria and had clearly decided to find a way out of the conflict. After a number of false starts in negotiations with the FLN, on March 18, 1962 at Evian an agreement was signed, instituting a ceasefire the next day and providing for a process that would lead to Algerian independence by July 5, 1962 (W. B. Cohen, 2002, p. 222). In the end, these negotiations and the growing sense and disappointment of having been betrayed by one's own country (Domenach, 1961, p. 186) culminated in a coup attempt. On 23 April 1961, a military coup led by French generals opposed to Algerian independence took place (Luttwak, 1979, pp. 116–169). A purely military and professional operation, the so-called "generals' coup" was an attempt by a faction of the French military to seize control of the government and halt negotiations for Algerian independence (Kelly, 1964, p. 336). However, the plan ultimately failed due to a lack of broad support and opposition from within and outside the military (Luttwak, 1979).

De Gaulle responded forcefully to the coup, imposing severe punishments on the conspirators and advocating for a strong civilian control over the army in a televised address (Ruffa, 2017, p. 404). Under De Gaulle's leadership, the Fifth Republic aimed to establish a strong civilian regime with authority over the people and the military, achieved through the promotion of new leaders focused on discipline, duty and European interests, and the restoration of civilian control (Ruffa, 2017, p. 404). The practice of keeping the military out of politics as a long-standing tradition in France referred to as *"La Grande Muette"* (Ambler, 1966) was then even further strengthened (Ruffa, 2017, p. 404). Moreover, civilian policymakers were able to assert their preferences over the military through newly established institutions designed to better control military operations (DeVore, 2019, p. 164). French society and the military have never fully come to terms with the Algerian war. There has been no reappraisal. The taboos created in the Algerian era have had a lasting effect, for example on officers' attitudes to public speaking and to certain things not being said, even among themselves (Daho, 2019, p. 512). But, as the interviews made clear, that moment in history is still very much present in the ranks of French officers.

4.2 Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary France

To date, civil-military relations in France have been characterized by professional armed forces that obey civilian control (Vennesson, 2003). Civilian control over the military has been enshrined in the Constitution since 1958. Although no article explicitly mentions or defines the principle of civilian control over the military, it is anchored in the constitutional framework and derives from various provisions. The French Constitution, particularly in its preamble and throughout the text, affirms the principles of democratic governance, the separation of powers and the primacy of civilian authority (Assemblée Nationale - Constitution Du 4 Octobre 1958 (Version d'origine), 1958). The President of the Republic, as Head of State and Head of the Armed Forces, is constitutionally empowered to ensure the defence of the nation. The President is also responsible for appointing and dismissing senior military officers. In addition, Article 15 of the French Constitution states that the armed forces are under the authority of the President and the Government. This provision implies the subordination of the military to civilian control. Summing up the civil control mechanisms of the French state, Alice Pannier & Olivier Schmitt write that France exemplifies a strong state with a robust executive and limited parliamentary oversight, particularly in defence and security matters. The French president holds significant institutional power, aided by the reserved domain of defence, security, and foreign policy. The Elysée, serving as a centralizing institution, consolidates vital information from intelligence services, embassies, and relevant ministries for the president, who has ultimate authority over equipment projects, strike plans, and the deployment of French forces, establishing their pivotal role in defence policy (Pannier & Schmitt, 2019, p. 898). In its current form, the French military is seen as an instrument of the state under objective civilian control.

Yet, civilian control and the mechanisms of its reliability have been challenged in recent years. In May 2021, an open letter was published in France by the right-wing magazine Valeurs Actuelles, warning of an impending civil war and reportedly

receiving more than 130,000 signatures from the population. About 1,000 servicemen and women, including about 20 retired generals, signed the letter. The letter warned of the "dangers" of "Islamism and the hordes from the banlieue". It also accused anti-racism groups of fomenting "hatred between communities" (Chrisafis, 2021). On the one hand, the publication of this letter was a novelty in the traditionally strict reticence of the French military to take political positions in public. On the other hand, the reaction of the public to the statements made in this letter represented a further development which appeared conspicuous in a similar way. A survey in 2021 provided a glimpse of the attitude of the French towards the published text. Nearly half of the French public would back a military intervention to restore order ('Tribune des militaires', 2021). Of course, just from this no general statement can be made about popular support for such a project. In 2022, however, another survey was conducted on the future of liberal democracy, including the possibility of military rule. To which 17% in France believed military rule could be a good way to run the country (Wike & Fetterolf, 2022). The perception of strategy as a professional craft provides a sense of reassurance for democratic politicians and citizens, as it suggests that war is not susceptible to the flaws and uncertainties of politics, and military expertise is considered a reliable and consistent element (E. A. Cohen, 2003, p. 244). Positive or at least a non-rejectionist attitude towards questions of defence and the military can be detected in the French population even earlier. Within the French civilian population, there is a comparatively special positioning vis-à-vis their own military when one considers the situation in other European nations. Rochon (1988) makes this attitude clear by describing the peace movements of the 1980s that formed in Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands and France against the NATO alliance's decision to deploy 108 Pershing II and 464 cruise missiles in West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Britain and the Netherlands. Compared to the other countries, the French movement was much smaller and weaker than in any other country with a movement.

Two implications can be drawn from this. Firstly, the support that the military as an institution enjoys in French society is strong and represents a relevant variable

when examining the current state of civil-military relations in France. Secondly, it can be noted that according to the respondents, the role that the military should assume is not a passive serving but an active leading political position. This support also affects the negotiating position on issues such as budget, equipment and personnel, as public support provides the military with new political bargaining chips.

5   Terrorism

Today, the study of terrorism is a broad field in its own right and it overlaps with other areas of research. Distinguishing between the different forms of terrorism is difficult due to its inherent complexity, making it difficult to establish clear boundaries and distinctions between them, as overlapping characteristics are very common. There is a lack of scientific consensus for a generally valid definition of "terrorism" and the use of the term in the most diverse contexts makes a clear classification impracticable (Pisoiu & Hain, 2018, pp. 25–36; Schmid, 2011, pp. 39–157, 2021, pp. 13–48). As a result, terrorism is a 'contested concept (Gallie, 1955) in the sense that it is difficult to agree on its meaning or scope (Schmid, 2011, p. 40). In order to come closer to a classification, the work of Alex Schmid is consolidated, who attempts to create a comparable definition with an extensive study of terrorism definitions. According to his work:

> „Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and noncombatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties" (Schmid, 2011, p. 86).

It becomes clear that understanding terrorism requires a multidimensional view, drawing on different theoretical perspectives and offering different angles for analysing the complex phenomenon. Considering that the literature on terrorism is not only very extensive but also very heterogeneous, Daniela Pisoiu & Sandra Hain suggest that theories from different disciplines should be divided into three dimensions of analysis: deterministic, intentional and relational (Pisoiu & Hain, 2018, p. 44). Each approach offers insights into the causes and dynamics of terrorism. First, deterministic approaches focus on structural and contextual factors that contribute to terrorism. Social, economic, political and historical conditions that create an environment conducive to terrorist activity are emphasised. Analyses often focus on root causes, systemic injustices and social inequalities (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Khosrokhavar, 2021; Richardson, 2006). Second, the intentional approaches, which focus more on the individual-level factors and psychological motives that motivate people to engage in terrorist activities. They examine personal grievances, ideological beliefs, psychological vulnerabilities and group dynamics that influence terrorist behaviour. Within this perspective, they seek to understand the thinking and decision-making processes of terrorists (Post, 2007; Sageman, 2004). Finally, relational approaches emphasise the interactions and relationships between different actors involved in terrorism, such as states, organisations and individuals. This perspective examines the influence of these relationships on the dynamics and outcomes of terrorist activities. It analyses power dynamics, communication strategies and the broader social and political context of terrorist activities that take place in such tensions (Hoffman, 1999; Jenkins et al., 2011; Rapoport, 2004). It is reasonable to assume that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, but that drawing on multiple perspectives produces a comprehensive understanding of terrorism that would not be possible in isolation.

Terrorism is a multifaceted and challenging phenomenon to understand, as evidenced by an in-depth examination of the development of terrorist groups. These groups employ diverse strategies and adopt varying organizational

structures. Consequently, it is their motives and their spatial component that serve as an effective means of differentiation. David Rapoport´s article "Four Waves of Terrorism" (2004), published after 9/11, is one of the most influential works in the field of terrorism studies. It continues to serve as a conceptual framework. He has classified terrorism into four distinct "waves" that have influenced its character throughout different historical periods. The initial wave involved anarchist groups conducting selective assassinations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The second wave emerged during anti-colonial movements, focusing on occupied and colonial powers, particularly in the post-World War II era, as exemplified by countries like Algeria and its Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN). The third wave witnessed a rise in social revolutionary violence, peaking between the 1960s and 1980s. Lastly, the fourth wave is characterized by religiously motivated terrorism, predominantly fuelled by Islamist ideologies since the 1980s (Rapoport, 2004).

Following the analysis of terrorism's complexity and the theoretical approaches, the focus shifts to transnational jihadist terrorism exemplified by groups like Daesh. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had a profound impact on the understanding of terrorism, prompting a shift in the theoretical discourse surrounding the subject. These attacks, perpetrated by the Islamist extremist group al-Qaeda, drew global attention to transnational terrorism and highlighted the significant role played by religious ideologies in shaping the landscape of terrorism (Martin-Jones et al., 2019). Transnational jihadist terrorism represents a contemporary manifestation of terrorism, characterized by the global reach and transnational operations of jihadist extremist groups. Transnational terrorism refers to acts of terrorism that transcend national borders and involve actors from several countries operating in different regions or countries. More specifically, transnational terrorism against states is defined by the location of its operations: where violence is carried out away from the group's domestic base, or where a group is dispersed across countries (Marsden & Schmid, 2011, p. 162).

Daesh, in particular, gained significant prominence in the early 2010s, establishing a self-proclaimed caliphate and carrying out high-profile acts of violence in various

regions. Their activities have demonstrated the evolving nature and tactics of terrorism, with a fusion of religious ideology, recruitment strategies, and the utilization of social media platforms to disseminate propaganda and attract followers (Winkler et al., 2019). By establishing 2014 state-like structures around its declared capital of Raqqa in Syria, Daesh has been able to create a transnational terrorist network (Caris & Reynolds, 2014). This transnationality was characterised in particular by the global recruitment of foreign supporters and the conduct of terrorist attacks outside the areas it controls in the form of international operations (Celso, 2018, pp. 173–216).

Apart from its transnational character, jihadist terrorism in the form of Daesh corresponds to religious extremism. Alexander Schmid work focuses specifically on religious terrorism, highlighting the importance of directing attention towards religious extremism as opposed to other forms of extremism. Religious terrorism represents a distinct category within the broader spectrum of extremism, characterized by acts of violence committed in the name of religious beliefs or ideologies. According to Schmid (2021), religious extremism has special characteristics and his definition fills a gap:

> "The pursuit, usually by a fanatical sect or cult, but occasionally also by a political 'party of God', a terrorist organization, or an official 'religious establishment' of a program of societal renewal which usually involves some form of social cleansing. The use of violence is justified by reference to a divine authority, an absolute truth, or a literal interpretation of texts deemed sacred. Specific groups of people such as non-believers, pagans, apostates or heretics are identified as enemies and as such earmarked for being subjugated, punished, expelled or killed in the name of one or another sacred cause. Religious extremists want to purify the world from alleged forces of evil and establish a theocratic regime run by a religious leader or council. True believers who adhere to such a religious ideology tend to be prepared

for martyrdom (suicide) operations, often expecting great rewards in afterlife for their sacrifice."(Schmid, 2021, pp. 24–25).

The Daesh ideology and caliphate centric strategy are driven by takfiri, sectarian and apocalyptic ideals (Celso, 2018, p. 41). Takfir describes the labelling of other Muslims as kafir (non-believer) and infidels, and legitimizing violation against them (Kadivar, 2020, p. 3). According to Farhad Khosrokhavar (2021), jihadism, as a theological-political ideology, places death at its centre and considers it of paramount importance compared to its role in secular totalitarianism. It focuses on two aspects of death: holy martyrdom and the act of killing infidels. This perspective makes jihadism inherently meta-political or infra-political, rather than offering a political alternative to secular modernity. Instead, it is expressed through death and destruction. The concept of a holy death for oneself and the condemnation of the enemy to a death that devalues their existence becomes a means of celebrating a utopian vision that glorifies killing, dying and those who carry out such acts (2021, pp. 15–16).

5.1   Terrorism Threat in France

France has a tested resilience to respond to attacks in the terrorist spectrum due to a historically continuous presence of terrorist threats. France has experienced the impact of various extremist groups, including right-wing extremists like Organisation de l'Armée Secrète, left-wing extremist terrorism exemplified by Action Directe, regional terrorism represented by FLNC Corsica, and Islamist-related terrorism since the 1980 associated with organizations such as Groupe Islamique Armée and more recently Daesh (Bartolucci, 2017, pp. 439–440). Given the significance of the ongoing acute threat situation since 2015 and the subsequent deployment of soldiers in France under Opération Sentinelle, this section primarily centers around Islamist terrorism.

France is threatened by domestic terrorist attacks for various reasons. There is a high proportion of potential extremist violent offenders and their supporters who could carry out attacks as potential recruits for a terrorist organization (Weill, 2018). Daesh has brought about a major change in the minds of European jihadis, but the most important sociological change occurred in the 1990s, when home-grown terrorists, mainly the sons or grandsons of migrants to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, grew up in Europe and felt rejected and stigmatised (Khosrokhavar, 2021, p. 19). Thus, in the decade between 2000 and 2012, the number of French jihadists was estimated at around 175 (Trévidic, 2013), while between 2013 and 2016 it rose to around 1,900 (including foreign fighters who travelled to Syria), representing a massive increase (Khosrokhavar, 2021, p. 20). This development is manifested in the number of foreign fighters who joined Daesh and other violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. By far the highest numbers in Western Europe travelled to the war zone from France (Soufan Group, 2015, p. 8). The reasons for radicalisation are manifold and are seen as a highly individualised process determined by the complex interplay of various personal and structural factors (Vidino & Brandon, 2012, p. 169). Nevertheless, France faces the challenge of a considerable number of marginalized young individuals, resulting from inconsistent integration policies that overlook a significant portion of migrant families' younger generation residing in suburban housing projects, creating an environment conducive to radicalization (Kepel & Jardin, 2017; Khosrokhavar, 2021; Moran, 2017). For France, terrorism has often been an exogenous and endogenous threat. The term exogenous, in the context of terrorism, refers to the threat posed by foreign actors. The term endogenous, on the other hand, refers to the terrorist threat posed by persons residing or living on the national territory. In many contexts, however, these two descriptions overlap. As in the case of the commandos in Paris on 13 November 2015. Almost all group members were French and Belgian nationals who had grown up and lived in their respective countries, but who were guided by an externally programmed and designed support structure (Samaan & Jacobs, 2020, p. 403).

Another factor is France intense involvement in counterterrorist operations abroad (Mullins, 2016, p. 28). From 2013 to 2021, France has massively increased its commitment to counter-terrorism with Operation Barkhane in Mali and from 2020 with Task Force Takuba in the Sahel (Pezard et al., 2021, pp. 19–21). Since 2014, French combat units have also been involved in the strategic bombing and dismantlement of Daesh in Iraq and Syria as part of Operation Chammal (2021, p. 20). In addition to military operations against foreign terrorist organisations, three factors in particular make France a priority target for jihadist terror. Firstly, France's international stance towards Muslim countries and jihadist fronts; secondly, France's perceived domestic hostility towards Islam; and finally, the very DNA of the country, which has led jihadists to describe it as the "flagship of disbelief" (Bindner, 2018, p. 4).

As described above, terrorist groups like Daesh do not confine themselves to one geographic area but carry out their operations in countries they openly fight. The recurring threat of transnational terrorist groups and their unconventional tactics has shown that governments are inadequately prepared to deal with attacks of this recurring scale. Dafna Rand described at a Congressional hearing, that through their initial successes in Iraq and Syria, Daesh had gained massive self-confidence and adopted a military doctrine that is not based on the typical terrorist logic of fighting the weak against the strong, but seeks to fight states and their militaries on equal terms (The Growing Strategic Threat of Isis, 2015, p. 23).

Although Salafist jihadists focus on anti-Shia propaganda, al-Qaeda Central had emphasised the fight against the "far enemy" (America and its European allies), while Daesh, at the beginning of its rise, dismissed the fight against America and Europe as a secondary goal and mainly fought the "near enemy" (Shia regimes and secular pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world) (Gerges, 2014, p. 340). However, this perspective failed to recognize the significant appeal of Daesh's extremist ideology, and while the Middle East remained their primary operational theatre, the rise in attacks linked to the Islamic State from 2014 to 2015

demonstrated the legitimate concern of international terrorism (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015). The success of Daesh's strategy targeting the far enemy was evident through the occurrence of 101 Daesh-related attacks in Western countries between 2014 and 2016, resulting in the loss of over 273 lives in Europe (Celso, 2018, p. 183). Countries like France were particularly affected. 17 jihadist-inspired violent attacks happened in France between January 2012 and June 2016 alone (Mullins, 2016, p. 28).

Daesh employed a range of tactics to undermine European security, including the involvement of commando teams trained and financed overseas, as exemplified by the November 2015 Paris attack (Celso, 2018, p. 184). These attacks, carried out using firearms and explosive devices, have been the deadliest in IS's campaign of terror, although they constitute only a fraction of the overall assault on the West (2018, p. 184). However, these massive attacks were not one of the group's main methods. Prior to the Paris attacks, a study examining jihadi plots in Europe from 2011 to mid-2015 revealed that the Islamic State primarily inspired attacks rather than directly orchestrating them (Byman, 2016, p. 157). Sam Mullins reported that 70 percent of Daesh-linked terrorist acts in the West were perpetrated by lone actors (2016, p. 28). This alarming number of individuals inspired by IS propaganda to target Westerners poses a significant concern, and some of these attacks have resulted in mass casualties through the use of conventional firearms, knives, axes, suicide explosive vests, and notably, vehicles such as trucks (Celso, 2018, p. 184). Transnational terrorist organisations such as Daesh represent an extremist ideology that combines radical interpretations of Islam with political goals. Their danger lies in their ability to exploit grievances, to manipulate through propaganda, and to recruit and mobilise people worldwide. Its ability to adapt to changing situations and change its strategy is what makes it so highly threatening. By moving to decentralised structures after the destruction of the caliphate and using asymmetric warfare tactics, their fight requires a comprehensive approach (Rumman, 2021, p. 14). What methods should be used to combat them and whether this repertoire of methods should include the military is a matter of ongoing debate (Andreeva, 2020; Edmunds, 2006).

The strength of terrorism lies not in the action itself, but in the reaction, and by achieving disproportionately large effects, terrorists are able to cause alarm worldwide and force governments to deal with them (Erickson, 1989, p. 31). According to Robert Grant, terrorism "creates the enormous frustration for a government of not being able to provide for the security of its citizens, and undermines public perceptions of the government´s ability to rule" (Grant, 1986, cited in Erickson, 1989, p. 31). At the same time, the principle that terrorists can attack everything, everywhere and at any time and that governments cannot protect everything, everywhere and at any time (Jenkins, 1986, p. 777) has not changed.

5.2 Opération Sentinelle

Following the attack on the headquarters of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, the government under President François Hollande supplemented the Vigipirate alert plan with a more explicit system of militarised physical protection in the form of Opération Sentinelle as an immediate response (Chalk, 2022, p. 634). The French army's involvement in counterterrorism is governed by the Vigipirate plan, developed in the 1970s but not implemented until the early 1990s, which consists of two stages: Vigipirate simple, involving increased controls and surveillance of critical sites, and Vigipirate renforcé, allowing military units to assist police forces (Lutterbeck, 2005, p. 243). During 1995 and 1996, following a series of terrorist attacks on French soil, Vigipirate renforcé was implemented, leading to the deployment of approximately 4,500 soldiers across the country, with around half stationed in Paris to conduct surveillance of public sites, including the metro system (Lutterbeck, 2005, p. 243).

Opération Sentinelle involved the deployment of up to 10,000 troops to support the police and the gendarmerie - and their respective commando units - in containing and dealing with the aftermath of a major crisis in France (Chalk, 2022, p. 634). Following the November 2015 Paris attacks, a state of emergency was declared with temporary border checks, multiple police raids, and arrests

conducted both in France and Belgium (Bartolucci, 2017, p. 438). However, the deployment of Opération Sentinelle and the subsequent state of emergency raised questions about the correctness of these decisions and their potential impact. Pisoiu & Hain emphasize that while the use of military force has frequently been a reflexive response to terrorism, it has proven effective in ending only a limited number of terrorist campaigns, with its usefulness depending on specific circumstances, similar to decapitation strategies (Pisoiu & Hain, 2018, p. 183). The use of force becomes necessary and effective when a terrorist threat evolves into an insurgency, especially when the terrorist group gains enough power to challenge the state through the actual takeover of territory, making the military the primary responder (Pisoiu & Hain, 2018, p. 183). However, this threshold of threat to the state was never crossed. While Sentinelle was accepted as a necessary measure to improve 'target resilience' across the country, it was not seen as really relevant to addressing the root cause of jihadist attacks: the failure of intelligence agencies to share their respective intelligence pools and act quickly (Chalk, 2022, p. 634). Beyond that, the deployment had several effects. Thus, the use of the military to combat transnational terrorism as part of internal policing has, over time, led to securitisation rather than militarisation (Kuehn & Levy, 2020, p. 8). Sentinelle, initially established as a temporary measure, became permanent in April 2016 and was reduced to 3,000 troops in 2021, while the state of emergency ended in 2017 when President Emmanuel Macron replaced it with a robust anti-terrorism law that reinforced emergency measures, granting law enforcement extended search powers, closure of religious sites promoting radical ideas, and restrictions on the movement of suspected jihadist sympathizers (Fougières & El Karoui, 2021).

Furthermore, the balance of autonomy has shifted in favor of the military. Compared to other democratic nations, the French military organization has shown a low degree of military autonomy in the past (Irondelle, 2008). During Hollande's presidency, the military's role by prioritizing the Defense Council over the Internal Security Council, launching a domestic operation, and reinforcing military operations abroad, resulted in an increased level of military autonomy (Bove et al., 2020, p. 272). According to Grégory Daho (2020), it is challenging to

assess the effects of the militarization of antiterrorism on civil-military relations due to the ongoing process and mixed empirical signals. On one hand, the domestic "fight against terrorism" through Opération Sentinelle has brought the military closer to the French population, reducing the civil-military gap (Daho, 2020, p. 2). Thus, trust in the military far outpaced trust in other institutions in France in 2018 (Johnson, 2018). However, on the other hand, the lack of direct transfer of training and resources between missions implies that inward-facing forces are likely to be more challenging to control than outward-facing ones, suggesting that military doctrines with an external orientation are more conducive to civilian control, while inward-looking doctrines tend to undermine it, making external orientation a necessary, if not always sufficient, condition for strong civilian control of the military (Desch, 2001, p. 18). In the case of France, however, the political use of the military as a police force or a symbol of national unity has allowed civilians to firmly regain control, evident in the declaration and prolongation of the state of emergency, increased executive control over intelligence operations, and the proliferation of martial language (Daho, 2020, p. 2).

6 Security Organs

France has two central police forces: the national police, which has civilian status, and the national gendarmerie, which has military status. They are hierarchical institutions, with the centre having formal control over the intermediate levels and the base of their organisations (Anderson, 2021, p. 66). Neither is less civilian than the other and both have full law enforcement powers over the civilian population, both in day-to-day policing and in the management of large-scale emergencies. However, both agencies have clearly defined areas of responsibility. While the police is responsible for law enforcement in urban areas, the gendarmerie is responsible for smaller towns and rural areas. Under this division, the gendarmerie

is responsible for policing about 95 per cent of the national territory, although only 50 per cent of the population falls within its jurisdiction (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 22).

6.1 Police

The police, originally a municipal police force, was created in 1941 under the Vichy regime. Since then, despite its civilian nature, it has been organised in a centralised manner (Anderson, 2011, p. 103). As a result of this centralisation and the fact that the operational area of the police is located in large cities and thus in problem neighbourhoods with a high potential for violence, the approximately 140,000 officers today are often closer to the government than to the local population (Mouhanna, 2013).

For some time now, the police force has been faced with a situation where, in addition to its internal policing tasks, it has had to integrate the fight against transnational threats affecting the French territory. Andreas Fischer-Lescano (2004, p. 67) observes that the decision to take action against globally active terrorist organisations after 11 September 2001 has led to a hybridisation of security policy instruments. More precisely, he speaks of a synergy of all state instruments of security provision integrated into this action. Various major events, such as terrorist attacks on French soil, have reinforced the training and equipment of the civil police in a defensive stance against increasingly capable actors. Thus, in response to the inferiority of ordinary patrol officers against the assailants armed with assault rifles in November 2015, the Minister of the Interior equipped the Paris police with high-powered assault rifles and Kalashnikov-resistant shields (Chadwick, 2016). This should enable future patrol officers to repel high-intensity terrorist attacks as quickly as possible. Furthermore, there are several highly specialised units with many years of operational experience. The most important special unit of the police is RAID (Recherche, Assistance, Intervention et Dissuasion). RAID evolved from the Anti-Commando Brigade (BAC), which was set up after the Munich attacks in 1972. Since 1985, RAID has been responsible

for the security of critical infrastructure and the fight against terrorism (Gregory, 2003, p. 136).

6.2 Gendarmerie

Predecessors of the gendarmerie were the military cavalry corps, the Maréchaussée, of the Ancien Régime. According to Pierre Gobinet, the Maréchaussée emerged at a time of political and social unrest, when France was struggling with a weak government and the aftermath of the violence of the Revolution. Its aim was to assert national sovereignty and create a sense of unity (2008, p. 451). In 1791, the gendarmerie Nationale replaced the Maréchaussée while retaining its military structure. This change reflected the revolutionary ideals of equality and separation of powers. By extending the reach of the state into rural areas and offering protection from crime and corruption in exchange for civic duties such as taxation and military service, the gendarmerie struck a balance between central control and community orientation (Gobinet, 2008, p. 451).

Since its foundation, the gendarmerie has been part of the military. But over time, the subaltern status of the gendarmerie changed. In 1950, the gendarmerie was made independent of the army and directly subordinate to the Minister of Defence (Durand, 2019, p. 19). Since 2009, the budget and personnel of the gendarmerie have been subordinate to the Minister of the Interior, but remain under the jurisdiction of the judicial authority for judicial tasks and the Minister of Defence for military tasks and status (Lutterbeck, 2013, pp. 21–22). This mission-oriented subordination is necessary because the gendarmerie is not only deployed for internal security, but also regularly for external security in interstate conflicts. The French gendarmerie was actively involved in all of France's major wars, both as military police and as combat troops (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 9). This may also be due to the fact that a purely military option often fails to address the complexity of crisis situations. (Fischer-Lescano, 2004, p. 70). In addition to the approx. 100,000 active officers, there are a further 30,000 reservists who can be called upon.

According to Derek Lutterbeck, the military status at home is mainly reflected in the internal structure, which is organised along military lines and thus more centralised and hierarchised than civilian police forces. Furthermore, the gendarmerie is usually equipped with heavier weapons and equipment than purely civilian police forces (2013, p. 9). With the Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) and the Escadrons de Parachutistes et Intervention de la Gendarmerie (EPIGN), the gendarmerie also has particularly powerful special units for combating terrorism. Since its creation in the 1970s, the GIGN has grown from less than 100 to around 400 officers (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 16). Its most famous operation took place in February 1976, when it spectacularly freed 30 French children taken hostage in Djibouti by members of the Somali Liberation Front (Gregory, 2003, p. 136). At the time, the army did not have the necessary specialists to carry out such an operation.

In its various roles, the gendarmerie sees itself as a multidimensional force, military in its organisation but civilian in its actions. This is probably the main difference between the civilian police and the military. While these two security actors find it difficult to increase or decrease their potential for violence, the gendarmerie is more flexible in responding to different security challenges.

6.3   Counterterrorism Capabilities

France has developed a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy based on the experience of past terrorist security situations. The National Coordination of Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism (CNRLT) was created by decree in June 2017. The CNRLT has two different tasks, mainly the coordination of the general activities of the intelligence services as well as the control – through the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (CNCT), which was created at the same time – of all the services contributing to the fight against terrorism (National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordination, 2017). The police and the gendarmerie are closely integrated into this security apparatus. Developments in police training, management and service coordination have been far-reaching over the past three

decades. Pierre Joxe, Minister of the Interior (1984-1986, 1988-1991) and Minister of Defense (1991-1993), established a process of modernization of the police and gendarmerie, in the context of which improved efficiency of criminal investigations into all types of crime, crime prevention efforts, better deployment and better coordination of policing were achieved (Anderson, 2021, p. 64). Furthermore, coordinating the gendarmerie with the police has been a longstanding priority aimed at improving efficiency. Since the early 1990s, measures have been taken to ensure that the police and the gendarmerie work together to achieve close cooperation in criminal investigations through regional task forces (Anderson, 2021, p. 65). Additionally, both services have capacities and specialised units to deal with a wide range of threats. In particular, since its foundation, the gendarmerie has been characterised as an instrument of order by stationary, networked and continuous territorial control (Gobinet, 2008, p. 451). This enables rapid and targeted support to police operations at national level when needed. The combined forces of the police and the gendarmerie, as well as the specialised skills of the GIGN and RAID, are therefore very well suited to the fight against terrorism in the interior of France.

Due to its close relationship with the vicissitudes of historical events, the army has always been closely linked to the birth and development of the French Republic. Its role as a means of maintaining order and providing effective service has not changed. Security challenges, such as the fight against transnational terrorism, have gradually been entrusted to the military. However, what has proven to be an essential component of military action for more than two decades cannot simply be projected onto every area of operation. Especially against the backdrop of historical discord, the usefulness of the massive deployment of military forces at home must be critically questioned.

7 Discussion

7.1 The Military's Main Task(s)

With the changes in the international environment, the military is no longer just a tool for defending or extending national borders. Especially because of that, it was important for the research to identify the framework in which the French military carries out its tasks and where the focus is placed. In the interviews, the experts addressed the core mission of the armed forces, according to which, "as any other rule of law-based system […] let's say the primary function of the French armed forces would be protecting French territory, protecting the territory from potential external sources of threats and insecurities. Traditionally and technically armed forces are concerned with external defence" (Interview 5). Apparently, little has changed in this basic understanding of core military competence. In particular, the potential for high kinetic force is still a unique feature of the military's competencies. For none of the interviewees, the question was whether the principle of national defence still existed, but rather what operations could be derived from it. In particular, the question of "where" is not simply defined by the statement that the armed forces defend French territory and the prevailing order in the event of war but is also determined by the specific historical background and current political choices. "Usually the mission, the purpose, the mission of the military doesn't stay with just pure protection of borders. Like other post-colonial, post-imperial countries. It uses the armed forces, quite actively sort of protecting its interest, and its influence on the post-imperial, post-colonial sphere, especially in Africa" (Interview 4). It was not only France's national security interests that changed after 1961, but also the entire global security order, in which other threats dictated new responses and new orientations. What has remained from the earlier military orientation is the interest in independent engagement in former French colonies and spheres of influence, while maintaining its own autonomy. The military serves as one of the key instruments in France's pursuit of a genuinely sovereign foreign policy. In particular, the change in force structure from a

predominantly conscript metropolitan army to a fully professional expeditionary army was mentioned as a key turning point. The transition to an all-professional, expeditionary army created a tension between focusing on training for conventional warfare and focusing on counter-terrorism campaigns. This also explains how the state views the armed forces. Having engaged in over two decades of war on terror and a significant history of counterinsurgency, there is a risk of over-prioritizing this growing military capability over traditional tasks like conventional warfare against state actors in the context of national defence.

7.2 Asymmetric Threat

As described, threats such as internationally operating terrorist groups defy conventional threat assessments. Their adaptability and proliferation make categorisation difficult. "So well, when it comes to terrorism, the tricky thing is that it's not exactly a typical external symmetric threat. But it's a type of threat, it's a type of security challenge that crosses borders quite easily. Right? So, it. This is why it's called a transnational threat" (Interview 5). What characterises the jihadist terrorism found here is a willingness to attack not only selected targets but also indiscriminately. No distinction is made between combatants and neutrals, or between legitimate and illegitimate targets. The external and internal manifestations of this threat require a multidimensional approach in the network of state security agencies. For example, dismantling Daesh's presence in Syria and Iraq could also reduce the terrorist threat inside France. The Paris attacks put these capabilities to the test, but the adapted strategies of terrorist actors also show that prioritising or hierarchising threats is not very effective, „I mean, this is just useless […] to make hierarchies of threats" (Interview 1). Unlike conventional threats and experience in dealing with counterterrorism abroad, new threats have a specification that is essential in assessing their treatment: "The specificity of new threats, terrorism, disease, is that there are no massive and frontal threats" (Interview 1). Despite its self-presentation as an equal opponent, Daesh's activities in France clearly represent an asymmetric threat. In a military context, this means that Daesh is a

weaker actor that poses a threat that cannot be directly countered by traditional military means or strategies of a conventional army. As Desch (2001) notes, it is the threats that determine the strength of civilian control over the military. But it can also be said that it is the response to the threat that determines the nature of the control. The military obeys, but factors such as society's reaction to the terrorist threat that the military's prioritisation creates cannot be controlled. For this consideration, it is clearly an unequal relationship in which Daesh is no match for the French military in terms of size, resources, tactics or capabilities. Not once in the interviews was it pointed out that Daesh in its current constellation represents the potential of a peer adversary for the military. Also, for this reason, the perpetrators are relying on unconventional and decentralised actions.

7.3   Military Threat Terrorism

The question of whether an acute threat is a danger that must be countered with military means is an assessment that must be made by civilian decision-makers. While counterinsurgency and counterterrorist threats have long been part of the core competence of French combat units deployed abroad, the assessment of whether countering terrorist threats at home with military means is not too far from a clear-cut. Particularly because groups like Daesh behave completely differently in their main areas of proliferation than in their declared enemy states like France. In fact, French soldiers are well trained and equipped to face the specific threats in countries like Mali "In that deployment France was well positioned to counter the Islamist threat in Mali. So, that should be, I think it should be the primary purposes of the French military" (Interview 4). Outside France, the military threat today is characterised by scenarios set in war zones and destabilised regions where basic mechanisms of order have failed and a high level of potential use of force is required. Yes, the military is heavily involved in the fight against terrorism, but on a completely different scale than in France. By deploying soldiers as a means of directly preventing further terrorist attacks, terrorism is established as a narrative of war and thus escalated „And obviously when we are

discussing terrorism as this type of threat as a let's say, kind of terrorist warfare. When we are using warfare narrative. And we are describing terrorism as a war issue" (Interview 5). Instead, the prioritisation of the combat strategy was on for the civilian authorities to make, whereby the choice of the military is not necessarily based on the principle of fighting the source, "Well. If the question was whether it's better to use the military than other law enforcement agencies, then certainly it's better to use other law enforcement agencies" (Interview 4). What is important is that in France we are dealing with a different form of threat, one that is being fought with the means that are appropriate to the context. Given Daesh's specific ideological aspects - takfirist, sectarian and apocalyptic - and the association of its attacks with total self-sacrifice through martyrdom, it is a particularly dangerous opponent.

Although President Hollande speaks of war in his speech, the threat of domestic terrorism must be recognised and combated as an extreme form of crime, not as a war "The thing is that historically, within Europe terrorism, even transnational form of priorities, which are not new by the way, nor in France, nor in other parts of Europe. It's historically, traditionally, we would consider that still, let's say, extreme forms of crimes." (Interview 5). Which makes it necessary to clarify the rationale for the deployment.

7.4 Justification for the Internal Operation in France

Sentinelle appeared reasonable from a symbolic point of view. However, the Paris attacks in 2015 do not seem to have convinced any of the respondents that it would make sense to deploy 10,000 troops in response to terrorist attacks. There is no evidence that the internal threat posed by Daesh was too great to be dealt with by conventional agencies and security mechanisms. When asked what kind of event would justify such a deployment, there were different scenarios mentioned, but generally the focus was on the potential size of the event and the level of devastation. In particular, it was stressed that this was primarily a political decision. "So, it's not a question of using the military for our terrorist context. It's using the

military on a mass murderer context, which is different, and which is a political choice" (Interview 1). In other words, the decision was based less on subjective factors than on the political variables that existed at the time. However, Sentinelle was not a response to an acute attack, but to a latent threat that followed the Daesh assaults. „But it would take, like the jihadists threat, to really get large for that to require Sentinelle scale" (Interview 3). This makes the deployment itself a rather optional decision and cannot be seen as a choice without an alternative. Other justifications for a high scale deployment, on the other hand, included "Well, usually war, actual war" (Interview 5) as well as "Unconventional, big attacks, something very big. I don't mean Bataclan. I mean, bacteriological massive attacks on the water system in Paris, Marseille, Orléans. Something very big. Nuclear attacks. Civil War, economic blackouts. I'm open minded. You want to use massively the military on the national territory. Give me big reasons to do so" (Interview 1). Among other things, the loss of state sovereignty through the elimination of the civilian executive was seen as a reason to legitimise military action "A failure of police, a failure of the gendarmerie, a failure of internal security forces. And, but, and as a strict condition of respect of international humanitarian law and maintenance of checks and balances institutions, and the maintenance of subordination of the military to the political authorities" (Interview 2). This view was in line with the widely shared perception that the failure or inadequacy of the civilian security forces could be compensated for by military support, if it came to that. Police and gendarmerie would therefore have to be overburdened, which could jeopardise domestic order. "So basically, it's a deployment of soldiers in an aid to support civilian authorities, to civilian powers." (Interview 4). Indicative in the case of a simultaneous hazardous situation that does not allow coverage by conventional means. „So, some point the scale of it in the dispersion. The geographic dispersion overwhelms them. Maybe the dispersion is more important than the scale, right?" (Interview 3). Interestingly, the decision to take military action was not seen as an escalation but also as an interim solution. This could also be due to the fact that the military was initially under the control and in coordination with civilian forces and did not act alone, "and, at least I think political

authorities in France where strong minded enough not to go into full berserker mode, such as the US did in 2003. And I think deployment of Opération Sentinelle, was kind of, how do we call that? It's not hot. It's not cold, it's medium water, right? That's what the political authorities did as a reaction" (Interview 2). It can be argued that certain criteria are needed to credibly justify the use of the military. For a domestic military operation on the scale of 2015, there would have to be an imminent threat that civilian forces could not cope with, that would endanger sovereignty, and that could be adequately responded to by military means.

7.5   Manifestation of the State

There is, however, a not insignificant argument in favour of a domestic military deployment. In the face of massive attacks, such as in Paris in 2015, civilian authorities have had to find quick responses to show their presence and reassure civilians that they have the situation under control. One way of doing this can be to use extraordinary means, such as deploying soldiers. There is hardly any other symbol that so clearly manifests a lethal threat as the visible presence of heavily armed security forces such as soldiers in everyday life. However, the inevitable government response must be careful not to open a dialogue, but a symbol of strength and cohesion. "Terrorists want to have a dialogue and governance tries not to have dialogue with them or unofficial ones" (Interview 2). The government's actions symbolise the state's stance towards the actions of terrorist groups. Particularly in the face of institutional weakness and the failure of the security apparatus there is a need to show strength. "From a state perspective [it] might be a way of reducing political responsibility and vulnerability, for instance. But I would say that the big advantage, especially in counterterrorism is that armed forces are very visible. Very visible. And they allow you to show an immediate, operative strong response" (Interview 5). In the moment of catastrophe, the state manifests itself through the soldiers in the streets: "But I still see that their soldiers in the streets sort of manifestation of the presence of the state and the presence of the security agencies. And basically, they are there to just, to let's say, to be a

guardsman" (Interview 4). In response to the devastating events, there were suggestions that a civilian, rule-of-law process be put in place to deal with the situation and bring the perpetrators to justice. Counter-terrorism efforts involve judicial, police, intelligence and military components, with the military primarily projecting power to reassure the population. The idea of a trial and individualised sanctions against the persons persecuted is seen as a way of restoring order and maintaining public safety in the country, thus preventing the legitimisation of armed means. What this indicates is that the use of the military can only satisfy the immediate feeling of security, and that further abilities to manage a scenario are no longer to be found in the field of military tasks. Especially when the subsequent attacks are no longer on the scale of the Stade de France or the Bataclan, but small, isolated attacks that can only be fought with the means of the law enforcement agencies.

7.6 Military Capabilities

While the symbolic effect of a military operation seems obvious, an essential aspect is left out. Less attention is paid to the suppressive potential of the military in domestic counter-terrorism operations. Opération Sentinelle challenged the armed forces in their traditional composition.

As with other aspects before, in the question of military capabilities and their suitability to face a domestic terrorist threat, there were differentiated assessments in the interviews. The focus here was primarily on exactly which capability is needed or can be deployed. On the one hand "So, they've had to think about all of that, because that's not something that the army automatically knows how to do, and not prepared for that kind of thing" (Interview 3) the military found themselves in an unfamiliar situation for which they had not specifically prepared. On the other hand, "The fact that actually French military is this sort of post-colonial military with still lots of out of area ore expeditionary commitments provides it with some skills that can be useful in counterterrorism" (Interview 4). Specialised knowledge may be required in situations with a high potential for

violence, where the military is a crucial instrument. "And again, in those kinds of scenarios and those kinds of scenes where you need an on the ground technical response, especially in sensitive areas, the military can give you the best technical coverage in this sense" (Interview 5). Moreover, it could be deployed quickly. "Obviously deploying the army is, makes it much easier to have a prompt security military response to a potential threat. And it would be, in a sense easier and more effective and faster to respond to the threat via the military" (Interview 5). In all these considerations, however, the area of activity must always be considered. In the context of a deployment at home, in a country that is not directly at war, the aspect of warrior culture also comes into play. "The Sahel operation is a Special Forces operation. I mean, it´s operation for the elite of the armed force […]. Who are the jihadist boss? Who are the jihadist logistic boss? Give the list and we are going to kill them on orders" (Interview 1). "Except abroad. I mean abroad, it's relevant to go in failed countries. We work on this time services and go fetch some people, right? That's part of their job, but not on domestic soil (Interview 2). This is less about soldiers not being able to tell where they are being deployed. It is more about whether the military is forced to create unclear perspectives and lose sight of its core tasks in the actual war zones. Following Stanislav Andreski's concept, it is important to deploy the French military primarily outside the country, emphasising the inherent incompatibility between internal deployment and external warfare; in essence, frequent internal deployments could reduce the military's effectiveness in combat. Demanding that the French armed forces should be broad-based, cover all capabilities, be autonomous and at the same time prioritise certain threats is a concept for the role of the armed forces that is simply difficult to realise. "So, our model of army is a little model of army trying to do everything. Space Forces, cybersecurity, hybrid sphere, nuclear deterrence, intervention in Africa. Small armies, small budgets, small states, but a mobile army capable to do everything. So, you cannot just make a hierarchy of the threats, you cannot just make the hierarchy of your enemy. You are you are prepared to do everything and finally nothing" (Interview 1).

7.7 Gendarmerie Capabilities

Alongside the police, the gendarmerie plays a special role in the French security apparatus, particularly in the fight against terrorism. The question of whether the gendarmerie is the most effective tool in the fight against terrorism has led to different results. Some of the speakers consider the gendarmerie as a praetorian institution that secures political authority vis-à-vis the military, "I think you have to see gendarmerie as a praetorian institution" (Interview 2). This competition between internal security forces, including the gendarmerie, is seen as one of the unnoticed aspects of the republic. For others, the gendarmerie is an institution that sits between the military and the police and functions as a law enforcement agency but is more military-oriented in its hierarchical and cultural structure. Results of the questionnaire suggest that the presence of gendarmerie forces increases the likelihood of success in combating terrorist activities. However, the impact of gendarmerie deployment on the fight against terrorist groups also depends on whether the available resources are used or disregarded. Especially regarding their rapid response units like G.I.G.N., which are highly skilled and proficient in handling violent situations, particularly in terms of shooting, "It's police. You know. The gendarmerie also have these rapid response forces that G.I.G.N. I think they're called, yeah. Yeah, yeah, those guys are serious. They're hardcore. And so, I think, that one thing they're very good at is shooting, right? So, when it comes to violence, they're very good at that" (Interview 3). Gendarmerie forces have demonstrated their ability to balance police and military duties under the most difficult conditions. They are deployed in situations requiring both defence capabilities and the maintenance of public order. Whether in UN peacekeeping missions or in European Union CSDP missions, they have the necessary skills to carry out defence-related tasks alongside civil control and public order requirements, making them well equipped to respond to such threats domestically in France. Their day-to-day activity in civilian spaces and their perception as a regular police force favours relatively inconspicuous action, whereas the deployment of the military sends a signal of escalation. It is the crucial ability of

law enforcement forces not only to possess the necessary tools, such as investigation and data collection, to prevent potential threats and attacks, but also the ability to respond effectively after a security event has occurred, using the judicial system to take appropriate action. Only the police and gendarmerie can provide this legal response to attacks; the military cannot and is not authorised to do so. Where the gendarmerie cannot replace the military is in the constant and large-scale surveillance of public spaces, which is carried out by the military, "The gendarmerie exactly, also because they deal with a number of issues, they might not necessarily have the same capacity in the long run to respond military to the threat if you do consider it so" (Interview 5). However, the effectiveness of this task is questionable. It is difficult to determine whether it prevents or deters terrorist attacks.

7.8 Algeria Coup D'état

With the exception of one interview, the events in Algeria were mentioned in all the interviews and classified as an important event in the development of civil-military relations in France. As not a single question referred to this historical event, its presence and prominence is a strong indication that this rupture between the military and the civilian government under Charles de Gaulle continues to have repercussions today. On the one hand, this rupture gave rise to new institutions that allow civilian decision-makers to pursue their preferences (DeVore, 2019, p. 164), on the other hand, the relationship has been based on mistrust since the birth of the Fifth Republic. "It's a big thing, especially in a French tradition. Do not forget that our current regime the Fifth Republic, was made on coup d'état in Algeria. So, there is a tradition of mistrust between political authorities and top-ranking officers" (Interview 1). The fact that the memory of the events of 1961 is not a distant memory but a very present one in the minds of the French officers was made clear by various statements, „And that being said. There is this weird nostalgia that goes on, particularly amongst older officers about Algeria and Indochina. Including some of the putschist, like the people involved in the coup

61 or 62. You know, they kind of sympathize with them" (Interview 3). Certain key figures are still central to the (personal) education and culture of officers, "Like it's, it's uncomfortable that it's sort of the romanticization of the commanders of Indochina, and Algeria. The one I'm thinking most of is Hélie Denoix de Saint Marc. Who was one of the putschist in 61. And he's regarded as a saint by French officers, and they've all read his memoirs, all of them." (Interview 3).

However, none of the interviewees recognised the possibility of a future coup d'état in France in the current circumstances. Rather, the presence of these actions in the current civil-military development was highlighted. Although the context is different in the case of Algeria, the threats themselves are different and the way they are dealt with has changed, the situational perspective is not irrelevant. As described by Desch (2001) and emphasised by interviewees "So, the 1950s were sort of burdened with this kind of almost like existential threats to both sort of the […] continental metropole of France, and the imperial positions of France in the world." (Interview 4). It is true that since 2015 there has been a threat situation with significant external and internal components. However, it can only be partially overcome by military means. The political view of an apolitical, silent and obedient army neglects the integration of officers and commanders, which is so important according to Janowitz. It is therefore also necessary to ask what burdens, but also what benefits, have arisen.

Overall, the operation has had a mixed impact on the military. Opération Sentinelle required special training for soldiers that was different from the training they received in their usual areas of operation, such as the Sahel. However, this also put a strain on resources and personnel, affecting the overall capacity of the force. "You know the military is not like waiting for something while not being deployed. They are training and process and basically preparing for deployment elsewhere" (Interview 4). Such a sudden deployment of troops for security purposes disrupted the normal training and deployment cycle of the military. The large number of troops required for security and the need for rest periods for units created resource

and scheduling problems and led to difficulties in sustaining such deployments, both nationally and internationally.

It is not going too far to say that Sentinelle gave the military an opportunity to 'come back'. It was seen as an opportunity to improve its own status in public discourse and to strengthen its reputation as one of the most respected institutions in the court of public opinion. Although the launch of this operation initially caused hardship and dissatisfaction among officers, it paid off for the armed forces in the long run. The increased public visibility in the form of protection duties led to the military gaining a high status in society's estimation. This new-found prestige and the broadening of its remit made it easier for the political authorities to ask for more resources. "So Sentinelle allows the military to lobby more efficiently political authorities" (Interview 1). For the military, the increase in the overall strength of the armed forces and the budgetary demands are demands to be negotiated with the political authorities, and Opération Sentinelle allows them to participate more efficiently and successfully in this process.

Whether this will have a long-term impact on the efficiency of the armed forces or reduce the leverage of civilian control in resource disputes, cannot be determined from this event alone. What is certain is that the military was able to turn the situation to its advantage, demonstrating adaptability and, more broadly, strategic efficiency. Admittedly, the decision to allocate a not inconsiderable proportion of the armed forces to guard public facilities and places necessitated an abrupt adjustment that strained the military logistically, in terms of personnel and resources. On the other hand, the reduction in the number of troops in the course of Sentinelle has reduced the burden on the armed forces considerably, although the positive aspects do not seem to have been reduced to the same extent.

7.9 Eroding Taboo

The recurring reference was striking as the military is now deployed extensively and for prolonged periods domestically, indicating a notable change in conditions. What was intended to be a temporary measure is still in place today. In particular, the threat that previous taboos are eroding and gradually taking on a life of their own was often emphasised. One aspect includes the growing possibility that the military will play a more prominent role in addressing national challenges swiftly. In addition to counterterrorism, the military is also strategically deployed during health emergencies, e.g. in the form of logistical support during the Covid 19 pandemic. The deployment of the army is directly related to the state of emergency and special measures, "This is not just about terrorists. This is not just about 2008 financial crack. This is about COVID crisis, this is about jurisdictional emergency powers, this is about telling the French people now you will stay at home during three months because we don't have any vaccine to give you. The acceptance of crisis management, the acceptance of strong executive powers going full legislative norms, symptoms of resiliency, and this is just unbelievable" (Interview 1). On another occasion, during the "yellow vest" demonstrations in Paris, the government deployed soldiers from Opération Sentinelle to replace police forces guarding sensitive sites, allowing them to take part in riot control against the said demonstrators, effectively using the anti-terrorist operation to maintain order. The aforementioned open letter represents another breakthrough. It calls into question the French officers' long-standing and sacrosanct policy of not communicating in public. It is impossible to say that France's civil-military relations are in jeopardy as a result, but it is part of a larger picture in which various cracks are appearing that need to be closely monitored. This is not a situation in which control over the armed forces is lost, but rather a matter of definitional sovereignty. If the state does not bring an operation of the military to an end but normalises it by continuing it, it may lose the authority to interpret the role of the military. "Or probably the perceived role and utility of the force associated with the military in France. Because the combination between these increased deployments. These longer and

more intense antiterrorism operations, with the extension of the state of emergency over multiple years. But also, with the kind of a martial language narrative employed by French authorities. Somehow, all these elements together somehow have again normalized a new role, a new utility, a new legitimacy of the military power represented by the armed forces in France" (Interview 5).

In addition, one aspect with critical potential must be mentioned. Subordination involves directing the military to carry out tasks, even if they are reluctant or opposed to them.

Compliance with such an involuntary order is an essential part of effective control. These decisions are the acid test. Especially since the Algeria War, the French military has strongly held the belief that they are not a domestic tool of politics, as demonstrated in their reluctance towards Opérations Sentinelle. Although they may comply with such tasks when ordered, their primary focus lies elsewhere, and they have valid reasons for their reservations. It becomes evident that the crucial factor here is time. Utilizing the military briefly during moments of shock to demonstrate power and state presence can yield significant effects. None of the main roles of the armed forces are being questioned, nor are their areas of responsibility being compromised. In the long run, this stationary deployment opens up unpredictable interactions, including the possibility of non-subordination to the demands of civil authorities. "We could see basically the manifestations of some civil-military problems that actually are very closely related to this sort of counterterrorism engagement. So, if actually the sort of the military machine, or if actually this type of counterterrorist mission become normalized for the military. Then, well we can see more of this tendency towards, dissociation, of the officer core" (Interview 4).

8 Conclusion

What becomes evident is that civil-military relations are more nuanced than initially perceived. It is not merely a two-sided relationship but rather a complex, multi-layered pattern of interactions. The question of who controls whom, what influence political leaders have on the military and vice versa, and what balance is most stable goes far beyond the institutionalised and codified interaction between actors. A political decision with the relatively clear task of protecting public spaces and sensitive sites from an omnipresent threat triggers different reactions and tendencies that can permanently change this relationship. In order to understand this connection and why a military obeys a civilian authority, the background and history of civil-military relations in France had to be explored. Despite discord in the past, the French army is a professional force that obeys civilian authority, demonstrating its commitment to upholding democratic principles and safeguarding the nation's security under the oversight of elected officials. It is a stable relationship, but it is also subject to change and challenges. An unconventional challenge was the fight against transnational terrorism, which dominated the public consciousness with its highly visible attacks. For this it was necessary to clarify what terrorist threat existed in France and whether this threat had reached a scale that had to be countered by military means. It was found that a significant terrorist threat persists on French territory, but not at a military level. Instead, the regular security forces, particularly the police and gendarmerie, possess the necessary equipment, training, and organizational structure to effectively address the threat and respond with force in acute dangerous situations. However, domestic operations should not be outright dismissed, as they can effectively demonstrate the state's strength in exceptional situations. France benefits from a favourable position, given the president's ability to make swift and independent decisions. Careful consideration is necessary for such operations, as the military might not always be adequately prepared for large-scale involvement, and their frequent use may lead to normalization, diminishing the impact of symbolic actions with soldiers on the streets. Especially the construction of terrorism as a war

narrative reveals tendencies that cross a threshold of jurisdiction and make further escalation more difficult in other, more appropriate situations. In the case of France and its decision in 2015 to involve the military in counterterrorism operations on a large scale and for the long term, several observations were made. It is important that the French government does not get carried away with its reactions that seem to demonstrate its ability to govern. With the military unable to tackle the core of the problem, but only its symptoms, the government appears weak and incapable in the face of ongoing attacks. Terrorists can operate and strike even under massive surveillance, as lone perpetrators have done time and again. Strengthening civilian police capabilities is therefore the primary measure. France has succeeded in establishing effective, objective civilian control and granting the military a degree of autonomy. The involvement of the armed forces in areas of law enforcement is altering what used to be clear objective civilian control into partly subjective civilian control. This is far from a complete transformation, but the French government is weakening an effective system without need. A priority must be to restore a clearly defined relationship with defined responsibilities, despite the drawbacks, as the military has strengthened its position over civilian authorities. Domestic operations tie up forces and hinder the military's expeditionary deployments. However, they have led to increased public support for the armed forces and strengthened the military's long-term negotiating position due to its proximity to decision-makers. Therefore, political interests and military realities need to be better balanced in the light of societal reactions to various decisions. Moreover, these developments should be considered in the context of past events. There is a potential for friction in the French army because of its past. The question of coming to terms with what happened in Algeria needs to be addressed to create a clear environment and to prevent existing dispositions from growing. Indeed, it is also a question of how future governments will use or interpret concepts such as the Vigipirate plan, which have been used less frequently in the past. In particular, the further shifting of scratched taboos, for example in demonstration control, opens the door to a wide range of interpretations.

Continued monitoring of counterterrorism measures and new trends must therefore be maintained.

Finally, during the creation of this work, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the military uncertainty in Europe sparked societal debates on the relevance of military doctrines, questioning long-held principles such as conscription abolition, foreign deployments, and armed forces' budgets. The full extent of the impact of this societal interest in national and European military realities remains unclear, and these changes could not be covered in this work. However, it is certain that current events will affect civil-military relations in Europe, especially in France, the most powerful military nation in the EU, leaving room for further exploration by others.

9   Bibliography

Alexander, M. S., Evans, M., & Keiger, J. F. V. (2002). The 'War without a Name', the French Army and the Algerians: Recovering Experiences, Images and Testimonies. In M. S. Alexander, M. Evans, & J. F. V. Keiger (Eds.), *The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954–62: Experiences, Images, Testimonies* (pp. 1–39). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230500952_1

Ambler, J. S. (1966). *The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962* (2014/08/01 ed.). The Ohio State University Press. http://hdl.handle.net/1811/6305

Anderson, M. (2011). *In thrall to political change: Police and gendarmerie in France.* Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199693641.001.0001

Anderson, M. (2021). The Dual French Police System—Centralization, Specialization, Competition. In J. de Maillard & W. G. Skogan (Eds.), *Policing in France* (pp. 54–68). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Andreeva, C. (2020). The EU's counter-terrorism policy after 2015—"Europe wasn't ready"—"But it has proven that it's adaptable". *ERA Forum, 20*(3), 343–370. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-019-00570-0

Andreski, S. (1980). On the peaceful disposition of military dictatorships. *Journal of Strategic Studies, 3*(3), 3–10. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398008437052

Assemblée nationale—Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 (version d'origine). (1958). https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution_version_origine_04101958.asp

Barber, J. A. (1969). BRITAIN AND FRANCE: THE OFFICER CORPS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. *Naval War College Review, 22*(4), 17–28. JSTOR.

Bartolucci, V. (2017). The Perils and Prospects of the French Approach to Counterterrorism. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy* (pp. 437–458). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55769-8

Beliakova, P. (2021). Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies, 54*(8), 1393–1423. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021989757

Bindner, L. (2018). Jihadists' Grievance Narratives against France. *ICCT Research Paper (Online), 8*(7), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.19165/2017.2.07

Black, J. (2004). *Rethinking military history.* Routledge.

Blaufarb, R. (2002). *The French Army, 1750-1820: Careers, talent, merit.* Manchester University Press. https://go.exlibris.link/55w4CL2V

Bove, V., Rivera, M., & Ruffa, C. (2020). Beyond coups: Terrorism and military involvement in politics. *European Journal of International Relations, 26*(1), 263–288. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119866499

Brinkmann, S. (2016). Methodological breaching experiments: Steps toward theorizing the qualitative interview. *Culture & Psychology, 22*(4), 520–533. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X16650816

Bröckling, U. (1997). *Disziplin: Soziologie und Geschichte militärischer Gehorsamsproduktion.* Fink.

Brown, H. G. (1993). 12A Separation of Powers. In C. Burrow (Ed.), *War, Revolution, and the Bureaucratic State: Politics and Army Administration in France, 1791–1799* (p. 0). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205425.003.0002

Bruneau, T. C., & Matei, F. C. (Cris). (2008). Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations. *Democratization*, *15*(5), 909–929. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340802362505

Byman, D. (2016). Understanding the Islamic State—A Review Essay. *International Security*, *40*(4), 127–165.

Caris, C. C., & Reynolds, S. (2014). *MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 22*.

Celso, A. (2018). *The Islamic state: A comparative history of Jihadist warfare*. Lexington Books. https://go.exlibris.link/3WslL70z

Chadwick, V. (2016). Paris police receive assault rifles and shields. *POLITICO*. https://www.politico.eu/article/paris-police-receive-assault-rifles-and-shields-terror-attacks-counter-terrorism-isil-islamic-state-isis-europe-news/

Chafer, T., Cumming, G. D., & Van Der Velde, R. (2020). France's interventions in Mali and the Sahel: A historical institutionalist perspective. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *43*(4), 482–507. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1733987

Chalk, P. (2022). Domestic Counter-Terrorist Intelligence Structures in the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Australia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *45*(7), 626–658. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1680186

Chrisafis, A. (2021, April 29). French soldiers to face military court over letter warning of 'civil war'. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/29/french-soldiers-to-face-military-court-over-letter-warning-of-civil-war

Cohen, E. A. (2003). *Supreme command: Soldiers, statesmen, and leadership in wartime* (1st Anchor Books ed). Anchor Books.

Cohen, W. B. (2002). The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory. *Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques*, *28*(2), 219–239. JSTOR.

Cottey, A. (2008). Zivil-militärische Beziehungen und Demokratie im neuen Europa. In Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg / IFSH (Ed.), *OSZE-Jahrbuch 2007* (pp. 307–324). Nomos. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845211695-307

Daho, G. (2019). A Revenge of the Generals. The Rebalancing of the Civil-military Relations in France. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, *13*(3), 304–322. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2019.1623753

Daho, G. (2020). France: Civil-Military Relations in the Antiterrorist Frame. In G. Daho, *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1818

Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2017). *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*.

Desch, M. C. (2001). *Civilian control of the military: The changing security environment*. Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

DeVore, M. R. (2019). Strategic satisficing: Civil-military relations and French intervention in Africa. *European Journal of International Security*, *4*(2), 163–189. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2019.1

DiCicco-Bloom, B., & Crabtree, B. F. (2006). The qualitative research interview. *Medical Education*, *40*(4), 314–321. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2929.2006.02418.x

Dieng, A. (2021). The Sahel: Challenges and opportunities. *International Review of the Red Cross (2005)*, *103*(918), 765–779. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383122000339

Domenach, J.-M. (1961). The French Army in Politics. *Foreign Affairs*, *39*(2), 185. https://doi.org/10.2307/20029478

Durand, P. (Ed.). (2019). *La transformation au coeur de la gendarmerie*. https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/crgn/arg-

colloques/colloques/colloques-2019/actes-du-colloque-du-10eme-anniversaire-de-rattachement-de-la-gendarmerie-nationale-au-ministere-de-l-interieur

Edmunds, T. (2006). What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe. *International Affairs*.

Erickson, R. J. (1989). *LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.*

Feaver, P. D. (1996). The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control. *Armed Forces & Society*, *23*(2), 149–178. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9602300203

Fescharek, N. (2015). 9. France: Vigilant Pragmatism in Afghanistan. In G. A. Mattox & S. M. Grenier (Eds.), *Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan* (pp. 123–139). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804796293-011

Finer, S. (2002). *The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics*. Transaction.

Fischer-Lescano, A. (2004). Soldaten sind Polizisten sind Soldaten—Paradoxien deutscher Sicherheitspolitik. *Kritische Justiz*, *37*(1), 67–80. https://doi.org/10.5771/0023-4834-2004-1-67

Forster, A. (2002). New Civil-Military Relations and its Research Agendas. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, *01*(2), 71–87. https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.01.2.06

Fougières, M. de, & El Karoui, H. (2021). *The French Brief - Bataclan 6 Years On: The Attacks That Changed France*. Institut Montaigne. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/bataclan-6-years-attacks-changed-france

Galbreath, D. J. (2014). Western European Armed Forces and the Modernisation Agenda: Following or Falling Behind? *Defence Studies*, *14*(4), 394–413. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2014.961356

Galletta, A. (2020). *Mastering the Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond: From Research Design to Analysis and Publication*. New York University Press. https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814732939.001.0001

Gallie, W. B. (1955). Essentially Contested Concepts. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *56*, 167–198. JSTOR.

Geiger, T. (2008). The British warfare state and the challenge of Americanisation of Western defence1. *European Review of History: Revue Europeenne d'histoire*, *15*(4), 345–374. https://doi.org/10.1080/13507480802228481

Gerges, F. A. (2014). ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism. *Current History*, *113*(767), 339–343. JSTOR.

Gobinet, P. (2008). The Gendarmerie Alternative: Is There a Case for the Existence of Police Organisations with Military Status in the Twenty-First Century European Security Apparatus? *International Journal of Police Science & Management*, *10*(4), 448–463. https://doi.org/10.1350/ijps.2008.10.4.098

Gregory, S. (2003). France and the war on terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *15*(1), 124–147. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550312331292987

Hartmann, U., & Von Rosen, C. (2018). Staat und Streitkräfte. In R. Voigt (Ed.), *Handbuch Staat* (pp. 895–905). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-20744-1_81

Hegghammer, T., & Nesser, P. (2015). Assessing the Islamic State's Commitment to Attacking the West. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *9*(4), 14–30. JSTOR.

Helfferich, C. (2014). Leitfaden- und Experteninterviews. In N. Baur & J. Blasius (Eds.), *Handbuch Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung* (pp. 559–574). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-18939-0_39

Hoffman, B. (1999). *Inside terrorism*. Indigo. https://go.exlibris.link/qKj2tKJy

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations* (19. print). Belknap Press.

Irondelle, B. (2003). Civil-Military Relations and the End of Conscription in France. *Security Studies*, *12*(3), 157–187. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410390443116

Irondelle, B. (2008). Démocratie, relations civilo-militaires et efficacité militaire. *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, *15*(1), 117–131. Cairn.info. https://doi.org/10.3917/ripc.151.0117

Janowitz, M. (1960). *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Free Press trade paperback edition). Free Press.

Jenkins, B. M. (1986). *Defense Against Terrorism. 101*(5), 773–786.

Jenkins, B. M., Godges, J., & Dobbins, J. (2011). *The long shadow of 9/11: America's response to terrorism*. RAND. https://doi.org/10.7249/mg1107rc

Johnson, C. (2018). Trust in the military exceeds trust in other institutions in Western Europe and U.S. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2018/09/04/trust-in-the-military-exceeds-trust-in-other-institutions-in-western-europe-and-u-s/

Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). *Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence* (3rd, rev.updat ed., Vol. 13). University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/j.ctt4cgfbx

Kadivar, J. (2020). Exploring Takfir, Its Origins and Contemporary Use: The Case of Takfiri Approach in Daesh's Media. *Contemporary Review of the Middle East (Online)*, *7*(3), 259–285. https://doi.org/10.1177/2347798920921706

Kantner, C., & Sandawi, S. (2012). Der Nationalstaat und das Militär. In N. Leonhard & I.-J. Werkner (Eds.), *Militärsoziologie – Eine Einführung* (pp. 37–64). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-93456-3_2

Kaplan, L. S. (1984). *The United States and NATO: The formative years*. University Press of Kentucky.

Kaurin, P. M. (2014). *The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare* (0 ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315551487

Kaurin, P. M. (2016). *Warrior, Citizen Solider or Guardian: Thoughts after a kerfuffle – Practicing Philosophy in Real Time*. https://shankskaurin.wordpress.com/2016/12/20/warrior-citizen-solider-or-guardian-thoughts-after-a-kerfuffle/

Kelly, G. A. (1964). Algeria, The Army, and the Fifth Republic (1959-1961): A Scenario of Civil-Military Conflict. *Political Science Quarterly*, *79*(3), 335–359. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/2145904

Kepel, G., & Jardin, A. (2017). *Terror in France: The rise of Jihad in the west*. Princeton University Press.

Khosrokhavar, F. (2021). Subcultures of Humiliation and Counter-Humiliation. In F. Khosrokhavar, *Jihadism in Europe* (pp. 33–104). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197564967.003.0003

Kuchler, B. (2013). Krieg und gesellschaftliche Differenzierung / War and the Institutional Differentiation of Modern Society. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, *42*(6), 502–520. https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-2013-0605

Kuehn, D., & Levy, Y. (2020). Material and Discursive Militarisation in Democracies. *GIGA Focus*, *6*.

Lequesne, C. (2016). French foreign and security challenges after the Paris terrorist attacks. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *37*(2), 306–318. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1193976

Libel, T. (2021). Professional Military Education as an Institution: A Short (Historical) Institutionalist Survey. *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies*, *4*(1), 121–131. https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.79

Lutterbeck, D. (2005). Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western Europe. *European Security*, *14*(2), 231–253. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662830500336193

Lutterbeck, D. (2013). *The Paradox of Gendarmeries: Between Expansion, Demilitarization and Dissolution*. Ubiquity Press. https://doi.org/10.5334/bbs

Luttwak, E. N. (1979). The Planning of the Coup d'État. In *Coup d'État* (pp. 116–169). Harvard University Press; JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjghwdq.12

Marsden, S. V., & Schmid, A. P. (2011). Typologies of Terrorism and Political Violence. In *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203828731.ch3

Martin, M. L. (1981). *Warriors to managers: The French military establishment since 1945*. University of North Carolina Press.

Martin-Jones, D., Schulte, P., Ungerer, C., Smith, M. L. R., & Edward Elgar Publishing. (2019). *Handbook of terrorism and counter terrorism post 9/11*. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786438027

Mayring, P. (2003). *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken* (8. Aufl.). Beltz.

Mayring, P. (2014). *Qualitative content analysis: Theoretical foundation, basic procedures and software solution*.

Mayring, P., & Fenzl, T. (2019). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. In *Handbuch Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung* (pp. 633–648). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-21308-4_42

Merom, G. (2003). *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808227

Military Action and Sovereignty. (2017). 74–79. https://www.c-dec.terre.defense.gouv.fr/index.php/fr/content-english/our-publications/64-colloque-action-militaire-souverainete/223-military-action-and-sovereignty

Moebius, S., & Ploder, A. (Eds.). (2018). *Handbuch Geschichte der deutschsprachigen Soziologie*. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07614-6

Moran, M. (2017). Terrorism and the banlieues: The Charlie Hebdo attacks in context. *Modern & Contemporary France*, *25*(3), 315–332. https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2017.1323199

Mouhanna, C. (2013). Reforms in France: Irreversibly Spiralling into (More) Centralization. In *Centralizing Forces? Comparative Perspectives on Contemporary Police Reform in Northern and Western Europe* (pp. 23–39). Eleven Publishers.

Mullins, S. (2016). The Road to Orlando: Jihadist-Inspired Violence in the West 2012–2016. *CTC Sentinel*, *9*(6), 26–30.

Munck, G. L., & Snyder, R. (2007). Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics: An Analysis of Leading Journals. *Comparative Political Studies*, *40*(1), 5–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006294815

National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordination. (2017, September 16). Elysee.Fr. https://www.elysee.fr/en/national-intelligence-and-counter-terrorism-coordination

Nuenlist, C. (2011). Dealing with the devil: NATO and Gaullist France, 1958–66. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, *9*(3), 220–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2011.593817

Olmeda, J. A. (2012). Escape from Huntington's Labyrinth: Civil–military relations and comparative politics. *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, *1*, 61–76. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203105276-17

Pannier, A., & Schmitt, O. (2019). To fight another day: France between the fight against terrorism and future warfare. *International Affairs*, *95*(4), 897–916. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz050

Perlmutter, A. (1969). The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities. *Comparative Politics*, *1*(3), 382. https://doi.org/10.2307/421446

Perlmutter, A. (1974). *Egypt, the praetorian state*. Transaction Books.

Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. (2015). *16 November 2015—François Hollande's Speech Before a Joint Session of Parliament*. France ONU. https://onu.delegfrance.org/Francois-Hollande-s-Speech-Before-a-Joint-Session-of-Parliament

Pezard, S., Shurkin, M., & Ochmanek, D. (2021). *A Strong Ally Stretched Thin: An Overview of France's Defense Capabilities from a Burdensharing Perspective*. RAND Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/RR-A231-1

Pfaffenzeller, S. (2010). Conscription and Democracy. *Armed Forces & Society*, *36*(3), 481–504. JSTOR.

Pisoiu, D., & Hain, S. (2018). *Theories of terrorism: An introduction*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Porch, D. (2013). *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139226301

Post, J. M. (2007). *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda* (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. https://go.exlibris.link/MDf6VRbP

Przyborski, A., & Wohlrab-Sahr, M. (2014). *Qualitative Sozialforschung: Ein Arbeitsbuch* (4., erweiterte Auflage). Oldenbourg Verlag.

Rapoport, D. (2004). The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. In *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (pp. 46–73). Georgetown University Press.

Richardson, L. (2006). *What terrorists want: Understanding the enemy, containing the threat* (1st ed.). Random House. https://go.exlibris.link/7pcQzbtP

Rochon, T. R. (2014). *Mobilizing for Peace: The Antinuclear Movements in Western Europe*. Princeton University Press.

Rubin, H., & Rubin, I. (2005). *Qualitative Interviewing (2nd ed.): The Art of Hearing Data*. SAGE Publications, Inc. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452226651

Ruffa, C. (2017). Military Cultures and Force Employment in Peace Operations. *Security Studies*, *26*, 391–422. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306393

Rumman, M. A. (Ed.). (2021). *"After the Caliphate": Ideology, Propaganda, Organization, and Global Jihad*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terror networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press. https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812206791

Samaan, J.-L., & Jacobs, A. (2020). Countering Jihadist Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of French and German Experiences. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *32*(2), 401–415. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1415891

Schmid, A. P. (Ed.). (2011). *The Routledge handbook of terrorism research*. Routledge.

Schmid, A. P. (Ed.). (2021). *Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness*. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-01/Handbook_Schmid_2020.pdf

Schmitt, C. (1922). *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität.* (10th ed.). Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-54702-9

Segell, G. (2001). Civil-Military Relations and Professional Military Identities After the Nation-State. In P. Kennedy & C. J. Danks (Eds.), *Globalization and National Identities* (pp. 124–138). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333985458_8

Soeters, J. (2018). Organizational Cultures in the Military. In G. Caforio & M. Nuciari (Eds.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* (pp. 251–272). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71602-2_13

Soufan Group. (2015). *The Numbers by Region* (FOREIGN FIGHTERS, pp. 12–20). Soufan Group; JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10784.7

The Growing Strategic Threat of Isis (pp. 23–25). (2015). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-114hhrg93284/CHRG-114hhrg93284/summary

Tocqueville, A. de. (2009). *Democracy in America. Volumes I & II*. Floating Press.

Trévidic, M. (2013). *Terroristes: Les sept piliers de la déraison*. JC Lattès.

Tribune des militaires: 58% des Français soutiennent l'initiative des signataires. (2021, April 29). *TF1 INFO*. https://www.tf1info.fr/societe/tribune-des-militaires-valeurs-actuelles-58-des-francais-soutiennent-l-initiative-des-signataires-2184708.html

Vennesson, P. (2003). Civil-military relations in France: Is there a gap? *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *26*(2), 29–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390412331302965

Vidino, L., & Brandon, J. (2012). Europe's experience in countering radicalisation: Approaches and challenges. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, *7*(2), 163–179. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2012.719097

Voigt, R. (2016). *Staatliche Souveränität*. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13181-4

Weill, S. (2018). French foreign fighters: The engagement of administrative and criminal justice in France. *International Review of the Red Cross (2005)*, *100*(907–909), 211–236. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383119000377

Wike, R., & Fetterolf, J. (2022, May 27). *Global Public Opinion in an Era of Democratic Anxiety*. https://pew.org/3FeDPPH

Winkler, C. K., El Damanhoury, K., Dicker, A., & Lemieux, A. F. (2019). The medium is terrorism: Transformation of the about to die trope in Dabiq. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *31*(2), 224–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1211526

Zervoudakis, A. J. (2002). From Indochina to Algeria: Counter-Insurgency Lessons. In M. S. Alexander, M. Evans, & J. F. V. Keiger (Eds.), *The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954–62: Experiences, Images, Testimonies* (pp. 43–60). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230500952_2