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Institute of Political Science
Department of International Relations

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Yohann Michalak

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
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Institute of Political Studies
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**The Consequences of Legitimacy Crises on International
Organizations' Policy Output.**

Master's thesis

Author of the Thesis: Yohann Michalak

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Supervisor: Dr. rer. pol. Michal Parížek, M.Sc., Ph.D.

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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 1st of December, 2023

Yohann Michalak

References

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Abstract

This thesis addresses the topic of legitimacy in global governance, specifically examining the repercussions of legitimacy crises on the policy output of 13 multi-issue international organizations (IOs) from 1985 to 2015. The research objectives are double: firstly, to furnish a descriptive analysis, and secondly, to pinpoint conditions influencing the likelihood and directions of these consequences. To accomplish this, data from two preceding articles were compiled and amalgamated. A noteworthy addition to this thesis is the utilization of the Intergovernmental Policy Output Dataset (IPOD), a novel dataset portraying policy output in five dimensions (volume, topic, type, instrument, and target) for the first time. Diverse analytical techniques were employed in analyzing this dataset, including visual analysis, t-tests, cross-section analysis, and multivariate regression. The results did not validate the various hypotheses aiming to predict the likelihood and direction of consequences. Nevertheless, the findings furnished a crucial descriptive analysis, enriching our comprehension of the phenomenon. Notably, they underscored the intricate nature of the impact of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output and, more expansively, their overall performance. Furthermore, the results confirmed a nuanced perspective: legitimacy crises do not invariably yield negative consequences; they may also have no impact or a positive impact. This challenges the traditional theory, calling for a reexamination, and suggests a form of resilience within IOs. Amid current challenges and waning global confidence in established orders, this research offers hope. Criticisms and protests against international organizations could strengthen values, demonstrating resilience in upholding principles. This implies a potential for positive adaptation, instilling optimism in the ongoing effectiveness of these organizations in managing global complexities.

Keywords: Legitimacy, Global Governance, International Organizations, Policy Output, Legitimacy Crises

Abstrakt (Czech)

Tato diplomní práce se zabývá tématem legitimacy v globálním vládnutí, konkrétně zkoumá dopady krizí legitimacy na politické výstupy 13 mezinárodních organizací (MVO) v letech 1985-2015. Cílem výzkumu jsou dvě oblasti: zaprvé poskytnout deskriptivní statistiky a zadruhé určit podmínky ovlivňující pravděpodobnost a směr těchto důsledků. Za tímto účelem byly shromážděny a sloučeny údaje ze dvou předchozích článků. Významným doplňkem této práce je využití datového souboru IPOD (Intergovernmental Policy Output Dataset), což je nový soubor dat, který poprvé zobrazuje výstupy z politiky v pěti dimenzích (počet, téma, typ, nástroj a cíl). Při analýze tohoto souboru dat byly použity různé analytické techniky, včetně vizuální analýzy, t-testů, křížové validace a vícerozměrné regrese. Výsledky však nepotvrdily různé hypotézy zaměřené na předpověď pravděpodobnosti a směru důsledků. Zjištění nicméně poskytla zásadní deskriptivní statistiky, které obohatily naše chápání tohoto fenoménu. Zejména zdůraznily složitou povahu dopadu krizí legitimacy na politické výstupy mezinárodních organizací a v širším smyslu na jejich celkovou výkonnost. Kromě toho výsledky potvrdily diferencovaný pohled: krize legitimacy nemusí mít vždy negativní důsledky, ale mohou mít i nulový nebo pozitivní dopad. To zpochybňuje tradiční teorii, vyzývá k jejímu přehodnocení a naznačuje určitou formu odolnosti v rámci mezinárodních organizací. Uprostřed současných problémů a upadající globální důvěra v zavedené řády nabízí tento výzkum jistou naději. Kritika a protesty proti mezinárodním organizacím by mohly posílit hodnoty a prokázat odolnost při dodržování zásad. To znamená potenciál pro pozitivní adaptaci, která vzbuzuje optimismus v pokračující úspěšnost těchto organizací při zvládnání globálních složitostí.

Klíčová slova: Legitimita, globální řízení, mezinárodní organizace, výstup politik, krize legitimacy

Název práce: Důsledky krizí legitimacy na politické výstupy IO.

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Abbreviations

AFP: Agence France Press

AMU: Arab Maghreb Union

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AU: African Union

CAN: Andean Community

COW IGO: Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organization

DPA: Deutsche Press-Argentur

EU: European Union

G20: Group of Twenty

GGI: Global Governance Institution

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IO: International Organization

MIA: Measure of International Authority

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NC: Nordic Council

OAS: Organization of American States

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OIC: Organization of Islamic Cooperation

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PIF: Pacific Islands Forum

SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SADC: South African Development Community

TRANSACCESS: Transnational Access to International Organizations dataset

UN: United Nations

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

WTO: World Trade Organization

WHO: World Health Organization

Table of Contents

Abbreviations	viii
Introduction	10
1. Literature review	16
2. Conceptual and theoretical framework	21
2.1 The conventional theory	22
2.2 Sommerer et al.'s revisited theory	24
2.3 Agné and Söderbaum's theory	32
2.4 The concept of legitimacy crises	36
2.5 The concept of policy output performance	38
2.6 Hypotheses.....	41
3. Empirical data	45
3.1 Data on legitimacy crises.....	46
3.2 The IPOD.....	51
4. Quantitative methods	57
5. Results	61
5.1 Visual analysis.....	61
5.1.1 Policy volume.....	61
5.1.2 Policy topics	63
5.1.3 Policy types	65
5.1.4 Policy instrument.....	66
5.1.5 Policy target.....	67
5.2 T-tests	69
5.3 Cross-section analysis.....	71
5.4 Multivariate analysis.....	72
5.4.1 Model presentation and robustness check	72
5.4.2 Policy volume.....	75
5.4.3 Policy topic.....	78
5.4.4 Policy type.....	79
5.4.5 Policy instrument.....	80
5.4.6 Policy target.....	82
5.5 Summary.....	83
Conclusion	85
Summary	91
List of References	93
List of Appendices	107

Introduction

The thesis addresses a pivotal subject within the realm of international relations, particularly captivating for scholars examining international organizations (IOs). Legitimacy, the focal point of my master's thesis, stands alongside two other key concepts – function (pertaining to IOs' roles and performance) and power (encompassing control dynamics and power relations). These three concepts constitute the primary areas of exploration for academics delving into the study of IOs.

From a scholarly perspective, this topic holds significant relevance as it represents a relatively new avenue in the field of International Relations (IR). While legitimacy has been extensively explored in other academic domains such as political theory, sociology, and psychology, tracing its roots back to Max Weber's seminal work "Economy and Society" in 1922, its introduction to the discipline of international relations is a more recent phenomenon. Academic attention to legitimacy in multilateral governance first started to grow after the Cold War ended when IOs were granted more power to overcome the transboundary problems that nation-states alone could not solve, resulting in the rise of global governance (Tallberg and Zürn, 2019, p. 585). Yet it only gained prominent attention in the early 2010s. Consequently, given its recent emergence in IR, there is still much to be uncovered and understood about the concept of legitimacy and its implications in global governance. Nevertheless, a growing body of literature, lively debates, and increased scholarly attention make it a dynamic and vibrant area of study, particularly for those interested in analyzing IOs.

This upswing in interest surrounding legitimacy is primarily driven by its immediate political and societal relevance. Recent events such as Brexit, Trump's election, and the broader emergence of authoritarian populism have underscored a mounting public resistance to international governance, particularly within its democratic core (Hooghe and Marks, 2014). This trend has prompted scholars in IR to turn their focus toward the concept of legitimacy, as it is seen as a key explanatory factor for both the origins and outcomes of contemporary public protests against global governance (Sommerer et al., 2022a). The significance of this topic is particularly heightened for those who view IOs as crucial instruments for mitigating the anarchic nature of the international system. For proponents of

IOs, who see them as essential for preventing conflict and fostering peaceful relations among nations, understanding the mechanisms of the legitimacy concept in global governance becomes paramount. This understanding could potentially provide the tools needed to address and counteract the escalating public contestations against IOs, ultimately bolstering their effectiveness.

However, the scope of studying IOs' legitimacy is extensive, and my intention is not to encompass the entire concept. Instead, my research will narrow its focus to a specific facet of the topic: the consequences of legitimacy on IOs' performance. I find this aspect particularly pertinent for two reasons. Firstly, as the literature review revealed, there is a notable scarcity of studies conducted in this area. To date, I have identified only two empirical research addressing this aspect. Secondly, despite the limited research, there is a prevalent assumption that legitimacy exerts a significant positive influence on the functioning of IOs (Weber, [1922] 1978; Beetham, 1991; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Gilley, 2008; Tallberg et al., 2018). Through this research, I aspire to contribute to bridging this gap, which I believe holds considerable relevance, especially in the context of the current challenges in global governance.

Although exploring the impacts of legitimacy on IOs represents a more focused aspect than the overarching theme of legitimacy in global governance, it still constitutes a substantial subject. Context and temporal considerations play a crucial role; for instance, the consequences of legitimacy may vary in intensity and direction depending on whether an IO is undergoing a legitimization phase or facing delegitimization. In this study, I examine legitimacy's impact on a global governance institution during a legitimacy crisis. Two reasons underpin this decision. Firstly, investigating the consequences of a legitimacy crisis is pertinent due to the escalating public and political resistance against IOs. Secondly, it serves examination purposes. The impacts of legitimacy on the day-to-day operations of IOs are anticipated to be modest and empirically challenging to capture. Conducting an empirical analysis and extracting meaningful results under these circumstances would be a difficult task. Conversely, a legitimacy crisis is expected to amplify the effects of legitimacy, rendering them more discernible and accessible for scrutiny and analysis.

In this thesis, the independent variable will be IOs' legitimacy crises. However, the dependent variable, the consequences, represents a vast topic, and my focus is not on studying it thoroughly. Instead, I aim to explore the impact of a legitimacy crisis on an IO's performance, with performance assessed through the policy output of the organization's primary decision-making body. The rationale behind choosing the policy output approach to evaluate IO performance will be elaborated on later. Nevertheless, it can be noted that akin to the legitimacy topic, the policy output method is chosen for its relevance and feasibility: relevance because policy output is one of the three metrics employed in existing research to gauge performance and feasibility because it can be easily quantified. To summarize, the specific target of the thesis is to discern any alterations in the dependent variable, which is the performance of IO measured through a policy output approach, due to the independent variable, a legitimacy crisis.

Consequently, the central research question for the upcoming thesis can be framed as follows: **how do legitimacy crises impact the policy output of IOs?**

In the early stages of my thesis research, I intended to leverage Bes et al.'s (2019) study on the consequences of legitimacy crises for 21 global governance institutions (GGIs) spanning 1985 to 2015. The plan was to utilize their data on legitimacy crises and complement it with information on GGIs' decision-making during the same timeframe. However, as I investigated deeper into my research, the same group of scholars published another study covering 31 IOs from 1985 to 2015, exploring the effects of legitimacy crises on IOs' resources, institutional changes, and decision-making (Sommerer et al., 2022a). Faced with this expanded scope and recognizing the impracticality of compiling data on state compliance with IO decisions, I shifted my focus. Further exploration in the literature on IO performance led me to Tallberg et al.'s (2016) policy output concept, encompassing five dimensions (volume, topic, type, instrument, and target). Additionally, I discovered Sommerer et al.'s (2021) paper, which used part of this typology for data on 30 IOs, 29 of which overlapped with the legitimacy crises data.

Originally, my plan involved using this combined dataset for analysis, but it fell short in capturing the full richness of the policy output concept. Later, the introduction of the Intergovernmental Policy Output Dataset (IPOD) by Lundgren et al. (2023) provided a more

comprehensive solution. This dataset offered precise information on the five dimensions of policy output for 13 multi-issue IOs, all of which were part of the data on legitimacy crises, spanning from 1980 to 2015. This discovery prompted a reassessment of my research strategy, leading me to focus exclusively on studying the effect of legitimacy crises on policy output using the IPOD. Recognizing the IPOD's depth of analysis and its potential demands for exploitation, I made the decision to prioritize quantitative research and set aside the two case studies initially planned for the thesis project.

By prioritizing quantitative analysis, I developed a comprehensive methodology consisting of four analytical layers. This approach enabled a thorough exploration of the IPOD, facilitating a nuanced and large-scale quantitative analysis of the impact of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output. The initial layer involved a visually inspecting of trends and patterns within the data. Dependent variables, representing the five dimensions of policy output, were plotted from 1985 to 2015. Vertical lines marked years of legitimacy crises, providing an initial illustration of the trajectory of each variable and offering insight into the potential impacts of legitimacy crises on policy outputs. The second layer, consisting of t-tests, was employed to ascertain the statistical significance of observed differences in policy output between periods with and without legitimacy crises. These tests were conducted individually for each IO, recognizing the variations in decision-making among different entities. Results were presented in a table, shedding light on the directional impact of legitimacy crises on different IOs. The third layer introduced a cross-sectional analysis of seven IOs experiencing legitimacy crises. Conditioning variables were calculated, and the difference between crisis and non-crisis periods for each dimension of IOs' policy output was examined. Plots with regression lines provided an initial understanding of the association between conditioning and dependent variables. The final and more intricate layer involved a multiple regression analysis, akin to Sommerer et al. (2022a). A generalized linear model with a Poisson link was employed, considering dummies, year dummies, and a time trend. This step was crucial for isolating legitimacy crises' contribution to policy output changes while controlling for various variables. The robust cluster function addressed potential issues related to correlated observations within groups. Additionally, a second iteration of the multiple regression analysis was performed to test Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) hypothesis. Legitimacy crises were excluded if there was a contestation level exceeding 25% on the IO scale of contestation in the year preceding a given IO's crisis.

This detailed methodology is expected to produce robust and reliable results, providing valuable insights enriched by the innovative use of the IPOD and the originality of the approach. These contributions advance the existing literature on legitimacy crises and their impact on IOs' policy output. Through this analysis, the study aims not only to offer a more detailed understanding of these effects but also to discern the conditions under which legitimacy crises might yield consequences, whether positive or negative.

Contrary to conventional expectations, the studies by Bes et al. (2019) and Sommerer et al. (2022a) revealed that legitimacy crises could lead to positive changes in IO resources, decision-making capacities, and institutional dynamics. Sommerer et al. (2022a) introduced a new framework to extend traditional legitimacy theory, yet their results did not confirm it. In response, I delved deeper into policy output and drew upon Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) legitimacy theory, to complement and re-test the theoretical innovation of Sommerer et al. (2022a). This approach allowed me to formulate four specific hypotheses aimed at predicting the likelihood and direction of the effect of legitimacy crises on different dimensions of IOs' policy output.

- First hypothesis posits that legitimacy crises dominated by constituent actors, member states, or a combination of elite critique and mass protest are more likely to have discernible consequences on the different dimensions of policy output of IOs compared to those dominated by other audiences.
- Second hypothesis maintains that the higher the level of pooling, delegation, policy scope, transnational access, and democratic membership, the more likely the consequences of a legitimacy crisis on IO's policy output will be positive, with a specific emphasis on policy scope being the most impacting variable.
- Third hypothesis implies that in some instances, legitimacy crises should lead to increased decisions in economic and cultural policy topics, demonstrating a corresponding improvement in IOs' performance.
- Fourth hypothesis suggests that legitimacy crises will increase IOs' policy output when the years preceding the crisis indicate that the IO was not or barely contested.

In addition to these specific hypotheses, to complement and facilitate the flow of the thesis, I incorporated three broad hypotheses: the null hypothesis, the hypothesis predicting

a positive effect, and the hypothesis predicting an adverse effect of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output. While the results did not definitively affirm or contradict these hypotheses, the quantitative analysis undertaken has significantly advanced the descriptive understanding of legitimacy crises' consequences on IOs' policy output. This study contributes valuable insights to the existing literature, addressing critical gaps in our understanding of the complex dynamics between legitimacy crises and IO performance

The subsequent sections will be organized as follows. Firstly, a comprehensive literature review will be conducted to illustrate the gap between widely assumed consequences of legitimacy and empirical evidence on these outcomes. Secondly, I will introduce the foundational theories and concepts underpinning my research. Commencing with the traditional theory of legitimacy, I will then move into the innovative framework proposed by Sommerer et al. (2022a), suggesting that legitimacy crises, under certain conditions, can act as a catalyst for positive change. Following this, Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) more general theory on legitimacy consequences will be presented, positing that high levels of legitimacy can be a liability for political institutions, and, in some cases, legitimacy crises may yield benefits. The introduction of the legitimacy crises and policy output concepts will ensue, culminating in the formulation of hypotheses drawn from both Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) research. Moving forward, the third section will present the dataset employed for quantitative analysis, highlighting notable patterns. Subsequently, the fourth section will delineate my quantitative methodology, structured into four layers. The fifth section will unveil and discuss the results, showcasing that my expectations were not confirmed but providing a robust descriptive analysis. Finally, the sixth and concluding section will recapitulate the methodologies, findings, and interweave them with existing literature.

1. Literature review

As I mentioned in the introduction, while authors from different fields of study, such as sociology, philosophy, and political science, have always granted great importance to legitimacy for its capacity to "affect the capacity to rule and enable(s) political institutions to effectively address real-world problems, at the domestic as well as the international level," (Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 1) legitimacy dynamics in global governance only started to spark the interest of IR scholars. However, even though some authors like Tallberg and Zurn (2019, p. 581) argue that legitimacy dynamics in global governance "have been insufficiently recognized, conceptualized, and explained in standard accounts of international cooperation," some gaps have begun to fill in the literature that question the sociological conception of legitimacy that Weber defined as, "a belief that a governing institution has a right to rule and exercises this right appropriately" (Weber et al., 1978).

Although legitimacy in IR is a broad subject, a significant part of the literature is only dedicated to the study of the relation between legitimacy and authority or the relation between legitimacy and democracy. If those topics take up much space in the literature, it is due to the debates that surround them, which are lively due to some contradictory findings (legitimacy/authority relation) or different beliefs (legitimacy/democracy). For instance, when examining the connection between authority and legitimacy, it is often suggested that a rise in authority is likely to diminish the legitimacy of an IO (Zürn et al., 2012). In their article, C. Rauh and M. Zurn (2019) found that an increase in the political authority of an IO indirectly impacts its legitimacy by increasing IO politicization. On the other hand, Anderson et al. (2018) found that in the case of climate governance, there is no adverse effect on legitimacy when increasing the authority of the global governance institutions.

In the case of the debate surrounding the effect of democratic procedure and performance on legitimacy, there are two camps. Those who believe that IOs cannot be democratic (like R. Dahl (1999)) and should not because any change in their design toward a democratic one would make them ineffective (Moravcsik, 2004). These scholars do not believe in the democratic deficit and do not see the reinforcement of IOs' democratic features as a solution or the cause of IOs' delegitimizing. On the other side are the academics who

believe in the democratic deficit and believe it is a significant source of illegitimacy (Zürn, 2000; Woods and Narlikar, 2001).

At first glance, those debates do not seem to be related to the subject of this thesis, but they are. Indeed, in both debates, some scholars (Scharpf, 1999; Moravcsik, 2004; Anderson et al., 2019) have argued in favor of performance over authority and democracy. Anderson et al. (2019) state that an increase in authority will not have a negative effect on legitimacy as long as the IO is performing well. In the democratic debate on the topic of legitimacy, some (Scharpf, 1999; Moravcsik, 2004) also argue that it is preferable to have well-performing institutions that are not democratic instead of having democratic institutions that perform poorly.

Accordingly, the already published research within this field presents a strongly believed relationship between performance and legitimacy. In political science, this notion is not new; it features prominently in the study of domestic institutions as it is believed that "government institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the confidence of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate feelings of distrust and low confidence" (Newton and Norris, 2000, p. 61). In IR, historically, the shared advantages brought by IOs to society are commonly viewed as how IOs earned their legitimacy. In the concept of "permissive consensus" in Europe, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) argue that the population enjoyed the benefit of cooperation and supported its general aims, while they did not pay much attention to the integration process. Similarly, Scharpf (1999), before the emergence of the debate on the relationship between legitimacy and democracy, already argued in favor of the need for the EU to gain legitimacy through its problem-solving contributions and not through its democratic procedure.

Recent studies on different IOs, such as the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are suggesting that the problem-solving effectiveness of IOs, or more precisely the way citizens perceive it, is still an important factor that shapes IOs' legitimacy (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012; Armingeon, Ceka 2014; Dellmuth, Tallberg 2015). In the same vein, a research by Dellmuth et al. (2019) was also able to demonstrate a significant causal relationship between performance and legitimacy in a broader set of IOs using a population-

based survey. In a more general sense, when it comes to international cooperation, functional theories suggest that states and their citizens support the authority of IOs because they see the collective benefits that these organizations provide (Keohane, 1984).

Consequently, we know that performance plays a significant role in the process of legitimation, as well as in the level of legitimacy an IO enjoys, but also in the process of delimitation, as a lack of performance can open opportunities for criticizing an IO (Tallberg, Zürn 2019). However, we only know a little about the effect in the other direction, namely, the effects of legitimacy on performance. The studies conducted on this matter are scarce, and when they do not focus on a single IO, they produce mixed results. Thus, as pointed out by Sommerer et al. (2022a), there is an important gap in the literature between the widely assumed "simplification in research on the legitimacy that noteworthy effects are purely positive for political desirables such as effectiveness and performance" (p. 188) and its lack of proof. Indeed, the literature on the consequence of the legitimacy of IOs, which could have asserted this claim or not, has remained rare, and its authors have mostly focused their attention on single IOs and institutional reforms. For example, Lenz et al. (2019) and Rocabert et al. (2018) demonstrated the link between legitimacy and the establishment of parliamentary assemblies. Others, such as O'Brien et al. (2000) and Tallberg et al. (2014), assessed the consequences of legitimacy variables on the establishment of participatory arrangements for nonstate actors.

Therefore, the literature unchecked the consequences of legitimacy on performance and effectiveness, and its assumed positive relation did not get called into question. On the opposite, scholars' confidence in the positive effect of legitimacy on IOs' effectiveness seemed to have grown more robust in the past decade (Bernstein, 2004; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015; Hurd, 2008; Schmidtke, 2019; Scholte, 2011; Zürn, 2018). For example, in their recent paper, J. Tallberg and M. Zürn (2019) try to develop a framework to foster research on legitimacy in global governance. They also advocate the importance of legitimacy for IOs "to make a difference in world politics" (p. 1). They even go beyond the basic assumption that legitimacy makes IOs more effective by pointing out why it matters so much in four points. Without going into too many details, we understand from their argument that, legitimacy should positively impact the output performance of an IO. An assumption that can be implicitly deduct from other parts of the literature on

legitimacy (Weber et al., 1978; Beetham, 1991; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Tallberg, Bäckstrand, and Scholte, 2018).

Nonetheless, a recent study by Bes et al. (2019) studied the effect of legitimacy crises on the resources of 32 global governance institutions. According to the aforementioned literature on legitimacy, the authors should have found a negative relation. A legitimacy crisis should have produced a cut in IOs' resources. However, the study found only little evidence supporting this link. In some cases, Bes et al. even found that an increase can follow a legitimacy crisis in IO resources. A few years later, the same authors, with some additional ones, pursued a more detailed study on the subject (Sommerer et al., 2022a). While they consolidated their findings with new information, they added institutional capacity and decision-making capacity variables to their study on the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs' capacity to rule. Once again, the results did not support the assumed relation. Instead, their findings are ambivalent.

In some cases, they observe a negative effect of legitimacy crises on IOs' capacity to rule; sometimes, the consequences are positive, and sometimes there is no consequence. However, they observed more cases in which legitimacy crises positively affected IOs' capacity to rule. These results have led the authors to argue that, in some cases, a legitimacy crisis can benefit IO contrary to the commonly assumed relation. It can serve as a "wake-up call that leads to a rediscovery of what is essential for these institutions to realize their goals" (Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 181). However, their research also found little evidence to support this new theoretical innovation. The absence of evidence for both the conventional theory and its contrary regarding the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs can lead us to question whether legitimacy truly matters in global governance. This view corresponds with Marquez (2016) paper, which argues that it does not. Without going that far, Sommerer et al. (2022a) study revealed at least the need to revise the conventional theory concerning the effects of legitimacy on political institutions.

Very recently, H. Agné and F. Soderbaum (2022), in an attempt to remedy this problem, developed a more general alternative theory proposing that "under certain conditions, legitimacy is a cost for political institutions" (p. 2) and suggested that a lower level of legitimacy or a legitimacy crisis can, in certain circumstances, serve as a resource

for political institutions, such as IOs. Agné and Soderbaum (2022) illustrated this with a case study of the African Union. In this specific case, their theory works. However, further research using different methods and approaches needs to be done to test in more details the pertinence of the theory and its broader validity.

To round up, in the literature on legitimacy in global governance and, more specifically, on the relationship between performance and legitimacy, a significant body of work has demonstrated and studied the role of performance in determining the legitimacy of IOs. In contrast, little research has studied legitimacy's effect on performance despite its widely assumed positive relation. The few research (Bes, Sommerer, and Agné, 2019; Sommerer et al., 2022a; Agné and Söderbaum, 2022) that have attempted to fill the gap produced mixed results and called for more research on the topic and a reconsideration of the theory regarding the effect of legitimacy on performance. It is precisely within this domain that this thesis seeks to make a valuable contribution.

Using a new approach to policy output and employing diverse research methods, this thesis aims to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of legitimacy on performance, enhancing our understanding of the phenomena. Additionally, the thesis will revisit the theoretical framework concerning the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs' performance and, from a broader perspective, the effects of legitimacy on iOS. There is also no doubt that the results will speak to other ongoing research and debates. For instance, a better understanding of the effect of legitimacy on performance might hint at its dynamics and importance, which can help direct further research related to the two central debates on the relationship between authority and legitimacy and between democracy and legitimacy.

2. Conceptual and theoretical framework

As was mentioned in the introduction, in the beginning, when this research was initially developed as a thesis proposal, only the article written by Bes et al. (2019) on the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs' resources was available. At that point, the idea was to conduct for the first-time a quantitative research over a large sample (approximately 30 IOs) and a long time period (1985-2015) on the effect of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output volume. That is to say, the number of decisions taken by IOs annually which is a variable that can be used to evaluate the performance of IOs (see, for example, Sommerer et al., 2022b).

However, during this research's progress, a study by Sommerer et al. (2022a) on the consequence of legitimacy crises on IOs' capacity to rule was published. Interestingly, in this study, a part is dedicated to the effect of legitimacy crises on the number of decisions taken by IOs each year, which was the initial idea for this research. Their findings yielded mixed results, offering limited support for both the conventional theory regarding the consequences of legitimacy on IOs and their revised theory on the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs. More significantly, they did not find robust evidence supporting the significance of legitimacy despite the widely assumed belief in its importance. Consequently, it was decided to move further in the analysis of the effect of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output by investigating additional characteristics of policy output made available thanks to another research (Lundgren et al., 2023).

Nonetheless, Sommerer et al.'s research (2022a) laid the groundwork for the conceptual and theoretical approach to studying legitimacy crises and their impact on IOs. Agné and Söderbaum (2022) partly integrated and revised some aspects of this framework (Sommerer et al., 2022a) to provide a more robust theoretical framework not only for explaining the effect of legitimacy crises on IOs but also, more broadly, for understanding the consequences of legitimacy on political institutions.

As my research seeks not only to provide a more detailed description of the effect of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output but also to offer explanations and expectations for these consequences, I will draw upon the theoretical framework developed by both

Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Agné and Söderbaum (2022) to formulate my research hypotheses. This approach allows me to revisit Sommerer et al.'s framework with different data and methodological tools, and assess the reliability of certain assumptions within Agné and Söderbaum's new theory that requires further testing.

Therefore, in the following sections, I will revisit in more detail the conventional theory regarding the expected effect of legitimacy and legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output, present the theoretical innovation of Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Agné and Söderbaum (2022), elaborate on the concepts of legitimacy crisis and policy output as an approach for measuring IOs' performance. And finally, the research hypothesis of this study will be introduced by synthesizing and connecting the various theories and concepts.

2.1 The conventional theory

First and foremost, it is essential to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of the concept of legitimacy, particularly concerning its implications for IOs in the realm of world politics. This concept can be interpreted through either a normative or a sociological lens. In my investigation, I specifically adopt the sociological perspective, defining legitimacy as the "actors' perception of an institution's authority as appropriately exercised" (Tallberg and Zürn, 2019, p. 583).

Delving into the foundational theories surrounding the impact of legitimacy on political institutions, we find Max Weber's seminal work ([1922] 1978). According to Weber, institutions lacking legitimacy resort to coercion and bribery as mechanisms to achieve their objectives. In contrast, those with high legitimacy find it easier to attain their goals by inspiring individuals and groups to take proactive measures. Legitimacy, in this context, not only diminishes the need for stringent oversight of individuals but is also considered to broaden the pool of resources available to institutions. These encompass invaluable resources such as knowledge, ideas, and a willingness to cooperate – resources that cannot be coerced but are indispensable for the effective functioning of institutions. Consequently, legitimacy is seen as conferring various advantages to political institutions (Agné and Söderbaum, 2022, p. 2). Some of these perceived benefits include heightened actor participation in decision-making processes (Nye, 1997; Booth and Seligson, 2009),

motivation for investors to contribute resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and improved acceptance of joint decision-making and compliance with established rules (Beetham, 1991; Sommerer and Agné, 2018).

Expanding the scope to a broader context, as highlighted by Agné and Söderbaum (2022), the conventional theory regarding the impact of legitimacy is often posited as an explanation for the effectiveness of political institutions (Beetham, 1991). This effectiveness is particularly evident in their ability to provide collective goods (Scharpf, 1991). The connection between legitimacy and effectiveness is underscored by the capacity of legitimacy to attract resources, influence decision-making processes, and enhance implementation and compliance, as Sommerer and Agné (2018) summarized. In the domain of domestic politics, there is widespread acknowledgment that legitimacy renders political institutions more effective (Weber, 1978; Dahl and Lindblom, 1992; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Rothstein, 2003).

Advancing these considerations to the realm of global governance, where theoretical and empirical research on the consequences of legitimacy remains somewhat limited (Sommerer and Agné, 2018), it is anticipated that the positive effects attributed to legitimacy in domestic contexts will extend to IOs. Echoing this sentiment, Buchanan and Keohane (2006, p. 407) assert that "multilateral institutions will thrive only when they are perceived as legitimate by democratic publics." In the context of international politics, the conventional theory posits that legitimacy plays a pivotal role in determining whether IOs remain relevant as key platforms for coordinating policies, resolving global issues, ensuring compliance with international rules and norms, developing new rules and norms, and addressing fundamental normative concerns about global governance (Tallberg and Zürn, 2019, p. 582).

Consequently, the absence of legitimacy in IOs is expected to yield significant consequences, leading to a decrease in functionality and effectiveness. Moreover, the lack of legitimacy in IOs and the international system more broadly is believed to instigate various effects, ultimately contributing to increased contestation of the world order (Hooghe et al., 2018; Rauh and Zürn, 2020). While the conventional theory of legitimacy holds a significant place in the study of global governance, its mechanisms and consequences remain vaguely described (Bes et al., 2018, p. 314) and have not undergone rigorous testing and

validation in research (Agné and Söderbaum, 2022, p. 1). In certain instances, as Marquez (2016) pointed out, the theory has failed to predict outcomes; for example, in liberal democracies, the level of legitimacy has decreased over time without resulting in observed violent breakdowns (Agné and Söderbaum, 2022).

In the specific case of a legitimacy crisis, the effects are also expected to impact IOs detrimentally. As I will explore in a dedicated section on this concept, a legitimacy crisis involves "public challenges to the right to rule in an organization that reaches an extreme point compared to average levels" (Sommerer et al., 2022a). In such a situation, the organization must either undergo transformation to align with the normative beliefs asserted by the legitimacy crisis or, if it remains unchanged, may resort to rule by coercion and bribery, significantly reducing its effectiveness and functionality, as discussed earlier. This implication is evident in the definitions provided by some scholars: "a crisis of legitimacy can be defined as that critical turning point when a decline in an actor's or institution's legitimacy necessitates adaptation (through re-legitimation or material inducement) or disempowerment" (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 167; also see Habermas, [1973] 2015; Hurd, 2007). Even scholars who do not go as far as viewing legitimacy crises as a moment where political institutions can either lose power or adapt agree that a legitimacy crisis negatively impacts effectiveness (Beetham, 1991, p. 6) because, as discussed earlier, legitimacy increases actor participation in decision-making, motivates investors to contribute resources, and enhances compliance and implementation with established rules.

However, two empirical research studies by Bes et al. (2019) and Sommerer et al. (2022a) found limited support for the related hypotheses, specifically, that legitimacy helps IOs attract resources (Bes et al., 2019) and enhances their capacity to rule (Sommerer et al., 2022a). These results prompted a reexamination of the established theory of legitimacy, in search of a more comprehensive explanation for their findings.

2.2 Sommerer et al.'s revisited theory

Unlike the conventional theory of legitimacy, which aims to explain a broad range of phenomena, including stability, performance, and breakdown of political order (Marquez, 2016), Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) revised framework focuses specifically on the

consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs' capacity to rule which is the concept they used in their study for assessing the performance and effectiveness of IOs. They were motivated to develop this revised theory for two main reasons. First, their empirical findings revealed anomalies: some legitimacy crises sometimes had a negative impact on IOs' capacity to rule, while other times, they had a positive or no impact. This contradicted the conventional theory, which consistently assumes a negative impact of legitimacy crises on IO effectiveness and performance. Second, the existing literature lacked detailed mechanisms to explain the potential consequences of legitimacy on IOs (Bes et al., 2018, p. 314), and it does not explain the anomalies encountered in their results.

Sommerer et al. (2022a) sought to provide a comprehensive set of expectations regarding how a legitimacy crisis could affect key dimensions of IOs' capacity to rule, including material capacity, institutional capacity, and decision-making capacity. Their theory posits that under certain conditions, a legitimacy crisis can enhance an IO's capacity to rule, which contrasts with the more traditional theory of legitimacy. However, they do not exclude the conventional theory; instead, they aim to complement it. Their view is that both theories can coexist, and they aim to unify them in a single framework to address the anomalies found in the conventional theory. In other words, they seek to supplement the traditional theory to explain that a legitimacy crisis can have positive, negative, or no consequences, depending on specific conditions. The critical questions are: How and why can a legitimacy crisis benefit IOs? And which approach is effective under particular circumstances?

According to Sommerer et al. (2022a), legitimacy crises function as an “activation of audiences.” This assertion is supported by their previous findings. Before trying to explain the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs' capacity to rule, they dedicated the first part of their book to the study of legitimacy crises. In this section, they develop their concept of legitimacy crisis and lay the foundation for their approach to studying and identifying legitimacy crises in global governance. In their research, they distinguished between different types of audiences that constitute legitimacy crises. These audiences include “government actors, nonstate actors or both; agents that are subjected to the rule of an IO (constituent actors), agents who are merely affected by the organizations, but not subjected to their jurisdiction, and by any agent of either territory; and elite actors or the masses”

(Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 113). In addition, for each type of audience they identified the normative depth of the crisis, which they defined as “the degree of the perceived violation of normative convictions held by an audience” (Sommerer et al., 2022a p. 113). Finally, they also identified what they termed the social breath of crises referred to as “the scope of the alternative audience conceptions in question” (Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 113). While each of these properties will be explained in greater detail in the following sections that delve into the conceptualization of legitimacy crises, it is important to mention them here as they play a crucial role in their theoretical framework.

In this first part of their book, Sommerer et al. found that all legitimacy crises “involve a particular audience that is being politically activated” (2022a, p. 113). They further argue that the subsequent behavioral changes in the audience being politically activated will, in turn, influence the behavior of other agents that are relevant to the functioning of the IO and which will ultimately impact the functioning of the IO. For this reason, they talk about an “activation of audiences.” In this process, the normative depth and the social breath of a legitimacy weight a lot because they, as I will show later, along with the type of audience being activated, will affect two major aspects of a legitimacy crisis’ consequences: the likelihood and the direction of the consequences.

To construct their theoretical framework, Sommerer et al. (2022a) drew on insights from individual human psychology. According to some research, a set of negative emotions can be triggered when the social context does not adhere to an individual’s moral standards (Prinz and Nichols, 2010). These emotions, in turn, can stimulate a person’s reasoning processes. As cited in Lenz and Viola (2017, p. 952), “active reasoning is sparked by negative emotions that cause despair and anxiety, stimulating actors to collect more information, to actively assess prior judgments and to learn new attitudes and behaviors” (Marcus et al., 2000).

Consequently, to explain the consequences of legitimacy crises, Sommerer et al. (2022a) explore the activation of individuals through negative emotions. They view legitimacy crises as a state where “a critical mass of individuals whose beliefs constitute that crisis and are formed in a short, quasi-simultaneous time span” (p. 114) is emotionally and mentally activated. They argue that such a crisis represents a time-limited 'shock' that can

create a “window of opportunity for change and new actions” (p. 114). Additionally, they anticipate that the initial phase of a legitimacy crisis will garner attention, spread to other individuals, and trigger broader activation on a social scale through an endogenous process. Sommerer et al. even predict that those opposing the legitimacy crisis may become activated and support various “more or less ambitious proposals to change how it operates” (p. 115).

Nonetheless, within this framework, the activation process inherent to any legitimacy crises differs from the activation it spurs in response to combating the legitimacy crisis (Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 115). In their theory, what they refer to as the likelihood and direction (positive or negative) of the consequences of IO legitimacy crises both depend on the identity of the activated audiences and the normative depth and social breadth of the legitimacy crisis, three components that were previously examined in their publication. This is also why they contend that their new theory can coexist with the conventional theory of legitimacy since, under certain circumstances, it may yield negative effects. In contrast, in others, it may have positive effects.

Regarding the likelihood of consequence of IO legitimacy crises, Sommerer et al. (2022a) contend that normative depth and social breadth are two crucial components for eliciting an effect of a legitimacy crisis on IOs. In the absence of normative depth, IOs are less likely to acknowledge a legitimacy crisis and respond to it. Normative depth is also likely to facilitate the spread of the initial round of activation to other audiences, thereby, increasing its social breadth. This, in turn, makes “a perception of rule without right more convincing when it is shared by people from different social groups” (p. 116).

Indeed, from their point of view, according to the specific audience that is being activated in crises, normative depth is not enough to make effects likely. For example, they believe that if a governmental elite audience dominates a legitimacy crisis and has a high degree of normative depth, it should be enough to trigger an effect. However, an audience constituting a legitimacy crisis consisting only of non-state actors is likely to be insufficient, even if it has normative depth. In that case, Sommerer et al. argue that it needs some social breadth, in the sense that “elite critique should be accompanied by mass mobilization and protests” (p. 117).

Moving to the consequences of IO legitimacy, the authors suggest that the outcome mainly depends on the ‘specific content of the norms and interests of the agents involved (in this case the activated audience)’ (p. 117). This perspective allows for two possible outcomes, interest-driven and norm-driven, both aligning with well-established theories in IR.

The first, interest-driven outcomes, resonate with liberal institutionalism. According to this perspective, the complex interdependence of our societies and the need for reliable information about the intentions and behavior of others lead individuals to rationally cooperate through institutions (Keohane and Nye, 1977). In this context, institutions are established to address these challenges and to maximize actors’ gains, what is referred to as a “logic of consequences.” Consequently, institutions are attractive to their members because they reduce transaction costs and eventually shape their preferences toward increased cooperation (Keohane, 1984, 1989; Keohane and Ostrom, 1995).

On the other hand, norm-driven outcomes align with constructivism and sociological institutionalism in IR. These schools of thoughts embrace the “logic of appropriateness” suggesting that actors’ behavior and decisions are primarily shaped by their “background of intersubjective factors, historical-cultural experiences, and institutional involvement” (p. 117). In simpler terms, they argue that individuals’ actions are not primarily driven by a quest to maximize their personal gains (as depicted by the famous homo economicus, as defined by Kirchgassner in 1991), but rather by the influence of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). As Sommerer et al. (2022a) elucidate, “actors identify the social requirements of a specific situation to act in consistency with their role, which is partially constituted by other people’s expectations – in other words, in accordance with norms that are understood as shared expectations of behavior” (p. 118).

Nevertheless, the authors are still able to identify scenarios in which a legitimacy crisis, influenced by the audience’s composition, normative depth, and social breadth, can either increase or decrease an IO’s capacity to rule. Specifying the interest-driven and norm-driven causal pathway helped them in this regard.

When it comes to a negative effect on IOs' capacity to rule, the authors anticipate a stronger likelihood when the audience primarily consists of constituent state actors, i.e. member governments (p. 119). In such cases, member governments can be motivated by either norm-driven considerations or interest-driven factors. They may choose to limit the IO's capacity if they perceive it as deviating from their established norms and values. Alternatively, as argued by Slominski and Traumer (2017), their decision may be interest-driven, based on the belief that they can better serve their own interests independently (p. 120). Legitimacy crises driven by different types of audiences can also result in negative consequences. However, the causal mechanism in such cases is less evident and depends on additional factors. For instance, Sommerer et al. argue that a legitimacy crisis primarily led by non-constituent actors can negatively impact an IO if it possesses sufficient normative depth and social breadth. In these circumstances, member states of the IO may take the crisis into account, translating universal criticisms and pressures into internal debates aimed at reducing the IO's resources (p. 120).

Concerning the positive impact on IOs' capacity to rule, Sommerer et al. have interestingly identified more causal pathways triggered by a legitimacy crisis that can lead to a favorable outcome. Firstly, they emphasize the significance of constituent audiences, who have a substantial role in building or founding the IO. Drawing from Lenz and Viola's cognitive model of legitimacy, which suggests path dependency in audiences' assessments of IOs, they expect that member governments will maintain a constructive view of IOs even during times of crisis due to their active involvement in establishing these institutions (p. 121). Additionally, Sommerer et al. contend that legitimacy crises encompassing a broad array of activated audiences can also yield positive results. An illustrative case is Roland and Römgers' (2021) study, which demonstrated the increased capacity of the European Union (EU) to tax corporations following the financial and Eurozone crises. This outcome was attributed to the combined effect of critique from diverse audiences, contributing to the EU's enhanced capacity (p. 121).

In a broader context, Sommerer et al. have identified various causal pathways, both interest-driven and norm-based, that explain the positive consequences of legitimacy crises without specifying particular audiences. When a crisis occurs, but the IO is perceived as still capable of pursuing an audience's core norms and interests, strengthening the IO's capacity

to rule can be a “reasonable preference of its audience” (p. 122). For example, there are instances in the literature where legitimacy challenges prompted IOs to enhance transparency and inclusiveness (Curtin and Meijer, 2006; Wille, 2010; Zürn 2014, 2018). In these cases, audiences believe that IOs can continue to pursue their core norms and interests. Moreover, norm-based reforms geared towards procedural transparency, fairness, and inclusiveness can also intersect with interest-driven motives. Constituent governments and IO staff may have an interest in bolstering the IO's institutional and decision-making capacity to address the challenge and ensure the continued operation of the IO, which safeguards their positions within it.

In addition to the audience type, normative depth, and social breadth that define a legitimacy crisis, Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) theoretical framework recognizes the significance of other factors in determining the intensity and directness of a crisis's impact on an IO's capacity to rule. These factors, termed "conditioning variables," are associated with the IO's characteristics. The authors identified six such variables through a literature review on IO legitimacy: pooling, delegation, policy scope, transnational access, democratic membership, and public visibility.

A high level of pooling is believed to increase the likelihood and move in a positive direction the consequences of a legitimacy crisis. This perspective is supported by previous studies that have shown that majority voting systems within IOs facilitate quicker decision-making and help avoid the potential for vetoes or time-consuming intergovernmental bargaining (Hooghe and Marks, 2015; Sommerer et al., 2021). Similarly, a high level of delegation is likely to support an increase in an IO's capacity to rule. Delegation is viewed as reducing the transaction costs for the principals of an IO to reach an agreement (Hawkins et al., 2006; Bradley and Kelley, 2008). This reduction in transaction costs also "makes it more likely that the IO can make use of the political activation of a legitimacy crisis" (Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 124) to strengthen its position, ultimately leading to an expansion in the organization's capacity to rule. Policy scope is also likely to influence the likelihood of consequences and increase an IO's capacity to rule. While the literature on this topic is less precise, some studies in organizational ecology suggest that actors with broad and generalist characteristics may be better equipped to adapt to a complex crisis environment. This adaptability can be attributed to their extensive portfolio, which often includes broader

institutional knowledge of the field and more connective capacities (Freeman and Hannan, 1983; Singh and Lumsden, 1990; Abbott et al., 2016). Better transnational access, which allows non-state actors to engage with IOs, is, according to Sommerer et al., likely to steer the consequences toward positive change in an IO's capacity to rule. Previous research in global governance has highlighted the importance of transnational actors for improving IO performance (Lall, 2017), contributing resources (Raustiala, 1997; Betsill and Corell, 2008; Abbott et al., 2015), and mitigating criticism and challenges (Dingwerth et al., 2019). Democratic membership, the fifth control variable, is also expected to affect the capacities of IOs to turn the consequences of legitimacy crises into positive outcomes. This is because democratic states are believed to have more aligned interests with IOs and are generally expected to have a more supportive and constructive approach towards IOs. Research has shown that democracies indeed tend to participate more actively in cooperative solutions (Moravcsik, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Kono, 2006; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008; Poast and Urpelainen, 2013). Finally, for the last variable, public visibility, the authors do not predict a specific direction of its effect. However, they anticipate that it does matter for the likelihood of legitimacy crises' consequences: the higher the level of public visibility, the greater the chance to broaden the social scope of a legitimacy crisis.

To summarize, Sommerer et al. view legitimacy crises in global governance as the activation of an audience, and they propose that the type of audience being activated, the normative depth and social breadth of the crisis, and six institutional features of the targeted IO all have varying consequences in terms of likelihood and direction. In their framework, they offer a set of predictions regarding these consequences. They believe that legitimacy crises dominated by constituent actors are more likely than other types of audiences to result in both negative and positive outcomes. Furthermore, they predict that crises dominated by a wide array of audiences are likely to produce positive consequences. Additionally, they expect that five characteristics of an IO, namely pooling, delegation, policy scope, transnational access, and democratic membership, will enhance the consequences of legitimacy crises and have a positive impact.

However, the quantitative research conducted by Sommerer et al. to test their theoretical framework produced mixed results, making it difficult to either support or contradict it (Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 153). Therefore, I propose first to introduce Agné

and Söderbaum's (2022) revision of the more general theory on the consequences of legitimacy on political institutions to refine and strengthen Sommerer et al.'s ideas regarding the potential consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs. Subsequently, I will introduce their concept of legitimacy crisis and a new concept of policy output developed by Tallberg et al. (2016), which allows for a more in-depth analysis in one of the three dimensions of IOs' capacity to rule, specifically the decision-making capacity.

2.3 Agné and Söderbaum's theory

Unlike Sommerer et al. (2022a), the theoretical innovation proposed by Agné and Söderbaum (2022) does not explicitly treat the effect of legitimacy crises on IOs, even though they do mention it and they do inform us about their prediction. They advance a more general theory with legitimacy, also in the sociological sense (the “social beliefs that an institution is normatively justified to rule the way it does” (Agné and Söderbaum, 2022, p. 9), effect on political institutions. Just like Sommerer et al. (2022a), the authors were motivated to formulate this new theory due to the lack of description concerning the plausible causal pathways, the lack of research rigorously testing the conventional theory of legitimacy consequences, and the publication of research such as Sommerer et al. which found weak support for the conventional theory. All of this, despite the widely assumed positive impact of legitimacy on institutions in the literature. In this new general theory of legitimacy proposed by Agné and Söderbaum (2022), the authors argue that legitimacy can also have a cost. That’s to say, in some instance high level of legitimacy can be a cost for a political institution. It can reduce its effectiveness because according to them, high level of legitimacy “make political actors complacent about the status quo and cause them to pay insufficient attention to problems related to implementation” (p. 1). Whereas lower level of legitimacy or as they mention, legitimacy crises, can, as Sommerer et al. (2022a) framed, “serve as a wake-up call and motivate actors to work harder to reach their original or wider goals” (p. 1).



Figure 1: Predicted effects of legitimacy, according to the resource theory (dashed line) and the cost sensitive theory (solid curve) (Source Agné and Söderbaum, 2022, p. 3).

Figure 1 presented above is extracted from Agné and Söderbaum’s work (2022). It illustrates both the conventional and cost-sensitive theories of legitimacy. As we can see, the authors delineate three primary levels of legitimacy: the lowest level (A), the middle level (B), and the highest level (C). Regarding the lowest (A) and highest (C) levels of legitimacy, both theories anticipate the same effectiveness difference, suggesting that a political institution will be more effective at the highest level of legitimacy (A) compared to the lowest (C). However, a substantial difference arises in their perspectives on the medium level of legitimacy (B). The cost-sensitive theory posits that institutions are more effective when they enjoy a medium level (B) of legitimacy than the conventional theory does. Moreover, the dynamics between the medium (B) and highest (C) levels of legitimacy vary between the two theories. Agné and Soderbaum’s theory predicts a decrease in effectiveness when an institution’s legitimacy level increases from a medium (B) to the highest level (C). In contrast, the conventional theory predicts an increase.

According to Agné and Söderbaum, the lowest level of legitimacy (A) implies that “a relevant audience believes that a political institution is not at all capable of achieving or designed to achieve any public goods” (p. 4). In such a scenario, institutions lack the support

of the audience for accomplishing their objectives. Consequently, these institutions must resort to coercion to guide and coordinate behavior. However, coercion is costly, relatively ineffective, and not available for all political institutions. Consequently, in these circumstances, the effectiveness of the institutions is expected to be low.

At the highest level of legitimacy (C), “a relevant legitimacy audience believes that a political institution can and should make important decisions for the common good and also that the institution is sure to deliver on that normative expectation” (p. 4). In this situation, the authors associate it with an intermediate level of efficiency, considering it a level where institutions can promote simple aims (law, order, security, etc.) that only require an absence of threats and violence. Agné and Söderbaum expect a high level of legitimacy to prompt an intermediate level of effectiveness due to two mechanisms. On one side, “high levels of legitimacy contribute to effectiveness because legitimacy stimulates voluntary participation and compliance with decisions among actors and lowers the need for coercion to enforce collective decisions” (p. 4). On the other side, “high levels of legitimacy also make audience members less attentive to the content of public policy, allowing power wielders to pursue their self-interests more effectively behind a veil of trust” (p. 4). Additionally, they believe that in this case, accountability mechanisms and public forum may not be efficient “to secure effective resolution of common problems because high levels of legitimacy have led to complacency or fatigue among political actors” (p. 4).

Finally, for Agné and Söderbaum, the intermediate level of legitimacy (B) signifies that the legitimacy of an institution is contested or in crisis. Building on Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) idea, a medium level of legitimacy involves audience activation. Due to the audience's belief that the institution has the potential to improve its performance, they are more likely to engage in decision-making and adhere to decisions. This participation is driven by the desire to support the prospect of a more effective institution in the future. Consequently, there is no necessity for expensive coercive measures to ensure compliance with norms and decisions. Meanwhile, the audience is stimulated "to supply information, initiatives, and interventions of relevance to effectiveness" (p. 4) because of their negative view regarding the institution. Agné and Söderbaum believe that this activation is unique to the intermediate level of legitimacy and enables institutions to reach the highest level of effectiveness, making it possible for institutions to achieve complicated aims. The authors

define complicated aims as requiring "many and diverse actions as identified and pursued by many and different agents across society" (p. 4). Such aims can be economic or cultural development for example.

Agné and Söderbaum (2022), similar to Sommerer et al. (2022a), drew insights from moral psychology to justify their theory. In brief, according to this literature, individuals are activated when they believe that a political institution is failing to do what it can and should do. This generates negative feelings, stimulating learning and new initiatives more forcefully (Marcus et al., 2000). Conversely, when individuals perceive an institution as legitimate, they are more passive. Therefore, because political institutions need the active participation of individuals to function well and address problems, they will perform better when their legitimacy is contested or in crisis. On the contrary, they will be less effective when they enjoy higher legitimacy. Interestingly, in their framework, Agné and Söderbaum emphasize the degree of complexity of challenges addressed by political institutions. They argue that during Weber's time, political institutions' aims were limited and dealt with simpler tasks such as violence and criminality. In this condition, a medium level of effectiveness, as described in their framework, was all they needed. That is the reason why they believe that the conventional theory was used to explain the variation in the effectiveness of institutions. Today, things are different, as modern political institutions are dealing with more complex problems and need active policymakers and audiences to attain their aims and be effective.

To summarize, Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) theory complements Sommerer et al. (2022a) framework by reusing their insights and offering a broader explanation regarding the consequence of legitimacy on political institutions, discussing also the effects of both low and high levels of legitimacy. Their theory provides two main insights for my study. First, I should expect a legitimacy crisis to positively affect IOs' effectiveness only if the IO enjoyed a high level of legitimacy before. Otherwise, if the legitimacy of the IO before the legitimacy crisis is at an intermediate level (B), I expect the legitimacy crisis to lower the level of legitimacy to the lowest level (A), where effectiveness is also the lowest. Second, I expect an increase in effectiveness to have different impacts according to the type of issue an IO is dealing with. For example, following their theory, when the level of effectiveness of political institutions increases because its level of legitimacy went from the highest (C) to the intermediate (B) level, I expect to observe a rise in decisions dealing with complex issues

such as economic and cultural development. Simultaneously, I should observe a consistent level of decisions dealing with simpler tasks such as laws, crimes, and violence. This is highly relevant because the policy output concept introduced later can capture the types of issues addressed by IOs.

2.4 The concept of legitimacy crises

The concept of legitimacy crises used in this research was developed by Sommerer et al. (2022a). Behind this choice are two reasons. Firstly, the data they collected on legitimacy crises will be utilized for the quantitative analysis in this paper. Secondly, their study represents the most recent and comprehensive examination of legitimacy crises in global governance.

However, it is essential to commence by delineating the concept of legitimacy upon which Sommerer et al. (2022a) built their research on legitimacy crises. As mentioned earlier, legitimacy in this research, as well as in Sommerer et al. (2022a) and in Agné and Söderbaum's (2022), is conceptualized as the audience's belief that an institution's authority is appropriately exercised. This emphasis on audience's beliefs is crucial for the study of the consequences of legitimacy on IOs. It is necessary to distinguish between beliefs and actions to prevent tautological explanations or the exclusion of many potential effects of legitimacy. Sommerer and Agné (2018) caution against conflating actions as both an indicator of legitimacy and its effects, stating that when "the actions of audiences feature both as an indicator of legitimacy and as an indicator of its effects: that is, if legitimacy is measured in terms of the behavior that it is expected to produce," (p. 4) problems of tautology arise, impeding the ability to "theorize and examine if and when institutions that possess more legitimacy are better or worse at generating certain actions" (p. 4).

Sommerer et al. (2022a) construct their conceptualization of legitimacy crises with a similar mindset. They strive to avoid tautological issues by formulating "a more limited yet precise and generally applicable definition of legitimacy crisis in comparison with some uses of the term in the existing literature" (p. 25). In essence, they aim to provide a nuanced definition that is robust enough to differentiate it from everyday protest and criticism of democratic politics without making assumptions about host organizations, such as delving

into specific issues like institutional breakdowns (Rothstein, 2009) or a general decline in the capacity to rule (Reus-Smith, 2007). More precisely, the definition Sommerer et al. (2022a) offer for legitimacy crises is as follows: "an international organization (IO) undergoes a legitimacy crisis if, and only if, a relevant group of people perceives that it rules in ways that diverge from what is right, to a point where they react critically to the political status quo with an intensity that is extreme compared to other moments in time" (p. 26). They further clarify and delineate five necessary conditions to fulfill this definition of legitimacy crises. According to them, legitimacy crises are best conceived as a social perception, a perception of rule without right, a perception by a relevant group of people, a perception of unusual intensity involving a critical reaction to the status quo, and a perception limited to a particular time frame.

In addition, the decision to select those five definitional criteria for legitimacy crises was also driven by Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) aim of providing a concept of legitimacy crises that is as relevant as possible in the field of research on global governance. As they point out, "for any concept to be fruitful in empirical research on any matter, it must first reflect the political and social structures in its field of application" (p. 26). Consequently, to choose those five characteristics, they first reviewed the differences between global and domestic governance to identify their implications. They then used these implications to make "a series of adjustments of, or new choices among, received definitions of legitimacy crisis" (p. 28), ultimately leading to the identification of the five conditions already mentioned (for more information, see Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 27-43).

Therefore, the clarification of these five necessary conditions allows Sommerer et al. (2022a) to construct a concept of legitimacy crises that best "describe their prevalence in global governance" (p. 44) and "analyze their effects on the capacity to rule of IOs" (p. 44). Moreover, while it also helps guide the selection of data and empirical indicators, it also allows them to distinguish several characteristics, such as the type of audience constituting the legitimacy crisis, its normative depth, and social breadth. Three characteristics that are essential in their framework and in their analyses of the consequences of legitimacy on IOs' capacity to rule, and which we shall integrate into the present research.

2.5 The concept of policy output performance

In their research, Sommerer et al. (2022a) analyze the effect of legitimacy crises on the concept of IO's capacity to rule, which comprises three dimensions: material, institutional, and decision-making capacity. Here, my attention is directed towards the decision-making capacity of IOs, which is at the core of this research.

Referring to Szulecki et al. (2011) and Sommerer et al. (2021), Sommerer et al. (2022a) define the decision-making capacity of IOs as the ability of an IO to issue regulations, whether binding or non-binding, within its policy scope or mandate (p. 111). Because decision-making capacity represents a transitional level between process and outcome in politics, and drawing on the literature of comparative politics that studied the effect of legitimacy on legislation, public spending, foreign aid, and climate change planning at domestic and local levels (Gilley, 2009; Cashmore and Wejs, 2014), as well as their theoretical framework and the conventional theory of legitimacy's effect on institutions, Sommerer et al. (2022a) view decision-making as one measure of IOs' effectiveness likely to capture the effect of legitimacy crises.




Figure 2: Consequences of global governance institutions (GGIs) legitimacy (Sommerer and Agné, 2018, p. 6)

In a previous paper, Sommerer and Agné (2018) provide a more detailed description of the relationship between policy output (or Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) decision-making capacity) and legitimacy, as well as the relationship between policy output and effectiveness. As illustrated in the Figure 2, they anticipate that legitimacy has both a direct and an indirect impact on policy output, asserting that legitimacy also influences resources, a precondition for policy output. Furthermore, the figure demonstrates that policy output is an insufficient yet necessary condition for IOs to achieve problem-solving effectiveness. Simultaneously, it serves as a marker of institutional performance. Therefore, policy output is a relevant metric for studying the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs and their overall performance.

Sommerer et al. (2022a) conducted the first and only research on the consequences of legitimacy on IOs' decision-making capacity. Their analysis explored the impact of legitimacy crises on the number of decisions made annually by the highest decision-making body of an institution, providing an initial glimpse into the influence of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output. However, this method has a significant limitation as it solely considers the quantity of decisions. As rightly noted by Sommerer and Agné (2018), the number of decisions is not a guarantee of contributing to the problem-solving effectiveness of an IO (p. 10). It is imperative to also assess the quality of decisions. Some researchers have demonstrated that IOs may produce symbolic and rhetorical decisions that fail to achieve their intended objectives (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Libman and Obydenkova, 2018).

To address this issue, a different approach will be employed. In 2016, Tallberg et al. introduced a new conceptualization of performance that is particularly suitable for comparative and large-scale studies. They developed an output-based approach that focuses on policies produced by IOs. Tallberg et al. (2016) presented "a taxonomy of policy output with five generic dimensions: volume; orientation; type; instrument; and target" (p. 1078) (see Table 1). According to them, this approach enables the examination of five relevant dimensions of IO performance, providing a more "fine-grained measurement" of performance when considered collectively.

Output dimension	Definition	Level of analysis	Examples
Volume	The volume of policy decisions produced by an IO in a given time period	IO, IO year	The UN General Assembly adopted 286 resolutions in its 69th (2014/15) session
Orientation (topic)	The distribution of policy acts across issue areas in a given time period	IO, IO year	The principal issue areas of UN General Assembly resolutions adopted in 2014/15 were security (28%), human rights (24%) and development (16%)
Type	Whether the aim of a policy is regulatory, distributive, declarative, constitutional or administrative	Individual policy act	UN General Assembly Resolution 69/285, recognizing the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan, is declarative; resolution 69/258, financing the UN mission in South Sudan, is administrative
Instrument	Whether a policy is binding (hard law) or non-binding (soft law)	Individual policy act	UN General Assembly resolution 69/285 contains non-binding recommendations, so classifies as soft law; resolution 69/258 requires member states to contribute funds, imposing legal obligations, so has a higher level of bindingness
Target	Whether a policy is aimed at states, non-states actors, the IO itself, other Ios, or the international community as a whole	Individual policy act	UN General Assembly resolution 69/285 targets states, non-state actors, and the international community as a whole; resolution 69/258 targets member states and the IO itself (UN Secretariat)

Table 1: Five dimensions of IO policy output (Tallberg et al., 2016, p. 1082)

More significantly, the concept advanced by Tallberg et al. (2016) allows for a more detailed examination in my study. It goes beyond a simple count of the number of decisions and, as they suggest, provides a more fine-grained analysis of the impact of legitimacy on IO policy output. Furthermore, it enables an assessment of the quality of decisions made by IOs, for example, by examining the proportion of binding/non-binding decisions or the number of declarative policies. This approach allows me to investigate some of the predictions made by Agné and Söderbaum (2022). Specifically, it allows to explore whether the increase in effectiveness following a legitimacy crisis affects an IO's capacity to address complex problems, such as economic and cultural development, as opposed to simpler ones, such as law and crime. Therefore, while addressing some limitations encountered by Sommerer et al. (2022a), this approach allows to test certain hypotheses proposed by Agné and Söderbaum (2022).

Nonetheless, it is essential to acknowledge that while this concept of policy output allows for a better assessment of decision quality, it still possesses some limitations. As illustrated by Sommerer and Agné's (2018) Figure 2, policy output is deemed a precondition for performance. Gutner and Thompson's (2010) paper further provides understandings of the limits of policy output. Their pyramid of performance posits policies as an initial

necessary condition but emphasizes that process performance, including policy output, “does not necessarily translate into outcome performance” (p. 236). Despite its capacity to inform us about how IOs perform administrative tasks, the policy output variable, as a measure of process performance, may not definitively indicate the effectiveness of an IO in achieving its goals. Recognizing these complexities, the policy output approach, while having its own limitations, remains one of the best available tools for analyzing and comparing the effects of legitimacy crises across multiple multi-issue IOs and over a 30-year timeframe.

2.6 Hypotheses

In the previous paragraphs, various theoretical frameworks and concepts that form the basis of the research have been introduced. The discussion began with the conventional theory on the consequences of legitimacy, emphasizing the belief that institutions, including IOs, require legitimacy for effective functioning. Conversely, a lack of legitimacy is expected to decrease performance and effectiveness, with legitimacy crises anticipated to severely impact IO functioning. However, quantitative analyses have yielded mixed results, with legitimacy crises showing varied and sometimes contradictory outcomes (Bes et al., 2019; Sommerer et al., 2022a). Recognizing these inconsistencies and the absence of a clear mechanism in existing literature, Sommerer et al. (2022a) proposed a new theoretical framework. While not negating the conventional theory, their framework suggests that legitimacy crises, under certain conditions, can enhance IO efficacy through audience activation. Yet, their empirical results neither confirmed nor contradicted their proposed framework.

For this reason, another theory developed by Agné and Söderbaum (2022) was introduced, which presents a more general framework concerning the impact of legitimacy on political institutions. Unlike Sommerer et al.'s framework, Agné and Söderbaum's theory does not complement but aims to replace the conventional theory of legitimacy. According to this theory, a high level of legitimacy is viewed as a cost for political institutions, preventing them from achieving high levels of effectiveness. However, a decrease from a high level of legitimacy to a lower level, such as during a legitimacy crisis, is considered a wake-up call, motivating actors to work harder and eventually leading to political institutions

attaining a high level of effectiveness. The authors applied this theory to a case study on the African Union (AU) and found it to be applicable.

To reinforce the expectations regarding the consequences of legitimacy on IOs' policy output, hypotheses derived from Agné and Söderbaum (2022) were integrated. This contributed to the research and literature on legitimacy in global governance in two ways. First, it refined the theoretical framework concerning the impact of legitimacy crises on IO policy output, specifically in terms of problem-solving. Second, it contributed to assessing the validity of a new general theory regarding legitimacy and its effects on political institutions across a substantial number of IOs (13) and an extended period (1985-2015).

In addition, the concept of legitimacy crises developed by Sommerer et al. (2022a) was introduced. This conceptualization was carefully crafted to avoid tautological issues and to provide a precise and suitable concept for comparative studies over large samples within the context of global governance. It enables the differentiation of various characteristics of legitimacy crises, including the audience constituting the crises, its normative depth, and social breadth. These distinctions are valuable for studying the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs. Therefore, this concept of legitimacy will be employed as the independent variable in the research.

Regarding the dependent variable, a new conceptualization of policy output based on the work of Tallberg et al. (2016) was introduced. This conceptualization, initially designed to offer a more comprehensive framework for measuring IOs' performance, captures five generic dimensions of IO policies: volume, orientation, type, instrument, and target. By using this conceptualization, the research aims to overcome the limitations of Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) study, which only considers the impact of legitimacy crises on the volume of decisions. The new approach seeks to provide a more refined and comprehensive description of the impact of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output, while also allowing the testing of some assumptions made by Agné and Söderbaum (2022).

To formulate hypotheses, my research connects the different theories and concepts together. I start by connecting Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) expectations with the new concept of policy output. More precisely, I retake their assumptions and check on a broader set of

dimensions of policy output. That is to say, I not only look at the effect of legitimacy crises on policy output volume but also the effect on the four other dimensions: orientation, type, instrument, and target. Sommerer et al. (2022a) anticipate that legitimacy crises dominated by constituent actors or member state governments may influence IO performance, but the consequences could be either positive or negative. Similar uncertainty is expected when legitimacy crises have a wide social breadth. Thus, *I hypothesize that legitimacy crises dominated by constituent actors, member states, or a combination of elite critique and mass protest are more likely to have discernible consequences on the different dimensions of policy output of IOs compared to those dominated by other audiences (H1).*

Furthermore, Sommerer et al. (2022a) identified six conditioning variables, five of which—pooling, delegation, policy scope, transnational access, and democratic membership—are believed to influence the consequences of legitimacy crises positively. Drawing insight from Agné and Söderbaum (2022), policy scope is likely to be the most significant in influencing the consequences. According to their perspective, a legitimacy crisis leading to increased effectiveness will result in more decisions addressing complex aims. IOs with a broader policy scope are likely to deal with more complex objectives than those with a narrower scope. Once again, I use the concept of policy output introduced to check these assumptions over the different dimensions, especially over the instrument dimension (binding or non-binding) and the type of policy, as declarative output can be symbolic (Tallberg et al., 2016, p. 1085). Therefore, the hypothesis is formulated as follows: *the higher the level of pooling, delegation, policy scope, transnational access, and democratic membership, the more likely the consequences of a legitimacy crisis on IO's policy output will lead to an increase, with a specific emphasis on policy scope being the most crucial variable (H2).*

Moving further, I extend Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) framework by incorporating expectations from Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) theory. According to Agné and Söderbaum (2022), a legitimacy crisis that enhances performance will result in an increase in decisions addressing complex issues. Consequently, utilizing the concept of policy output, *I hypothesize that in some instance, legitimacy crises lead to an increase in the number of decisions related to economic and cultural development policy topics. This increase is expected to demonstrate a corresponding improvement in IOs' performance(H3).*

Lastly, Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) theory posit that legitimacy crises can only lead to increased effectiveness if the IO in question enjoys a high level of legitimacy before the crisis. Consequently, *I hypothesize that legitimacy crises will lead to an increase in policy output when the years preceding the crisis indicate that the IO was not or barely contested (H4).*

In addition to the four specific hypotheses outlined in Table 2 below (H1 to H4), three overarching hypotheses were introduced to complement and enhance the clarity of my research. Firstly, the inclusion of the null hypothesis posits that legitimacy crises have no discernible effect on IOs' policy output (HA). Secondly, aligning with conventional theory, an additional hypothesis predicts a negative impact of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output, measured by a reduction in the number of decisions (HB). Lastly, drawing on insights from Bes et al. (2019), Sommerer et al. (2022a), and Agné and Söderbaum (2022), I incorporated a hypothesis anticipating a positive influence of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output, resulting in an augmentation in the number of policies (HC).

Hypothesis	Descriptions
H1	Legitimacy crises dominated by constituent actors, member states, or a combination of elite critique and mass protest are more likely to have discernible consequences on the different dimensions of policy output of IOs compared to those dominated by other audiences.
H2	The higher the level of pooling, delegation, policy scope, transnational access, and democratic membership, the more likely the consequences of a legitimacy crisis on IO's policy output will be positive, with a specific emphasis on policy scope being the most crucial variable.
H3	In some instances, legitimacy crises should lead to an increase of decisions in economic and cultural policy topics. This increase is expected to demonstrate a corresponding improvement in IOs' performance.
H4	Legitimacy crises will lead to an increase in IOs' policy output when the years preceding the crisis indicate that the IO was not or barely contested.
HA	Legitimacy crises do not have consequences on IOs' policy output.
HB	Legitimacy crises have negative consequences on IOs' policy output. They lead to a decrease in policy output.
HC	Legitimacy crises have positive consequences on IOs' policy output. They lead to an increase in policy output.

Table 2: Summary of research hypotheses

3. Empirical data

To quantitatively analyze the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output, my research relied on primary data sources from previous studies. The data on legitimacy crises were sourced from Sommerer et al. (2022a), while the data on policy output were obtained from Lundgren et al. (2023).

Sommerer et al. (2022a) conducted an analysis of legitimacy crises in a sample of 32 IOs from 1985 to 2020. Following their conceptualization of legitimacy crises, consisting of five points, they precisely identify legitimacy crises and explore their various characteristics, such as the audience involved, normative depth, social breadth, and intensity. Conversely, Lundgren et al. (2023) introduced a new dataset named the "Intergovernmental Policy Output Dataset" (IPOD). This dataset, based on the framework developed by Tallberg et al. (2016), examines five dimensions of policy output (volume, topic, type, instrument, and target) across more than 37,000 individual policy acts from 13 IOs. The time span for the IPOD data is from 1980 to 2015, and all 13 IOs included in this dataset overlap with those present in Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) data.

The decision to reuse the primary data collected by Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Lundgren et al. (2023) is grounded in several considerations. First, the use of data collected by reputable scholars ensures a high level of quality and reliability. Second, leveraging data from recognized scholars adds credibility and relevance to the current study. Third, there is a need to extend the analysis beyond what Sommerer et al. (2022a) have already explored, and the IPOD presents an opportunity to dig deeper into the effects of legitimacy crises on IO output. Lastly, the novelty of the IPOD data, which has not been used in prior studies, adds to the significance of this research by demonstrating how it can be effectively employed as well as its relevance to the literature.

The upcoming section will be separated into two parts. The first one will focus on the legitimacy crisis data sourced from Sommerer et al. (2022a), while the second one will look into the IPOD introduced by Lundgren et al. (2023). In each section, the collection method will be expounded, accompanied by some descriptive statistics.

3.1 Data on legitimacy crises

Sommerer et al. (2022a) employed a method to analyze legitimacy crises based on publicly visible statements and actions of activists and politicians. They sourced this information from global mass media to create a quantitative measure that assesses social perceptions of rule without right from a broad spectrum of political actors and activists. Legitimacy crises, in their study, are operationalized as the peak of these publicly visible legitimacy challenges.

Abbreviation	Name	Region	Orientation
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union	Africa	General purpose
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	Asia Pacific	Task specific
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	Asia Pacific	General purpose
AU	African Union	Africa	General purpose
CAN	Andean Community	Americas	General purpose
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	Americas	General purpose
CoE	Council of Europe	Europe	Task specific
Commonwealth	Commonwealth of Nations	Global	General purpose
EU	European Union	Europe	General purpose
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	Global	Task specific
G20	Group of 20	Global	General purpose
ICC	International Criminal Court	Global	Task specific
ILO	International Labour Organization	Global	Task specific
IMF	International Monetary Fund	Global	Task specific
IWC	International Whaling Commission	Global	Task specific
NAFO	Northwest Atlantic Fishery Organization	Global	Task specific
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement	Americas	Task specific
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Europe	Task specific
NC	Nordic Council	Europe	General purpose
OAS	Organization of American States	Americas	General purpose
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	Global	General purpose
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation	Global	General purpose
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	Europe	Task specific
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum	Asia Pacific	General purpose
SADC	Southern African Development Community	Africa	General purpose
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	Asia Pacific	General purpose
UN	United Nations	Global	General purpose
UNESCO	UN Education, Scientific, & Cultural Organization	Global	Task specific
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	Global	Task specific
WB	World Bank	Global	Task specific
WHO	World Health Organization	Global	Task specific
WTO	World Trade Organization	Global	Task specific

Table 3 : Sample of 32 IOs (Sommerer et al., 2022a)

Sommerer et al. (2022a) constructed their sample by selecting 32 IOs (Table 3), which represents nearly 10 percent of all existing IOs. It includes 16 general-purpose IOs like the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), as well as 16 task-specific IOs such as the World Health Organization (WHO). The positioning of these IOs was also considered : 16 have a global membership and 16 have a regional one. In terms of timeline, the study covers the period from 1985 to 2020, starting approximately at the end of the Cold War and the beginning of widespread popular critiques against IOs (Braungart and Braungart, 1990; Holzapfel and Konig, 2001).

To gather information on public statements regarding IOs, Sommerer et al. (2022a) utilized a selection of leading global newswire data from the Lexis Uni database, including sources such as Agence France Presse (AFP), Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), the Russian News Agency (TASS), Japan Economic Newswire, PR newswire, the Associated Press, and the Associated Press International. The choice of these newswires aimed to provide less domestically focused coverage and better geographical representation. Two search strings were created for data collection. The first-string targeted elite critiques, using terms like "accuse" or "blame" along with the name of a specific IO. The second string aimed at identifying mass protests, employing terms such as "protest against" combined with the name of the IO. In total, the two search strings yielded 6000 articles. This dataset allowed the researchers to identify the normative depth (or intensity) and social breadth of legitimacy crises.

To further refine their distinction of audience type between elite critique and mass protest, Sommerer et al. (2022a) conducted manual coding of all collected newswires. This coding aimed to identify whether the challenges were posed by state, non-state, or IO agents. Additionally, they introduced another distinction to determine if the audience belonged to the constituent audience (subjected to the authority of the IO) or the non-constituent audience (not subjected to the authority of the IO). This distinction was also established through manual coding of the newswire content.

Using this data, Sommerer et al. (2022a) constructed an annual composite measure of legitimacy crises for IOs, incorporating various subgroups that distinguished challenges from elite actors or mass protests, state or non-state actors, and constituent or non-constituent

actors. These subgroups enabled the identification of the social breadth of legitimacy crises. To pinpoint the crisis years, they calculated the annual count of publicly visible challenges within each IO and determined the worst years from 1985 to 2020. These worst years had to meet the threshold of the top 25 percentile among the years that counted at least three challenges. Once the crisis years were identified, the authors assessed the audience that dominated these years. Domination by a particular audience required that this audience constituted more than 75 percent of the total number of challenges comprising the legitimacy crisis. Conversely, to be characterized as a mix of audiences, the smaller category had to represent at least 25 percent of all challenges.

While Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) methodology for constructing a composite measure of legitimacy crises is robust and systematic, it is not immune to potential criticisms and considerations. The reliance on quantifiable indicators, such as the count of publicly visible challenges, may oversimplify the intricate nature of legitimacy crises. These crises are often complex and multifaceted, and reducing them to quantitative metrics might overlook qualitative aspects or variations in the challenges faced by IOs. Moreover, the selection of thresholds, such as the top 25 percentile among years with at least three challenges, and the criteria for audience domination introduce subjective elements that could be subject to debate. For example, elite protests might be proportionally more reported in global newswires than public protests, which could bias the threshold. Additionally, the homogeneity assumption within identified crisis years may oversimplify the heterogeneous dynamics of legitimacy challenges. While these considerations do not necessarily invalidate the findings, they underscore the complexity of measuring and categorizing legitimacy crises. However, two case studies on the UNFCCC and the WTO corroborated the quantitative results, supporting its reliability.

The data collected by Sommerer et al. (2022a) provided interesting insights into the challenges faced by IOs. At a general level, the data did not support the existence of a systemic crisis in regional and global governance in the late 2010s, contrary to widespread assumptions (Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 60). After examining the results associated with each IO, different patterns emerged. Some IOs exhibited a leptokurtic challenge pattern with only one or two peaks (e.g., G20, ASEAN, UNFCCC, WHO), while others experienced more extended periods of high-level criticism (e.g., EU, UN, OSCE). The authors identified three

groups of IOs with varying degrees of challenges. The first group, comprising nine IOs (e.g., AMU, PIF, OECD), had few challenges and no legitimacy crises. The second group faced a moderate number of challenges (e.g., AU, ASEAN, UNESCO). The last group, consisting of eight IOs, was targeted very often, including the EU and NATO. However, patterns among IOs within the same group were not clearly discernible. Additionally, the data indicated that most challenges occurred around the turn of the millennium.

Concerning the audience challenging the IOs, Sommerer et al. (2022a) observed a balance between state and nonstate audiences, as well as constituent and non-constituent audiences at the sample level. However, the pattern changed over time. Around the turn of the millennium, nonstate actors had a more significant share, while today, representatives of member governments dominate by a large margin. The authors also identified different patterns when examining IOs one by one. They found two groups: one primarily challenged by state actors and the other by nonstate actors. A similar occurrence was observed between challenges from constituent and non-constituent audiences. Overall, their findings supported the idea of representing a plurality of audiences in their quantitative measure.

Moving on to the descriptive analysis of legitimacy crises, Sommerer et al. (2022a) detected 109 year-crises for 22 IOs of the sample, with a higher density of legitimacy crises between 1995 and 2005, and with some IOs, such as the EU and NATO, experiencing more than ten years of crises. More specifically, the data collected shows that among the crises observed, 43 are dominated by state actors, usually affecting the IOs dealing with human rights and security. Nonstate actors drive 26 crises, mainly concerning IOs dealing with development, trade, and finance. No particular category of actors dominates the last 40 cases of crisis. In opposition to the result on challenges, legitimacy crises are dominated by member states' audiences, 68 out of 109, and only 20 are dominated by external audiences, the rest being a mix of both. Interestingly, out of these 20 crises, 13 are observed for the EU, which counts a total of 15 years of crises, so almost all of the EU crises come from both member states and external observers. To sum up, the collection of data on legitimacy crises in global governance demonstrates legitimacy crises to be a recurrent phenomenon without a clear time trend and with a variety of types.

Intriguing, Sommerer et al. (2022a) did not delve much into the observation that legitimacy crises are often short-lived, typically lasting only a year. Unless the crisis naturally resolves itself, which seems unlikely, there must be changes occurring to shift the audience's perception from criticism to a positive view. This could suggest that IOs are successfully adapting, and the legitimacy crisis acts as a wake-up call. In contrast, when challenges are persistent, it may indicate that IOs struggle to change, and the crises may not serve as a wake-up call, on the opposite it may have a negative impact on the IO. This perspective aligns with Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) theory. IOs facing sporadic crises and fewer challenges are those with a high level of legitimacy before the crises, supporting my hypothesis that legitimacy crises have a positive effect in such cases. Conversely, IOs with regular challenges and more legitimacy crises tend to have a moderate level of legitimacy before the crises, indicating that in their situations, legitimacy crises are expected to have a negative impact. However, it's essential to acknowledge a potential limitation related to measurement in Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) methodology for quantitatively identifying legitimacy crises. Over time, the coverage of a particular legitimacy crisis might diminish, affecting the study's ability to accurately measure its duration and impact, and potentially influencing the observed short duration of crises.

In my research, I only used the data of the 13 IOs matching the IPOD (Table 4 below) with a duration reduced to the years in concordance between both studies (1985-2015). Within these 13 IOs, six of them, CAN, CARICOM, NC, PIC, SADC, and SCO, were little challenged and did not experience a legitimacy crisis. However, the remaining seven IOs, ASEAN, AU, COMW, EU, OAS, OIC, and the UN, sustained 36 crisis years. In this group of seven IOs, two IOs, EU and UN, are part of the broader group of eight IOs, which experienced a high level of criticism and numerous legitimacy crises. The other five IOs are part of the more moderate group, which went through legitimacy less challenges and crises. At the sample level, the number of year crises between the different categories of audiences is rather well distributed except for the nonstate actor dominance, where only the ASEAN experienced a crisis of this kind, and for the non-constituent actor dominance, which in my sample only contains four crisis years. Apart from that, all the other audience types experienced more than ten years crises from different IOs. Thus, the diversity of the sample should allow a comprehensive examination of the relationships between variables, reinforcing the study's validity.

IO	IO legitimacy crises	State actor dominance	Nonstate actor dominance	State and nonstate audiences	Constituent actor dominance	Nonconstituent actor dominance	Constituent state dominance	Constituent and nonconstituent audiences
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	3	0	1	2	0	2	0	1
African Union (AU)	4	0	0	4	3	0	0	1
Commonwealth of Nations (COMW)	4	2	0	2	2	0	0	2
European Union (EU)	10	1	0	9	0	2	0	8
Organization of American States (OAS)	4	3	0	1	4	0	3	0
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	0
United Nations (UN)	9	7	0	2	9	0	7	0
Total	36	13	1	22	20	4	10	12

Table 4: Distribution of legitimacy crises over IOs and audiences.

3.2 The IPOD

The IPOD dataset spans 13 IOs (Table 5) from 1985 to 2015, all of which are multi-issue-oriented, capable of formulating policies in at least three different substantive areas. Two main considerations guided the selection of these IOs. Firstly, the authors aimed for a diverse geographic representation, encompassing both global and regional multi-issue organizations from various parts of the world. Secondly, they sought to capture relevant subgroups within the larger population of multi-issue IOs concerning membership size and institutionalization. For example, the sample includes IOs with small, medium, and large memberships, aiming for a mean membership (23.7) close to that of multi-issue organizations in the COW-IGO dataset (24.2) (Pevehouse et al., 2020). Overall, Lundgren et al. (2023) sought to provide a representative picture of the broader population of multi-issue IOs, enhancing future analyses, working with the IPOD, reliability.

IO	Region	Years	Decision-making body	Primary policy formats
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)	Asia-Pacific	1980-2015	Ministerial meetings	Communiqués
Organization of African Unity/ African Union (AU)	Africa	1980-2015	Assembly of the African Union	Resolutions, Decisions, Declarations
Andean Community (CAN)	Americas	1980-2015	Commission	Decisions
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)	Americas	1980-2015	Ministerial councils	Communiqués, Declarations
Commonwealth of Nations (COMW)	Global	1980-2008	Heads of Government Meetings	Communiqués
European Union (EU)	Europe	1980-2015	Council of the European Union	Directives, Regulations, Decisions
Nordic Council (NC)	Europe	1980-2015	Council of Ministers	Proposals
Organization of American States (OAS)	Americas	1980-2015	General Assembly	Resolutions, Declarations
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)	Global	1980-2015	Ministerial councils	Resolutions
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	Asia-Pacific	1980-2015	Heads Of State and Government	Communiqués
South African Development Community (SADC)	Africa	1980-2015	Summit of Heads of States or Government	Communiqués, Déclarations
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)	Asia-Pacific	2002-2015	Council of Heads of State	Communiqués
United Nations (UN)	Global	1980-2015	Security Council	Resolutions. Presidential statements

Table 5: IPOD sample (Lundgren et al., 2023, p. 6)

To create the IPOD, which covers 13 IOs from 1985 to 2015, Lundgren et al. (2023) collected information on all policy acts adopted by the central decision-making body of each IO. To collect this policy output, they used two sources. First, in most cases, they used the available online archive of the IO, and second, when not available or incomplete, they used archival research and secondary sources to obtain physical copies of policy acts. Then, using a joint codebook, nine multilingual trained research assistants “hand-coded each act based on manual content analysis” (Lundgren et al., 2023, p. 8). In total, 36,987 acts were coded, and to ensure the reliability of the process, two tests were also carried out. Using the conceptualization of IO policy output of Tallberg et al. (2016), the dataset captures values on four dimensions of policy acts: topic, type, instrument, and target.

Policy topic “captures the thematic orientation of an act” (Lundgren et al., 2023, p. 9). In the dataset, 16 specific topics are distinguished. Among them, four are highly relevant for my topic: IO governance, economic development, law and crime, and governance. Economic development and law and crime are interesting in this study. According to Agné and Söderbaum (2022), a legitimacy that leads to a higher level of effectiveness should be perceived by its ability to deal with more complex issues such as economic development. Conversely, IO capacity to deal with a simpler issue such as law and crime should not evolve. Thus, in this case, in my research I should observe an increase in policy output dealing with economic development while law and crime policy output should remain stable. The other two orientations are equally noteworthy, as any increase in their numbers might indicate that

the IO going through the crisis is trying to address the challenges by changing its way of functioning so that it is not exercising its authority inappropriately anymore. Thus, this echoes some parts of the literature, such as those who suggested that legitimacy challenges can pressure IOs to evolve in order to be more transparent and inclusive (Curtin and Mejer, 2006; Wille, 2010; Tallberg et al., 2013; Zurn, 2014, 2018) or those who suggested that it pressures IOs to change voting procedures (O'Brian et al., 2000; Wendt, 2001; Steffek and Nanz, 2008; Stephen, 2018; Lenz and Viola, 2017).

The IPOD classifies policy types based on the function of an act, differentiating between five types: regulatory, distributive, declarative, constitutional, and administrative. In the analysis, I will pay particular attention to declarative, constitutional, and administrative acts. Declarative policies are of particular interest because they can be symbolic and might not significantly contribute to the problem-solving effectiveness of the IO. This focused examination allows for a more nuanced assessment of the quality of an IO's performance, going beyond a simple quantitative count of acts.

The policy instrument dimension in the IPOD delves into whether a decision establishes legal obligations for the signatories, essentially discerning the binding or non-binding nature of a policy act. This dimension is pivotal as it enables me to estimate the legal impact of adopted policies, offering insights into the quality of IO performance. If a legitimacy crisis stimulates an increase in binding decisions, it would probably signify an enhancement in IO performance.

The final dimension, policy target, encompasses "the entity whose behavior or action the policy is intended to influence or address" (Lundgren et al., 2023, p. 11). The IPOD classifies policies into six target groups: IO, member states, selected member state(s), non-member states, other IOs, and private actors. This dimension holds significance for two key reasons. Firstly, like governance-oriented policies and administrative and constitutional acts, a surge in policies targeting the IO prompted by a legitimacy crisis could signify efforts toward re-legitimization. More importantly, by cross-referencing this with Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) data, I can explore potential correlations between the audience dominating the crisis and the target entities of IO policies. For instance, examining whether a legitimacy crisis

fueled by non-constituent actors leads to an uptick in IO policies targeting non-member states, other IOs, or private actors would be intriguing.

After collecting and coding the data, Lundgren et al. (2023) aggregated it at the act-level, as well as at the year and IO levels. The analysis revealed descriptive patterns that shed light on the general trends in IOs' policy output. Notably, they observed an uneven distribution of policy acts among different IOs. While the EU stands out as the most prolific in terms of decision-making, the OAS, OIC, and UN also exhibit high levels of activity. Significantly, these four IOs, as mentioned earlier, are part of the group in my sample that experienced a legitimacy crisis. Examining the temporal dimension, the distribution of intergovernmental policy acts appears asymmetrical. Some IOs consistently show growth, others display a mix of growth, stagnation, or decline in different periods, and a final group maintains a relatively stable output. Despite these variations, the long-term trend suggests an overall upswing in policy output across IOs.

Policy topic acts exhibit a generally well-distributed pattern within IOs, although there are instances where specific topics dominate a significant portion of an IO's agenda. Despite this overall distribution, a few discernible patterns emerged. IO governance output, along with security and defense acts, demonstrated an increasing trend over time. This observation led Lundgren et al. (2023) to posit that as IOs become more focused on their administration, they concurrently become more active and extend their coverage across a broader array of issues.

In the policy type category, the data indicates a prevalence of regulatory acts (primarily influenced by the EU). Declaratory acts follow suit, while distributive and constitutional policy types maintain a consistently low and stable level. Notably, over time, there is a discernible decline in the proportion of regulatory acts, accompanied by a corresponding increase in declarative acts. This shift suggests a trend toward the utilization of soft law mechanisms.

The policy instrument categories affirm this trajectory. The data delineates two groups of IOs: one employing both binding and non-binding policies and another exclusively relying on one type. Within the group utilizing both types, a discernible shift emerges over

time, gravitating towards a higher prevalence of non-binding acts. This aligns seamlessly with the observed increase in declaratory acts and the simultaneous decline in regulatory acts.

Ultimately, the policy targets reveal a prevailing emphasis on policies directed at member states (the most prominent) and the IOs themselves (the second most significant). IOs rarely target non-state actors. The trend over time indicates a shift towards an increased focus on policies directed at IOs themselves and specific member states.

Hence, the IPOD presents an intriguing avenue for examining the repercussions of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output. Encompassing the most substantial aspect of policy output and holding a central position in contemporary discourse, it provides a comprehensive, comparable, and nuanced depiction of IO policy output. For Lundgren et al., the IPOD also serves as a distinctive resource for investigating questions surrounding the legitimacy of IOs. To scrutinize such inquiries, I propose to aggregate the observations from the IPOD with the data gathered from Sommerer et al. (2022a) on legitimacy crises. I believe that both datasets offer a high degree of precision for independent (legitimacy crises) and dependent (policy output) variables (for an overview of the variables, see Table 6 below). Consequently, the integration and contextual analysis of these datasets should yield interesting and precise insights into the relationship between them, shedding light on the impact of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output and more broadly on legitimacy consequences on IOs.

For my research work, in order to be able to apply the quantitative methods I present in the following paragraph, the data from the IPOD which is combined with information on legitimacy crises from the same 13 IOs covered in Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) study. Additionally, data on conditioning variables, such as pooling, delegation, scope, transnational access, democratic membership, and public visibility, present in Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) data, will be included. These variables are sourced from different datasets. Pooling and delegation data come from the MIA dataset (Hooghe et al., 2017), formal access to IOs is obtained from the TRANSACCESS dataset (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017), scope of IOs' mandate is taken from the MIA dataset (Hooghe et al., 2019). To measure the overall visibility of IOs, Sommerer et al. (2022a) use their findings and create an indicator based on

the same newswire data used to indicate public challenges. Finally, the proportion of democracies among the member states of an IO is extracted from Tallberg et al.'s (2016) paper.

Dependent variables - IOs' policy output		Independent variables - Legitimacy crises	
Policy volume	Number of decisions	Legitimacy crisis	All crisis year
Policy topic	IO governance	Legitimacy crisis with specific audience	State actor dominance
	Economic development		Nonstate actor dominance
	Health and Social affairs		Constituent actor dominance
	Human rights	Legitimacy crisis with social breath	Nonconstituent actor dominance
	Culture and education		Member state government dominance
	Labor and employment		Elite critique and mass protest
	Law and crime	Conditioning variables	Heterogeneity state and nonstate actors
	Governance		Heterogeneity constituent and nonconstituent actors
	Environment and natural resource management		Heterogeneity state and nonstate, const. and nonconst. actors
	Agriculture, fisheries and commodities		
	Energy and transport		
	Science and technology		
	Trade, economic integration, and industry		
	Finance and monetary policy		
	Security and defense		
International affairs			
Policy type	Regulatory	Pooling	
	Distributive	Delegation	
	Declarative	Transnational access	
	Constitutional	Visibility in mass media	
Policy instrument	Administrative	Policy scope	
	Binding	Democratic membership	
Policy target	Non-binding		
	IO		
	Member state(s), selected		
	Member states		
	Other state(s)		
	Other IO(s)		
	Private actor(s)		

Table 6: Summary of variables

4. Quantitative methods

Utilizing data from both the IPOD (Lundgren et al., 2023) and Sommerer et al. (2022a), I have compiled a comprehensive dataset consisting of 387 observations across 13 entities (IOs) over the period from 1985 to 2015, essentially forming a panel data. Panel data presents unique challenges compared to other data types, such as cross-sections, but it also holds the potential to disclose dynamic processes and individual variations, yielding reliable results with proper model specification and adherence to assumptions. To tackle the complexity of the data and aiming for robust and dependable outcomes, I have employed a four-layered analytical approach. This method gradually goes deeper into the analysis, offering complementary insights. I believe this multi-layered analysis is crucial as it enables a more precise examination, providing a comprehensive understanding of the phenomena under investigation.

The initial layer of analysis involves visual inspection. Using Microsoft Excel, I have plotted each dependent variable, representing the five dimensions of policy output, from 1985 to 2015. With vertical lines, I have marked the years of legitimacy crises, showcasing only the first and last crises in instances of multiple crises. This layer is designed to illustrate the trajectory of each dependent variable and explore whether any discernible impact of legitimacy crises on these trends can be observed in relation to policy outputs.

The second layer of analysis relies on t-tests where each t-test is a statistical tool used to compare the means of two groups and to indicate whether these two groups are significantly different. In this phase, I conducted separate t-tests for each dependent variable in the study, comparing the means of years with and without legitimacy crises. Considering the variations in decision-making among different IOs, I opted to conduct the test individually for each IO that experienced a legitimacy crisis (ASEAN, AU, EU, OAS, OIC, and UN) to enhance the test's reliability. For improved clarity and ease of interpretation, the results are presented in a table within the Results section (5.2) and in a more detailed format in Appendix 6. The t-test adds depth to the analysis by indicating whether a significant difference exists between the means of the crisis and non-crisis groups, providing their respective means. This statistical tool helps identify the IOs and dependent variables for which legitimacy crises have consequential effects as well as the direction of these effects.

The third layer of analysis consists of a cross-sectional analysis. For the seven IOs experiencing a legitimacy crisis (ASEAN, AU, EU, OAS, OIC, and UN), I conducted a cross-sectional analysis by calculating the mean of their conditioning variables (pooling, delegation, scope, transnational access, democratic membership, and public visibility) and the difference between crisis and non-crisis periods for each dimension of IOs' policy output. With this data, I performed a bivariate cross-section analysis for each combination of policy output means difference with conditioning variables means. To enhance the quality of this cross-sectional analysis, the difference in the dependent variable was calculated as a percentage, resulting in a distribution closer to a normal distribution. After completing the various calculations, I created plots for each dependent variable against each conditioning variable and added their regression line. The resulting direction of the relationship (positive or negative) was documented in a table. This part of the analysis aims to provide an initial understanding of the association between the conditioning and dependent variables (policy output dimensions). However, due to the limited number of observations (only seven), the results must be interpreted cautiously and cannot be considered highly reliable.

Finally, the last layer of analysis involves a multiple regression analysis. Given that multiple regression analysis on panel data can be challenging and needs to meet specific assumptions, I opted to use a multiple regression model similar to that employed by Sommerer et al. (2022a) in their analysis of similar data. I chose this method as they likely considered it the most suitable for their quantitative research, adding credibility to my approach by following in their footsteps. Although my methods differ slightly due to variations in the dependent variable data, I utilized a generalized linear model with a Poisson link, which is well-suited for count data like mine. While checking for the normal distribution of variables, which would have allowed for a more straightforward linear regression, this condition was not met. Similarly to Sommerer et al. (2022a), alongside the conditioning variables, dummies, year dummies, and a time trend were included in the model to account for the idiosyncratic effect of a particular organizational or temporal effect. I also applied a robust cluster function to the model to address potential issues related to correlated observations within groups or clusters, mirroring Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) approach once again. The specific models are represented as follow in R Studio:

'glm (Y ~ X + pooling + delegation + transnational access + visibility in mass media + democratic membership + policy scope+ id_* + year_* + time, family = poisson(), data = data)'

Where:

- 'Y' represents the dependent variables (policy output).
- 'X' represents the independent variables (legitimacy crises).
- 'pooling', 'delegation', 'transnational_access', 'visibility_in_mass_media', 'democratic_membership', and 'policy_scope' are control variables.
- 'id_*' represents dummy variables.
- 'year_*' represents year dummies.
- 'time' represents the time trend.

Given that the literature did not identify a specific timing for the anticipated effects of legitimacy crises (Agné and Söderbaum, 2022, p. 3; Gilley, 2009; Sommerer et al., 2022a, p. 133), various models for each dependent variable, incorporating time lags ranging from one to a maximum of four years, were employed. Before presenting the results in the following section (5.4), a few generalized linear models of my analysis will be displayed, and, to illustrate the relevance and fit of the model to the data, a plot showing the predicted values against the observed values of the first model will also be included.

In addition, to test Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) hypothesis that legitimacy crises only lead to an increase in effectiveness and, consequently, policy output, especially regarding complex issues like economic development, I performed the multiple regression analysis a second time. In this iteration, I excluded legitimacy crises from the sample where, in the year preceding a given IO's crisis, there was a certain level of contestation. Using Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) data, I had access to the number of contestations for each IO and each year. I calculated the scale of contestation for each IO and set a threshold of 25%. Legitimacy crises were removed from the sample if the number of contestations exceeded 25% on the IO scale of contestation in the year before the crisis.

Layer of Analysis	Method Used	Description
1. Visual Inspection	Microsoft Excel (Plots)	Examined trajectory of each dependent variable (policy output dimensions) from 1985 to 2015; identification of legitimacy crises marked with vertical lines; exploration of discernible impacts of legitimacy crises on trends in policy outputs.
2. T-test	Statistical Analysis	Comparison of means for years with and without legitimacy crises for each dependent variable; individual t-tests for each IO (ASEAN, AU, EU, OAS, OIC, UN) to assess variations in decision-making.
3. Cross-Sectional	Mean Calculation, Regression	Mean calculation of conditioning variables during crisis and non-crisis periods for seven IOs; calculation of percentage differences in dependent variables for enhanced normal distribution; plots with regression lines showing associations between conditioning and dependent variables.
4. Regression	Generalized Linear Model	Use of a Poisson link for count data in a multiple regression model; inclusion of conditioning variables, dummies, year dummies, and a time trend; robust cluster function applied to account for correlated observations within groups; exploration of time lags ranging from one to four years for each dependent variable.
4.1 Regression	Exclusion of Contestation	Second iteration of multiple regression analysis excluding legitimacy crises with >25% contestation in the year before the crisis; testing Agné and Söderbaum's hypothesis on the increase in effectiveness and policy output without contestation-driven crises.

Table 7: Summary of quantitative methods

I believe that with these specifications, the model meets the assumptions and serves as a powerful tool for analyzing data, producing robust results, and thereby concluding the research in alignment with the earlier methods employed, addressing the various hypotheses formulated. Additionally, for transparency and replicability, the appendix (no. 1) includes a link leading to an open Google Drive. Within this drive, the dataset and the R Studio code used for the regression analysis, cross-section, and t-test can be found.

5. Results

5.1 Visual analysis

A few notes before delving into the graphical representation of trends in IOs' policy output and the observable impacts of legitimacy crises. First, the vertical lines depict a legitimacy crisis. If there are more than two legitimacy crises, the first line represents the initial crisis, and the second indicates the latest crisis in the time trend of the analysis. Second, I could not plot the policy output trend for COMW due to several missing values. Third, although ASEAN did experience legitimacy crises in 1994 and 1999, they were not included in the graph for relevance reasons. Lastly, only the most relevant graphs for the analysis are displayed here; all others can be found in the appendix (No. 1 to 5).

5.1.1 Policy volume




Figure 3: EU's policy volume and legitimacy crises




Figure 4: OAS's policy volume and legitimacy crises

Examining the visual analysis of the EU's policy volume trend and legitimacy crisis (Figure 3), we observe no change in trend following the first legitimacy crisis. However, after the last crisis, the curve experienced an upward trajectory. Turning our attention to the case of the OAS (Figure 4), the initial crisis was followed by a decline, while an increase followed the most recent crisis. Similar patterns, or lack thereof, are observed in the remaining plots. In certain instances, a legitimacy crisis demonstrates no discernible impact on the policy volume of IOs. In other scenarios, such a crisis may result in either a decrease or an increase. Furthermore, some IOs may undergo both shifts.

In an effort to enhance clarity, I introduced a method to quantify both upward and downward shifts, as well as instances with no observable effect. Changes were categorized into two groups: those within a 10% margin (considered normal) and those exceeding 10% (deemed significant). Additionally, I applied distinct time frames to assess their impact—short-term (observable within one year), medium-term (observable within three years), and long-term (visible within six years). In total, I identified nine instances of upward shifts, seven cases of downward shifts, and six cases of no effect (see Table 7 below). Among these, four were significant upward changes compared to three significant downward shifts. Furthermore, three long-term upward shifts were observed versus two downward shifts, two

medium-term upward shifts against three downward shifts, and four short-term upward shifts compared to two downward shifts.

Overall, from the interpretation of these graphs, legitimacy crises can result in all three outcomes: an increase, a decrease, and no change in the number of decisions an IO makes each year. However, there are more instances of change either upwards or downwards than instances of no change, with a slightly higher likelihood of leading to an increase.

Change direction/change interval	Short-term	Medium-term	Long-term
Significant decrease	None	EU/OIC	OIC
Decrease	OAS/OIC	UN	OAS
No effect	AU/EU/UN	EU/OAS/UN	EU
Increase	EU/OAS/OIC	OAS	EU
Significant increase	AU	AU	AU/UN

Table 7: Summary visual change of policy volume.

5.1.2 Policy topics




Figure 5: AU's policy topics and legitimacy crises




Figure 6: UN's policy topics and legitimacy crises

This section of visual analysis focuses on trends related to four policy topics: IO governance, economic development, law and crime, and governance. To facilitate interpretation, the other 12 topics are excluded from the graphs. Thus, I observe trends without the constraint of a zero-sum game, where an increase in one topic would result in a decrease in another. The graphs do not reveal a consistent pattern across IOs. For instance, a legitimacy crisis for one IO might lead to a decrease in a specific topic, while for another IO, it could result in an increase. For example, the number of policies related to IO governance increased after the last legitimacy crisis of the AU (Figure 5), but in the first and preceding legitimacy crisis of the UN (Figure 6), it decreased. At the unit level, no specific pattern emerges, as the topics affected often vary from one crisis to another. While precise patterns are challenging to identify, the plots demonstrate that legitimacy crises do influence these topics. Further analysis, possibly examining specific crisis characteristics, would be needed to uncover any discernible patterns, if they exist.

5.1.3 Policy types




Figure 7: EU's policy types and legitimacy crises

In this set of plots, all the various policy types are presented. Surprisingly, the curves closely resemble the trend observed for policy volume, indicating a high degree of collinearity (evident in, for example, Figure 7 when compared to Figure 3). Moreover, the curves for the other dimensions of policy types within an IO also exhibit similarity, making it challenging to identify specific patterns. Since the trends mirror those of policy volume, the changes are likewise similar, with some resulting in an increase and others in a decrease, albeit with a slightly higher frequency of increases. It would have been intriguing to observe a scenario where, after a crisis, one curve decreased while others increased. However, such a phenomenon is not evident in the graphs.

5.1.4 Policy instrument




Figure 8: OAS's policy instrument and legitimacy crises



Figure 9: UN's policy instrument and legitimacy crises

In the plots depicting the trends related to the number of binding or nonbinding policies are depicted two noteworthy instances are observed. In the most recent crises for the OAS (Figure 8) and the UN (Figure 9), there is a noticeable decrease in binding decisions and a simultaneous increase in non-binding decisions following a legitimacy crisis. In accordance with my theoretical framework, these two occurrences indicate a reduction in the effectiveness of the respective IOs.

5.1.5 Policy target




Figure 10: OAS's policy target and legitimacy crises




Figure 11: OIC’s policy target and legitimacy crises




Figure 12: UN’s policy target and legitimacy crises

In this section highlighting trends in policy targets, three IOs deserve attention: the first legitimacy crisis of the OIC (Figure 11) and the latest legitimacy crises of the OAS (Figure 10) and the UN (Figure 12). In these instances, following a legitimacy crisis, policies

targeting the IO itself decreased, while policies directed at member states witnessed an increase. This upward trend likely signifies IOs' efforts to regain legitimacy. However, it would be intriguing to investigate whether member states also played a dominant role in the legitimacy crises leading to this phenomenon.

In summary, the graphs reveal several patterns. Firstly, they indicate that legitimacy crises influence IO policy volume in both upward and downward directions, with slightly more pronounced and frequent increases. Secondly, subtle changes were observed in policy instruments and policy targets. However, this analysis serves as an initial exploration, primarily aimed at determining whether legitimacy crises indeed have consequences on various dimensions of policy output, which it successfully demonstrated. Consequently, it prompts further analysis to offer a more detailed description of these phenomena and, if feasible, provide explanations.

5.2 T-tests

		ASEAN		AU		COMW		EU		OAS		OIC		UN	
		P-Value	Direction	P-Value	Direction	P-value	Direction	P-value	Direction	P-value	Direction	P-value	Direction	P-value	Direction
Policy volume	Number of decisions	0.003***	-	0.83	-	0.28	-	0.001***	-	0.586	+	0.015**	+	0.912	+
Policy topic	IO governance	0.004***	-	0.58	-	0.908	-	0.114	+	0.38	+	0.483	-	0.826	+
	Economic development	0.009***	-	0.262	-	0.499	-	0.043**	+	0.792	-	0.117	+	0.951	-
	Law and crime	0.444	-	0.736	+	0.127	-	0.001***	+	0.971	-	0.001***	+	0.374	+
	Governance	0.247	-	0.809	+	0.3	+	0.001***	+	0.843	+	0.954	+	0.688	+
	Energy and transport	0.012**	-	0.949	+	0.725	+	0.4156	+	1	+	0.001***	+	0.046**	-
	Trade, eco. integration, and industry	0.04**	-	0.021**	-	0.147	+	0.007***	-	0.172	+	0.06*	+	0.77	-
Policy type	Regulatory	0.166	-	0.08*	-	0.528	-	0.004***	-	0.838	+	0.106	-	0.938	+
	Distributive	0.04**	-	0.63	+	0.76	-	0.001***	-	0.918	-	0.581	+	0.465	-
	Declarative	0.002***	-	0.503	+	0.154	-	0.278	+	0.827	+	0.263	+	0.694	+
	Constitutional	0.958	+	0.474	-	0.581	+	0.231	+	0.688	+	0.702	+	0.18	-
	Administrative	0.006***	-	0.926	+	0.607	+	0.114	+	0.937	-	0.145	+	0.92	-
Policy instrumen	Binding	0.315	-	NA	NA	0.55	+	0.001***	-	0.055*	+	NA	NA	0.983	+
	Non-binding	0.003***	-	0.83	-	0.126	-	0.771	+	0.539	-	0.015**	+	0.857	+
Policy target	IO	0.242	-	0.651	-	0.881	+	0.08*	+	0.423	+	0.656	+	0.957	+
	Member state(s), selected	0.003***	-	0.993	+	0.453	-	0.001***	-	0.898	-	0.112	+	0.72	+
	Member states	0.008***	-	0.176	-	0.447	-	0.544	-	0.885	+	0.636	+	0.96	-
	Other state(s)	0.001***	-	0.728	+	0.51	-	NA	NA	0.344	-	0.206	+	0.668	+
	Other IO(s)	0.11	-	0.336	+	0.358	-	0.331	-	0.083*	-	0.468	+	0.266	+
	Private actor(s)	NA	NA	0.38	+	NA	NA	0.163	-	0.491	+	0.593	+	0.317	-

Note: The results are obtained from R Studio. A '+' sign means the mean of the crisis group is higher than the non-crisis group, whereas a '-' means the opposite. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table 8: Summary t-test results

In Table 8 above, I present the results of the conducted t-test. Bold highlights indicate p-values below 0.1, indicating a significant difference between the mean values of the crises and non-crises groups. For each IO, in the second column, labeled "Direction," a '+' sign denotes that the mean of the crisis group is higher than that of the non-crisis group, while a

'-' sign indicates the opposite. The decision to employ this technique, along with the exclusion of 10 topics from the table, was driven by considerations of space and readability. For a more detailed table, please refer to the Appendix no. 6.

The outcomes of the t-test reveal intriguing insights. Primarily, legitimacy crises do not uniformly influence the policy output of the IOs in the sample. Notably, ASEAN, EU, and OIC are the main IOs for which legitimacy crises exhibit an important impact, and the nature of this impact varies among them. For ASEAN, legitimacy crises consistently result in negative implications across the affected dimensions of policy output. The EU, on the other hand, shows mixed results, with both negative and positive consequences observed. In contrast, for the OIC, almost each dimension of policy output affected by legitimacy crises yields positive outcomes. Notably, legitimacy crises had a minimal impact on UN policy output despite the UN experiencing a substantial number of legitimacy crises, as reported by Sommerer et al. (2022a), and the visual analysis indicating changes in the trend of different categories of UN policy output after a legitimacy crisis (Figure 6, 7, 9, and 12). Only one category of policy topic (energy and transport) of the UN was affected by legitimacy crises. Similarly, for the AU, only the trade and economic integration industry policy topic was impacted by legitimacy crises. Still at the IO level, legitimacy crises did not significantly influence the COMW policy output. In the case of the OAS, only four subcategories of policy output were affected. These findings suggest a dichotomy; either legitimacy crises affect all dimensions of policy output or they do not, aligning with the observed visual trends indicating collinearity.

Following the visual analysis, the t-test provides statistical confirmation of the impact of legitimacy crises on IO policy output. However, while revealing intriguing insights at the IO level, the t-test fails to elucidate specific patterns for particular policy output dimensions across IOs. It becomes evident that the same dimension can experience both positive and negative effects of legitimacy crises across different IOs. Rather than indicating a clear direction of consequences on policy output dimensions, the t-test suggests that the nature of these consequences appears to cluster at the level of individual IO. Furthermore, the observation that legitimacy crises had a negative impact on the policy output of ASEAN seems to contradict one of my hypotheses drawn from Agné and Soderbaum (2022). Specifically, the expectation that a legitimacy crisis should positively influence the

effectiveness and policy output of IOs when, before the crises, the IO in question had a high level of legitimacy (H4). In the case of ASEAN, examining Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) data reveals that the IO was scarcely contested before the crises. In this case, one deduction could be that ASEAN enjoyed a relatively high level of legitimacy prior to the crises, yet it experienced a negative impact.

5.3 Cross-section analysis

Conditioning variables	Policy volume	Policy orientation (topic)			Policy type						Policy instrument		Policy target				
	Number of decisions	IO governance	Economic development	Law and crime	Governance	Regulatory	Distributive	Declarative	Constitutional	Administrative	Binding	Non-binding	Member state selected	Member states	Other state(s)	Other IO(s)	Private actor(s)
Pooling	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Delegation	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TNA access	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-
Mediarefs	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-
Democratic membership	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Policy scope	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 9: Cross-section analysis results

Table 9 above summarizes the cross-section analysis results, providing an initial overview of how conditioning variables impact various categories of policy output (examples of plots obtained for binding and non-binding decisions can be found in appendix no. 7). A "+" sign in the table denotes a positive relation, while a "-" symbol indicates a negative one. It's important to note that the cross-section analyses do not determine whether the relations are statistically significant, due to the very limited number of observations (7), which restricts the robustness of the findings. Nevertheless, examining the table yields some interesting insights. When considering different measurements of IO policy output, I observe that the direction of the relation varies among measures. Even within specific categories of policy output, the direction of the relation can change. I also notice that within a particular policy output measurement, the direction of the relation is generally consistent across the six conditioning variables. Most often, only one or two conditioning variable relations differ from the others within the exact dimension of policy output. Turning attention to the conditioning variables, no specific pattern emerges across the dimensions of policy output. It is notable that certain conditioning variables more frequently indicate a different direction than others for a particular dimension of policy output, such as pooling. This may suggest that pooling significantly influences policy output more than other conditioning variables.

Contrary to the expectations set by the theoretical framework and hypothesis 2, the cross-section analysis indicates that conditioning variables, especially the scope variable, were not consistently associated with a positive impact on various dimensions of policy output. Instead, the analysis suggests that the effect of conditioning variables can vary depending on the specific policy output dimension in question. It's crucial to note that the test does not provide information about the statistical significance of these relations, preventing definitive conclusions. As a result, no firm assertions can be made based on the current findings. Further investigation and statistical testing would be necessary to confirm and better understand the observed patterns.

5.4 Multivariate analysis

5.4.1 Model presentation and robustness check

	Dependent Variables					
	Policy volume	IO governance	Regulatory	Clustered models		
	<i>Poisson</i>	<i>Poisson</i>	<i>Poisson</i>	<i>coefficient</i>	<i>test</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All legitimacy crises	-0.081*** (0.024)	-0.071 (0.058)	-0.097** (0.040)	-0.081 (0.070)	-0.071 (0.070)	-0.097 (0.070)
Pooling	0.516** (0.208)	-1.258*** (0.476)	1.618*** (0.426)	0.516 (0.634)	-1.258** (0.634)	1.618** (0.634)
Delegation	0.530** (0.239)	-0.470 (0.452)	-0.064 (0.776)	0.530 (0.692)	-0.470 (0.692)	-0.064 (0.692)
Transnational access	0.142* (0.084)	0.636*** (0.172)	0.068 (0.167)	0.142 (0.280)	0.636** (0.280)	0.068 (0.280)
Visibility in mass media	0.00000* (0.00000)	0.00003*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00003*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)
Democratic membership	3.124*** (0.193)	1.038** (0.413)	3.842*** (0.482)	3.124*** (0.626)	1.038* (0.626)	3.842*** (0.626)
Policy scope	-0.042*** (0.005)	0.046*** (0.011)	-0.115*** (0.012)	-0.042*** (0.014)	0.046*** (0.014)	-0.115*** (0.014)
Constant	2.582*** (0.206)	0.557 (0.441)	1.837*** (0.446)	2.582*** (0.644)	0.557 (0.644)	1.837*** (0.644)
Observations	284	284	284			
Log Likelihood	-1,773.762	-998.073	-932.559			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,637.523	2,086.146	1,955.119			

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 10: Example of regression results

Table 10 above displays three models (1, 2, and 3) and their corresponding clustered forms (4, 5, and 6) derived from my study, following the model specifications outlined in Part 4. Utilizing Stargazer in R Studio, this presentation offers a glance at my regression analysis. Each of these models shares the same independent variable, 'all legitimacy crises,' along with consistent control variables. For visual simplicity, unit and year dummies, as well as the time trend, are omitted. The dependent variables, however, vary among the models. The first model pertains to policy volume, the second focuses on the IO governance policy topic, and the third centers on the regulatory policy type. These models represent a series of analyses conducted for every combination of dependent (policy output) and independent (legitimacy crises) variables. In each instance, the first value corresponding to the interaction of these variables is extracted and organized into tables.

Table 10 shows that the model yields high AIC values and low Log Likelihood, suggesting a potential imbalance between goodness of fit and complexity. However, this observation can be influenced by the numerous parameters introduced by the inclusion of unit, year dummies, and a time trend. To assess the model's fit, the observed values of the first model, using the policy volume as dependent variable, were plotted against its predicted values (Figure 13). The distribution of points around the line reveals that predicted values closely align with observed values, suggesting a well-fitted model. This indicates that the model effectively captures the relationship between the predictor variable and the response. The uneven distribution of points across the plot is likely attributed to the nature of the 'policy volume' variable. The investigation through a histogram of this variable (Appendix no. 8) reveals that the range where points are absent corresponds to the range in the histogram where values are absent.




Figure 13: Predicted vs observed values of legitimacy crises impact on policy volume.

The following sections present the results of the multiple regression analysis in tables. To enhance clarity and conserve space, only the estimated coefficients and symbols denoting the relationships' significance level are shown. In addition, the models did not generate results for the legitimacy crisis variable about "elite critique and mass protest" due to the sample's limited instances of legitimacy crises within this distinct social context (only one). Similarly, results for constitutional policy type and private actor policy target were unattainable due to insufficient observations, rendering the model inoperable for these dimensions.

5.4.2 Policy volume

5.4.2.1 All level of contests before the crisis included.

Policy volume		Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4
Legitimacy crisis	All crisis year	-0.005	-0.108	-0.073	-0.117*
Legitimacy crisis with specific audience	State actor dominance	0.093	-0.083	-0.036	-0.045
	Nonstate actor dominance	-0.493	0.562	-0.153	-0.858**
	Constituent actor dominance	0.282**	0.067	0.12	0.152
	Nonconstituent actor dominance	0.013	0.223	0.077	-0.008
	Member state government dominance	0.088	-0.069	0.037	0.042
Legitimacy crisis with social breath	Elite critique and mass protest				
	Heterogeneity state and nonstate actors	-0.086	0.247*	0.102	0.145
	Heterogeneity constituent and nonconstituent actors	-0.15	0.134	-0.173	-0.087
Legitimacy crisisxIO characteristics	Heterogeneity state and nonstate, const. and nonconst. actors	-0.184	0.268	-0.082	0.06
	Pooling	0.516	0.172	0.278	0.94**
	Delegation	-0.385	-0.079	-0.116	0.063
	TNA access	-0.182	0.01	-0.049	0.19
	Media coverage	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	Policy scope	-0.014*	-0.001	-0.114	0.025
	Democratic membership	-0.301	-0.145	-0.002	-0.001
IO characteristics (Control variables)	Pooling	1.162*	1.184**	1.614***	1.593***
	Delegation	-0.299	0.117	0.758	0.462
	TNA access	0.082	0.22	0.205	0.16
	Media coverage	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	Policy scope	-0.016	-0.014	-0.017	2.133***
	Democratic membership	3.094***	2.568***	2.165***	-0.001

Note: The results are based on a generalized linear model with a poisson link using R Studio. The model includes unit and year dummies along with a time trend. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: Legitimacy crises impact on policy volume.

Table 11 above informs us regarding the relationship of the different variables of the models, the various kinds of legitimacy crises, and the conditioning variables, with the total number of decisions IOs took for each year, simply the policy volume dimension in the policy output framework I employ. Findings include positive and significant impacts of legitimacy crises with constituent actor dominance and heterogeneity of state and non-state actors, within the first two years following a crisis (time lags 1 and 2). On the contrary, going against the expectations (H2) policy scope exhibits a negative effect in the first-time lag. Examining the results four years post-crisis, legitimacy crises taken all together and those dominated by non-state actors, negatively affect the policy volume of IOs. Simultaneously, a higher level of pooling has a positive impact on the IO policy volume.

The results for the policy volume dimension are limited and varied, making it challenging to affirm or contradict my expectations. Before delving into other dimensions of policy output to potentially uncover more actionable results, I conducted a similar analysis, considering legitimacy crises in which IOs experienced a low level of contestation

beforehand, as outlined in the methods section, to test Agné and Soderbaum's (2022) hypotheses (H4).

5.4.2.2 With low level of contests before the crises

Policy volume, only with low level of contest before the crises		Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4
Legitimacy crisis	All crisis year	0.074	-0.117	-0.099	-0.319*
	State actor dominance	0.096	0.22	0.42	0.075
	Nonstate actor dominance	-0.505	0.614	0.971***	-2.962***
Legitimacy crisis with specific audience	Constituent actor dominance	0.637	0.396	0.561	0.428
	Nonconstituent actor dominance	-0.607**		-2.599***	-1.195***
	Member state government dominance	0.075	0.245	0.437*	0.057
	Elite critique and mass protest				
Legitimacy crisis with social breadth	Heterogeneity state and nonstate actors	0.869**	0.52	0.194	0.635*
	Heterogeneity constituent and nonconstituent actors	-0.217	-0.033	-0.698	
	Heterogeneity state and nonstate, const. and nonconst. actors		0.437*	-0.042	0.068
	Pooling	1.399	3.084**	1.996	3.318***
Legitimacy crisisxIO characteristics	Delegation	-0.587	0.461	-0.665	0.063
	TNA access	-0.004	0.322	0.114	0.542
	Media coverage	-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001
	Policy scope	-0.071	-0.013	-0.019	0.208
	Democratic membership	-0.203	-0.24	-0.065	-0.044
	Pooling	0.643	0.319	0.467	0.143
	Delegation	-0.875	-0.951	-0.314	-0.346
IO characteristics (Control variables)	TNA access	-0.179	-0.335	-0.383	-0.104
	Media coverage	0.001	0.001**	0.001***	0.001***
	Policy scope	0.029*	0.034**	0.035**	0.037**
	Democratic membership	1.489**	1.176*	1.277*	1.549*

Note: The results are based on a generalized linear model with a poisson link using R Studio. The model includes unit and year dummies along with a time trend. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: Effect of legitimacy crises on IO policy volume when before the crises, the level of contestation is low.

In Table 12 above, a similar multivariate regression analysis was conducted, excluding crises from the sample when there was not a low level of contestation before the crises. According to Agné and Soderbaum's (2022) theory, in instances where there is a low level of contestation before crises, the crises should act as a "wake up call," and IOs' effectiveness should increase, resulting in increased policy output. However, the table reveals that this is not the case. While there are more significant relations between dependent and independent variables compared to the previous table, the results remain varied and mixed across variables and time lags.

To further test my hypothesis (H4) drawn from Agné and Soderbaum's (2022), I made the subsequent Table 13 summarizing the relationship between all dimensions of policy output and all the legitimacy crises, without differencing their specific audience and social breadth and without the conditioning variables. The analysis reveals a few significant

relations, most of which are negative. Consequently, the findings do not support the hypothesis derived from Agné and Soderbaum's (2022) theory: legitimacy crises occurring when IOs enjoy a high level of legitimacy just before do not appear to impact IOs' policy output positively.

It is crucial to note that my study only provides an initial test of Agné and Soderbaum's (2022) theory. Low contestation may not necessarily equate to a high level of legitimacy in all instances. And as seen in section 3.1, there are some limits in measuring IOs' legitimacy through data collection in the global newswire, which can impact the accuracy and comprehensiveness of my assessment. Nevertheless, the results of this initial test invite further exploration and refinement.

Policy output, with low level of constests before the crises			Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4
Legitimacy crisis	Policy volume	Number of decisions	0.074	-0.117	-0.099	-0.319*
		Policy topic				
		IO governance	-0.113	-0.13	-0.689***	-0.501**
		Economic development	-0.139	-0.309	0.175	-0.268
		Law and crime	0.26	-0.129	-0.181	-0.044
		Governance	0.118	-0.311	-0.287	0.127
	Policy type	Regulatory	0.373**	0.264	-0.048	-0.314
		Distributive	0.145	-0.087	0.232	-0.343
		Declarative	0.008	-0.226	0.058	-0.191
		Administrative	-0.14	-0.187	-0.706**	-0.443
	Policy instruments	Binding	0.091	-0.145	-0.048	0.011
		Non-binding	0.071	-0.051	-0.026	-0.321*
	Policy target	IO	0.02	-0.295	-0.373**	-0.339*
		Member state(s), selected	0.208	0.015	0.151	-0.207
		Member states	-0.156	-0.167	0.276	-0.53
		Other state(s)	-0.078	-0.577*	-0.724**	-0.208
Other IO(s)		-0.027	-0.242	-0.145	-0.495	

Note : The results are based on a generalized linear model with a poisson link using R Studio. The model includes unit and year dummies along with a time trend. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: Effect of legitimacy crises across the various dimensions of policy output when before the crises, the level of contestation is low.

5.4.3 Policy topic

Policy topic	IO governance				Economic development				Law and crime				Governance				
	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	
Legitimacy crisis	All crisis year	-0.021	0.122	-0.058	-0.076	0.027	-0.021	0.082	-0.253**	0.173	-0.186	0.084	0.029	0.288*	-0.281*	-0.119	-0.098
Legitimacy crisis with specific audience	State actor dominance	0.309	-0.174	0.077	-0.059	0.006	0.083	0.187	0.177	-0.112	0.184	0.034	-0.039	0.085	-0.265	-0.166	-0.042
	Nonstate actor dominance	-0.684	0.534	-0.016	-1.85***	-0.751	0.951	0.637	0.114	0.422	-12.5***	2.019**	-0.736	-1.355	0.47	-0.17	-2.059**
	Constituent actor dominance	0.27	-0.218	-0.475**	-0.056	-0.068	0.125	0.595**	0.649**	-0.231	-0.259	-0.606**	-0.171	-0.148	-0.33	0.512*	0.152
	Nonconstituent actor dominance	0.246	0.321	-0.578*	0.226	-0.01	0.624*	-0.028	-0.484	-0.404	-0.23	1.194***	-0.241	0.19	-0.304	0.166	0.6*
	Member state government dominance	0.165	-0.256	-0.144	-0.057	-0.186	-0.103	0.434*	0.471*	-0.067	0.022	-0.297	-0.162	0.117	-0.256	0.107	-0.039
Legitimacy crisis with social breath	Elite critique and mass protest																
	Heterogeneity state and nonstate actors	-0.337*	0.473**	0.196	0.153	-0.114	0.172	-0.187	-0.241	-0.075	0.011	-0.149	-0.101	-0.18	0.014	0.222	0.25
	Heterogeneity constituent and nonconstituent actors	-0.322	0.271	-0.165	-0.073	-0.079	-0.231	-0.732***	-0.804***	0.189	0.437	0.332	0.098	0.079	0.143	-0.341	-0.201
	Heterogeneity state and nonstate, const. and nonconst. actors	-0.179	0.555**	0.021	-0.011	-0.33	0.053	-0.76**	-0.929***	-0.282	0.294	0.117	0.235	-0.138	-0.08	-0.184	0.462
Legitimacy crisisxIO characteristics	Pooling	0.147	-0.335	-0.382	1.123	-0.528	0.642	1.659*	2.393***	0.471	-0.453	-1.455	-0.124	-1.718*	-1.279	0.982	0.375
	Delegation	0.123	0.617	1.436***	0.843*	0.048	-0.296	-1.60***	-1.18**	0.391	0.74	1.206*	0.409	0.997*	1.135*	-0.212	-0.722
	TNA access	0.284	0.578	0.939***	0.61*	-0.073	-0.103	-0.90***	-0.387	0.447	0.722	0.282	0.324	1.136**	0.991**	-0.377	-0.847*
	Media coverage	0.001	0.001	0.001	0	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001*	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	Policy scope	-0.005	0.021	0.05***	0.025	-0.001	-0.011	-0.052***	-0.044**	0.01	0.018	0.028	0.007	0.023	0.035	-0.001	-0.014
	Democratic membership	0.163	0.313	0.813*	0.328	-0.138	-0.514	-1.19***	-0.673	0.287	1.062	0.364	0.041	1.319***	1.105*	-0.29	-0.628
IO characteristics (Control variables)	Pooling	-0.475	-0.225	0.279	0.333	-3.54***	-2.23*	-0.881	-1.338	1.147	-0.252	-0.275	-2.694	4.759***	1.786	-0.324	-0.74
	Delegation	-1.381	-0.351	0.074	0.467	0.892	0.009	-0.233	-2.227	-7.043**	-7.53**	-3.712	-4.906**	0.337	1.754	3.974***	2.389
	TNA access	0.74*	0.443	0.313	0.2	-0.874	-0.121	0.145	0.348	-1.294*	-1.228	-0.509	-0.028	1.595***	0.952*	0.99*	1.124**
	Media coverage	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**	0.001**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001
	Policy scope	0.083***	0.068***	0.067***	0.074***	0.02	0.008	0.004	0.027	0.19***	0.206***	0.08	0.067	-0.018	0.038	0.043	0.066*
	Democratic membership	1.509*	1.742**	1.95**	2.342**	1.92	1.21	0.562	-0.286	4.399**	4.645**	4.502**	4.485**	7.003***	4.555***	3.409**	3.234**

Note : The results are based on a generalized linear model with a poisson link using RStudio. The model includes unit and year dummies along with a time trend. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: Legitimacy crisis effect on policy topic

Table 14 above presents the outcomes of the multiple regression analysis, examining the impact of legitimacy crises on four policy topics: IO governance, economic development, law and crime, and governance. I first observe that compared to policy volume, there are more noteworthy results. Nevertheless, the findings remain diverse and intricate, making it challenging to identify clear patterns. Examining the impact across policy topics reveals that legitimacy crises do not affect them uniformly; some topics exhibit more significant relations, suggesting a greater influence of legitimacy crises. Specifically, economic development appears to be more affected than other topics. Additionally, the timing of the effects varies among the four policy topics. Economic development is primarily impacted three and four years after crises, law and crime are mostly affected three years after, while the effects on IO governance and governance topics are dispersed across different time lags.

The influence of control variables on policy topics is also not consistent. In the case of economic development, conditioning variables, except for pooling, show predominantly negative impacts. Conversely, the significant relationships with conditioning variables in IO governance and governance topics indicate a positive effect. Examining the legitimacy variables, the results reveal a mixed picture. Consistent with Sommerer et al. (2022a), I observe more significant relations when specific types of legitimacy crises are considered.

However, no pattern indicates that a particular type of legitimacy crisis has a more pronounced impact on policy topics or affects them uniformly, as the results are evenly dispersed and balanced in various directions across different types of crises. Notably, state actor dominance does not significantly impact policy topics, contrary to expectations based on the theoretical framework, where state actors were anticipated to trigger consequences. Considering the control variables, except for the economic development topic where impacts are negative, four variables—delegation, transnational access (TNA), policy scope, and democratic membership—demonstrate positive consequences across different time lags.

The results of the multivariate regression analysis on policy topics neither confirm nor contradict the initial expectations. Instead, they offer a nuanced perspective. Firstly, they align with the cross-section analysis findings, indicating that the consequences of conditioning variables vary depending on the specific dimension of policy output. Secondly, the results suggest that legitimacy crises are not equally likely to have implications across different dimensions of policy output and that the effects manifest at different times following the crises, depending on the specific type of policies involved.

5.4.4 Policy type

Policy type		Regulatory				Distributive				Declarative				Administrative			
		Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4
Legitimacy crisis	All crisis year	-0.008	-0.068	-0.018	0.047	0.074	0.21	0.583***	0.106	0.021	-0.213*	0.008	-0.18	0.048	0.016	-0.053	-0.162
Legitimacy crisis with specific audier	State actor dominance	-0.009	-0.213*	-0.133	-0.122	0.121	-0.163	-0.23	-0.686*	0.041	-0.023	0.003	0.06	0.088	-0.138	0.141	0.029
	Nonstate actor dominance	-0.785	0.139	-0.26	-0.799**	0.6	0.729	-0.282	16.982***	-0.612	0.895	-0.051	-1.108*	-0.489	0.651	0.126	-0.577
	Constituent actor dominance	0.183	-0.007	-0.127	-0.166	0.918***	0.853**	0.954***	1.299***	0.249	-0.056	0.357	0.308	0.141	-0.172	-0.204	0.083
	Nonconstituent actor dominance	-0.133	0.271**	0.253	-0.08	-0.018	0.487	0.498	-0.91	-0.388	0.494	-0.493	0.02	0.322	0.229	-0.501**	0.186
	Member state government dominance	0.05	-0.136	-0.175	-0.18	0.086	-0.281	0.039	-0.257	0.123	-0.227	0.187	-0.002	-0.009	-0.074	0.088	0.196
Legitimacy crisis with social breath	Elite critique and mass protest	0.014	0.172	0.143	0.179	-0.248	0.368	0.025	0.979*	-0.09	0.325	0.001	-0.023	-0.238	0.171	-0.007	0.003
	Heterogeneity state and nonstate actors	0.021	0.182	0.112	0.208	-0.885***	-0.978***	-1.334***	-0.726	0.036	0.316	-0.582**	-0.235	-0.468**	0.022	-0.321**	-0.405**
	Heterogeneity constituent and nonconstituent actors	0.105	0.311	0.231	0.347**	-0.568**	-0.419	-1.184***	-0.876	-0.04	0.532**	-0.291	-0.004	-0.57**	0.177	-0.213	-0.34
Legitimacy crisis IO characteristics	Pooling	0.392	-0.219	-0.778	-0.666	1.485	2.07	3.374**	4.234**	0.886	0.233	0.36	1.648*	-0.369	-0.651	0.308	1.309**
	Delegation	-0.205	0.085	0.509	0.903**	-2.674***	-1.858***	-2.455***	-2.02*	0.347	0.478	-0.015	-0.107	-0.042	0.417	0.552	-0.143
	TNA access	-0.064	0.111	0.672**	1.228***	-1.54***	-1.066**	-1.486***	-1.303*	0.344	0.394	0.235	0.275	-0.101	0.327	0.344	-0.076
	Media coverage	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001***	-0.001	-0.001*	0.001	-0.001	-0.001*	-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001
	Policy scope	-0.006	0.004	0.015	0.023**	-0.096***	-0.067***	-0.083***	-0.066	-0.001	0.018	-0.002	-0.009	-0.005	0.015	0.016	-0.004
	Democratic membership	-0.021	0.115	0.699*	1.089***	-1.866***	-1.512***	-1.816***	-1.677**	0.247	0.106	0.025	-0.071	-0.172	0.23	0.186	-0.282
	IO characteristics (Control variables)	Pooling	2.391**	2.607***	2.829***	2.745***	-0.696	-0.547	4.253**	4.742**	1.656**	1.468*	1.857**	0.508	-1.621	-1.974	-0.716
	Delegation	-0.702	0.36	0.182	1.669	9.447***	6.258*	7.956***	3.074	-0.1	0.404	1.806	1.216	0.094	-0.016	0.156	-0.415
	TNA access	0.182	0.51	0.914**	1.204***	0.848	1.586	3.14***	1.562	-0.298	-0.661	-0.433	1.387***	1.282***	0.899**	0.559	
	Media coverage	0.001	0.001**	0.001**	0.001*	0.001	0.001	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001	0.001	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001
	Policy scope	-0.089***	-0.077***	-0.094***	-0.09***	-0.22***	-0.255***	-0.335***	-0.269	0.016	0.027	0.025	0.058***	0.142***	0.147***	0.126***	0.128***
	Democratic membership	4.288**	3.957***	2.118**	1.582	-1.898	-1.463	-5.875***	-4.745	2.372***	1.833**	2.002**	1.557*	1.883**	1.846**	1.252	1.258

Note: The results are based on a generalized linear model with a poisson link using R Studio. The model includes unit and year dummies along with a time trend. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Legitimacy crises effect on policy type

Table 15 above illustrates the results of the multivariate regression analysis on the policy type dimension of policy output, presenting outcomes similar to those observed in the study of policy topics. It highlights that legitimacy crises impact various dimensions of policy type differently, with the distributive part being more significantly affected. All relations with conditioning variables are negative within the distributive part, indicating a consistent direction. Additionally, the controlling variable exhibits a consistent direction within each type but varies between them. Unlike policy topics, there is no discernible difference in the likelihood of effects across time lags in the policy type dimension. Examining the independent variables (legitimacy crises), the results reveal mixed and dispersed outcomes across time lags and policy types. However, two patterns emerge: constituent actor dominance positively influences distributive policies across all time lags of the distributive type (aligning with H1), while member state governance dominance lacks a significant impact throughout the table (contrary to H1). Once again, the results neither confirm nor contradict expectations but offer a nuanced and mixed perspective like the analysis of policy topics.

5.4.5 Policy instrument

Policy instrument		Binding				Non-Binding			
		Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4
Legitimacy crisis	All crisis year	-0.08	-0.181***	-0.139***	-0.011	-0.002	-0.142	-0.032	-0.243**
Legitimacy crisis with specific audien	State actor dominance	0.062	-0.163	-0.009	-0.057	0.041	0.003	0.038	0.038
	Nonstate actor dominance	-0.363	-0.209	0.058	-0.79***	-0.533	0.684	-0.172	-1.019*
	Constituent actor dominance	0.281**	0.07	-0.016	0.13	0.447**	0.167	0.43**	0.345
	Nonconstituent actor dominance	-0.079	-0.031	0.063	0.05	-0.534*	0.458	-0.774	-0.294
	Member state government dominance	0.184	0.004	-0.017	0.073	0.086	-0.079	0.163	0.037
Legitimacy crisis with social breath	Elite critique and mass protest								
	Heterogeneity state and nonstate actors	-0.139	0.168	0.028	0.028	-0.16	0.159	0.037	0.118
	Heterogeneity constituent and nonconstituent actors	-0.155	0.129	-0.039	-0.17	-0.278	0.035	-0.653***	-0.225
	Heterogeneity state and nonstate, const. and nonconst. ac	-0.103	0.306**	0.103	0.051	-0.567**	0.255	-0.437	-0.054
Legitimacy crisisxIO characteristics	Pooling	0.741**	0.251	0.036	0.306	0.568	0.451	0.394	1.657**
	Delegation	-0.501*	-0.146	0.02	-0.328	-0.366	-0.183	-0.509	-0.044
	TNA access	-0.27	0.001	-0.004	-0.182	-0.093	0.043	-0.032	0.292
	Media coverage	0.001	0.001*	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.001
	Policy scope	-0.014*	-0.004	0.001	-0.01	-0.022	-0.002	-0.018	-0.008
	Democratic membership	-0.351	0.011	0.043	-0.2	-0.225	-0.323	-0.251	-0.114
IO characteristics (Control variables)	Pooling	1.062	0.721	0.78	1.147*	1.059	0.672	1.38*	0.69
	Delegation	0.277	0.145	-0.5	-1.445	0.335	0.624	1.814*	1.287
	TNA access	0.02	0.11	-0.091	-0.244	0.514	0.519	0.577	0.893**
	Media coverage	0.001	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**	0.001**	0.001*	0.001	0.001
	Policy scope	-0.021	-0.012	-0.014	-0.003	0.017	0.035**	0.023	0.047**
	Democratic membership	4.793***	3.29***	1.693**	1.308*	2.269***	2.215***	2.049***	1.778**

Note: The results are based on a generalized linear model with a poisson link using R Studio. The model includes unit and year dummies along with a time trend. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: Legitimacy crises effect on policy instrument

Table 16 above reveals that both policy instruments, binding and non-binding decisions, are negatively affected by legitimacy crises. Contrary to the expectation of a significant increase in non-binding decisions alongside a decrease in binding decisions, the analysis shows that both are impacted negatively when considering all IOs. From the results, I also notice a significant negative impact four years after crises dominated by non-state actors. In the short term, after crises dominated by constituent actors, there is an increase in both binding and non-binding policies. However, crises characterized by heterogeneity of all actors lead to divergent outcomes, increasing the number of binding decisions while decreasing the number of non-binding decisions.

In examining the impact of conditioning variables on policy instruments, the task of identifying clear comparisons and patterns becomes more challenging. Notably, pooling exhibits a positive impact on both binding and non-binding decisions, while media coverage, which appears to exert the most influence, results in conflicting outcomes—positive for binding decisions and negative for non-binding decisions. This aspect of the analysis aimed to understand how legitimacy crises influence the number of binding and non-binding decisions. Contrary to expectations, the findings suggest no increase in binding decisions, challenging the notion that effectiveness could be enhanced by delivering more impactful decisions during crises even if the total number of decisions decreases. Additionally, no evidence supports the idea that binding and non-binding decisions react differently to legitimacy crises, as both dimensions are similarly affected by the crises, including their specific types and consequences.

5.4.6 Policy target

Policy target	IO				Member state(s), selected				Member states				Other state(s)				Other IO(s)			
	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4	Lag 1	Lag 2	Lag 3	Lag 4
Legitimacy crisis	0.027	-0.04	-0.004	-0.043	0.099	0.046	0.094	-0.11	0.047	-0.07	-0.093	-0.092	0.143	-0.124	-0.415	0.011	0.236	0.11	0.183	-0.069
Legitimacy crisis with specific audience																				
State actor dominance	-0.081	-0.197	0.019	-0.082	0.209	0.153	0.077	0.234	-0.182	-0.328	-0.337	-0.484*	0.068	-1.06	-3.37***	-0.352	-0.035	0.304	-0.462	-0.192
Nonstate actor dominance	-0.102	0.365	0.065	-0.828**	-0.949	0.658	0.192	-1.138	-0.803	0.654	-0.134	-0.704*	0.628	1.434	-18.96***	-17.88***	0.365	0.455	-0.839	0.998
Constituent actor dominance	0.051	-0.204	-0.304*	-0.055	0.403***	0.232	0.411***	0.363*	0.025	-0.034	-0.059	-0.127	2.106***	0.088	17.19***	0.215	0.492	0.774	1.305**	0.772
Nonconstituent actor dominance	0.146	0.133	-0.61***	0.189	-0.229	0.311*	0.069	-0.008	-0.162	0.03	0.915**	1.112***	-0.72	-0.242	-15.59***	-1.081**	-1.456**	-15.53***	-14.75***	-16.54***
Member state government dominance	-0.103	-0.256*	-0.012	-0.041	0.269	0.21	0.396*	0.311	-0.134	-0.168	-0.35	-0.284	0.294	-1.06	-2.473**	-0.232	0.181	0.539	0.167	0.819
Legitimacy crisis with social breach																				
Elite critique and mass protest																				
Heterogeneity state and nonstate actors	-0.04	0.293*	-0.017	0.136	-0.058	0.166	0.198	0.18	0.206	0.333	0.243	0.405	0.057	0.417	3.503***	-0.497	1.087	0.065	0.593	-0.099
Heterogeneity constituent and nonconstituent actors	-0.251	0.038	-0.168	-0.22	0.01	0.136	-0.143	0.153	-0.124	0.039	-0.306	-0.13	-0.896	-0.65	-17***	0.061	-0.145	-0.471	-2.144***	-0.427
Heterogeneity state and nonstate, const. and nonconst. actor	-0.28	0.324	-0.081	-0.126	-0.168	0.023	-0.128	0.193	0.486	0.488	0.191	0.588*	-13.34***	-0.654	-14.53***	0.112	14.469***	-0.248	-2.132***	14.14***
Legitimacy crisis IO characteristics																				
Pooling	-0.104	-0.767	-0.357	0.337	1.401**	1.334*	1.505**	2.241***	-0.609	-0.282	-0.837	-0.147	4.55	3.159	-1.238	5.056**	2.643	1.38	0.662	3.95**
Delegation	-0.119	0.407	0.778**	0.273	-0.402	-0.138	-0.425	0.12	0.222	0.264	0.06	0.425	7.386	-0.444	-14.416*	7.553	-1.111	-3.068	-4.964*	1.58
TNA access	-0.113	0.143	0.504*	0.234	-0.147	0.079	-0.115	0.344	0.392	0.349	-0.161	0.27	2.015*	-0.428	-3.607	1.351	1.062	0.789	-0.971	1.109
Media coverage	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001*	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.001***	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001
Policy scope	-0.005	0.015	0.022*	0.006	-0.02*	-0.006	-0.016	-0.003	0.005	0.011	0.01	0.015	0.108	0.088	-0.072	0.082	-0.086	-0.088	-0.033	0.002
Democratic membership	-0.198	0.033	0.389	0.035	-0.305	-0.131	-0.204	0.22	0.32	0.288	-0.101	0.113	0.441	-3.25**	4.53**	-1.318	-0.649	-3.324	-2.92**	-0.507
IO characteristics (Control variables)																				
Pooling	-0.119	0.03	0.936	1.508*	2.346***	2.715***	3.082***	2.605**	3.234**	2.28	2.994**	2.311*	-1.628	-1.74	-3.017	-1.731	-0.239	-1.28	-1.777	-3.435*
Delegation	-0.442	-0.469	-0.607	-1.001	-0.537	0.355	0.727	1.33	0.264	-1.209	0.227	-1.326	0.007	-0.507	-1.586	-1.26	-3.124	-0.503	1.622	3.268
TNA access	0.371	0.575	0.645	0.743*	0.215	-0.051	-0.398	-0.33	-0.697	-0.357	0.096	0.417	-1.93**	-0.83	-0.301	0.069	-0.001	0.31	0.446	0.72
Media coverage	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001***	0.001***
Policy scope	0.889***	0.064***	0.042**	0.042**	-0.06**	-0.051***	-0.044*	-0.034	0.012	0.075**	0.069*	0.109***	0.009	0.03	0.013	-0.001	-0.024	-0.02	0.035	0.084
Democratic membership	1.038	0.704	0.145	0.664	0.836	0.598	0.192	0.592	4.373***	3.612***	3.238**	2.423*	3.864***	3.306**	4.315***	4.543***	5.968***	5.309***	5.738***	4.992***

Note: The results are based on a generalized linear model with a poisson link using R Studio. The model includes unit and year dummies along with a time trend. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: Legitimacy crises effect on policy target

Finally, in Table 17, the results of the multi-regression analysis with the policy target dimension as the dependent variable are presented. Starting my interpretation of the various categories of policy targets, it is apparent that legitimacy crises have different effects on them. Certain categories, such as "other state(s) targets," seem to be more sensitive to the impact of legitimacy crises. The influence of legitimacy crises on this dimension of policy output also appears to manifest more prominently three to four years after the crises, particularly evident in variables such as "IO," "member state(s), selected," and notably, "other state(s)." The conditioning variables, once again, exhibit dispersion in terms of significance and direction across different target categories and within the variables across different time periods. Only "pooling" emerges as distinctive, demonstrating a positive and significant relation across the table.

The result of the policy target dimension aligns with patterns observed in other categories of policy output. However, exploring the relationship between different types of audiences dominating the crises and policy targets can add an interesting dimension. A positive connection between these variables could suggest that IOs, during a crisis, are actively working to regain legitimacy with the audience from which they lost support. The results partially support this hypothesis. I can observe that "constituent actor dominance" in a crisis is associated with more policies directed at "member state(s) selected." On the other

hand, legitimacy crises dominated by "nonconstituent actors" show a robust negative effect on policies targeting "other IO(s)."

5.5 Summary

To sum up, I ended the quantitative analysis of the research with a multiple regression analysis. By using this complex quantitative tools I aimed at providing a better description of the consequences of legitimacy crises on IO policy output and to test the different expectations I had by drawing from Sommer et al (2022) framework as well as (Agné & Söderbaum, 2022) theory. Yet, the results from the multiple regression analysis and from the other methods did not confirm my expectations. The multivariate regression analysis probably included too many variables and gave too many details to be able to find patterns across variables. Nonetheless, it provided a far deeper and precise description of the phenomenon under study. And the results also align with Sommerer et al (2022a) study as they also found mix results for their analysis of legitimacy crises impact on the number of decisions taken by IOs. Just like them, the study also found that they are more instances of significant relationship when you take specific characteristic of legitimacy but you don't find any pattern of which one is more likely than the other.

The analysis of conditioning variables in this research has expanded beyond Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) study, revealing a more nuanced picture. While Sommerer et al. found indications that policy scope positively influences the number of decisions post-legitimacy crisis, my results suggest that the relationship is more complicated. The theoretical framework remains valid, but the impact of conditioning variables appears to vary across dimensions within a policy output category. The lack of significant relations between conditioning variables and the total number of policies, contrasted with the significance in specific categories of policy output, underlines this complexity. This aligns with the first insights provided from the cross-section analysis. Moreover, the multivariate regression results suggest that the consequences of legitimacy crises may manifest more strongly at different times after legitimacy crises. The t-test also hints at the unequal effects of legitimacy crises across different IOs and offers a preliminary contradiction to Agné and Söderbaum's theory. The multivariate regression analysis reaffirmed this lack of support.

Hypothesis	Results
H1	The results did not substantially support the hypothesis that legitimacy crises dominated by constituent actors, member states, or a combination of elite critique and mass protest have a greater likelihood of triggering discernible consequences on IOs' policy output. However, the analysis revealed a higher frequency of a significant relationship when specific characteristics of legitimacy are considered.
H2	The analysis did not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that conditioning variables are more likely to lead to positive consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output, specifically an increase in the number of decisions.
H3	The analysis does not support this hypothesis. No clear patterns were identified; complex issues such as economic development did not appear to be more affected by legitimacy crises than other topics.
H4	The results do not confirm this hypothesis. Legitimacy crises following low levels of contestation did not yield positive consequences.
HA	The results did not support this hypothesis. Various tests indicated numerous instances where legitimacy crises had an impact on IOs' policy output.
HB	The results only partially supported this hypothesis. While, in some cases, legitimacy crises led to negative consequences, in others, they led to positive consequences, specifically, an increase in the number of policies.
HC	The results partially supported this hypothesis. Similar to the findings mentioned earlier, legitimacy crises can lead to both positive and negative consequences. According to the visual analysis, there is a slightly

Table 18 Summary of results

In brief, the visual analysis and t-test affirmed the impact of legitimacy crises on policy output. However, while not confirming initial expectations (see Table 17 above), the cross-section, t-test, and multivariate analyses provided a more fine-grained perspective. The likelihood and direction of consequences vary across IOs, dimensions within policy output categories, and time lags, but also with the audience, social breadth, and normative depth of legitimacy crises. This diversity of results complicates the identification of patterns and the formulation of clear expectations.

Conclusion

The central focus of this thesis is the topic of legitimacy in global governance, more specifically it aims to strengthen our knowledge of the impact of legitimacy crises on the policy output of IOs. The research question driving this goal is: **how do legitimacy crises impact the policy output of IOs?**

In addressing this question, I conducted a comprehensive review of various theoretical and conceptual frameworks relevant to the subject. An existing prevailing theory emphasizes the necessity of legitimacy for the well-functioning of IOs. Within this framework, legitimacy crises are commonly anticipated to exert negative impacts on the performance and policy output of IOs. However, recent studies by Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Agné and Söderbaum (2022) challenge this conventional wisdom, proposing that legitimacy crises can, under specific conditions, positively influence IO effectiveness and policy output.

Building on these divergent perspectives, I introduced the key concepts of legitimacy crises and policy output, delineated into five dimensions according to the framework developed by Tallberg et al. (2016). By integrating these theories and concepts, my research objectives are twofold: to enhance our understanding of the influence of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output and to identify the conditions under which consequences are more likely to occur, along with their potential directions—whether negative or positive.

To empirically investigate my research objectives, I amalgamated data from two distinct studies—Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Lundgren et al. (2023). This merged dataset offered a comprehensive set of information on legitimacy crises and policy output for 13 multi-issue IOs over the period from 1985 to 2015. Employing a variety of quantitative methods, I analyzed the intricate relationship between the two variables of interest and their diverse characteristics. This methodological approach aimed to provide a robust examination of the impact of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output.

The initial stages of my analysis, comprising visual examination and t-tests, served as a preliminary exploration. Contrary to arguments by scholars such as Marquez (2016),

who posit that legitimacy does not wield significant influence, my findings indicated that legitimacy bears relevance during crises. The subsequent techniques, including cross-section analysis and, notably, multivariate analysis, allowed further study, providing a nuanced depiction of the impact of legitimacy crises on IO's policy output. These methods not only facilitated a comprehensive description of the consequences but also enabled the testing of my preconceived expectations. The outcomes yielded a range of insightful findings.

Primarily, the outcomes of the analysis not only corroborate the findings of Bes et al. (2019) and Sommerer et al. (2022a) but also challenge the traditional theory of legitimacy. Contrary to the conventional expectation that legitimacy crises invariably undermine IO capacities and performance, the results present a nuanced and mixed perspective. Legitimacy crises exhibit varied effects on IOs' policy output, encompassing negative, positive, and neutral outcomes. This complexity highlights the need to revisit the conventional theory of legitimacy, which typically anticipates damaging consequences for crises. Such reevaluation is essential as the conventional theory of legitimacy is frequently employed to predict the repercussions of contemporary challenges in multilateral governance.

In this vein, my hypotheses, aimed at identifying the conditions favoring legitimacy crises' impact on IOs policy output and the circumstances leading to positive outcomes, were not substantiated. My intention to refine the analysis by categorizing policy volume into distinct dimensions—such as topic, type, instrument, and target—was to reevaluate the expectations outlined by Sommerer et al. (2022a). However, the results did not align with this anticipation. Similar to the mixed outcomes in Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) research on legitimacy crises' impact on the number of decisions by IOs, I failed to discern clear patterns. Audience dominated by constituent or member state actors did not exhibit a consistent effect on policy output. Additionally, the conditioning variables identified by Sommerer et al. (2022a)—pooling, delegation, transnational access, media coverage, policy scope, and democratic membership—did not consistently lead to positive outcomes when coupled with legitimacy crises. Instead, the results, spanning audience type, conditioning variables, and other categories like legitimacy with social breadth, were varied and scattered across variables. The only aspect corroborated by my analyses, echoing Sommerer et al. (2022a), is that specific types of legitimacy crises, defined by audience and social breadth, yield more

instances of significant relationships, emphasizing the relevance of their legitimacy crises concept.

Similarly, my research did not validate certain expectations derived from Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) theory. Their proposition that legitimacy crises should augment an IO's policy output, especially when the organization enjoyed a high level of legitimacy before the crises, has not been substantiated by my analyses. Moreover, the anticipated surge in policies addressing complex issues like economic development following legitimacy crises was not observed in my findings. While my results do not support Agné and Söderbaum's (2022) theory, they also do not necessarily contradict it. Their theory, positioned at a more general level, may warrant refinement or specification, as my findings suggest that their predictions, particularly concerning legitimacy crises, may not universally hold or require further clarification.

Although I couldn't pinpoint the precise mechanism behind the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output, my research has provided a nuanced description of this phenomenon. The t-test underscored the variability in how legitimacy crises affected each IO; it wasn't a uniform impact across all organizations. For instance, despite facing numerous crises, the UN remained largely unaffected, while the EU, with a comparable number of crises, experienced significant influences. The results further revealed that when there were significant consequences, the direction of these consequences tended to cluster at the IO level. However, when aggregated, the cross-section analysis highlighted that the effects of conditioning variables were similar within specific dimensions of policy output categories. This pattern was confirmed by the multivariate analyses. For example, within policy topics, conditioning variables had positive impacts on IO governance policies but negative effects on economic governance policies. Moreover, the multivariate analyses showed that the significance of effects could differ across time lags within policy output categories.

In most cases, the significant consequences were evenly distributed across time lags, but for certain categories like distributive policy type, the effects were more pronounced in the third- and fourth-time lags. While similar patterns emerged in other policy output categories, no evidence suggested more significant results in the first- and second-time lags.

The findings suggest that the relationship between legitimacy and IO policy output, as well as broader IO performance, is more intricate than commonly assumed. To predict the likelihood and direction of consequences accurately, theories and expectations need refinement to account for this complexity. While Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Agné and Söderbaum (2022) are heading in the right direction, their theories may benefit from further expansion and refinement.

Beyond academia, the research results carry social and political implications. They offer optimism for those who view IOs as pivotal actors in our global system. The escalating challenges, such as the rise of nationalist and populist movements worldwide, do not signify the demise of IOs and the liberal world order. Instead, these challenges may contribute to strengthening their capacities. Moreover, the results suggest that even amid contemporary challenges and declining global confidence in the existing order, there is room for hope. Criticism and protests against IOs can prompt them to reinforce their values and respond positively, indicating resilience in protecting their principles.

In addition to its implications, my research holds relevance as it contributes to various topics and research fields. Firstly, by empirically testing the theoretical innovations of Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Agné and Söderbaum (2022) and offering a detailed examination of the effects of legitimacy crises on IOs' policy output, this study advances our understanding of legitimacy dynamics and its consequences on a broad scale. In this domain, my results align with scarce research that has previously delved into the consequences of IO legitimacy (Ba, 2014; Fehl, 2004; Lenz et al., 2019; Rocabert et al., 2019; O'Brien et al., 2000; Tallberg et al., 2013).

Secondly, my findings contribute to the emerging literature (Bes et al., 2016; Sommerer et al., 2022a; Agné and Söderbaum, 2022), challenging the commonly assumed oversimplification that legitimacy is purely positive for the political institutions' performance and effectiveness (Weber, [1922] 1978; Beetham, 1991; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Gilley, 2008; Tallberg et al., 2018).

Thirdly, I believe my research offers valuable insights into the literature focused on the legitimation, delegitimation, and (re-)legitimation of IOs. By treating legitimacy crises as a form of delegitimation, the results shed light on the consequences of such processes on IOs' policy output. Simultaneously, it contributes to the (re-)legitimation discourse by providing clues about how IOs respond through their policy output.

Fourthly and finally, this research significantly contributes to existing studies exploring the broader performance of IOs (Agné, 2016; Sommerer et al., 2021). Pioneering the use of a new concept developed by Tallberg et al. (2016) and the IPOD (Lundgren et al., 2023), it conducts a large-scale comparative analysis in a field where such analyses are often scarce.

Nevertheless, it's crucial to acknowledge the limitations of my research. The chosen dependent variable, policy output, represents only one facet contributing to performance and problem-solving effectiveness, as elucidated in the conceptual framework of the study. While I've progressed beyond a simple count of policies, which might obscure rhetorical decisions and better reflect problem-solving effectiveness, it's essential to recognize that governments still need to comply with IO decisions. Compliance, as emphasized by Sommerer and Agné (2018, p. 6), is also contingent upon legitimacy. Therefore, future research in this domain could explore the consequences of legitimacy on compliance, providing valuable insights to complement my examination of IO policy output and Sommerer et al.'s (2022a) study on resources. Collectively, these findings would offer a more comprehensive assessment of the impact of legitimacy crises on IOs' problem-solving performance, as proposed by Sommerer and Agné (2018).

However, a notable challenge arises as there is currently no available comparative quantitative data on compliance with IO decisions. Establishing such a dataset proves challenging due to the diversity of IOs working across various policy fields, generating different types of output and maintaining varying levels of access to information on compliance. Despite these challenges, avenues for further studies exist to enhance our understanding of the consequences of legitimacy crises on IOs. For instance, a similar study to Sommerer et al. (2022a) could be conducted, focusing exclusively on legitimacy crises occurring when IOs enjoyed a high level of legitimacy. By employing methods similar to

mine, researchers could retest Agné and Soderbaum's (2022) theory on a larger scale and with different dependent variables, such as IO resources and institutional change. Additionally, case studies could offer valuable insights into the complex dynamics of legitimacy consequences on IOs, contributing to the development or refinement of existing theories.

Summary

This thesis investigates the intricate dynamics of legitimacy in global governance, specifically examining how legitimacy crises impact the policy output of international organizations (IOs). The central research question revolves around the nuanced effects of legitimacy crises on IOs, challenging traditional expectations and drawing on divergent perspectives from scholars like Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Agné and Söderbaum (2022). The study employs a comprehensive approach, integrating various theoretical frameworks and conceptual dimensions, notably those proposed by Tallberg et al. (2016). By amalgamating data from studies spanning 1985 to 2015, the research combines quantitative methods to analyze the relationship between legitimacy crises and policy output in 13 multi-issue IOs.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings reveal a mixed perspective on the impact of legitimacy crises. The study challenges traditional notions by identifying varied outcomes—negative, positive, and neutral—of legitimacy crises on IO policy output. Importantly, the research fails to substantiate hypotheses derived from the theories of both Sommerer et al. (2022a) and Agné and Söderbaum (2022), indicating the need for further refinement. The results highlight the complexity of the relationship between legitimacy and IO policy output, suggesting that theories must evolve to accurately predict outcomes. The thesis also emphasizes the broader social and political implications of its findings, offering optimism in the face of contemporary challenges to IOs. Criticism and protests, it suggests, can prompt IOs to reinforce their values, showcasing resilience in protecting their principles.

Beyond its implications, the research contributes significantly to the understanding of legitimacy dynamics and its consequences on a broad scale. It challenges oversimplified views of legitimacy and its positive impact on political institutions, aligning with an emerging literature that questions such assumptions. Additionally, the study offers valuable insights into the legitimation, delegitimation, and (re-)legitimation of IOs, contributing to a nuanced understanding of these processes. Finally, it advances existing studies on the broader performance of IOs, conducting a large-scale comparative analysis in a field where such analyses are often scarce.

However, acknowledging its limitations, the thesis suggests avenues for further research, particularly in exploring the consequences of legitimacy on compliance with IO decisions. Despite challenges, the study encourages future investigations to enhance our understanding of the impact of legitimacy crises on IOs, emphasizing the need for refinement and expansion of existing theories.

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List of Appendices

Appendix no. 1: Download link for dataset and R Studio codes (link)

Appendix no. 2: Policy volume and legitimacy crises (graphs)

Appendix no. 3: Policy topic and legitimacy crises (graphs)

Appendix no. 4: Policy type and legitimacy crises (graphs)

Appendix no. 5: Policy instrument and legitimacy crises (graphs)

Appendix no. 6: Policy target and legitimacy crises (graphs)

Appendix no. 7: T-test results (table)

Appendix no. 8: Example of plots obtained with the cross-section analysis for binding and non-bindings decisions (graphs)


Appendix no. 9: Policy volume's histogram (graphs)


Appendix no. 1

Dataset and R codes employed in this thesis can be downloaded using the following link:


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Appendix no. 2







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


Appendix no. 4




Appendix no. 5





Appendix no. 6





Appendix no. 7

T-test	ASEAN		AU		COMW		EU		OAS		OIC		UN	
	P-Value	Mean Ratio	P-Value	Mean Ratio	P-Value	Mean Ratio	P-Value	Mean Ratio	P-Value	Mean Ratio	P-Value	Mean Ratio	P-Value	Mean Ratio
Policy volume														
Number of decisions	0.003***	0.159	0.83	0.893	0.28	0.828	0.001***	0.846	0.586	1.054	0.015**	1.608	0.912	1.017
Policy topic														
IO governance	0.004***	0.083	0.58	0.686	0.908	0.972	0.114	1.289	0.38	1.177	0.483	0.823	0.826	1.053
Economic development	0.009***	0.113	0.262	0.57	0.499	0.778	0.043**	1.43	0.792	0.882	0.117	2.166	0.951	0.985
Health and Social affairs	0.001***	0	0.843	1.125	0.876	0.875	0.115	1.278	0.099*	0.599	0.458	0.734	0.301	0.389
Human rights	0.114	0.241	0.13	0.677	0.119	0.395	0.34	1.271	0.504	0.884	0.081*	1.634	0.946	0.986
Culture and education	0.021**	0.267	0.972	0.975	0.346	0.438	0.406	1.219	0.538	1.387	0.001***	1.894	NA	NA
Labor and employment	0.005***	0	0.038	0	0.356	0	0.147	0.792	0.742	1.182	0.082*	0	NA	NA
Law and crime	0.444	0.468	0.736	1.625	0.127	0.368	0.001***	2.372	0.971	0.991	0.001***	2.3	0.374	1.339
Governance	0.247	0.34	0.809	1.238	0.3	1.837	0.001***	1.672	0.843	1.147	0.954	1.078	0.688	1.114
Environment and natural resource manager	0.002***	0	0.748	0.788	0.665	0.787	0.014**	1.357	0.892	0.945	0.001	1.944	0.953	0.933
Agriculture, fisheries and commodities	0.033**	0	0.9	1.083	0.2	0	0.005***	0.51	0.949	0.929	0.015**	0	0.162	0
Energy and transport	0.012**	0	0.949	1.083	0.725	1.75	0.4156	1.187	1	1	0.001***	0	0.046**	0
Science and technology	0.019**	0	0.281	0.325	0.557	1.75	0.4813	0.9	0.918	1.026	0.246	1.967	NA	NA
Trade, economic integration, and industry	0.04**	0.489	0.021**	0.203	0.147	1.75	0.007***	0.634	0.172	1.363	0.06*	1.506	0.77	0.778
Finance and monetary policy	0.131	0.267	0.396	2.6	0.519	2.333	0.965	1.011	0.083*	0	0.035**	2.202	NA	NA
Security and defense	0.011**	0.145	0.541	1.351	0.161	0.739	0.208	0.588	0.522	1.256	0.001***	1.621	0.98	1.004
International affairs	0.037**	0	0.617	1.509	0.25	0.612	0.077*	1.581	0.464	1.174	0.523	1.93	0.5	1.4
Policy type														
Regulatory	0.166	0.657	0.08*	0.429	0.528	0.656	0.004***	0.82	0.838	1.094	0.106	0.664	0.938	1.013
Distributive	0.04**	0	0.63	1.625	0.76	0.843	0.001***	0.472	0.918	0.929	0.581	1.98	0.465	0.718
Declarative	0.002***	0.079	0.503	1.519	0.154	0.737	0.278	1.174	0.827	1.048	0.263	1.888	0.694	1.091
Constitutional	0.958	1.071	0.474	0.636	0.581	1.5	0.231	1.432	0.688	1.187	0.702	1.127	0.18	0.449
Administrative	0.006***	0	0.926	1.09	0.607	1.197	0.114	1.277	0.937	0.932	0.145	1.393	0.92	0.987
Policy instrument														
Binding	0.315	0.742	NA	NA	0.55	1.238	0.001***	0.835	0.055*	1.44	NA	NA	0.983	1.003
Non-binding	0.003***	0.08	0.83	0.893	0.126	0.741	0.771	1.04	0.539	0.919	0.015**	1.608	0.857	1.038
Policy target														
IO	0.242	0.334	0.651	0.773	0.881	1.046	0.08*	1.306	0.423	1.078	0.656	1.421	0.957	1.007
Member state(s), selected	0.003***	0.144	0.993	1.005	0.453	0.804	0.001***	0.783	0.898	0.954	0.112	1.58	0.72	1.071
Member states	0.008***	0	0.176	0.622	0.447	0.875	0.544	0.857	0.885	1.059	0.636	1.903	0.96	0.991
Other state(s)	0.001***	0	0.728	1.444	0.51	0.718	NA	NA	0.344	0.433	0.206	1.199	0.668	1.458
Other IO(s)	0.11	0	0.336	1.477	0.358	0.599	0.331	0	0.083*	0	0.468	3.329	0.266	1.784
Private actor(s)	NA	NA	0.38	2.6	NA	NA	0.163	0	0.491	1.857	0.593	3.833	0.317	0.662

Note: The results are obtained in R Studio, instead of displaying both groups' mean, the ratio of the mean of a crisis group to the mean of a non-crisis group is displayed. A value less than one indicates a non-crisis group with a higher mean, while a value above one suggests a crisis group with a higher mean. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix no. 8





Appendix no. 9

Histogram of Number of Decisions

