

## Abstract

The primary topic of this dissertation is the theory of knowledge, and the logic which based on it, and contained in the main philosophical-logical work *Medicina mentis, sive artis inveniendi praecepta generalia*. Its author was philosopher, mathematician, naturalist, and inventor of the early Enlightenment Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708). Tschirnhaus' concept of inventive logic is denoted by the standard term *ars inveniendi*, i. e. the art of discovery, the art of invention, or the art of inventing something. In the introduction and conclusion of this thesis, Tschirnhaus's concept is placed in the context of traditional *topica universalis* (Τοπικά), which most often operate with the notion of *ars inveniendi*, coined by Cicero. Parts of this work are devoted to related topics such as philosophical anthropology and ethics, which the philosopher understands as special sciences derived from the four empirical principles. So far, only three sub-studies in the standard history of philosophy which could be classified under Spinozian and Leibnizian studies have been devoted to this historical topic.

This paper aims to analyse the primary literature comprising the first and second editions of the *Medicina mentis*, including other relevant parts of the corpus of texts in question. Based on this analysis, Tschirnhaus' thought development and inspirational sources are reconstructed. Another goal, reflected in the very structure of the thesis, is an interpretation that illustrates Tschirnhaus' philosophy and logic in several basic levels or layers. These are the philosopher's anthropological hypothesis, the ethical goal of knowledge, the theory of knowledge, and the applied epistemology, or methodology based on it, which is related to his understanding of inventive logic. The initial hypothesis, in this case, was that Tschirnhaus' concept of *ars inveniendi* is only loosely related to the traditional *topica*, since here we speak about its transformation and, for the first time, its infusion with new Cartesian content.

The method applied is mainly hermeneutical, so the interpretation is preceded by introductory chapters summarising Tschirnhaus' intellectual biography and historical-critical notes on the analysed writing and followed by an exposition of the philosophical doctrines in the text *Medicina mentis*. Since the theme of the art of discovery provides a cross-section of the entire text under study, the conclusion of the thesis makes it possible to assess previous, often overly general interpretations of Tschirnhaus' philosophy with critical distance.

The main contribution of this thesis is elaborating a new interpretive framework in which Tschirnhaus' *ars inveniendi* can be understood as a particular philosophical method. The text intends to highlight relevant metaphysical assumptions and principles from the theory of knowledge and to approach their application in logic, which naturally does not do without comparison with the approaches of the philosopher's inspirers (Descartes, Spinoza, Geulincx, Gassendi), colleagues (Leibniz, Huygens) and successors (Wolff). Indeed, Tschirnhaus appears in his thoughts as a proponent of *topical* innovation, a trait also shared by Leibniz, who also emphasised the importance of causal definitions in his

own conception of the art of discovery. On the other hand, Spinoza's influence seems to be limited mainly to the ethical aspects of Tschirnhaus' work. His philosophical position is closest to Descartes' *Treatise on Method*, whose wide practical application was probably his main concern.