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Dissertation

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PŘÍSTUPY K BOLESTI V KLASICKÉ ŘECKÉ FILOSOFII A LÉKAŘSTVÍ

Approaches to Pain in Classical Greek Philosophy and Medicine

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I hereby declare that I have written this dissertation independently, using only the mentioned and duly cited sources and literature, and that the work has not been used in another university study programme or to obtain the same or another academic title.

In Prague on 10/06/2023 Mgr. Vojtěch Linka m.p.

Contents

Abstract

In this dissertation, I undertake an exploration of the approaches to the problem of pain within classical Greek philosophy and medicine. The aim of my research is to investigate the role of pain by analysing the most prevalent Greek words denoting pain in three ancient text collections: the *Corpus Hippocraticum*, *Corpus Platonicum*, and *Corpus Aristotelicum*. As an omnipresent phenomenon inherent to both human and animal life, pain held significant importance as a theme for medical and philosophical contemplation during antiquity. In the introductory section, I not only outline the theme, methodologies, and contemporary discussions on pain in antiquity but also provide an overview of the origins of classical Greek approaches to pain. This involves summarizing the conceptualization of pain in various genres and works from Homer to the authors who lived contemporaneously with Aristotle. Throughout the three central chapters of this dissertation, I concentrate on addressing the following research questions: What is pain? Are there distinct kinds of pain? What role does pain play? During the course of this dissertation, I elucidate and critically evaluate how these questions were addressed by the physicians and philosophers in the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, while also exploring the interdependencies and potential influences or connections between their viewpoints. Through an examination of medical texts, I demonstrate that pain was primarily regarded by their authors as a symptom aiding in the accurate diagnosis of underlying pathologies. However, pain also played a role in explaining more complex theories concerning the nature of the human body, health and illness, suitable therapies, and even acted as a therapeutic tool itself. In discussing the philosophical texts of Plato and Aristotle, I reveal that although pain ceased to be primarily viewed as a physiological issue, and instead acquired ethical and even political dimensions, the philosophers incorporated pain into their theories the frameworks, schemas, examples, and strategies used by their medical predecessors and contemporaries. By assessing the outcomes of these comprehensive analyses, I observe a common inclination within both medicine and philosophy to integrate pain into these disciplines and offer an answer to the question of what the role of pain in a good human life is. Consequently, this dissertation demonstrates that although physicians and philosophers may appear to approach pain from disparate perspectives, they ultimately share a fundamental framework. In addition to shedding light on the specific issue of the role of pain, this research contributes to the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between philosophy and medicine in antiquity.

Keywords: Plato, Aristotle, Hippocratic corpus, the problem of pain, the relationship between philosophy and medicine, meaning of pain in the human life

Abstrakt

V této disertační práci se věnuji zkoumání přístupů k problému bolesti v klasické řecké filosofii a lékařství. Cílem mého výzkumu je vyložit roli bolesti pomocí rozboru nejčastěji používaných řeckých slov označujících bolest ve třech souborech starověkých textů: *Corpus Hippocraticum*, *Corpus Platonicum* a *Corpus Aristotelicum*. Bolest je univerzálně přítomná v lidském i zvířecímu životě, a jako taková byla významným tématem lékařské a filosofické reflexe již v klasické antice. V úvodu dizertace představuji nejen téma, metody, stav bádání a současnou diskusi o bolesti v antice, ale předkládám také shrnutí konceptualizace bolesti v různých žánrech a dílech řecké literatury od Homéra po autory žijící současně s Aristotelem. V průběhu tří ústředních kapitol této disertační práce se zaměřuji na zodpovězení následujících výzkumných otázek: Co je to bolest? Existují nějaké druhy bolesti? Jakou roli bolest hraje? Rozborem konkrétních pasáží ze studovaných textů objasňuji a kriticky hodnotím, jak byly tyto otázky zodpovězeny autory lékařských a filosofických textů a zároveň zkoumám vzájemné závislosti a potenciální vlivy či spojitosti mezi jejich pohledy. Na základě analýzy lékařských textů ukazuji, že pro jejich autory byla bolest především symptomem, který pomáhal přesně diagnostikovat zdravotní stav pacientů. Bolest nicméně hrála také roli při vysvětlování komplexnějších teorií týkajících se povahy lidského těla, zdraví a nemoci, vhodné léčby, a dokonce sama sloužila jako terapeutický nástroj. Při rozboru filosofických textů Platóna a Aristotela odhaluji, že i když pro tyto autory bolest přestala být primárně fyziologickým tématem, a naopak začala být ústředním etickým, a dokonce politickým problémem, filosofové začlenili do svých teorií schémata, příklady a strategie používané jejich lékařskými předchůdci a současníky. Vycházeje z výsledků těchto komplexních analýz vykazuji společnou tendenci jak v lékařství, tak ve filosofii začleňovat bolest do širších teorií dané disciplíny a nabízet odpověď na otázku, jakou roli bolest hraje v dobrém lidském životě. Tato disertační práce tedy dokazuje, že ačkoli se lékaři a filosofové zdánlivě zabývají bolestí z různých perspektiv, sdílí spolu určitý základní rámec. A tak kromě toho, že tato práce osvětluje specifický problém role bolesti, přispívá také do debaty o vztahu mezi filosofií a lékařstvím ve starověku.

Klíčová slova: Platón, Aristotelés, Corpus Hippocraticum, problém bolesti, vztah mezi filosofií a lékařstvím, smysl bolesti v lidském životě

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Abbreviations

Aristotle

De an.	*On the Soul*
Eth. Eud.	*Eudemian Ethics*
Eth. Nic.	*Nicomachean Ethics*
Gen. an.	*Generation of Animals*
Hist. an.	*History of Animals*
Met.	*Metaphysics*
Part. an.	*On the Parts of Animals*
Phys.	*Physics*
Probl.	*Problems**
Pol.	*Politics*
Rh.	*Rhetoric*
Top.	*Topics*

Herodotus

Hist.	*The Histories*

Hesiod

Th.	*Theogony*
Op.	*Works and Days*

'Hippocratic' corpus

Acut. A/B	*On Regimen in Acute Diseases*
Aër.	*Airs, Waters, Places*
Aff.	*On Affections*
Alim.	*On Nutriment*
Aph.	*Aphorisms*
De arte	*On the Art*
Epid.	*Epidemics*
Flat.	*On Winds*
Foet. Exsect	*On Excision of the Foetus*
Fract.	*On Fractures*

Hum.	*On Humours*
Genit.	*On Generation*
Int.	*On Internal Affections*
Loc. Hom.	*On Places in Man*
Morb. 4	*On Diseases 4*
Morb. Sacr.	*On the Sacred Disease*
Mul.	*On Diseases of Women*
Nat. Hom.	*On the Nature of Man*
Salubr.	*Regimen in Health*
Nat. Mul.	*On the Nature of Women*
Praec.	*Precepts*
Prog.	*Prognostic*
Sept./Oct.	*On Seventh Month Infant, On Eight Month Infant*
Steril.	*On Sterile Women*
Superf.	*On Superfetation*
Vict.	*On Regimen*
Virg.	*On Diseases of Girls*
VM	*On Ancient Medicine*

Homer

Il.	*Iliad*
Od.	*Odyssey*

Pindar

Pyth.	*Pythian Odes*
Olymp.	*Olympian Odes*

Plato

Alc.	*Alcibiades*
Ap.	*Apology*
Charm.	*Charmides*
Cri.	*Crito*
Euth.	*Euthydemus*
Grg.	*Gorgias*

Lach.	*Laches*
Leg.	*Laws*
Menex.	*Menexenus*
Phd.	*Phaedo*
Phdr.	*Phaedrus*
Phlb.	*Philebus*
Plt.	*Statesman*
Prot.	*Protagoras*
Resp.	*Republic*
Soph.	*Sophist*
Symp.	*Symposium*
Th.	*Theaetetus*
Ti.	*Timaeus*

Simplicius

Phys.	*On Aristotle's Physics*

Sophocles

Philoc.	*Philoctetes*
Trach.	*Women of Trachis*

Theophrastus

Sens.	*On the Senses*

Thucydides

Hist.	*The Peloponnesian war*

Preface

Pain is a universal experience that is encountered by everyone. While for some individuals it may arise only in response to injury or illness and punctuate an otherwise painless life, for others it can be a persistent and debilitating challenge that is intimately connected with chronic illness or mental afflictions. Pain may be disregarded, contested, ameliorated, but also studied and analysed. Given that pain is a ubiquitous aspect of human existence, its intellectual reflection can potentially contribute to an improved understanding of the nature of pain itself and, secondarily, to a greater comprehension of human beings (or animals in general). Furthermore, the study of pain across different time periods and cultures may offer insight into how we presently approach pain. Given that the foundations of Western civilization can be traced back to ancient Greece, it is appropriate to endeavour an investigation of pain by examining the ideas of the eminent figures of philosophy and medicine from that era. In this dissertation, thus, the focus of my study of pain is on three corpora of texts, namely the *Corpus hippocraticum*, *Corpus platonicum*, and *Corpus aristotelicum*. The objective of this study is to analyse how would the authors of these corpora answer three fundamental questions about pain: what is pain? Are there different kinds of pain? What is the role of pain?

The first question seeks to comprehend the meaning of pain as represented by the Greek words typically translated as 'pain' such as ἄλγος [*algos*], λύπη [*lupē*], ὀδυνή [*odunē*], πόνος [*ponos*] and their cognates. The meaning of pain will be established by examining the context in which the pain words occur, their relation to other words, and their role in explanatory sentences, such as definitions, metaphors, and lists of examples.

The second question aims to determine whether there are distinct categories in which pain words are used in a different sense. Specifically, the inquiry seeks to establish whether there is a class A, in which phenomena called 'pain' are included, and a distinct class B, in which other phenomena called 'pain' are also present. For instance, the study will investigate whether we can differentiate between bodily pains and pains of the soul.

The third question is motivated by the desire to understand the role of pain in the philosophical or medical theories of the authors studied. The inquiry seeks to identify the reasons why authors employ pain words in their expositions and explanations of higher order theories, such as a theory of morals, physiology, psychology, and others, and the purpose that pain serves in these theories.

To answer these questions, the study will analyse all the instances of pain words in the three corpora studied, with one chapter dedicated to each corpus. The length and content of each chapter will vary depending on how the authors would answer the three questions, as some

authors may not consider all the questions equally relevant. Various 'approaches to pain' will be emphasized during this analysis. By 'approaches to pain,' I mean the viewpoints that each author offers in their perspective on pain, and the study aims to capture all the perspectives utilized by the studied authors.

The study also seeks to establish links and relationships between the ways in which the authors of particular corpora answer the research questions. For instance, the study will explore the relationship between Plato's and Aristotle's answers to the question about the kinds of pain.

The primary motivation for this dissertation is to analyse the approaches to and perspectives on pain in the medical and philosophical traditions of classical antiquity. Secondly, the study aims to determine what this analysis can reveal about the relations between philosophy and medicine during the period under study.

The three central chapters of the study will be preceded by an introduction that aims to demonstrate the relevance of this dissertation, explain its methodology, and provide contextualization at two levels. First, I will set the theme of this dissertation in the context of modern scholarship on pain in classical Greece. Secondly, I will provide a brief history of the problem of pain from Homer to the 4th century BCE.

1. Introduction

1.1 Philosophy, Medicine and Pain in the 5th and 4th Century BC

> At first the science of healing was held to be part of philosophy, so that treatment of disease and contemplation of the nature of things began through the same authorities; clearly because healing was needed especially by those whose bodily strength had been weakened by restless thinking and night-watching. Hence we find that many who professed philosophy became experts in medicine, the most celebrated being Pythagoras, Empedocles and Democritus. But it was, as some believe, a pupil of the last Hippocrates of Cos, a man first and foremost worthy to be remembered, notable both for professional skill and for eloquence, who separated this branch of learning from the study of philosophy.
>
> Celsus, *De Medicina* proem. 6-8[1]

Aulus Cornelius Celsus championed the notion in ancient times that medicine was practiced by figures traditionally classified as 'presocratic' philosophers, and this view was widely held among authors writing on both medicine and philosophy.[2] Philosophy, in fact, was not solely a theoretical pursuit, but also had practical applications, and "was deemed of considerable practical relevance, be it in the field of ethics and politics, in the technical mastery of natural things and processes, or in the provision of health and healing."[3] Philosophers' interest in topics related to medicine, such as the nature of disease, possible treatments, and their practical application, was motivated not only by curiosity but also by a serious concern for the aspects of "natural and human reality" that these phenomena represent.[4] This is true even for authors who were not commonly identified as medical practitioners in antiquity, such as Plato and Aristotle.[5] Consequently, to gain a better understanding of these philosophers, one must examine them in the context of medical authors. Admittedly, the relationship between philosophy and medicine in classical Greek thought is far from clear and straightforward and cannot be fully explored in this dissertation. Nonetheless, the dissertation is founded on the concept endorsed by various eminent scholars that to properly grasp classical Greek philosophy, one must also investigate classical Greek medicine (and vice versa).[6]

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[1] Trans. Spencer (1935) 5.

[2] Eijk (2008) 386.

[3] Eijk (2008) 387.

[4] Eijk (2008) 387.

[5] Eijk (2008) 12.

[6] Bartoš (2015) 9, Burnet (1920) 201 n. 4, Edelstein (1967), Eijk (2005) 8, Jaeger (1944) 11, Longrigg (1993) 27, 53, 81, Craik (2017) 203-204. For relation between Greek philosophy and medicine in general, and for specific aspects of this relation, see Longrigg (1993), Litz (1995), Lloyd (1991) 49-69, 70-99, 164-193, Lloyd (2003),

If we were to reject this approach and limit our study of ancient philosophy solely to philosophers, we would be confronted with the question of which philosophers to consider. If we were to include Democritus, for example, should we not also include the author of *On the Art*? The author of this 'Hippocratic' treatise, whoever it was, presents a philosophical theory similar in structure and depth to the theories of the presocratic philosophers. Therefore, when examining the dietetic passages in Plato's *Timaeus* and its connection to his ethics, education, and general physical theory, what justifies our omission of a comparison between the dialogue and the treatise *On Regimen*? The fact that certain authors were identified as presocratic philosophers and others as Hippocratic physicians reflects more the intentions of later scholars than the situation in the 5th and 4th centuries BCE.

My objective is not to completely dismantle the classifications of 'philosophy' and 'medicine' in classical Greek thought, but to underscore the intricacy of the intellectual field I am examining. The fact that modern philosophical education does not incorporate inquiries into human physiology does not imply that this was also the case in antiquity. Furthermore, instead of accepting Plato's differentiation between the philosopher and the physician, we should question his motivation for introducing such a distinction. Although philosophy and medicine serve as useful labels in the study of (classical) antiquity, we should only utilize them insofar as they do not obscure the subject matter of our investigation.

In addition to this broad understanding of the significance of medicine for examining philosophy, this dissertation also subscribes to the notion that Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy was substantially impacted by medical writers. By medical writers, I refer to those whose texts were composed on similar topics and in a similar manner as those included in the so-called 'Hippocratic' corpus. While we cannot be certain that Plato and Aristotle read the exact texts that have survived to the present day, there is strong evidence to suggest that they were influenced by the ideas that can be traced in these surviving texts. This implies that if we acknowledge the importance of reading Heraclitus for comprehending the *Theaetetus* and Gorgias for understanding the *Phaedrus*, why do we not approach the 'Hippocratic' treatises in the same way when reading Plato's dialogues and Aristotle's treatises?

However, if I make the claim that medicine inspired philosophy, the question arises as to which specific medical texts I am referring to. If I were making a similar claim about Plato and Aristotle, the situation would be clear: Plato's ideas, as expressed in his dialogues, inspired

Pellegrin (2009) 664-685, Jouanna (2012) 121-258, Bartoš (2015) 111-129, 230-289, Auffret (2019), 19-50; Lefebvre (2019) 51-84, Eijk (2021).

Aristotle's ideas, as expressed in his treatises. We can compare the texts, rely on ancient testimonies, and make educated guesses about their chronology and authorship. However, when it comes to classical Greek medical texts, we know very little about their authors and even less about their chronology. In section 1.3, which deals with the methodology and corpora, I will explain the challenges of studying ancient medical texts in more detail.

The theoretical framework presented in the previous paragraphs, which posits that ancient philosophy must be studied in the context of ancient medicine, will be applied in this dissertation to a specific problem, namely pain. Pain is currently studied by medical science, humanities, philosophy, and social sciences, and is approached from various perspectives due to its physiological, emotional, social, and spiritual aspects.[7] Similarly, in classical antiquity, pain was discussed in various contexts, such as physiology, biology, ethics, politics, or education. Pain played a significant role in both medical treatises, as evidenced by its mention in two famous definitions of medicine,[8] and philosophical treatises, particularly in relation to pleasure, virtues, happiness, and so on, making it a topic that warrants a thorough philosophical analysis (see 1.4 below 'State of the art'). Given that pain primarily occurs in medical contexts, in the passages discussing diseases or wounds, it seems both natural and necessary to explore this theme in both authors who write about philosophy and those who write about medicine. This dissertation will demonstrate that the way in which Plato and Aristotle speak about pain, the language they use, and the concepts they associate with pain are deeply influenced by medical ideas. These ideas provide an essential hermeneutic tool for interpreting the philosophical theories of these two major philosophical figures.

The research questions in this dissertation are approached by analysing passages that contain the most common words denoting pain in the classical antiquity, such as ἄλγος, λύπη, ὀδύνη, and πόνος. The aim is to explore how pain was perceived in the works of the authors traditionally labelled as 'Hippocratic' physicians, including the fragments of other physicians whose texts are not part of the 'Hippocratic' corpus. Additionally, the study aims to gain insight into the specific subgroups of the 'Hippocratic' corpus where pain is discussed, and how pain was perceived by Plato and Aristotle in the context of ancient medicine. Moreover, the study aims to explore the relationship between classical Greek philosophy and medicine by examining

[7] See for example Aydede (2005, 2019), Bakan (1971), Cassel (1982), Dennett (1978) Good et al. (1992), Hardcastle (1999), Grahek (2012), Malzack (1982, 2003), Morris (1992), Scarry (1985), Schleifer (2014).

[8] *Flat.* 1 (6.90 L = 102.1-103.4 Jouanna), *Vict*. 1.15 (6.490 L = 136.27-28 Joly-Byl).

how treating the problem of pain can enrich our understanding of this relationship. Despite the differences in how medical and philosophical authors write about pain, the study aims to identify underlying conceptual similarities between the two areas of knowledge. By exploring both the similarities and differences, the study intends to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between philosophy and medicine in classical antiquity.

1.2 An outline of the Dissertation

As my objective is to examine diverse perspectives on pain in classical Greek philosophy and medicine, my approach will involve focusing on specific contexts and authors to reconstruct their theories on pain and the relationships between them. Preceding the three central sections of my dissertation is a segment dedicated to the broader context of the problem of pain in classical Greek thinking. In this section, I analyse how pain was addressed in the writings of various significant Greek literary figures, ranging from Homer to Demosthenes. This survey illustrates how pain was approached from multiple perspectives such as poetry, drama, 'presocratic' philosophy and science, history, and rhetoric. While these perspectives may differ, they often influence each other in numerous aspects, and they anticipate the discussions of classical Greek philosophers and physicians. Discussions of 'presocratic' philosophers are especially relevant to our topic as they appear to have influenced both Plato and Aristotle and the physicians of the 'Hippocratic' corpus. Furthermore, authors who are contemporary with or even younger than the 'Hippocratic' physicians, such as Herodotus, Thucydides, Isocrates, and Demosthenes, demonstrate how pain was addressed in contexts other than philosophical or scientific inquiries, and thereby significantly contribute to our general understanding of pain in Greek literature of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE.

Then I proceed to the three main chapters, which are devoted to pain in the works of the 'Hippocratic' authors, Plato, and Aristotle. Each chapter commences with a detailed introduction, and therefore, a general outline suffices here. In approaching the ancient texts that discuss pain, I am guided by the three research questions mentioned above (what is pain? are there any kinds of pain? what is the role of pain?). However, I strive to adhere to the texts themselves as closely as possible and consider all the perspectives used by their authors. This approach reflects the methodology of my work: I have examined all the passages in which the pain words appear and attempted to comprehend them in context. Therefore, each particular chapter shares some common features with the others, such as the focus on the research questions, analysis of the same pain words, contextualisation of particular problems within broader theories, and so forth. Simultaneously, I respect the specific features of the given texts.

When examining medical texts, it is important to recognize that while pain related terminology may be used frequently, there is usually no explicitly formulated theory of pain. Instead, these terms are employed within technical contexts to describe the condition of ill patients. To begin analysis of such texts, it is necessary to summarize the passages and interpret the role of pain within them. However, there are certain medical authors who provide more theoretical treatises on health, diseases, and related topics. In these cases, pain-related passages must be contextualized within the broader theories offered by the authors. This allows for an understanding of the motivations and specific features of pain discussed by these authors. Of particular importance in the study of pain is dietetic medicine, given the close link between pain (expressed sometimes by the word πόνος) and exercise (πόνος), one of the main principles of dietetics.

The medical authors discussed in the first chapter serve as a precursor to the philosophers examined in the subsequent chapters. The focus shifts to the philosophical views of Plato and Aristotle on pain, which are approached from varying angles. While they also consider pain as a physiological issue, it holds above all ethical significance for them. Philosophers must possess a comprehensive understanding of pain as it plays a critical role in shaping the character of individuals and contributing to the prosperity of the city. The philosophical theories are based on medical imagery, specific examples of pain, and the role of professionals in dealing with it, which philosophers use to clarify their theories and persuade their audience. The two chapters dedicated to Plato and Aristotle incorporate the medical context while highlighting the unique aspects of the philosophers' perspectives on pain.

The concluding sections of each chapter, along with the final conclusion of the entire dissertation, aim to illuminate the central argument of my work, namely that pain is a problem that must be addressed and integrated into both philosophy and medicine. Philosophy and medicine both seek to understand and cope with the most significant issues of human life, such as health, disease, happiness, body, and soul. They must also confront the question of how to account for the fact that human beings experience pain and that it often has a decisive impact on human life. Neither physicians nor philosophers can afford to ignore pain, as it is such a pervasive experience with such a profound impact on human life that, if medical and philosophical professionals aspire to provide explanations and guidance for a happy and healthy life, they must somehow incorporate pain, a phenomenon that people usually attempt to avoid, alleviate, or combat. Despite the attempts to address pain, even in today's wealthy developed world, they are only partially successful, and in antiquity, without modern healthcare, people were even more likely to experience more frequent and intense pain. The two disciplines,

philosophy and medicine, which aimed to offer health and happiness, among other things, must have provided an explanation for the role of pain in human life, including its origin, types, and so on. Despite their differences, classical Greek philosophy and medicine share a common goal of offering an explanation of pain that allows them to integrate it into their broader theories of the highest goods they offer to their audience: health and happiness. In this dissertation, I examine specific passages where pain-related words occur to demonstrate that the question of pain was indeed present in classical Greek philosophy and medicine, and to explore the answers that were provided. This project is significant not only for its historical relevance, but also for its relevance to contemporary philosophy and medicine. Although the answers to the question of pain may differ today, the question itself remains pertinent.

1.3 Methodology and *Corpora*

The medical part of the present study heavily relies on the 'Hippocratic corpus' (*CH*), which raises two specific problems that need to be addressed. First, the *CH* is a peculiar type of corpus that differs significantly from other ancient corpora, such as the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, *Corpus Platonicum* or *Corpus Galenicum*.[9] The *CH* comprises works written by various authors over various periods,[10] making it challenging to identify a single author's viewpoints on medical or theoretical issues. While in the Platonic or Aristotelian corpora, one can ask questions about such problems as Plato's theory of ideas or Aristotle's theory of teleology, it is problematic, if not impossible, to ask questions about Hippocrates' theory of health or similar.[11] Since there is no substantial evidence that historical Hippocrates wrote any of the treatises collected in the corpus, there is no way of determining his opinions on particular medical or theoretical questions.[12] Despite putting historical Hippocrates aside, it is still doubtful whether the corpus constitutes some kind of unity, where one can seek at least some common 'Hippocratic' conceptions, meaning conceptions common to all or the majority of the treatises in the *CH*.

[9] See Eijk (2015) 24, Craik (2015) xxi.

[10] The majority of treatises were written between half of the fifth and end of the fourth century BCE, but some treatises are from the Hellenistic period and younger. See Craik (2015), Eijk (2008) 390, Jouanna (1999) 57, Nutton (2013) 61.

[11] Craik (2015) 286. See also Overwien (2014) 101-102.

[12] Craik (2015) xxii, Nutton (2013) 61-71, Bartoš (2015) 11 n. 47, ibid. p. 20.

Formulating such conceptions is extremely difficult, if possible, as the only two characteristics common to all the treatises of the corpus are the ionic dialect and a relation to medicine.[13]

Secondly, it is important to note that the 'Hippocratic' corpus does not include all of the medical texts written in the 5th and 4th centuries BCE. While the majority of them have been lost, some fragments and even extant writings have survived.[14] As demonstrated by Philip van der Eijk, during this time period, there were several dozen authors who wrote on "medicine, human physiology and related subjects". Among them were Democritus of Abdera, Diocles of Carystus, Praxagoras of Cos, Mnesitheus of Athens, Heracleides of Pontus, Theophrastus, and Strato,[15] as well as the prominent philosophers Plato and Aristotle.[16] In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of Greek classical medicine, these authors and their texts cannot be overlooked.

Despite all this, the reason why the treatises collected in the *CH* are the primary focus of this work is simply because they have survived from antiquity in an extant form, unlike many other texts from the authors mentioned earlier which have been lost or survived only in fragments. While the analyses of the fragments of authors like Diocles of Carystus will be provided, the primary emphasis will be placed on the treatises of the *CH*. It is important, however, to exercise caution in generalizing the results from the analysis of the *CH* to classical Greek medicine as a whole. Furthermore, due to the extensive nature of the material, the analyses will be selective, with only some representative groups of texts being chosen for analysis. These groups include seven books of *Epidemics*, gynaecological texts, and dietetic texts.[17] The reasons for selecting these particular groups of texts will be discussed below. In the case of less frequent pain words such as λύπη, all instances of that word in all treatises of the *CH* will be analysed.

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[13] See Eijk (2008) 390, who formulates the second common feature in a slightly different manner and says that all treatises were in the later tradition associated with or attributed to Hippocrates.

[14] This is true, however, only for Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus. See Eijk (2015) 27-34.

[15] For the list of the relevant authors and texts, see Eijk (2015) 27-34

[16] In the case of Plato because of his *Timaeus*, in the case of Aristotle because of several treatises devoted to medical topics. The majority of them are lost, however, among the extant ones, we can count passages concerning animal disease (*Hist. An.* 7, 602b12-605b21), the tenth book of the *History of animals*, the treatise *On Breath* and the first book of the *Problems.*

[17] In the group labelled "dietetics treatises," I include these texts of the *CH* in which dietetic medicine plays a substantial role. These treatises are *Airs, Waters, Places, On Regimen in Acute Diseases, On Regimen*, *On the Nature of Man*, *On Regimen in Health* and *On Ancient Medicine.* See Bartoš (2015) 15, 38 'Gynaecological treatises' are discussed below, p. 59, n. 313.

In terms of philosophers, the analysis will focus on the works of Plato and Aristotle, and in particular section also on the *Problems* and two treatises of Theophrastus. The selection of Plato and Aristotle is not controversial since they both have substantial contributions to ancient philosophy. As for Theophrastus and the Problems, they were chosen for their significant and pertinent discussions originating in Aristotle's school during his lifetime and in the first few decades after his death.

1.4 State of the Art

Scholarly discussions concerning pain in classical Greek medicine have thus far been restricted to the 'Hippocratic' corpus. In the following passage, I provide a brief overview of these discussions. Distinguished scholars such as Helen King and Rosalyne Rey posit the existence of an underlying theory of pain in the *CH* and suggest that it is possible to associate particular pain words with specific types of pain. They focus on the difference between ὀδύνη and πόνος, which lies, purportedly, in the degree of generality and specificity. Rey views πόνος as a term denoting pain in a more general sense, pain which is not so closely connected to a particular bodily part.[18] Thus, πόνος should be understood and translated as suffering rather than as pain. On the other hand, ὀδύνη should be understood as pain localized in a specific part of the body. King also distinguishes between πόνος and ὀδύνη, focusing rather on the question of the naturalness of pain: whereas ὀδύνη and ἄλγος designate pain connected to illness or injury, thus something unnatural to a healthy body, πόνος can denote pain felt during childbirth, which is not unnatural.[19] Moreover, Rey offers a general theory of pain that claims that in most treatises in the *CH*, pain serves as a diagnostic sign of illness, helping the doctor to provide an accurate prognosis and treatment.[20] Both Rey and King have been criticized by Peregrine Horden, who claims that there is no underlying theory of pain in the *CH* and that pain words are used interchangeably, reflecting only the linguistic preferences of the author of the treatise in question.[21] I will provide a nuanced theory of pain in the *CH* and take stance in this discussion in the chapter 2.1.2 below.

An alternative approach to the study of pain in the *CH* was undertaken by myself and my colleague, Vojtěch Kaše.[22] Our methodology employed several computational methods,

[18] Rey (1995) 17-23.

[19] King (1998, 1999). See chapter 2.1.2 below.

[20] Rey (1995) 17-23.

[21] Horden (1999) 295–315. See also Villard (2006) 61-78, Scullin (2012).

[22] Linka and Kaše (2021).

including distributional semantic analysis, to examine particular pain words in the *CH*.[23] We focused on identifying the words with which pain words co-occur and the nature of their relationships.[24] Our findings revealed a general tendency for the pain words - ἄλγος, ὀδύνη, and πόνος - to be associated with pathological states or bodily parts,[25] such as fever (πυρετός), cough (βήξ), shivering (ῥῖγος), an unwholesome state (ἐπίνοσος), and bodily parts, including the belly (γαστήρ), head (κεφαλή), loins (ὀσφῦς), and abdomen (κοιλία), among others.[26] However, the degree of association with these words varies among the pain words. It is evident that ἄλγος and ὀδύνη are more closely linked to pathological states and bodily parts than πόνος, as they are often used in a technical sense to denote pain caused by illness or wound and localized in a specific bodily part.[27] In contrast, πόνος is more general in nature, and it is frequently associated with terms such as εἰμί, γίγνομαι, πᾶς, ἄλλος, and οὗτος. Furthermore, it is connected to some words that cannot be classified as pathological states or bodily parts, such as food (σῖτος), time (χρόνος), or day (ἡμέρα), that are more closely linked to dietetics and other contexts. [28] The discrepancy between πόνος and ἄλγος and ὀδύνη is attributable to the dual usage of πόνος in the *CH*. In most cases, it refers to pain or suffering. However, in dietetical treatises, specifically *On Regimen*, it refers to exercise, work, and the like (as discussed below). When the computational analysis of πόνος was conducted without *On Regimen*, the results were more comparable to those of ἄλγος and ὀδύνη.[29] Our analysis has the advantage of taking all instances of the pain words into account, which is not usually the case in traditional approaches to the issue of pain in the *CH*. However, given the specific techniques we used, our research is restricted to philological and semantical analyses, with limited conceptual and philosophical contributions. For a more profound investigation, it would be necessary to focus on the context of specific treatises, their interrelations, and so on, for which computational tools we used are insufficient. Nonetheless, some findings of our study, such as the differences between the

[23] "According to the distributional hypothesis, words that occur in similar contexts tend to have similar meanings. Thus, to capture the meaning of a word requires an analysis of words most frequently surrounding it." Linka and Kaše (2021) 57.

[24] For the methodology of this analysis, see pages 54-59 ibid.

[25] See the result section on pages 59-64 ibid.

[26] Linka and Kaše (2021) 62-64, fig. 3-6.

[27] See particularly fig. 5, p. 63 (ibid.)

[28] Ibid. pp. 65-66.

[29] Linka and Kaše (2021) 66 n. 55.

particular pain words in their co-occurrence with other terms, provide a significant starting point for analyses presented in this dissertation.[30]

Plato's and Aristotle's theories of pain are often overlooked in contemporary scholarship, as the focus tends to be on the concept of pleasure. Pain is frequently treated as merely the opposite of pleasure, with little attention given to it as an independent subject of inquiry. Therefore, articles and monographs on pleasure (and pain) in classical antiquity tend to devote relatively little space to pain.[31] Nevertheless, some scholars do examine Plato's theory of pain within the context of their broader interpretations of specific dialogues. Although the emphasis is usually on pleasure, pain plays an important role in the studies of several Plato's works, including the *Philebus*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and the *Laws*.[32] These analyses often address broader philosophical issues, such as the nature of opposition between pleasure and pain in the *Gorgias*, the true and false pleasures in the *Philebus*, the educational role of pleasure and pain in the *Laws*, and the nature of hedonism in *Protagoras*. However, while these works are useful for understanding specific features of Plato's theory of pain, they do not provide a comprehensive discussion of the topic as a whole.

Yet there are two scholars who are particularly noteworthy for their direct focus on pain in Plato. Matthew Evans attempts to demonstrate that Plato, in his *Philebus*, espouses a representational theory of pain that shares many features with the modern version of this theory. According to Evans, Plato's theory of pain is best understood as contending that pains are "psychological states that represent bodily damage".[33] This model is based on the observation that pain and pleasure follow from a disturbance in the optimal bodily and psychic states of the animal, [34] with pain indicating the need for "repair" of bodily damage. However, pain is not perceived in the same way that visual content is perceived, but rather is mentally represented. As Evans puts it, "A psyche that detects in its body 'wounds' requiring 'repair' is to that extent a *disturbed* psyche - on what is, of the moment at least, knocked out of *its own* equilibrium and driven to take action on behalf of the body it rules. Bodily pain is, in this sense, a *psychological*

[30] For a similar approach to the study of pain in the classical Greek literature as a whole, see Linka and Kaše(2023).

[31] See for example Frede (2016), Wolfsdorf (2013), Riel (2005), Taylor (2008), Gosling and Taylor (1982) Harris (2018), Russel (2005).

[32] See for example Frede (1985, 1992), Mann (2018), Russel (2005), Warren (2015), Delcomminette (2005) Jinek (2021), Erginel (2011), Erginel (2019).

[33] Evans (2007) 72.

[34] Evans (2007) 73-74.

trauma."[35] According to Evans, this conception of pain serves Plato in his attempt to explain the role of pain in rational practical action, since pain *means* something, it "refers to some condition in the body that requires attention and care"[36] and bodily pains as representational states are "the primary motivators of every animal's attempt to repair damage to its body".[37]

Mehmet M. Erginel also has made a valuable contribution to the understanding of pain in Plato through his observation that the well-known kinetic model of pleasure and pain, which posits that pain is a motion away from the natural state while pleasure is a motion toward it, is inadequate in explaining the various aspects of the phenomenology of pleasure and pain emphasized by Plato.[38] Erginel's analysis focuses on the mixtures of pleasure and pain, and sheds light on several important and relevant details not only about pleasure, but also about pain. Moreover, Erginel is among the few contemporary scholars who take the issue of pain in Plato seriously, thereby providing a valuable perspective to the discourse.[39]

In the realm of Aristotelian scholarship, much like in the Platonic tradition, pain has long been a relatively neglected topic, with more attention being devoted to pleasure.[40] However, this situation has undergone a notable shift thanks in large part to the work of Wei Chang, who has made significant contributions to our understanding of pleasure and pain in Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. In his dissertation and subsequent papers, Chang has brought fresh insight on this topic, shedding new light on the complex interplay between pleasure and pain in Aristotelian thought.[41]

Cheng's study of various Greek words that express pain in Aristotle reveals that this philosopher focused more on the concepts of pain, rather than on the semantics of the words used to designate it.[42] Similarly to Plato, it seems that Aristotle did not pay much attention to the different words used for pain, but rather to the concept of pain itself.[43] Nevertheless, as

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[35] Evans (2007) 86. This theory can be schematised in a following way: "For any animal A and any bodily pain P, if A is undergoing P, then there is some destruction D, such that (i) A's psyche is undergoing D, (ii) D represents the occurrence of some destruction D* in A's body, and (iii) P = D." Ibid. p. 82. Some scholars, however, use *perception* when characterising Plato's conception of pain in *Philebus*. See Frede (1992) 441.

[36] Evans (2013) 90.

[37] Evans (2013) 88.

[38] Erginel (2011, 2019).

[39] I discuss some aspects of Erginel's work in detail below, p. 97, n. 500.

[40] Cheng (2018) 4 n. 15.

[41] Cheng (2015, 2018, 2019).

[42] Cheng (2018).

[43] Cheng (2018) 2.

Cheng argues, in order to gain a better understanding of pain, it is important to examine whether there are semantic differences between the various words used to denote it.[44] Although pain words are often used interchangeably, there are still relevant nuances between them.[45] Cheng correctly points out that before Plato and Aristotle, λύπη did not typically connote pain, but rather was associated with grief or other emotional states. Its emergence as a pain word is linked to the rise of Greek tragedy, which emphasized the psychological and emotional aspects of human life.[46]

Cheng proceeds to present substantial evidence that in Aristotle's writings, ὀδύνη, the word used for pain already in Homer, is overshadowed by other terms. However, it retains its customary meaning of sharp bodily pain connected to death and fatal injury.[47] Another pain word with a similar meaning is ἄλγος, which denotes pain associated with wounds or diseases in both humans and animals. Although Aristotle shared the medical writers' notion that "pain comes about when an unnatural change destroys the initial balance of the body," his "main concern … is biological rather than therapeutic, theoretical rather than practical".[48] As a result, we seldom find quantitative or qualitative specifications of pain in Aristotle's works.[49] Concerning practical philosophy, Cheng reveals that ἄλγος is a subset of λύπη and expresses pain of the soul, such as when sharing pain among friends.[50]

As for the last pain word, πόνος, it can, according to Cheng, refer to pain in general or pain specific to certain species of animals or bodily parts.[51] However, it can also be used to convey the idea of work, effort, or toil. "This connotation results in an oscillation of the semantic field of πόνος between the physical energy to be invested and its corresponding unpleasantness."[52] Pain that is expressed by πόνος is distinct from other types of pain in that it is voluntary and "comes from an agent's exertion of his/her power and makes some activities possible."[53] In Aristotle's writings, hard work and effort expressed by πόνος are almost

[44] Cheng (2018) 2-3.

[45] Cheng (2018) 4.

[46] Cheng (2018) 6.

[47] Cheng (2018) 10.

[48] Cheng (2018) 12.

[49] Cheng (2018) 12-13.

[50] Cheng (2018)13-14.

[51] Cheng (2018) 15.

[52] Cheng (2018) 16.

[53] Cheng (2018) 17.

exclusively associated with bodily development rather than the formation of the soul or virtuous character (education), and may even be in conflict with them. [54] Instead of emphasising the importance of vigorous πόνος, Aristotle "prefers a moderately healthy condition to the excellent constitution embodied by athletes, because πόνος often harms, rather than improves, the health of the body."[55] Cheng suggests that Aristotle's rather negative or neutral evaluation of πόνος, as compared to other authors, may explain why he opted to use ἐνέργεια rather than πόνος to express the concept of activity in general. Unlike πόνος, ἐνέργεια conveys a sense of timelessness and completion. [56] Although λύπη is a general term for pain in Aristotle, and other pain words are often interchangeable with it, Cheng argues that there are nuances between them that can help to clarify various aspects of pain and contextualize Aristotle's inquiries about it within the broader discourse of other Greek thinkers.

It was however Cheng's dissertation that has made a significant contribution to Aristotelian scholarship by providing a thorough and insightful analysis of Aristotle's conception of pleasure and pain.[57] Not only did he explicate the nature of pleasure and pain in Aristotle's philosophy, but he also explored how Aristotle's ideas were situated within the broader discussion of these topics in the Academy and among medical writers in the 5th and 4th centuries. Although the bigger part of his work is focused on pleasure, Cheng also offered a detailed analysis of pain, which has been immensely valuable to my own research. While I concur with the majority of his arguments, there are some differences in approach between his work and mine. Specifically, my research is concerned not only with Aristotle's views on pain but also with Plato and the 'Hippocratic' authors. While I do discuss pleasure in my work, it is not an end in itself, but rather a means to better understand pain. Furthermore, while Cheng's focus lies on the ontology of pleasure and pain, and he offers a compelling interpretation of these phenomena by taking into account contemporary philosophical discussions about consciousness and the mind, my interest is in demonstrating the *role* of pain in classical philosophy and medicine. To achieve this aim, an ontological account is also necessary, and I provide one, although it is just a part of the overall picture. In certain places, I do not delve into as much detail when discussing particular issues, notably the relationship between pleasure, pain and consciousness. Lastly, there are some specific issues in which our

[54] Cheng (2018) 18.

[55] Cheng (2018) 18.

[56] Cheng (2018) 19.

[57] Cheng (2015).

interpretations diverge, such as the way in which we each understand Aristotle's assertion that pain hinders energeia.[58]

In summary, our contemporary understanding of the problem of pain in classical Greek philosophy and medicine still has areas to explore. This is due to the lack of a comprehensive interpretation of medical authors' perspectives on pain that meets the specific nature of their texts on both a semantic and philosophical level of interpretation. In the scholarship on Plato and Aristotle, there is still an overwhelming emphasis on pleasure, with the problem of pain having not received the attention it deserves, with the exception of Cheng, Evans, and Erginel. In my dissertation, I aim to contribute to these discussions and demonstrate that despite the physicians and philosophers focusing on different features of pain and disagreeing on many points, they nevertheless shared a frame in which they thought and wrote about pain.

[58] See below ch. 4.1.2.

1.5 Perspectives on Pain in Classical Greek Philosophy and Medicine in Context: from Homer to Demosthenes

1.5.1 Introduction

Before I proceed to the central figures of my dissertation, I present here an outline of the perspectives on pain from Homer to Demosthenes. This approach will help me to show some general tendencies in writing about pain in ancient Greek literature, the contexts in which pain occurs, its vocabulary, etc. This overview can by no means include all authors or texts from the archaic and classical periods, however, I hope that it is representative of all major literary genres. In some genres, for example in tragedies, I analysed in detail only one author or text (Sophocles' *Philoctetes*), so the scope of my overview is substantially restricted. Yet, my aim is not to provide analyses of pain in all Greek literature, but just to emphasise some ideas relevant for my theme. After the summary of the way pain is expressed in particular authors or texts, I point out the similarities or possible inspiration in relation to the medical and philosophical ideas about pain from the 5th and 4th centuries BCE.

1.5.2 Pain in Homer and Hesiod

In Homer's *Iliad*,[59] heroes suffer war injuries, sometimes resulting in death; not only humans but gods can be wounded, too.[60] However, only in the minority of instances, do we read about pain accompanying these wounds[61] and only once it is the wounded hero himself, who verbally expresses his pain.[62] Some scholars even assume that pain is almost absent in the *Iliad.*[63] Nevertheless, can we learn something about pain from the passages where the words denoting it occur?[64] Generally, in the *Iliad*, pain is an outcome of the war, and Greek heroes suffer

[59] Ed. West (1998), transl. Fagles (1991).

[60] Ares (*Il.* V, 384), Hades (*Il.* V, 394–400), Aphrodite (*Il.* V, 337–360), Hephaestus (*Il.* XVIII, 395).

[61] See e.g., *Il.* XI, 268–72; XI, 827–841; XII, 385–395; XIII, 417; XIV, 430–440; XVI, 514–526.

[62] Glaucus in *Il.* XVI, 514–526.

[63] "In fact, pain concerns Homer far less than death, and death too seems to exist in detachment from the agonies of dying." Morris (1991) 42.

[64] In the *Iliad*, there are several words which denote pain or have a strong connection to it. R. Rey classifies them as follows: πένθος (mourning and rituals associated with it), κῆδος (grief and care given to grief), ἄχος (sudden and violent emotion), ὀδύνη (sharp shooting pain localised in the body), ἄλγος (more general type of suffering involving the whole body) πῆμα (similar as ἄλγος, the subject is more involved). See Rey (1995) 11–13. Rey doesn't mention πόνος which occurs in the *Iliad*, too, because this word is used there rather in the sense of work

because they try to seize Troy, Trojan heroes suffer because they defend it.[65] Pains inflicted by wounds are inevitable effects of the war prolonged because of the insult of Achilles's honour which he suffered when he was deprived of Briseis.[66] What is more, the Trojan war causes not only bodily pain: various characters of the epic suffer pain of the soul caused by the death of their friends and relatives. However, even though we can assume that wounded and dying warriors felt pain in their body and their mourning companions were struck by it in their hearts, pain is very scarcely a theme of an explicit narrative. In the *Iliad,* pain is expressed rather *visually,* than *verbally*.[67] Especially in the case of war injuries, we find several visible aspects of pain.

Bodily pain in the *Iliad* is almost exclusively connected to wounds (ἕλκος).[68] Their connection is very close:[69] closeness of this relation is accentuated in the treatment of pain. In the epic, there are several healers or physicians mentioned and some heroes are healed by their art.[70] It is of interest that when the healer administers drugs (φάρμακα) or some healing root

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or hardship. She also underlines that the distinction between "physical" and "moral" pain is not sharp, even though the mentioned words seem to express either physical or moral emphasis. See Rey (1995) 12, cf. Cheng (2018) 6.

[65] According to B. Holmes, "pain plays a key role in representing the circulation of suffering that the poem tracks from Achilles' crisis of honour to the death of Patroclus and beyond." See Holmes (2007) 48. The problem of damaged honour (τιμή) is interwoven into the narrative of the *Iliad* from the very beginning: Menelaus' honour is damaged by Paris (*Il.* XVII, 85–95.), Achilles' honour is damaged when he is deprived of Briseis (*Il.* I, 180–190; see also *Il.* XVI, 80–90), Agamemnon's honour is damaged when Achilles refuses his gifts and the offer for reconciliation (*Il.* IX, 695–705), etc. At the beginning of the *Iliad*, pain and suffering are directly caused by god Apollo as a response to the insult done to his priest (*Il.* I, 1–10).

[66] Holmes notices that the wounded warriors in pain are almost exclusively the leaders of both armies (Menelaus in *Il.* IV, 120–140; Agamemnon in *Il.* XI, 268–72; Odysseus in *Il.* XIX, 48; Hector in *Il.* XIV, 435–445). Besides the categories of individual and collective suffering, we can thus say that the suffering of an individual is a *synecdoche* for collective suffering. See Holmes (2007) 48.

[67] See Holmes (2007) 48.

[68] According to R. Rey, pain connected to war injuries is the main type of pain in the *Iliad*. Her book, however, focuses only on bodily pain. Rey (1995) 11.

[69] Wound and pain coincide; it is not clear whether the passages speak about the wound – visible to external observers – or about pain – felt subjectively by the sufferer. See for example *Il.* 11, 398–400: "Tydides dropped to a knee / and yanked the winged arrow from his foot / as the raw / pain went stabbing through his flesh (ὀδύνη δὲ διὰ χροὸς ἦλθ' ἀλεγεινή)."

[70] Machaon and Podalarius (*Il.* II, 732), Asclepius (V, 899), Eurypylus (XVI, 27). Healers in general are mentioned in *Il.* XVI, 30. However, injuries can also be healed by divine intervention, for example in the case of Glaucus (*Il.* XVI, 514–526). Thus, in the *Iliad*, we can still find a conception of medicine based on divine principles. See Longrigg (1993) 24–26. It is of interest that in the *Iliad*, we find two conceptions of medicine: "irrational" based

(ῥίζα),[71] it has a positive effect not only on the pain, but on the wound, too; it heals, and the hero can join the battle again. Thus, it seems that once the pain is alleviated, the wound is healed, too.[72]

Also, we usually get the information about the weapon, which inflicted the wound/pain. These weapons are usually arrows, spears, or swords i.e., sharp objects.[73] Their sharpness, according to some interpreters, constitutes an important link to the effect they are causing, i.e., pain.[74] In both Homeric and classical Greek, one of the words denoting pain, ὀδύνη, is characterised by attributes such as sharp, biting or piercing, so there is a close connection between the weapon inflicting pain and the quality of this pain. In the *Iliad*, this word denotes pain localised in the body and belongs to the specific medical vocabulary,[75] in which it agrees with later usage of the word, for example in the *'Hippocratic' corpus*.[76] Besides of the word ὀδύνη and its connection to sharpness, there is another word in the *Iliad* denoting pain, which is significant in the later tradition, too: ἄλγος. This word signifies usually prolonged or recurrent

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on divine intervention, and "rational" based on the intervention of the healer and drugs. However, it is unclear on what principle the "rational" medicine of the healers in the *Iliad* works and whether the healing power of their drugs is divine or not. Personally, I find the division between "rational" and "irrational" in the case of Homer (and in general, too) problematic.

[71] See Patroclus curing Eurypylus in *Il.* XV, 390–395: "Patroclus sat it out / in his friend Eurypylus' shelter / trying to lift the soldier's heart with stories, / applying soothing drugs (ἤπια φάρμακα) to his dreadful wound / as he sought to calm the black waves of pain." See also *Il.* IV, 218 (ἤπια φάρμακα / soothing drugs) V, 401 (ὀδυνήφατα φάρμακα / pain-killing drugs); V, 900 (ὀδυνήφατα φάρμακα); XI, 515 (ἤπια φάρμακα); XI, 741 (φάρμακα) XI, 830 (ἤπια φάρμακα); XI, 846 (ῥίζα πικρή / bitter root).

[72] See *Il.* V, 400–402: "But the Healer applied his pain–killing drugs and sealed Hades' wound–he was not born to die."

[73] Sharp sword / ὀξύς χαλκός (IV, 540; V, 132; V, 238; V, 558; V, 821; IX, 458), sharp spear / ὀξύ δουρύ (IV, 490; V, 73; V, 238; V, 336), sharp stone / ὀξύς λᾶας (XVI, 739). See also Holmes (2007) 58.

[74] See Rey (1995) 12; Cheng (2018) 9. Sharp pain is explicitly mentioned in the passage about Agamemnon's wound in *Il.* XI, 268–72: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἕλκος ἐτέρσετο, παύσατο δ' αἷμα, / ὀξεῖαι δ' ὀδύναι δῦνον μένος Ἀτρείδαο. / ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ὠδίνουσαν ἔχῃ βέλος ὀξὺ γυναῖκα, / δριμύ, τό τε προϊεῖσι μογοστόκοι Εἰλείθυιαι, / Ἥρης θυγατέρες πικρὰς ὠδῖνας ἔχουσαι / ὣς ὀξεῖ' ὀδύνη δῦνεν μένος Ἀτρείδαο. "But soon as the gash dried and firm clots formed, / sharp pain came bursting in on Atrides' strength /spear-sharp as the labor-pangs that pierce a woman, / agonies brought on by the harsh, birthing spirits, / Hera's daughters who hold the stabbing power of birth / so sharp the throes that burst on Atrides' strength." See also *Il.* XVI, 518 (Glaucus' pain): χείρ ὀξείῃς ὀδύνῃσιν. "My whole arm rings with the stabbing pangs."

[75] Rey (1995) 13: "In Homer's language it is the word *odune* which is the technical term that belongs to the specialised vocabulary of medicine."

[76] See chapter 2.1 bellow.

suffering.[77] When Achilles speaks about his continuous suffering in the war, the author uses ἄλγος in these passages.[78]

Another phenomenon accompanying pain in the *Illiad* is blood. It is mentioned very often in the scenes describing wounds and it seems to be a visible sign of invisible suffering.[79] The relation between pain and blood is again peculiar to our modern experience, because, in the *Iliad*, when the bleeding stops, the pain stops, too.[80]

All the notions related to pain mentioned so far, wounds, drugs, weapons, and blood, were related either to some external agent (drugs and weapons) or to some state of the body (wound and blood). Yet, there is one very important aspect of the situation when the warrior is experiencing pain which is more deeply connected to the personality of the sufferer: it is the verbal expression of pain. Of course, not all wounded warriors in the *Iliad* are able to talk. Some of them die immediately after they are wounded. But some of the wounded and dying heroes speak of many things, but not of pain:[81] they are able to foresee the future and lament about their destiny, but they do not verbally express their pain.[82] Only once a hero speaks about his

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[77] Rey explains the use of ἄλγος as follows: "*Algos* is used not only, as its verbal contexts suggest (to endure, to put up with or to work with pain), to indicate a submission to suffering and consequently a trait inherent to human destiny; it also signifies prolonged suffering by recording its duration and susceptibility to recurrence." Rey (2005) 12–13.

[78] οὐδέ τί μοι περίκειται, ἐπεὶ πάθον ἄλγεα θυμῶι, / αἰεὶ ἐμὴν ψυχὴν παραβαλλόμενος πολεμίζειν. "Nothing / and after suffering hardships, year in, year out, / staking my life on the mortal risks of war." See also *Il.* I, 2. This word is also used when the narrative talks about pain/suffering inflicted by Zeus: *Il.* II, 375; XVIII, 431. Priam uses this word when talking about his pain after the death of Hector (*Il.* XXII, 423).

[79] See for example how Eurypylus urges Patrocles to cure him in *Il.* XI, 828–35: "Cut this shaft from my thigh. And the dark blood / wash it out of the wound with clear warm water. / And spread the soothing, healing salves across it, / the powerful drugs they say you learned from Achilles / and Chiron the most humane of Centaurs taught your friend." See also *Il.* XI, 840–48; XVI, 514–526; Holmes (2007) 48, 51.

[80] See e.g., *Il.* IV, 120–140: "Pray god you're right, dear brother Menelaus! But the wound–a healer will treat it, apply drugs and put a stop to the black waves of pain." See also Holmes (2007) 64, 71–2.

[81] See, for example, the words of Eurypylus, who doesn't heed his pain or wound, but rather urges his companions to help Ajax (*Il.* XI, 587–591); see also Sarpedon's words when dying (XVI, 490–501) and Hector's prediction of Achilles' death (*Il.* XXII, 356–360).

[82] Morris summarises this phenomenon as follows: "What such moments [i.e., wounds or dying] rarely contain, however, is an extended description of anguish or agony. Homeric warriors normally expire all at once in a black mist or in a bone-crunching clatter of armor; they groan, gasp, and vomit blood; but, in an epic where we have little access to the interior life of the characters, they seldom die in pain." Morris (1991) 41. The situation is slightly different in the case of injured gods (*Il.* V, 384; 394–400; 337–360). It seems that because they cannot die, the narrative focuses more on their suffering. See Holmes (2007) 64, Morris (1991) 42.

pain and even in this case he uses neutral language without emphasizing his suffering; it seems that Glaucus prays Apollo for healing not because he suffers, but only because he wants to join the battle again.[83] This is striking in comparison with the scenes of psychic suffering where the heroes don't hesitate to express their emotions openly.[84] Achilles, more than anyone, often expresses his anger or sorrow.[85] But in battle, the heroes don't stand aside from their duty, even though they are in pain, and the narrative doesn't focus on the painfulness of their situation.[86]

Besides pain understood in the context of war injuries, in the *Iliad*, we read about emotional pain, too.[87] The most significant example here is old Priam who, after the loss of his son Hector, suffered immensely (one of the translators expressed it as "pain to break the spirit").[88] Emotional pain is felt also by Achilles; before the death of Patroclus, he feels pain

[83] See *Il.* XVI, 514–526: "Look at this ugly wound / my whole arm rings with the stabbing pangs (ὀδύνη), / the blood won't clot, my shoulder's a dead weight. / I can't take up my spear, can't hold it steady / no wading into enemy ranks to fight it out / and our bravest man is dead, Sarpedon, Zeus's son / did Zeus stand by him? Not even his own son! / I beg you, Apollo, heal this throbbing wound, / lull the pain (ὀδύνη) now, lend me power in battle / so I can rally our Lycians, drive them into war /and fight to save my comrade's corpse myself. / So Glaucus prayed and Apollo heard his prayer. / He stopped the pains (ὀδύνη) at once, stanched the dark blood /in his throbbing wound and filled his heart with courage."

[84] After Patroclus' death, "the sands grew wet, / the armor of fighting men grew wet with tears, / such bitter longing he roused." *Il.* XXIII, 14–20.

[85] *Il.* I, 348–350: "But Achilles wept, and slipping away from his companions, far apart, sat down on the beach of the heaving grey sea and scanned the endless ocean." See also *Il.* IX, 646–7 "…my heart still heaves with rage / οἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλωι.' *Il.* XVIII, 22–3: "A black cloud of grief came shrouding (τὸν δ' ἄχεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε μέλαινα) over Achilles. Both hands clawing the ground for soot and filth…". Cf. *Il.* XIX, 5. Holmes summarises it as follows: "The wounded warrior is silent. Achilles does not flinch, let alone speak, when he is hit by a spear. Despite their willingness to express grief or anger, then, warriors never complain about the pain of their wounds." Holmes (2007) 57–58.

[86] See for example *Il.* XII, 385–395: "Soon as he noticed Glaucus slipping clear, / the pain overcame Sarpedon / but even so he never forgot his lust for battle." See also *Il.* XIII, 418–20 "brave Antilochus most, his battle–passion rising, / stunned with pain but he would not fail Hypsenor."

[87] Division between bodily and emotional pain was criticised by Rey, who suggest that instead of this division, our "understanding of pain in Homer should be based on the extent to which the subject is engrossed in the pain and how he or she perceives it with respect to time and to its origin: long-lasting and fast, sharp or cutting, i.e. by referring directly to the instrument which causes it and which simultaneously defines the very nature of the sensation." (Rey 1995) 13–14. Even though I find her suggestion plausible, it still seems appropriate to discern between bodily pain connected to war injuries and other types of pain.

[88] *Il.* XXIV, 518 (ἦ δὴ πολλὰ κάκ' ἄνσχεο σὸν κατὰ θυμόν); XXIV, 549 (μηδ' ἀλίαστον ὀδύρεο σὸν κατὰ θυμόν); See also *Il.* XXIV, 241: "You think it nothing, the pain that Zeus has sent me… / μοι Κρονίδης Ζεὺς ἄλγε' ἔδωκεν.'

caused by Agamemnon's insult.[89] We also read about sharing pain (sympathy) among fighting comrades.[90]

Already in the *Iliad,* pain can be used in a figurative or metaphorical way (which is common in later literary tradition) and is not necessarily a direct expression of bodily injury.[91] So we can read that Hector is the cause of "pain for Acheans",[92] which is connected to the notion of not only individual, but collective pain.[93] In other figurative expressions we read about a "cup of pain"[94] and "pains heaped on pains."[95] Not only the wounds are painful,[96] but also the weapons,[97] grief[98] and news.[99] Somewhere in between the bodily pain and its figurative use is the expression "pains of death" which is used in the general characterization of human destiny.[100] In the figurative sense, pains can last even after death, as in the case of Hector, whose body lay unburied twelve days after his death.[101]

In sum, the studied material sheds light on a specific manner of expression of pain in the *Iliad.* In this epic, pain is visually expressed: we see the weapon inflicting it, the wound from which blood is flowing, and the herbs alleviating it. But we don't hear about pain from

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[89] XVI, 50–55: "No doom my noble mother revealed to me from Zeus, / just this terrible pain (ἄχος κραδίην) that wounds me to the quick / when one man attempts to plunder a man his equal, / to commandeer a prize, exulting so in his own power."

[90] See *Il.* XVII, 352–3: τὸν δὲ πεσόντ' ἐλέησεν ἀρήϊος Ἀστεροπαῖος, / ἴθυσεν δὲ καὶ ὃ πρόφρων Δαναοῖσι μάχεσθαι. "Down to the ground he went / but battling Asteropaeus pitied his comrade's pain / and charged the Argives hard, mad to fight it out / no use, too late."

[91] However, in the Greek of the following passages, we usually find words which originally denote something other than pain.

[92] *Il.* X, 52 (τόσα γὰρ κακὰ μήσατ' Ἀχαιούς).

[93] *Il.* XIV, 480–1: "Don't think struggle and pain will be ours alone." / οὔ θην οἵοισίν γε πόνος τ' ἔσεται καὶ ὀϊζύς / ἡμῖν.

[94] *Il.* XV, 132 (κακὰ πολλά).

[95] *Il.* XVI, 111 (πάντηι δὲ κακὸν κακῶι ἐστήρικτο).

[96] *Il.* XIX, 55 (ἕλκεα λυγρά).

[97] *Il.* XVII, 430 (βέλεα στονόεντα).

[98] *Il.* XIX, 360 (ἄχος αἰνὸν).

[99] *Il.* XVIII, 20 (λυγρῆς πεύσεαι ἀγγελίης); XIX, 337 (λυγρὴ ἀγγελίη).

[100] See *Il.* XXII, 210: ὦ πάτερ Ἀργικέραυνε κελαινεφές, οἷον ἔειπες· / ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἐόντα, πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσηι, / ἂψ ἐθέλεις θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ἐξαναλῦσαι; / ἔρδ'· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι. "Father! / Lord of the lightning, king of the black cloud, / what are you saying? A man, a mere mortal, / his doom sealed long ago? You'd set him free / from all the pains of death?" See also *Il.* XVI, 442 (θάνατος δυσηχης). Yet, even gods can suffer pain, so death, not pain, is the border line between mortals and immortals.

[101] *Il.* XXIV, 422 (κῆδος).

the heroes suffering it. Sometimes, we hear the narrator describing their pain but the sufferers themselves stay silent. However, in the case of pain of the soul, the sufferers are more involved. If there is one significant difference between the *Iliad* and tragic poets concerning pain, it is the absence of verbal (articulate or inarticulate) expression in the former and their abundance in the latter.

In the *Odyssey*,[102] there is a significant shift of emphasis concerning pain. The word ὀδύνη in its meaning of bodily pain connected to injury is used only rarely,[103] for example in the scene where Odysseus blinds Cyclops Polyphemus.[104] Overall, if the *Iliad* was characteristic in connecting pain with war injuries, in the *Odyssey*, we usually read about pain of the soul, or, more precisely, about unspecified general pain or suffering which includes both bodily and pain of the soul.[105] The core of this epic, Odysseus' return home, is exemplified by recurring themes of Odysseus' suffering,[106] Penelope's pains,[107] or of pains suffered by other members of Odysseus' family, his father Laertes and his son Telemachus.[108] It is clear that Odysseus' family does not suffer any bodily pain, but rather they must bear Odysseus' long absence and feel grief over his continuous suffering.[109] This shift of emphasis in comparison to the *Iliad* is manifested

[102] Ed. Mühll (1967), transl. Lombardo (2000).

[103] Only 7 times in comparison to 21 occurrences in the *Iliad.* In the *Odyssey*, ὀδύνη is not always so strictly connected to bodily pain. See for example Telemachus' complaint about his father in *Od.* I, 242-3: οἴχετ' ἄϊστος ἄπυστος, ἐμοὶ δ' ὀδύνας τε γόους τε / κάλλιπεν. "He's vanished, gone, and left me / pain and sorrow."

[104] *Od.* IX, 440-2: ἄναξ δ' ὀδύνῃσι κακῇσι / τειρόμενος πάντων ὀΐων ἐπεμαίετο νῶτα / ὀρθῶν ἑσταότων·
"Their master, / worn out with pain, felt along the backs / of all of the sheep as they walked by, the fool, / unaware of the men under their fleecy chests."

[105] *Od.* II, 174; IV, 108; IV, 219-21; IV, 715-717; IV, 722-3; V, 206-8; V, 336; V, 491-3; VI, 169-170; V, 282-3; IX, 12; XI, 100-9; XI, 111; XI, 207-9; XII, 271; XIV, 170; XIV, 215; XIV, 337-8; XV, 342; XVI, 147; XVI, 187-9; XVII, 555; XVIII, 347; XIX, 355; XX, 203; XXII, 200; XXIII, 306-8; XXIV, 315

[106] *Od.* V, 206-8: εἴ γε μὲν εἰδείης σῇσι φρεσίν, ὅσσα τοι αἶσα / κήδε' ἀναπλῆσαι, πρὶν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἱκέσθαι, / ἐνθάδε κ' αὖθι μένων σὺν ἐμοὶ τόδε δῶμα φυλάσσοις. "But if you had any idea of all the pain /you're destined to suffer before getting home, /you'd stay here with me." See also *Od.* XI, 111: καί κεν ἔτ' εἰς Ἰθάκην, κακά περ πάσχοντες, ἵκοισθε. "And you may still reach Ithaca, though not without pain." See also *Od*. V, 491-3; V, 282-3 ; XI, 100-9; XXIII, 306-8.

[107] *Od.* IV, 722-3: κλῦτε, φίλαι· περὶ γάρ μοι Ὀλύμπιος ἄλγε' ἔδωκεν / ἐκ πασέων. "Hear me, my friends, for the god on Olympus / has given me pain beyond all other women / of my generation." See also IV, 715-717; XIV, 170; XVII, 555.

[108] *Od.* XVI, 187-9; XXIV, 315.

[109] Not only his family but the nymph Calypso feels sympathy with Odysseus' pain (ἄλγος), too.

in the vocabulary, too. Besides the already familiar words as ὀδύνη or ἄλγος,[110] the metaphoric expressions or use of words with a closer link to emotions are more common. Unspecified pains or suffering can be expressed as κακά,[111] and pain of the soul is often expressed by ἄχος,[112] πένθος[113] or κένδος[114]

Before we leave Homer, there are two features of pain in the *Odyssey* worth mentioning. Firstly, in contrast to the *Iliad,* there is no explicit link here between pain and wounds, weapons or blood. However, it is of interest that we learn something more about the connection between pain and drugs. When Telemachus searches for Odysseus and visits Menelaus, Helen prepares a potion for them, a mixture of wine and some drug, "that stilled all pain, quieted all anger / and brought forgetfulness of every ill."[115] While Patroclus used stories for lifting the heart of his wounded companion Eurypylus,[116] Helen needs only this miraculous drug.

Secondly, in the *Odyssey*, (almost) all pain is directly or indirectly linked to the principal character of the epic. Surely, it is not surprising given the role Odysseus plays in the narrative: while in the *Iliad*, there are several main characters of the epic, amongst them Achilles and Hector are the most important, in the second epic, Odysseus plays really a key role which is unmeasurable to any other character present in the narrative. His connection to pain is, however, based also on the inner logic of the story and, even, on his name. Odysseus' name is, we are told, connected to the verb ὀδύσσομαι, which means "to hate" or "suffer pain". Thus, Odysseus is someone who is hated or who is in pain. The latter notion can be modified into the active voice: Odysseus is also someone who causes pain, which is actually expressed in the narrative itself. When Odysseus' grandfather Autolycus gives a name to his grandson, he stresses the ambiguous meaning of ὀδυσσάμενος:

> Daughter and son-in-law of mine, / Give this child the name I now tell you. / I come here as one who is odious, yes, / Hateful to many for the pain I have caused All over the land. Let this child, therefore, / Go by the name of Odysseus.
>
> γαμβρὸς ἐμὸς θύγατέρ τε, τίθεσθ' ὄνομ', ὅττι κεν εἴπω· / πολλοῖσιν γὰρ ἐγώ γε ὀδυσσάμενος τόδ' ἱκάνω, / ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξὶν ἀνὰ χθόνα βωτιάνειραν· / τῷ δ' Ὀδυσεὺς ὄνομ' ἔστω ἐπώνυμον.

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[110] An interesting word compound, θυμαλγής / heart-grieving pain, is at *Od.* XVIII, 347.

[111] *Od.* II, 174; IV, 219-21; XI, 105; XI, 111; XII, 271. See also κακότης at *Od.* V, 282; XX, 203.

[112] *Od.* IV, 715-717; XI, 207-9. XVI, 147. XXIV, 315.

[113] *Od.* VI, 169; VII, 217-8.

[114] *Od.* V, 206-8; IX, 12; XIV, 170.

[115] *Od.* IV, 219-21: νηπενθές τ' ἄχολόν τε, κακῶν ἐπίληθον ἁπάντων.

[116] *Il.* XV, 390–395.

The destiny of Odysseus is thus foreshadowed at the beginning of his life, by his very name. It seems that by the end of the narrative he acknowledges it himself when he is telling Penelope about "all the suffering He had brought upon others, and of all the pain He endured himself."[117]

Thus, in the *Odyssey*, several new important features of pain are elaborated. Especially, there is a significant shift from its strict connection to wounds and injuries to the notion of suffering which can include bodily, but alsoemotional, with greater emphasis on the latter. This shift already anticipated the way pain is represented in classical Greek tragedies and, to some degree, in the philosophical conceptions of Plato and Aristotle. Wound-pain connection, so important in the *Iliad*, will be later developed and modified in the *'Hippocratic' corpus*, whose authors will, however, speak not only about wounds or injuries but primarily about diseases, which stand outside the scope of Homer's narrative.[118]

Let us now move to the second major epic poet, Hesiod. In both his poems, *Theogony*[119] and *Works and Days*,[120] pain is of divine origin. In the first poem, the passage about the Night and its offspring (*Th.* 211-232), speaks about "painful Toil" (Πόνος ἀλγινόεις) and "tearful Pains" (Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα) born by Strife (Ἔρις).[121] In the second poem, pain and other evils are connected to Pandora (παν-δώρα / All-gift),[122] a maiden made by gods and sent to humans as a punishment for Prometheus' stealing of fire. We are told that before Pandora's arrival, "the tribes of men used to live upon the earth entirely apart from evils, and without grievous toil (ἄτερ χαλεποῖο πόνοιο) and distressful diseases, which give death to men."[123] When Pandora, who in herself had "painful desire",[124] opened the lid of the jar, she "wrought baneful evils for human beings".[125] After opening Pandora's jar, pain is inevitably connected to human beings who suffer it "because of their acts of folly".[126]

In comparison to other authors, Hesiod is particularly coherent in the use of terminology when expressing pain. For pains in general, without specifying their kind or quality, he uses the

[117] *Od.* XXIII, 306-308: ὅσα κήδε' ἔθηκεν / ἀνθρώποισ' ὅσα τ' αὐτὸς ὀϊζύσας ἐμόγησε, / πάντ' ἔλεγ'

[118] War medicine plays a principal role in the epos. See Cordes (1991).

[119] Ed. and transl. West (1966).

[120] Ed. Solmsen (1970), transl. West (2006).

[121] *Th.* 226-227.

[122] *Op.* 42-106.

[123] πρὶν μὲν γὰρ ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων νόφσιν ἄτερ τε κακῶν καὶ ἄτερ χαλεποῖο πόνοιο νούσφιν τ' ἀργαλέων ἅι τ ἀνδράσι κῆρας ἔδωκαν. *Op.* 91-93.

[124] πόθος ἀργαλέος. *Op.* 66.

[125] ἀνθρώποισι δ ἐμήσατο κήδεα λυγρά. *Op.* 95.

[126] ἄλγε' ἔχοντες ἀφραδίῃς. *Op*. 134-5.

word ἄλγεα.[127] When talking about pain afflicting the gods, he specifies that it is pain of the spirit (θυμαλγής).[128] Also, pain can be used as an attribute of other negative phenomena such as distress or toil.[129] It is of interest that Hesiod uses the word πόνος in the sense of toil.[130] This word can mean both pain and toil and it is used in both of these senses by later authors. It seems that already in Hesiod, we find the idea that even though toil is not always painful, there exists a close link between these two notions.[131] Hesiod's account of pain agrees with the Homeric one in the emphasis on the divine origin of pain. Also, in its connection to toil, pain is conceived of as an inevitable feature of the human condition.

1.5.3 Pain in Tragic and Lyric Poets

Sophocles' *Philoctetes*[132] represents one of the most expressive sources related to pain in classical Greek literature.[133] Its hero Philoctetes suffers for ten years because his leg was

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[127] See for example *Op.* 211.

[128] "The spirits of gods are pained with toil (πόνον θυμαλγέ' ἔχοντες)." *Th.* 630. "They are pained with distress (ἄχη θυμαλγέ' ἔχοντες)." *Th*. 630 (Wieseler has ἄχη, West has μάχην).

[129] Ὀιζὺς ἀλγινόεσσα. *Th.* 214. When Hesiod mentions the painlessness of the see, he uses the word ἀπήμον (*Op.* 670).

[130] *Th.* 226, 629, 881, *Op.* 91, 113, 432.

[131] See *Th.* 226 and *Op.* 91.

[132] Ed. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990) transl. Storr (1909). According to Allan, in Sophocles' dramas, medical notions such as disease and pain a play very important role: "Sophocles is notable for the way he relates the disorders afflicting Ajax, Heracles, and Philoctetes to their specific characters; or, to put in more medical terms, madness (in the case of Ajax) and physical agony (in the case of Heracles and Philoctetes) are the symptoms of heroic suffering, whose cause is the nature (or *physis*) of the patient himself." Allan (2014) 266. For a discussion of the relation between Greek tragedy and medicine see Lloyd (2003) 84-113. For a discussion of the *Philoctetes*, see ibid. 89-91.

[133] Greek tragedy is an especially apt genre for expressing pain. See Budelmann (2014) 445: "When Sophocles forces spectators to face for several minutes the physical agony that is enacted visibly before their eyes, he prompts responses that are likely to go far beyond analytical modes of interpretation. The precise effect will vary from spectator to the spectator and has been conceptualized differently in different periods." See also Rey (1995) 14: "The tragic genre gives pain a special place in which it finds its natural means of expression." See also A. Pleniceanu (2018) 6-7: "Fighting pain's inherent inexpressibility, Aeschylus and Sophocles find ways of integrating it in tragedy and the result is that all tools of expression are tested and enriched… Pain signals towards a viscerality or rawness inherent in tragedy." Pain is an important topic also in other Sophocles' plays, e.g., in *Ajax* the emotional pain/madness of the main hero, in *Trachiniae*, Heracles's bodily suffering before his death.

wounded by a poisonous viper.[134] Because of his crying caused by pain, he was abandoned by his companions on the island of Lemnos on their journey to Troy.[135] He spends almost the whole time of the Trojan War there, but at the very end of it, an embassy led by Achilles' son Neoptolemus and Odysseus is sent to acquire his bow, because the Greeks learned that without it, they could not win over the Trojans.[136] However, this bow Philoctetes got from Heracles and it is his only means of living and safety, so he is reluctant to give it up.[137] In the course of the narrative during which the embassy attempts to persuade Philoctetes to either render his bow or to accompany them to Troy, we learn a lot about the unhappy hero's painful condition.[138] Philoctetes' pain is so intensive and so omnipresent in the drama, so it seems to be "almost an independent being which takes possession of the subject".[139]

Philoctetes is "afflicted by his foot's envenomed wound."[140] His pain is thus caused by some external agent, as in the case of Homer's warriors. Yet, there is a striking difference here, because Philoctetes' pain is chronic, and is deeply interwoven with emotional suffering.[141] In the play, we find Philoctetes referring to his "old wound", because he has suffered from it for ten years.[142] Intensity of his pain changes in time[143] and at least at sleep, he doesn't feel it at all.[144] As in Homer, in *Philoctetes*, too, pain can be alleviated by drugs (φάρμακα). Philoctetes

[134] *Philoc.* 265-7: „[M]arked for death / by a man-slaying serpent's (ἐχίδνης ἀγρίῳ) venomous fangs." See also *Philoc.* 6; 310-320; *Trach.* 771: "Soon the fell venom of the hydra (ἐχίδνης ἰὸς) dire / worked inward and devoured him."

[135] *Philoc.* 11; 260-280; 610-621.

[136] *Philoc.* 69.

[137] *Philoc.* 105.

[138] Philoctetes is mentioned already in the *Iliad*. Homer summarises his story as follows: "But their captain lay on an island, racked with pain (ἄλγεα), / on Lemnos' holy shores where the armies had marooned him, / agonized by his wound (ἕλκεϊ μοχθίζοντα κακῷ), the bite of a deadly water-viper (ὕδρου). / There he writhed in pain (ἀχέων) but soon, encamped by the ships, / the Argives would recall Philoctetes, their great king." *Il.* II, 721-5.

[139] Rey (1995) 15.

[140] νόσῳ καταστάζοντα διαβόρῳ πόδα. *Philoc.* 6.

[141] See also Rey (1995) 14.

[142] κηρίς παλαιά. *Philoc.* 42.

[143] *Philoc.* 742-750; 807-8.

[144] *Philoc.* 766-8, 828-832.

knows about a leaf (φύλλον), which he uses as anodyne (τι νώδυνον).[145] He speaks about its "wondrous virtue" in withdrawing the pain.[146]

In contrast to Homer, however, in *Philoctetes*, we find vivid verbal expressions of the hero's pain. Philoctetes himself not only speaks about his pain, but he expresses it with screams. When he conveys Neoptolemus his tail, he says that after he was abandoned by his companions ten years ago, "he gazed and nothing found but pain";[147] when describing his pain, he talks about the "wretched foot,"[148] "savage disease,"[149] and "malady which daily grows from bad to worse."[150] Then he describes himself as "plague-stricken, wasting slowly, marked for death / by a man-slaying serpent's venomous fangs."[151] Philoctetes' pain is so severe so he pleads Neoptolemus to kill him:

> "My son, I am lost, undone! Impossible / To hide it longer from you; lost, undone! / It stabs me, stabs me through and through and through. / Ah me! ah me! ah me! / For heaven's sake, if thou hast a sword at hand, / Draw it, my son, strike swiftly, at a stroke / Cut off this foot, no matter if it kill me; / Quick, quick, my son!"[152]

In this passage, Philoctetes not only speaks about his pain, but he is also "moaning and groaning",[153] which Sophocles expresses by unusual "words": ἀπαππαπαῖ, παπᾶ παπᾶ παπᾶ

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[145] *Philoc.* 43-44.

[146] φύλλον τί μοι πάρεστιν, ᾧ μάλιστ' ἀεὶ / κοιμῶ τόδ' ἕλκος, ὥστε πραῦνειν πάνυ. „A herb of wondrous virtue wherewithal / I use to mollify and lull my wound." *Philoc.* 649-650. See also *Philoc.* 703-5.

[147] πάντα δὲ σκοπῶν / ηὕρισκον οὐδὲν πλὴν ἀνιᾶσθαι παρόν, / τούτου δὲ πολλὴν εὐμάρειαν, ὦ τέκνον. "All ways I gazed and nothing found but pain / Pain, and of pain, God wot, enow, my son." *Philoc.* 282-4

[148] πούς δύστηνος. *Philoc.* 291.

[149] νόσος ἄγρια. *Philoc.* 173, 265-6. See also *Trach.* 975, 1030. According to some interpreters, the use of the word savage should emphasise the savageness and wildness of the hero suffering pain. See Budelmann 2007, 444; Rey 1995, 15.

[150] ἡ δ' ἐμὴ νόσος / ἀεὶ τέθηλε κἀπὶ μεῖζον ἔρχεται. "My malady the while / Rankles, and daily grows from bad to worse." *Philoc.* 258-9

[151] ἀγρίᾳ / νόσῳ καταφθίνοντα, τῆς ἀνδροφθόρου / πληγέντ' ἐχίδνης ἀγρίῳ χαράγματι. *Philoc.* 265-7.

[152] *Philoc.* 742-750. Φι. ἀπόλωλα, τέκνον, κοὐ δυνήσομαι κακὸν / κρύψαι παρ' ὑμῖν, ἀτταταῖ· διέρχεται, / διέρχεται. δύστηνος, ὢ τάλας ἐγώ. / ἀπόλωλα, τέκνον· βρύκομαι, τέκνον· παπαῖ, / ἀπαππαπαῖ, παπᾶ παπᾶ παπᾶ παπαῖ. / πρὸς θεῶν, πρόχειρον εἴ τί σοι, τέκνον, πάρα / ξίφος χεροῖν, πάταξον εἰς ἄκρον πόδα· / ἀπάμησον ὡς τάχιστα· μὴ φείσῃ βίου. /ἴθ', ὦ παῖ. See a similar motive in *Trach.* 1013-16.

[153] βοῶν, ἰύζων. *Philoc.* 11. See also *Philoc.* 210.

παπαῖ.[154] This literary means allows the author to fully express the pain in its impressiveness.[155]

Another important feature of Sophocles' writing about pain is the pervasiveness of pain: Philoctetes' bodily pain is always experienced on both bodily and emotional levels. He is in a state of suffering which is caused not only by his wound but also by the fact that he was left on the island alone and lost all his friends and companions.[156] When he is struck by a new attack of pain, his principal worry is about Neoptolemus leaving him. He asks for his friend's presence to alleviate his own suffering.[157]

Sophocles' inventiveness concerning pain is most apparent in these two aspects just mentioned: in the expression of pain and in the impossibility to reduce pain to its bodily experience. In some other respects, however, *Philoctetes* is deeply rooted in Homeric tradition: Philoctetes' pain is god's punishment for insulting Apollo's priest Chryses.[158] Philoctetes himself cannot heal his pain,[159] so he prays to god[160] and only he, through Asclepius or other physicians, can heal him.[161]

In this drama, thus, we can find answers on the origin of pain, the possibility of its expression and treatment. In contrast to philosophical and medical tradition, however, these

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[154] *Philoc.* 746. See also *Philoc.* 732, 739 (ᾆ ᾆ ᾆ ᾆ). Concerning this topic, see Budelmann (2007) 445: "Perhaps the best example of the interdependence of body and language is that most iconic expression of pain, the scream. On the one hand, screaming is at least to a degree a hard-wired, pre-linguistic response to pain (babies are good at it), but on the other hand, Philoctetes and Heracles scream in trimeters and complex metres, using a range of different formalised expressions… Sophocles' pain is a matter not of body *or* language, but body *and* language." More sceptical approach concerning expression of pain in Sophocles proposes Pleniceanu (2018) 21, 23: "Where pain makes an apparition in Greek tragedy, language is used only to suggest, but neither words, nor metre, nor any other mimetic mode get to the core of the experience… Philoctetes experiences a complete disconnection from any cognitive process that could help him explain or narrate his experience."

[155] There is also an interesting relation between pain and speech: in one passage, Philoctetes explains his confusion talking by his pain: οὔτοι νεμεσητὸν / ἀλύοντα χειμερίῳ / λύπᾳ καὶ παρὰ νοῦν θροεῖν. "O be not wrath if one distraught with pain / Blurts out discordant words beside the mark." 1193-5. According to Pleniceanu (2018) 23, pain destroys first Philoctetes' language (as in the passage 1193-5) then his sentience (when he faints at 762–66, 790–93).

[156] *Philoc.* 260-280; 610-621.

[157] *Philoc.* 760-770.

[158] *Philoc.* 191-6, 1325-35.

[159] *Philoc.* 299.

[160] *Philoc.* 737-8.

[161] *Philoc.* 1329-35, 1378-9, 1437-8.

questions stay in a strong connection to the explanations offered by Greek thought based on Homer.

In lyric authors, pain is often mentioned in an emotional context rather than in the sense of strict bodily pain. For example, in Sappho and Archilochus, pain is connected to the sorrow of an absent lover or weeping over the drowned friends (see e.g., Sappho fr. 94; Archilochus fr. 13 and 193). Unfortunately, the fragmentary state in which we possess the texts of these authors makes it difficult to decipher their notions of pain. Pindar, whose work is more extant, talks about pain in various contexts: he mentions pain connected to bodily wounds and diseases[162] and he talks about the centaur Chiron and his ability to heal wounds and pains.[163] Pain – unspecified whether bodily or emotional – belongs to human destiny, and is mentioned with its opposite, pleasure.[164] Emotional aspect of pain is manifested in an expression that localises pain in the heart.[165] On the whole, it seems that pain is treated in a similar context as in Homer and tragic poets.

1.5.4 Pain in 'Presocratic' Thinkers

Many presocratic thinkers were interested in medicine and even though their writings devoted to medical topics are usually lost, we can gain some picture of their theories from the fragments quoted by later ancient thinkers.[166] Alcmaeon of Croton is considered to be one of the most important medical authors before the *'Hippocratic' corpus*.[167] From his work we have only five extant fragments which do not speak explicitly about pain, however, one of them is particularly important since health and disease is discussed in it.[168] According to Alcmaeon, health is

[162] *Pyth*. 3, 55 (λύσαις ἄλλον ἀλλοίων ἀχέων); 4, 220-223 (στερεᾶν ὀδυνᾶν); *Olymp*. 8, 84-85 (ὀξείας δὲ νόσους); *Nem*. 1, 50-53 (ὀξείαις ἀνίαισι τυπείς). Ed. Maehler (post B. Snell) (1971).

[163] *Pyth*. 3, 1-6; 3, 45-50.

[164] *Olymp*. 2, 33-37 (εὐθυμιᾶν – πόνων); *Olymp*. 12, 10-12 (πήμα – τέρψις).

[165] *Pyth*. 2, 90-92 (ἕλκος ὀδυναρὸν ἑᾷ πρόσθε καρδίᾳ).

[166] I rely here on J. Longrigg's notion that Greek medicine and philosophical thinking of the 6th and 5th century substantially influenced each other. See Longrigg (1993) 27, 53, 81.

[167] Alcmaeon is said to be in some contact with the Pythagorean school and to flourish at the beginning of the fifth century BC. See for example Longrigg (1993) 48; Zhmund (2012) 356; Kirk, Raven (1977), 232-236; Gurthie (1978) 341-352.

[168] Also, Alcmaeon's conception of health may have had a significant influence on some ''Hippocratic'' authors. Some of his other ideas may have influenced them, too, for example, the idea that the brain is a seat of perception (*Morb. Sacr.* ch. 14-17. Kirk, Raven [1977] 233; Gurthie [1978] 349). Gurthie (1978) 245 assumes that Alcmaeon is already writing in the spirit of the emphasis on detailed observation of particular cases rather than relying on

preserved by equality (ισονομία) of the following powers (δυνάμεις): moist, dry, cold, hot, bitter, and sweet. Disease (νόσος) is caused by the supremacy (μοναρχία) of one of them.[169] Alcmaeon specifies that diseases arising because of excessive heat or cold are caused by surfeit or deficiency of nourishment and that they are located in blood, marrow, or brain. Also, diseases can come about because of some external causes (ἔξωθεν αἰτιῶν), such as the quality of water, local environment, toil, or torture. "Health," on the other hand," is a harmonious blending of the qualities." [170] Yet, caution is needed in ascribing Alcmaeon these ideas, since it is highly probable that the state of the fragments is substantially influenced by later doxographers, thus we cannot be sure that Alcmaeon really held them.

The theory of interrelated powers (δυνάμεις) and their connection to health played an important role in the later development of Greek medicine. In the 'Hippocratic' *On the Nature of Man*, we find these powers (but without bitter and sweet) in connection to the four humours, and in some other treatises, we find traces of various (opposing) qualities, powers or basic constituents, too.[171] It is striking that already Alcmaeon explains diseases by the supremacy of one of these powers. In a similar way, some 'Hippocratic' authors explain not only the origin of disease but of pain as well.[172] We don't know how wide Alcmaeon's notion of disease (νόσος) was, but it may be possible that he understood the relationship between disease and pain in a similar manner as his 'Hippocratic' successors; some of them conceived of pain as of a sign or symptom indicating the imbalance of bodily constituents (see below, ch. 2). If this were so, we face here an important shift concerning the origin of pain: in contrast to the epic and tragic thinkers, Alcmaeon holds that pain is caused by an interaction between various

philosophical theories, thus in accordance with the 'Hippocratic' treatise *On Ancient Medicine.* For the scarcity of the extant material, this claim is difficult to evaluate.

[169] Aetius, V.30.1 (DK B4).

[170] τὴν δὲ ὑγείαν τὴν σύμμετρον τῶν ποιῶν κρᾶσιν. Aetius, V.30.1 (DK B4). Transl. Longrigg (1990) 31.

[171] *Loc. Hom.* 42 (6.334-336 L = 77-80 Craik); *Vict*. 1.2 (6.470 L = 124.2-20 Joly-Byl; Cf. *Morb.* 4.45 (7.572 L = 100.8-9 Joly); *Med. Vet.* 14 (1.602 L = 136.10-16 Jouanna), *Med. Vet.* 16 (1.606-608 L = 136.10-16 Jouanna); *Gen.* 3 (7.475 L = 46 Joly).

[172] *Nat. hom.* 4 (6.40 L = 172.13-174.10 Jouanna). However, in *Nat. Hom.* we do not read about isonomy which, after all, seems to have some political connotation (Gurthie [1978] 345; Vlastos [1993]). For the 'Hippocratic' author, health is maintained when the humours are "perfectly mingled (μάλιστα μεμιγμένα)," and disease/pain arises "when one of these elements is in defect or excess or is isolated in the body without being compounded with all the others (μὴ κεκρημένον ᾗ τοῖσι ξύμπασιν)." Transl. Jones (1931). Even though the explanation of Alcmaeon and of *Nat. Hom.* share some common ground, they are not identical. See below ch. 2.1.3.

powers which is influenced by external agents, without any explicit relation to divine origin.[173] However, due to the fragmentary state of Alcmaeon's writings, the exact interpretation of his ideas is very highly speculative.

Another presocratic author, this time explicitly mentioning pain, is Parmenides' pupil and Samian general Melissus (flourishing in the forties of the 5th century).[174] In his argument for the oneness of Being, Melissus argues that

> The One-Being…does not feel pain…for, if it should suffer any such thing, it would not still be one… nor does it feel pain; for, if it were in pain, it would not be entire. For a thing in pain could not be for ever, nor has it the same power as what is healthy. Nor would it be all alike if it were in pain. For it would feel pain by the addition or subtraction of something, and would no longer be the same. Nor could what is healthy feel pain, for then what is and is healthy would perish, and what is not would come to be. And the same argument applies to grief as to pain.[175]

Melissus' account of pain is of particular interest because we find a similar argument in the 'Hippocratic' treatise *On the Nature of Man.*[176] In this treatise, however, it is used in the critique of monism and its author gives it a reverse meaning: the 'Hippocratic' author argues for the plurality of the constitutive parts of man from the fact that we suffer pain. Instead of plunging into an explanation of Melissus' monism, let us focus on what the quoted passage tells us about pain.[177] We learn that One-Being (complete and perfect being) cannot feel pain because pain is a kind of alteration. If altered by pain, One-Being would have been somehow hampered in its

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[173] Alcmaeon "regards disease as a part of nature and, in consequence, subject to the same rules that operate in the world at large." Longrigg (1993) 52.

[174] Kirk, Raven (1977) 398; Hariman (2018) 2-8.

For a similar argument see Diogenes of Apollonia DK B2.

[175] Simplicius, *Phys.* 111,18. DK B7. (2) …οὔτε ἀλγεῖ οὔτε ἀνιᾶται· εἰ γάρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἓν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι … (4) οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα ἀλγέον· οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσην δύναμιν τῶι ὑγιεῖ· οὐδ' ἂν ὁμοῖον εἴη, εἰ ἀλγέοι· ἀπογινομένου γάρ τευ ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ προσγινομένου, κοὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὁμοῖον εἴη. (5) οὐδ' ἂν τὸ ὑγιὲς ἀλγῆσαι δύναιτο· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἂν ὅλοιτο τὸ ὑγιὲς καὶ τὸ ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γένοιτο. (6) καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀνιᾶσθαι ὡυτὸς. λόγος τῶι ἀλγέοντι. Simplicius, *Phys.* 111,18. DK B7. Transl. Longrigg (1993) 88. Last sentence is translated by Harriman (2018) 177.

[176] There is a scholarly discussion about whether the main target of the 'Hippocratic' author is Melissus or Diogenes of Apollonia (and his fragment B2). See Harriman (2018) 20.

[177] According to Harriman, the oddity of this passage (why Melissus talks about pain and grief in the context of One-Being which is nowhere presented as animated or intelligent) resolves when we bear in mind that the author argues at other places (B9) against the conception that One-Being has body. Thus, "he was following the lead of Xenophanes by denying that what-is should be understood to be anthropomorphic in any way." Harriman (2018) 169-170.

perfection, entireness and eternity. Also, one who is in pain has not the same power (δύναμις) as someone who is healthy. In Alcmaeon, the counterpart of health was disease (νόσος), for Melissus, it is pain (ἄλος).[178] Pain signalises destruction of the healthy state. It is of interest that pain is caused by "addition or subtraction of something"; it seems that there is a physiological background behind this idea, similar to some later 'Hippocratic' theories.[179] Also, it is possible that Melissus talks about two kinds of pain: bodily pain (ἄλγος) and grief/mental pain (ἀνιᾶσθαι).[180]

Even though Melissus's argument about pain serves only as a support of his monism and it is not to be understood to talk about human or animal life, we learn some important conceptual features of pain which were of relevance for the later authors, too, most importantly that pain is a sign of some imperfection and unhealthy state.

In relation to pain, two other presocratic authors should be mentioned, namely Anaxagoras and Empedocles. They are both important because they speak about the relationship between pain and sense-perception. However, about their contribution to this topic, we learn only from Theophrastus' treatise *De sensibus,*[181] so caution is needed because it is likely that the author reads and interprets his predecessors for his own peripatetic purposes. Theophrastus classifies his predecessors on those who ascribed sense-perception to similarity (ὁμοίῳ) and those who ascribed it to contrast (ἐνάντιῳ).[182] These two principles, similarity and contrast, play crucial roles in the perception of pleasure and pain.

[178] But the close relation of pain and disease (sometimes even identity between these notions) can be found in the 'Hippocratic' corpus, too, see below p. 67.

[179] Harriman (2018) 172. A similar idea is to be found in *On the Nature of Man*: because there is an unnatural amount of humour somewhere in the body, we feel pain. *Nat. hom.* 4.1-15 (6.40 L = 172.13-174.10 Jouanna). See p. 67 below. According to Harriman, both Melissus and the 'Hippocratic' author address the same question, namely in what sense holds the suffering person its unity. It seems that both authors agree that pain and unity cannot coincide. See Harriman (2018) 173.

[180] Harriman (2018) 177. Yet, Harriman is right in indicating that ἄλγος does not mean *only* bodily pain.

[181] Ed. Diels (1879) transl. Stratton (1917). It is possible that the account of his two predecessors is influenced by Theophrastus' own ideas about the topic. This seems to be true at least in the terminology: Theophrastus uses for pain the word λύπη, which is often used by Plato and Aristotle but almost never by presocratic thinkers.

[182] *De sens.* 1.2. In the first group, we find Parmenides, Empedocles and Plato, in the second one Anaxagoras and Heraclitus.

Empedocles is described to hold the theory that "perception occurs because something fits into the passages of the particular sense organ."[183] Pleasure, then, "is excited by things that are similar [to our organs], both in their constituent parts and in the manner of their composition (κρᾶσιν); pain, by things opposed."[184] Connection to sense-perception is accentuated by Aristotle who holds the capacity of sense-perceiving to be the necessary condition for feeling pleasure and pain.[185] Another important notion for later philosophical and medical tradition is the connection between pain and appropriate mixture (κρᾶσις).[186] Yet, it is not easy to evaluate to what extent this account is faithful to Empedocles and to what extent it conveys Theophrastus' own theory.[187]

In contrast to Empedocles, Anaxagoras supposedly held that "sense perception comes to pass by means of opposites, for the like is unaffected by the like,"[188] and that "all perception is linked with pain.".[189] The unlikeness between the sense organ and the object of sense perception causes pain felt at their contact.[190] He also specifies that the painfulness of sense-perception "is illustrated by [our experience when an impression] long persists and when the exciting objects are present in excess".[191] His example that "dazzling colours and excessively

[183] Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ περὶ ἁπασῶν ὁμοίως λέγει καί φησι τῷ ἐναρμόττειν εἰς τοὺς πόρους τοὺς ἑκάστης αἰσθάνεσθαι. *De sens.* 7, 1-2. Transl. p. 71. See also 9, 8. Transl. p. 75: "Perception arises because emanations fit into the passages of sense." ἐναρμόττειν τοῖς πόροις αἴσθησίς ἐστιν.

[184] ἥδεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ὁμοίοις κατά τε † μόρια καὶ τὴν κρᾶσιν, λυπεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. 9, 9-10. Transl. p. 75 = Empedocles A 86.

[185] Aristotle, *De an.* 2.2, 413b20.

[186] However, we must bear in mind that Theophrastus' account of Empedocles and usage of this particular word can be influenced by Aristotle.

[187] It is of interest that Theophrastus uses Empedocles' explanation of pleasure and pain to denial of his general theory of perception. If pleasure and pain are "sense-perception or accompaniments of sense-perception" how could we feel pain (which is dissimilar to our sense organs) when the perception is based on similarity? *De sens.* 16, 6-9. Transl. p. 81.

[188] Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ γίνεσθαι μὲν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον ἀπαθὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου. *De sens.* 1, 2. Transl. p. 91.

[189] ἅπασαν δ' αἴσθησιν μετὰ λύπης. *De sens.* 17, 2. Transl. p. 81

[190] "All sense perception, he holds, is fraught with pain, which would seem in keeping with his general principle, for the unlike when brought in contact <with our organs> always brings distress (πόνος)." *De sens.* 29, 1-3. Transl. p. 81.

[191] φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο τῶι τε τοῦ χρόνου πλήθει καὶ τῆι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπερβολῆι. *De sens.* 29, 3-4. Transl. p. 91 - 93 = DK A92.

loud sounds cause pain and we cannot long endure the same objects,"[192] is elaborated later by Aristotle.[193] Theophrastus is very sceptical of the idea that all perception is linked with pain.[194] However, in general, the connection between pain, pleasure and sense-perception seem to be common for both the two peripatetic philosophers and to (Theophrastus' version of) Empedocles and Anaxagoras, too.

Democritus is the first author known to us who treats pain in the context of ethics.[195] He claims that gods give humans only good things. As for the bad and harmful, "we run into them themselves through the blindness of mind (νοῦ τυφλότητα) and lack of judgement (ἀγνωμοσύνην)".[196] Human beings should live their life "as cheerfully as possible" (ὡς πλεῖστα εὐθυμηθέντι) and "with the least distress" (ἐλάχιστα ἀνιηθέντι).[197] He thus introduces the problem of the relation between pleasure, pain, and happiness, which will be later crucial in Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy.

The happy life is possible when people do not follow every pleasure, but those that are "fine" (κάλη)[198] and when they do not have "pleasures in mortal things" (τοῖς θνητοῖσι τὰς ἡδονὰς)[199]. Thus, in pleasures, we should be moderate:[200] if people indulge in pleasures which, are "exceeding what is appropriate (ὑπερβεβληκότες τὸν καιρὸν) in food or drink or sex," their pleasures will be "meagre and brief (βραχεῖαί τε καὶ δι' ὀλίγου), lasting just so long as they are eating and drinking."[201] These pleasures are not only degenerated but they "lead to many pains"

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[192] τά τε γὰρ λαμπρὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς ὑπερβάλλοντας ψόφους λύπην ἐμποιεῖν καὶ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον δύνασθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιμένειν. *De sens.* 29, 4-6. Transl. p. 93.

[193] *De an.* 2.12, 424a27-32.

[194] "But as for the thesis that sense perception is universally conjoined with pain, this finds no warrant in experience, inasmuch as some objects are actually perceived with pleasure (μεθ' ἡδονῆς), and most of them at least without pain (ἄνευ λύπης). For sense-perception is in accord with nature (κατὰ φύσιν), and no such process does violence and brings pain (βίᾳ καὶ μετὰ λύπης), but the rather it has pleasure as its accompaniment, a law whose operation is quite manifest." *De sens.* 31, 4-7. Transl. p. 93-95.

[195] According to Vlastos, it is the "first rigorously naturalistic ethics in Greek thought". Quoted in Kirk, Raven (1977) 425. See for example the fragment B 234 (Stobaeus III.18.30, Taylor [1999] 234): People, not the gods, are in charge of their own health through moderation and self-control.

[196] B 175 = Stobaeus II.9.4. Transl. Taylor (1999) 19.

[197] B 189 = Stobaeus III.1.14, Taylor (1999) 23.

[198] B 207 = Stobaeus III.5.22, Taylor (1999) 27.

[199] B 189 = Stobaeus III.1.14, Taylor (1999) 23.

[200] B 285 = Stobaeus IV.34.65, Taylor (1999) 50.

[201] B 235 = Stobaeus III.18.35, Taylor (1999) 35.

(αἱ δὲ λῦπαι πολλαί).[202] Almost the same critique of pleasures is to be found in Plato's *Gorgias* and (to some extent) *Philebus.*[203]

Democritus is conscious of the fact that "ease (εὐπετείη)… gives birth to those pleasures form which wickedness (κακότης) arises,"[204] and that sometimes we must go through pain (πόνος) to achieve some good: "Children who are allowed not to take pains (μὴ πονεῖν ἀνιέντες) ... would not learn letters or music or athletics or respect, which above all maintains virtue (μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν συνέχει."[205] In general, pains (πόνοι) can be beneficial for human life: if they are undertaken voluntarily, it is easier than to "endure those which come unbidden".[206] In the context of education, it seems that πόνος should be rendered rather as toil, hardship, or work, than as pain. Even though some aspects of education can be painful (gymnastics, for example), in general, it is rather laborious, tiring or fatiguing. This aspect of education is later underlined by Plato and Aristotle.[207] The fact that πόνος may have some positive outcomes (for example in bodily exercise) is at the core of the dietetic theory of *On Regimen* and some passages from Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus discussed below.

Two more themes from Democritus' ethics in relation to pain should be mentioned. Pain and pleasure, or more generally joy and sorrow (τέρψις καὶ ἀτερπίη), "are the distinguishing mark of things beneficial and harmful".[208] The importance of pleasure and pain for distinguishing between harmful and beneficial things was later developed by Aristotle.[209] Democritus also seems to indicate that the soul is responsible for "all the sufferings and ills" (παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον ὧν ὠδύνηται καὶ κακῶς πέπονθεν) body have to endure. The body can be ruined through the soul's lack of carelessness (ἀμελεία) and love of pleasures

[202] B 235 = Stobaeus III.18.35, Taylor (1999) 35.

[203] *Gorg.* 492a-499e. *Philb.* 32a.

[204] B 178 = Stobaeus II.31.56, Taylor (1999) 21.

[205] B 179 = Stobaeus II.31.57, Taylor (1999) 21.

[206] B 240 = III.29.63, Taylor (1999) 35. See also B 243 = Stobaeus III.29.88, Taylor (1999) 37; B 182 = Stobaeus II.31.66, Taylor (1999) 21.

[207] See bellow chapters 3.3 and 4.4.

[208] B 188 = Stobaeus III.1.46, Taylor (1999). See also *Vict*. 1.18 (6.492 L = 138.25-26 Joly-Byl = 257 Jones) where the author uses the word τέρψις as the opposite to λύπη.

[209] See *De an.* 3.7, 431a8-15. This is not restricted only to ethics. For the physician, pain indicates not only some bodily imbalance but also the fact that some procedure is not adequately performed. See for example *Fract.* 17 (3.478.16-22 L = 140.6-14 Withington).

(φιληδονίαις).[210] Whereas for Plato, it is the body that ruins the soul's good state, Democritus indicates the opposite.[211]

Presocratic thinkers I have briefly summarised represent an interesting development in thinking about pain. In accordance with the general principles of their philosophy, i.e., the focus on rational explanations of natural phenomena, they emphasise features of pain that were omitted by the poets discussed above. And even if these two traditions of thinking ask similar questions (e.g., the origin of pain) the answers they provide are substantially different. In the fragments of presocratic philosophers, we meet first formulations of the questions connected to the physiological explanation of the origin and nature of pain, its relation to sense perception, and to ethics. Pain plays an important role in their arguments connected to their physical (Alcmaeon, Melissus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras) and ethical (Democritus) theories. Echoes of their approaches to pain will be found in later authors discussed in the central parts of this dissertation.

1.5.5 Pain in Classical Greek Historians and Orators

Even though Herodotus and Thucydides, the most prominent historians of classical Greece, wrote their treatises in different literary genres than the authors discussed above and below, it is convenient to mention their approach to pain, too. After all, they are contemporaries of some 'Hippocratic' and presocratic authors, and also of Plato. Also, there are some connections between their writings and medical ideas found in 'Hippocratic' treatises.[212]

In Herodotus' *Histories*, we find all four pain words.[213] However, only in one case the historian uses one of these words to express bodily pain: we are told that the horse of Masistius, a general of the Persian army, was hit by an arrow and was "rearing with pain (ἀλγήσας)".[214] In some instances, ἄλγος is used to signify illness, for example in the case of Aristodemus and the king of Scythians.[215] It is of interest that the author doesn't use ὀδύνη for expressing bodily pain, which is common even outside the medical writings. In the *Histories*, however, it is used

[210] B 159 = Plutarch *fragm. de libid. et aegr*. 2, Taylor (1999) 17.

[211] See e.g., *Phd.* 83b5-84b8.

[212] For the relation between Herodotus and medicine, see for example Jouanna (2012) 3-12. For the relation between Thucydides (especially his account of the Plague) and 'Hippocratic' authors, see Craik (2001) 102, n. 1; Parry (1969) 106-7; Morgan (1994); Jouanna (2012) 21-37; Lloyd (2003) 120-127.

[213] Number of instances: ὀδύνη (1), ἄλγος (9), πόνος (26) and λύπη (7).

[214] Herodotus, *Hist.* 9.22, 1-8. Ed. Wilson (2015), transl. Godley (1920-1925).

[215] Herodotus, *Hist.* 4.68, 6-11; 7.229, 17-19.

in a figurative sense: "It is the most hateful thing (ἐχθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη) for a person to have much knowledge and no power."[216] In adjective form, ἄλγος is used here to signify that someone is grieved,[217] angered[218] or sad,[219] thus, it seems that in the majority of cases, the word ἄλγος is connected to emotional states.

The same is true for another pain word, namely λύπη. In its adjective form, in Herodotus, it signifies someone upset,[220] grieved,[221] or something burdensome[222]. In its substantive form, it signifies distress,[223] harm[224] or suffering,[225] without differentiating between bodily and psychic one. In some cases, however, it is clear that the author talks about psychic suffering, for example, one of the characters says that "harsh words stung me (ἔδακε λύπη)".[226] The word λύπη then, is used in a similar way as in writings of Herodotus' contemporaries, mainly to express some painful emotion. The last pain word we focus on is πόνος. In general, it can mean pain but also work, toil or exercise. None of the 26 instances used by Herodotus expresses (bodily) pain. In the *Histories*, this word designates work, task, or labour,[227] toil,[228] trouble[229] or struggle[230]. Thus, in some instances, there is a link between πόνος and suffering; its connection to pain, however, is very loose.

Overall, it seems that even though Herodotus uses the words that usually denote pain, their meaning in the *Histories* is almost always figurative, only remotely connected to bodily pain. This is not unsurprising in the case of πόνος, because its use for expressing work or toil is common in other authors and contexts, too, and for λύπη, that is often used as sorrow by other

[216] Herodotus, *Hist.* 9.16, 21-24.

[217] Herodotus, *Hist.* 6.67, 8-14; 5.49, 8-10.

[218] Herodotus, *Hist.* 3.120, 15-17.

[219] Herodotus, *Hist.* 2.43, 5-8.

[220] Herodotus, *Hist.* 1.99, 8-12.

[221] Herodotus, *Hist.* 8.100, 11-14.

[222] Herodotus, *Hist.* 8.144, 21-30.

[223] Herodotus, *Hist.* 7.152, 9-15.

[224] Herodotus, *Hist.* 5.106, 10-15.

[225] Herodotus, *Hist.* 7.190, 1-9.

[226] Herodotus, *Hist.* 7.16A, 9-14.

[227] Herodotus, *Hist.* 2.14, 8-18; 2.148, 5-9; 6.12, 1-6; 6.12, 7-10; 6.108, 1-6; 6.114, 1-5; 7.23, 8-11; 7.26, 1-5; 8.74, 1-5; 9.15, 17-20.

[228] Herodotus, *Hist.* 1.126, 18-22; 6.11, 5-11; 9.52, 1-3.

[229] Herodotus, *Hist.* 1.177, 1-5; 4.1, 9-12; 6.108, 12-16; 7. 24, 1-8; 7.119, 17-21.

[230] Herodotus, *Hist.* 7, 224, 1-7; 7. 89, 1-6.

authors as well. However, it is quite surprising in the case of ἄλγος and especially ὀδύνη which are common words for expressing bodily pain in classical Greek literature in general. Thus, it seems that Herodotus focuses on emotional or broader aspects of suffering without concentrating much on its bodily manifestations.

In Thucydides, the word ὀδύνη is utterly absent. Word ἄλγος and λύπη are used almost interchangeably: ἄλγος designates either grief[231] or some trouble the characters suffer.[232] As for λύπη, Thucydides designates by this word an emotional state of grief or sorrow[233] and also some negative affliction, wrongdoing, or harm which one character does to another.[234]

In the case of πόνος, we find usual expressions as labour,[235] toil,[236] affliction[237] trouble or distress[238]. However, we can find some passages where this word has more medical content: it can express weariness[239] or sickness[240]. Passages describing the Plague of Athens, the "sickness which far surmounted all expression of words"[241], are of particular importance for me. Thucydides describes how this disaster afflicted the people of Athens with emphasis on the course of the sickness. When he talks about pain caused by the plague, he uses either πόνος[242] or some other expressions without the pain words; for example, we read about "extreme aches in the head"[243], "extreme torment"[244] accompanying vomiting and "bodies resisting torment"[245].

In the majority of cases, Thucydides uses pain words similarly to Herodotus, i.e., without an explicit link to bodily pain. Only in the description of the Plague of Athens, we find

[231] Thucydides, *Hist.* 3.66, 2. Ed. Jones, Powell (1967, 1970), transl. Hobbes (1843).

[232] Thucydides, *Hist.* 2.39, 4; 2.43, 6; 7.75, 2.

[233] Thucydides, *Hist.* 1.33, 2; 1.99, 1; 2.37, 2; 2.38, 1; 2.44, 1; 2.44, 2; 7.75, 3.

[234] Thucydides, *Hist.* 1.71, 1; 2.61, 2; 2.64, 5; 2.64, 6; 6.18, 1; 6.57, 3; 6.59, 1; 6.66, 1; 8.46, 1.

[235] Thucydides, *Hist.* 1.70, 8; 1.123, 1; 2.62, 3; 2.64, 3; 3.98, 1; 4.36, 1; 4.86, 5; 5.73, 2.

[236] Thucydides, *Hist.* 2.62, 1; 7.81, 4.

[237] Thucydides, *Hist.* 2.52, 1; 2.64, 6; 2.76, 3; 4.59, 1.

[238] Thucydides, *Hist.* 1.78, 1; 2.76, 3; 5.16, 1; 5.110, 2; 6.34, 2; 6.67, 1.

[239] Thucydides, *Hist.* 2.14, 4.

[240] Thucydides, *Hist.* 4.51, 6.

[241] Thucydides, *Hist.* 2.50.1, 1-2. κρεῖσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου.

[242] Thucydides, *Hist.* 2. 49.3.

[243] τῆς κεφαλῆς θέρμαι ἰσχυραὶ. Thucydides, *Hist.* 2. 49.1, 3. However, in this case, the translation is arguable; θέρμαι usually means fever.

[244] ταλαιπωρίας μεγάλης. Thucydides, *Hist.* 2. 49.3, 6.

[245] ἀντεῖχε τῇ ταλαιπωρίᾳ. Thucydides, *Hist.* 2. 49.6, 3-4.

some passages where bodily pain is expressed. Overall, both historians focus more on the emotional part of human suffering, which is expressed by words that, in other authors, express bodily pain, too. It is significant that the word ὀδύνη, found already in Homer, which is used by majority of other classical writers to designate bodily pain is either absent (Thucydides) or used in the figurative sense (Herodotus). It seems that in emphasis on the emotional dimension of human suffering, the historians approached pain similarly as the tragic poets who lived in roughly the same time as them.

In both the most prominent Attic orators, Isocrates and Demosthenes, we find pain words used mainly in a figurative sense. Isocrates mentions pains (ἄλγος) that are to be relieved by a physician as a simile to what the art of rhetoric does.[246] Beside it, ἄλγος expresses rather some distress in general,[247] sorrow[248] or something burdensome[249] or annoying[250]. Word λυπή can signify either sorrow[251], annoyance[252] or pain in general, both bodily and psychic[253]. This can be seen also from the fact that λυπή stands in opposition to pleasure (ἡδονή)[254] which is typical for the philosophical literature of Isocrates' time. In two instances, pain is connected directly to illness, which is typical to 'Hippocratic' treatises.[255] Word πόνος is used only in the sense of (bodily) exertions[256] and toil/labour/work[257].

[246] Isocrates, *De pace* (orat. 8) 40.4. Ed. Brémond, Mathieu (1929, 1938 1942, 1962).

[247] Isocrates, *Plataicus* (*orat.* 14) 41.1; *Antidosis* (*orat.* 15) 218.6.

[248] Isocrates, *Areopagitatus* (*orat.* 7) 54.2; *Helenae encomium* (*orat.* 10) 34.1; *Plauticus* (*orat.* 14) 46.8.

[249] Isocrates, *De pace* (*orat.* 8) 128.5.

[250] Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* (*orat.* 12) 23.9.

[251] Isocrates, *Ad Demonicum* (*orat.* 1) 42.2.

[252] Isocrates, *De pace* (*orat.* 8) 128.5.

[253] Isocrates, *Ad Demonicum* (*orat.* 1) 21.5; 35.7; *Nicocles* (*orat.* 3) 40.4-5; *Aeropagiticus* (*orat.*7) 82.3; *Panathenaicus* (*orat.* 12) 140.10; *Antidosis* (*orat.* 15) 13.6.

[254] Isocrates, *Ad Demonicum* (*orat*. 1) 21.5; 46.4.

[255] Isocrates, *Ad Demonicum* (*orat*. 1) 35.7; *Antidosis* (*orat*. 15) 13.6.

[256] Isocrates, *Ad Demonicum* (*orat.* 1) 12.7;14.5; *Ad Nicoclem* (*orat.* 2) 46.9.

[257] Isocrates, *Ad Demonicum* (*orat.* 1) 9.3; *Philippus* (*orat.* 5) 93.4; *Aeropagitus* (*orat.* 7) 43.7; *De pace* (*orat.* 8) 91.8; *Helenae encomium* (*orat.* 10) 36.7; *Panathenaicus* (*orat.* 12) 11.4; *Antidosis* (*orat.* 15) 146.5; 247.2.

Demosthenes uses ἄγλος (ἀλγήματα) for expressing acute and severe (σφοδρὰ καὶ δεινά) bodily pain.[258] Word λυπή means usually sorrow,[259] distress[260] or annoyance[261]. Similarly to Isocrates, Demosthenes also uses πόνος for expressing toil[262] or work[263]. Both orators use pain words similarly as the historians. It seems that their connection to (bodily) pain is even looser, however it is obvious that the suffering and struggles they talk about include bodily pain, too. After all, they are mostly connected to war. The emphasis lies however on emotions or psychic layers of suffering.

1.5.6 Conclusion

This survey has revealed that older and classical Greek literature offers various approaches and perspectives on pain. Pain is used for poetic or argumentative purposes in each literary genre, and the vocabulary used to describe it evolves until it stabilises on four pain words (ἄλγος, ὀδύνη, λύπη, πόνος). Even though different authors use the same pain words, they express by them different phenomena or layers of painful experience. These points are crucial to keep in mind during subsequent analyses. The authors discussed in this overview provide a backdrop for their successors and introduce contexts and topics in which pain is discussed. The distinction between bodily and emotional/psychic pain is often made, and some authors specify where the pain occurs, emphasising whether it is psychic or bodily. However, it is also common to read about suffering that includes both bodily and psychic pain. This oscillation is observed in many passages where it is unclear what type of pain the author is referring to. Pain is discussed in various contexts, such as physiology, the constitution of the human body, and ethics. The religious aspect of pain and the role of gods in its infliction are missing from the authors discussed below. 'Presocratic' thinkers foreshadowed the way in which pain would be treated by physicians and philosophers of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE. Whether in ethical or physiological contexts, these authors attempted to explain pain and its role in human life through rational reflection, rather than religion.

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[258] Demosthenes, *In Cononem* (*orat*. 54) 11.7. Ed. Butcher (1903, 1907).

[259] Demosthenes, *Epipathius* (*orat.* 60) 33.3; *De corona* (*orat.* 18) 292.4.

[260] Demosthenes, *De Chersoneso* 8.55.1,3,6; *Phillipica* (*orat.* 10) 4.57.5, 58.6; *De corona* (*orat.* 18).5.5; *Ep.* 2.15.8.

[261] Demosthenes, *De falsa legatione* (*orat.* 19) 181.5.

[262] Demosthenes, *Philippica 1* (*orat.* 4) 5.8; *De chersoneso* (*orat*. 8) 44.5; 48.1; *Philippica 4* (*orat*. 10).81; *In epistulam Philippi* (*orat.* 11) 21.6; *Adversus Leptinem* (*orat.* 20) 87.9; *Ex.* 34.2.8.

[263] Demosthenes, *Philippica 2* (*orat.* 6) 4.5.

2. 'Hippocratic' writings

Introduction

The initial association we make with the term 'pain' is usually related to the part of our body where it is experienced. In certain languages, pain words and body parts form a single word, such as 'toothache' or 'headache'. When we approach a physician with complaints of pain, we are asked about the location of the pain, when it began, and the quality of the pain - whether it is sharp, dull, throbbing, etc.[264] Therefore, it is natural to explore the relationship between pain and the body in classical medicine and first determine whether the authors of medical texts shared our intuitive associations. Through this analysis, we can gain a better understanding of the role of pain in medical texts. Since all surviving classical medical texts were written from a physician's perspective,[265] it is necessary to comprehend the role of pain for medical practice, i.e., how its association with the body helped physicians in their job. Additionally, it will be shown that the majority of medical texts do not offer explanations for what pain is,[266] but instead view it implicitely as a significant symptom that indicates a pathology. Physicians require patients to indicate the location, quality, and intensity of their pain, along with other symptoms like fevers, coughs, or swellings. At the end of the first part of the chapter, theoretical questions regarding the origin, cause, and meaning of pain will be addressed. If pain and disease are considered pathological and require specialist treatment, more elaborate answers to these questions can be provided. Therefore, the most detailed explanations of pain preserved in the 'Hippocratic' corpus, in the treatises *On the Nature of Man* and *On Ancient Medicine*, will be examined.

In the second part of this chapter, I shall conduct an analysis of texts in which pain words play a more complex role than simply indicating the location of pain in the body. Although the prevailing understanding of pain is still the pain localised within the body, there are passages in which pain assumes a more theoretical role. In such passages, we can learn about the

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[264] See for example The McGill Pain Questionnaire (https://www.sralab.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/McGill%20Pain%20Questionnaire%20%281%29.pdf).

[265] Even if we include some Plato's and Aristotle's texts about medical topics to the medical corpus (see above), the point of view is that of a researcher, philosopher or physician, not that of the patient. In the *CH*, not all texts were necessarily written by a practicing physician, yet, the patient's point of view is marginal there. For the role of the patient in antiquity, see Petridou, Thumiger (2016), Thumiger (2018).

[266] A similar thing can be said about pain's traditional counterpart, pleasure: "It is remarkable that early theorists do not usually manifest strong philosophical ambitions to determine the exact nature of pleasure or its physiological mechanisms. Pleasure, in most cases, is addressed randomly or sporadically." Cheng (2015) 18.

physician's approach to pain, its relevance to medical practice, and other subtle features of pain, such as its relation to pain of the soul and pleasure. Although such an approach to pain is dominant in the philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle, it is interesting to observe how it was conceived of in medical literature, despite being only a marginal topic therein.

Finally, the third perspective of significance for our understanding of pain is its relation to exercise and bodily activity. In this regard, I will elaborate particularly on the role of the pain word 'πόνος', which, as previously indicated in the introduction, can signify both pain and exercise. Given that exercise holds utmost relevance in dietetic medicine and since it can lead to fatigue and pain, it is illuminating to investigate the connection between exercise and pain. Furthermore, by examining the relationship between exercise and pain, we shall observe that something painful (i.e., exercise) can be utilised to benefit something beneficial (i.e., maintaining and restoring health). This aspect, together with the previously mentioned diagnostic role of pain, forms the conceptual framework through which classical physicians approached pain. In chapters 3 and 4, I will demonstrate that philosophers share this framework and that the diagnostic role of pain and its role in maintaining and restoring health inspired their approach to it as well, albeit their emphasis shifts from bodily pain to the pain of the soul and from the health of the body to the health of the soul.

2.1 Pain and the Body

As already mentioned in the introduction, I will focus on three subcorpora of the 'Hippocratic' corpus, namely *Epidemics*, gynaecological treatises, and dietetic treatises. In some relevant cases, I will mention other treatises of the *CH* and fragments of Diocles of Carystus. I will always analyse the role of pain in the particular subcorpora in general, then focusing in some detail on some significant treatises or passages.

2.1.1 *Epidemics*

In its emphasis on the detailed description of particular cases of ill patients, and in relatively small interest in therapy, *Epidemics* constitute a relatively homogenous and distinct group of medical texts. I will firstly offer a detailed analysis of the use of pain words in *Epidemics* 1 and 3 and then I will compare their use with the books 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7.[267] I choose *Epidemics* 1 and

[267] According to some scholars, there are probably three groups of books collected in what we do today called *Epidemics*: a) books 1 and 3, b) books 2, 4, 6, c) books 5 and 7. Even though there is not agreement on whether every group was written by the same author or editor, there seems to be at least some unity in vocabulary and content there. See Jouanna and Grmek (2003) ix-xvii, Langholf (1990) 77-79, Craik (2015) 63, 89.

3 since it is one of the most influential works in the corpus, highly valued in both ancient and later scholarship,[268] because it belongs to the oldest part of the *CH*[269] and because we find all four pain words there. *Epidemics* as a whole is significant also because the comparison between books 1 and 3 and the rest of the books of the *Epidemics* can be elucidating since it allows us to see how the use of pain words variates by different authors writing about the same topic and thus helps us to understand whether there any differences between particular pain words.

In *Epidemics* 1 and 3, we find a series of case studies of people living under various constitutions (composed of weather, period of the year, type of winds, rain, etc.). The kind, nature, severity, and duration of the disease is based on the nature of the given constitution. The role of pain in this treatise can be seen in the following passage which describes headaches afflicting people living in the second constitution:

> Pains (ἀλγήματα/les maux) about the head and neck, and heaviness combined with pain (ὀδύνης/souffrance), occur both without and with fever. Sufferers from phrenitis have convulsions, and eject verdigris-coloured vomit; some die very quickly. But in ardent and the other fevers, those with pain (πόνος/douleur) in the neck, heaviness of the temples, dimness of sight, and painless (ὀδύνης/souffrance) tension of the hypochondrium, bleed from the nose; those with a general heaviness of the head, cardialgia, and nausea, vomit afterwards bile and phlegm. Children for the most part in such cases suffer chiefly from the convulsions. Women have both these symptoms and pains (πόνοι/douleurs) in the womb. Older people, and those whose natural heat is failing, have paralysis or raving or blindness.[270]

It seems that pain in this passage is a part of a larger diagnostic picture:[271] together with other symptoms, such as heaviness (βάρεα), fever (πυρετός), convulsions (σπασμοί) and dimness of sight (σκοτώδεα περὶ τὰς ὄψιας) it helps the physician to determine the type of disease. There are two types of headaches in this passage, one is accompanied by dimness of sight, painless tension in the hypochondrium (ὑποχονδρίου ξύντασις οὐ μετ' ὀδύνης) and nosebleed (αἱμορῥαγέει διὰ ῥινῶν). The second type of headache is accompanied by cardialgia

[268] See Craik (2015) 88-90.

[269] Both Jouanna and Craik situate the date of composition at the end of 5th century. See Jouanna (2016) cxxiii-cxxiv; Craik (2015) 91. Concerning the significance of this treatise, Jouanna notices that "c'est, en effet, le traité le plus ancien où apparaissent des fiches de malades décrits au jour le jour de la maladie." Jouanna (2016) vii. See also Langholf (1990) 73-79.

[270] *Epid*. 1.2.6 (2.636-638 L = 19.1-20.2 Jouanna). Transl. Jones p. 165. French words in the brackets are from Jouanna's translation: Jouanna (2016) 19.

[271] See commentary of J. Jouanna ad. loc. Jouanna (2016) 186-189.

(καρδιωγμοί), nausea (ἀσώδεές), and vomiting bile and phlegm (ἐπανεμέουσι χολώδεα καὶ φλεγματώδεα).[272] The role of pain in this passage is diagnostic in the sense that it helps the doctor to determine what type of disease his patient suffers. This passage is significant since there are three pain words, ἀλγήμα, ὀδύνη and πόνος, there.[273] There doesn't seem to be any significant semantic difference between the three words: there are used to describe pain in a particular bodily part – head (κεφαλή), neck (τράχηλον), hypochondrium (ὑποχονδρίον) and womb (ὑστέρη). It seems that the author uses them interchangeably.

The author is consistent in the usage of pain words in the whole *Epidemics* 1 and 3. The function of pain (be it expressed by any of the three pain words) is the same as the role of other symptoms: to describe the state of the patient (diagnosis). That is very clearly seen in the fourteen case histories in the first book, twenty-eight case histories in the third book, and in the stories of patients mentioned in connection to various constitutions throughout both books. For describing pain, the word πόνος is prevalent there, indicating pain in a specific bodily part[274] or

[272] See Jouanna 2016, 186.

[273] The fourth word, λυπή, is used only four times in the whole seven books of the *Epidemics* and its meaning is rather connected to sorrow or emotional distress than to bodily pain. See *Epid.* 3.3.17(11) (3.134 L = 105.15-106.1 Jouanna = Jones 277): "In Thasos a woman of gloomy temperament, after a grief (ἐκ λύπης) with a reason for it, without taking to bed lost sleep and appetite, and suffered thirst and nausea."; 3.3.17(15) (3.142 L = 110.2-4 Jouanna = 283 Jones): "In Thasos the wife of Delearces, who lay sick on the plain, was seized after a grief (ἐκ λύπης) with an acute fever with shivering.". See also *Epid.* 6.8.7 (5.344.19 L = 265.10 Smith), 6.8.7 (5.346.2 = 265.12 Smith).

[274] Pain in the legs (σκέλεα ἐπωδύνως εἶχεν), *Epid.* 1.3.13(12) (2.712 L = 59.4 Jouanna), 1.3.13(3) (2.690 L = 45.9 Jouanna), cf. *Epid.* 3.1.3 (3.42 L = 67.9-10 Jouanna); pain in the hypochondrium (Ἤρξατο δὲ πονέειν τὴν πρώτην, περὶ ὑποχόνδριον), *Epid.* 1.3.13(11) (2.708 L = 56.12-13 Jouanna), cf. *Epid.* 1.3.13(11) (2.710 L = 57.6 Jouanna), 1.3.13(12) (2.710 L = 58.5 Jouanna), 1.3.13(13) (2.714 L = 60.3 Jouanna), *Epid.* 3. 1.3 (3.44 L = 68.5-6 Jouanna), 3. 2.9.2-3(3.58 L = 75.1-2 Jouanna); pain in the loins (ἤρξατο δὲ πονέειν ὀσφὺν), *Epid.* 1.3.13(2) (2.684 L = 41.3-4 Jouanna); pains in the stomach and in the genitals (καρδίης πόνος καὶ γυναικείων), *Epid.* 1.3.13(5) (2.694 L = 47.13-14 Jouanna), cf. 1.3.13(4) (2.691 L = 45.3 Jouanna); pain in the head, neck and loins (κεφαλῆς δὲ καὶ τραχήλου καὶ ὀσφύος πόνος), *Epid.* 1.3.13(5) (2.694 L = 47.3-5 Jouanna) Cf. *Epid.* 3.1.2 (3.32-34 L = 63.7-8 Jouanna), 3. 2.4.1 (6.44 L = 68.15-16); pain in the groin, *Epid.* 1.3.13(3) (2.690 L = 45.2-3 Jouanna); heaviness in the head and pain in the right temple (εφαλῆς βάρος, καὶ κρόταφον δεξιὸν ἐπώδυνον εἶχε), *Epid.* 3. 1.3 (3.38-40 L = 65.4-6 = 223 Jones); pain in the seat (περὶ ἕδρην ἐπόνεεν): *Epid.* 3.2.6 (3.50 = 71.12 Jouanna = 229 Jones); "pains everywhere" (πόνοι πάντων): *Epid.* 3.3.17(10) (3.130 L = 104.18 Jouanna = Jones 275), *Epid.* 3.17(10)10 (3.132 L = 105.1 Jouanna).

the overall painful state of the patient.[275] Pain functions also as a determinant of other pathological states, so it is specified if fever, strangury, convulsion or a consumptive affection is painful.[276] In these two books, πόνος seems to be a notion used for both explicitly localised pain and for pain in general, when it is not specified what is the quality of that pain or where it is localised.[277] As for relation to other pain words, there seems to be no significant difference there. It happens that the description of a patient's state starts with one pain word (usually a verbal form of ἄλγος) and continues with another pain word (usually πόνος).[278] Both πόνος and ὀδύνη can be specified by an adjective indicating sharp or abrupt pain (ἰσχυρός),[279] so it seem that at least in this treatise we cannot find a distinction between πόνος as a dull pain and ὀδύνη as a sharp pain, as Helen King argues for the pain words in general.[280] Nevertheless, some other characteristics ascribed to πόνος by for example Rosalyne Rey are valid. In the *Epidemics* 1 and 3, pain (expressed by whatever pain word) plays a semiotic role in the process of diagnosis and prognosis,[281] thus it is a σημεῖον, a sign of injury or disease.

In the rest of the books of the *Epidemics* (2, 4, 6; 5 and 7), πόνος is still used for denoting pain, but, in comparison to ὀδύνη and ἄλγος, it is used less often. [282] Also, in these books, πόνος

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[275] *Epid.* 1.3.13(1) (2.682 L = 39.5 Jouanna), 1.3.13(8) (2.704 L = 53.3 Jouanna), 1.3.13(8) (2.704 L = 53.5 Jouanna), 1.3.13(10) (2.706 L = 55.2 Jouanna), *Epid.* 3.2.5 (3.48 L = 70.7 Jouanna), 3.2.12 (3.64 L = 78.4), 3.3.17(8) (3.124 L = 101.11 Jouanna), 3.3.17(13) (3.136 L = 106.12 Jouanna).

[276]*Epid.* 1.2.4 (2.618 L = 10.1 Jouanna), 1.1.2.4 (2.620; 11.1 Jouanna), 1.1.2.4 (2.632 L = 16.14 Jouanna), 1.3.13(4) (2.692 L = 46.12 Jouanna).

[277] *Epid*. 1.2.5 (2.634 L = 17.5 Jouanna), 1.2.9 (2.654 L = 26.4 Jouanna), 1.1.2.4 (2.628 L = 14.9 Jouanna).

[278] "Pain (ἤλγησε) first in the groin, on the side the spleen; then the pains (ἐπόνει) extended to both legs. *Epid.* 1.3.13(3) (2.690 L = 45.2-3 Jouanna = 191 Jones). "At first she suffered (ἤλγεε) in the stomach and the right hypochondrium. Pains (πόνοι) in the genital organs." 1.3.13(4) (2.690 L = 46.1-3 Jouanna = 193 Jones). "He had at the beginning pains (ἤλγεε) in the head and left side, and in the other parts pains (πόνοι) like these caused by fatigue." 1.3.13(6) (2.698 L = 50.6-7 Jouanna = 197-199 Jones). "Severe pains (ἐπιπόνως ἤλγεε) in the legs; pain again (ὀδύνη) at the stomach." 1.3.13(5) (2.694-696 L = 48.9-10 Jouanna = 197 Jones).

[279] "Melidia, who lay sick by the temple of Hera, began to suffer violent pain (πόνος ἰσχυρός) in the head, neck, and chest." 1.3.13(14) (2.716 L = 61.1-3 Jouanna = 211 Jones). "Crito, in Thasos, while walking about, was seized with a violent pain (ὀδύνη ἰσχυρή) in the great toe." 1.3.13(9) (2.704 L = 54.3-5 Jouanna = 203 Jones).

[280] King (1999) 275. Cf. King (1998) 123.

[281] Rey (1995) 18-19.

[282] A comparison between various pain words in particular books of the *Epidemics* can be seen from the following table (n = noun, a = adjective, v = verb). It is clear that πόνος is a prevailing pain word in books 1 and 3, but in other books, it is used only occasionally.

is often used without an explicit link to an affected bodily part.[283] Even though all the books of the *Epidemics* share the same topic and belong to the same genre and there is no qualitative difference between pains described in the books 1 and 3, and the rest of the books, the terminology differs. This seems to support Horden's thesis that the choice of a particular pain word was to a great degree influenced by the preferences of the author and wasn't intrinsically connected to discerning between various types of pains.[284] The author of the books I and III used πόνος even for describing a sharp explicitly localised pain. The authors of the rest of the books used for this kind of pain only the word ὀδύνη.

In general, the authors of *Epidemics* are keen to indicate where the pain is felt, so they associate pain with head,[285] ears,[286] eyes,[287] nose,[288] jaws (γναθός),[289] teeth,[290] neck,[291]

Table 1. Pain words in the Epidemics:

	I			II			III			IV			V			VI			VII		
	n	a	v	n	a	v	n	a	v	n	a	v	n	a	v	n	a	v	n	a	v
ἄλγος	3			1		7			1	4		1	14			2		1	42		
λύπη							2											6			
ὀδύνη	14	8		21	6		15	4		13	9		26	3	4	16	2		72	5	
πόνος	25	10	3	5		2	34	16		1			6			17	2	4	9		3

[283] *Epid.* 2.3.17 (5.116.12 L= 59.12 Smith), *Epid.* 2.3.17 (5.116.16 L = 59.17 Smith), *Epid.* 5.5.1.2 (5.204.10 L = 142.12 Smith), V.1.80 (5.250.7 L = 194.2 Smith [Littré reads ἄπορος instead of ἄπονος]), *Epid.* 6.4.4 (5.306.13 L = 235.14 Smith), *Epid.* 7.1.74 (5.432 L = 93.5 Jouanna). Even though it is sometimes clear form the context which bodily area is affected, it is not named explicitly (in contrast to the passages where ὀδύνη or ἄλγος is used).

[284] Horden 1999, 295–315.

[285] *Epid.* 1.2.6 (2.636 L = 19.1 Jouanna), 1.3.13(5) (2.694-6 L = 48.9-10 Jouanna), 1.3.13(6) (2.698 L = 50.6-7 Jouanna), 1.3.13(10) (2.704 L = 54.12 Jouanna), 2. 1.11 (V.82.13 L = 28.11 Smith), 3.1.2 (3.32 L = 63.7 Jouanna), 6.3.20 (5.302.7 = 230.13 Smith), 7.1.5 (7. 372 L = 53.1-6 Jouanna), 7.1.5 (7.372 L = 53.9-12 Jouanna), 7.1.5 (7.372 L = 53.17 Jouanna), 7.1.20 (V. 392 = 65.1 Jouanna), 7.1.11 (7. 382 L = 58.21 Jouanna), 7.1.56 (7. 422 L 85.9 = Jouanna), 7.1.57 (7.422 L = 85.20 Jouanna), 7.1.62 (5. 426-428 L = 88.13 Jouanna).

[286] *Epid.* 1.3.13(10) (2.706-708 L = 56.1-3 Jouanna), 2.1.11 (5. 82.13 L = 28.11 Smith), 2.3.4 (5.106.4 L = 50.2 Smith), 2.3.4 (4.106.5 = 50.5 Smith), 3. 3.17(12) (3.136 L = 107.7-9 Jouanna), 7. 1.5 (7. 372 L = 53.1-6 Jouanna), 7.1.5 (7.372 L = 53.9-12 Jouanna), 7.1.5 (7.372 L = 53.17 Jouanna), 7.1.54 (7. 422 L = 85.1-2 Jouanna).

[287] *Epid.* 1.3.13.10 (2. 708 L = 56.7 Jouanna), 3.1.3.44 (3.44 L = 68.9 Jouanna), 6. 3.20 (5. 302.8 = 230.13 Smith).

[288] *Epid.* 4.1.40 (5.182.2 L = 124.11 Smith).

[289] *Epid.* 7.1.64 (7. 428 L = 89.14 Jouanna).

[290] *Epid.* 5.1.67 (5. 244 L = 30.12 Jouanna), 6. 3.20 (5. 302.8 = 230.13 Smith), 7.1.64 (7. 428 L = 89.14 Jouanna).

[291] *Epid.* 1.2.6 (2.636 L = 19.1 Jouanna), 1. 3.13(10) (2.704 L = 54.12 Jouanna), 7.1.8 (7. 378 L = 56.21 Jouanna), 7.1.112 (7.460 L = 112.7 Jouanna).

collarbone,[292] shoulders,[293] spine,[294] chest,[295] heart,[296] ribs,[297] abdomen,[298] loins,[299] waist,[300] kidneys,[301] spleen,[302] legs,[303] thighs,[304] knees[305] and feet.[306] Even though ὀδύνη and ἄλγος are used interchangeably in the books 2, 4-6, only ὀδύνη is characterised as strong (ἰσχυρή),[307]

[292] *Epid.* 1.2.8 (2.646 L = 23.5-6 Jouanna), 1.3.13(13) (2.714 L = 60.10 Jouanna).

[293] *Epid.* 5.1.92 (5. 254 L = 41.10 Jouanna), 7.1.78 (7. 434 L = 95.3 Jouanna), 7.1.103 (7.456 L = 109.2 Jouanna).

[294] *Epid.* 7.1.8 (7. 378 L = 56.21 Jouanna).

[295] *Epid.* 5.1.103 (V. 258 L = 45.5-6 Jouanna), 7.1.49.1 (7. 418 L = 82.7 Jouanna), 7.1.85 (7.444 L = 100.21 Jouanna).

[296] *Epid.* 1.3.13(4) (2.692 L = 46.1-3 Jouanna).

[297] *Epid.* 1.3.13(5) (2.698 L = 49.16 Jouanna), 1.3.13(6) (2.698 L = 50.6-7 Jouanna), *Epid.* 2.3.3 (4.104.15 L = 48.12-13 Smith), 4.1.29 (5. 172.9-10 L = 117.3-4 Smith), 5.1.58 (5.238-240 L = 26.4-8 Jouanna), 5.1 73 (5.246 L = 33.10 Jouanna), 6.2.5 (5. 280.1 L = 214.21-22 Smith), 6. 3.20 (5.302.8 = 230.13 Smith), 7.1.26 (7.398 L = 68.11 Jouanna), 7.1.26 (7. 398 L = 68.11 Jouanna), 7.1 40 (7.408 L = 76.22 Jouanna), 7.1.49 (7.418 L = 82.7 Jouanna).

[298] *Epid.* 5.1.43 (5. 234 L = 20.14 Jouanna), 5. 1.61 (5.240 L = 27.10 Jouanna), 5.1.73 (5. 246 L = 33.10 Jouanna), 5.1.91 (5. 256 L = 43.12 Jouanna), 5.1.91 (5. 256 L = 43.15 Jouanna), 7.1.3 (5. 368 L = 50.18 Jouanna), 7. 1.23 (7. 392 L = 65.11 Jouanna), 7.1.102 (7.454 L = 108.17 Jouanna).

[299] *Epid.* 1.3.13(10) (2.704 L = 54.12 Jouanna), 2.1.11 (5.82.13 L = 28.11 Smith), 7.1.76 (7. 434 L = 94.11-95.2 Jouanna).

[300] *Epid.* 1.3.13(10) (2.706-708 L = 56.1-3 Jouanna), 2. 5.9 (5.130.9 L = 72.8 Smith), 2.5.11 (5.130.13 L = 72.14 Smith), 2.6.25 (4.136.20 L = 82.17 Smith), 3. 1.2 (3.32 L = 63.7 Jouanna), 3.1.3 (3.44 L = 68.9 Jouanna), 3. 3.17(2) (3.110 = 94.10 Jouanna), 5.1.58 (5. 238-240 L = 26.4-8 Jouanna = 183 Smith), 5.1 91 (5. 254 L = 41.4-8 Jouanna), 7.1.8 (7. 378 L = 56.21 Jouanna), 7.1.76 (7. 434 L = 94.11-95.2 Jouanna = 355 Smith), 7.1.100 (7. 452-454 L = 108.4-8 Jouanna).

[301] *Epid.* 2.2.9 (5.88.10-11 L = 32.15 Smith), 6.1.5 (5.268.3-4 L = 206.14-15 Smith).

[302] *Epid.* 2.2.23.2 (5.94.9 L = 38.14 Smith).

[303] *Epid.* 1.3.13(5) (2.694-6 L = 48.9-10 Jouanna), 5.1.58 (5. 238-240 L = 26.4-8 Jouanna), 7.1.76 (7. 434 L = 94.11-95.2 Jouanna = 355 Smith).

[304] *Epid.* 7.1 54 (7. 422 L = 85.1-2 Jouanna).

[305] *Epid.* 2.6.25 (5.136.20 L = 82.17 Smith), 5. 1.63 (5. 242 L = 28.13-4 Jouanna), 7.1.28 (7. 400 L = 69.14 Jouanna), 7.1 54 (7. 422 L = 85.1-2 Jouanna).

[306] *Epid.* 1.3.13(9) (2.704 L = 54.1 Jouanna), 3.3.17(7) (3.122 L = 100.18-101.2 Jouanna), 4.1.48 (5. 190 L = 132 Smith).

[307] *Epid.* 1.3.13(9) (2.704 L = 54.1 Jouanna), 1.3.13(10) (2.706-708 L = 56.1-3 Jouanna), 3.3.17(2) (3.110 = 94.10 Jouanna), 2.2.10 (5.88.13-14 L = 32.17-18 Smith), 2.5.9 (5.130.9 L = 72.8 Smith), 5.1.21 (5.220 L = 13.21 Jouanna), 7.1.112 (7.460 L = 112.7 Jouanna).

sharp (οξείη),[308] violent (σφοδρή),[309] or horrible (δεινή)[310]. Generally speaking, pain occurs in the *Epidemics* as one of the symptoms of the disease, together with fever (πυρετός), heaviness (βαρύτης) or cough (βήξ).[311] The role pain plays in all the books of the *Epidemics* seems to be very similar: it is one of the symptoms helping the physician to formulate a correct diagnosis.[312]

2.1.2 Gynaecological Treatises

Second group of texts I would like to analyse concerns female medicine and female diseases,[313] since one of the pain words, πόνος, in this branch of 'Hippocratic' corpus has been studied in recent years by two distinguished scholars. According to Helen King and Nicole Loraux, πόνος plays a significant role in describing a specifically female type of pain.[314] We are told that female pain accompanying childbirth has some specific features distinguishing it from other kinds of pain suffered by men and women alike. Thus, there is a possibility to distinguish two kinds of pain: female kind of pain and a general kind of pain. In this section, I will evaluate this hypothesis.

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[308] *Epid.* 5.1.31 (5.228 L = 18.11 Jouanna).

[309] *Epid.* 7.1.3 (5. 368 L = 50.18 Jouanna).

[310] *Epid.* 5.1.61 (5.240 L = 27.10 Jouanna), 5.1 91 (5. 254 L = 41.4-8 Jouanna), 5.1.91 (5. 256 L = 43.12 Jouanna), 5.1.91 (5. 256 L = 43.15 Jouanna = 203 Smith), 7. 1.5 (7. 372 L = 53.1-6 Jouanna), 7. 1.5. (7.372 L = 53.9-12 Jouanna), 7. 1.5 (7.372 L = 53.17 Jouanna), 7. 1.56 (7. 422 L 85.9 = Jouanna), 7. 1.57 (7.422 L = 85.20 Jouanna), 7.1.62 (5. 426-428 L = 88.13 Jouanna = 347 Smith), 7. 1.64 (7. 428 L = 89.14 Jouanna), 7. 1.98 (7.452 L = 107.22 Jouanna).

[311] *Epid.* 1.2.6 (2.636 L = 19.1 Jouanna), 2. 3.4.5-7 (4.106 = 50 Smith), 2.5.9 (V.130.9 L = 72.8 Smith), 2. 5.11 (5.130.13 L = 72.14 Smith), 3.3.17(2) (3.110 = 94.10 Jouanna), 3.3.17(7) (3.122 L = 100.18-101.2 Jouanna), 5. 1.63 (5. 242 L = 28.13-4 Jouanna), 6.1.5 (V.268.3-4 L = 206.14-15 Smith), 7.1.5 (7.372 L = 53.9-12 Jouanna), 7. 1.26.1 (7. 398 L = 68.11 Jouanna), 7.1.28 (7. 400 L = 69.14 Jouanna), 7.1 40 (7. 408 L = 76.22 Jouanna), 7. 1.56 (7.422 L = 85.9 Jouanna).

[312] T. Tracy aptly summarised the relation between pain and disease in classical Greek medicine as follows: "The gravity of the disease may be gauged by the severity of the pain." Tracy (1969) 40. For the role of symptoms in 'Hippocratic' medicine, see Holmes (2010, 2018). L. Perilli sees the role of symptoms and their interpretation so central that he claims that "the main characteristics [of the Hippocratic corpus] is the semiotics of diagnosis and prognosis." Perilli (2018) 136.

[313] According to E. Craik following treatises can be labelled as gynaecological: *On Excision of the Foetus, On Generation-On the Nature of the Child, On Diseases of Women* 1–3*, On the Nature of Woman, On the Seven-month Infant-On the Eight-month Infant, On Superfetation, On Diseases of Girls.* Craik (2015) xxvii. See also Dean-Jones (2018) 66-71.

[314] See especially King (1999) 269-286, (1998), Loraux (1990) 44-63.

Also, scholars advocating this theory suggest that πόνος is an appropriate term for expressing pain connected to the two crucial activities of the citizens of the classical Greek polis, namely war and childbirth.[315] According to this theory, in contrast to other kinds of pain (in both medical and non-medical contexts), πόνος designates pain that is a means to some goal and is connected to some vital activities such as agriculture or exercise.[316] King and Loraux base their conceptions of πόνος on Hesiod's use of this word: after the opening of Pandora's jar, people have to work which is intrinsically connected to pain and labour (πόνος).[317] Thus, according to these scholars, πόνος designates pain which it is natural to feel, pain which is interwoven with human destiny.[318] Naturalness of πόνος can be seen, we are told, in the fact that πόνος during the childbirth shouldn't be treated or alleviated, whereas ὀδύνη should.[319] Pain connected to childbirth, thus, represents a special kind of pain felt only by women. Focusing on the role πόνος plays in the gynaecological treatises, together with its comparison to other pain words is thus necessary for understanding the role of pain in this medical genre.

Analyses of both King and Loraux are based on some classical Greek sources, especially Hesiod and other poets. Yet, surprisingly, they cite only a few medical sources.[320] Thus, it is questionable whether their theory, based on analyses of the poets and playwrights, can be applied to medical authors, too. In what follows, I intend to scrutinise the concept of female pain in the gynaecological treatises of the *CH* and the role πόνος plays in it. I will work mainly with the primary sources, and I will show that the theory of King and Loraux can hardly be supported by textual evidence of the *CH.* I will also compare the use of πόνος with the use of other pain words and show that they are used interchangeably and that there is a unified conception of pain in the gynaecological treatises expressed by all the pain words (except λύπη), which, however, do not differ what the way pain is understood in other medical genres.

When discussing female pain in the *CH*, it is necessary to take into consideration the problem of sources. Even though the gynaecological treatises constitute an important part of the 'Hippocratic' corpus, they are, for the most part, designated to female diseases and pathological states. But childbirth (with which πόνος is supposedly connected) is neither

[315] King (1999) 276. Cf. King (1998) 124, Loraux (1990) 24, 25, 32, 38, 43.

[316] King (1999) 276. Cf. King (1998) 124.

[317] King (1999) 276. Cf. King (1998) 125. See above ch. 1.5.1.

[318] King (1998) 125.

[319] King (1999) 277. Cf. King (1998) 114.

[320] This is especially true of King's book and paper. Loraux cites some 'Hippocratic' passages, however, in closer scrutiny, they don't always support her outcomes. See Loraux (1990) 29 n. 43, 44.

disease, nor a pathological state; thus, it is natural that the authors of gynaecological texts focused on the description of the diseases and their treatment instead of talking about non-problematic childbirth.[321] Obviously, they are interested in problematic child births or in child births that are preceded or followed by some pathology.[322] Pain in these cases, however, is not natural to childbirth; it is caused by some extraordinary circumstances. Following King's argument, these problematic cases of childbirth shouldn't be classified as πόνος – natural female pain; childbirth pain is in these cases characterised as ὠδίς and this word can designate both childbirth pain and childbirth itself.[323]

Before we look closely at the problem of pain during childbirth, it is necessary to say several things about the general conception of the female body in the *CH* and the way it is conceived of in the gynaecological treatises. This elucidation will help in answering the question of whether there are other specifically female pains than childbirth pangs. After all, it is not only childbirth that distinguishes women from men.[324] In contrast to the male body, the female body has a uterus (ὑστέρα/ὑστέρη). This organ plays a substantial role not only in the reproductive process but in the female suffering in general, too. According to the author of the treatise *Affections of Women*, the place of the uterus is not fixed; it can move in the body.[325] When the uterus leaves its appropriate place in the lower belly, pain and disease arise.[326] In the case it moves upwards it can cause hysteria[327] but even if it moves only in the region of the belly or when it is in an inappropriate position, it causes serious troubles.[328] Uterus can be

[321] Cf. Dean-Jones (2018) 251.

[322] See e.g. *Foet. Exsect.* 1-5 (8.212-217 L = 367-371 Joly). This seems to be true also outside the gynaecological treatises. In *Epidemics* 1 and 3, for example, when there is a case history about a woman, her complications arise after she gives birth (the wife of Dromaiades, *Epid.* 1.3.13[11] [2.708 L = 56 Jouanna]; the wife of Philinos, *Epid.* 1.3.13[4] [2.690 L = 45 Jouanna]), during a complicated childbirth (the wife of Epicrates, *Epid.* 1.3.13[5] [2.694 L = 47 Jouanna]), during pregnancy (an unnamed woman at *Epid.* 1.3.13[13] [2.712-714 L = 59 Jouanna) or after abortion (an unnamed woman at *Epid.* 3.2.10 [3.60 L = 75.7-13 Jouanna], *Epid.* 3.2.11 [3.60-62 L = 76.3-6 Jouanna]).

[323] See e.g. *Mul.* 1.68 (8.144.14 L = 150.11 Potter); 77 (8.172.5 L = 180.5 Potter).

[324] See Dean-Jones (2018) 253-258.

[325] *Mul.* 2.137 (8.308.14-21 L = 344.14-24 Potter). See also Plato, *Tim.* 91b7-d5.

[326] *Nat. Mul.* 3-8 (7.312-324 L = 4-12 Bourbon).

[327] *Mul.* 2.122-130 (8.264-278 L = 296-310 Potter); 148-152 (8.324-326 L = 360-364 Potter).

[328] *Mul.* 2.134-136 (8.302-308 L = 338-345 Potter); 139-140 (8.312-314 L = 348-350 Potter).

inflamed[329] or there can be an unnatural flow of humours in it, which also leads to pain and disease.[330]

The difference between male and female body is even more substantial: the female body is softer (ἀραιοσαρκοτέρην) and spongier (ἀπαλωτέρην); thus, it has more liquid in itself.[331] This means that the female body must evacuate more humours than the male body; from this stems the need for menstruation. Most female diseases are connected to the problem of delayed menstruation: if the blood doesn't leave the body naturally and in an appropriate amount, disease or pain occur.[332] It is not only menstrual blood which has to leave the body, but also lochia. Blood can also cause troubles when it is not in the right amount and its quality is bad.[333] It is obvious that these pathological states occur only in the female body. However, does it also mean that the nature of pain that accompanies them is specific only to the women?

As already stated above, some scholars assume that there is no theoretical explanation of pain in the *CH* and even though the words denoting pain occur very often, there is, it seems, no elaborated theory behind them.[334] According to others, it can be said at least that in the majority of treatises in the corpus, pain works as a diagnosing sign of disease which helps the doctor to provide an accurate prognosis and treatment.[335] Putting this question aside, let us focus on the most significant theoretical passage concerning pain in the *CH* which appears in *On the Nature of Man* and it will be analysed in detail later.[336] For now, it is enough to say that the author of this treatise specifies that pain occurs in the places where there is some unnatural mixture of bodily humours. If there is too much or too little humour which should be in that place, pain occurs.[337] Even though all the four humours from which the human body is constituted according to *On the Nature of Man* are not present in any other treatise of the *CH*,

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[329] *Mul.* 2.168-171 (8.346-352 L = 384-390 Potter). Cf. *Nat. Mul.* 10-12 (7.324-330 L = 13-15 Bourbon).

[330] *Mul.* 2.112 (8.240-242 L = 268-270 Potter); 182-184 (8.364-366 L = 11.402-404). Cf. *Nat. Mul.* 15-17 (7.332-338 L = 18-21 Bourbon); 22-24 (7.340-342 L = 24-25 Bourbon).

[331] *Mul.* 1.1 (8.12.5-9 L = 10.13-17 Potter). An alternative account of the difference between male and female body is to be found in *Vict.* 1.27 (6.500 L = 142.27-144.14 Joly-Byl), 1.34 (6.513 = 150.23-28 Joly-Byl); *Gland.* 16 (8.570-572 L = 80 Craik).

[332] *Mul.* 1.1.7-9 (8.10.13-19 L = 8.15-18 Potter). Cf. *Virg.* 1 (8.466 L = 189 Bourbon); *Nat. Mul.* 2 (7.312-314 L = 2-5 Bourbon).

[333] *Mul.* 2.112-121 (8.240-264 L = 268-296 Potter).

[334] E.g., Horden (1999) 295–315.

[335] E.g., Rey (1995) 17-23.

[336] *Nat. Hom.* 4 (6.40 L = 174.3-10 Jouanna). See below pp. 66-67.

[337] *Nat. Hom.* 4 (6.40 L = 174.3-10 Jouanna). See below pp. 66-67.

it seems that the principle that pain occurs when there is some disharmony between bodily constituents (humours, parts etc.) is common to some other treatises, too.[338]

Even though we do not know whether the authors of gynaecological treatises adhere to the same theory as the author of *On the Nature of Man* and that it is problematic to interpret one treatise of the *CH* with the help of another one, pain described in the gynaecological treatises fits nicely into this theory. As stated above, pain in these treatises usually occurs when there is a problem with discharging menstrual blood or lochia, which means that there is too much or too little of these humours or that they are in an inappropriate place. Also, when the uterus changes its place, it causes pain because it moves to the place where there are already other organs which are oppressed by it. Thus, even though the female body distinguishes substantially from the male body, the way in which pain arises is similar to both of them.

Let us now focus on childbirth. Helen King claims that "the precise word used for pain in both war and childbirth is usually *ponos*, or the plural *ponoi*".[339] Do we find any evidence for that in gynaecological treatises? Quite surprisingly, to support her argument, King mentions the only one case in the treatise *Diseases* I in which a physician gives something (τι) to alleviate the pain of a woman in labour. When her pain gets worse or when she dies, the physician is to blame. King interprets this case in a way that pain accompanying childbirth is natural and shouldn't be treated in a similar manner as other kinds of pain.[340] However, the word denoting pain in this passage is not πόνος but ὀδύνη, so it is questionable how much this passage support King's theory.

In other gynaecological texts, the evidence is not much stronger.[341] In the *Nature of women*, we find seven instances of πόνος.[342] However, no passage containing πόνος talks about childbirth. In some instances, it seems that πόνος is synonymous with other pain words and

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[338] See below pp. 66-68.

[339] King (1998) 124. However, this claim is not based on any references from *CH*, but on a fragment of Aeschylus' play *Europe* (Ibid. fr. 99. 7-8 Nauck).

[340] *Morb.* 1.8 (6.154-156 L = 22.19-20 Wittern = 117-119 Potter). καὶ λεχοῖ ἐπὶ γαστρὸς ὀδύνῃ, ἢν δῷ τι ὁ ἰητρὸς, καὶ κακῶς σχῇ, ἢ καὶ ἀπόληται, ὁ ἰητρὸς αἴτιος. "If a physician gives anything to a woman in childbed for the pain in her belly, and she becomes worse or even dies, the physician is blamed."

[341] In the following paragraphs, I summarise instances of πόνος in gynaecological treatises (for the list of these treatises see n. 4 above). I omit the *Diseases of girls* and *Barrenness* (*steril.*) since there is no instance of πόνος there.

[342] *Nat. Mul.* 5 (7.318 L = 7.5 Bourbon); 12 (7.330 L = 16.5 Bourbon); 18 (7.338 L = 22.3 Bourbon); 23 (7.342 L = 24.17 Bourbon [in Bourbon's edition, however, πόνου is corrected on νούσου]); 35 (7.376 L = 51.7 Bourbon); 38 (7.380 L = 54.8 Bourbon); 64 (7.400 L = 71.9 Bourbon).

designates a pathological state of an ill woman.[343] Pain designated as πόνος occurs in pregnant women, too. Contrary to King's theory, however, it signifies some pathological state, not natural pain connected to childbirth.[344] Women are in pain (ὑπὸ πόνου ᾖ) when menstruation delays,[345] or they suffer (πονέι) when their womb is in an unnatural place.[346] Thus, in this treatise, πόνος seems to designate pain accompanying some pathological state; there is, however, no connection to childbirth.

In the *Affections of women*, there is a significantly higher number of instances of πόνος there.[347] Yet, the role of πόνος is quite similar to what we have seen in the previous paragraph. The author uses πόνος in describing a pathological state, usually connected to some problems during pregnancy,[348] menstruation,[349] or attempts to conceive.[350] Also, πόνος occurs when the discharge of fluids from the female body is blocked.[351] As already mentioned above, the female body has in itself more fluid which must be regularly discharged. Pain occurs also when there is some unnatural arrangement of the inner parts of the female body.[352] There is no explicit link between πόνος and childbirth here, rather, πόνος works as a pain word which can be easily substituted by other pain words without any significant shift in the meaning. In several other gynaecological texts, the use of πόνος is very similar.[353]

Yet, there are some passages containing πόνος in the context of childbirth in other gynaecological treatises, too. In *Superfetation*, we are told that a woman gives birth with pain and the help of a doctor's equipment (ξὺν πόνῳ καὶ μηχανῇσιν ἰητροῦ).[354] In *Seven months'*

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[343] *Nat. Mul.* 5 (7.318 L = 7.5 Bourbon); 18.2 (7.338 L = 22.3 Bourbon). In these passages, πόνος occurs together with ὀδύνη and both terms seem to be synonymous.

[344] *Nat. Mul.* 12 (7.330 L = 16.5 Bourbon).

[345] *Nat. Mul.* 23 (7.342 L = 24.16-25.4 Bourbon).

[346] *Nat. Mul.* 38 (7.380 L = 54.6-10 Bourbon). Cf. 64.1-5 (7.400 L = 71.8-14 Bourbon).

[347] There are 53 instances of πόνος in this treatise; ὀδύνη has 116 instances and ἄλγος 56.

[348] *Mul.* 1.52 (8.110.11 L = 114.8 Potter).

[349] *Mul.* 1.3 (8.22.5-19 L = 22.5-21 Potter).

[350] *Mul.* 1.4 (8.24-26. L =24-28 Potter); 3 (8.22.16 L = 22.19 Potter); 72 (8.152.2 L = 158.6 Potter).

[351] *Mul.* 1.3 (8.22.7 L = 22.7 Potter); 36 (8.84.15 L = 86.22 Potter); 41 (8.98.16 L = 102.11 Potter).

[352] *Mul.* 1.26 (8.70.6 L = 72.12 Potter); 36 (8.86.6 L = 88.22 Potter); 46.2 (8.104.17 L = 108.15 Potter); 61.27 (8.124.10 L = 128.8 Potter).

[353] See 1.e., *Foet. Exsect.* 5 (8.516 L = 371.3 Joly); *Septim.* (*Oct.*) 3 (7.438 L = 166.1 Joly), *Septim.* (*Oct.*) 4 (7.442 L = 167.16 Joly), *Septim.* (*Oct.*) 6 (7.444 L = 169.14 Joly). *Genit.* 4 (7.477 L = 47.24 Joly) *Nat. Puer.* 15 (7.492-494 L = 57.5-9 Joly); *Nat. Puer.* 15 (7.494 L = 58.7-15 Joly).

[354] *Superf.* 15 (8.484 L = 281.19 Bourbon).

child, there is a case of a woman giving birth with birth pangs and pain (αἵ τε ὠδῖνες εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ πόνοι).[355] Word πόνος occurs also when the birth is premature, and the foetus is not adequately developed.[356] In *Eight months' child*, we read about women suffering (πονῆσαι) when the child is in an inappropriate position;[357] child itself suffers (πονεῖν) as well because its birth is premature or because it is in an unnatural position.[358] In the *Nature of the child*, we are told that primiparas suffer (πονέονται) more than women who have already given birth.[359] It is however questionable whether these few passages can assure the link between πόνος and natural (uncomplicated) childbirth. They all, except the last one, speak about some complications occurring during childbirth; thus, we can only guess what implications it has for natural (without complications) childbirth. It is more probable that πόνος has a similar role as other pain words, ὀδύνη and ἄλγος, that indicate where the pain is felt. Due to the emphasis on female afflictions, pain appears most often in the lower part of the belly (νειαίρη),[360] waist (ἰξύς)[361] or womb (μῆτραι/ὑστέρα).[362] It seems, thus, in the use of pain words, there is no significant difference with the *Epidemics.*

The role of πόνος in gynaecological texts thus seems as follows: There is good evidence that it is used in designating pain and suffering, even when it is not specified what is the origin or location of the pain. Besides this, πόνος is used for designating pain located in some specific

[355] *Septim.* (*Oct.*) 4 (7.442 L = 168.12 Joly).

[356] *Septim.* (*Oct.*) 2 (7.438 L = 165.13 Joly).

[357] *Oct.* 10 (8.454 L = 175.12 Joly).

[358] *Oct.* 10 (8.454 L = 174.16 Joly). There is also a third passage from this treatise containing πόνος (*Oct.* 12 [8.457 L = 176.16 Joly]). However, in this passage, the author speaks about pain accompanying bad nourishment.

[359] *Nat. Puer.* 8 (7.500 L = 61.10-13 Joly), 30 (7.539 L = 82.6-10 Joly).

[360] *Nat. Mul.* 2 (7. 312 L = 3.12 Bourbon), 5 (7. 316 L = 7.2 Bourbon), 6. (7. 320 L = 8.14-16 Bourbon), 7 (7. 320 L = 9.16 Bourbon), 8 (7. 322 L = 10.15 Bourbon), 9 (7. 324 L = 12.7 Bourbon), 11 (7. 326 L = 14.6 Bourbon), 12 (7. 328 L = 15.12 Bourbon), 35 (2.378 L = 51.12-13 Bourbon), 54 (2. 396 L = 68.2 Bourbon), 89 (2. 408 L = 78.6 Bourbon); *Mul.* 1.52.3 (8. 110.13 L = 114.11 Potter), 57 (8. 114.13 L = 118.10-11 Potter), 60 (8. 120.12 = 124.8 Potter), 2. 134.2 (8. 302.14 = 388.16 Potter), 137.21 (8. 310.13-14 L = 346.14 Potter).

[361] *Nat. Mul.* 12 (7. 328 L = 15.12 Bourbon), 14 (7. 322 L = 17.15 Bourbon), 54 (2. 396 L = 68.2 Bourbon), 70.1 (2. 402 L = 74.1 Bourbon), 89 (2. 408 L = 78.6 Bourbon); *Mul.* 1.3 (8. 22.5 L = 22.5 Potter), 34 (8. 80.8 L = 82.9 Potter), 37 (8. 88.19 L = 92.9 Potter), 57 (8. 114.13 L = 118.10-11 Potter).

[362] *Nat. Mul.* 14 (7.322 L = 17.15 Bourbon), 80 (2.406 L = 76.3-4 Bourbon), 85 (2. 406 L = 77.4 Bourbon) 89 (2. 408 L = 78.6 Bourbon) 92 (2. 410 L = 79.11 Bourbon) *Superf.* 38 (8. 506 L = 297.9 Bourbon). Other bodily parts, such as the head, spine, back, hips, arms or feet are mentioned as well, see *Mul.* 1.4 (8. 26.13 L = 26.18 Potter), 35 (8. 82.16 L = 84.24 Potter), 36.12 (8.84.18 L = 86.26 Potter), 50 (8. 108.10 L = 112.4 Potter). 2. 131 (8. 278.14 L = 310.16 Potter).

bodily part, so it is to some degree synonymous with other pain words, especially ὀδύνη. Concerning the relation between πόνος and childbirth, caution is needed. Even though we have seen some instances of this relation, they are scarce, and it doesn't seem prudent to infer some general theory from them. I agree with King and Loraux that πόνος has semantic layers which fit nicely to the idea of natural pain accompanying childbirth. Yet, I am not sure that we can find enough textual evidence for that in gynaecological treatises. Also, the pain felt at childbirth – be it natural or unnatural – can be easily interpreted as other kinds of pain: due to the movement of the baby through the uterus, the internal arrangement of the female body temporarily changes, so the natural balance or harmony of the body is disturbed. The difference between normal and abnormal childbirth would then lay in the intensity of pain and additional complications. Thus, it does not seem that there is textual evidence for distinguishing between pain in general and specifically female pain.

2.1.3 Dietetic Treatises

In this section I attempt to analyse the role of pain in dietetic treatises, expressed by the pain words ἄλγος and ὀδύνη. Since πόνος designates in dietetic treatises usually exercise or activity, its use will be analysed in detail below in chapter 2.3.

In the treatises characterised above as 'dietetic', pain often plays a similar role as in the other medical texts already discussed. In *On Regimen*, ὀδύνη appears only once, indicating pain accompanying swelling of intestines, when these have no moisture (ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχῃ τὸ ἔντερον ὑγρασίην).[363] Lack of moisture leads to pain and shivering of the dried bodily part (κενωθεῖσα δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ, θερμαίνεται καὶ ἀλγέει καὶ φρίσσει); this happens as an outcome of an immoderate toil (ὁταν δὲ πλείων τοῦ καιροῦ πόνος ᾖ).[364] Pain (ἄλγος) can be caused not only by lack of moisture but by surfeit (πλησμονή) of it as well; in this case, the "ache resembles the pain of fatigue" (τὸ δὲ ἄλγος ἐστὶν ὁκοῖον κόπος).[365] Pain, be it fatigue pain or another type of pain, is thus caused by lack or surfeit of moisture and, generally speaking, by an imbalance between the constituent parts of the regimen, namely nourishment (providing moisture) and exercise (reducing moisture).

[363] *Vict.* 4.82 (6.630 L = 214.12-17 Joly-Byl).

[364] *Vict.* 2.66 (6. 586 L = 190.14-18 Joly-Byl).

[365] *Vict.* 3.72 (6. 610 L = 72.11-13 Joly-Byl = 391 Jones).

In *On Ancient Medicine* and *Airs, Waters, Places*, ὀδύνη and ἄλγος express bodily pain as well. They accompany disease together with fever (πυρετοί) or burning (καῦμα),[366] and ὀδύνη is characterised as sharp (ὀδύναι τε ὀξύταται)[367] or violent (ἰσχυρή)[368] pain. Similarly in *Regimen in Acute Diseases*, these two pain words are used interchangeably and often in the same sentence,[369] indicating the bodily part where the pain appears.[370]

The treatise *On the Nature of Man* is of particular importance for understanding pain in ancient medicine. Besides of indicating that bleeding is beneficial for curing pains,[371] the 'Hippocratic' author offers some insights into understanding pain at a more theoretical level. In the following passage, he explains the role of pain in the context of his theory of the composition of the human body:

> The body of man has in itself blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile; these make up the nature of his body, and through these he feels pain or enjoys health (ἀλγεῖ καὶ ὑγιαίνει). Now he enjoys the most perfect health when these humours are duly proportioned (μετρίως ἔχῃ) to one another in respect of power and quantity (δυνάμιος καὶ πλήθεος), and when they are perfectly mingled (μεμιγμένα). Pain is felt (ἀλγεῖ) when one of these humours is in deficiency or excess (ἔλασσον ἢ πλέον), or is isolated (χωρισθῇ) in the body without being mixed (μὴ κεκρημένον) with all the others. For when a humour is isolated and stands by itself, not only must the place which it left become diseased (ἐπίνοσον), but the place where it poured into must, because of the excess (ὑπερπιμπλάμενον), cause pain and distress (ὀδύνην τε καὶ πόνον). In fact when one humour (τι τουτέων) flows out of the body in bigger amount (πλέον) than is necessary to get rid of superfluity (ἐπιπολάζοντος), the emptying causes pain (ὀδύνην παρέχει ἡ κένωσις). If, on the other hand, it is the inside of the body where the emptying (κένωσιν), the shifting (μετάστασιν) and the separation (ἀπόκρισιν) from other elements take place, the man certainly must, according to what has been said, suffer from a double pain (διπλῆν τὴν ὀδύνην παρέχειν), one in the place left, and another in the place poured into (ὑπερέβαλεν).[372]

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[366] *Med. Vet.* 6 (1. 582 L = 125.5-10 Jouanna), 19 (1. 616 L = 143.7-15 Jouanna).

[367] *Med. Vet.* 22 (1. 632 L = 152.9-13 Jouanna).

[368] *Aer.* 9 (2. 38 L = 210.7 Jouanna).

[369] *Acut. A* 6 (2. 264 L = 43.26-44.10 Joly), 7 (2.270-272 L = 45.12-46.7 Joly), *Acut. B* 1 (2.398 L = 69.6-11 Joly), 11 (2.458-460 L = 83.11-18 Joly).

[370] *Acut. A* 7 (2.268 L = 44.25-27 Joly), *Acut. B* 1 (2.398 L = 69.6-11 Joly), 10 (2.346 L =80.21-81.1 Joly), 12 (2.468 L = 85.13-16 Joly).

[371] *Nat. Hom.* 11 (6. 58 L = 192.15-194.10 Jouanna), 11 (6.60 L = 196.10-15 Jouanna).

[372] *Nat. Hom.* 4 (6.40 L = 172.13-174.10 Jouanna), transl. Jones 12-14, modified, Greek text according to Jouanna.

According to the author of this text, the human body is composed of four humours, blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile.[373] Maintaining of health depends on their duly qualitative and quantitative proportion and on their perfect mixture (μίξις, μίγνυμι).[374] Deficiency, excess or isolation of one of these humours leads to disruption of health, to disease (νόσος) and pain (ὀδύνη, πόνος). In this model of bodily composition, flow of humours out of the body or inside it takes place, however, when the flow is too excessive, pain occurs in both the area which the humour left and in the area, it poured into.[375] Similar theory, namely that health depends on the balance of the constituent parts of the body, can be found in few other 'Hippocratic' treatises, particularly in *On Ancient Medicine.* In this treatise, in arguing against thinkers who restrict the number of the constitutive elements of the human body, the author explains that the human body is composed of "salty and bitter and sweet and acid and astringent and insipid and myriad other things" and when they are "mixed and blended with one other" they "neither manifest nor cause the human being pain (οὔτε λυπεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον), but when one of them separates off and comes to be on its own, then it is both manifest and causes the human being pain (λυπεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον)".[376] Explicit bond between λύπη and the mixture of bodily constituents indicate that the author talks here about bodily pain. In his translation, Jouanna renders λύπη as 'souffrance' which is a more general term than just pain.[377] This interpretation is possible, however, the relation to the body seems to be quite strong here, so I understand λύπη here primarily as bodily pain. The idea that pain arises when a balance of some constitutive parts is dissolved, occurs later in *On Ancient Medicine*, too. If cold and hot are "mixed together with one another in the body they do not cause pain/il ne cause pas de la souffrance" (ὃν μὲν ἂν δήπου χρόνον μεμιγμένα αὐτὰ ἐωυτοῖσιν, ἅμα τὸ ψυχρόν τε καὶ θερμὸν ἔνῇ, οὐ λυπεῖ).[378] Fever, which is a possible outcome of the disruption of the mixture is said to be one of the harmful or painful

[373] Even though the theory of four humours was in later tradition seen as emblematic of 'Hippocratic' medicine, all four humours are mentioned only in this treatise.

[374] This approach to health may have played a significant role in establishing a 'medical model of pleasure', i.e. an idea that pleasure consists in maintaining the equilibrium between various bodily parts or forces in the natural state, which is critically assessed by Plato and other members of the Academy who see pleasurable the process of returning to the natural state, not the natural state itself. See below, chapter 3 and also Cheng (2015) 29, 77.

[375] Very similar idea is to be found in *On Regimen*, too. See *Vict*. 2.66 (6.582-584 L = 188.18-19 Joly-Byl).

[376] *Med. Vet.* 14 (1.602 L = 136.10-16 Jouanna = 92.10-16 Schiefsky) transl. Schiefsky p. 93.

[377] See Jouanna' translation (2003b) 136.

[378] *Med. Vet.* 16 (1.606-608 L = 139.4-10 Jouanna) transl. Schiefsky p. 95. Text according to Schiefsky.

things (τὰ λυπέοντα) afflicting the human being.[379] Some other Hippocratic authors share the idea that pathology arises from an imbalance of bodily parts, they differ, however, in what these constitutive parts are.[380] Also, this theory is documented in other thinkers, too, namely in Plato and, supposedly, in some 'presocratic' thinkers (Alcmaeon, Empedocles, Democritus or Philistion of Locri).[381]

Explaining pain as an imbalance of humours provides the 'Hippocratic' author with a theoretical frame for explaining pain caused both by wounds and diseases. In both cases, the the right proportion of humours is broken, be it because of the flow of blood from the wound or by the shift of humours inside the body caused by swelling or some other pathology.

The author of this treatise explains the fact that people suffer pain by the idea their body is composed of various constituents. In his reaction to medical and philosophical debates of his time, particularly to 'presocratic' thinkers advocating monism, i.e., a theory that there is only one constituent of the human body, not many, he says:

> [B]ut I hold that if man were a unity (ἓν) he would never feel pain (ἤλγει), as there would be nothing from which a unity could suffer pain. And even if he were to suffer, the cure (τὸ ἰώμενον) too would have to be one. But as a matter of fact cures are many. For in the body are many constituents (ἐνεόντα), which, by heating, by cooling, by drying or by wetting one another contrary to nature (παρὰ φύσιν), engender diseases (νούσους τίκτει); so that both the forms of diseases are many and the healing of them is manifold.[382]

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[379] *Med. Vet.* 19 (1.616 L = 144.1-2 Jouanna). It is however worth mentioning that λύπη is used here only in its verbal form.

[380] *Loc. Hom.* 42 (6.334-336 L = 77-80 Craik); *Vict*. 1.2 (6.470 L = 124.2-20 Joly-Byl; Cf. *Morb.* 4.45 (7.572 L = 100.8-9 Joly); *Med. Vet.* 14 (1.602 L = 136.10-16 Jouanna), *Med. Vet.* 16 (1.606-608 L = 136.10-16 Jouanna); *Gen.* 3 (7.475 L = 46 Joly).

[381] In his commentary on the quoted passage, Jouanna ascribes the theory of health as balance and disease as imbalance to Empedocles and Democritus (he does not mention Alcmaeon). However, both passages supposedly supporting this claim he cites from Theophrastus, and it is difficult to evaluate whether Theophrastus really describes the theories of his predecessors or his own conception of them (Jouanna [2003b] 256; Empedocles A 86.10 [Theophrastus, *De sens.* 36-41], Democritus A 135.58 [Theophrastus, *De sens.* 70-71). See above p. 44. Other testimonies for health conceived of as balance and disease as imbalance, cited by Jouanna, are Philistion of Locri (*Anon. Lond.* 20.34-37) and Plato (*Tim.* 82a). He also rightly notices that there is a difference in perspective among these thinkers: Plato talks about elements (air, fire, earth, water), Philistion about elemental qualities (warm, wet) and the author of *On the Nature of Man* about humours (ibid.). Concerning Philistion, caution is needed since about his teaching, we possess only second-hand testimony from *Anon. Lond.* See also Cheng (2015) 16 n. 28.

[382] *Nat. Hom.* 2 (6.34-36 L = 168.4-9 Jouanna = 7 Jones).

This passage obviously attacks an argument attributed to Melissus who, according to Simplicius, claimed that "the One-Being does not feel pain for, if it should suffer any such thing, it would not still be one."[383] Leaving aside the context of the original presocratic ideas behind this passage,[384] from the 'Hippocratic' reading, we learn not only that the human body is a composite but also that disease is caused by the unnatural influence of heating, cooling, drying or wetting of bodily constituents (ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνεόντα). Again, the 'Hippocratic' author creates a theoretical frame which allows him to induce a general theory of healing: since there are four ways of inducting disease, there are also four ways of healing it. The imbalance of the bodily constituents – in the case of this treatise, humours – is repaired by the influence of the contradictory quality to the excessive or deficient one. Similarly, if the pain is caused by excessive heating, it can be healed by cooling and vice versa.

Both quoted passages show, among other things, that the boundary between pain and disease is not very sharp. Even though the word ἄλγος usually means pain, in the first quoted passage it stands as the opposite of health (ὑγεῖα),[385] and the whole passage can be read as talking not about pain, but about disease in general.[386] However, any strict distinction is not necessarily needed, since it seems clear that any imbalance of health leads to some pathological state, be it just pain or a disease accompanied by pain. In some treatises of the *'Hippocratic' corpus*, pain is often listed as one of the symptoms of a disease, but it can also play a more substantial role since the disease is often not explicitly mentioned by name (see the *Epidemics* discussed above).[387] Be it as it may, in both passages, the pathological state, expressed by the word usually denoting pain, is caused by an imbalance of the bodily humours which is, at least in the second passage, explicitly explained as an outcome of unnatural influence of some elementary quality.

2.1.4 Conclusion

The analyses conducted thus far on medical texts have revealed that pain is primarily associated with the bodily part where it is felt. It is considered an essential symptom that, along with others, assists the physician in comprehending the nature of the pathology, be it a wound or disease, to

[383] οὔτε ἀλγεῖ οὔτε ἀνιᾶται· εἰ γάρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἓν εἴη. Melissus DK B7; Simplicius, *Phys.* 111,18.

[384] See above pp 42-43.

[385] ἀλγεῖ καὶ ὑγιαίνει. *Nat. Hom.* 4 (6.40 L = 172.15 Jouanna). This can be attested in Plato, too. See *Resp.* 9. 583c10-d4.

[386] In this way it is rendered by Jouanna (2002) 169.

[387] Pain in the *CH* is interpreted in this way also by Scullin (2012) 64.

enable the provision of diagnosis, prognosis, and therapy. It is noteworthy that explanations of pain are missing from the majority of medical treatises. However, in the case of *On the Nature of Man*, we discover that pain and disease stem from an imbalance of humours, a notion shared by other ancient thinkers, which posits that pathology results from an imbalance of constitutive bodily parts. The explanation presented by the author of *On the Nature of Man* meets the requirements for a physician to perform their job effectively, as knowledge of the humour responsible for causing pain or disease is necessary to select the appropriate therapy. Generally, therefore, bodily pain serves as a significant symptom aiding the physician in diagnosing and treating their patients, with theoretical explanations forming an integral part of this pursuit.

2.2 Pain, Soul and the Definition of Medicine

Even in medical treatises, pain can sometimes be used in contexts where its connection to the body is not as strong as in the passages analysed before. To be clear, there is *almost always* an association with the body in the medical treatises, however, this association is not necessarily as straightforward as in the passages where pain was simply a symptom indicating where the pathology is felt. It is of particular interest that this 'second' or 'more theoretical' use of pain is almost always expressed by the word λύπη which is a prevalent word for pain in Plato and Aristotle and which can also mean sadness or related emotional states.[388] Analysing the occurrences of this word in medical treatises enriches thus our understanding of pain in general and uncovers some layers of meaning not emphasized so far. Even though association with the

[388] However, in many places of the *CH*, λύπη is used for expressing 'normal' bodily pain, too. Pain (λύπη) is caused by moisture (ικμάς, *Mal.* 4.46 [7.572 L = 101.2 Joly], 4.46 [7.574 L = 102.10 Joly], 4.49 [7.578 L = 105.3 Joly], 4.52 [7.592 L = 112.14 Joly], 4.52 [7.592 L = 112.18 Joly]), bile (*Mul.* 1. 8 [8.36.12 L = 38.2 Potter], *Mul.* 1. 31 [8.74.19 L = 78.1 Potter]), phlegm (*Int.* 20 [7.216.19 L = 138.10 Potter]), pus (*Loc. Hom.* 32 [6.324 L = 70.24 Craik]), food and drink (*Nat. Mul.* 41 [7.386 L = 58.11 Bourbon]; *Mul.* 2. 154 [8.328.20 L = 366.9 Potter]), dust (*Mul.* 2. 188 [8.368.18 L = 408.7 Potter]), flow (ῥεῦμα, *Gland.* 7.12 [8.562 L = 72.7 Craik]), injurious fluids (λυπεοντὰ πνευματά, *Acut. B.* 5 [2.408 L = 71.15-17 Joly]), irritation (κνησμοί, *Fract.* 7 [3.438.19-20 L = 112.5 Withington]), stoppage of the vessels (*Acut. B.* 4 [2.402 L = 70.17 Joly]), some harmful substance (τὸ λυπέον, *Mal.* IV.45 [7.570 L = Joly 100.18-20]) or disease (νοῦσός, *Mal.* 4.45 [7.570 L = Joly 100.18-20]). As for where λύπη is felt, only thorax (*Acut. B.* 25 [2.512 L = 94.3 Joly]) and the whole body (τὸ σῶμα, *Aff.* 52 [6.262.6 L = 78.18 Potter]) are mentioned. In fragments of Diocles of Carystus, λύπη is used for expressing bodily pain or hurting in passages cited by Galen, Oribasius, and Athenaeus of Naucratia (Diocles of Carystus, fr. 185.42, 49; fr. 187.22; fr. 202.2.). In the first fragment, pain is caused by touching stinging-nettles (ἀκαλήφαι), in the second by eating green almonds (ἀμύγδαλα χλωρά) and in the third the goat cheese (αἴγειος ταμισίνης). Scarcity of the instances of λύπη and possible modifications of its meaning in later authors prevents us in formulating any definite claims about the role of λύπη in Diocles.

soul, indicated in the name of this chapter, is too bold, it wants to indicate that even medical authors are aware of a more intricate relation of pain to our life.

In contemporary scholarship, usually, not much attention to is paid to λύπη in the 'Hippocratic' corpus. W. Cheng claims that this word, in the *CH*, is used only marginally in the sense of pain and in general in the sense of emotional distress, such as fear.[389] Some interpreters even do not mention this word at all, when analysing the problem of pain in the texts collected in this 'corpus'.[390] I hope to show that the situation is more complicated and that this pain word bears various meanings in different treatises of the corpus; sometimes it expresses different phenomena even in the same treatise.

The most relevant difference in contrast to the medical passages discussed so far is the fact that pain is more general here, indicating suffering afflicting the whole person, not only a specific bodily part. In *On Regimen*, we find the first two instances of λύπη in the excursion about *physis* and *technē* analogy (chapters 12-24).[391] In this excursus, the author shows the analogies between the nature of man and the arts and crafts. In chapter 15, λύπη occurs in the analogy between three activities: the activity of cobblers, of nature and of medical therapy. We are told that "cobblers divide wholes into parts and make the parts wholes; cutting and stitching (τάμνοντες δὲ καὶ κεντέοντες) they make sound what is rotten."[392] By similar tools, the author continues, namely by cutting and stitching, doctors heal their patients and it is also expressed in the definition of medicine: "This too is part of the physician's art: to do away with that which causes pain, and by taking away the cause of his suffering to make him sound" (καὶ τόδε ἰητρικῆς τὸ λυπέον ἀπαλλάσσειν, καὶ ὑφ' οὗ πονεῖ ἀφαιρέοντα ὑγιέα ποιεῖν).[393] The key question in interpreting this passage is the relation between λύπη and πόνος. In his translation, Jones renders λύπη as a general notion for pain which is accompanied with πόνος (suffering) in the second part of the definition. Joly and Byl, however, render λύπη in a slightly more general way: "Ceci aussi est le propre de la médecine: débarrasser de ce qui fait souffrir (τὸ λυπέον), rendre sain en enlevant la cause de la souffrance (πονεῖ)."[394] Given the context in which other three instances of λύπη occur in *On Regimen* (see the next paragraph), translating this word as

[389] Cheng (2018) 6.

[390] Horden (1999), Rey (1995), King (1999) 275 (King mentions that λύπη is used for pain in *CH*, but does not specify this claim and analyses only the other three pain words).

[391] For interpretation of this excursus, see Bartoš (2015) 138-163.

[392] *Vict.* 1.15 (6.490 L = 136.24-25 Joly-Byl = 253 Jones).

[393] *Vict*. 1.15 (6.490 L = 136.27-28 Joly-Byl = 253 Jones). Text according to Joly-Byl.

[394] Joly-Byl (2003) 137.

suffering – i.e., emphasising that it is not only the bodily pain – seems prudent. However, the analogy between medicine and cobblery may suggest that the author is talking about surgical medicine, the words "cutting and stitching" (τάμνοντες δὲ καὶ κεντέοντες) are especially evocative here. In the context of surgery, physical pain is more apt an expression than suffering in general. Yet, the definition of medicine is followed by a claim that nature actually does of itself what medicine must do artificially: "Nature of herself knows how to do these things: she makes one who is sitting stand up and makes one in motion rest. Nature also has similar features in common with medicine."[395] It seems thus, that the definition of medicine is not restricted to the surgery only but includes dietetic medicine (evoked by motion and rest), so a wider understanding of λύπη in a more general sense (as suffering and not necessarily a strictly bodily pain) is appropriate. Since the whole excursus is based on examples of activities that are generally known, it is possible that the author evoked surgery since it is something everyone connects to medicine.

Three chapters after the definition of medicine, still in the excursus about *physis* and *technē* analogy, λύπη occurs in the context of music and enjoyment that music, and more specifically singing, brings. If we want to get τέρψις (enjoyment, delight) the tongue be must well-tuned (καλῶς δ'ἠρμοσμένης γλώσσης); if it is not, λύπη follows.[396] Even though Jones again translates λύπη as 'pain' here, it seems that 'suffering' or even 'disagreement' or 'discontentment' would be better candidates, since they better express the opposition to τέρψις. Thus, the translation of Joly and Byl seem more accurate: "Quand la langue est bien dans le ton, l'accord produit le plaisir (τέρψις); mais quand elle n'est pas dans le ton, il y a désagrément (λύπη)."[397] Opposition between pain and pleasure is one of the most significant features of the way Plato and Aristotle write about pain, it is thus significant that we find it already here.

A similar sense λύπη expresses at the end of the first book of *On Regimen*, where the relation between the two constitutive elements, water and fire, and thinking or intelligence (φρόνησις) is discussed. The nature of character and intelligence depends on the mixture of water and fire in the soul and if the fire is dominated by water, people afflicted by imbecility (μανίη) are said to "weep for no reason, fear what is not dreadful, are pained at what does not affect them/ils s'affligent à contre-temps" (λυπέονταί τε ἐπὶ τοῖσι μὴ προσήκουσι).[398] In the

[395] *Vict.* 1.15 (6.490 L = 136.28-138.2 Joly-Byl), transl. Bartoš (2015) 160.

[396] *Vict*. 1.18 (6.492 L = 138.25-26 Joly-Byl).

[397] Joly-Byl (2003) 139. Jones' translation is as follows: "When the tongue is well in tune the concord pleases, but there is pain when the tongue is out of tune." Jones (1931) 257.

[398] *Vict*. 1.35 (6.518 L = 154.8-11 Joly-Byl = 287 Jones).

context of this sentence, and in the context of the whole chapter - dealing with intelligence, thinking, and, in general, soul - emotional aspects of λύπη are clearly seen. In all three quoted passages, it is possible to understand λύπη as bodily pain, however, understanding it as suffering – with its psychological and emotional aspects – is much more natural. This claim is supported by the last passage where λύπη occurs in *On Regimen*. In the fourth book, devoted to the role of dreams in dietetics, we are told that "body when asleep has no perception; but the soul when awake has cognizance of all things – sees what is visible, hears what is audible, walks, touches, feels pain, ponders (Τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα καθεῦδον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἡ δ' ἐγρηγοροῦσα γινώσκει, καθορῇ τε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ διακούει τὰ ἀκουστὰ, βαδίζει, ψαύει, λυπέεται, ἐνθυμέεται)."[399] Joly and Byl render λυπέται as 's'afflige' which seems to reflect better that the body is asleep and that λύπη – even if we translated it as pain – is felt by the soul. Even though the soul in *On Regimen* is not conceived as something immaterial, there is still some difference between body and soul and, thus, possible, between the way the body and the soul experience pain.[400]

It is also worth noting, that λύπη occurs only in books one and four of *On Regimen*, but that in books two and three, other words are used for designating pain, namely ἄλγος, κόπος, and πόνος. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that there are two contexts in which λύπη occurs in the *On Regimen*. The first two instances are part of the excursus about analogies between human nature and *technē*, where λύπη seems to mean suffering or something disagreeable. The third and fourth instances occur in the context of cognitive activities, and psychological aspects of λύπη are emphasised. Thus, in *On Regimen*, it seems appropriate to understand (and render) λύπη in a more general way. Its opposition to τέρψις and its relation to the activity of the soul seems to advocate a possible link between the use of λύπη in *On Regimen* and in Plato and Aristotle: λύπη can express the pain in a very general way and it is not necessarily restricted to the bodily pain only.

Similarity with the way λύπη is treated by the philosophers is documented in other medical treatises, too, particularly in the relation between λύπη and psychic or emotional aspects of human suffering. In *On Humours*,[401] for example, λῦπαι, are included in the list of

[399] *Vict.* 4.86 (6.640L = 218.9-13 Joly-Byl = 421 Jones).

[400] For the problem of soul in *On Regimen*, see Bartoš (2015) 187-207.

[401] This treatise has a peculiar form expressed aptly by O. Overwien: "Diese stellt vielmehr eine Sammlung von Wörtern, einzelnen Sätzen und auch Satzperioden dar, deren Verbindung entweder nicht vorhanden ist oder sich zumindest nicht auf den ersten Blick erschließt." Overwien (2014) 102. Thus, there is a question of what weight we should put on the notions in this treatise since any conceptual structure and fixed terminology seems to be missing.

"moral characteristics" (τὰ ἠθεά), together with "passionate outbursts and strong desires" (δυσοργησίαι, ἐπιθυμίαι).[402] Thus, it seems appropriate to render it as grief, rather than as pain, especially since we are told that grieving afflicts the mind (τὰ λυπήματα γνώμης).[403] The author of this treatise is aware that even though grief (λύπη) and similar phenomena, such as fear, shame, pleasure, or passion (φόβοι, αἰσχύνη, λύπη, ἡδονὴ, ὀργή) afflict the mind, they have some bodily manifestations, too, such as sweat and palpitation of the heart (ἱδρῶτες, καρδίης παλμός).[404] It is possible that λύπη in this last passage is meant in a broader sense than just grief, and expresses (emotional, psychic) pain; it is, however, difficult to decide it with any certainty. Be it as it may, two points might be relevant for discussion with philosophical texts of that time: 1) pain stands here next to pleasure (ἡδονή) which is typical for Plato and Aristotle, 2) emotions have somatic effects.

Similar motives can be found in the treatise *On Sacred disease*. In this text, the brain (ἐγκέφαλος) plays a crucial role, since the author attempts to explain epilepsy in the context of the physiology of the human body and the influence of the environment (particularly air) on it. The brain is important here because after entering the body, air goes through the brain and affects the rest of the body according to the way it is 'processed' by the brain: if the air sediments in the brain, excess of phlegm arises there which, when dissolved and entered into veins, causes epileptic fits.[405] Due to the importance brain has for the treatise as a whole, in chapter 15, we learn more about its nature and workings: "Men ought to know that from the brain and from the brain only, arise our pleasures (ἡδοναί), joys (εὐφροσύναι), laughter (φέλωτες) and jests (παιδιαί), as well as our sorrows (λῦπαι), pains (ἀνίαι), griefs (δυσφροσύναι) and tears (κλαυθμοί). Through it, in particular, we think, see, hear, and distinguish ugly from the beautiful, the bad from the good, and the pleasant from the unpleasant" (τούτῳ φρονεῦμεν μάλιστα καὶ νοεῦμεν καὶ βλέπομεν καὶ ἀκούομεν καὶ γινώσκομεν τά τε αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀηδέα).[406] In this passage, we find four positive and four negative phenomena arising in the brain. The two lists are symmetrical, so we get four pairs of opposites: ἡδοναί – λῦπαι, εὐφροσύναι - ἀνίαι, παιδιαί

[402] *Hum.* 9 (5.488-490 L = 168.5-6 Overwien).

[403] *Hum.* 9.6 (5.490 L = 168.6 Overwien).

[404] *Hum.* 9 (5.490 L = 168.11 Overwien). The connection between anger and palpitation (or boiling of blood) of the heart is known to Aristotle, too (*DA* 1.1 403a24-403b1). For λύπη as grief, see also *Acut. B.* 16 (2.476 L = 87.12 Joly).

[405] See particularly chapters 3-7.

[406] *Morb. Sacr.* 14 (6.386 L = 25.12-26-4 Jouanna). Transl. Jones (1931) 175.

– δυσφροσύναι, φέλωτες – κλαυθμοί. The two first pairs are important for our topic. Both ἡδονή and εὐφροσύνη mean enjoyment and pleasure and despite possible slight semantic differences (εὐφροσύνη can mean merriment or festivity, too) they seem to be synonymous. Similarly, both λύπη and ἀνία mean grief, sorrow and distress. There is no strong reason to translate either of them as pain in this passage and Jouanna's rendering seems to be more suitable here: chagrins et contrariétés.[407] In the rest of the passage, we find ἡδονή (in the form of ἡδέα) again, however, its opposite is ἀηδέα, not λύπη. I take it that λύπη and ἀνία belong to the subclass of ἀηδέα or "unpleasant things". Bodily pain is certainly ἀηδέα, too, however, in the context of the passage, it seems that λύπη is used in a more general way and that its emotional aspects are emphasised. The bodily aspect of pain is not excluded but cannot be proved from the context.

The emotional aspect of λύπη is underlined in the *Precepts*, too, when we are told the sympathy (ξυμπάθησις) with someone who is grieving (ὑπὸ λύπης) causes distress (ὀχλέει);[408] connection between imbecility (μανίη) and λύπη in *On Regimen* was already mentioned.[409] Word λύπη in the sense of suffering or pain of the soul is mentioned in several passages in other medical texts and we are told that it follows laud talking (καταύδησις),[410] sounds (ἀκοαί),[411] and odours (ὀσμαί).[412] There are also two passages from the *Epidemics* 3 in which λύπη (rendered as grief) is listed as one of the symptoms of women who suffer from unspecified mental disease.[413] From this context and from the fact one of the women is said to have "gloomy temperament" (δυσήνιος) it seems that λύπη has here rather emotional than bodily aspects; it is however difficult to decide it with certainty.

Another passage from the *Winds* is relevant for understanding the link between λύπη and emotions: we are told in the sentence characterising the physician's job that "medical man sees terrible sights, touches unpleasant things, and the misfortunes of others bring harvest of sorrows that are peculiarly his (ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίῃσί τε ξυμφορῇσιν ἰδίας καρποῦται λύπας); but the sick by means of the art rid themselves of the worst of evils, disease, suffering, pain and death

[407] Jouanna (2003) 25.

[408] *Praec.* 14 (9.272 L = 35.7 Heiberg). See Aristotle's discussion of sharing pain among friends, below pp. 162-166.

[409] *Vict*. 1.35 (6.518 L = 154.8-11 Joly-Byl).

[410] *Praec.* 14 (9.272 L = 35.8 Heiberg).

[411] *Epid.* 6.8.7 (5.346.2 = 265.12 Smith).

[412] *Epid.* 6.8.7. (5.344.19 L = 265.10 Smith).

[413] *Epid.* 3.3.17(11) (3.134 L = 105.15-106.1 Jouanna), *Epid.* 3.3.17(15) (3.142 L = 110.2-4 Jouanna).

(νούσων, πόνων, λύπης, θανάτου)".[414] In the first part of the sentence, λύπη seems to be rightly rendered as sorrow, since it is an outcome of the physician's encounters with the suffering of his patients. At the end of the sentence, however, λύπη stands next to πόνος and one can wonder whether the author understands πόνος and λύπη as two kinds of pain, or, as the translation suggests, πόνος in the broader sense, as suffering, and λύπη in the more restricted sense, as pain. It can also be the case that λύπη expresses here the psychic aspects of disease and pain (πόνος). There is only one other instance of λύπη in the *Winds* where λύπη figures in the definition of disease: "everything is called a disease which makes a man suffer (ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν λυπέῃ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτο καλέεται νοῦσος)".[415] Since hunger is named as an example of disease, it seems that λύπη can be understood quite broadly.[416]

I hope that this survey showed that λύπη occurs in the treatises collected to 'Hippocratic' corpus' both in the sense of grief, or pain of the soul, and in the sense of suffering, however, its relation to psychic and emotional aspects of suffering is stronger than in other pain words.[417] It is significant that λύπη plays quite an important role in the medical treatises which can be labelled as 'more theoretical', since beside of practical interest in physiology or therapy, we find in them some theory of the constitution of the human body (*Ancient Medicine*), the relation between λύπη and the soul (*On Regimen*) or thinking (*On Sacred Disease*) or emotions (*Winds*). It is thus possible that in some medical treatises, namely in those with some philosophical content and impact, we witness the beginning of conceptualisation of λύπη which will be later developed in Plato and Aristotle. It is also worth mentioning that λύπη occurs in two definitions of medicine, where this word designate pain or suffering in general. Also, the relation to ἡδονή is significant, since the opposition between ἡδονή and λύπη is one of the characteristics of the way the philosophers write about pain. The connection between λύπη and ἡδονή, the emotional aspect of λύπη and the use of this word for designating pain or suffering in general are significant, since they foreshadow the way pain is treated in Plato and Aristotle. We are not sure about which particular treatises from the *CH* (if any) were read by Plato and Aristotle, but it seems that the ones in which dietetic medicine is discussed could be good candidates, for example *On Regimen* and *On Ancient Medicine.*[418] The way in which λύπη is used in these treatises supports this claim.

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[414] *Flat.* 1 (6.90 L = 102.1-103.4 Jouann), transl. Jones (1923b) 227.

[415] *Flat.* 1 (6.92 L. = 104.5 Jouanna). Transl. Jones (1923b) 227.

[416] Ibid.

[417] Similar outcomes were reached by Linka and Kaše (2021).

[418] For a discussion which treatises could be read by (Plato and) Aristotle, see Eijk (2021) 111-112, 124.

2.3 Pain and Exercise

Already in the archaic literature, one of our pain words, πόνος, is connected to toil, labour, fatigue and, eventually, pain. In Hesiod's *Theogony,* "painful Toil" (Πόνος ἀλγινόεις) is named as one of the offsprings of the Night[419] and in *Works and Days*, we are told that before Pandora's arrival, "the tribes of men used to live upon the earth entirely apart from evils, and without grievous toil (ἄτερ χαλεποῖο πόνοιο) and distressful diseases, which give death to men."[420] In the later tradition, the semantic field of πόνος broadens even more as can be documented in some treatises collected in the 'Hippocratic' corpus' and other medical texts from 5th and 4th century BC. In these treatises, πόνος can mean toil, labour, fatigue, exertion, pain, exercise or activity. A similar tendency is documented in Plato's, Aristotle's and Aristotelian writings as well.

In this section, I intend to focus on the notion of πόνος in the Greek classical medical texts where it does not mean primarily pain, and especially in the treatise *On Regimen* where this word is used for denoting various activities of body and soul. In this manner, the author of *On Regimen*, or the tradition of thinking he is a part of, probably inspires some important philosophical theories of Plato and Aristotle in relation to the role of pain and toil in human life, namely that not all πόνος is pathological or bad and that it can be used for beneficial ends. This tendency is clearly seen in the philosophical tradition discussed below where some more theoretical aspects of πόνος (such as its relation to motion and fatigue) are discussed. I will first summarise how πόνος in the sense of toil or exercise is conceived of in some treatises of the *CH*, then I will focus on the treatise *On Regimen*.

In the *Epidemics*, besides the use of πόνος in the meaning of bodily pain, we can find several passages where this word is used in the sense of toil or exercise. These passages share the idea that pain or disease can arise from exercise or toil, [421] and that some amount of exercise

[419] Hesiod, *Th.* 226-227.

[420] πρὶν μὲν γὰρ ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων νόφσιν ἄτερ τε κακῶν καὶ ἄτερ χαλεποῖο πόνοιο νούσφιν τ' ἀργαλέων ἄι τ ἀνδράσι κῆρας ἔδωκαν. *Op.* 91-93. Cf. *Th.* 226, 629, 881, *Op.* 91, 113, 432. See also Homer, *Il.* 2.291; 4.456; 5.517; 6.78; 6.355. *Od.* 2.334; 8.529; 11.54; 12.117; 13.424. For a wider cultural context of πόνος in the Greek non-medical literature, see Loraux (1990) 44-46. For πόνος in Hesiod, see ibid. pp. 51-52.

[421] *Epid.* 3.2.8 (3.56 L = 74.1-3 Jouanna), 3.3.17(3) (3.112 L = 96.1-4 = Jouanna), *Epid.* 6.7.1 (5.332.6 L = 255.10 Smith), *Epid.* 7.8.72 (5.434 L = 94.12 Jouanna), *Epid.* 7.1.99 (5.452 L = 108.2 Jouanna).

is needed for maintaining health.[422] These passages occur in books 3, 6 and 7, i.e., in every group of the books included in the *Epidemics*, and the idea that exercise (γυμνάσια, ταλαιπωρία) has some relevance for maintaining health is mentioned elsewhere, too.[423] Yet, there is no elaborate theory of the relationship between exercise and health, and even though regimen (δίαιτα) is mentioned in several passages, exercise doesn't play any prominent role there.[424] For the author(s) or redactor(s) of the *Epidemics* 4 for example, "regimen consists in repletion and evacuation of foods and drinks" (Δίαιτα γίνεται πλησμονῆ, κενώσει, βρωμάτων, ποτμάτων.).[425] Nevertheless, these passages are an important source of evidence that in the *CH*, πόνος is used not only in the sense of pain or suffering but also in the sense of toil and exercise. However, it is only in dietetic treatises, and especially in *On Regimen,* where this use of πόνος prevails.[426]

[422] *Epid.* 6.5.5 (5.316.7-8 L = 242.15 Smith), 6.6.6.1 (5.322.7 L = 247.11 Smith) Smith's emendation, *Epid.* 6.6.6.2 (324.1 L = 247.17 Smith), 6.8.23 (5.352.8 L = 270.19 Smith).

[423] For ταλαιπωρία, see *Epid.* 5.1.70 (5.244.17 L = 188.1 Smith). Cf. *Epid.* 7.1.67b (5.430 L = 91.7 Jouanna); for γυμνάσια see *Epid.* 1.1.1 (2.602 L = 3.4 Jouanna), *Epid.* 6.1.5 (5.268.7 L = 208.4-5 Smith), *Epid.* 7.1.47 (5.414 L = 81.3 Jouanna).

[424] *Epid.* 2.3.2 (5.104.11 L = 48.7 Smith), 2.3.17 (5.116.14 L = 58.15 Smith), *Epid.* 3.3.16 (3.100-102 L = 113.5-114.3 Jouanna = Jones 257), 3.3.17(13) (3.138 L = 107.17 Jouanna), *Epid.* 6.4.16 (5.310.11 L = 238.11 Smith), 6.8.7 (5.344.17 L = 264.7 Smith), 6.8.25 (5.352.14 L = 272.1 Smith), *Epid.* 7.1.99 (5.462 L = 115.6 Jouanna).

[425] 6.8.7 (5.344.17 L = 264.7 Smith). For the relation between *On Regimen* and *Epidemics* 6, see Joly-Byl (2003) 38-41.

[426] As for the passages where πόνος is used in the sense of labour, toil, exercise, exertion, fatigue etc. in other treatises than *Epidemics* and the dietetic treatises mentioned below, here is the complete list: *Aff.* 1 (6.208.11 L = 6.15 Potter), 19 (6.228.10 L = 32.21 Potter), 22 (6.232.23 L = 40.8 Potter), 43 (6.252.21 L = 66.25 Potter), 52.21 (6.262.16 L = 80.9 Potter); *Aph.* 2.6 (4.470.17-18 L = 110.1-3 Jones), 2.16.1 (4.474.7 L = 112.8 Jones), *de Arte* 5 (6.8 L = 229.2 Jouanna), 11.6 (6.20 L = 237.10 Jouanna); *Flat.* 1 (6.92 L = 104.8-10 Jouanna), *Flat.* 7 (6.98 L = 111.4 Jouanna); *Gland.* 3 (8.558 L = 68.5 Craik), 4 (8.558 L = 68.16-17 Craik), 16 (8.604 L = 81.13-15 Craik); *Hum*. 5 (5.484 L = 164.2 Overwien); 9 (5.488 L = 168.4 Overwien); *Morb.* 1. 2 (6.142 L = 6.7 Wittern), 11 (6.158 L = 28.5 Wittern), 14 (6.162 L = 32.2 Wittern), 20 (6.176 L = 52.9 Wittern), 20 (6.1180 L = 58.4 Wittern), 21 (6.182 L = 62. 5 Wittern), 22 (6.184 L = 64.9 Wittern), 23 (6.188 L = 70.8 Wittern), 22 (6.184 L = 64.19 Wittern), *Morb.* 2. 5.10 (7.14 L = 136.17 Jouanna), 11 (7.18 L = 141.14 Jouanna), 62.7 (7.96 L = 201.19 Jouanna), 70 (7.106 L = 209.15 Jouanna); *Praec.* 12 (9.268 L = 34.8 Heiberg). Passages where it is not decidedly clear whether πόνος is used in the sense of pain or toil are *Aff.* 21 (6.230.25 L = 38.2 Potter)*; Hum*. 7 (5.488 L = 166.13 Overwien); *Coac.* 244 (5.636.17 L = Potter 162.5); *Prorrh.* 1.55 (5.524.5 L = 181.14 Potter).

Before plunging into *On Regimen*, I will shortly summarise the use of πόνος in other dietetic treatises.[427]

In the *Airs, Waters, Places*, word πόνος is used only once, in the meaning of hard work.[428] For expressing work, labour, exertion, fatigue etc., the author of this work uses the word ταλαιπωρία. In this treatise, ταλαιπωρία can be used very generally, usually indicating the active life-style of Europeans and people ruling themselves,[429] in contrast to the passive or idle (ἀταλαίπωρος) life-style of Asians and people subjected to the rule of the king.[430] When it is used more specifically, it means endurance[431] or fatigue and suffering.[432] Also, ταλαιπωρία does not indicate only an activity of the body, but of the soul, too.[433] In this treatise, thus ταλαιπωρία plays a role the πόνος plays in, for example, the *Epidemics* passages mentioned in the previous paragraph.

In the *Regimen in acute diseases*,[434] there are 25 instances of πόνος and its cognates, but only once this word is used in the sense of exercise,[435] in other instances it denotes pain or suffering. For expressing exercise, there are also four instances of γυμνάσια used there.[436] In this treatise, exercise (be it expressed by whatever word) is not at the centre of the dietetic theory. In relation to health, the author emphasises the relevance of change in general, rather than focusing on the relation between nutrition and exercise.[437]

In the treatise *On the Nature of Man*,[438] πόνος is used only once in the sense of hard work and once in the description of hardworking people.[439] For activity in the broad sense, i.e.,

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[427] From my summary, I exclude *On Ancient Medicine*, since there is no instance of πόνος in the sense of exercise there. Another word for exercise (γυμνάσια) is mentioned only once there in the sense of gymnastic exercises. *Med. Vet.*4 (1.580 L = 123.14 Jouanna).

[428] *Aër.* 23 (2.84 L = 243 Jouanna = 133 Jones). Jones translates this word as exertion, Jouanna as effort. In the context of these passages, the hard work of Europeans is put in contrast with the idleness of Asians.

[429] *Aër.* 16 (2.64 L = 229.13-16 Jouanna).

[430] *Aër.* 24 (2.92 L = 249.3-7 Jouanna). Inactivity or idleness (ῥᾳθυμίη) plays an important role in the dietetic theory of *On Regimen*, too. See *Vict.* 1.36 (2.522 L = 156.24 Jouanna), 2.60 (2.574 L = 182.26 Jouanna).

[431] *Aër.* 24 (2.86 L = 245.3 Jouanna), 24 (2.88 L = 246.1-4 Jouanna).

[432] *Aër.* 16 (2.64 L = 229.3-6 Jouanna).

[433] *Aër.* 23 (2.84 L = 243.8-10 Jouanna), 19.23-24 (2.72 L = 234.10-11 Jouanna).

[434] *Acut.* A and *Acut.* B/sp./appendix.

[435] *Acut*. A. 12 (2.328 L = 57.6 Joly).

[436] *Acut*. B. 29 (2.516 L = 95.17-18 Joly); B. 23 (2.506 L = 93.1 Joly); B. 10 (2.450 L = 82.9 Joly).

[437] *Acut.* A. 8 (2.280 L = 47.14-21 Joly). *Acut.* B. 18 (2.478 L = 87.21-23 Joly).

[438] I follow Jouanna in considering that *Nat. Hom.* and *Salub.* are two parts of one treatise. Jouanna (2003) 22-38.

[439] *Nat. Hom.* 12 (6.62 L = 198.5-9 Jouanna).

including both physical work and exercise, the author uses the word ταλαιπωρία,[440] and for more specific bodily exercise the word γυμνάσια.[441] The author of this treatise doesn't focus on the role of exercise for regimen. It is true that the exercise and nourishment are mentioned as important features of the regimen,[442] however, in the list of the signs important for the adequate regimen, exercise is missing.[443]

In Diocles of Carystus, there are a few instances where πόνος is used in the sense of bodily effort (τοῖς σώμασι πονεῖν) or exercise (φιλοπονεῖν),[444] however, in the fragment 182 from Oribasius, which is devoted to dietetics, the word for exercise is γυμνάζεσθαι or γυμνασίου.[445] From this fragment, it seems clear that bodily activities, such as taking a walk (προπεριπατεῖν)[446] or exercising in the gymnasium[447] or massages[448] are beneficial for health, they are not, however, in contrast to the treatise *On Regimen* analysed below, characterised as πόνος. Due to the scarcity of textual sources, it seems very problematic to evaluate whether πόνος, in the sense of exercise, effort or activity, played any role in Diocles' medical thought so that we could compare it to the treatise *On Regimen*. In any case, Diocles' fragments can at least testify that he also used the word πόνος in both senses – pain and activity. In the use of γυμνάζεσθαι rather than πόνος for exercise, he is in line with the *Nature of Man* and *Regimen in acute diseases*. This survey showed that in the analysed dietetic treatises the idea that exercise or toil have some relevance for health is present, however, their authors choose other words

[440] There are 11 instances of ταλαιπωρία in this treatise: *Nat. Hom.* 9 (52 L = 188.5 Jouanna), 9 (52 L = 188.6 Jouanna), 9 (54 L = 188.19-20 Jouanna), 12 (6.62 L = 198.5-6 Jouanna), 19 (*Salub*. 4; 6.76 L = 210.8 Jouanna), 19 (*Salub.* 4; 6.78 L = 210.15 Jouanna), 22 (*Salub.* 7; 6.82 L = 216.8 Jouanna), 22 (*Salub.* 7; 6.84 L = 218.5 Jouanna), 22 (*Salub.* 7; 6.84 L = 218.9 Jouanna), 22 (*Salub.* 7; 6.84 L = 218.13 Jouanna), 22 (*Salub.* 7; 6.84 L = 218.16 Jouanna).

[441] This word is used only twice: *Nat. Hom*. 22 (*Salub.* 7; 6.82 L = 216.9 Jouanna), 22 (*Salub.* 7; 6.84 L = 218.15 Jouanna).

[442] *Nat. Hom.* 9 (6.54 L = 189.15-20 Jouanna).

[443] These signs are age (ἡλικία), constitution (εἶδος) season of the year (ὥρα τοῦ ἔτεος), the fashion of the disease (τῆς νούσου ὁ τρόπος). *Nat. Hom.* 9 (6.54 L = 190.5-12 Jouanna).

[444] Diocles of Carystus, fr. 182.228-229 (*Oribasius, Collectiones medicae* [libri incerti], c. 40. Eijk [2000] 310); fr. 183a120, 126 (Paulus Aegineta, *Epitomae medicae* 1.100.1-6. Eijk [2000] 320).

[445] Diocles of Carystus, fr. 182.61, 72, 90, 169, 181 Diocles of Carystus, fr. 182.228-229 (*Oribasius, Collectiones medicae* [libri incerti], c. 40. Eijk [2000], 300-306).

[446] Diocles of Carystus, fr. 182.43, 99 (Eijk [2000] 298, 302).

[447] Diocles of Carystus, fr. 182.62, 100 (Eijk [2000] 300, 302).

[448] Diocles of Carystus, fr. 182.71-76. According to Diocles, it is more beneficial to massage oneself, since it is a kind of exercise, too.

than πόνος for expressing it. It is thus easier to distinguish lexically between exercise and pain which can accompany the exercise. Let us now look at how this problem is tackled in *On Regimen.*

On Regimen occupies an exceptional position among the other dietetic treatises. The author himself claims that he has "discovered regimen, with gods' help, as far as it is possible for a mere man to discover it."[449] From the perspective of the historian of medicine, his discovery should be rather interpreted as "the climax or crowning achievement of dietetics as a whole,"[450] since he develops and perfects theories of his predecessors' writing on regimen.[451] However, this treatise is exceptional in that its author is not only "providing useful instructions for dietetic therapy and prevention," but also "a theoretically elaborated account of human nature grounded on the most influential cosmological and philosophical conceptions of the day."[452]

In *On Regimen*, πόνος is almost exclusively used in this sense of exercise as it will be explained below, and only on five occasions the author uses this word for denoting pain.[453] The way the author uses other-pain words was discussed above. Πόνος plays a significant role in the dietetic theory of this treatise. According to the author of *On Regimen*, exercise, and food are the main constituents of dietetics and, thus, of health:

> And it is necessary, as it appears, to discern the power (δύναμιν) of the various exercises (πόνων), both natural exercises and violent (τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν διὰ βίης), to know which of them tends to increase flesh and which to lessen it; and not only this, but also to proportion exercise to bulk of food (τὰς ξυμμετρίας τῶν πόνων πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σιτίων), to the constitution of the patient, to the age of the individual, to the season of the year, to the changes of the winds, to the situation of the constitution of the year. A man must observe the risings and settings of stars, that he may know how to watch for change and excess (τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ὑπερβολὰς) in food, drink,

[449] *Vict.* 4. 93 (6.662 L = 230.12 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) 447.

[450] Bartoš (2015) 70.

[451] Bartoš (2015) 16-47.

[452] Bartoš (2015) 70.

[453] *Vict.* 3.78 (6.622 L = 210.8-9 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) 403: "Relief follows the vomiting, and no pain (πόνος) is felt in the body though the complexion is pale. In the course of time, however, pain (πόνοι) and disease occur." *Vict.* 3.79 (6.624 L = 210.24-25 Joly-By), transl. Jones (1931): "The following symptoms are experienced by some patients. Their food passes watery and undigested; there is no disease like lientery to cause the trouble, and no pain (πόνον) is felt." *Vict.* 3.81 (6.628 L = 212.23-24 Jol), transl. Jones (1931): "In some cases the stools are watery and of waste matter; the general health is good, exercise is taken (γυμναζομένοισι) and no pain (πόνον) is felt."

> wind and the whole universe (καὶ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου,), from which disease exist among men. But even when all this is discerned, the discovery is not complete. If indeed in addition to these things it were possible to discover for the constitution of each individual a due proportion of food to exercise (σίτου μέτρον καὶ πόνων ἀριθμὸς σύμμετρος), with no inaccuracy either of excess or of defect (μήτε ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον μήτε ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλασσον), an exact discovery of health for men would have been made.[454]

An adequate proportion and balance between exercises (πόνοι) and food (σίτος) constitutes health.[455] Diseases exist because of the changes and excesses in "food, drink, wind and the whole universe" and these changes can be overbalanced by an adequate diet. For this adequate diet, a due proportion (αἱ ξυμμετρίαι) between exercise and food is necessary. Exercise, however, is not only a gymnastic exercise;[456] this term must be understood more broadly and include a variety of activities that are subcategorised as natural or violent (τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν διὰ βίης): "Natural exercises are those of sight, hearing, voice and thought (μερίμνη)," i.e., the activities of sense-perception, voice, and thinking.[457] Other activities have something violent (or artificial)[458] in itself – probably because they require more activity of the muscles–, even though they are natural in the sense of being not contra nature (παρὰ φύσιν), too (for example walking, running, swinging the arms, wrestling and rubbing).[459] In general, exercise

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[454] *Vict*. 1.2 (6.470 L = 124.2-20 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) modified.

[455] See also *Vict*. 2.66 (6.588 L = 190.25-7 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) 365: "Now if it were possible to discover the amount of the excess of exercise and cure it by an appropriate amount of food, all would be well thus.". Transl. modified. Cf. "*Vict.* 3.69 (6.606 L = 200.30-32 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) 383: "For it is from the overpowering of one of the other (*sc. exercise and food*) that diseases arise, while form their being evenly balanced comes good health." Cf. *Epid*. 6.4.23 (314 L = 240 Smith).

[456] So Loraux is not right in claiming that for the author of *On Regimen*, πόνοι are just physical exercises in the sense of γυμνάσια. Loraux, N., (1990) 50. I agree with her, however, concerning the claim that "exercise must not be too tiring, or it is likely to become sheer physical suffering—once again *ponos*." Ibid.

[457] *Vict*. 2.61 (6.574 L = 184.8-9 Joly), transl. Jones (1931) 349.

[458] See the note ad. loc. of the translator: "The word πόνος cannot always be represented by the same English equivalent. It may mean 'toil' generally, voluntary toil (or 'exercise'), or even the 'pain' caused by toil (usually κόπος). The division of πόνοι into natural and violent corresponds to no modern division, as is proved by the enumeration of 'natural' exercises, while by 'violent' exercise we mean 'excessive' exercise, but οἱ διὰ βίης πόνοι means rather exercises that are artificial, the result of conscious and forced effort. Apparently, all muscular exercises are 'violent'". Jones (1931) 348-349 n. 1.

[459] Walking: *Vict*. 2.62 (6.576 L = 184.17-18 Joly-Byl); running: *Vict*. 2.63 (6.578-580 L = 186.6-19 Joly-Byl), swinging the arms (παρασείσματα): *Vict*. 2.64 (6.580 L = 186.20-24 Joly); wrestling (πάλη) and rubbing (τρῖψις): *Vict*. 2.65 (6.580-582 L = 184.24-30 Joly-Byl). Holding breath (πνεύματος δὲ κατάσχεσις) is also mentioned in

"dries and strengthens the body."[460] This is true for natural exercises, too, since "exercises of the voice, whether speech, reading or singing, all these move the soul. And as it moves it grows warm and dry and consumes the moisture."[461] Exercises can be thus understood quite broadly as various activities of sense-perception, voice, thought, locomotion, etc. The right amount and an appropriate proportion of exercise in relation to food are needed for maintaining health which consists in melting the flesh and the moisture which the body gains from the food.

Since the right amount and type of exercise is necessary for maintaining health and for therapy, the author explores the relationship between exercise and pain. In the last chapter of the second book, we read about fatigue pains (κόποι) and their relation to exercises. [462] It seems that in the context of these passages, the author has in mind exercises in a more specific sense (gymnastic exercises, athletic training, or physical work), not the ones defined above as natural. Fatigue pains arise in untrained men (ἀγύμναστοι), "since no part of their body has been injured

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this chapter. However, it is not clear whether and in what sense it is an exercise, too. *Vict*. 2.65(6.580-582 L = 188.1-2 Joly-Byl).

[460] *Vict*. 2.60 (6.574 L = 182.28 Joly-Byl). Cf *Epid.* 6.5.5 (5.316.7-8 L = 242.15 Smith): "Labor is food for the flesh and joints." (Transl. Smith ibid.) Cf. *Morb.* 4.45 (7.568 L = 99.23-26 Joly = 133 Potter): "Now the body of people exerting themselves (ταλαιπωρεόντων) also becomes warm, and then moisture in them melts and becomes thin, and, becoming useless, it flows down into the cavity ad the bladder, and these things are excreted from the body." There are some parallels between dietetic theories in *On Regimen* and *Diseases* 4, however, the author of the latter treatise doesn't put such emphasis on the role of work or exercise and never uses πόνος in the sense of exercise. See e.g., *Morb.* 4.45 (7.572 L = 100.2-3 Joly), 45.28-30 (7.572 L = 100.8-9 Joly), 45 (7.582 L = 107.13 Joly).

[461] *Vict*. 2.61 (6.574-576 L = 184.14-16 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) 349-351.

[462] There seems to be a terminological inconsistency in the use of πόνος in the second and third book of *On Regimen.* While in the second book, exercise is expressed by πόνος and fatigue pain by κόπος, in the third book, the author often uses γυμνάσια for exercises, whereas πόνος is used for pains caused by the excess of exercise. There are 35 instances of γυμνάσιον (and its cognates) in the whole *On Regimen* and 30 of them are in the third book. All the instances of πόνος in the sense of pain are in the third book: *Vict. Vict.*3.78 (6.622 L = 210.8-9 Joly-Byl), *Vict.* 3.79 (6.624 L = 210.24-25 Joly-Byl), *Vict.* 3.81 (6.628 L = 212.23-24 Joly-Byl). In this last passage, πόνος is used both for pain (twice) and for exercise (once). It seems that this terminological fluidity is possible since in the first part of the passage, the author uses for exercising another word (γυμναζεῖν). It seems that the pain (πόνος) caused by excess exercises (γυμνάσια) in the third book has the same qualities as the fatigue pain (κόπος) caused by excess exercise (πόνος) in the second book. Thus, even though the terminology differs, the idea behind it remains the same. In one passage of book 2, it seems that πόνος and γυμνάσια are used interchangeably. *Vict*. 2.66 (6.586 L = 68 Joly). In general, however, it seems that γυμνάσια are a subgroup of πόνος, so every γυμνάσια (exercise) is πόνος (exertion, exercise, activity), but not every πόνος is γυμνάσια.

(διαπεπόνηται) to any exercise".[463] But even in the "trained bodies" (τὰ δὲ γεγυμνασμένα τῶν σωμάτων), fatigue pains arise when the exercises are unusual (ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνεθίστων πόνων), or excessive (ὑπερβολῇ χρησάμενα).[464] Fatigue pains are caused by the fact that the body of the untrained people is overly moist (ὑγρὴν τὴν σάρκα ἔχοντες) due to their inaction; after the exercise, however, their body is warmed (θερμαινομένου τοῦ σώματος) and their flesh melt (σύντηξιν πολλὴν ἀφιᾶσιν). Melted moisture is afterward evacuated in sweat or breath, but since the evacuation is "contrary to custom" (παρὰ τὸ ἔθος), pain arises at the place from where the moisture was evacuated and at the place where the moisture moved to.[465] Similar things happen to people who are not untrained but who exercise excessively or in an uncustomed manner.[466] Yet, even though exercise can lead to fatigue pains, πόνος, in the sense of activity, can also lead to their therapy. When moisture is accumulated in the body it must be dissolved (διαλυεῖν) by baths (πυρία, λουτρόν),[467] gentle walks (περιπάτοισι μὴ βιαίοισιν), applying oil gently and for a long time (ἀλείφεσθαι τῷ ἐλαίῳ ἡσυχῇ πολύν χρόνον),[468] accustomed gymnastic exercises (γυμνάσια συνήθες), rubbing (τρίψις)[469] and vomiting (ἐξεμεῖν)[470].

It remains unclear how wide the concept of pain caused by excessive exercise is and whether it applies to other activities than gymnastic and athletic exercises and bodily work. Can pain arise from natural exercises, such as seeing or thinking, too? Afterall, after we watch something too long, our eyes get tired and burn and we can lose our voice after much shouting and singing. In the case of thinking, it is maybe also possible to 'overthink', get tired, and to feel (at least emotional) pain. To my knowledge, this problem is not explicitly addressed in *On Regimen.* However, there are two passages there which, at least implicitly, speak about some mental distress caused by unaccustomed thinking or sense-perception; in both cases, the power

[463] *Vict*. 2.66 (6.582 L = 188.12-14 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) 359.

[464] *Vict*. 2.66 (6.582 L = 188.14-18 Joly-Byl).

[465] *Vict*. 2.66 (6.582-584 L = 188.18-19 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) 351-361. Cf. *Morb.* 4. 45 (7.572 L = 100.8-9 Joly), transl. Potter (2012) 135: "From the strain (πονέειν) of previous exertions or exercises (ταλαιπωρίην ἢ γυμνασίην), different moistures become deficient in different persons."

[466] *Vict*. 2.66 (6.584-586 L = 190.5-96 Joly-Byl), *Vict*. 2.66 (6.586 L = 190.14-17 Joly-Byl).

[467] It is not clear what is the status of baths (λουτρόν), ointment (λίπος), vomiting (ἔμετος), sleep (ὕπνος) and sexual intercourse (λαγείη). They are treated before the introduction of activities (ch. 57-60) and they play some therapeutic role in an unbalanced regimen (*Vict*. 2.66 [6.584 L = 188.31-190.6 Joly-Byl]; *Vict*. 2.66 [6.586 L = 190.5-9 Joly-Byl). It seems that at least sexual intercourse should be understood as πόνος.

[468] *Vict*. 2.66 (6.584 L = 188.31-190.6 Joly-Byl).

[469] *Vict*. 2.66 (6.586 L = 190.5-9 Joly-Byl).

[470] *Vict*. 2.66 (6.586 L = 190.5-9 Joly-Byl).

(δύναμις) of fire is diminished by a surplus of water. When the imbalance between these two elements is only slight, then thinking (which is dependent on the circular movement of the soul) is too slow that it cannot adequately catch impressions of sight and hearing, since they are too fast.[471] When the domination of water is more substantial, people who are suffering from it are called "senseless" or "grossly stupid" (ἄφρονας, ἐμβροντήτατους) and their stupidness (μανίη) is caused by the slowness (βραδύτερον) of the movement of the soul.[472] Yet, in these cases, distress or pain of the soul is not caused by an excess of the activity, but, on the contrary, by its deficiency. Relation between sense-perception and thinking to pain is more treated outside the medical circles, especially by Aristotle and Theophrastus.[473]

Let us now get back to the exercise in the usual sense of the word (muscular, gymnastic exercise). The author emphasizes that fatigues pains are caused by unusual or excessive exercise and "moderate exercise is not followed by pain" (ἀπὸ μὲν συμμέτρου πόνου κόπος οὐ γίγνεται).[474] Fatigue pains are thus caused by excessive exercises and this fact could help us to understand why πόνος, even though used in the sense of activity or exercise, still retains some of its 'painful' features known from other texts. Moderate exercise is painless, yet we can easily imagine that for some patients and in some cases, the dietitian must order the exercise which is not moderate and is followed by pain, since the patient's body is in such a bad condition that moderate exercise is not enough for him. In that case, the exercise, thus something good working as a means for regaining health, is accompanied by pain. Even though we usually call on the physician precisely because we want him to get rid of pain, in some cases, the healing procedure is itself painful. We can imagine, for example, that after excessive eating we feel pain in the belly and other painful pathological conditions which would be today associated with high blood pressure and cholesterol. In that case, to cure these painful pathologies, we have to undergo exercise which will be at least at the beginning tiresome and painful. However, they are necessary in order to restore health. Thus, it seems that the model proposed by the author of *On Regimen* in which the patient is in such a good state that he needs only mild painless exercises and other painless πόνοι, such as baths or oiling, seems to be rather an ideal than the factual state of the average patient. If we eat too much or if we do not exercise regularly

[471] *Vict.* 1.35 (6.516 L = 152.28-34 Joly-Byl).

[472] *Vict.* 1.35 (6.518 L = 154.7-9 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) 287.

[473] For the idea that excessive thinking can lead to deterioration of health, see Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 7.12, 1153a20-21; for a connection between sense-perception and pain, see *De an.* 2.2, 413b20 and Theophrastus, *De sens.* 17, 2; 29, 1-3).

[474] *Vict*. 2.66 (6.586 L = 190.14-15 Joly-Byl) transl. Jones (1931) 363.

or even if we do but we are weak after a disease, the exercise is painful. Yet, it is beneficial, too, and the painful part is a necessary component leading to (re)establishing the painless balance.

However, even if we exclude painful exercises from dietetic therapy, there are many activities which can be described as tiresome, fatiguing, etc. For example, if I go jogging, even though I am accustomed to it, I 'feel my legs' afterward. I may not call this experience 'painful', yet, the boundary between something tiresome and something painful is not exactly sharp. Thus, I would argue, even in the painless exercises, we are undergoing something tiresome, fatiguing etc., in order to gain something good (health). This argument is certainly not so strong as the argument that in undergoing something painful, we gain something good, yet it goes in the same direction. Dietetic practice, it seems to me, counts with both scenarios, even though, in *On Regimen*, painful exercises leading to health are not explicitly discussed.

In this section, we have seen that the 'discovery' of regimen and its positive influence on maintaining and restoring health also complicates the relation between πόνος and pain. For the dieticians, too, pain is to be alleviated and cured. An ideal patient needs only painless and moderate exercises. However, it seems that for the non-ideal ones, exercises leading to restoring health are necessarily accompanied by fatigue or even pain. Also, when the right balance is strongly deflected to the side of excessive nourishment, exercise leading to the re-establishing of health will be painful. In any case, interpreting *On Regimen* allows us to see that pain relates to human life in a more complex way than as something that is just to be healed and that is not (only) pathological in all instances. In the activity leading to restoring or maintaining health, pain can be used as something beneficial and helpful. Rather than avoiding all pain – and all activity possible leading to it – one should find a balance between πόνος and nourishment and choose the activity which is appropriate to his state and capacities.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let us turn our attention to the three questions that have framed the research of this dissertation: What is pain? Are there different kinds of pain? What is the role of pain? Medical treatises from the Classical period do not offer a straightforward answer to the question 'what is pain?' There is no definition or account provided. There are various ways to explain this fact. One possible explanation is that conceptual thinking was not yet developed enough in the Classical period to tackle questions like 'what is X?' a question that was introduced only by Socrates (as presented by Plato). However, this conception of the development of Greek thinking is problematic, and it misses the target in the case of Greek medical treatises. The

majority of the authors of these treatises were not interested in theorizing about the nature of pain because such theorizing did not bring any relevant insights to their purposes of treating pain. What was important for them was to know where the pain was felt, what its intensity was, when it started, and what its possible cause was.[475] The medical treatises examined in this dissertation shed light on the problems associated with pain. While some treatises are more theoretical and discuss the constitution of the human body and the nature of the illness, they do not provide any definitions of pain. However, this should not be taken as a lack of conceptual thinking. Rather, pain has a particular role in these treatises, and it is more important to inquire about its causes and quality than its definition. Pain is viewed as a symptom of a pathology, and medical practitioners focus on understanding its nature in order to diagnose and treat the underlying condition. Thus, in the case of medical authors, the first and third research questions cannot be separated. To understand the nature of pain, it is necessary to comprehend the role that pain plays in medical practice. This perspective is the most common one through which medical practitioners approached pain.

In addition to the primary perspective on pain as a bodily symptom discussed in the previous section, I proposed a second perspective in this chapter which can be labelled toto as the 'conceptualisation and psychologization of pain'. It is evident that in some passages, pain words have a broader meaning than merely bodily pain. Emotional and psychological aspects of pain began to emerge, though these passages are sparse, and the understanding of pain in the sense of pain of the soul or pain affecting the whole person was still in its nascent stages. A better comprehension of our authors' soul conceptions would be necessary to understand the psychological aspect of pain. Unfortunately, we have few sources in this regard. Furthermore, in the materialistic worldview held by the medical authors, distinguishing between bodily and psychological pain was challenging. Nevertheless, the emergence of this conceptualization is significant, and we shall see that these aspects of pain, namely pain of the soul and the role of the soul in experiencing pain, assume a central position in the approach to pain adopted by Plato and Aristotle. Thus, some medical authors had already initiated this perspective on thinking about pain.

Finally, the third perspective that has been explored is bound to the ambiguity of the word πόνος and has more serious consequences than just lexical ones. If πόνος can mean both

[475] This is also true of pleasure: "It is remarkable to see that the concern of early naturalists is often to specify the conditions under which we feel pleasure, rather than to answer the Socratic question of what pleasure is." Cheng (2015) 121.

pain and exercise, the problem arises that in some circumstances pain or something painful can be beneficial for human beings. This fact is, of course, implied in any invasive medical intervention and in many pharmacological interventions. In order to cure their patients, physicians must inflict pain upon them. Similarly, in the realm of dietetics, the situation is to some degree similar: in order to maintain good health, individuals must take care of their bodies, and this means that certain activities, which are usually painless, such as bathing, massages, etc., are accompanied by varying degrees of pain. It should be noted, however, that not every exercise is painful, but many can be, especially if the person is not accustomed to them. In analysing the role of exercise and the qualities it should possess, dietetics is thus able to integrate pain connected to bodily activity in a way that promotes a healthy li.

Below, I will endeavour to demonstrate that the use of something painful for something beneficial is a theme present in the works of Plato and Aristotle. It is likely that they were inspired by the medical approaches that were analysed earlier. This assertion will be supported by textual evidence provided below. For now, however, let us illustrate this suggestion by two examples. As previously discussed, pain plays a critical role in diagnosing bodily pathologies. Without pain, we would be unaware of the existence of any pathology, and physicians would be unable to commence with diagnosis and treatment. Though unpleasant, pain facilitates the physician's ability to perform their job. While some illnesses can be identified using other symptoms, pain is present in most bodily pathologies. Ironically, even though we consult physicians to cure pain, they use it in the treatment process. Pain is used in the diagnosis stage and sometimes even in the treatment stage. As we shall see below, the emotional or psychic pain experienced by unvirtuous individuals serves a similar purpose, but at the soul level. In Aristotle's ethics, for instance, one of pain's functions is to evaluate our dispositions, that is, our virtues and vices. If we feel pain of the soul due to the lack of bodily pleasures such as food, drink, and sex, we are immoderate. If we experience extreme fear when facing only a mildly intimidating situation, we are cowards. Thus, pain of the soul, if rightly interpreted, can aid in the cultivation of our virtues and the avoidance of our vices. A philosopher, lawgiver, or politician can utilise the fact that the pain we experience reveals something significant about us to suggest an appropriate therapy, such as education or punishments, for our soul. The medical analogy is evident in this context.

The second example is closely related to dietetics. According to dietitians, exercise is necessary for maintaining good health. Some exercises may be painless, while others may be tiresome and even painful, but they are all essential for our well-being. In order to acquire virtues and cultivate a good and noble soul, both Plato and Aristotle believed that individuals

must encounter painful and fearful situations. Without undergoing prior arduous, fatiguing, and even painful training, it is impossible to be courageous in battle and thus maintain a noble soul. The training of both body and soul, i.e. education, is a necessary component for acquiring and maintaining a healthy soul. Although some procedures leading to this end may be painless, such as philosophizing, others may be tiresome or painful. However, philosophy can integrate these painful features into the good and noble life of human beings, especially for the life of their soul. Similarly, dietetics can integrate painful exercises into the life of bodily health.

In both medicine and philosophy, attempts have been made to give meaning to pain, a phenomenon that is naturally seen as something negative and avoidable. Philosophy and medicine do not dispute this intuition, but they do offer ways in which pain can be integrated into human life. In this chapter, I aimed to demonstrate that this integration is led in two main directions: using pain for diagnosis and using something painful for treatment. The claim that I try to show in the following two chapters is that this framework is also to be seen in philosophical writings about pain. Despite the fact that philosophers seem to approach pain from different perspectives and focus primarily (or even exclusively) on its emotional and psychic aspects, striking similarities become evident when the broader picture is examined. Thus, in the next two chapters, I will not only analyse philosophical texts about pain but also attempt to identify the possible medical background underlying them. It is worth noting that although Plato and Aristotle introduced many perspectives on pain that are not found in medical texts, the medical ideas provided them with the framework within which they did so.

3. Plato

Introduction

Upon initial examination, Plato's treatment of pain appears to differ substantially from the previous chapter's analyses. Given the difference in genre, style, and perspective between the two, this disparity is unsurprising. Consequently, it is necessary to examine Plato's perspective on pain in its own right. Pain can no longer be directly equated with bodily pain since, in the majority of instances, Plato discusses pain more broadly, encompassing emotional and moral components as well. Although some passages connect pain explicitly with bodily parts, the emphasis is not on the pain's location or intensity, but rather on its ethical significance. Additionally, Plato introduces new themes that were previously peripheral or completely absent in medical literature, such as the ethical dimension of pain, its relation to pleasure, etc.

Plato's philosophical approach to pain is not inflexible; rather, his dialogues explore and highlight various aspects of reality, emphasizing different aspects of the same phenomena depending on the context and the author's strategy in the given dialogue. This holds true for Plato's conceptions of pain, too:[476] his account of pain is not static but develops over time, with different dialogues shaping and influencing his views on the subject.[477] Nonetheless, several fundamental questions and perspectives on pain can be identified throughout his work, and this chapter will systematically examine them.

First, I will explore with Plato what pain is, its ontology, and its origin. This inquiry will approach the question from two perspectives: first, by examining the passages where Plato offers explicit definitions or accounts of pain, which is usually defined alongside its opposite, pleasure; secondly, by examining the relationship between pain and pleasure, desires, emotions, and sensations, which occur together so often in Plato's dialogues, we can discover the common characteristics of these phenomena and ultimately shed light on the pain itself. Following these preliminary inquiries, I will delve into Plato's understanding of pain in several steps. Plato's motivation for writing about pleasure and pain stems from the desire to specify the relationship between pleasure and pain and goodness and badness. In several dialogues, most notably in the

[476] This was also shown, for example, in Plato's conception of illness by Gábor Betegh (2021) who argues that Plato's conception of illness and its role in human beings evolves from the *Phaedo* through the *Republic* to the *Timaeus*, which is characterised by a more realistic and inclusive approach to the human body, which can get sick. Pain shares some structural features with illness and we shall see a similar development of Plato's conception of it.

[477] In general approach to Plato, I follow Irwin's doctrinal reading of the dialogues and his tentative chronology of them. Cf. Irwin (1995) 4-6, 11-13.

Philebus and *Gorgias*, he argues against his opponents and aims to demonstrate that pleasure cannot be equated with goodness. If this is indeed the case, and if pleasure and pain are opposites, then an overall identification of pain with badness is no longer tenable. Consequently, in the second part of the first section, I will focus on the 'moral' evaluation of pain, which is a perspective that is absent, at least explicitly, in the 'Hippocratic' treatises.

The second section of this chapter explores the different types of pain, with a particular focus on the pains of the soul. As mentioned earlier, while the medical treatises also touch upon pain of the soul, Plato's emphasis on this type of pain is much greater and more complex. Thus, the aim of this section is to unravel the intricate issue of the different types of pain, including bodily pain, pain of the soul, moral pain, and so on. Even in the few instances where the pain is explicitly linked to a bodily part or non-human animals, bodily pain is never purely bodily for Plato. Rather, there must be something that is aware of pain, which is the soul. Furthermore, the soul can also feel pains by itself. By distinguishing between the pains of the soul itself and the pains of the body and soul together, Plato highlights the fact that we typically do not experience only pleasure or only pain, but rather the two in combination. Since we can differentiate between bodily and emotional pleasures and pains, various possible states arise (such as feeling bodily pain and emotional pleasure simultaneously).

In light of these ontological discussions, the question of the meaning of pain in human life arises. While pain is generally considered a negative experience to be avoided, it is also a natural part of human existence. I will show in the third section that Plato attempts to reconcile these seemingly contradictory facts by integrating pain into the process of education and the formation of morally virtuous character. According to Plato, virtuous citizens will inevitably encounter pain, fear, pleasure, and desire in their life and must be trained to navigate these experiences. This training, or education, cannot occur without exposure to painful and fearful situations, which help to strengthen one's character. Thus, our capacity to feel pain provides us with the opportunity to act virtuously, as, without fearful situations, courage would not be possible. In this way, pain can be seen as potentially beneficial for individuals (and society as a whole) when integrated into philosophy and used to develop morally good character.

In the last section, this chapter will examine Plato's treatment of the relationship between pain and exercise. The term 'πόνος', which was previously discussed in the medical context, is predominantly used in Plato's dialogues to refer to exercise. Since exercise is a fundamental part of education and a necessary component of morally good action, it is essential to overcome its painful aspect to achieve desirable outcomes. It is difficult to be brave in battle without the physical strength gained from the gymnastic training necessary for fighting. The

perspective presented in this chapter is not novel as it is similar to the one previously explored in medical writings. Nevertheless, its significance lies in that we can compare how physicians and philosophers approached the same question, namely the relationship between pain and exercise.

This chapter as a whole seeks to demonstrate that Plato's treatment of pain introduces several novel perspectives. Although Plato employs the same terminology as his contemporary medical writers, however, he uses it differently. Nevertheless, a crucial conceptual framework shared by Plato and medical writers is the idea that pain can serve a positive function and that their disciplines can integrate it into a good human life. This aspect will be further developed in the chapter's conclusion.

3.1 What is Pain?

In Plato's dialogues, there are several passages where one can find explicit answers to the question 'what is pain' and what is painful. In different dialogues, they are presented with different degrees of complexity according to the purposes Plato follows there. The most generally known explanation of pain is to find in the *Gorgias* where – in order to refute Callicles' and Polus' views that the happy life is the life of greatest pleasures – Socrates offers the following characteristics: "Am I to ask any further, or do you agree that every deficiency (ἔνδεια) and appetite (ἐπιθυμία) is painful?"[478] In contrast to the pleasures of eating and drinking that are characterised as "filling of the deficiency,"[479] we feel pain when we are hungry and thirsty.[480] In this passage Plato opens several topics which I will elaborate on throughout this chapter, such as the relation between pleasure and pain and good and bad, and also the mixed state in which we feel both pleasure and pain. For now, let's focus on the characteristics of pain we gain here: while filling is pleasurable, deficiency is painful. This idea is emphasised

[478] *Grg.* 496d3-4. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; All translations are from Cooper (1997).

[479] *Grg.* 496e1-2. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή; The idea that hunger and thirst are something pathological is to be found also in the medical writings. Cf. *Flat.* 1 (6.92 L = 104.5-10 Jouanna), *Nat. Hom.* 9 (6.52 L = 188.3-6 Jouanna), *Aph.* 2. 22 (4. 476 L = 112 Jones). For the roots of the notion of deficiency and filling in relation to pleasure and pain before Plato, see Gosling and Tylor (1982) 21-23.

[480] *Grg.* 496d1. For the discussion about the disintegration and refiling model of pleasure and pain, see Gosling and Taylor (1982) 105-106, Frede (2010) 109-110, Cheng (2015) 129-155, Jorgensen (2018) 127-129, Ogihara (2019) 107-109, Dimas (2019) 127, Linka (2023a).

in the simile of leaking jars: the soul of the people indulging in pleasures is similar to the never-ending filling and emptying of leaking jars, where filling is pleasurable and emptying is painful, while the soul of the self-controlled man is similar to jars that are sound and full.[481] Also, the passage tells us that pleasure and pain are opposites.

The fact that pain and pleasure are opposites and that they often follow each other is emphasised in other places, too. In the *Phaedo*, for example, Socrates formulates this contention after the bonds are taken off from his legs:

> What a strange thing (ἄτοπον) that which men call pleasure seems to be, and how astonishing the relation it has with what is thought to be its opposite (ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι), namely pain (λυπηρόν)! A man cannot have both at the same time (τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτὼ μὴ ’θέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ). Yet if he pursues and catches the one, he is almost always bound to catch the other also, like two creatures with one head. I think that if Aesop had noted this he would have composed a fable that a god wished to reconcile their opposition but could not do so, so he joined their two heads together, and therefore when a man has the one, the other follows later. This seems to be happening to me. My bonds caused pain (ἀλγεινόν) in my leg, and now pleasure seems to be following (ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ).[482]

Pleasure (something good) follows the previous pain (something bad) which is ceasing. Here, one of the main features of the platonic approach to pleasure and pain occurs: if pleasure is necessarily dependent on pain, which is something bad, it cannot be identified with the good.[483] It is no coincidence that this story is implemented to *Phaedo*, since the fact that pleasure and pain are somehow closely related corroborates the ideal of the philosophical life, namely abstaining from both pain *and* pleasure, since they, together with desires, and cravings, etc., disturb the soul from its appropriate form of life.[484]

The idea that pain is a deficiency working as an opposite to pleasure is elaborated in detail in the *Philebus*.[485] In living creatures, Socrates claims, there is harmony and health, and

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[481] *Grg.* 493d5-494c3. For interpretation of the ‘leaky jars’ passage, see Irwin (1995) 104-109, Gosling and Tylor (1982) 70-71.

[482] *Phd*. 60b3-c7. For an interpretation of this passage in the context of Plato’s myths see Betegh (2009) 78-80. See also Gosling and Taylor (1982) 86-87. For the discussion about pleasure and pain in the *Phaedo*, see Jorgenson (2019) 42-47.

[483] Plato will later develop his conception of the relationship between pleasure and pain which will support this claim (see below chapter 3.1 and 3.2).

[484] *Phd*. 59a1-7, 65c4-6, 83b5-84b8. Cf. Betegh (2021) 235-236.

[485] This dialogue, since its main theme is pleasure and its role in a good life, is also the dialogue where we find the most instances of pain words (over 100). For pleasure in the *Philebus*, see e.g., Irwin (1995) 318-338.

"when we find the harmony in living creatures disrupted, there will at the same time be a disintegration (λύσις) of their nature and a rise of pain."[486] Hunger, characterised in the *Gorgias* as deficiency (ἔνδεια) is in the *Philebus* characterised as "disintegration (λύσις) and pain (λύπη)".[487] Pleasure, thus, arises when "harmony is regained and the former nature restored".[488] The same goes for thirst and drinking, and "unnatural separation and dissolution (διάκρισις δέ γ' αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν), the affection caused by heat" and "the natural restoration (ἀπόδοσίς) of cooling down".[489] Socrates summarises it as follows:

> When the natural combination of limit and unlimitedness that forms a live organism, as I explained before, is destroyed (φθείρηται), this destruction (φθορά) is pain, while the return towards its own nature, this general restoration, is pleasure.[490]

Plato divulges here his conception of pleasure, pain, their mixture, and the natural state of neither pleasure nor pain in the framework of the 'medical model of pleasure', namely the conception that pleasure is somehow similar to health in that both are seen as something good and desirable and that both are closely connected to the natural state of the animal in which the constitutive parts of the body are in balance.[491] As we shall see below, Plato argues decisively that pleasure is not to be identified with the natural state but rather with a process leading to its restoration, yet, he still thinks and works in the frames outlined by the medical tradition.[492] So far, pain was characterised as deficiency (ἔνδεια), disintegration (λύσις), unnatural separation and dissolution (διάκρισις δέ γ' αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν), and destruction (φθορά). All these characteristics imply that pain is somehow deficient in relation to the normal, natural, or neutral state of the animal.

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[486] *Phlb.* 31d3-6 Λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ. For a summary of Plato's theory of health, see e.g., Tracy (1969) 143: "Plato conceives the body in health as a complex of opposing elements, mixed in proportion (σύμμετρα) with respect to both quantity and quality, and given a relative stability by being blended (κεκραμμένα) to form an equilibrium (ἰσόρροπα) with is dynamic because of the constant interaction of the elements even in combination. The basic cause of disease is the loss of this equilibrium when the elements become disproportionate through excess or deficiency, or when the blend is disturbed by improper distribution of the elements. Environment, nourishment and exercise are of first importance in maintaining or disturbing the equilibrium of the all."

[487] *Phlb.* 31e6. For pain as disintegration, see also *Phlb.* 32d9-33b1, 35e9-36a1.

[488] *Phlb.* 31d8-10.

[489] *Phlb.* 31e10-32a4.

[490] *Phlb.* 32a8-4.

[491] For the 'medical model of pleasure' see Cheng (2015) 83 and Gosling and Taylor (1982) 2.

[492] This will be also clearly seen in Plato's discussion about mixtures of pleasure and pain. See below chapter 3.2.

Plato develops these ideas in the *Timaeus*, where we are told that pleasure and pain can accompany sensations we feel throughout the body.[493] This happens when, for example, we have got an injury, are burnt, etc., in general, when we experience a sensation that is too violent and unnatural:

> This, then, is what we should understand about pleasure and pain: an unnatural disturbance that comes upon us with great force and intensity is painful (τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν), while its equally intense departure, leading back to the natural state, is pleasant. One that is mild and gradual is not perceived, whereas the opposite is the case with the opposite disturbance.[494]

It can happen that the disturbances and disintegrations are gradual and mild, so we are not aware of them (thus of pain), while we can be aware of replenishment which is intense, this is the case of fragrances (εὐωδία). On the other hand, if replenishments are gradual and slow, but disintegrations are intense, we feel only pain and no pleasure, for example in the case of burns or cuts (καύσεις καὶ τομάς).[495] Pain is thus disintegration and, in general, when we take into account the previous characteristics of pain, a motion (regression) from the natural state.

This disintegration, so far caused by hunger, thirst, heat, or injury, can be caused by other factors, too, for example by the abundance of man's seed:

> And if the seed of a man's marrow grows to overflowing abundance like a tree that bears an inordinately plentiful quantity of fruit, he is in for a long series of bursts of pain, or of pleasures, in the area of his desires and their fruition. These severe pleasures and pains drive him mad for the greater part of his life, and though his body has made his soul diseased and witless, people will think of him not as sick, but as willfully evil. But the truth about sexual overindulgence is that it is a disease of the soul caused primarily by the condition of a single stuff which, due to the porousness of the bones, flows within the body and renders it moist.[496]

Pain of the soul, manifesting as madness is caused by bodily pathology, when there is too much seed. The passage echoes the 'Hippocratic' principle that pain is caused by the imbalance of humours, even though the seed is not usually one of the humours mentioned.[497] Medical or

[493] *Ti.* 64a3-6.

[494] *Ti.* 64c7-d3.

[495] *Ti.* 65a1-b3.

[496] *Ti.* 86c3-d5.

[497] Medical echo is clearly present in Plato's discussion of disease, too, see *Ti.* 82a1-4.

dietetic inspiration of this passage is however clearly seen from the following explanation of the origin of pain:

> And as for pains (λύπας), once again it is the body that causes the soul so much trouble, and in the same ways. When any of a man's acid and briny phlegms or any bitter and bilious humors wander up and down his body without finding a vent to the outside and remain pent up inside, they mix the vapor that they give off with the motion of the soul and so are confounded with it. So they produce all sorts of diseases of the soul (νοσήματα ψυχῆς), some more intense and some more frequent than others. And as they move to the three regions of the soul, each of them produces a multitude of varieties of bad temper and melancholy in the region it attacks, as well as of recklessness and cowardice, not to mention forgetfulness and stupidity.[498]

In contrast to the majority of medical texts, humours cause here emotional or psychic pain, manifesting as recklessness, cowardice, forgetfulness, or stupidity.[499] The principle of this pain, namely that humours cannot naturally leave the body is however shared with medical authors. Yet, it is developed in the way that vapours arising from unnatural mixtures of humours confound the movement of the soul and thus cause it trouble.

Motion, in general, seems to be a crucial principle in understanding Plato's conception of pain. In the *Gorgias* and *Philebus* pain can be characterised as a motion of disintegration and moving away from the natural state. In the *Timaeus* we have seen pain arising from sensation, which is a kind of motion, too.[500] This is corroborated in the *Theaetetus*, where pain and

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[498] *Ti.* 86e3-87a7.

[499] Something similar, however, can be find in *Vict.* 1. 35 (6.512 L = 150.29-152.11 Joly-Byl).

[500] This model was convincingly criticised and revised by Erginel, who argues for an 'asymmetrical model' of pleasure and pain. While pleasure is in Plato always a *motion*, pain can be both *motion* and a *state*. If not, it would not be possible to explain such phenomena as feeling both pleasure and pain during the motion of return to the natural state. See Erginel (2006, 2019); cf. Warren 2016 (33). I argue that if Plato's explanation of pain should work, pain must be understood not only through the *kinetic* model but also through the *static* one: the mere fact that my natural state is disrupted (and I am aware of it) should be a sufficient condition for feeling pain, it is not necessary to be continuously in the process of moving from the natural state. It would be impossible to be in the two opposite motions at the same time. This conceptual misunderstanding stems possibly from putting too much weight on the example of hunger (At least in this way, this example is explained by Aristotle in *Eth. Nic*. 10.3, 1173b6-15.). It is maybe true that I am in every moment hungrier than I was a minute ago, it is not the case, however, in other experiences of feeling pain. If I burn my hand, for example, my pain can initially intensify, but then its level may for some time stand still before it begins to cease in the process of recovery. Putting emphasis on the symmetry between pleasure and pain (there are both motions) is maybe due to Plato's contention that pleasure cannot be identified with the state, namely the natural state, or – following the eating simile – with the state of satiety. When reaching the natural state, both pleasure and pain stop.

pleasure, together with sense-perceptions and feeling hot and cold are included to the category of sensation (αἴσθησις).[501] In contrast to the *Timaeus* where pleasure and pain were only accompanying sensations, here they are characterised as sensations themselves. However, since Plato refers to the *Theaetetus* opinions of those who claim that "everything is really motion" (probably some Heraclitans) and not his own, the way pain is understood in the *Timaeus* seems to be more authoritative. The sensation is surely necessary for feeling (bodily) pain, but it does not mean that pain is identical to it.[502]

So far, I have focused on the passages where it is more or less explicitly said what pain is. Sometimes I had to take into account what is said about the opposite of pain, pleasure, but I gained quite a solid understanding of the way Plato characterises pain. For all these passages there seems to be a common feature, namely that pain is a kind of motion, which can be expressed by words such as disintegration, dissolution etc. We feel pain when we are moved from the natural state by hunger, injury or disease. In order to understand more about pain, let us now focus on passages where it is not said explicitly what pain *is*, but what pain *does*; in these passages pain occurs together with other phenomena, such as pleasure, appetites, and emotions. Analysing the way Plato treats these phenomena sheds some light on his understanding of pain, too.

Throughout his dialogues, Plato is clear that some phenomena experienced by everyone are actually bad for our soul since they disturb it from its principal activity, i.e., rational thinking.[503] One of these phenomena is pain, together with pleasure, beliefs (δόξας), desires (ἐπιθυμίαις), and emotions, such as anger (θυμός), and fears (φόβοι).[504] In some cases, even sense-perception is added.[505] In general, we feel pain (and pleasure, etc.) since we are in the body. Since the soul is the better part of us, which is to be cultivated and educated, pain is disturbing its activity. The effect pleasure and pain have on the soul, especially if they are violent, is emphasised in the *Phaedo*:

> That the soul of every man, when it feels violent pleasure or pain (ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα ἢ λυπηθῆναι) in connection with some object, inevitably believes at the same time that what causes such feelings must be very clear and very true, which it is not. … Because every pleasure or pain

[501] *Tht.* 156a2-c4.

[502] For an interpretation of this passage along the same lines, see Gosling and Tylor (1982) 183.

[503] *Phd.* 65c4-6.

[504] See for example *Soph.* 228a10-b9, *Symp.* 207e1-4, *Lach.* 191d3-e7, *Resp.* 606d1-7, *Leg*. 645d2-e4, *Leg.* 9. 863e4-864b4, *Phd.* 59a1-7.

[505] *Phd*. 65c6.

> provides, as it were, another nail to rivet the soul to the body and to weld them together (σωματοειδῆ). It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes that truth is what the body says it is. As it shares the beliefs and delights of the body, I think it inevitably comes to share its ways and manner of life and is unable ever to reach Hades in a pure state; it is always full of body when it departs, so that it soon falls back into another body and grows with it as if it had been sewn into it. Because of this, it can have no part in the company of the divine, the pure and uniform.[506]

The soul of a true philosopher should stay away from pleasure and pain as much as possible and "contemplate the true and the divine".[507] If he does not do it there is a risk that what will be ruling him "is not knowledge but rather anything else—sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, at other times love, often fear".[508] It is of course not always possible to abstain from pain, and, after all, it is not always prudent to do so. Courageous men, for example, should, according to Plato in the dialogue *Laches*, be "brave in the face of pain" (πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοί), similarly as they should be brave in facing fear, desire, and pleasure.[509] I shall elaborate on the relation between pain and courage below, for now, it is enough to see that pain stays again next to pleasure, emotions, etc., and thus plays a similar role as these phenomena do.

In some of his later dialogues (e.g., *Laws* and *Timaeus*), Plato offers a more nuanced explanation of why people have pains, pleasures, etc., emphasising the fact that the capacity to feel pleasure and pain is natural for human beings:

> So, once the souls were of necessity implanted in bodies, and these bodies had things coming to them and leaving them, the first innate capacity they would of necessity come to have would be sense perception, which arises out of forceful disturbances. This they all would have. The second would be love, mingled with pleasure and pain. And they would come to have fear and spiritedness as well, plus whatever goes with having these emotions, as well as all their natural opposites.[510]

Due to our corporeity, we necessarily have sense-perception and capacities to feel pleasure and pain. We shall see below that, particularly in later dialogues, it is no longer our task to

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[506] *Phd.* 83b5-84b8.

[507] *Phd.* 84a6-7.

[508] *Prt.* 352b5-c2, cf. *Prt.* 352d7-e2. For pleasure and pain in the *Protagoras*, see Irwin (1995) 111-114, Rowe (2003), Tylor (2003), Kahn (2003).

[509] *Lach.* 191d3-e7, cf. *Lach.* 192b5-8, *Resp.* 4. 429c5-d2.

[510] *Ti.* 42a3-c1. For interpretation of this passage, see also Johansen (2004), 145.

abstain absolutely from these feelings but to "master" (κράτησαι) them.[511] I will analyse below what it means for the life of human beings.

…

In this survey, I opened the area of Plato's thinking about pain and showed its main features. Pain is primarily discussed together with pleasure and often also with emotions, desires, fears, etc. In the majority of instances, Plato shows in what all these phenomena are problematic for his conception of the morally good life, namely that they disturb the soul in its rational activity. Pain is usually not at the centre of Plato's focus; this place belongs to pleasure. However, in order to describe what pleasure is and does, he repeatedly discusses pain, too. An initial and most relevant feature is the fact that pleasure and pain are opposites. So far, we have seen it in passages where pleasure is characterised as filling and returning to the natural state, pain as dissolution, and moving away from it. However, pain and pleasure are opposites only to some degree. We have already seen that they are both in the category of phenomena that gain rather negative evaluation in the majority of Plato's dialogues: pleasures, pains, desires, and emotions disturb our soul from contemplating the truth, so we should abstain from them as much as possible. Plato here faces the question of the relation of these phenomena to good and bad, which I will address in the next section. One could think that if pain and pleasure are opposites and pain is something bad that everyone avoids, it is just natural to identify pleasure with the good and pain with the bad. However, it is exactly this opinion that Plato argues against. He shares the presupposition that pain is bad and that it is the opposite of pleasure. It does not mean, however, that every pleasure is good. But if pleasure is not the good, maybe even the claim that every pain is something bad needs to be revised. Is it not possible that in some circumstances pain is good or at least neutral? And if so, isn't it necessary to distinguish between various kinds of pains (and pleasures)? And finally, even though pain is (sometimes) bad, it is nevertheless a necessary component of human life that cannot be just rejected or ignored. It should be rather integrated and explained, as Plato does in some dialogues.

[511] Ibid. See also *Leg.* 5. 732e4-6. In *Timaeus* 69c7, Plato calls pleasure and pain dreadful but necessary (δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα). This shift is probably caused by Plato's more realistic and sympathetic evaluation of the body in his later dialogues. Cf. Jorgenson (2018), Carone (2005), Brodie (2011), Betegh (2021) 239.

3.2 Pleasure and Pain – Good and Bad

In the dialogue *Protagoras*, Plato addresses openly the question of the relation between pleasure and pain and good and bad. Famous Protagoras holds the position that we "pursue pleasure as being good and avoid pain as bad".[512] Socrates immediately shows that it can't be as easy as that since some pleasures we call bad if they deprive us of greater pleasures or have some pains inherent to them. And similarly, some pains are good, since they relieve greater pains or bring about greater pleasures.[513] We can also distinguish between near and remote pleasures and pains: sometimes it is better to suffer immediate pain to prevent some greater pain in the future (one should for example undergo surgery in order to avoid future death).[514] Pleasure and pain cannot be called good and bad straightforwardly, but they must be "weighed" in order to discern what is good in the current situation.[515] If it is so, one should not just choose every pleasure and avoid every pain, rather "it has turned out that our salvation in life depends on the right choice (ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει) of pleasures and pains, be they more or fewer, greater or lesser, farther or nearer, doesn't our salvation seem, first of all, to be measurement (μετρητική), which is the study of relative excess and deficiency and equality?"[516] In line with his attempt to explicate knowledge as measurement, Plato thus shows that attributes of good and bad do not belong to pleasure and pain per se, but that it is necessary to have knowledge in order to evaluate them correctly.[517]

In a similar vein, Plato refines the relation between pleasure and pain and good and bad in the dialogue *Gorgias*. There is no doubt that pain is often, maybe in the majority of cases, bad, since it usually accompanies things that are "most shameful" (αἴσχιστον).[518] And truly shameful things are characterised as bad and painful.[519] However, if Socrates' maxim that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it holds true,[520] the fact that something is painful does not automatically mean that it is bad. Even though it is more painful to be beaten than to beat someone, the latter is worse, since there is more badness (κακία) in it.[521] Here, a theme

[512] *Prt.* 354c3-5.

[513] *Prt.* 354c5-e2.

[514] *Prt.* 354b1-3, *Grg.* 467c7-9.

[515] *Prt.* 356a2-b9.

[516] *Prt.* 357a5-b3.

[517] *Prt.* 357d3-7.

[518] *Grg.* 477c6-8.

[519] *Grg.* 475a4-5

[520] *Grg.* 475b5-8.

[521] *Grg.* 475c7.

discussed below opens, namely the distinction between bodily pain and pain of the soul: in being beaten, I feel bodily pain, but in beating, I undergo pain of the soul. And since pain of the soul has a greater impact on myself because, acting unjustly, is a sign that my soul is corrupted and at the same time contributes to it being more corrupted, I should rather choose the bodily one.

The impossibility of identifying pain with badness and pleasure with goodness is also caused by a peculiar feature of their co-presence. We saw earlier that Plato used for explaining the nature of pleasure and pain a simile of hunger and eating. We are hungry and feeling pain, so we began to eat and feel pleasure from eating:

> Do you observe the result, that when you say that a thirsty person drinks, you're saying that a person who's in pain simultaneously feels enjoyment? Or doesn't this happen simultaneously in the same place, in the soul or in the body as you like? ... So, feeling enjoyment isn't the same as doing well, and being in pain isn't the same as doing badly, and the result is that what's pleasant turns out to be different from what's good.[522]

Plato emphasises here the idea which I elaborate on in detail below, namely that in many cases, we feel pleasure and pain simultaneously.[523] If it is so, one cannot characterise either pleasure as good, nor pain as bad, since how could a state which is *also* painful be characterised as good? In *Gorgias*, Plato rather wants to say that the truly good state happens when neither pain nor pleasure are felt since neither body nor soul are disturbed.

The third argument in the *Gorgias* against the identification of pain with badness and pleasure with goodness is based on Socrates' observations, unwillingly agreed to by Callicles, that both intelligent and foolish (φρόνιμοι καί οἱ ἄφρονες), courageous and cowards (ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ δειλοί), good and bad (ἀγαθοί καὶ κακοί) people feel both pleasure and pain. Since "good men are good and the bad men bad because of the presence of good or bad things in them,"[524] it is not possible to identify pain to badness and pleasure to goodness, since both good and bad people have them.[525] Necessarily, thus, just as pleasures, "some pains are good and others bad,

[522] *Grg.* 496e4-497a.

[523] To be precise, there are three types of mixtures of pleasures and pains: *sequential* (pleasure follows pain, pain follows pleasure), *simultaneous* (I feel bodily/emotional pleasure and pain at the same time), and *interspecies* (I feel bodily pain and emotional pleasure/bodily pleasure and emotional pain at the same time). See Erginel (2019), Linka (2023b).

[524] *Grg.* 498d2-4.

[525] *Grg.* 498a3-e8.

too".[526] If it is so, our task is to "choose and act to have the good pleasures and pains".[527] This we have already seen above in the passage from *Laches*: to be brave and courageous means to "to avoid and pursue what he should, whether these are things to do, or people, or pleasures and pains, and to stand fast and endure them where he should".[528] Thus, not every pleasure is to be pursued, nor every pain avoided. We can always say whether something is good or bad not only because there is or is not in it pleasure or pain, but because we evaluate what role pleasure or pain plays in the overall situation. So, pleasure and pain without refelction are not sufficient signs of something being good or bad.

In the *Philebus*, Plato explains why it is so: First, pleasure and pain do not belong to the category of things having limits, they "admit the more and less", there can thus be intensive pleasure, mild pain, etc.[529] The category of unlimitedness is not simply good or bad, things belonging to it can obtain both attributes. Pain, thus is not altogether bad:[530] "pleasure and pain may rather turn out to share the predicament of hot and cold and other such things that are welcome at one point but unwelcome at another, because they are not good, but it happens that some of them do occasionally assume a beneficial nature."[531]

So, even though pains are usually bad, it is not always so. Or rather, they can acquire characteristics of good, too. The pain a courageous person feels in battle is of course bad since it is the disintegration of the natural state of his body. However, since this pain is necessary for him to act bravely, it is not bad per se. In the context of the situation, it can be said that it is beneficial since it is a necessary component of acting virtuously. Similarly, pain inherent to a medical treatment is bad since it disintegrates our body, however, it is good in that it prevents even greater disintegration if the pathological condition remains untreated. In the passages where Plato discusses the relation of pain to badness and pleasure to goodness, it is even more visible what we have seen above: even though for the ideal philosopher who devotes all his time to rational contemplation of real being it would be best not to feel any pleasure or pain, this option is not open to us. Due to our human nature and corporeity, pleasure, and pain are

[526] *Grg.* 494e2.

[527] *Grg.* 494e3-5.

[528] *Grg.* 507b4-7.

[529] *Phlb.* 27e5-28a3, cf. 37c4-d10.

[530] *Phlb.* 28a1.

[531] *Phlb.* 32d3-6. See also *Laws* 9. 875b1-c2, where it is said that to avoid all pain is "irrational" (ἄλογος).

necessary components of our life. And due to the nature of human relations, it is necessary to act sometimes in ways that are not possible without pain.[532]

It is actually one of the tasks of proper education, to learn to see rightly what is bad and what is good and be thus able to evaluate pleasures and pain accordingly,[533] since it is an inherent feature of human nature to seek "a predominance of pleasure over pain throughout our lives".[534] Right education should lead us to acquire abilities to discern what pleasures and pains are good, what are bad and choose them accordingly. Due to knowledge, characterised above as measurement and weighing, we should be able to evaluate what kinds of pleasures and pains are inherent in prospective lives and choose the right one. Plato offers an elaborate 'algorithm' for such choosing in *Laws*:

> We want to have pleasure; we neither choose nor want pain; we prefer the neutral state if we are thereby relieved of pain, but not if it involves the loss of pleasure. We want less pain and more pleasure, we do not want less pleasure and more pain; but we should be hard put to it to be clear about our wishes when faced with a choice of two situations bringing pleasure and pain in the same proportions. These considerations of number or size or intensity or equality (or their opposites) which determine our wishes all influence or fail to influence us whenever we make a choice. This being inevitably the way of things, we want a life in which pleasures and pains come frequently and with great intensity, but with pleasure predominating; if pains predominate, we reject that life. Similarly when pleasures and pains are few and small and feeble: if pain outweighs pleasure, we do not want that life, but we do when pleasure outweighs pain. As for the 'average' life, which experiences only moderate pleasures or pains, we should observe the same point as before: we desire it when it offers us a preponderance of pleasure (which we enjoy), but not when it offers us a preponderance of pain (which we abhor). In that sense, then, we should think of all human lives as bound up in these two feelings, and we must think to what kind of life our natural wishes incline. … Now anyone who knows what the life of self-control is like will describe it as gentle in all respects, with mild pleasures and pains, light appetites, and desires without frenzy. … He will say that in the life of self control the pleasures outweigh the pains. … The healthy and unhealthy life should be regarded in the same way: they both offer pleasures and pains, but the

[532] It is possible to see a development of Plato's conception of happy life. In the *Phaedo*, the requirements for such a life are very strict and only a philosopher devoting his time to rational activity fulfils them. In later dialogues, such as the *Philebus*, *Timaeus* and *Laws*, the requirements are more realistic and open to other areas of human action, too.

[533] *Leg.* 2. 654c3-d3. For pleasure and pain in the *Laws*, see Frede (2010), 108-126, Kamtekar (2010) 127-130, Jinek (2021).

[534] *Leg.* 5. 733a2-4.

> pleasures outweigh the pains in the healthy life, vice versa in the unhealthy. But what we want when we choose between lives is not a predominance of pain: we have chosen as the pleasanter life the one where pain is the weaker element.[535]

In this passages, we can see Plato being aware that even though our natural inclinations urge us to seek as much pleasure as possible, it does not mean we should succumb to this urge. On the other hand, it does not mean that we should ignore it, either. It is rather necessary to be able to evaluate realistically what pleasures bring to our life. If some pleasures are necessarily accompanied by pains, it seems more prudent to seek only the mild ones. This is what the self-controlled man does. It is inevitable, that in any life we choose, there will be not only pleasures but pains, too. We can only choose what pains are we likely to meet. This passage thus corroborates that the relation between pleasure and pain and goodness and badness is more complex than it previously seemed to be. The goodness or badness of one's life cannot be evaluated simply on the grounds that there is or is not pain in it. Plato insists that "everyone should avoid a life of extreme pleasure and pain" and "the right way of life is neither a singleminded pursuit of pleasure nor an absolute avoidance of pain".[536] We should rather choose a "state between those extremes" and "take the middle course between them", in order to live happily.[537]

In this section we have seen that Plato attacks from several positions the contention that pain is to be identified with badness and pleasure with goodness. His main motivation is sure to show that goodness is something different than pleasure which is necessary for his promoting the life of knowledge as the best life over the life of physical enjoyment. If pleasure is not identical to goodness, pain is not identical to badness either. Rather than avoiding all pain and

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[535] *Leg.* 5. 732d8-734e2. In this passage, it is possible to hear an echo of the hedonistic calculus from the *Protagoras* (354a-355d, cf. Taylor [2003] 174). In both the *Laws* and *Protagoras*, Plato endorses the idea that the good life is more pleasurable than the bad one and that we should use our rational faculties for choosing and pursuing the good (and thus pleasurable) life. A possible inspiration in the 'measuring' role of the reason in the dietitian's task to measure the appropriate diet is discussed by Jorgenson (2018) 113-118. See also a possible inspiration in *On Regimen* where we can find a passage in which the best mixture of the bodily components is defined as being composed of 'the finest water and the rarest fire' (ὕδατος δὲ τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ τὸ ἀραιότατον) because it preserves us outside the extreme outcomes when we undergo a change. Both principal elements are thus not 'fulfilled to the densest limit' (ἐπιπληροῦνται τὸ ἔσχατον οὐδέτερον) which makes the mixture more stable and helps to preserve the health. *Vict*. 1.32 (506-508 L = 148.3-13 Joly-Byl), transl. Jones (1931) 253-5. For the role of pleasure and pain in the *Laws*, see e.g., see Frede (2010), 108-126, Kamtekar (2010) 127-130, Jinek (2021).

[536] *Leg.* 7. 792c7-793a5.

[537] *Leg.* 7. 793a1-5.

pursuing all pleasure, we should discern what is good and bad about them, we should measure and weigh them between each other, taking into account not only actual pleasures and pains but also future ones. In the later dialogues, Plato contends that pain cannot be utterly avoided. After all, it is our nature to feel it, as it is our nature to feel and seek pleasure. Intelligent, courageous, and good man thus does not avoid all pain but rather chooses a life which is good even though sometimes painful. There seems to be a shift from the dialogues such as the *Phaedo* and the *Gorgias*, where everything connected to the body was bad to the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* where Plato offers much more realistic and less radical views. Due to our corporeity, it is necessary to feel pain sometimes, and if it is necessary, it cannot be entirely bad. Our task is just to avoid pains connected to shameful things and endure pains connected to good or neutral ones.

3.3 Kinds of Pain

In order to choose and avoid the right pains, it is necessary to better understand the variety of kinds, features and layers of pain. Plato's motivation is again directed to pleasure: pleasure is for him not only something bodily, such as eating, drinking, and having sex. There are also pleasures that are felt by the soul without the body. A similar thing can be said about pains. Even though our intuition together with the 'Hippocratic' authors discussed above leads us to see pain as something bodily, connected to injury or disease, for Plato pain is much broader than that. He discerns between pains originating in the body – which are almost always felt by the soul – and pains that are felt by the soul itself.

While in the case of 'Hippocratic' writings it was relatively easy to characterise pain as bodily pain, since it was localised in some bodily part, was accompanied by attributes of intensity, etc., in Plato's case, this is no longer possible. There are only a few passages where he talks about pain in a similar sense as the physicians did and even there, bodily pain is often used as a metaphor for pain of the soul. Plato mentions in the *Statesman* that doctors treat their patients "by cutting or burning or applying some other painful treatment" (ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀλγηδόνα προσάπτοντες),[538] which is utterly in accordance with what a physician could have written. Bodily pain accompanying medical intervention is certainly meant in other passages, too, for example in *Protagoras* 354b1-3 and *Gorgias* 467c7-9. In both of them, however, painful medical intervention is used as a practical example of situations where it is beneficial to undergo something unpleasant to gain something good. Pain occurring in the body (a

[538] *Plt.* 293b1-2, cf. *Prt.* 354b1-3.

snakebite) is also mentioned in *Symposium*. However, it is only a parallel that Alcibiades uses for describing that he has been "struck and bitten by philosophy," not in the body, but in "my heart, or my soul, or whatever you want to call it".[539] Metaphors or figurative usages of bodily pain are to be found in the *Phaedrus*, too. In the simile of the chariot and the two horses – our soul – we are told that the horse follows his desire even if it's painful for it.[540] It is interesting that in both passages from the *Phaedrus*, Plato uses for pain the word ὀδύνη, which is in philosophical literature quite unusual and which, as we have seen in the 'Hippocratic' writings, and even in Homer, is used for bodily pain. On the one hand, it is understandable to use this word when Plato talks about the pain of non-human animals, on the other hand, since the horses are only a metaphor for the irascible and appetitive parts of the soul, it is strange.[541] In any case, bodily pain is here used as a metaphor for pain of the soul. Another metaphorical use of bodily pain is to be found in the *Republic* where the prisoner feels pain in his eyes after he left the cave and was forced to look "at the light itself" (πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς).[542] Here it is also a metaphor for the pain our soul feels when confronted with the real things, i.e., ideas. Explicit bodily pain is thus an exception in Plato, which is not surprising since his motivations for writing about pain were different from the motivations of the physicians. In these few places where he speaks about pain localised in the body, he does so in order to demonstrate what is happening to the soul.

This can be clearly seen in a passage from the *Republic* where bodily pain is used not only as a metaphor in relation to pain of the soul but to the ideal city, too:

> What about the city that is most like a single person? For example, when one of us hurts his finger, the entire organism that binds body and soul into a single system under the ruling part within it is aware of this, and the whole feels the pain together with the part that suffers (πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἤσθετό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα συνήλγησεν μέρους πονήσαντος ὅλη). That's why we say that the man has a pain in his finger. And the same can be said about any part of a man, with regard either to the pain it suffers or to the pleasure it experiences when it finds relief. … Then, whenever anything good or bad happens to a single one of its citizens, such a city above all others will say that the affected part is its own and will share in the pleasure or pain as a whole.[543]

[539] *Symp.* 218a2-3.

[540] *Phdr.* 254e5, cf. *Phdr.* 254c5, *Phdr.* 251c1-5.

[541] For another metaphor of pain in animals and in the human soul, see *Phd.* 85a6-8.

[542] *Resp.* 7. 515e1-2.

[543] *Resp.* 5. 462c9-e1.

Let us put aside the meaning this passage has for the nature of the ideal city, and focus on what it says about the experience of pain.[544] First, pain starts in the body when a bodily part – a finger here – suffers an injury. However, not only the finger, but the whole 'organism' (πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία) is aware of pain (ᾔσθετό) and suffers together (συνήλγησεν) with the afflicted part. Since the whole 'organism' is a single system (μία σύνταξις) where body and soul are bounded together (κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη), even pain originating in the body is never *only* a bodily pain. Plato here states explicitly what was absent in the 'Hippocratic' writings: in order to feel pain, something must be aware of it. In this passage, we as an organism, are aware of pain. This passage indicates what is really relevant for Plato in talking about pain. Even though some pains can be characterised as bodily ones in the sense that we feel them because of a bodily injury, disease, etc., there must be something which is aware of them and on which they have some influence, namely the soul.[545]

The role of the soul is thus critical for understanding pain in Plato since the soul is not only aware of the pain caused by a bodily pathology, but it can also feel the pain that belongs to the soul itself. As already stated above, dialogue *Philebus* offers the most elaborate discussion of pleasure and pain. When pleasure is defined as filling and restoring harmony, while pain as the disintegration of nature,[546] Plato offers more details about the relationship between pleasure and pain and the way these phenomena are experienced by human beings. First, he discerns pleasure and pain already defined (disintegration and filling) that are felt because something is the case at now from the second type, which can be called anticipatory, that relates to something happening in the future:

> *Socrates*: But now accept also the anticipation by the soul itself (αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα) of these two kinds of experiences; the hope before the actual pleasure will be pleasant and comforting (ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον), while the expectation of pain will be frightening and painful (φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν).

[544] For the idea that all citizens should feel the same pleasures and pains, see also *Resp.* 5. 464a4-d5, *Leg.* 5. 739d1-3.

[545] See also *Leg.*10. 896e8-897b5. Evans (2007) offers a convincing interpretation of the way the soul is aware of pain in Plato, which is close to modern representational theories of pain.

[546] *Phlb.* 31c1-32d8.

> *Protarchus*: This turns out then to be a different kind (ἕτερον εἶδος) of pleasure and pain, namely the expectation that the soul experiences by itself, without the body (τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον).[547]

Based on this passage, we can discern two kinds of pleasure and pain: actual and anticipatory. Actual pleasures and pains are caused (at least so far) by a bodily state (hunger, thirst, injury, disease, freezing, burning, eating, drinking, sex, etc.) and we are aware of them thanks to our soul. They thus belong to both body and soul. Anticipatory pleasures and pains, on the other hand, arise in the soul itself, even though a preceding bodily state is necessary: I am hungry (actual pain) and I am hopefully expecting to eat (anticipatory pleasure). Similarly, I am attending a feast (actual pleasure), but I am afraid that tomorrow I'll have nothing to eat and be hungry (anticipatory pain). Structurally, however, both kinds of pleasures and pain are similar: the main feature of them both is a motion to/from the natural state. In actual pleasures and pain, it is already happening, in the anticipatory ones we expect it to happen. A similar idea is expressed in *Laws*, too, with an important addition, namely that we have the ability of 'calculation' (λογισμός) by which we evaluate future pleasures and pains:

> In addition to these two, he has opinions about the future, whose general name is 'expectations' (ἐλπίς). Specifically, the anticipation of pain is called 'fear' (φόβος), and the anticipation of the opposite is called 'confidence' (θάρρος). Over and against all these we have 'calculation' (λογισμός), by which we judge the relative merits of pleasure and pain, and when this is expressed as a public decision of a state, it receives the title 'law'.[548]

Anticipatory pains and pleasures corroborate one of Plato's main points in the *Philebus* (and elsewhere), that pleasure cannot be identified with goodness and that there is a state of neither pleasure nor pain – a neutral state – that is better than being in pleasure:

> *Socrates*: If it truly holds, as we said, that their disintegration constitutes pain, but restoration is pleasure, what kind of state should we ascribe to animals when they are neither destroyed nor restored; what kind of condition is this? Think about it carefully, and tell me: Is there not every necessity that the animal will at that time experience neither pain nor pleasure, neither large nor small? ... You realize that nothing prevents the person who has chosen the life of reason from living in this state.[549]

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[547] *Phlb.* 32b9-c5. For anticipatory pleasures, see Gosling and Tylor (1982) 136. Gosling and Tylor argue that anticipatory pleasures cannot be interpreted as replenishments (ibid. 136-139).

[548] *Leg.* 1. 644c4-d3. For a more detailed discussion about anticipatory pains, see Delcomminette (2003).

[549] *Phlb.* 32d9-33b1.

This state is in the *Republic* characterised as a middle state (between pleasure and pain) and calm (ἐν μέσῳ ὂν ἡσυχίαν τινά).[550] However, the majority of people do not perceive the middle state as good, since it arises after their pleasure ceases, so they actually feel pain due to its absence.[551]

Since the whole dialogue *Philebus* is a contest between the life of pleasure and the life of reason, Plato's tactic is to show that the life of pleasure is almost always necessarily a life of pain (a few exceptions will be mentioned below), since not only the actual pleasures presuppose previous actual pains (for enjoying eating I must first be hungry), but anticipatory ones presuppose them as well. We see again that even though pleasure and pain are opposites, they are often felt at the same time and follow each other.

Discerning between actual and anticipatory pleasures and pains allows Plato to introduce another state we can be in. Not only it is possible to feel actual pleasure and anticipatory pain, or actual pain and anticipatory pleasure, but it is also possible to feel actual and anticipatory pain at the same time:

> *Socrates*: When he is pained by his condition and remembers the pleasant things that would put an end to the pain, but is not yet being filled. What about this situation? Should we claim that he is then in between these two affections, or not?
> *Protarchus*: By heaven, he seems to me to be suffering a twofold pain; one consists in the body's condition, the other in the soul's desire caused by the expectation.
> …
> *Socrates*: But what if he is without hope of attaining any replenishment when he is emptied? Is not that the situation where this twofold pain occurs, which you have just come across and simply taken to be twofold?[552]

When we are hungry and at the same time, we know that we are not likely to eat soon so we will starve, we feel both kinds of pain. Another option is possible to raise, even though it was not explicitly stated by Plato: we are eating at a feast and at the same time we are looking forward to eating at another feast tomorrow. We are thus experiencing both actual and anticipatory pleasure. However, Plato would insist, we feel the actual pain of hunger, too. Once we are satiated, both actual pleasure and pain stop. There is a question of whether we could feel anticipatory pleasure in the neutral state, for example, whether we can look forward to

[550] *Resp.* 9. 583c7.

[551] *Resp.* 9. 583e1-2.

[552] *Phlb.* 35e1-36b12.

tomorrow's feast even though we are satiated right now. I suppose that Plato would not agree and add that if we feel anticipatory pleasure, we feel anticipatory pain, too: we are afraid that we will be hungry tomorrow, so we are already looking forward to the feast. In that case, however, we are no longer in the neutral state which is characterised by the absence of pleasure and pain of both kinds.

The mixture of pleasure and pain shows itself also due to the relation between body and soul and Plato actually distinguishes between these mixtures in body and soul separately, as well as in body and soul taken together. We can focus first on the bodily processes:

> *Socrates*: When someone undergoes restoration or destruction he experiences two opposed conditions at once. He may feel hot while shivering or feel chilled while sweating. I suppose he will then want to retain one of these conditions and get rid of the other. But if this so called bittersweet condition (πικρῷ γλυκὺ μεμειγμένον) is hard to shake, it first causes irritation and later on turns into wild excitement.[553]

What we learn here in addition to the discussion of the mixture of body and soul above is the characterisation of the 'mixed state'.[554] When feeling pleasure and pain at the same time, our overall state can be characterised as a bittersweet condition in which pain and pleasure can be of even amount or there can be a predominance of one of them. Then we usually say that we are in pleasure or in pain, depending on which of them is stronger.[555] This kind of mixture is different from the one connected to hunger or thirst in that it does not take into account anticipatory pleasures or pains but is based on the mixture of actual pleasure of pain. Both pleasure and pain, in this case, are to be characterised as bodily ones, since they are caused by some bodily condition. The mixture of pleasure and pain can arise in the soul itself, too.:

> *Socrates*: But here we are still left with one further kind of mixture of pleasure and pain (ἡμῖν τῶν μείξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπὴ μία).
> *Protarchus*: Tell me what it is.
> *Socrates*: The case, a common one, where the mixture (σύγκρασιν) is the product of affections within the soul itself, as we said before.
> *Protarchus*: What was it again that we said?

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[553] *Phlb.* 46c6-d2

[554] The idea of mixture plays, in general, an important role in Plato's philosophy, in explaining phenomena such as health and disease (see e.g. *Symp.* 188a4-b3 *Phd.* 111b1-6, *Ti.* 24c4-7, *Phlb.* 48a1-6, 50c10-d2, 64d9-e3, 82a1-4) and there is a clear inspiration by the medical conceptions of mixture there. The concept of the mixture in the context of the relation of pleasure and pain is analysed by Erginel (2019) and Linka (2023b).

[555] *Phlb.* 46b8-47a9.

Socrates: Take wrath, fear, longing, lamentations, love, jealousy, malice (ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον), and other things like that; don't you regard them as a kind of pain within the soul itself?

Protarchus: I certainly do.

Socrates: And don't we find that they are full of marvellous pleasures (αὐτὰς ἡδονῶν μεστὰς εὑρήσομεν ἀμηχάνων)? Or do we need the famous lines as a reminder about wrath (τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ὀργαῖς):

That can embitter even the wise
But much sweeter than soft-flowing honey

Similarly, in the case of lamentations and longing, aren't there also pleasures mixed in with the pain (θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὔσας ἀναμεμειγμένας)?

Protarchus: No need for further reminders; in all these cases it must be just as you said.

Socrates: And the same happens in those who watch tragedies: There is laughter mixed with the weeping (χαίροντες κλάωσι), if you remember.[556]

In this passage the area of what Plato calls pain is very broad since it includes what we would call nowadays emotions.[557] Important is the fact that these 'pains within the soul itself' are also blended with pleasures and give origin to mixtures such as wrath or the feeling we have when watching tragedy (expression χαίροντες κλάωσι can be taken as the emotional equivalent of the bittersweet condition of the body discussed above). It seems that in the mixtures of pleasure and pain of the soul, a similar distinction can be made as in the mixtures of pleasure and pain in the body. In relation to the amount of the particular parts of the mixture, we can characterise the actual state as pleasurable, painful, or bittersweet. There are other examples of such mixtures belonging to the soul itself. One of them is connected to malice (φθόνος). While it is pleasurable and just to rejoice about evils happening to our enemies,[558] in the case of evils happening to our friends it is not so:

Socrates: If we laugh at what is ridiculous about our friends, by mixing pleasure with malice, we thereby mix pleasure with pain (κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν αὖ φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν συγκεραννύναι). For we had agreed earlier that malice is a pain in the soul (φθόνον λύπην ψυχῆς),

[556] *Phlb.* 47e5-48a10.

[557] At many places, we can find the word λύπη used for describing emotions, such as sorrow, grief, emotional distress, etc. See e.g., *Ap*. 21e3-22a1, *Ap*. 41e2-6, *Cri*. 43b4, *Phdr*. 232c3, *Phdr*. 233b2, *Phdr*. 251c1-5, *Phdr*. 251c8, *Phdr*. 251d1-e3, *Lach*. 188e3 *Menex*. 247b7, 248a6.

[558] *Phlb.* 49d1-5.

that laughing is a pleasure (τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν), and that both occur together on those occasions.[559]

Finally, mixtures of pleasure and pain in the soul are at the heart of not only tragedy, which was already mentioned but of comedy as well:

Socrates: Now, what precisely do you think was the purpose for which I pointed out to you this mixture in comedy (ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μεῖξιν)? Don't you see that it was designed to make it easier to persuade you that there is such a mixture in fear and love and other cases (τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κρᾶσιν)? I hoped that once you had accepted this you would release me from a protracted discussion of the rest—once the main point was understood, that there exists the possibility, for the body without the soul, for the soul without the body, and for both of them in a joint affection, to contain a mixture of pleasure and pain (ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις).[560]

…

It is clear that for Plato, it is important to emphasise the fact that pleasure and pain often, if not usually, appear in a mixture. One of the motives for underlining this fact was already mentioned: Plato needs to establish that pleasure and goodness are not identical. However, by focusing on this particular feature of pleasure and pain, he proves to be an attentive observer of the way human beings experience the world. Even though his philosophy, at least in the dialogues such as *Phaedo* and *Republic* can be with some simplifications characterised as an attempt to seek the perfection, ideal and undisturbed state of the soul, in the quotes I analysed here he shows that he is aware of what is the normal and everyday way we live. The feeling of pleasure and pain is natural to human beings, but Plato does not show only that. He shows also that pleasure and pain scarcely appear separately and that their mixtures, actually, most fully express our experience. The observation that these mixtures can appear on the level of the body itself, soul itself, or the compound of the body and soul is also a valuable fact contributing to our comprehension of these phenomena and relations between the two constitutive parts of human beings, i.e., body and soul. It also seems that the observation that pain and pleasure are usually constituting one mixed experience, plays different roles in different dialogues. In the *Phaedo*, the *Republic,* or the *Gorgias*, Plato seeks primarily to support by it the contention that pleasure cannot be identified with goodness. In the *Philebus*, *Timaeus,* and the *Laws*, he is rather

[559] *Phlb.* 50a5-9.

[560] *Phlb.* 50c10-e2.

emphasising that the mixture of pleasure and pain is a natural component of our everyday life and that we should be aware of it in our moral decisions and seek the mixtures where pleasure is prevalent.

Yet, one could easily object that Plato's theory of pleasure and pain conceived of as filling and emptying has got a major weakness in the fact that in many cases we feel pleasure, and enjoy something, but do not feel any preceding pain. In everyday life we usually do not starve before every meal: we eat, have pleasure from it, but do not experience pain from hunger. Plato addresses this problem in *Philebus* and asks "whether all living creatures in all cases notice it whenever they are affected in some way" (πότερον ἀεὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα πάσχει τι τῶν ἐμψύχων, ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον).[561] His partner in the dialogue answers negatively: Almost all of these "processes totally escape our notice" (ὀλίγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθ' ἡμᾶς).[562] So far, pleasure and pain were characterised as motions from or to the natural state.[563] Now it is specified that they are evoked by changes (μεταβολαί).[564] These two accounts are easily compatible: motion from or to the natural state is a change of my actual state. For any sensation to be felt, be it sense-perception, pleasure, or pain, a change that the body undergoes must be big enough for us to be aware of it. If the change is violent and unnatural, moving us from the natural state, we feel pain. If, on the other hand, it is intensive and moves us back to its natural state, it is pleasurable. There can also be changes that are mild and gradual and these are not necessarily perceived. We can thus feel pleasure even without our previous feeling of pain:

> The most important point that remains concerning the properties that have a common effect upon the body as a whole, pertains to the causes of pleasures and pains in the cases we have described as well as all cases in which sensations (κατὰ παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἀναισθήτου παθήματος) are registered throughout the bodily parts, sensations which are also simultaneously accompanied by pains and pleasures in those parts (καὶ ὅσα διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων αἰσθήσεις κεκτημένα καὶ λύπας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡδονάς θ' ἅμα ἑπομένας ἔχει). With every property, whether perceived or not, let us take up the question of the causes of pleasure or pain in the following way ... When even a minor disturbance affects that which is easily moved by nature (τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν εὐκίνητον, ὅταν καὶ βραχὺ πάθος εἰς αὐτὸ ἐμπίπτῃ), the disturbance is passed on in a chain reaction with some parts affecting others in the same way as they were affected, until it reaches

[561] *Phlb.* 43b1-2.

[562] *Phlb.* 43b5-6.

[563] See also *Resp.* 9. 583e9-10.

[564] *Phlb.* 43b10.

> the center of consciousness and reports the property that produced the reaction. ... This, then, is what we should understand about pleasure and pain: an unnatural disturbance that comes upon us with great force and intensity is painful, while its equally intense departure, leading back to the natural state, is pleasant. One that is mild and gradual is not perceived, whereas the opposite is the case with the opposite disturbance (τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ ἡρέμα καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀναίσθητον, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τούτοις ἐναντίως).[565]

In a similar vein, Plato explains in *Philebus* why we do not feel every affection:

> Great changes cause pleasures and pains in us, while moderate or small ones engender neither of the two effects (Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δ' αὖ μέτριαί τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων.).[566]

This clarification allows Plato to introduce a kind of 'true pleasures' that are characterised by the fact that the lack we feel in hunger or thirst is "imperceptible and painless" (ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους), while their "fulfilments are perceptible and pleasant" (τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας).[567] As examples of these true pleasures, Plato enumerates "pure colors and to shapes and to most smells and sound" (τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν).[568] Besides these pleasures connected to sense-perception, are of course "pleasures of learning" (τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονάς), because the "lack of knowledge never causes us any pain" (χωρὶς λύπης ἡμῖν λήθη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν).[569]

Establishing the category of pure or right pleasures allows Plato to support his main argument in *Philebus*, namely that the life of knowledge is more valuable than the life of pleasure and that this life is not utterly devoid of pleasures;[570] only the pleasures inherent to it are of a special kind. Yet, even in the case of this kind of pleasure, pain has its say. Plato attempts to apply his model of pleasure and pain to all types of pleasures since he still needs to hold the impossibility of identification of pleasure and goodness. Thus, even in the case of pure pleasures, there is a preceding loss, though it is painless and unfelt. Plato characterises the pure

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[565] *Ti.* 64a1-65b3.

[566] *Phlb.* 43c4-6.

[567] *Phlb.* 51a4-b7.

[568] *Phlb.* 51b3-4. For pure pleasures, see *Phlb.* 53b8-c2, *Resp.* 9. 583b5-9. See also Irwin (1995) 292-294, Gosling and Tylor (1982) 107-109, Parry (2010) 221-224, Jorgenson (2018) 105-6, 131, Arenson (2019) 12-28, Rangos (2019) 213-215, Warren (2019) 184-201.

[569] *Phlb.* 52b4-5.

[570] *Phlb.* 67a14-15.

pleasures of sense-perception and knowledge as 'right'. At another place in the *Philebus*, he distinguishes between right and false pleasures and pains, though in a slightly different sense.

> *Socrates*: Do you really want to claim that there is no one who, either in a dream or awake, either in madness or any other delusion, sometimes believes he is enjoying himself, while in reality he is not doing so, or believes he is in pain while he is not (Οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ οὔθ' ὕπαρ, ὡς φῄς, [ἐστιν] οὔτ' ἐν μανίαις οὔτ' ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθ' ὅστις ποτὲ δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδ' αὖ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι,λυπεῖται δ' οὔ.)?[571]

The fact that I feel something as pleasurable or as painful can be thus influenced by a variety of factors, which are all connected to our mental states: I can be dreaming or mentally deranged. We can assume, however, that not only do dreaming or pathological states influence our perception of pleasure and pain, but the state of our soul in general. This claim is supported by the evidence cited above, that the soul is aware of pain. Soul, however, is not the same in everyone: it can be more or less educated, more or less virtuous or vicious, etc. It is thus probable that the quality of our soul influences the way in which we feel pleasure and pain, which things we feel as painful or as pleasurable, and in what intensity. After all, we shall see in the next section that one of the main tasks of education in relation to pleasure and pain is to learn to feel pleasure and pain appropriately, to be pleased by the good things, and to be pained by the bad ones. In the next section I will focus on the role pain plays in education and in moral life in general. We have already seen above that Plato argues against a straightforward identification of pain with badness. Some pains are necessary, and some are better to suffer since abstaining from them would lead to acting shamefully. However, he goes a step further and shows that some pains can be even described as beneficial under certain circumstances. He attempts, thus, to integrate a phenomenon that at first sight seems bad and unnatural to morally good and happy human life.

3.4 Pain, Education, and Moral Life

In both Plato's dialogue about the ideal city, the *Republic,* and the *Laws*, one of the tasks of the main interlocutors, Socrates and the Athenian, is to establish what the character of the citizens, especially the guardians, should be. Their education, both musical and gymnastic, should lead to forming their soul in the best possible manner, which shows itself in their task of preserving

[571] *Phlb.* 36e5-8.

the city from both external and internal enemies and promoting its welfare.[572] The principal character trait needed for accomplishing this task is courage:

> Then, you should understand that, as far as we could, we were doing something similar when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music and physical training (μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ). What we were contriving was nothing other than this: That because they had the proper nature and upbringing, they would absorb the laws in the finest possible way, just like a dye, so that their belief about what they should fear and all the rest (αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα γίγνοιτο καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων) would become so fast that even such extremely effective detergents as pleasure, pain, fear, and desire (ἡδονή λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπιθυμία) wouldn't wash it out—and pleasure is much more potent than any powder, washing soda, or soap. This power to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about what is to be feared and what isn't is what I call courage (παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν τε πέρι καὶ μὴ ἀνδρείαν ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι), unless, of course, you say otherwise.[573]

Fear, here expressed literally as 'belief about what is to be feared' (δόξα περὶ δεινῶν), was above characterised as a pain of the soul. Courageous people prove their courage in facing fear. To be courageous does not mean to be reckless, do not feel fear at all. It rather means to fear only the things that should be feared. For Socrates in prison, for example, it seems absurd to fear death since he believes that his soul is immortal, and a good destiny awaits it. For the guardians, it is appropriate to feel the right amount of fear in facing the enemies of the city which endows them with the ability to calculate realistically what action should be done and not to act recklessly. Both absolute absence and absolute presence of fear are thus destructive. Courage manifests itself not only in relation to pain but also to pleasure and to the mixture of pleasure and pain. We can suppose that the courageous person does not fear the loss of some excessive and unnatural pleasures, such as wealth, luxury, etc. As already mentioned, courage is a product of proper education. In the model of the soul proposed in the *Republic*, courage belongs to the spirited part (θυμοειδὲς μέρος), a part of the soul which should be formed by the right education to listen to the reasonable part of the soul. Thus "we call a single individual

[572] In the *Republic*, Plato is very critical of the positive effect of music education on the virtues of the guardians. See for example *Resp*. 10. 606d1-7, 10. 607a5-8. A possible inspiration of Plato's educational project in medicine is summarised by T. Tracy: "The whole educational process of body and soul is conceived as a kind of dietetics and gymnastics." Tracy (1969) 140.

[573] *Resp.* 4. 429e7-430b5, cf. *Resp.* 4. 429c5-d2, *Lach.* 191d3-e7, *Lach*. 192b5-8, *Leg.* 5. 734c3-e2.

courageous, namely when it preserves through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared (δεινόν) and what isn't."[574]

In order to acquire the virtue of courage, pleasure, and pain play a particular role. On the one hand, brave people show their courage in the proper evaluation of what is fearful, on the other hand, pleasure and pain help them to become courageous. So if we want to properly educate the guardians of the city and – one may add – in general anyone to be courageous, we must confront them with pleasure and pain:

> We said, if you remember, that they must show themselves to be lovers of their city (φιλοπόλιδάς) when tested by pleasure and pain (βασανιζομένους ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις) and that they must hold on to their resolve through labors, fears, and all other adversities (καὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μήτ' ἐν πόνοις μήτ' ἐν φόβοις μήτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας).[575]

Pain, labours, and fears, thus, even though by themselves something bad, avoidable, and dangerous, play a necessary role in the right education. Similarly, as one cannot expect to do well in a physical contest without previous gymnastic training, the guardians cannot stand a chance in facing real pains, pleasures, and fears if they did not face them before during their education. If we do not make the citizens to face pleasures and pains during their education, as some politicians discussed by Plato did to their children, they will become "fond of luxury, incapable of effort either mental or physical, too soft to stand up to pleasures or pains, and idle besides (ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀργούς)".[576]

Plato's emphasis on the importance of courage for the good life of both individuals and the city is based on the contention that this virtue is an important (maybe the most important) tool we have in defence of our soul against its corruption and harm:

> *Athenian*: You've put it all very well, my Spartan friend. But what is our definition of courage? Are we to define it simply in terms of a fight against fears and pains only, or do we include desires and pleasures, which cajole and seduce us so effectively? They mould the heart like wax—even the hearts of those who loftily believe themselves superior to such influences.
>
> *Megillus*: Yes, I think so—the fight is against all these feelings.
>
> *Athenian*: Now, if we remember aright what was said earlier on, our friend from Cnossus spoke of a city and an individual as 'conquered by' themselves. Isn't that right?

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[574] *Resp.* 4. 442b11-c3.

[575] *Resp.* 6. 502e2-503a2. See also *Resp.* 3. 413d3.

[576] *Resp.* 8. 556b6-c1.

Clinias: Surely.

Athenian: Well, shall we call 'bad' only the man who is 'conquered by' pains, or shall we include the victim of pleasures as well?

Clinias: The term 'bad' we apply, I think, to the victim of pleasures even more than to the other. When we say that a man has been shamefully 'conquered by' himself, we are all, I fancy, much more likely to mean someone defeated by pleasures than by pains.[577]

Since pleasures, pain, desires, and fears can so heavily affect our soul, courage is a necessary weapon in conquering them. And since courage is no natural disposition but rather something acquired by education, enduring pain and fears (pain of the soul) is a necessity for every citizen. Plato is aware of this fact and tries to integrate it into the legislation of the city in *Laws*. The Athenian mentions the practice of facing pains and pleasures during education and leading the citizens to overcome pains by force, persuasion, or awards:

Athenian: We ought to mention next what practices exist in your two cities that give a man a taste of pleasure rather than teach him how to avoid it—you remember how a man could not avoid pains, but was surrounded by them, and then forced, or persuaded by awards of honor, to get the better of them.[578]

Yet when it came to pains and fears, your legislator reckoned that if a man ran away from them on every occasion from his earliest years and was then faced with hardships, pains and fears he could not avoid, he would likewise run away from any enemies who had received such a training, and become their slaves. I think this same lawgiver ought to have taken this same line in the case of pleasures too.[579]

If we do not follow the "recommendations and advice of the legislator (παρὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ ἔπαινον)" we are actually acting against the best part of ourselves "not honoring our soul at all, but dishonoring it, by filling it with misery and repentance" (τότε οὐδαμῶς τιμᾷ, ἀτιμάζει δὲ κακῶν καὶ μεταμελείας ἐμπιμπλὰς αὐτήν). If we do not endure "the recommended toils and fears and troubles and pains (πόνους καὶ φόβους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ λύπας), and simply give up … we bring disgrace upon our soul".[580]

In practice, to prevent these outcomes, such encounters with pleasures and pains leading to acquiring virtues should start already in the earliest stages of life. The capacity of feeling

[577] *Leg.* 1. 633c8-634a5. For an interpretation of pleasure and pain in the *Laws,* see Irwin (1995) 342-5.

[578] *Leg.* 1. 634a5-b6.

[579] *Leg.* 1. 635b6-c4.

[580] *Leg.* 5. 727c1-d2. Translation slightly modified.

pleasure and pain, which is natural to human beings is actually necessary for forming emotions, which are, in general, pleasures and pains of the soul or their mixtures:

> *Athenian*: I maintain that the earliest sensations (πρώτην αἴσθησιν) that a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul (ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον). (But for a man to acquire good judgment, and unshakable correct opinions, however late in life, is a matter of good luck: a man who possesses them, and all the benefits they entail, is perfect.) I call 'education' the initial acquisition of virtue by the child (παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν), when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in the right courses (ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται) before he can understand the reason why. Then when he does understand, his reason and his emotions agree in telling him that he has been properly trained by inculcation of appropriate habits. Virtue is this general concord of reason and emotion (ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή). But there is one element you could isolate in any account you give, and this is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, which makes us hate what we ought to hate (ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν) from first to last, and love what we ought to love. Call this 'education', and I, at any rate, think you would be giving it its proper name.[581]

This passage is valuable since we learn here that acting virtuously does not consist only in the ability of the spirited part of the soul to listen to the rational part, but that, in children, virtues are formed by the right education even though the children do not yet understand the reason (λόγος) why they should behave in the way indicated by laws or educators. Only later do they gain the rational abilities to understand the reason for the right behaviour. Hopefully, a properly educated citizen, in the end, becomes "wise" (σοφός) and keeps his feelings of pleasure and pain in tune with the right reason and obedient to it (τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας κεκτημένον συμφώνους τοῖς ὀρθοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἑπομένας).[582] In contrast to that, "disaccord between his feelings of pleasure and pain and his rational judgment constitutes the very lowest depth of ignorance (ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην)".[583]

Also, this passage says explicitly that pleasure and pain are necessary conditions not only for the existence of vices but also of virtues. We could not be virtuous, courageous, just, moderate, etc., if we did not have the ability to feel pleasure and pain. Pain is not to be

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[581] *Leg.* 2. 653a5-c4. Cf. *Leg.* 2. 659c8-660a8, *Leg.* 6. 782d10-783b1, *Leg.* 7. 788a5-b4.

[582] *Leg.* 3. 696c8-10.

[583] *Leg.* 3. 689a7-9.

avoided in all circumstances, as a tyrannical man does,[584] but rather to be mastered.[585] Also, pain is not only a necessary component in forming a healthy character, but also, as a punishment, to correct the corrupt one.[586] Thus, even though we have repeatedly seen that pain is something bad we want to avoid, philosophy is able to integrate it to human life and offer ways in which we can see pain as beneficial or at least contributing to good.

If the role of courage, and by implication of fear and pain is so big in the legislation and moral life of the citizens, it is not surprising to read from Plato a following statement:

> When men investigate legislation, they investigate almost exclusively pleasures and pains as they affect society and the character of the individual (πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις περί τε τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας ἔν τε πόλεσιν καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις ἤθεσιν). Pleasure and pain, you see, flow like two springs released by nature. If a man draws the right amount from the right one at the right time, he lives a happy life (ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀρυτόμενος ὅθεν τε δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε καὶ ὁπόσον εὐδαιμονεῖ, καὶ πόλις ὁμοίως καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ ζῷον ἅπαν); but if he draws unintelligently at the wrong time, his life will be rather different. State and individual and every living being are on the same footing here.[587]

This passage summarises various features of Plato's usage of pain discussed above. It underlines the fact that a correct understanding of pleasure and pain is of utmost importance for a legislator, thus for anyone who wants to show what a good city should be. The legislator is aware that pleasure and pain are natural to be felt and that their relevance for a morally good life is significant, as we saw when we discussed courage. The character of the individual is formed in his encounters with pleasure and pain, and, the correct education, it will lead to forming a good, virtuous, and noble character. Pleasure and pain are thus necessary for acting morally well. If it is, Plato's discussion of them in the context of morality corroborates his rejection of identifying pleasure with goodness and pain with badness. In Plato's ethics, thus, pain can play a beneficiary role or at least a role of a means which is unpleasant but leads to something good. This feature of pain is discussed in the last section of this chapter where we focus on the relation between pain and exercise.

[584] *Leg.* 9. 875b1-c2.

[585] *Leg.* 9. 863e4-864b4.

[586] *Leg.* 9. 862d1-e1.

[587] *Leg.* 1. 636d4-e3.

3.5 Pain and Exercise

Similarly as in the last section of the previous chapter, let us now focus on the ambivalent word πόνος and the relation between exercise and pain. I will show that Plato develops both his contention that something painful can have a positive role in acquiring something good and also the way πόνος is discussed in the dietetic treatises.

In Plato's dialogues, πόνος is used quite consistently in the meaning of toil, hardship, labour or something tiresome; only marginally it is used in the sense of pain and suffering. Activities, such as Socrates' visits to various craftsmen and professionals described in the *Apology* are characterised as labours (πόνους),[588] and similarly in other dialogues, this word is used for work, job, task or effort;[589] in these passages, πόνος is not necessarily hard, difficult or tiresome. However, in the majority of instances, πόνος bears exactly these qualities and it is best rendered as toil or labour, in the sense of hard physical work[590] or tiresome activity of the soul.[591] In many passages, πόνος expresses some unspecified troubles connected to human life in this world.[592]

In Plato's educational project as it is presented in his last dialogue *Laws*, πόνος plays an important role and, what is more, in the context of this dialogue, it is possible to find various similarities with the 'Hippocratic' treatise *On Regimen.* According to Plato's account in the *Laws*, education consists in making both body and soul "as handsome and fine" (ὡς κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα) as possible.[593] From early childhood, "appropriately graded exercises" (πόνων χωρὶς πολλῶν καὶ συμμέτρων) are necessary for avoiding "a lot of trouble for the body" (μυρία κακά).[594] Importance of exercise lies in its effect on nourishment: we need to exercise because it enables our "body to assimilate its solid and liquid food so that we grow healthy and

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[588] *Ap*. 22a7.

[589] *Leg.* 7. 794d8, 7. 805b1, 7. 823c 7, 8. 835d8; *Phil.* 59a9; *Resp.* 5. 451d8, 6. 504d1, 8. 561a8, *Soph.* 218a8, 230a8.

[590] *Leg.* 1. 635c1, 2. 653d2, 3. 686a2, 4. 713e6, 5. 727c5, 6. 761d2, 6. 779a6, 7. 788d10, 8. 841a7, 10. 903a2, 12. 960e5; *Menex.* 238a8; *Phdr.* 229d4; *Phil.* 56a1; *Resp.* 2. 369e5, 2. 371e2, 2. 380e5, 3. 410b8, 3. 413d3, 6. 486c10, 6. 503a3, 6. 503d12, 7. 519d6, 7. 520b3, 7. 531a3, 7. 531d2, 7. 535c1, 7. 535d4, 7. 536d2, 7. 536e1, 7. 537a9; *Symp.* 210e6, 219e7; *Ti.* 40d3, 42c4, 70d5, 87e3.

[591] *Grg.* 493e3; *Phdr.* 245b5.

[592] *Leg.* 5. 732c7, 5. 736b4, 6. 779a7, 7. 815e1; *Phd*. 78a6 *Phdr.* 231b4, 238a9, 244d5, 245b5, 248b4, 252b1, 255e6, *Resp*. 2. 365b6, 2. 654e10.

[593] *Leg.* 7. 788c6-8.

[594] *Leg.* 7. 788d10-a2. For "a due proportion" (αἱ ξυμμετρίαι/συμμετρίαι) in *On Regimen*, see *Vict*. 1.2 (6.470 L = 124.2-20 Joly-Byl), 2.66 (6.586 L = 190.14-15 Joly-Byl).

handsome and strong" (καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὰς τῶν σίτων τροφὰς καὶ ποτῶν κατακρατοῦντα, ὑγίειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην ἡμῖν δυνατά ἐστι παραδιδόναι).[595] Surprisingly, not only children or adults should exercise, but pregnant women, too, in order to provide healthy development for their yet-unborn children.[596] In general, exercises (πόνοι) are helpful since for everyone holds true that "all bodies find it helpful and invigorating to be shaken by movements and joltings of all kinds, whether the motion is due to their own efforts or they are carried on a vehicle or boat or horse or any other mode of conveyance."[597]

Exercise leads not only to bodily development but to increasing virtues of the soul, such as courage, as well.[598] Both luxury – i.e. lack of exercise – and its opposite, namely too strenuous and excessive exercise lead to detrimental character traits.[599] Exercise helps to maintain a balance between pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (λύπη), which is important for the development of a healthy body and character.[600] Exercises, together with food and drink play an important role in maintaining health which can be endangered if there is a too abrupt a change in our regimen:[601] "[T]he regimen and the flesh form a kind of partnership, so that the body grows used to this congenial and familiar system, and lives a life of perfect happiness and health."[602] Similarly as in *On Regimen*, for Plato, too, the regimen consists of the right nourishment and exercise.[603]

Similarities between the notion of exercise in book 7 of Plato's *Laws* and of 'Hippocratic' *On Regimen* are clear: the authors of both these books share the view that regimen

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[595] *Leg.* 7. 789d5-7.

[596] *Leg.* 7. 789a8-9.

[597] *Leg.* 7. 789d1-5. ὅτι τὰ σώματα πάντα ὑπὸ τῶν σεισμῶν τε καὶ κινήσεων κινούμενα ἄκοπα ὀνίναται πάντων, ὅσα τε ὑπὸ ἑαυτῶν, ἢ καὶ ἐν αἰώραις ἢ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, ἢ καὶ ἐφ' ἵππων ὀχουμένων καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων ὁπωσοῦν δὴ φερομένων τῶν σωμάτων, κινεῖται.

[598] *Leg.* 7. 791b10-c6. Cf. 7. 807d3. Even though Plato uses γυμναστική at 791c5, it seems that its meaning is in this context the same as the meaning of πόνος, since both words designate motional exercise leading to the development of the human body and soul. Yet, later in the same book, it seems that πόνος is more general than γυμναστική, since the letter includes only dancing (ὄρχησις) and wrestling (πάλη) (*Leg.* 7. 795e1), whereas the former includes some others as well, that are "beneath the dignity of a gentleman" (οὐκ ἐλευθέρων) (*Leg.* 7. 796d3-6). Cf. 7. 823c5-7, 7. 824a4.

[599] *Leg.* 7. 791d5-9.

[600] *Leg.* 7. 792c7-e7.

[601] *Leg.* 7. 797d8-798d5.

[602] *Leg.* 7. 797d5-798a2. ἔπειτ' ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων ὑπὸ χρόνου σάρκας φύσαντα οἰκείας τούτοις, φίλα τε καὶ συνήθη καὶ γνώριμα γενόμενα ἀπάσῃ ταύτῃ τῇ διαίτῃ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ὑγίειαν ἄριστα διάγει.

[603] *Leg.* 7. 807d3.

consists of proper nourishment and exercise and that it contributes to maintaining health. Exercises described in the *Laws* play an important role in Plato's educational project and even though they are primarily connected to bodily development, they lead to a healthy development of individual human beings only when they are connected with the cultivation of the soul.[604] At the physiological level, exercises are connected to motions and, again similar to what we have already seen in *On Regimen*, when excessive or changing too abruptly, they are harmful.[605] Not only the passages from the *Laws*, but the way in which πόνος is used in other dialogues, too, shows more resemblance to the medical treatises in which πόνος is used for hard work and exercise than to these treatises in which it used for designating pain. This seems to indicate that Plato could have been inspired by the 'Hippocratic' treatise *On Regimen* not only in considering that regimen consists of proper nourishment and exercise but also in the way he used the word πόνος, namely *not* in the sense of pain. Both Plato and the author of *On Regimen* use for expressing pain other words, in the case of Plato, mainly λύπη.

Another context in which the reader of Plato could expect a discussion about πόνος is a part of the *Timaeus* where Plato proposes his theory of bodily and psychic activities contributing to maintaining health.[606] Even though πόνος is used only once in this passage (probably in the sense of tiresome work of bodily limbs),[607] the idea that activity or movement of body and soul is crucial for maintaining health, is present there. Also, an emphasis on the right balance between the activities of the soul and the activities of the body shows a clear dietetic heritage:

> The mathematician, then, or the ardent devotee of any other intellectual discipline should also provide exercise for his body (τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν) by taking part in gymnastics (γυμναστικῇ προσομιλοῦντα), while one who takes care to develop his body should in his turn practice the

[604] In Democritus, πόνος also plays an important role in the educational process, as well: "Children who are allowed not to take pains (μὴ πονεῖν ἀνιέντες) ... would not learn letters or music or athletics or respect, which above all maintains virtue (μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν συνέχει." Democritus, B 179 = Stobaeus II.31.57, Taylor 1999, 21 (see above pp. 45-46).

[605] For negative outcomes of repeating or persisting πόνοι on the human body and soul, see also *Ti.* 81d4-6: "Eventually the interlocking bonds of the triangles around the marrow can no longer hold on, and come apart under stress (τῷ πόνῳ), and when this happens they let the bonds of the soul go."

[606] *Ti.* 86b-90a.

[607] *Ti.* 87e3, cf. *Resp.* 3. 411e1-10 and a commentary in Johansen (2004) 156.

exercises of the soul (τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις) by applying himself to the arts and to every pursuit of wisdom, if he is to truly deserve the joint epithets of 'fine and good.'[608]

Even though the terminology of *Timaeus* and *On Regimen* differ, the letter using for activities the word πόνοι, the former κινήσεις, both these treatises share the idea that bodily motions or activities are important for healthy life and, Timaeus claims, any type of soul that is "idle and keeps its motions inactive (ἐν ἀργίᾳ διάγον) cannot but become very weak, while one that keeps exercising (τὸ δ' ἐν γυμνασίοις) becomes very strong".[609] In contrast to *On Regimen* (and to the *Laws* as well), Plato does not talk here about the relevance of nourishment for maintaining health, so that the balance and symmetry is no longer between the activity and nourishment, but between activities of the body and activities of the soul. He specifies what activities or bodily movements (κινήσεις) one should practise.[610] The best motion is the one that "occurs within oneself and is caused by oneself (ἡ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὑφ' αὑτοῦ)".[611] Then there is a motion caused "by the agency of something else" and the worst motions "moves, part by part, a passive body in a state of rest".[612] The best motion is thus equivalent to physical exercises (γυμνασία).[613] Timaeus also mentions a peculiar type of movement induced "by the rocking motion of sea travel or travel in any other kind of conveyance that doesn't tire (ἄκοποι) one out".[614] Finally, he talks about a motion that should be done only "in an occasional instance of dire need," namely "medical purging by drugs (τὸ τῆς φαρμακευτικῆς καθάρσεως)".[615]

Even though the word πόνος itself is not at the core of Plato's dietetic theory in the *Timaeus*, the idea that activity in general, and physical motion, in particular, is important for a healthy life, is clearly present in the analysed passages. Although Plato here shifts considerably basic dietetics concepts, leaves out nourishment, and emphasises the activities of the soul, inspiration by *On Regimen* or another dietetic treatise is clear. Together with educational passages in the *Laws*, dietetic passages in the *Timaeus* confirm the influence of medical ideas on his philosophical inquiries. In the context of our analysis of πόνος, we can clearly see that Plato uses it similarly to the dietetics authors, even though he sometimes, especially in the

[608] *Ti*. 88b5-6.

[609] *Ti.* 89e3-90a1.

[610] *Ti.* 89a1-b3.

[611] *Ti.* 89a1-2.

[612] *Ti.* 89a3-5.

[613] *Ti.* 89a6.

[614] *Ti.* 89a7-8.

[615] *Ti.* 89b2-3.

Timaeus, does not use πόνος itself, but rather some relative notions, such as motion (κίνησις) or physical exercise (γυμνασία).

Conclusion

Plato offers more explicit responses to our research questions - what is pain, what kinds of pain exist, and what is the meaning of pain - than the 'Hippocratic' authors. His approach to pain, however, centres around a single central issue: what role does pain play in human life? Plato's attempts to differentiate between pleasure and goodness demonstrate that pain, as the opposite of pleasure, can be understood as a disintegration of our natural state. Although Plato emphasizes the relationship between pleasure and pain, he also underlines that pain cannot be solely identified with badness, since some pains can be good. Therefore, distinguishing between various types of pain, such as actual and anticipatory, bodily and of the soul, is necessary. These distinctions allow Plato to emphasize the common phenomenon of the mixture of pleasure and soul on different levels of our experience, including body, soul, and their compound.

Plato explains that despite the pleasurable sensation that usually accompanies this mixture, courage, which is characterized by both pleasure (from virtuous actions) and pain (from fear and injury), is an example of a phenomenon that requires an understanding of both pain and pleasure. Courage and other virtues are integral components of the moral life, and individuals must confront fearful and painful situations to develop virtuous character. Pain, therefore, plays a significant role in moral education that cannot be replaced by anything else. While its unpleasantness and badness are acknowledged, it is integrated into the moral life that people should live. As a result, pain, together with pleasure, becomes one of the key interests of legislators and moral philosophers due to their significant impact on the character of individuals and cities. Discussions of the nature of pain and its various types are merely a means of establishing the correct character of citizens.

If Plato's writings on pain are examined closely, one may conclude that his general motivation for discussing pain is driven by therapeutic purposes. In contrast to the 'Hippocratic' authors, for whom pain was primarily a bodily phenomenon, Plato emphasizes the emotional and psychic aspects of pain more heavily. However, a general motivation for writing about pain could be characterized in a similar way: in order to restore and maintain health, it is necessary to lead a certain type of life, engage in certain activities, and abstain from others, even if those activities or abstentions are unpleasant, arduous, or even painful. To lead a morally good life, and to have a healthy, virtuous, and noble soul that facilitates such a life, the right education is

necessary. Facing and overcoming painful experiences are essential components of such an education. Throughout life, the cultivation of our souls through virtuous actions and the selection of noble pain over shameful pleasure is necessary to maintain soul health. Finally, when depravity occurs, philosophical guidance back to the truth, even if it is painful, is necessary. In both medicine and Plato's philosophy, health has the greatest value; for physicians, the health of the body is paramount, while for Plato, the health of the soul is the primary focus. Both philosophy and medicine demonstrate how pain can be integrated into our lives to aid in gaining, maintaining, and restoring health.

4. Aristotle

Introduction

Aristotle's approach to pain shares many similarities with that of Plato. Both authors highlight the concept that pleasure and pain are typically viewed as opposing phenomena. Furthermore, they both focus more on the role of the soul in experiencing pain over the physiological and medical aspects of pain that are present in the 'Hippocratic' writings. [616] Additionally, both authors recognize the significance of integrating pain into their ethical theories. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Plato introduced several perspectives on pain that were not as prevalent in medical literature. In Aristotle's case, we observe an elaboration and critique of the concepts that his teacher previously discussed.[617] This does not imply that Aristotle fails to introduce novel perspectives on pain, but rather that he expands upon Plato's ideas within the established framework. Aristotle provides a more nuanced analysis of pain in several respects, but generally views it through a similar lens as Plato.

The forthcoming chapter will follow a structure similar to the preceding one. To begin with, I will focus on the inquiry of what constitutes pain. As with Plato, this question is closely linked to the nature of pleasure. While I have also discussed pleasure in Plato, a more detailed examination is necessary when exploring Aristotle's perspectives. Plato's approach posits pleasure and pain as opposites that can be primarily characterized as motions towards or away from the natural state. However, Aristotle's approach to pleasure is more complex. As we have seen, Plato views pleasure as frequently being linked to something negative or painful, whereas Aristotle holds pleasure in high regard. In fact, Aristotle argues that the finest activities that humans are capable of are actually pleasurable and that the pleasure itself is good.[618] This suggests that pleasure encompasses more than just fulfilling a need or restoring balance. Consequently, this shift in the conception of pleasure may imply a corresponding shift in the understanding of pain. I will assert that although pain can be interpreted in Aristotle's work

[616] See Cheng (2015) 334: "'Pain' in Aristotle stands for a vast family of sufferings – big and small – that afflict people. Although, for him, pain also occurs as a spatiotemporal process in a body with volume and intensity, this kind of pain is nevertheless not predominant in his discourses. On the contrary, he feels free to characterise many kinds of unpleasant experiences as genuine cases of pain, rather than what is nowadays called 'unpleasant non-pains' … and pains in a metaphorical sense."

[617] In the case of pleasure, and thus to some degree in the case of pain, too, Aristotle seems to integrate Plato's insights about these phenomena into his own conception. See Cheng (2015) 61.

[618] Cheng shows that Aristotle stands in between the hedonists (Eudoxus) and anti-hedonists (Speusippus) of the Academy. Cf. Cheng (2015) 43-45, 71-73, 171-173.

similarly to Plato's in some cases, there are novel aspects of the nature of pain presented in Aristotle's philosophy. To demonstrate these points, I will commence with an exposition of Aristotle's conception of pleasure in the initial section. Subsequently, I will delve into his account of pain, primarily examining his ethical writings. Following this, I will contextualize Aristotle's views on pain in relation to his other works.

An inquiry into the nature of pain necessitates a clarification of the type of pain under discussion. This issue will be addressed in the second section of this chapter. In Plato's work, pain localized explicitly in the body was infrequent. In contrast, Aristotle frequently speaks about pain in this manner. Notably, many of these passages can be found in his biological treatises, and they evoke the style of the 'Hippocratic' authors when discussing the physiology, health, and causes of pain. Hence, we can observe striking similarities between medical writers and Aristotle in discussing pain in this context. Additionally, in the biological context, Aristotle adapts his discussions of pain, so it matches the style of the physicians, indicating that the genre in which he explores pain heavily impacts the manner in which he does so. The second part of the second section will concentrate on pains of the soul, which play a pivotal role in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Here, Aristotle characterizes emotions as pains of the soul. By examining specific pains of the soul, considering their relationships with other emotions, and emphasizing their painful and pleasurable aspects, Aristotle can better explain how our soul operates and how this understanding can be applied in rhetorical practice.

The distinction between bodily pain and pain of the soul, as well as the various contexts in which this distinction plays a role, leads to a third theme - the role pain plays in ethics. Since its role in biology is quite straightforward, Aristotle considers the study of pain and pleasure to be most appropriately placed in ethics. Aristotle views pleasure and pain as the central themes of ethical inquiry because their proper evaluation is essential for understanding how to acquire a good character and, thus, how to live a good life. He develops several topics already discussed by Plato, such as the fact that not every pain is bad and, in some situations, it is better to undergo something painful than to pursue something pleasurable. He also emphasizes that pain is not only a symptom of a deprived character, as seen in the pain the immoderate person feels when deprived of pleasure, but also a necessary component of some virtuous actions, such as those of a brave person. For this reason, Aristotle, like Plato, integrates pain into the education and formation of good character. Finally, like the 'Hippocratic' authors and Plato, Aristotle acknowledges the beneficial role pain plays in accompanying some activities that are good and beneficial but also necessarily painful, such as exercising and acting courageously in battle. In the last section of this chapter, I will discuss this aspect of pain, particularly its connection to

πόνος. This discussion will include not only Aristotle's views but also those from his school, as preserved in the *Problemata* and in two writings of Theophrastus.

4.1 What is Pain?

4.1.1 Pleasure

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is our main source of Aristotle's thoughts about pleasure and pain, Aristotle introduces his account of pleasure in opposition to Plato and other members of the Academy[619] who "assume that the key good is something perfect and complete, and that processes (κινήσεις), and in particular processes that bring about something (γενήσεις), are incomplete, and then try to show that pleasure is a process and brings about something"[620]. In the *Nicomachean ethics* 10.3., Aristotle refuses both these conceptions with a series of arguments: against the identification of pleasure with κίνησις, Aristotle objects that understanding the pleasure thus is in conflict with his understanding of the process: "every process seems to have its way of being fast or slow, if not in itself (as in the case of the motion of the cosmos) at least relative to something else. But neither of those applies to pleasure".[621] An additional argument is introduced in the *Nicomachean ethics* 10.4: pleasure – in analogy to seeing – is "something whole; there's no instance you could freeze a pleasure, such that it has go on for more time before its form is completed" and, therefore, "it's not a process".[622]

Aristotle's argument against conceiving of pleasure as γένεσις is based on the assumption that "when X comes into being, what it comes out of is what it also dissolves back into … What pleasure brings about, that's what pain destroys".[623] The criticized opposers hold

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[619] See for example *Eth. Nic.* 10.2, 1172b28, cf. *Phlb.* 60a-b (is pleasure the good?); *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173a15.

[620] *Eth. Nic.* 10. 3 1173a28-31. Cf. 7.11, 1152b13, „Every pleasure is a perceptible process to a natural state" πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή. In the *Philebus*, we read the following formulation: "Socrates: Have we not been told that pleasure is always a process of becoming and that there is no being at all of pleasure?" (ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς;) *Phlb.* 53c4-5.. If not stated otherwise, in citing Aristotle, I use Oxford revised translations (Barnes 1984). For the *Nicomachean Ethics*, I use a translation of A. Beresford (2020).

[621] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173a32-34. Cheng (2015) 38, claims that the *kinetic* model of pleasure is used by Aristotle only for accidental pleasures (e.g., eating and drinking).

[622] *Eth. Nic.* 10.4, 1174a12-19.

[623] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b4-6. γένεσίς τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· Cheng (2015) 189 notices that the argument from contraries can be used only about accidental pleasures and pains (hunger – eating, thirst – drinking).

that "that pain is the lacking of your natural state and pleasure the refilling and the restoring of that natural state".[624] Aristotle objects that according to this view, it is the body that feels pleasure, which is not true.[625] He recognizes that understanding of pain in the criticized thinkers "seems to be based only on the pleasures and pains to do with eating and drinking" and admits that in this particular case "the idea is that people get into a state of need and first experience that pain, then feel pleasure at filling up again".[626] Nonetheless, "this doesn't happen with all pleasures,"[627] as Aristotle illustrates on the pleasures of knowledge, where "there is no prior need or lack of anything here,"[628] and also pleasures of sense-perception, and memories and hopes and other pleasures of the soul. "So what shall we say all those pleasures 'bring about'", asks Aristotle and concludes: "so there's nothing that can be refilled".[629]

The position criticized by Aristotle is well-documented in several texts, including the *Gorgias* and the *Philebus*, which have been discussed earlier. In these texts, Plato articulates his negative evaluation of pleasure,[630] arguing that if pleasure is a motion towards the natural state, it cannot be identified with goodness since becoming always involves both pleasure and pain - something desirable and something undesirable.[631] Thus, it is the natural state, which is good, not its becoming.[632] Pleasure always implies some preceding lack, such as in the case of the pleasure of food, which can only be felt after hunger.[633] As Plato summarizes in *Gorgias*,

[624] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b7-9.

[625] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b11.

[626] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b13-16; cf. *Gorg.* 496d-e.

[627] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b15-16.

[628] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b19-20.

[629] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b19-21.

[630] For Plato, in contrast to the group of people mentioned in *Eth. Nic.* 10.1, 1172a27-28, pleasure is not entirely bad. In *Philebus,* he classifies it as the fifth highest good (*Philb.* 67a). However, this positive evaluation applies only to pure pleasures unmixed with pain, belonging to the soul and related to knowledge and sense perception (*Philb.* 66c). For Plato, as discussed above in ch. 3.2, pleasure is not *the* good.

[631] *Gorg.* 496d-e. In his criticism of Platonic opinions on pleasure, Aristotle is aware of the connection between pleasure understood as γένεσις and κίνησις and the negative evaluation of pleasure, so he argues against this conception.

[632] However, in *Gorg.* 492a-499a, the word γένεσις is not mentioned. In the connection to pleasure, Plato uses this word in *Philebus* (*Philb.* 31b8, 54a8-10, 54c1, 54e2)

[633] *Gorg.* 496c-d. Examples of pleasures and pain used in *Gorgias* are mainly connected to eating and drinking, which is criticized by Aristotle in *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b13-16.

"feeling enjoyment isn't the same as doing well, and being in pain isn't the same as doing badly, and the result is that what's pleasant turns out to be different from what's good".[634]

Aristotle is well aware that this conception leads to neutral or even negative ethical evaluation of pleasure, which does not allow a straightforward association between pleasure and the natural, good and healthy state.[635] Facing these difficulties, Aristotle introduces his own theory of pleasure which is connected to the notion of ἐνέργεια. This theory allows him to ascribe pleasure to the activities of the natural state, too. In the *Nicomachean ethics* 7.12, Aristotle introduces his own conception of pleasure in opposition to the Platonic notion of pleasure as a process or motion:

> Also, there doesn't always have to be some other thing that's better than the pleasure, the way some people say the endpoint, B, must be better that the A-to-B process. Because pleasures are not A-to-B processes (not all of them even involve any such process). They are activities, exercisings of our capacities, and hence are endpoints and goals. They don't arise when we're changing form A-to-B. They arise when we're using some part of our nature. Not all pleasures have some other thing as their endpoint. That's only true when people are being brought to a completion of their nature. That's why it's simply not right to say that pleasure is a 'perceptible' A-to-B process'. It would be better to say that it's the exercising of our natural dispositions. And instead of 'perceptible' we should say 'unimpeded'.[636]

According to this passage, complete pleasure arises if and only if there is no hindrance or impediment to it and if the animal is in its natural state. The most important impact for activity (ἐνέργεια) issuing from the connection with pleasure is that it becomes completed (τέλειος).[637] This completion consists in the fact, that some perfection (τελειότης) complements the activity. In contrast to the process, activity is completed in itself, and has no external goal.[638] What is more, there is one more feature of this perfection which must be mentioned:

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[634] *Gorg.* 497a3-5. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

[635] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173a27-34.

[636] *Eth. Nic.* 7.12, 1153a7-15. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον.

[637] τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1174a23.

[638] *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b2-4.

> And the pleasure perfects and completes the activity, not in the same way as the disposition does (by already being in place), but as a kind of emergent, perfecting feature – like the 'bloom' of youth.[639]

How should one understand the metaphor between the "bloom of youth" and the "emergent, perfecting feature"? Sarah Brodie, for example, reads τέλος in this passage as "a completion/perfection additional to the latter [i.e. the activity] although inseparable from it".[640] Gerd van Riel understands ὥρα as bloom arriving in the moment when the man has achieved his prime (ἀκμή) and is ἀκμαίοις. In that condition, man has success, power, prestige, etc. The bloom, however, is not something indispensable in our life. It only "gives a supervenient quality to our life, a perfection that cannot be reached in any other way".[641] On my reading pleasure brings something to the (already complete) activity, this activity would otherwise be deprived of.[642] People then gladly perform this activity accompanied by pleasure and they desire it to last infinitely.[643] For having this bloom (ὥρα), one must be in his prime (ἀκμαίοις). If we apply this metaphor to pleasure, it seems that the activity must fulfil some criteria for pleasure to arise.[644] The activity must have the goal in itself and it must be completed in each and every moment.[645] For my purposes here, I underline the importance of the relation between pleasure and activity; namely that pleasure brings perfection and some supervenient quality to the activity.[646] What is more, if pain is the opposite of pleasure, its relation to activity should be also the opposite in some way. Thus, for understanding pain, we must focus on its relation to activity.

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[639] *Eth. Nic* 10.4, 1174b31-33. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.

[640] Brodie (2002) 436.

[641] Van Riel (2005) 57.

[642] Yet even without pleasure, the activity would be completed and perfected, since the cause of its completion is not pleasure but the faculty which exercises it. See Gauthier and Jolif (1970) 842. See also van Riel (2003) 177-186. For an interpretation of this passage along the same lines, see also Schields (2011).

[643] *Eth. Nic.* 10.5, 1175a30-32.

[644] It is of course possible to see the relation between pleasure and activity to take place in degrees: the more perfect activity, the more perfect pleasure.

[645] In contrast to ἐνέργεια that has an end in itself, the process is leading to some external end and is defined as ἐνέργεια ἀτελής in *De an.* 2.5, 417a16, *Phys.* 3.2, 201b32, *Met.* 9.6, 1048b29, 11.9, 1066a21.

[646] Cheng interprets the supervenience of pleasure in the frame of higher-order consciousness and shows thus that Aristotle's theory of pleasure may play a relevant role in contemporary discussions about pleasure and consciousness. See Cheng (2015) 231-328.

4.1.2 Pain

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.12 Aristotle explains the role of pain in acquiring virtues and vices as follows:

> Being gluttonous and lecherous seems a more wilful character trait than being a coward. It's caused by pleasure, something we choose, whereas cowardice is caused by pain, something we try to avoid. Plus, pain disrupts and damages the nature of whatever's experiencing it, but pleasure doesn't do anything like that.[647]

Pain and pleasure stand here in opposition to each other: pleasure is something choice-worthy (αἱρετόν), and pain is something to be avoided (φευκτόν). Pain is to be avoided because it has a negative influence on the nature (φύσις) of the individual experiencing it. This negative influence manifests itself in degeneration or destruction of the nature of the animal or human being.[648] When one hurts himself, for instance, or when one is ill, one's nature is degenerated, but only when it is entirely annihilated (when he dies), it is destroyed completely. How much one's nature has degenerated correlates thus with the amount, quality, and intensity of the pain. It seems that pain in general works as an important warning signal: if one doesn't heed his injury or illness which becomes manifest by the pain, it can lead to more serious and irreversible damage to one's nature and, eventually to death.

In his discussion of the reasons why pain, in general, is considered bad and avoidable, Aristotle mentions the degenerative and destructive feature of pain:

> And of course, it's also uncontroversial that pain is a bad thing and to be avoided (φευκτόν). In some cases, pain is simply a bad thing (ἁπλῶς κακόν), in other cases because it hinders us in some respect (πῇ ἐμποδιστική).[649]

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[647] *Eth. Nic.* 3.12, 1119a21-25. Ἑκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. ἣ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἣ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον δὴ ἑκούσιον.

[648] Nature (φύσις) of living beings is their substance, i.e., their soul. See *Met.* 5.4, 1014b35-36, *Met.* 5.4, 1015a13-19. *Part. an.* 1.1 641a17-32. The verb ἐξίστημι in the sense of degeneration is used also in *Pol*. 5.9, 1309b32 (democracy is a degenerate form of the best state) and *Hist. an.* 1.1 488b18-20 (of noble birth is someone who did not degenerate from his φύσις).

[649] *Eth. Nic.* 7.13, 1153b1-3. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἣ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. Translation slightly modified. Amongst the translators, there is a disagreement about whether the passage should be understood as talking about the two *manners* in which the pain is bad, or whether it talks about two *kinds* of pain. The first position is advocated by e.g., A. Beresford, J. Sachs, H. G. Apostle, R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, J. B. Saint-Hilaire, and F. Dielmeier. The second position is advocated by e.g. R. C.

Analogically to Aristotle's distinction between simply good things and things good only for someone,[650] I understand this passage describing two aspects of pain: ἁπλῶς κακόν describes pain which is bad for everyone in every circumstance, πῇ ἐμποδιστική describes pain that is bad only for some individuals in some circumstances.[651] How are these two aspects in which pain is considered bad, connected to the notion according to which pain degenerates and destroys the natural state of the individual that experiences it? I understand them both as expressing the effects pain has on the animal experiencing it. Pains which degenerate or destroy our nature are simply bad (ἁπλῶς κακόν) because for every animal it is bad when its nature is degenerated. And even though in some circumstances some additional good can arise from pain (e.g., in a surgical operation),[652] degeneration of the nature is *per se* never beneficial.[653] On the other hand, if we emphasize that pain is bad because it hinders something (πῇ ἐμποδιστική), it does not mean that it is necessarily destroying our nature but rather that it hinders us in performing some of its activities.[654] This aspect of pain is emblematic of the human being because the activities that are hindered are stemming either from our character (ἦθος) and/or from the intellect. As human beings, we are by nature rational and political and to attain flourishing, we should, as much as we can, devote our life to rational activities in accordance with virtues.[655] Thus, the second characteristic of pain expresses the fact that it hinders us

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Bartlett, S. D. Collins, D. Ross, T. Irwin, C. D. C. Reeve, R. Crisp. In this article, I read the quoted passage following the first group of scholars. It is true that the phrase ἥ μέν … ἥ δέ is in *Eth. Nic.* usually used when distinguishing two types of something (see e.g. *Eth. Nic.* 1115b15, 1119a22, 1128b6, 1130b19, 1139b29, 1141b15). Yet, I understand the syntactic structure of the quoted phrase in a way that the distinguishing function of ἥ μέν … ἥ δέ is connected not only to ἡ λύπη, but to ἡ λύπη κακόν, so it specifies the manner in which pain (λύπη) is bad (κακόν).

[650] *Eth. Nic.* 7.11, 1152b26-27.

[651] After all, there is not one best state for everyone, nor everyone pursues the same pleasure (*Eth. Nic.* 7.13, 1153b29-30).

[652] *Eth. Nic.* 7.11, 1152b30-32.

[653] Afterall, one of the chief roles of the vegetative soul is the preservation of our substance (*De an.* 2.4, 416b12–22).

[654] Being the principle of life, the soul is responsible for performing various activities connected to its vegetative, sensitive, and rational levels, and these activities can be hindered by pain (*De an.* 2.4, 415b13). For nourishment, growth, and reproduction as activities of the vegetative level of the soul see *De an.* 2.1, 412a12. The sensitive soul is responsible for sensation, locomotion a desire. It is also a necessary condition for feeling pleasure and pain; see *De an.* 2.2, 413b20.

[655] *Eth. Nic.* 1.7, 1098a12-18; 1.1, 1097a11; 8.12, 1162a16; 9.9, 1169b18; *Pol.* 1.1, 1253a2-3; *Pol.* 1.1, 1253a8.

(ἐμποδίζει) in advancing these rational and virtuous activities.[656] We shall see later that in the context of Aristotle's ethics, it seems more important to focus on this second aspect of pain because it is more closely connected to the activities we perform as human beings and have a closer connection to our character. Also, the examples of pain that Aristotle mentions in the *Nicomachean ethics* are almost always connected to the intellectual or moral capacities of the human soul,[657] for example in the next passage:

> In fact, external pleasure have pretty much the same effect as the pains specific to an activity. Pains specific to our activities disrupt them. Like, say, if you find writing or doing arithmetic boring and tiresome. You just don't do it – you simply don't write; you don't do the arithmetic – if the activity is painful like that. So the pains specific to an activity have exactly opposite effect on it as its pleasure. (By specific to it I mean the ones that arise in the activity itself.) And external pleasures, as I just said, have pretty much the same effect as pain. They disrupt the activity; only not in the same way.[658]

External pleasures (ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναί), i.e., pleasures that are not naturally connected to the activity we are currently performing, as well as specific pains, hinder us in performing the activity and feeling its proper pleasure. A similar example concerns people who enjoy listening to music: they are unable to concentrate on the activity of discoursing, as soon as they hear the sound of the flute.[659] In both these examples, pain, and external pleasure hinder the carrying out of the activity properly.

Human beings can also feel pain connected to their vicious actions. If we are intemperate, acting moderately is painful to us. Similarly, cowards feel too much distress when facing a frightening situation.[660] In these situations, moral depravity is accompanied by pain, and we cannot feel the pleasure that the good person feels when acting virtuously. If moral vices

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[656] Cheng sees the *kinetic* model of pain as the primary explanatory tool in understanding pain, the *energia-like model* (*hindering the energeia* in my terminology) as a secondary model, applicable only in the very specific situations. I, however, take it that in ethics, which is the most important context for discussing pain, the hindering aspect of it is dominant a more relevant. Cf. Cheng (2015) 345-372.

[657] An exception is to be found at *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b12-13.

[658] *Eth. Nic.* 10.5, 1175b16-24. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι·φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὃ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὑτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. Transl. modified.

[659] *Eth. Nic.* 5.5, 1175b5-6.

[660] *Eth. Nic.* 2.2, 1104b3-16.

are too intense, we are even unable to perform the activities we should because the pain we feel is so intense it hinders us from being active: when someone is really big a coward: "particular situations drive [this] man out of his mind with pain and stress to the point where he throws down his arms and does those other disgraceful things."[661]

In the *Nicomachean ethics,* there are no explicit examples of pains connected directly to the activities of the perceptual soul.[662] Nevertheless, we can easily imagine that when there is damage to a sense-organ, carrying out the activity of this organ becomes painful as it is for example in the case of excessive sensual objects destroying our ability to perceive.[663] Also, the destruction of the organ can be characterized as an injury degenerating our nature relating to the notion of a vegetative soul, too. By means of nourishment and reproduction, the vegetative soul is responsible for the preservation (σωτηρία) of the individual and the species.[664] If we suffer an injury or illness, when we are hungry or thirsty, our nature, for which the vegetative soul is responsible, is threatened or partially destroyed;[665] thanks to the perceptual soul, we are aware of the pain caused in such a way. Even though the disturbance is not fatal, the animated body which cares about its own preservation, is in danger.

In the realm of ethics, the impact of pain as a degeneration of nature on the facets of animal life that are connected to morality and reason is a significant factor. When an individual is suffering or unwell and is required to perform some rational activity, they will encounter significant obstacles. If the pain is not too severe, they will continue with the activity, but without achieving perfection and being deprived of the corresponding perfect pleasure; as noted previously, perfect pleasures are only associated with perfect activities. If the pain is intense, it will make the performance of the activity completely impossible. Therefore, while pain's primary model in Aristotle's ethics is understood as hindering activity, we should not overlook the fact that pain as a destruction of nature also plays a crucial role in Aristotle's ethics. Whenever any part of our nature is harmed, some activity of our soul is inevitably hindered.

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[661] *Eth. Nic.* 3.12, 1119a29-30. αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥιπτεῖν καὶ τἆλλα ἀσχημονεῖν.

[662] In *Eth. Nic.* 9.9, 1170a13-1170b5, Aristotle mentions that being alive (which in animals is defined by their capacity of perceiving and in humans by perceiving and thinking) is "something good and pleasant in itself" (τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ αὑτο ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων *Eth. Nic.* 9.9, 1170a19-20). Thus, pleasure (and pain) is an internal part of animal life (ζωή).

[663] *De an.* 2.12 424a27-32.

[664] *De an.* 2.4, 416b12-22. The notion of "preservation" is well summarized in Polansky 2017 (218).

[665] Pleasures and pain connected to eating and drinking are mentioned at *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1173b13-16.

While pain conceived as a degeneration of nature can be easily compared to Plato's account of pain discussed earlier, emphasizing the hindering aspect of pain and its particular role in moral and intellectual activities can be seen as Aristotle's innovation.

We should now inquire into how we experience the hindering aspect of pain in moral or intellectual contexts. In terms of bodily pain, it can be characterized as an unpleasant sensation localized to a specific bodily part and its mechanism will be explained below (see pages 147-8 below). However, understanding how we experience moral or intellectual pain requires revisiting the notion of pleasure. Aristotle views pleasure as the completion and perfection of a given activity. Therefore, the painful activity must be incomplete and imperfect. Regardless of pain intensity, the activity is deprived of some of the features it could have had if accompanied by pleasure: activity is intensified (συναύξει) by its pleasure,[666] we judge objects of our pleasurable rational activity more precisely (ἐξακριβοῦσιν),[667] we are grasping them better (κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον)[668] and we are happy/joyful (χαίροντες) when performing these activities.[669] Conversely, pain dampens the intensity of the activity, rendering us less accurate in our thinking, less aware of the objects of our thinking, and incapable of enjoying the activity and performing it at its best. Nevertheless, the extent of pleasure or pain experienced still depends on the intensity of the pain. Despite the presence of pain, some degree of pleasure can still be derived from engaging in rational activities, albeit not to its fullest extent.

To further elucidate the impact of pain on our activities, it is useful to differentiate between specific and outside pains, as Aristotle did in his distinction between specific and outside pleasures. In the strongest sense, specific pain can be so severe that it renders us unable to carry out the activity we wish to perform: when we suffer from a broken leg, for instance, we cannot walk or engage in various other activities that are dependent on walking. Furthermore, the pain we experience as a result of our broken leg not only hinders us from performing activities directly connected to it, such as running or jumping, but it can also have a negative impact on activities that are more closely linked to rationality or morality. For instance, this pain may impair our ability to concentrate on reading or thinking or prevent us from acting courageously by making it impossible for us to stand and confront danger. Thus, even though the pain is external to these activities, it still hinders them to some degree. For both

[666] *Eth. Nic.* 10.5, 1175a30.

[667] *Eth. Nic.* 10.5, 1175a31.

[668] *Eth. Nic.* 10.5, 1175a33.

[669] *Eth. Nic.* 10.5, 1175a32. See also Jimenez (2015) 155-156.

specific and external pains, it holds true that if the pain is not intense, it does not entirely impede our ability to perform the activity, but merely deprives us of the pleasure or satisfaction we would have normally experienced.

The effects of pain become particularly evident when examining individuals who suffer from long-term or chronic pain. Such pain can have fatal consequences for their lives, as the objective of human life, namely *eudaimonia* - living in accordance with reason and performing virtuous acts accompanied by pleasure - becomes severely disrupted.[670] In the case of long-term pain, individuals may either be unable to perform activities due to the intensity of the pain, or they may be able to perform them, albeit without experiencing any pleasure. Pain, particularly when it is chronic, therefore poses a significant obstacle to the attainment of the goals of human life, rendering it incompatible with a life of happiness and well-being. As Aristotle noted, "We can all tolerate pain for a short while, you can't possibly endure something continuously – not even the Form of the Good itself – if you find it painful."[671] Even though we can imagine that the pleasure I get from intellectual activity may overcome the pain I feel because of bodily pain, Aristotle is aware that attaining *eudaimonia* in such a life would be difficult and for the majority of people probably impossible, since the influence of pain on other aspects of our life can be so decisive.

4.2 Kinds of Pain

Thus far, we have observed that Aristotle's understanding of pain differs from Plato's mainly in its relationship to the notion of ἐνέργεια. However, their views are not mutually exclusive, as pain can also be viewed as a degeneration of nature, which expresses an idea similar to Plato's descriptions of pain as a disintegration or deviation from the natural state. In fact, some treatises in Aristotle's corpus describe pain precisely as Plato does. Moreover, even pleasure is characterized as a motion in some passages. This fact does not necessarily indicate an inconsistency in Aristotle's thinking or prove a developmental theory of his account of pleasure and pain. Instead, it reflects the fact that Aristotle pursues different objectives in different writings. Detailed and nuanced discussions of pleasure and pain are particularly relevant in ethics, as we shall see below, since pleasure and pain play the most significant role there and their detailed exposition and understanding is needed. In other branches of his

[670] *Eth. Nic.* 1.7, 1098a12-18, 10.7, 1177b19-25.

[671] *Eth. Nic.* 8.6, 1158a23-25.

intellectual project, however, different aspects of pleasure and pain are emphasized, depending on the context and goals of the specific treatises. Therefore, it is not surprising that we find pain and pleasure characterized as motions (κινήσεις) in Aristotle's biological treatises, where he discusses pain localized in the body, for which the account of motion from the natural state, caused by some physiological issue in the organism, is appropriate.[672] Similarly, in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines and analyses various emotions, which, according to him, are always a kind of pain.[673] In this chapter, I shall first focus on bodily pains (i.e., pains localized in the body), which are particularly discussed in biological treatises. Then, I shall delve into pains of the soul, such as fear, anger, and envy, which are discussed in the *Rhetoric*.

4.2.1 Bodily pain

When compared to Plato, Aristotle provides numerous examples of pains that are explicitly said to be localised in the body. As expected, these examples are mainly found in his biological treatises. It is noteworthy that the passages where Aristotle is writings on bodily pain often resemble the style of the 'Hippocratic' authors. We have seen above that these authors typically emphasised the location of pain, its quality, and the underlying pathology, and Aristotle shares this focus. What sets his treatment of bodily pain apart from Plato and Hippocratics is his discussion of pain experienced by non-human animals. In this section, I will first examine Aristotle's account of pain felt by humans and then move on to his discussion of pain in non-human animals.[674]

Pain and suffering, discussed in biological writings, arise in various situations of human and animal life; in humans, they are very often connected to reproduction. After conception, women are prone to feel heaviness throughout the body (αἱ γυναῖκες βαρύνονται τὸ σῶμα πᾶν) and pains in the head (ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ γίνονται πόνοι).[675] Generally, women suffer (πονοῦσι) during pregnancy, some of them at the beginning, others later,[676] and they suffer most in the fourth or fifth month of gestation.[677] Pain also occurs if the womb moves "from place to place"

[672] *Part. an.* 3.4, 666a11-15.

[673] *Rh.* 1.11, 1369b33-1370a3.

[674] For a general discussion about philosophical aspects of Aristotle's biology, see Lennox and Gotthelf (1987), Gotthelf (2012), Tipton (2014), Connell (2021).

[675] *Hist. an.* 7.4, 584a2-4.

[676] *Hist. an.* 7.4, 584a9-12.

[677] *Hist. an.* 7.4, 584b14-17.

(τῷ τόπῳ μὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ),[678] or if superfetation takes place[679] or before the childbirth when the child moves its head in the belly.[680]

Pain accompanies childbirth itself as well: painful childbirths are more common in women than in non-human animals, and more in women leading a sedentary life (ἑδραῖαι γὰρ οὖσαι) than in those who are used for hard work (ἐν οἷς ἔθνεσι πονητικός).[681] Due to their sedentary way of life, these women are full of residual matter (πλείονος γέμουσι περιττώματος)[682] that makes them suffer. Hard work, on the other hand, consumes the residual matter (ἀναλίσκει γὰρ ὁ πόνος τὰ περιττώματα) and helps in exercising holding breath (τὸ πνεῦμα ὥστε δύνασθαι κατέχειν) which makes the childbirth easier. Another difficulty arises when the women are young and having childbirth for the first time; in that case, it is more painful than for the older women.[683] In general, pains during childbirth occur in different bodily parts (εἰς πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα ἀποστηρίζονται αὐταῖς οἱ πόνοι), most often in thigs (μηροί) or in the belly (κοιλία).[684] Pain (πόνος) accompanies other specifically female conditions, such as menstruation, too, especially if some pathology, such as a closure of *os uteri* (τὸ στόμα τῶν ὑστερῶν συμπεφυκὸς διετέλεσεν) takes place.[685]

Besides menstruation, gestation, and childbirth, Aristotle discusses pain occurring in other situations, too, that are not specific only to women. Growth of wisdom-teeth, especially in advanced age, is especially painful.[686] Pain occurs also when anything other than air enters the windpipe (ἀρτηρία),[687] in some affection of the liver (πόνων περὶ τὸ ἦπαρ),[688] kidneys,[689]

[678] *Hist. an.* 10.1, 634a1-5.

[679] *Hist. an.* 7.4, 585a8-10.

[680] *Hist. an.* 7.4, 584a28.

[681] *Hist. an.* 4.6, 775a27-b2. See also *Hist. an.* 7.9, 586b27-587a5.

[682] The idea that the way of life (sedentary, laborious, etc.) influences the constitution of the human body and health is present in the 'Hippocratic' *Airs, Waters, Places*, particularly in chapters 16-24.

[683] *Hist. an.* 7.1, 582a16-20. See also *Pol.* 7.16, 1335a18.

[684] *Hist. an.* 7.9, 586b27-587a5.

[685] *Gen. an.* 4.4, 773a15-18. For pains during menstruation in general, see *Hist. an.* 7.2, 582b6-9.

[686] *Hist. an.* 2.4, 501b24-29.

[687] *Hist. an.* 1.17, 495b14-19. See also *Part. an.* 3.3, 664b2-6.

[688] *Hist. an.* 3.4, 514b3.

[689] *Part. an.* 3.9, 672a33-36.

head,[690] foot,[691] genitals,[692] belly[693] or womb.[694] Pain can be caused also by stings of wasps or bites of poisonous beetles.[695] Generally speaking, the absence of pain (be it expressed by πόνος or another pain word) and exhaustion is a sign that the bodily part performs its function well,[696] while its presence is a sign of an underlying pathology.

Aristotle discusses pain in the explicitly medical contexts, too, when he refers to the Polybus' account of the veins:

> Polybus writes to the following effect: 'There are four pairs of veins (τῶν φλεβῶν τέτταρα ζεύγη ἐστίν). The first extends from the back of the head, through the neck on the outside, past the backbone on either side, until it reaches the loins and passes on to the legs, after which it goes on through the shins to the outer side of the ankles and on to the feet. And it is on this account that surgeons, for pains in the back and loin, bleed in the ham and in the outer side of the ankle (διὸ καὶ τὰς φλεβοτομίας ποιοῦνται τῶν περὶ τὸν νῶτον ἀλγημάτων καὶ ἰσχίον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰγνύων καὶ τῶν σφυρῶν ἔξωθεν). Another pair of veins runs from the head, past the ears, through the neck: they are termed the jugular veins. This pair goes on inside along the backbone, past the muscles of the loins, on to the testicles, and onwards to the thighs, and through the inside of the hams and through the shins down to the inside of the ankles and to the feet; and for this reason, surgeons, for pains in the muscles of the loins and in the testicles, bleed on the hams and the inner side of the ankles (διὸ καὶ τὰς φλεβοτομίας ποιοῦνται τῶν περὶ τὰς ψύας καὶ τοὺς ὄρχεις ἀλγημάτων ἀπὸ τῶν ἰγνύων καὶ τῶν σφυρῶν εἴσωθεν). The third pair extends from the temples, through the neck, in underneath the shoulder-blades, into the lung; the one running from right to left in underneath the breast and on to the spleen and the kidney.'[697]
>
> When there is a pain near the surface of the body, the physician lances these two latter veins (ἃς ἀποσχάζουσιν, ὅταν τι ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα λυπῇ); but when the pain is in the region of the stomach he lances the splenetic and hepatitic veins. And from these, other veins depart to run below the breasts.[698]

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[690] *Hist. an.* 5.31, 557a10, *Hist. an.* 8.21, 603b7-9.

[691] *Part. an.* 4.11, 690b3-5, *Hist. an.* 2.1, 499a29-30.

[692] *Hist. an.* 7.1, 581a27-31.

[693] *Hist. an.* 10.7, 638b19-25.

[694] *Hist. an.* 10.1, 633b23, 10.2, 635a10-16, 10.2, 635a25-30.

[695] *Hist. an.* 8.24, 604b19-23, 9.40, 627b24-31.

[696] *Hist. an.* 10.1, 633b18-25.

[697] *Hist. an.* 3.3, 512b13-26.

[698] *Hist. an.* 3.1, 511a29-512b1.

Aristotle, in reflecting on supposed Polybus's theory, discusses pain here from a perspective indistinguishable from what we have seen in the medical authors. The anatomy of the bodily part is explained, and a prospective therapy based on knowledge of this anatomy is proposed. Even though "surgeons" or "physicians" are not explicitly mentioned in the Greek text, the context justifies their use in the translation.

In general, we can see that Aristotle is well aware of the way pain is discussed in the medical context and is able to contribute to that discussion.[699] We can even find a passage where the pain is conceived of similarly as in the dietetic treatises, thus as an imbalance of constitutive bodily parts: "For the disruption of parts naturally conjoined is not pain, but a cause of pain" (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλγηδὼν ἡ διάστασις τῶν συμφύτων μερῶν, ἀλλὰ ποιητικὸν ἀλγηδόνος).[700] Similarly as in *On the Nature of Man*, where the pain occurs when the imbalance of humours takes place, where the pain is caused by 'disruption' of naturally conjoined parts.[701] The further step, however, which Aristotle does, is emphasizing that disruption cannot be identified with pain. Rather we must be aware of this disruption to feel pain which is possible due to our capacity of sense-perception. Before we follow this topic any further, however, let us discuss an aspect of pain totally absent in medical writers and almost absent in Plato, namely the pain of non-human animals.

Discussing the pain of non-human animals in Aristotle serves to generalization of some aspect of pain to all animals, for example, from the passage about smell and touch in cetaceans, we learn that "all animals furnished with a mouth derive pleasure or pain from the touch of sapid juices" (ὅσα ἔχει στόμα, χαίρει καὶ λυπεῖται τῇ τῶν χυμῶν ἅψει).[702] In the majority of cases, however, Aristotle is writing about animal pain in the passages explaining animal physiology, some particular behaviour of various animals, or in describing typical diseases these animals suffer.[703] So we learn that eggs harden only after coming out from the animal "for otherwise it would cause pain/effort in laying" (πόνον γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχε τικτόμενον).[704] Similarly as in humans, in animals, too, nothing other than air should enter the windpipe, lest the pain

[699] We can even find a passage where Aristotle discusses a therapy of an ill elephant. See *Hist. an.* 8.26, 605a30-b5.

[700] *Top.* 6.6, 145b13-14.

[701] See pp. 66-67 above.

[702] *Hist. an.* 4.8, 535a6-12.

[703] See Cheng (2018) 12.

[704] *Gen. an.* 3.2, 752a34, transl slightly modified. For some birds, for example, herons, however, laying eggs is painful. See *Hist. an.* 9.1, 609b21-27.

occurs.[705] In some animals, similarly as in women, procreation is connected to pain and effort, even though not so often as in humans.

I must admit that it is not always clear whether the condition expressed by πόνος should be understood as pain or straining/hardship/fatigue. The cuttlefish, for example, "spirts out the spawn with pain/effort" (μετὰ πόνου)[706] and all fish generally "suffer greatly during the period of gestation" (πονοῦσι δὲ τῇ κυήσει πάντες, διὸ μάλιστα τὴν ὥραν ταύτην ἐκπίπτουσιν).[707] Fish also seem to be especially susceptible to suffering due to weather, some of them "do not thrive in cold places" and "suffer (πονοῦσιν) most in severe winters",[708] others in summer.[709] Not only weather afflicts fish, but a parasite, called 'gadfly' (τὸ καλούμενον οἶστρον), too. This parasite resembling a scorpion (ὅμοιον μὲν σκορπίῳ) causes pain so acute (ποιοῦσι δὲ ταῦτα πόνον) that the sword-fish "leap as high out of the water as a dolphin".[710] Aristotle mentions also the pain of sea-turtles,[711] bees - when their combs are fumigated[712]- and quails who suffer since they are too heavy to fly (because they have supposedly a stone in their head), and for that reason these birds always scream when flying.[713]

In mammals, Aristotle talks about the pain of horses, mares, dogs, bulls, deer, sheep, herded cattle and panthers. Horses are said to suffer from abscesses (ἔμπυοι) and from the illness called 'barley-surfeit' (καλεῖται δὲ τοῦτο κριθιᾶν).[714] Their intercourse is not so painful/laborious as the intercourse of the oxen[715] and meres are said to feel pain from suckling of foal after six months.[716] Dogs, especially Laconian hounds, are said to work hard (πονεῖν)[717]

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[705] *Hist. an.* 1.17, 495b14-19.

[706] *Hist. an.* 5.18, 550b11, transl slightly modified.

[707] *Hist. an.* 6.17, 570b3.

[708] *Hist. an.* 8.19, 601b29-31, 8.19, 602a11-12.

[709] *Hist. an.* 8.19, 602a11-12.

[710] *Hist. an.* 8.19, 602a25-602b2.

[711] *Hist. an.* 8.2, 590b7-9.

[712] *Hist. an.* 9.40, 623b18-21.

[713] *Hist. an.* 8.12, 597b13-14. It is possible, however, that quails cry because flying is tiresome for them, not painful.

[714] *Hist. an.* 8.2,4 604b6-10. See also *Hist. an.* 8.24, 604b15-19.

[715] *Hist. an.* 6.22, 575b30.

[716] *Hist. an.* 6.22, 576b10-12.

[717] *Hist. an.* 6.20, 574b28-29, 6.21, 575b3. See also *Part. an.* 3.14, 675a31-675b2, where Aristotle explains that dogs must strain in discharging their excrement (αἱ κύνες μετὰ πόνου προΐενται τὴν τοιαύτην περίττωσιν). Bulls are also said to toil, see *Hist. an.* 6.21, 575b3.

and to search for a herb causing vomiting which helps them to recover, if they are ill or in pain (πονῶσιν).[718] Similarly panthers seek human excrement which helps them as a painkiller.[719] Extreme weather causes suffering not only to fish but to herded cattle, too, which suffer particularly because of frost.[720] Finally, deer suffer from some unspecified internal pain (διὰ τὸ πονεῖν τὰ ἐντός)[721] and sheep suffer when their kidneys are over-fat (λίαν πίονες).[722] Last example mentioned is a part of one of the rare passages, where Aristotle explains how animal pain arises: when the kidneys are over-fat, rotting takes place which causes suffering (πόνος) and "deadly pain" (ὀδύναι θανατηφόροι).

We have seen that in his research of both human beings and non-human animals, Aristotle discusses situations when they experience pain. In the biological context, his motivation is probably different than in ethical treatises. He wants to describe what is happening to animals, how pain is connected to their physiology, what behaviour can be explained by the fact an animal is in pain, etc. For that purpose, he proceeds similarly as the medical writers did, he thus does not formulate explicit theories or definitions of pain which, in case of bodily pain, may seem to be superfluous. His readers know what it is like to feel pain, so it is not necessary to define it for them. What they probably do not know and what is the core of Aristotle's inquiry is how pain is connected to physiology, behaviour, etc. This suggests that Aristotle focuses on different aspects of pain according to the context in which he discusses it. What was important in the ethics, can be omitted in the biology and *vice versa*. Thus, approaching pain from various perspectives represented by different genres of Aristotle's writings can be helpful in discovering particular layers of pain and the roles they play in his intellectual project.

Aristotle also addresses the question of how we experience pain. As mentioned above, the feeling of pain relates somehow to sense-perception and, in general, to perceptive aspects of animal life. Pleasure and pain are an internal part of animal life, which, according to Aristotle, is defined by the capacity of sense-perception (in animals) and sense-perception and thinking (in human beings).[723] The structure of perception and its relation to pleasure and pain is explained in *On the soul.*

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[718] *Hist. an.* 9.6, 612a1-9.

[719] *Hist. an.* 9.6, 612a1-9.

[720] *Hist. an.* 8.7, 595b15-16.

[721] *Hist. an.* 6.30, 579a15.

[722] *Part. an.* 3.9, 672a26-36.

[723] See *Eth. Nic.* 9.9, 1170a13-1170b5.

In this treatise, Aristotle repeatedly claims that the capacity of sense-perception is a necessary condition for feeling pleasure and pain.[724] Thus, if we want to understand how animals experience pain we must focus on the relationship between sense-perception and feeling pleasure and pain. Aristotle discerns between these two processes, but describes the relationship between them as follows:

> Perception is similar, then, to base assertion and to thinking. But whatever there is something pleasant or painful, it by, so to speak, affirming or denying, pursues or avoids. And it is the case that being pleased and being pained are actualization of the mean of the perceptual faculty in relation to that is good or bad insofar as they are such.[725]

This model can be explained with the example of sheep and wolf.[726] When the sheep sees a wolf, it is instinctively moved to flee. When, on the other hand, the sheep see grass, it moves to pursue it and eat it. In this model, sense perception works as an intermediary between the animal and the good or bad – pleasurable or painful – object. The fact that the animal relates itself to some object considered to be good and to another considered to be bad depends on three factors: the natural state of the animal (φύσις), its actual state and the state to which it is to be moved by the given object. The sheep flees from the wolf because it experiences that the wolf would move it out from its natural state/destroy its natural state. A similar mechanism applies when we are thirsty: the drink is pleasurable for us because it moves us from the actual state of thirst to the state of satiety.

Thus, in the case of pain, we are experiencing an object and such perception moves us from the natural state. We want to flee from the potentially or actually harming object. This happens for example when we are near something hot. We move the hand away before or immediately after we burn. Thus, the passage quoted above speaks about two types of pain. On the one hand, there is anticipated/potential pain (sheep–wolf), on the other hand, there is actual bodily pain. In both cases, the animal is moved from its natural state. If the sheep are about to flee from the wolf, they must perceive it in some way and this perception evinces fear the sheep

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[724] *De an.* 2.2, 413b24, 2.3, 414b3-5, 3.11, 434a2. The relation between sense-perception and pleasure and pain is to be found also in Theophrastus' *De sensibus*, in his testimony about Anaxagoras and Empedocles (*De sensibus* 9.9-10; 29,1-3). See above pp. 43-44.

[725] *De an.* 3.7, 431a8-15. Transl. Ch. Shields. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα διώκει ἢ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ταὐτό, ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν, οὔτ' ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο.

[726] My interpretation here is based on Corcilius (2008) 78 ff. See also Corcilius (2011) and Tracy (1969) 249.

feels. The fear (pain of the soul) urges the sheep to flee since there is a risk of its nature being destroyed by the wolf. The sense perception thus triggers the mechanism of the relation between the natural state, the actual state, and the object. However, pain itself, be it anticipated or actually felt, is not identical to sense perception. Their relation could be characterized as one act but two beings. Sense perception allows the animal to assess whether the given object causes pain or pleasure to it. Thus, we feel pain as the destruction of our nature thanks to the mediation of sense perception.

4.2.3 Pain of the soul

After discussing pain in the biological treatises, let us now focus on the account of pain in the *Rhetoric*, since in this treatise, pain can be in the majority of cases understood as an emotional or psychic experience. Also, its general account resembles significantly Plato's way of speaking about pain (and pleasure):

> Let us assume, then, that pleasure is a sort of movement of the soul, an intensive and perceptible settling down into its original natural state, and pain the contrary (ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον). And if pleasure is something like this, it is also clear that what is productive of the aforementioned condition is also pleasant, and what is destructive of it or is productive of the contrary settling down painful. Thus movement into the condition that is in accord with nature is necessarily pleasant for the most part (ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), and especially whenever what comes about in accord with nature has recovered its own natural state.[727]

This account of pleasure and pain echoes the way Plato conceived of them, since the passage defines pleasure and pain as motions. We saw that in ethics, Aristotle argued explicitly against the understanding of pleasure as a movement. However, pain, at least in some cases can be understood in Aristotle as a movement and, in the context of *Rhetoric*, the way of understanding pain has its place. After all, in the majority of passages, pain is understood as being an emotion disrupting the neutral equilibrium of our psychic life. Thus, in his discussion of emotions,

[727] *Rh.* 1.11, 1369b33-1370a3. Transl. Reeve. For a commentary to this passage see Reeve (2018) 226-7. For a general discussion of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see Dow (2015), Furley and Nehamas (1994). Concerning emotions in the *Rhetoric*, see also Tracy (1969) 252-253.

Aristotle simply shows a different aspect of pleasures and pains than he did in ethics or biology, so the frame he uses for describing them may be different, too.[728]

Aristotle's motivation in discussing pain in the *Rhetoric* is based on the contention that pleasure, pain, and various emotional states these phenomena are connected to, influence our judgment and can be used in rhetorical speech for persuasion:

> The assemblyman and the juror are already judging about present and definite issues, in relation to which they already feel both love and hatred, and with which their own private advantage is already knitted together, so that they are no longer capable of adequately seeing the truth (ὥστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ἱκανῶς τὸ ἀληθές), but instead their own private pleasure or pain overshadows their judgment (ἀλλ'ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν).[729]

> Persuasion is through the listeners whenever they are led to feel things by the speech (ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν). For we do not give the same judgments pained and pleased, or loving and hating (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες, ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες). ... The details where this is concerned will be made clear when we speak about feelings.[730]

> The feelings are those things due to which people, by undergoing a change, differ in their judgments (τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις), and that entail pain and pleasure— for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things, and their contraries (ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία).[731]

Aristotle's discussion in the *Rhetoric* thus attempts to elucidate what is the nature of these two means of persuasion. We have already mentioned one of their features, namely to movement from the natural state or to the natural state. The second feature of pain of and pleasure of the soul is again similar to what we have seen in Plato, namely that they are characterised as anticipatory pleasures and pains:

> Also, a sort of pleasure follows along with most appetites, since people enjoy a certain pleasure (ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις ἡδονή) when they remember that they got something

[728] Cf. Cheng (2015) 60: "The application of the Platonic kinēsis-based model in the *Rhetoric* is also conditioned by context. It is essentially a Platonic insight, offered as a criticism of the naturalists, that pleasure, as a pathos of soul, has an emotional character. … A merit of this classification, as we see in the *Philebus*, is that emotions can be analysed into a mixture of pleasure and pain, two more basic emotions. This fits well with Aristotle's characterisation of a central aspect of emotions as being accompanied by pleasure and pain."

[729] *Rh.* 1.1, 1354b4-11.

[730] *Rh.* 1.2, 1356a14-20.

[731] *Rh.* 2.1, 1378a19-21. For the role of passions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see Dow (2015) 131-181.

or anticipate that they will get it (ἢ γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔτυχον ἢ ἐλπίζοντες ὡς τεύξονται χαίρουσίν τινα ἡδονήν). For example, those in a fever, during their attacks of thirst, enjoy both remembering having drunk and anticipating drinking. And lovers always enjoy discussing things, writing, and doing something concerning the beloved, since in all such things, by remembering, they think they perceive, as it were, their beloved. For the starting-point of love is the same for all, namely, when they not only enjoy the beloved when he is present, but also remember him when he is absent, though pain would attach to his not being present (καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὕτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος χαίρωσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος μεμνημένοις [ἐρῶσιν] λύπη προσγένηται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι).[732]

At first sight, Aristotle's account of anticipatory pleasures seems similar to that of Plato's and to a great degree, it is. Aristotle emphasizes various aspects of emotional inner life opened by Plato. The first is the role of memory. Because we remember (μεμνημένοι) that something was pleasurable in the past, we anticipate (ἐλπίζοντες) it will be so in the future, too. Similarly, when the lover is absent, people can still feel pleasure, by remembering, they think they perceive, as it were, their beloved (ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ ἐρωμένου). When the absence is long, we can argue, that remembering leads to pain, instead of pleasure. Pain and pleasure of the soul, thus, are similarly as in Plato based on the actual state of the person experiencing them and are also bound to both past and future by remembering and anticipating.

Aristotle then provides in the *Rhetoric* definition of various emotions, which share two formal features: first emotion is defined as being "a sort of pain or disturbance" (λύπη τις ἢ ταραχή), second, there is the relation between being in the actual state of the emotion and past or future:

What sorts of things people fear, and whom, and by being disposed in which way [they feel fear] will be evident from what follows. Let fear, then, be a sort of pain or disturbance coming from the appearance of a future destructive or painful evil (ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ). For people do not fear all evils (for example, that one will become unjust or slow-witted), but rather those that are capable of [causing] great pains or great destructions (λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθοράς), and if they appear not far off but close at hand, and so about to happen. … If, then, this is what fear is, necessarily the sorts of things that are fearsome are whichever ones appear to have a great capacity for destroying or causing harms

[732] *Rh.* 1.11, 1370b14-24. Cf. Reeve (2018) 228-229.

that lead to great pain (δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην συντεινούσας).[733]

Let shame be a sort of pain or disturbance concerned with the evils—whether present, past, or future—that appear to bring a person into disrepute, and shamelessness a sort of contempt and lack of feeling concerning these same things (ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, ἡ δ' ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα).[734]

Let pity, then, be a sort of pain at an apparently destructive or painful bad thing happening to someone who does not deserve it, and one that a person might expect himself or one of his own to suffer, and this when it appears close at hand (ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται).[735]

First, then, let us speak about being indignant, whom people are indignant at, why, and by being disposed in which way they feel it, and after this about the other feelings. And it is evident from what has been said. For if being indignant is being pained at what appears tobe undeservedly doing well (εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν), it is clear, first, that it is not possible to be indignant at all good things.[736]

And it is also clear why people envy, whom they do, and by being disposed in which way, if indeed envy is a sort of pain at apparent doing well in terms of the goods mentioned, on the part of those like themselves (εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινομένῃ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους), not in order that something accrue to the person himself, but because of those [possessing it].[737]

For if jealousy is a sort of pain at the apparent presence, in the case of others who are by nature like the person himself, of good things that are honored and possible for someone to acquire, not due to the fact that another has them but rather due to the fact that he himself does not (εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῷ ἔστιν).[738]

[733] *Rh.* 2.5, 1382a20-32. Cf. Reeve (2018) 261.

[734] *Rh.* 2.6, 1383b11-16. Cf. Reeve (2018) 262.

[735] *Rh.* 2.8, 1385b11-16. Cf. Reeve (2018) 267.

[736] *Rh.* 2.9, 1387a6-11. Cf. Reeve (2018) 270.

[737] *Rh.* 2.10, 1387b22-25. Cf. Reeve (2018) 271. For a discussion of envy in Aristotle, see Leighton (2011).

[738] *Rh.* 2.11, 1388a32-35.

All these passions take place when there is a combination of some actual state and reminiscence or anticipation of something happening in the future. The anticipatory aspect of pain has also a feature similar to near and remote pains and pleasures known from Plato. For example, when Aristotle enumerates the reasons for which people act unjustly, he notices that it is the case of people without self-control who are driven by the immediate profit:

> And those for whom the pleasure is immediate, while the pain is later (καὶ οἷς ἂν παραχρῆμα ᾖ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὕστερον), or where the profit (κέρδος) is immediate, while the penalty is later (for those who lack self-control are like that, and lack of self-control is concerned with everything that people desire); and, contrariwise, those for whom the pain or the penalty (ζημία) is immediate, while the pleasure and benefit are later and more lasting (for those who are self-controlled and those who are more practically-wise pursue such things).[739]

Our anticipations can also influence the intensity of pain and pleasure we feel, "since what is to a high degree contrary to belief pains more, just as what is to a high degree contrary to belief delights more, if what is wished for comes about".[740]

We have seen in Plato that discerning between pleasures and pains of the body and of the soul allows him to speak about mixtures of pleasures and pains: the mixture was usually between bodily pleasure and pain of the soul (or *vice versa*), or in the mixture of pleasurable and painful expectation (fear and hope). Aristotle differs from Plato substantially in the following point. While Plato emphasizes repeatedly that pleasure and pain are mixed, Aristotle prefers to say that one follows the other, or, as in the following passage from the *Rhetoric*, pleasure 'attaches' to mourning (a kind of pain):

> So too in the same way there is a certain pleasure that attaches to mourning and lamentation for a departed one, since there is pain at his not being there and pleasure in remembering and, in a way, seeing him, the actions he was doing, and what he was like. That is why it made perfect sense to say: Thus he spoke, and stirred in all of them the longing for weeping. Also, getting revenge is pleasant. For if something is such that not getting it is painful, getting it is pleasant, and angry people who do not get revenge are unsurpassably pained, whereas they enjoy anticipating it.[741]

Thanks to the capacity of remembering and expecting things we can feel pleasure and pain at the same time. At other places, however, Aristotle is sceptical about the possibility to feel

[739] *Rh.* 1.12, 1372b8-16.

[740] *Rh.* 2.2, 1379a23-26.

[741] *Rh.* 1.11, 1370b24-32. Cf. Reeve (2018) 229.

pleasure and pain at the same time.[742] In general, however, pains serve to Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* to describe the richness of human inner life using a unified conceptual tool and creating thus a comprehensive theory of emotions.

4.3 Pain, Education and Moral Life

4.3.1 Pain and Character

After outlining what is the place of pain in *Rhetoric*, the biological treatises, and *On the soul* let us now face the question of what its role in Aristotle's ethics is. We tackled this question already in previous paragraphs since it is inseparable from the analysis of the nature of pain. In the discussion of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, at the beginning of this chapter, we saw that Aristotle aims to modify the platonic conception of pleasure showing that pleasure can be understood not only as a motion, but as something essentially related to the activity, too. We have also seen what this conception of pleasure means for pain, namely that it can be understood not only as a degeneration of our nature but also as hindering the activity. Since activities which Aristotle ascribes specifically to human beings are those of morals and intellection, we can see already why pain is so important a topic in ethics. Its role in biological treatises can consists in describing the situations in which animals feel pain contributes to understanding their physiology, behaviour etc. In the *Rhetoric*, pains and pleasures, expressed as various emotions are necessary to be known to orators since persuasion of the listeners is based on understanding and using their emotions. What is its role in the ethics?

I shall now first analyse a few of Aristotle's explicit statements about the role of pleasure and pain in his moral enquiries and then elucidate these statements through a series of examples of the usage of pain and pleasure in the developments of the arguments in the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian ethics*. It is not surprising that Aristotle, in general, follows the way in which Plato integrated pleasure and pain in his ethical theories. Both philosophers are aware that pleasure and pain have a strong influence on human beings and that it is necessary to face the general presumption that pleasure is something good to be pursued and pain is something bad to be

[742] I have argued elsewhere that the reason why Aristotle does not describe the relation between pleasure and pain as mixtures may be that these phenomena are not 'mixable' since they are structurally different: pleasure is usually closely connected to activity while pain is usually understood as degeneration of nature. If it happens that they are felt at the same time, as for example in the case of bad people who are both pleased and pained from their wickedness their 'mixture' is so unstable that it cannot exist and has serious negative effects on the one experiencing it. See Linka (2023b).

avoided. Neither of them wants to contradict this dictum completely but they both propose substantial modifications of it. The shared motivation is here, possibly, a threat of hedonism for their ethical theories. We have already seen that Aristotle's answer to hedonism, affecting also his conception of pain, is more nuanced than Plato's. So even though they probably have the same starting points from which stems the shared motivation that it is necessary to place pleasure and pain at the central place in their ethical theories, their answers to this challenge differ. The connection between pleasure, pain, and activity is one of these differing points. We shall also see that Aristotle emphasizes some points that are not so developed in Plato, for example, the role of pleasure and pain in friendship. Also, in contrast, Aristotle does not elaborate on some features of pleasure and pain, namely on the problem that pleasure is usually mixed with pain which was so frequently emphasized by Plato. Thus, it cannot be said that Aristotle just offers more elaborate and profound answers than Plato on the same questions, but rather that he develops his answers in different directions because it accentuates different problems (e.g., friendship). So, even though the general perspective on pain in ethics is shared by the two philosophers, we shall see that there are a few new perspectives introduced by Aristotle.

I start with three general statements (*T1-T3*) about the role of pleasure and pain in ethics.

> *T1.* Having a theoretical grasp on pleasure and pain is part of being a political philosopher (Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος), because it's the part of philosophy that makes the master plan (lays out life's goal), which we can use as our criteria for calling anything good or bad (without qualification) (τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς λέγομεν). Plus, investigating them is something we really have to do. First, because we made the claim earlier that 'being a morally good or bad person is all about pleasures and pains' (τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν); and also because most people say that a blessed, (flourishing) life must include pleasure (μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναί). That's why even the word in Greek for someone blessed, (Makarios), comes from word for feeling joy, pleasure happiness: *chairein.*[743]

> *T2.* We should take as evidence for someone's dispositions – their character traits – the pleasure and pain that arises with their actions (Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις). For example: if you hold back from physical pleasures, and enjoy doing exactly that, you're moderate. If it pains you to have to do so, you're a lecherous man or a glutton (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος). If you face frightening things and enjoy it, or at least aren't distressed by

[743] *Eth. Nic.* 7.11, 1152b1-8. The first sentence translated according to Reeve (2014).

it, you're brave. If it distresses you, you're a coward (καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός). The fact is, being a morally good person is all about pleasures and pains (περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή). After all, we do bad things because they give us pleasure, and fail to do honorable things because they're painful (διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα). That is why it's important for us to have been brought up a certain way right from childhood – as Plato says – so that we enjoy the things we should and feel pain at the things we should (ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ). That's what a good upbringing is (ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν). Also, if virtues are all about our actions and our emotions, and if every emotion and every action has a feeling of pleasure or pain that goes with it, that's another reason for thinking that being a good person is all about pleasures and pains (ἔτι δ' εἰ αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας).[744]

T3. Pleasure, after all, seems something deeply ingrained in human nature. That's why people educate the young by steering them with pleasure and pain (μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ). Also, enjoying the things you should, and hating the things you should (τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ), seems hugely important to your goodness of character (καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον). Those things extend through the whole of your life and have a major bearing, a powerful influence, on how good a person you are and on whether you flourish in life (ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον). Because pleasure shapes our choices: people choose and value the things that give them pleasure and avoid the things that cause them pain (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν).[745]

Aristotle first tries to justify that ethics (moral and political philosophy) is a proper place to address the problem of pleasure and pain. Moral philosophy, we are told in *T1*, "lays out life's goal (οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων), which we can use as our criteria for calling anything good or bad without qualification."[746] This implies that good and bad without

[744] *Eth. Nic.* 2.3, 1104b3-16.

[745] *Eth. Nic.* 10.1, 1172a19-25.

[746] See also *Eth. Nic.* 6.5, 1140b13-20: "Pleasure and pain don't mess up or distort just any notion at all, like, say, the notion that the internal angles of a triangle add up to two right angles. They only disrupt your ideas about what you should or shouldn't be doing. Because the starting point for action is the purpose of the things you're doing, and when someone is corrupted by pleasure or pain, then from the outset they fail to see that starting point, so then they also don't see that they should be choosing and doing all the other things for that purpose and for that reason. That's what being a bad person does to you. It warps your ethical starting points (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς)."

qualification must thus somehow relate to goodness and badness in the sense of morality, since "being a morally good or bad person is all about pleasures and pains" (τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν) and that being happy (εὐδαιμονία) – which can be identified with good without qualification have some significant relation to pleasure: "most people say that a blessed, (flourishing) life must include pleasure (μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναί)".

For supporting that, we must show why "being a morally good or bad person is all about pleasures and pains". As Aristotle argues throughout the *Ethics*, being morally good or bad consists in having and acting from certain dispositions, i.e., virtues and vices. And to evaluate the disposition of people we should focus on "pleasure and pain that arises from their actions. For example: if you hold back from physical pleasures, and enjoy doing exactly that, you're moderate. If it pains you to have to do so, you're a lecherous man or a glutton." (*T2*) Thus, the way we feel in acting virtuously or viciously shows how strong or weak our dispositions are. A moderate person is not the one who acts moderately but is sad about it and does it against his wishes, but the one who acts moderately and feels pleasure in acting so.[747]

The reader or listener of the *Ethics* must thus understand pleasure and pain in order to understand the core of ethical theory; virtues and vices. That is not all. Pleasure and pain also help to explain why people act badly: "After all, we do bad things because they give us pleasure, and fail to do honorable things because they're painful (διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα)." (*T2*) If that is the case and, at the same time it is natural to feel pleasure and pain, there is a need for their cultivation and proper education: "That is why it's important for us to have been brought up a certain way right from childhood – as Plato says – so that we enjoy the things we should and feel pain at the things we should (ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ). (*T2*) This is corroborated in the *T3*, too: If pleasure is "deeply ingrained in our nature" (συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν), we should educate people in the way already mentioned (τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ), because "pleasure shapes our choices: people choose and value the things that give them pleasure and avoid the things that cause them pain" (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν). The argument, shared by all three texts, is thus as follows: ethics sets up what is good and bad without qualification; to attain the good we must live a morally

[747] For the relation between acting virtuously and feeling pleasure in doing so, see e.g., Tracy (1969) 235, Burnyeat (1980) and Konstan (1980).

good life, for which we need to have appropriate dispositions, i.e., virtues. Virtues are cultivated through education whose tools are pleasure and pain because in acting honourably we must act virtuously and feel pleasure, not pain, in doing so. Thus, education leads to feeling pleasure at the honourable things and pain from the shameful ones in the right manner; also, it is a sign of good education that we can endure pains connected to virtuous actions, such as acting bravely in the battle or in illness.

This initial argument is enriched with many details when Aristotle discusses particular problems of moral life. In education, for example, punishments are important, and they work through pleasures and pains; we apply them to people who act wrongly in pursuing or avoiding pleasures and pain, wrong ones, at the wrong time, in the wrong way.[748]

Our goal as morally developed human beings, in relation to pleasure and pain, is not a 'tranquillity state' (*apatheia*). We should rather seek *how* and *when* we should feel pleasure and pain. Aristotle repeats that "being a good person is a matter of feeling pleasures and pains in such a way that you do what's best; and being the bad person, the opposite" (ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτική, ἡ δὲ κακία τοὐναντίον).[749]

For acting in a certain way and thus to ethics in general, the problem of choice is of utmost interest. There are three classes of things which are targets of our choices, honourable things, things in our interest and pleasurable ones (καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος).[750] Their opposites are shameful, harmful and painful things (αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ).[751] "Pleasure accompanies all possible objects of choice" (καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ [ἡδονή]).[752] If we want to choose correctly, we must be well educated in the right relation to pleasures and pain. Our decision to act in a particular way is to certain degree dependent on the pleasure and pain stemming from it:

> We also regulate our actions (κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις) (some of us more than others) using the pleasure and pain they produce as our standard. So that means our whole task here is bound to be all about pleasure and pain; because it's going to make a really big difference to our actions, whether we feel pleasure and pain at the right things or the wrong things. … So that's

[748] *Eth. Nic.* 2.3, 1104b16-20.

[749] *Eth. Nic.* 2.3, 1104b27-28.

[750] *Eth. Nic.* 2.3, 1104b30. For a discussion on choice and deliberation in Aristotle, see e.g., Mele (1981), Sherman (1985), McDowell (1996), and Price (2011).

[751] *Eth. Nic*. 2.3, 1104ab32.

[752] *Eth. Nic.* 2.3, 1104b30.

another reason why the whole business of being good people (and the whole business of statesmanship) is to do with pleasures and pains. Depending on whether you feel them the right way or the wrong way, you'll be a good person or a bad one (ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός). So here's what we've claimed so far: that virtues are all to do with pleasures and pains; that the activities that produce them can either augment them or diminish them (depending on whether they're done one way or the other); and that they're exercised in the very same activities that produced them." (ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ).[753]

In acting moderately, for example, we not only evince our character traits in feeling pleasure stemming from the noble act, but we also cultivate our feeling in such a way. In education, young people initially do not feel the right pleasures and pains, but if they act in the way the virtuous man would have acted, they will finally start feeling in the appropriate way, too.[754] In contrast, if someone acts viciously, he will 'cultivate' his feeling of pleasure in doing so, and acting in the opposite direction, thus courageously instead of cowardly, will be really painful for him.

Virtues, thus, stand at the core of Aristotle's ethical theory and their understanding helps us to see the proper place of pleasures and pains in it:

Virtues, whatever they're the virtues of, always put the thing itself into a good state, and also make it good at performing the task (πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν). E.g. the physical virtues of an eye make the eye a good eye, and make it perform its task well – which is to say, the eye's virtues make us see well. … Human virtues are presumably dispositions that make someone a good human being, a good person, and good at performing the task of a human being" (ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφ'ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει).[755]

Virtue stands in between two extremes: "so virtues must aim at a mid-point, too (τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική), I'm only talking about character virtues. Those are to do with actions and

[753] *Eth. Nic.* 2.3, 1105a3-16. See also *Eth. Nic.* 4.1, 1121a3-4: "A key part of being a good person is being pleased and displeased by the right things in the eight way."

[754] "We become fair and honest people by doing things that are fair and honest, moderate people by doing things that are moderate, and brave people by doing brave things." *Eth. Nic.* 2.1, 1103a34-b2.

[755] *Eth. Nic.* 2.6, 1106a15-22. For the role of habituation of virtues in the process of education of the moral character, see e.g., Burnyeat (1980), Bowditch (2008), Hursthouse (1988), Sherman (1989). For a connection between habituation and pleasure and pain, see Tracy (1969) 235: "As the healthy body responds properly and easily to diet and climate, so the habit of moral virtue, once established, actualises itself in responding ὡς δεῖ to painful and pleasant object or situation."

feelings, and it's in those that you can have too much, too little and a mid-point. You can … feel … any pleasure and pain more or less; too much or too little. And neither is good" (ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα οὐκ εὖ)[756]. Virtue can be thus defined in the following way: "So a virtue is a disposition to choose certain things; it lies in a middle state (middle relative to us) as determined by reason, or as a wise person would define it" (Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν).[757]

For a better understanding of the relation between virtue and pleasure and pain, this sequel to the definition of dispositions must be added:

> By dispositions, or states, I mean the things that set us in a good or bad way as regards our emotion (ἕξεις δὲ καθ'ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶ), e.g. with respect to feeling angry, we're set in a bad way if our feeling of anger are either typically intense or typically feeble, and in a good way if they're somewhere in the middle; and similarly for our other emotions.[758]

> By emotions or feelings, I mean things like desire, anger, fear boldness, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, jealousy, pity – in general, things that are accompanied by pleasure or pain (λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη).[759]

Aristotle settles his ethical theory in the observation that emotions, "things accompanied by pleasure or pain", are natural to be felt.[760] The task of the philosopher is thus not to claim that feeling them is bad, but rather cultivate the way we feel them. And since the way we feel them expresses our dispositions, thus, virtues and vices, we have to focus, in education and in moral philosophy, on forming the appropriate virtues.[761] And since all emotions are connected to

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[756] *Eth. Nic.* 2.6, 1106b16-21 Transl. slightly modified. For Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, see e.g., Urmson (1980), Curzer (1996, 2006).

[757] *Eth. Nic.* 2.6, 1106b36-1107a2.

[758] *Eth. Nic.* 2.5, 1105b25-28. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* 2.4, 1221b32-1222a5, 2.5, 1222a10-17, 2.5, 1222b9-1.

[759] *Eth. Nic.* 2.5, 1105b21-23, cf. 3.2, 1111b16-18, *Eth. Eud.* 2.2, 1220b12-14. For a discussion on emotions in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* see e.g., Brinton (1988), Cooper (1999), Dow (2011).

[760] For example, people who don't get angry at the right moment at the right things are "as if not sentient; as if they don't feel the pain" (δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι). *Eth. Nic.* 4.4, 1126a6. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* 2.3, 1221a28-31. See also Leighton (2011).

[761] Cf. Tracy (1969) 243, 245: "The pleasure or pain which one finds in good acts is an index of whether or not he has acquired the corresponding ἕξις. … The proper balance of emotional powers allows the virtuous man … to perceive what is objectively good, noble, fitting or helpful to man as man and to be pleased by it so as to pursue it, as well as to perceive and be pained by the opposite and so to avoid it."

pleasure and pain (in the *Rhetoric* we have seen that some emotions *are* pains) we have to cultivate our feeling of pleasure and pain. In a way, this topic is similar to what we saw in some of Plato's later dialogues, namely the recognition of the fact that it is natural to feel pleasure and pain and an attempt to integrate them into moral theory. Aristotle is very realistic here: he is aware that in the majority, people are not able to shut themselves up to emotions completely, and that it would not be right. What should we do is not to abstain completely from, e.g., anger, but to feel it in appropriate situations and in appropriate amounts.

Pain and pleasure accompanying emotions we feel in acting according to our dispositions enable us to better understand these dispositions and their role in human life. As an example, let us first discuss the virtues of moderation and then of bravery.[762] Aristotle's discussion of moderation shows that in some contexts, Aristotle uses Plato's explanation of pleasure and pain:

> Natural desire, here, is all about refilling – satisfying a need (ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία). … So, going too far with respect to physical pleasures means being lecherous and gluttonous (περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία). And it's blameworthy. … You're gluttonous and lecherous if you feel more pain than you should at not getting physical pleasures (ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει) (such that the pain is actually caused by the pleasure) and a moderate man if you don't feel pain at the absence of pleasure or when you abstain from it (ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος). … That's why he [gluttonous and lecherous] feels pain, when he doesn't get them, and pain in craving them. His desire itself causes him pain. And that seems pretty silly – to be in pain on account of pleasure (μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι).[763]

Aristotle is aware that we naturally seek food, drink, sexual intercourse, etc., and that there is nothing shameful about it, "our strongest natural impulse, after all, is to avoid pain and aim for pleasure (μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος)".[764] However, if these desires are too intense, they actually lead not to pleasure, which was their initial goal, but to its opposite, to pain. This is similar to what we read in Plato: we have a need,

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[762] Pleasure and pain of course play a role in other virtues, too. See e.g., 4.1, 1120a27-30 (generosity), 7.1, 1145b12-14 (self-control).

[763] *Eth. Nic.* 3.11, 1118b18-1119a5. For a general discussion about desire in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, see e.g., Pearson (2012).

[764] *Eth. Nic.* 8.5, 1157b13-17. See also 7.14, 1154a15-17: "And there is such a thing as going too far with bodily goods, and we only fault someone for pursuing excessive amounts of them, not for pursuing necessary pleasures." Cf. 10.2, 1172b19-20.

and we try to satisfy it. For Aristotle, however, this does not seem to lead to the conclusion that pleasure is bad because it depends on preceding pain. He rather emphasizes the outcomes of intensive desires. So, we could say that even though both Plato and Aristotle understand that at least some pleasures can be described as refiling of needs, each of them emphasizes a different feature deducible from this scheme: Plato sees in it a corroboration for his negative evaluation of pleasure, Aristotle the need for establishing a safe manner in following the natural urges of the 'refiling' pleasures. For that reason, he introduces the notion of a moderate person who

> doesn't ever feel intense (σφόδρα) pleasure at any of those kinds of things [as the gluttonous]. He also doesn't feel pain at the absence of pleasures or crave them, or he desires them within measure and never more than one should or at the wrong time or wrong anything else (οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν). … All the pleasures that keep you healthy or in good shape he'll desire within measure (ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα), and in the way that you should, and other pleasures too as long as they don't undermine his health or his fitness and as long as they don't go against what's honourable and aren't beyond his means (τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν).[765]

We can see that Aristotle is much more sympathetic to refiling pleasures than Plato and that he understands their natural place in our life. As for the pain preceding them, it even seems that he would discern between a 'need' we feel when we are hungry and a 'pain' that we feel when we are starving. A moderate man then would feel the pain only when he is starving, after the intensity of need crossed a particular level, while the gluttonous one would feel already the normal hunger as painful. Aristotle's explanation of refiling pleasures thus seems to be more in accordance with the reality of such examples as hunger and thirst and, at the same time, offers an elaborate argument concerning the ways in which virtuous and vicious people not only act but how they feel, too. He knows of course that there are other types of pleasure that do not involve need, filling etc., and which are more valuable (pleasures of knowledge, contemplation),[766] but he is aware that for some (maybe most) people, the refiling pleasures are the only pleasures they experience: "The problem is that most people don't have anything else they enjoy, and also, for most people, even the neutral state of neither pleasure nor pain is painful."[767]

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[765] *Eth. Nic.* 3.11, 1119a13-18. For a discussion on moderation, see Curzer (1997), MacIntyre (1988).

[766] *Eth. Nic.* 7.14, 1154b15-28, 10.3, 1173b16-20, 10.3, 1174a10, 10.7, 1177b19-27, 10.7, 1178a5-8.

[767] *Eth. Nic.* 7.14, 1154b5-6.

Another example testifying to the elaboration of the role of pleasure and pain in connection to virtues is the virtue of courage (bravery):

> So that means it's for facing and enduring painful things that people are called brave, as we've explained. Because fear is a form of pain. That's why being brave is painful and stressful, and that's why men are praised for it and rightly so. It's harder to endure things that are painful than to abstain from pleasures.[768]

Bravery is a peculiar virtue since it is somehow more intensely connected to pain. Whereas other virtues, such as moderation, help us not to feel pain so often, in courage, pain is a necessary component in acting according to this disposition. If it is so, a distinction must be made between bodily and pain of the soul here, since in acting in accordance with some virtues, particularly courage, it is necessary to risk or even suffer bodily pain (in training, in the battle etc.): "But being punched hurts (assuming they're made of flesh and blood), it's painful. So is all the training" (τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος).[769] So, similarly to Plato, a risk of bodily pain should not stop us in acting virtuously, since acting viciously would bring pain, too. If one flees the battle, thus, one escapes the immediate bodily pain but exposes himself to pain of the soul instead. We can see that my distinction between pain hindering the activity and pain degenerating our nature introduced above can be applied here. In suffering the injury and bodily pain in the battle, my pain can be understood as a degeneration of nature, in acting cowardly, the pain I feel – the fear – hinders me in acting courageously.[770] At the same time, even a brave man should feel fear, because if not, he would be acting recklessly. In that case, the fear does not hinder him to act courageously, but viciously (since both cowardice and recklessness are vices opposite to courage).[771] Even a brave man fears the things normal people do, such as disgrace, poverty, sickness, having no friends, dying (ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον) and it is appropriate.[772] But if he should choose between acting shamelessly or dying an honourable death, he chooses the latter and is "fearless

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[768] *Eth. Nic.* 3.9, 1117a32-35. For discussion about bravery, see e.g., Pears (1980), Leighton (1988), Pearson (2014).

[769] *Eth. Nic.* 3.9, 1117b4-5.

[770] Being a coward (the disposition) is painless, "but the particular situations drive a man out of his mind with pain and stress to the point where he throws down his arms and does those other disgraceful things." *Eth. Nic.* 3.12, 1119a29-30.

[771] "So a brave man is someone who fears (or is emboldened by) and faces the right things, for the right reason, to the right degree, at the right time." *Eth. Nic.* 3.7, 1115b17-19, cf. 2.2, 1104a20-22.

[772] *Eth. Nic.* 3.6, 1115a10.

in the face of an honourable death".[773] Courage is a very good example of why Aristotle, similarly as Plato, cannot say that all pain is bad: in some circumstances, it is better to suffer pain that to act non-honourably or to suffer one kind of pain (bodily pain) than another (pain of the soul – shame).[774] Human beings are exceptional in this, since "with animals, it's really just pain that drives them. It's because they've been hit or wounded or they're afraid."[775] Also, if we compare cowardice and being gluttonous, we shall see that the role of pleasure and of pain has a slightly different value in Aristotle's evaluation: "Being gluttonous and lecherous seems a more wilful character trait than being a coward. It's caused by pleasure, something we choose, whereas cowardice is caused by pain, something we try to avoid. Plus, pain disrupts and damages the nature of whatever's experiencing it, but pleasure doesn't do anything like that. So that makes it more wilful, and therefore more reprehensible."[776]

Human beings, due to their capacity to act virtuously or viciously are able to act against the immediate feelings of pleasure and pain. For that reason, the role of pleasure and pain is so important for education, as Aristotle repeatedly stresses: in order to act virtuously, it is impossible to abstain from facing pleasure and pain, so we need to be properly prepared for such an encounter. And since in the ethical domain, practice, not theory, is a necessary means for acquiring particular dispositions we must face pleasurable and painful things, suffer punishments, etc. Only this way can we prepare for good action.

4.3.2 Friendship

We have seen that for Plato, pleasure and pain are usually mixed. Aristotle discusses this problem in the context of friendship, and it is worth looking at it in detail since it shows that even though Plato and Aristotle share some general frame in discussing pain, in some particular points, they differ. Also, since the discussion of friendship occupies an important place in Aristotle's general ethical theory, it is worth focusing on the role pain plays in it.

According to Aristotle, friendship is a "virtue – of a sort; or tied to being a good person. It's also absolutely necessary to life," which "holds cities together".[777] We are friends with

[773] *Eth. Nic.* 3.6, 1115a33, cf. 3.1, 1110a25-26.

[774] *Eth. Nic.* 3.1, 1110a32-33.

[775] *Eth. Nic.* 3.8, 1117a31-33.

[776] *Eth. Nic.* 3.12, 1119a21-25.

[777] *Eth. Nic.* 8.1, 1155a3-6, 1155a22-23. For Aristotle's theory of friendship, see e.g., Miller (2014), Utz (2003),

people with whom we have something in common, so the perfect friendship is between people "where being good people is precisely the thing they have in common".[778] Friend is someone "who, because they love you, shares your pains and your joys. … he is another self" (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός).[779] The perfect friendship, finally, brings us pleasure in one more and essential way that is peculiar only to this kind of friendship and to this virtue. Aristotle follows his predecessors in the contention that friendship consists in 'sharing'. We may share various things with our friends, money, the household, pleasure, pain, etc., but for Aristotle, what we share in the perfect friendship is nothing other than life: "Also, we exercise friendship by sharing a life (συζῆν). So it's no surprise that that's what friends aim to do."[780]

Sharing our life with a friend can take various forms, the most general and important is to spend time with him, since if the friends do not see each other for a long time, their friendship begins to fade[781]. A friend is someone "who, because they love you, shares your pains and your joys. Again, that's especially true of mothers with respect to their children."[782] If a friend stayed by us only in the good times, we would not think very highly of him; after all 'A friend in need is a friend indeed'. So far, I underlined several ways in which friendship contributes to our pleasure. However, if I share my friends' pains, does it not mean that I feel pain myself? And when I share my pains with a friend, does not that mean that I am causing him pain? Aristotle

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Carreras (2012), Perälä (2016), Fortenbaugh (1975) Annas (1977), Cooper (1977a, 1977b), Walker (1979), Sherman (1987, 1989, 91-118), Millgram (1987), Price (1989), Cocking (2014), Biss (2011), For friendship in antiquity, see e.g. See e.g., Konstan (1997), Stern-Gillet, Gurtler (2014).

[778] *Eth. Nic.* 8.3, 1156b7-10.

[779] *Eth. Nic.* 9.4, 1166a7-8, 1166a30-31. For an interpretation of this dictum, see e.g., Annas (1977) 539-542 who emphasizes that for understanding it, it is necessary to bear the discussion of friendship in Plato's *Lysis* in mind, especially the problem of altruism and egoism in friendship. In loving someone because he is another self, both these perspectives (loving someone purely for his sake and loving them for my sake) can take place. See also Carreras (2012).

[780] *Eth. Nic.* 9.12. 1171b35-1172a1, cf. *Eth. Eud.* 7.2, 1237b35-37.

[781] "Nothing's as crucial to friendship as spending time together." *Eth. Nic.* 8.5, 1157b19.

[782] *Eth. Nic.* 9.4, 1166a7-8. See also *Eth. Eud*. 7.6, 1240a33-b40: "Further, we will suppose that sharing in the suffering (τὸ ἀλγοῦντι συναλγεῖν) of one who suffers is a mark of loving, when it is not because of something else (like slaves in relation to their masters because they are harsh when in pain) but because of the sufferers themselves, like mothers for their children and birds who share each other's suffering (συνωδίνοντες). In fact, the friend most wishes not just to share in the pain of his friend, but even the same pain (οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην), if possible (for example, sharing in thirst if he is thirsty), or if not, very close to it. And the same account also applies to enjoying; for it is fitted to friendship (φιλικόν) to rejoice not because of something else but because the other is rejoicing."

discusses this problem at length in the ninth chapters of the ninth book of the *Nicomachean ethics*.[783] He starts with a common-sense observation:

> In fact, just the mere presence (ἡ παρουσία αὐτή) of our friends, both in times of good fortune and in adversity (καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις), gives us pleasure (ἡδεῖα). We get relief from our distress when friends share our pain (κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων). Which raises another question: are they, as it were, helping us carry a burden (βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν)? Or is that not it? Maybe it's that their presence is a pleasure, and the realization that they're feeling our pain with us lessens our own distress (ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ). Anyway, whether it's for that reason or for some other reason that people are uplifted in that way by their friends – let's not worry about that for now. The point is, it does seem to work that way (συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν).[784]

In times of distress, we get relief when our friends are around and share our pain. Aristotle accepts this observation and offers two possible explanations: it can be the case that the presence of our friend brings us relief in just that the friend helps us carry the burden of our misfortune. Our pain is thus less intensive, or we are less aware of it because the friend takes a part of it on himself. Another possibility is that the mere presence of our friend brings us pleasure, so we experience both pains caused by the misfortune and pleasure caused by the presence of our friend. The whole experience is thus less painful than it would be without the presence of our friend. These two possibilities are not exclusive, they can be perceived as two perspectives of view on the experience of sharing pains with friends. The second possibility, however, Aristotle discusses in some detail in the next passage:

> But the presence of friends seems kind of a mixed experience (ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις). On the one hand, just seeing your friends it is a pleasure (αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ), especially when you're having a hard time, and acts as a support (ἐπικουρία); stops you feeling too distressed (μὴ λυπεῖσθαι). A friend is a thing with the power to make you feel better, by the mere sight of them and by what they say (τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ), if they're good at saying the right thing (ᾗ ἐπιδέξιος). Because a friend knows your character, and knows what pleases you and what pains you (οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἥδεται καὶ λυπεῖται).[785]

In the presence of our friend, we are undergoing a mixed experience; there are two parts in the mixture: pleasure and pain. Just seeing our friend helps, he works as a support and is able to

[783] For a parallel passage in the *Eudemian Ethics*, see *Eth. Eud.* 7.12, 1245b26-1246a25.

[784] *Eth. Nic.* 9.11, 1171a27-34.

[785] *Eth. Nic.* 9.11, 1171a34-b4.

alleviate our misfortune. He helps us not only because it is pleasurable to see him, but also because of what he says to us. Since he knows us, knows our pleasures and pains, he can better understand what is going on and what can help us than other people who do not know us so well. One could think that the second part of the mixture, pain, is the pain caused by the misfortune we are sharing with our friend. However, it is not so. The pain Aristotle has in mind is pain arising from our act of sharing:

> On the other hand, the awareness that your friend is upset (λυπούμενον) at your misfortunes is painful (λυπηρόν). Nobody wants to be a cause of pain to their friends (πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις). That's why people who are tough by nature (ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν) take care not to spread their own pain and distress to their friends (συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους). A man like that may even outdo his friends in not being upset, and, if not, he certainly doesn't tolerate his friends getting upset as well, and in general he doesn't let his friends moan about his misfortunes because he doesn't even like to moan about them himself. But females, and womanish men (γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες), enjoy it when people whine and wail along with them. They love those people: 'They care about me; they feel my pain.' And in in all things, obviously you should imitate the better type of person.[786]

In sharing our misfortune, we are causing pain to our friend. Since he loves us, he will naturally feel worried about us and since he is 'the other self' of us, he will feel the pain and pity much stronger than if we were not his friends. In sharing our misfortune, thus, we are experiencing quite a complex situation: there is our initial misfortune, e.g., illness. Then there is the pleasure of our friend being present, alleviating our initial pain, and helping us to cope with the illness. And, finally, there is the pain we feel from sharing the misfortune and causing thus a pain to our friend. No one wants to cause pain to their friend, so we should be restrained in sharing misfortunes. The opposite is a sign, according to Aristotle, of 'females, and womanish men'. 'People who are tough by nature,' on the other hand, are restrained in sharing pains, and share only, or most of all, good things:

> When you're enjoying good fortune (ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις), the presence of your friends offers both a pleasant way of passing your time and the awareness that they're taking pleasure in your blessings. So I'd say what you should do is this: be eager to invite your friends to share in your good fortune (εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους) – doing good for others in an honourable thing – but be reluctant to invite them into your misfortunes (εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα). You should share the bad stuff in your life as little as possible (μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν

[786] *Eth. Nic.* 9.11, 1171b4-12.

κακῶν). (Hence the line: 'One of us being miserable is plenty'.) Ideally, you should call on them only when they're going to be a very big help to you with very little trouble to themselves (μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν). But when it come to going to people's aid, I'd say the reverse applies. If your friends are in trouble you should go to their aid without being called, and eagerly (ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως).[787]

Since we love our friend, we want good for him, and thus we share good things happening to us with him. So, we should share the good fortune as much as possible and the bad one as little as possible. On the other hand, when a friend is in need, we should readily come to his aid, not worrying about the potential distress we may feel from it.

A second passage where Aristotle discusses the possibility of the mixture of pleasure and pain, is about the bad people who are unable to make friendships:

People like that don't even sympathize with their own joys or their own pains (οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναγοῦσιν). Their soul is in a state of civil war (στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή). Part of it, because of their wickedness, feels pained when they abstain (or refrain) from something. Part of it is pleased. One part pulls them in one direction, another in some other direction – tearing them apart, as it were. Even if it's not strictly possible to feel pain and pleasure at the very same instant, at any rate, right after enjoying something, they're upset that they enjoyed it." (εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ).[788]

From this passage it seems clear that Aristotle knows about situations when we feel both pleasure and pain. He does not want to accept that we feel them at once, or, as Plato said, that we feel them as a mixture of pleasure and pain. He must thus describe this phenomenon in another way: the imagery of civil war and the soul pulling us in different directions indicates that Aristotle wants to avoid describing these states as mixtures. He rather describes it in the way that pain is following pleasure.

In the case of friendship, similarly as in the case of other virtues, pleasure and pain, and the relationship we have with them can tell us something important about our character. We should be ready to bear the pain our friend feels even though it may be distressing for us, at the same time, however, we should abstain from sharing our pain with the friend. So, as friendships focused only on sharing pleasure would not be conceived as the highest kind of friendship,

[787] *Eth. Nic.* 9.11, 1171b12-22.

[788] *Eth. Nic.* 9.4, 1166b18-24.

those focused on sharing pain, too. Rather, a moderate relation to pleasure that should never be based on causing pain to our friend through sharing our misfortune is to be searched for.

4.3.3 Conclusion

In the realm of ethics pain occupies a significant role. This role can be observed in two domains. First, pain is a relevant diagnostic tool. The manner in which pain is experienced, including its intensity, duration, and so forth, provides crucial information about an individual's character. There is a distinction between experiencing pain while acting bravely versus experiencing pain while acting cowardly. In normal circumstances, leading a virtuous life should elicit pleasure rather than pain. If pain is present, it should not deter an individual from acting virtuously. Aristotle, therefore, similarly as Plato, provides an elaborate account of the role of pain in human action. As the Stagirite develops a more comprehensive theory of human action, emotions, and feelings, it is natural that his integration of pain into this area is similarly intricate. Zooming out and putting aside numerous relevant details, Aristotle's incorporation of pain into ethics echoes the general approach to pain among medical thinkers, namely, that pain is a vital diagnostic tool. However, in ethics, this tool is primarily oriented toward the diagnosis of the human character rather than the body.

The second perspective through which one can observe the role of pain in ethics is the practical or therapeutic one. Pain not only informs us that something is amiss, but it can also be used to correct what is wrong, such as in the case of punishment. Additionally, pain may sometimes play a role in the process of character education since it is occasionally necessary to confront painful situations actively in order to develop the appropriate relationship to them while acquiring a good character. A philosopher or educator must therefore determine the appropriate place for pain in education since pain is senseless in itself, but only gains meaning when used as a means to achieve something good. This attribute of pain will be further explored in the last section of this chapter, as it is closely related to phenomena such as exercise and hard work. Examining how Aristotle interprets the concept of πόνος in comparison to Plato and medical writers sheds light on this 'therapeutic' role of pain and related painful phenomena.

4.4 Pain, Exercise and Stress

In the last section of this chapter, I will discuss the use of the term πόνος in Aristotle and his school, both for the reason that is closely related to pain and because it can provide valuable insights into the relation between Aristotle, Plato and the medical writers. In addition

to Aristotle's genuine writings, I will discuss here three texts that have their origin in his school and that develop the ideas about the role of πόνος of Aristotle himself. This move is motivated by the fact that from the study of the sources, it seems that πόνος was important and much discussed a theme in both philosophy and medicine of that era and that taking into account other texts inspired by Aristotle allows us to gain a more elaborated picture of the role of πόνος in the Aristotle's school.

Similarly to Plato, Aristotle discuss the role of πόνος (understood as work, toil or labour), especially in education.[789] It is possible to find in Aristotle's ethical treatises some traces of dietetic inspiration, for example in the claim that one should not exercise/be active or be idle too much or too little (ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν).[790] Similarly in another passage we are told that best exertions and nourishment lead to physical well-being (οἷον πόνοι τε ἄριστοι καὶ τροφὴ ἀφ' ὧν γίνεται εὐεξία).[791] Ethical relevance of πόνος consists in its importance for education and development of ethical character: moderate πόνος is necessary for the good development of our body and help us in acting courageously.[792] On the other hand, abstaining from all toil is a sign of effeminacy.[793] Also, in true friendship, we should share not only benefits but labours and charitable services (πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείπποντας), too.[794] Interestingly, in the *Politics*, πόνος is not only associated with a bodily effort, but it can also be connected to the mind, too: "Men ought not to labour at the same time with their minds and with their bodies (τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ); for the two kinds of labour (τῶν πόνων) are opposed to one another; the labour of the body impedes the mind, and the labour of the mind the body."[795] In Aristotle, as in other authors and treatises from that time, connecting πόνος and διανοία is unusual and it echoes the passage from *On Regimen* in which thinking (μερίμνη) is characterised as an example of natural

[789] *Eth. Eud.* 3.1, 1228b34 *Eth. Eud.* 3.1, 1229b3-1230a1; *Eth. Nic.* 3.7, 1116a14-15, 5.6, 1134b5, 9.6, 1167b11, 9.8. 1168a21-27, 9.10, 1170b25, 10.6, 1176b28-36; *Pol.* 2.5, 1263a11-16, 2.6, 1265a31-34, 7.16, 1335b5-15, 7.17, 1336a25, 8.3, 1337b38, 8.4, 1338b38-1339a10, 8.5, 1339b15-19, 8.5, 1339b39-42.

[790] *Eth. Nic.* 6.1, 1138b28. See also *Eth. Nic.* 10.6, 1176b28-36; *Eth. Eud.* 2.5, 1222a24-31. For benefits of πόνος for the good condition of the human body, see also *Met*. 5.2, 1013b9-10 and *Ph*. 2.3, 159a9-11.

[791] *Eth. Eud.* 2.1, 1220a22-28.

[792] *Pol.* 7.16, 1335b5-15, 7.17, 1336a23-27, 7.17, 1336a36-38, 8.4, 1338b38-1339a6. See also *Eth. Eud.* 3.1, 1229b3-1230a1 and *Rh.* 1.5, 1361b3-14. Excessive and brutal exercises in children are however harmful; see *Pol.* 8.4, 1338b9-14.

[793] *Eth. Nic.* 7.7, 1150b4; *Rh*. 2.6 1383b33-1384a2.

[794] *Eth. Nic.* 9.6 1167b9-12. See also Pol. 2.5, 1263a11-16.

[795] *Pol.* 8.4, 1339a7-10. See also *Pol.* 1.2, 1252a33.

πόνοι.[796] What is shared, however, is the emphasis on the importance of activity and exercise for human life, especially during education. Since exercise can be painful, it is important to choose an adequate amount of it, but a complete absence of toil is seen as being negative. In his use of πόνος and, in general, in the understanding of the relation between pain and exercise, Aristotle thus follows Plato and the author of *On Regimen*, adding a few interesting details, such as need for the harmony between labours of mind and body.

The problem of πόνος was further discussed refined in Aristotle's school, as it will be clear from the following paragraphs. According to contemporary scholarship, it is still difficult to decisively determine both the date and authorship of the Aristotelian text *Problems.*[797] It is most probable that this treatise reflects discussions in Aristotle's school and that some problems and questions were discussed already by him, and others by his disciples. It is almost certain that some parts of this treatise are later than the 4th century BCE. However, I take it that the material collected in the *Problems* is Aristotelian in the sense that it was inspired by the philosophical and scientific endeavours of the Stagirite, and that it is important to study it even though we cannot decisively prove that the formulations of questions and ideas in the *Problems* are from Aristotle himself.[798] For these reasons, I refer to this treatise as Aristotelian, not Aristotle's, and I arrange it chronologically between Aristotle's exact writings and Theophrastus' treatises *On Sweat* and *On Fatigue* analysed below.[799]

In the *Problems*, πόνος is most often used in the sense of exertion, which, in contrast to passages from Aristotle discussed above, is not so often connected to hard work or toil, but rather to bodily exercise or movement in general. Similarly, as in the dietetic treatises, πόνος is mentioned together with nourishment, they both contribute to human health and excess or deficiency of one of them leads to illness.[800] Similarly as in *On Regimen*, exercise is important for reducing the moisture in the body.[801] In comparison to all treatises discussed so far, however, the emphasis of the authors of the *Problems* is different, since this treatise is interested in questions such as why do we sweat more after than during the exercise,[802] what bodily parts are

[796] *Vict*. 2.61 (6.574 L = 184.8-9 Joly). See above p. 84.

[797] Mayhew (2019) i-xxiv.

[798] See for example Robert Mayhew's introduction to his translation of the *Problems*, Mayhew 2019 (xiii-xxiv).

[799] For the role of medical topics in Aristotle's school, see Eijk (2021) 121-125.

[800] *Probl.* 1.46, 864b36-865a2, 5.34, 884a21-25, 19.38, 920b36-921a6.

[801] *Probl.* 2.41, 870b14-26, 4.26, 879a35-6b, 5.4, 880b36-38, 5.21, 883a7-10.

[802] *Probl.* 2.20, 868a15-25, 2.23, 868b11-17.

exerted in what type of movement or bodily activity,[803] what the relation between the level of exertion and season of the year is,[804] what the benefits and harms of exercises are,[805] etc. At least in these passages, πόνος is seen as a natural phenomenon accompanying everyday activities such as working, exercising, walking, seeing or singing; it is not, in contrast to the epidemic and gynaecological medical treatises discussed above, seen as a harmful sign of some pathology.

However, even this 'pathological' aspect of πόνος can be found in some passages of the *Problems*, as it was present in some medical treatises. Even though the exercises are normally beneficial or neutral, they can be harmful and cause pain, when they are excessive or practised in an inappropriate season of the year.[806] Other natural processes, such as nourishment can also sometimes cause pain,[807] similarly excessive drinking of wine causes hangover (κραιπάλη) and headache (πονοῦσι τὴν κεφαλήν).[808] Some drunks can even suffer apoplectic seizures (ἀποπληκτικὰς ἀρρωστία) and violent pain (πόνος δὲ ἰσχυρὸς).[809] According to one physiological observation, pains are to be experienced more in bodily parts "closely connected by growth with another" (μάλιστα γὰρ πονοῦσι τῇ τοῦ συνεχοῦς διαστάσει), such as thighs and loins (τοὺς μηροὺς καὶ τὴν ὀσφὺν πονοῦσι μᾶλλον).[810] At another place, the authors deliberate why chilled people feel pain "if they are taken straight to the fire, whereas they do not do so if they are warmed gradually," and conclude that pain is caused by an abrupt change, whereas when one is "warmed by degrees, the heat comes out gradually and less pain (ἧττον πονεῖ) is caused".[811] Toothache is mentioned, too, similarly as pain of the limbs,[812] ears[813] and eyes[814]

[803] *Probl.* 2.5, 866b33-867a3, 2.30, 869a24-28, 5.5, 881a1-3, 5.19, 882b25-36, 5.20, 882b37-883a2, 5.29, 883a29-883b2 5.34, 884a15-21, 5.34, 884b3-7, 6.40, 885a14-22, 6.40, 885a27-36, 19.3, 917b30-34, 23.39, 935b28-33, 31.19, 959a24-37, 37.3, 966a29-34, 38.5, 967a12-19.

[804] *Probl.* 1.25, 862a34-862b6.

[805] *Probl.* 5.4, 880b36-38, 5.14, 882a13-17, 8.10, 888a23-25, 27.3, 948a3-6, 31.19, 959a24-37.

[806] *Probl.* 1.25, 862a34-862b6.

[807] *Probl.* 1.50, 865b3-5.

[808] *Probl.* 3.14, 873a4-5, 3.17, 873b15-23.

[809] *Probl.* 3.26, 874b28-32.

[810] *Probl.* 5.26, 883b18-20.

[811] *Probl.* 8.18, 888b39-889a9.

[812] *Probl.* 25.1, 937b31-37.

[813] *Probl.* 32.13, 962a5.

[814] *Probl.* 20.14, 931a31-32, 20.22, 935b5.

According to one other passage concerning the pain in the eyes we learn that every disease (ἡ δὲ μαλακία ὅλως πᾶσά) is caused by lack of concoction (ἀπεψίας).[815]

Two interesting passages are worth mentioning here. First, in the part of the *Problems* concerned with music, the authors mention that both the grieving (οἱ πονοῦντες) and the enjoying themselves (οἱ ἀπολαύοντες) like the sound of flute.[816] It is one of the rare, maybe the only one, places in the Aristotelian corpus, where πόνος is used in the sense of grief.[817] Another passage describes the work (πόνος) of perception and mind when we sleep and claims that it is actually the mind which is more active than the body. This passage echoes not only the notion that sense-perception and thinking are πόνοι from *On Regimen* 2. 61, but also chapter 86 from the fourth book of that treatise about the activity of thinking during sleep.[818]

Overall, even though in the *Problems*, the word πόνος is used in similar meaning as in the medical and philosophical treatises analysed so far, the shift of emphasis and focus on the new questions, connected particularly to the physiological processes as sweating, fatigue and similar, are clear. The reason that these topics played an important role in Aristotle's school can I am going to support by evidence from Theophrastus' extant writings discussed in what follows.

Two treatises of Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus of Eresus, namely *On Sweat* and *On Fatigue*, are particularly important for our topic, since πόνος plays a crucial role in them. In the treatise *On Sweat*, πόνος (in the context of this treatise rendered as exertion) and motion (κίνησις) cause the secretion of sweat (ἱδρως):[819] "where there is exertion, here too there is sweat" (ὅπου δὲ πόνος ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἱδρώς).[820] Sweat is needed for evacuation of residual moisture accumulated in the body after eating.[821] Excessive exertion can lead to pathological states, namely to ulcers (ἕλκη).[822] In the excessive exertions (ὑπερβολὴν πόνων), the residues which should be secreted with sweat are too "thick and contain bad juices" (παχέα ὄντα καὶ

[815] *Probl.* 31.23, 959b20-28.

[816] *Probl.* 1.1, 917b19-20.

[817] We should not dismiss the possibility that the authors use πόνος here as suffering in general. However, the comparison with enjoyment seems to support the translator's choice.

[818] *Probl.* 11.33 903a17-26.

[819] Theophrastus, *On Sweat* 12-13. Transl. Fortenbaugh (2003) 24. Cf. ibid. 71, p. 30.

[820] *On Sweat* 204, p. 44. Sweat is secreted also after taking exercise (γυμνασία) which seems to be one type of exertion (πόνος). See *On Sweat* 37, p. 26. Cf. ibid. 141-142, p. 36; 197, p. 42.

[821] *On Sweat* 18, p. 24. Cf. ibid. 138, p. 36.

[822] *On Sweat* 83, p. 30.

χυμοὺς ἔχοντα μοχθηρούς), so they cannot be secreted properly and "cause the flesh to ulcerate" (ἐξελκοῖ τὴν σάρκα).[823] In a similar manner, excessive exertion can lead to other pathologies, such as scab (ψώρα), scurvy (λειχῆνες), leprosy (λέπρα), and "so called road sores" (τὰ ἐνοδὶα καλουμενά).[824] Swellings (ἰονθώδεις) that follow these pathologies should not be scratched, but rather treated by a "mild and limited douche" (περικλύσει χλιαρᾷ μὴ πολλῇ),[825] which will eventually lead to the restoration of the "balance of secretion" (συμμετρία τῆς ἐκκρίσεως).[826] Quality of sweat depends on the health condition: healthy ones secrete sweat while exerting themselves and they are "removing what is proportionate" (τὸ σύμμετρον ἀφαιποῦντες), unhealthy ones secrete "automatically" (αὐτομάτως) and have "at all times a quantity of residue" (ἀεὶ περιττώματος ἔχοντες πλῆθος).[827] In his explanation of why people sweat more after than during exertion, Theophrastus informs us about what exertion does to our physiology: during the exertion, the vessels are inflated with breath (αἱ φλέβες ἐμφυσώμεναι) which causes the pores to close up. As soon as the exertion stops, the vessels contract, and more moisture pass out through the pores.[828]

In his use of πόνος in this treatise, Theophrastus shares some relevant points with the author of *On Regimen*. Πόνος is consistently used in the sense of exertion and plays an important role in maintaining health. Since sweat is needed for evacuation of residual moisture, and sweating is caused by exertion, πόνος plays a beneficial role in maintaining health. However, if excessive, it leads to pathologies, such as sores, scurvy, and lepra. Both its relation to the evacuation of moisture and possible negative consequences following excessive exertion is similar to the ideas of *On Regimen* analysed above. Yet, we do not know how wide Theophrastus' concept of πόνος is and it seems that it is rather narrower than the understanding of πόνος as an activity form *On Regimen* 2. 61: if πόνος is for Theophrastus so substantially connected to sweating, it is probable that he would exclude activities as sense-perception, speaking, singing and thinking. After all, following Aristotle, he can describe these activities as ἐνέργειαι, not as πόνοι. In any case, Theophrastus' treatise *On Sweat* provides substantial evidence that the author of *On Regimen* was not alone in using πόνος in the sense of exertion

[823] *On Sweat* 88, p. 30. Cf. ibid. 116, p. 34.

[824] *On Sweat* 90, p. 31.

[825] *On Sweat* 114, p. 34.

[826] *On Sweat* 117, p. 34.

[827] *On Sweat* 152-154, p. 38.

[828] *On Sweat* 168-171, p. 40.

and that some similarities indicated above speak for a possible inspiration of Theophrastus in this treatise.

I hope to support this claim with the help of an analysis of the second Theophrastus' relevant treatise, namely *On Fatigue.* In this treatise, too, πόνος is mentioned already at the very beginning, its meaning is, however more specific than in the treatise *On Sweat*: "Or is it simply that wherever there is stress (οὗπερ πόνος), here too, there is fatigue (ταύτῃ καὶ ὁ κόπος) on which account indeed the fatigued person is always weighed down (ἀεὶ βαρύνεται ὁ κοπιῶν)?"[829] The translator's choice of the English word "stress" may seem unusual, it is however quite adequate. In this treatise, πόνος is not exercise or exertion in general, it is rather an outcome of such activity occurring "especially in the jointed parts (καμπτομένοις) [of the body] and the most sinewy ones (νεθρωδεστάτοις), wherever some colliquescence comes to the sinews and joints (σύντηξις ἐπὶ τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰς καμπὰς)."[830] From these parts, when people engage in an activity (ἄν τις ἐνεργῇ), stress can spread to all parts of the body (διαδοθέντος τοῦ πόνου) cause fatigue occurs.[831] It is intriguing that stress is but one of the causes of fatigue, the other are repletion (πλησμονή), sleeplessness (ἀγρυπνία), and catarrh (κατάρρους) which "are in some way an abundance of moisture" (πλῆθος ὑγρότητος).[832] In contrast to these causes, stress (πόνος) causes fatigue, because it dries (ξηραίνει) the body.[833] Theophrastus is not explicit about it, but can we assume that the relationship between stress and fatigue is similar as in *On Regimen* 2. 66, namely that fatigue occurs when the moisture is melted too abruptly?

Another contrast to *On Regimen* is that Theophrastus does not speak about the role of excess in producing stress. He claims that the more intense and greater stress, the more fatigue follows,[834] but other circumstances play, apparently, a more important role in his exposition: he specifies that we feel stress in the particular bodily parts depending on whether we go uphill or downhill.[835] In a similar manner, "people experience stress (πονοῦσι) especially in the shoulder

[829] Theophrastus, *On Fatigue* 4-5. Transl. Sollenberger (2003) 264.

[830] *On Fatigue* 21-23, p. 264. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 81d6: "Eventually the interlocking bonds of the triangles around the marrow can no longer hold on, and come apart under stress (τῷ πόνῳ), and when this happens they let the bonds of the soul go."

[831] *On Fatigue* 17-20, p. 264.

[832] *On Fatigue* 29-34, p. 266.

[833] *On Fatigue* 51, p. 268.

[834] *On Fatigue* 66-69, p. 268.

[835] *On Fatigue* 78-82, p. 270.

because of the weight (ὑπὸ τοῦ βάρους) which they carry".[836] Fatigue caused by movement (and stress) in steep walks is not always caused by an excess, but by a "change which is violent and opposed (ἐναντίαν)".[837] It is also claimed that moist bodies are more apt to fatigue since they are weaker.[838] Theophrastus does not say it explicitly, but is it possible that he relies here on the idea from *On Regimen* that exercise not only dries the body but strengthens it, too?

This treatise develops the problem of the relation between stress (πόνος) and fatigue (κόπος), which we have already seen formulated in the treatise *On Regimen.* Theophrastus shares some important ideas with the 'Hippocratic' author, however, he develops and specifies them. Fatigue is not simply caused by excessive exertion. Exertion, movement or other muscular activity leads to forming of stress in the places of contact between joints and sinews, and only after that fatigue follows. The connection between stress and moisture is not explicitly formulated but there is a clear connection between moisture and fatigue. From all texts I have analysed so far, Theophrastus' treatise *On Fatigue* presents the most specific and peculiar use of πόνος, which may be inspired by the use of this word in the treatise *On Regimen*, but which, however, substantially develops it.[839]

Theophrastus' treatises offer a number of original ideas concerning πόνος. His treatment of the relation between πόνος and sweat, and πόνος and fatigue develops considerably the ideas from the treatise *On Regimen*. In Theophrastus' treatises, πόνος constitutes an important means of explanation of bodily processes such as sweating and fatigue, and whereas in the majority of 'Hippocratic' treatises discussed above, πόνος was more or less connected to some pathology, here it is an integral part of the natural physiological processes. It is still true that πόνος, when excessive or in other ways 'abnormal', can lead to pathologies such as sores or exhaustion, its link to disease is, however, much weaker here. In contrast to the majority of 'Hippocratic' treatises, where πόνος is something negative (pain), and to the treatise *On Regimen*, where it is, *inter alia,* something positive and therapeutic, it seems that in Theophrastus, in the majority of cases, it is something neutral. In the two treatises we have analysed, Theophrastus is aware of both the harmful and beneficial aspects of πόνος, but he does not put emphasis on them.

[836] *On Fatigue* 83-85, p. 270.

[837] *On Fatigue* 118-122, p. 274.

[838] *On Fatigue* 139-140, p. 276.

[839] It is also worth mentioning that in both Theophrastus' treatises, πόνος is never used there in the sense of pain.

Conclusion

In his discussions of pain, Aristotle addresses all three research questions that we have focused on. He provides insight into the nature of pain, its relationship to pleasure and activity, the different types of pain, and its role in various branches of his philosophy. Like Plato, Aristotle too, examines pleasure and shows how it relates to pain and activity. However, he introduces the concept of *energeia* as a more appropriate tool for understanding pleasure. While some pleasures can still be understood as motions, perceptual and intellectual pleasures are more closely tied to *energeia*. This innovation in Aristotle's philosophy also informs his understanding of pain. While pain can be understood as a disintegration of the nature of the animal experiencing it, I argue that Aristotle emphasizes another aspect of pain, particularly in the domain of ethics. Pain hinders the *energeia* of the person experiencing it. Given that Aristotle sees pain primarily as an ethical problem, this hindering aspect of pain is an important innovation in his study of pleasure and pain. However, I have also discussed passages in which Aristotle writes about pain in a similar manner as the physicians, in focusing on the physiological aspects of feeling pain, on particular painful conditions, etc. Given his interest in natural philosophy, this fact is not surprising. It is rather worth noting that the way in which he speaks about pain depends substantially on the genre he is discussing it.

Like Plato, Aristotle also assigns the greatest importance to pain in the realm of ethics. Through the study of pleasure and pain, the moral philosopher can describe the nature of human character, and how and why virtuous and vicious individuals experience emotions. Pain therefore plays a descriptive role in understanding human moral psychology, and its significance prompts the moral philosopher to emphasize its role in moral education. In general, Aristotle's approach to moral education shares its main points with Plato's, asserting that in order to act virtuously, one must face painful and fearful situations that lead to the development of good character dispositions or virtues. If we take into account the medical metaphor introduced in the previous chapter, Aristotle follows Plato in using pain for diagnosis, maintaining, and restoration of the health of the soul, i.e., its dispositions and virtues. Thus, although there are differences between Plato's and Aristotle's programs, they share a philosophical approach to pain that has some relevant features in common with the medical approach. Both a physician and a philosopher can use pain for beneficial ends, including diagnosis, learning the nature of the problem, using painful procedures for regaining health, and using painful procedures for maintaining the good state of body and soul through exercise or education. Aristotle's elaboration of the notion of πόνος integrates the painful aspects of exercise into his school's teachings, which I have shown in analysing the *Problems* and two

Theophrastus' treatises. In them, πόνος is no longer a pathology to be cured but a natural and necessary phenomenon to be explained.

In the conclusion, I will attempt to show that all the particular findings about pain in Plato and Aristotle discussed so far can be interpreted against the background of the medical approaches to pain introduced by medical writers.

5. Why does it hurt? The Role of Pain in Classical Greek Philosophy and Medicine Reconsidered

After the three central chapters, it is now appropriate to provide a contextualisation and evaluation of the outcomes that I have achieved thus far. My aim was to demonstrate that, despite the plurality of perspectives through which pain was approached by medical authors, Plato and Aristotle, a shared frame emerges. This frame was alluded to in the concluding sections of the previous chapters, and broadly speaking, it can be described as the effort, shared by both medicine and philosophy, to integrate pain into the comprehensive worldview about the nature of human beings, their body and soul, and human agency offered by prominent figures of these disciplines. The findings of my dissertation can thus offer support for a more general thesis advocated by T. Tracy, who claims that philosophy and medicine shared a common goal:

> The common objective of physician, moral guide, statesman is to imitate nature and make up for her deficiencies, assisting the efforts to produce the perfect organism on all three levels – the physical, moral and political.[840]

One of the areas where such an endeavour of physicians and philosophers can be seen is the integration of pain into their disciplines. Also, the similarities between the intellectual use of pain by physicians and philosophers, support a possible relationship between these disciplines, as it was conceived of by L. Edelstein:

> The true contribution of medicine to philosophy, I venture to suggest, lies in the fact that philosophers found in medical treatment and in the physician's task a simile of their own endeavor. The healing of diseases, as well as the preservation of health, provided an analogy which served to emphasize the validity of certain significant ethical concepts and thus helped to establish the truth of philosophy; therein consisted the most fruitful relationship between ancient medicine and ancient philosophy.[841]

The fact that medical authors felt such an urge for explaining and integrating pain is unsurprising, given that pain is often the central experience for the patient who seeks medical assistance. The patient may not know the exact nature of their illness, but they certainly feel the

[840] Tracy (1969) 314.

[841] Edelstein (1967) 350. However, apart from its relation to ethics, Edelstein is generally sceptical concerning the influence of medicine on philosophy. Concerning the relation between philosophy and medicine in classical antiquity see p. 12, n. 6.

pain. The philosophical urge to explain and contextualise pain may seem less substantial, but it arises from the same problem, namely, the condition of the person being addressed by the philosopher. If pain is intuitively understood as a disruption of the healthy state of the animal's body, soul, or both, then it must be explained. Moreover, if the pain is a recurring phenomenon, and explanations cannot eliminate it entirely, it must be integrated and, in a sense, used for some greater good. Human and animal life share the peculiar condition that pain cannot be permanently overcome; it remains a phenomenon that recurs time and again, and time and again begs a question about its sense.

In the preceding chapters, I endeavoured to demonstrate that pain plays a vital diagnostic and therapeutic role in both philosophy and medicine. The physician must determine the source of the patient's pain to identify the underlying medical issue accurately. In ancient medicine, where many of the contemporary objective examination techniques were unavailable, the patient's accounts were crucial. If the physician knew the location of pain, he could speculate on the possible pathology. This understanding, as seen in certain medical treatises, was the initial stage in comprehending why the pain occurred. As such, pain plays a crucial part in the more comprehensive explanations of the workings of the human body and the potential processes it may undergo. Given that pain is such a ubiquitous experience, one might imagine that its utilization in the explanation of the concealed processes of the human body, such as the intermixing of bodily fluids, could enhance the arguments of medical authors, since every one has some experience with pain and can thus more easily understand what the medical theory using pain aims to prove.

Once the physician has located the cause of pain, he may decide, depending on the specific circumstances, to utilize a painful procedure such as surgical operation, correcting a dislocated limb, or cauterizing a putrefied area. Pain, in this context, is a necessary evil that leads to a positive outcome. However, the physician must also evaluate whether the potential benefits of a painful intervention outweigh the inherent pain associated with it. In some instances, such as with kidney stones, it may be more prudent not to intervene since the pain linked to the procedure is so brutal, and the chances of success are so low that non-intervention is preferable for the patient. Therefore, if a physician intends to employ a painful technique during the healing process, there must be sufficient grounds for doing so. Pain is only meaningful if it is helpful; otherwise, it should not be employed. In the 'new' medicine, which puts greater emphasis on dietetics, the role of pain has been refined and its use re-evaluated. Although the dietetic ideal would suggest a state of being in which exercise is painless, reality

dictates otherwise. If one overeats, neglects physical activity, and disrupts the body's equilibrium, therapy leading to re-establishing balance will inevitably be painful.

The philosophical approaches of Plato and Aristotle to the topic of pain diverged in several ways, but both philosophers viewed it as primarily an ethical matter. Despite this or maybe because of it, there are some structural similarities between their perspectives and those of the medical authors discussed previously. For instance, pain can function as a diagnostic tool in both domains. In medicine, the location of pain can help to identify the underlying problem, while in philosophy, the nature and intensity of pain can offer insight into a person's psychological state. However, the interpretation of pain in the realm of ethics is much more complex than in medicine. For example, fear experienced in battle may or may not be an indication of a problem, as an appropriate amount of fear is natural and beneficial in such a situation. In contrast, a doctor faces similar challenges only in cases where pain accompanies natural processes such as menstruation, childbirth, or aging, and indicates a problem only if it is excessive. The philosopher, on the other hand, must more frequently and thoroughly interrogate the nature of pain that is intrinsic to human life. Pain in the ethical domain is not always an indication of pathology, but rather presents an opportunity for interpretation and contextualisation.

Although the philosophical diagnosis of pain is more complex than the medical one, the fundamental structure remains the same: pain is a sign that calls for interpretation. This shared use of pain in both medicine and philosophy suggests that Plato and Aristotle may have been influenced by the medical tradition when adopting this method. This suggests the medical tradition influenced philosophy not only by providing specific findings or theories, but more importantly by offering motivations and general frameworks within which health-related issues can be structured and explained. Since everyone has some experience with health, diseases, and medicine, it is natural for philosophy to use medical examples, terminology, and ideas when explicating and explaining ethical and psychological problems. Just as physicians ask patients "where does it hurt" and then prescribe an appropriate therapy based on their answer, philosophers can successfully use the same method to interpret the pains associated with the soul and character.

One way of characterizing pain is by its semiotic role, as it serves as a sign of something. In medicine, pain is an indicator of illness or injury in the body part where it is felt. In philosophy, some pains signify an issue with the character of the person experiencing it. Physicians must be able to distinguish between natural pain and pain that expresses a pathology. For instance, pain during menstruation or old age should be understood as a natural part of the

patient's condition. Likewise, philosophers must be able to discern whether pain is in line with the natural state of the patient or if it is pathological. Certain types of pain may be necessary for beneficial processes, such as surgical operations or teeth extraction. In philosophy, pain can also be a necessary component of acquiring knowledge or moral virtues. Both medicine and philosophy can explain the various types of pain and why people experience pain. Some pains are a result of the natural, non-pathological condition of the human body, while others are naturally present during the healing process. Still, some pains indicate a pathology that must be addressed. Physicians must differentiate between necessary, beneficial, and pathological pain to effectively treat their patients. If they can also explain this distinction to the patient, the patient can make an informed decision regarding their condition: natural and beneficial pain must be endured, while pathological pain should be treated if possible.

Could a similar distinction be made in philosophical approaches to pain? When discussing natural pains connected to the body, philosophers follow similar lines to physicians. Although their explanations may differ, they are in agreement that natural pains of the body are based in the nature of our corporeal life. While the theories of the human body proposed by Plato and Aristotle may be more developed than the majority of medical theories, they are clear that the human body is capable of feeling pain and that certain bodily processes, such as teeth growth, menstruation, or childbirth, are necessarily painful. These things, even though painful, are not pathological and have a neutral moral evaluation. The second group of pains is characterized by accompanying processes leading to something good. If one is led, by their tutors, to acquire knowledge or moral virtue, accompanying pains are necessary concomitants of the process.

The inherent nature of the human condition dictates that processes aimed at self-improvement are often accompanied by pain. Although this pain may be undesirable, it is a necessary component of these processes and serves as a diagnostic tool for distinguishing between different types of pain. For instance, in the realm of education, the cultivation of reason requires a painful and arduous journey. However, the pain associated with this journey is connected to a process that is ultimately beneficial, thereby imbuing the pain with a sense or purpose. Similarly, bodily pain can be classified into different categories depending on its underlying cause. Pain associated with natural bodily processes, such as menstruation, childbirth, and tooth growth, is an inevitable aspect of corporeal life and is not inherently pathological. In contrast, pain that is accompanied by processes leading to something beneficial, such as the pain associated with training to become courageous, is a beneficial type of pain. Finally, pathological pain serves as an indication that something is wrong and requires attention.

By acknowledging pain as a diagnostic tool, philosophers can distinguish between natural, beneficial, and pathological types of pain in the ethical domain.

The pain associated with beneficial processes has usually been viewed through the lens of therapy, such as in surgical operations, tooth extractions, or regimen. While physicians may aim to minimize pain, their means to do so have been limited in the past. Pain is often the first signal that prompts us to seek help, and sensitivity to pain is essential since it indicates the presence of a problem that requires attention.[842] Pain thus motivates us to undergo a painful process that ultimately leads, hopefully, to restoration of health. On the ethical side, a similar mechanism may be at play. If an individual feels distress and shame for failing to act morally in a challenging situation, it may lead to a reconsideration of his/her moral stances and an improvement in character. However, this mechanism has limitations, as truly vicious individuals may not experience pain in their immoral actions. Nevertheless, moral pain can prompt a person to change their behaviour, which often is a painful process itself. Pathological pain, therefore, directs us towards processes that are necessarily connected to beneficial pain. It can be imagined that both physicians and philosophers, lead their patients and students to developing appropriate sensitivity to pain, since without them reporting the pain, neither physician, nor philosopher, can provide the right diagnosis and offer their help with the therapy.

The diagnostic and therapeutic potential of pain is an area where both philosophy and medicine can benefit those who seek these practices. The crucial contribution of these practices with regards to pain lies in the realm of meaning. Pain can acquire meaning in philosophy and medicine, and from the chaos of painful experiences, an order can be established through integrating pain into broader theories of the human body, emotions, and the development of moral character. This integration can be extended to the overall structure of the world. Even recognizing natural pain as a natural phenomenon can have a profound theoretical impact. If we take seriously Aristotle's assertion that 'οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγονδὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων',[843] then formulating a description of pain and its role and expressing its sense and meaning (λόγος) becomes a necessary step in integrating this initially senseless phenomenon into a meaningful life. Through philosophy and medicine, pain can

[842] This is of course more problematic in the case of chronic pain.

[843] "Nature makes nothing pointlessly, as we say, and no animal has speech except a human being." *Pol.* 1.1, 1253a9-10. Transl. Reeve.

acquire a sense, and we are no longer subject to the chaotic, destructive power of pain. We can now grasp the nature of pain, which is the first step in dealing with it.[844]

Philosophy takes a broader approach than medicine, as it deals not only with bodily pain, but also with pain of the soul, and moral pain. Philosophical insight should enable us to distinguish between pain that should be avoided and pain that should be faced. Education focused on cultivating virtues should equip us with the ability to discern the various aspects of pain. At times, pain should be listened to, as it prompts us to change our character. Through introspection or with the help of a philosopher, we can use our pain to diagnose the nature of our moral life, identify any pathological aspects connected to the pain, and begin the road to their correction. The corporeality of human beings and the connection of the soul to the body, as conceived in Plato's dualistic or Aristotle's hylomorphic theories, condition our ability to feel pain. Philosophy thus seeks to integrate pain into a good human life by offering an explanation for it. In doing so, a philosopher may assign a more positive role to pain and use it in education or statesmanship. This approach still follows the same framework of giving meaning to pain. Pain associated with punishment serves the purpose of correcting the faults of the one who is punished. Of course, philosophy can provide guidance in seeking a life where pain is infrequent and not too intense. However, when pain strikes, philosophy has an answer ready that may bring relief to the sufferer. Offering a meaning to pain seems to be the most fundamental contribution of classical Greek philosophy to the problem of pain. Philosophical authors were influenced in it by, or at least followed the same lines as, medical writers. While refinement and development on the philosophical side are undeniable, the medical contribution to the structural framework that allowed the philosophers to evolve their theories and practices concerning pain has been so far overlooked. This dissertation attempted to bring it into light.

[844] The chaotic, language destructing power of pain was aptly described by Scarry (1985).

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