

### **Abstract (in English)**

This work explores the critique of Protagoras' teachings presented by Plato in the first third of the dialogue Theaetetus. Plato approaches this criticism through Theaetetus' initial definition of knowledge, namely that knowledge is perception, which Plato considers equivalent to Protagoras' statement that 'man is the measure of all things.'

In this work, I focus on whether Plato's critique of Protagoras, as he is depicted here, is legitimate. I intend to highlight its less convincing arguments and attempt to provide a possible response to the stronger ones. Specifically, I want to concentrate on the argument where Protagoras is compelled to agree that his theory is invalid because, according to his own theory, it is not possible for his opponents to be mistaken, and also try to offer a potential response that Protagoras could present in this context.