CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

Master's Thesis

2024 **Russell Burrell**

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Political Science

Ontological Security, Radicalization and Violent Extremism: A Practical Approach

Master's Thesis

Author of the Thesis: Russell Burrell

Study programme: Security Studies

Supervisor: Mgr. Jonathan Collins

Year of the defence: 2024

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on January 3, 2024 Russell Burrell

References

BURRELL, Russell. *Ontological Security, Radicalization and Violent Extremism: A Practical Approach.* Praha, 2024. 82 Pages. Master's thesis (Mgr). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies, Department of Security Studies. Supervisor Mgr. Jonathan Collins

Length of the Thesis:

Without Spaces: 106,443
With Spaces: 125,351

Abstract

This work explores the links between extremist content and ontological security utilizing a single case study of the Christchurch manifesto. The objective is to apply Anthony Giddens's original concept of ontological security to radicalization and identify ontological security's role in radicalization. Radicalization occurs horizontally, meaning that a feeling of community is created and is engendered within the target individual. The existing literature primarily focuses on the role of theoretical models, which are largely multilayered and conceptualize the phenomenon as a process of escalation rather than integration. This explores how extremist content affects the individual on the level of ontological security and how ontological security may or may not be weaponized. It utilizes a mixed methods discourse analysis approach to reveal the intimate, intricate, and strategic nature of extremist discourse and finds that this discourse attempts to undermine an individual's sense of ontological security. Strategic goals are attempted by weaponizing grievances and socializing individuals through discursive tactics such as direct address, power and identity management, and framing. The findings are that extremist content and discourse is strategically oriented at destabilizing and undermining an individual's sense of ontological security.

Abstrakt

Tato práce zkoumá vztahy mezi extremistickým obsahem a ontologickou bezpečností s využitím jediného případového studia manisfestu z Christchurch. Cílem je aplikovat původní koncept ontologické bezpečnosti Anthonyho Giddense na radikalizaci a identifikovat roli ontologické bezpečnosti v radikalizaci. Radikalizace probíhá horizontálně, což znamená, že vzniká pocit komunity a zakořeňuje se v cílové osobě. Existující literatura se především zaměřuje na roli teoretických modelů, které jsou většinou vrstvené a konceptualizují fenomén jako proces eskalace spíše než integrace. Tato práce zkoumá, jak extremistický obsah ovlivňuje jednotlivce na úrovni ontologické bezpečnosti a jak může být ontologická bezpečnost zbraněna nebo ne. Využívá smíšený přístup k analýze diskurzu, aby odhalila intimní, složitou a strategickou povahu extremistického diskurzu a zjišťuje, že tento diskurz se snaží podkopat pocit ontologické bezpečnosti jednotlivce. Strategické cíle jsou dosahovány zbraněním stížností a socializací jednotlivců prostřednictvím diskurzních taktik, jako jsou přímý projev, správa moci a identity a rámce. Závěry ukazují, že extremistický

obsah a diskurz jsou strategicky zaměřeny na destabilizaci a podkopávání pocitu ontologické bezpečnosti jednotlivce.

Keywords

Radicalization, Far Right, Right Wing Extremism, Extremism, Manifesto, The Great Replacement, Ontological Security, Extremist Content

Klíčová slova

Radikalizace, Dálná pravice, Pravicový extremismus, Extremismus, Manifest, Velká výměna, Ontologická bezpečnost, Extremistický obsah

Title

Ontological Security, Radicalization and Violent Extremism: A Practical Approach

Název práce

Ontologická bezpečnost, radikalizace a násilný extremismus: Praktický přístup

Table of Contents

Introduction

"Until that time, Ullah had not been interested in politics, but he bought a book about ethnic cleansing against Muslims in Bosnia. Saleem also mentioned videos about massacres of Muslims in Chechnya and loaned him one…Ullah later said that watching the videos was inspirational: seeing Muslims from all over the world come and defend their fellow Muslims brought him 'a sense of brotherhood to a different level. . . I thought this is beautiful.' It changed him. He went to pray with Tanweer at the local mosque. They stopped listening to music and started listening to audiocassettes of nasheed (war songs without instrumental music) and speeches by preachers like Maulana Masood Azhar, which Saleem translated for Tanweer." – Marc Sageman, *The London Bombings* (2019)

One example of radicalization is the excerpt above from Marc Sageman's "*The London Bombers*". A young man encounters a specific individual holding radical views. This individual introduces ideas to him and is guided to specific content by the radicalized individual. Soon, multiple content mediums are integrated. Suddenly, his perception of the world is twisted to conform to what he sees in videos about war against people identified as his people, reads in books about ethnic cleansing, what he learns from discussions with peers, and hears in audio mediums, or reads on the internet. He becomes invested in the cause and soon, he is no longer in control.

Just as academics learn from one another, extremists do as well; extremist groups whose origins lie in the MENA region and emerging out of the Cold War and its rivalries adapted to both contemporary and then-emerging technologies which allowed them to extend their reach far beyond the region of origin. This involved the creation of decentralized networks of cells that were able to operate independently from the core group while still maintaining a structured hierarchy (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010). The content mentioned in the excerpt above was helpful in the radicalization of the London bombers. The connections made among those that frequented Iqra bookshop were particularly relevant in the radicalization of the London bombers (Sageman, ibid). Furthermore, the Madrid and London bombings

awakened western policymakers and security practitioners to the fact that terrorism was no longer coming from outside, but that a significant threat came from within (Crone & Harrow, 2011).

While Al-Qaeda (AQ) disseminated content for radicalization purposes (Hoffman, 2006; Kirby, 2007), and ISIS (Da'esh) leveraged mainstream social media platforms (Speckhard et al., 2018), the far right has capitalized on these tactics and harnessed the internet's capabilities as a platform for radicalization, mainstreaming their messages, and for operations (Voogt, 2017). This is accomplished through the exploitation of both online platforms like 4chan and mainstream (social) media. The Christchurch shootings exemplify this, with the attacker using 8chan and Facebook for content dissemination. Traditional media, adapting in their own way to perform better in a market dominated by the internet's click-based revenue model (Nielsen et al., 2016), amplifies sensational stories. The sensationalizing of stories like the Christchurch, El Paso, and Buffalo shootings provide a wider audience for extremist ideologies and conspiracy theories. This, in turn, gives documents such as extremist manifestos a much wider audience than they would have otherwise had.

This thesis delves into the intricacies of extremist content and discourse, focusing on its strategic communication and its impact on individuals. The objective is to understand how extremist materials aim to influence individuals. While there is a very small body of literature on the subject, the literature that exists is primarily oriented at looking at traits of extremist ideologies or dissemination rather than explicitly on the impact of the content itself or the strategic nature of extremists. This work is intended to build upon the pre-existing literature and fill this gap by exploring the Christchurch shooter's manifesto. This work applies Anthony Giddens' concept of Ontological Security as the theoretical lens and uses a mixed-methods single case study as its methodological framework.

Given the dissemination capabilities and the potential for a such a broad audience, the objective of this work is to answer the following questions, which are made up of one research question and two sub-questions:

RQ1: *Does extremist content utilize discourse in a strategic manner with the objective of fostering ontological insecurity?*

RQ2: *Is there a relationship between this sense of ontological insecurity and radicalization?*

What follows is the conceptualization of different terms utilized in both the literature review and the work itself, the ensuing structure is as such: the second chapter of this thesis is a review of literature surrounding the subjects of radicalization and extremism. The third chapter provides the theoretical framework of ontological security and explores both the concept itself and how it has been applied to international relations and its sub-field, international security studies. The fourth chapter outlines the methodology, a single case study of the Christchurch Manifesto deconstructed by integrating Fairclough's Method of critical discourse analysis and discursive psychology. Chapter five analyzes the manifesto, highlighting discursive strategies and tactics to prey on the ontological security of the reader. Chapter six contains the discussion, which connects the previous conceptualizations and literature to the analysis and findings and explores the implications of the work. Finally, the conclusion wraps the thesis up by briefly summarizing the work as a whole.

Radicalization

While not impossible, it would be remiss to mention radicalization without noting its rise after 9/11 as a focus of for academics, politicians, and security practitioners in conjunction to the study of terrorism (Schmid, 2016). Furthermore, there is a need to highlight that not

all of the conceptual models related to terrorism and radicalization consider only Islamist and far right terrorism or violent extremism; Sageman (2004), McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), and Horgan (2005) extensively discuss the IRA and PIRA as cases. Furthermore, David Rapoport (2016; 2022) highlights that terrorism is far from a new phenomenon.

The objective is to keep to the most sensible and simple definition. In this thesis, Radicalization is defined as a transitive verb used in describing "to make radical especially in politics" (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Luckily, the work of attempting to de-tangle the definitional web of terms like "radical" and "terrorist" (Sageman, 2008), who also pits the three "agendas" of terminology against one another, has already been done. The latter part is vital and as muddying as the conceptualization of radicalization itself, and simply a source of further problems. Thus, the word radical needs a meaning.

Sedgewick (2010) notes that terms such as "radical" and "moderate" or "normal" are relative, yet in the context of this thesis, someone who is radical or an idea that can be categorized as radical indicates an inflexibility in ideology or belief regarding extreme personal or group views. The definition of radical, while involving extreme views, does not implicate the need for violence such as someone defined as a violent extremist would commit. Another distinction to be made is that a radical and a terrorist are also not the same, just as a terrorist and an (violent) extremist are also not.

Terrorism

Terrorism's subjectivity makes it a difficult phenomenon to properly conceptualize. The issue of "one man's freedom fighter is another's terrorist", the varying reasons for acts of terror, the diversity of organizations and governments around the world that have their own definitions of terrorism. These issues and other are mentioned by Schuurman et al. (2018),

who has compiled a short list and summary of the definitional problems of terrorism. However, Alex Schmid (2012) has probably done the most work on trying to encapsulate the concepts of terrorism and extremism.

Terrorism, however, is both fought against and perpetrated by states while being experienced by the global population. It often functions as a means to an end, and therefore, it is not necessary for the terrorist to be an extremist (Freedman, 2007). This is where terrorism and violent extremism differ; as Borum and Neer (2017) note, terrorism is acts of violence (as opposed to general threats or more general coercion) intentionally perpetrated on civilian non-combatants with the goal of furthering some ideological, religious, or political objective." In the context of this work, terrorism is a strategy. The definition of terrorism here is a modified version of Freedman's (ibid) definition, who defines terrorism as a strategically-oriented tactic involving the "creation of a psychological effect" aimed at the construction of a political effect with the objective of modifying or changing the opponent's strategy through violent acts directed at soft targets (p. 320). To this end, Keven G. Ruby (2004) attempted to further the understanding of acts of terror by applying the concept of ontological security to acts of terror and how acts of terror affected the wider US population.

(Violent) Extremism

The term "extremism" has a quite a long history, and there are several good examples of definitions of extremism. Astrid Bötticher (2017) has attempted to trace the source of the history of the term in an effort to properly define it and gives several sources from which the word has been used in western society. The majority of Bötticher's conceptualization of extremism will be used; her conceptualization describes an extremist as someone who

supports an authoritarian, homogenized society seeking supremacy over those who may be considered different. However, while it has been illustrated that extremists seek to divide society with the objective of reaching the goals mentioned above, it does not always mean that they are bent on committing violence themselves. More often than not, they favor violent action over other methods of problem-solving.

However, the inclusion of violence as a necessary aspect of extremism is still up for debate. Alex Schmid (ibid) has written that the idea of a non-violent extremist is an oxymoron, thus separating the terms "radical" and "extremist", Schmid writes that *"Radicals might be violent or not, might be democrats or not, extremists are never democrats. Their state of mind tolerates no diversity"* (p. 10). Yet, this does not clear anything up regarding an extremist vs. a violent extremist. To put it simply, the difference is whether or not the individual has committed a violent act, leaving the question open-ended.

For the purpose of this thesis, it is concluded that there is no version of extremism (religious, political, or otherwise) that is non-violent. Without proper comprehension of what is happening, whether it be the psychological processes, the external events that cause "cognitive openings" (2004), or the acts themselves, those looking to push back cannot do so. This is precisely why comprehending ontological security's relation to radicalization by and of extremists is relevant to not only academia, but to those looking to combat extremism (even if it comes from their political or religious groups or leanings).

Far Right Extremism

The far right is not easy to define. In fact, the definition utilized here does not entirely encapsulate everything related to the far right. Yet, considering the nature of the work here, it is important to conceptualize and attempt to give a definition of the far right. Here, the far

right is conceptualized according to Elisabeth Carter's (2018) definition, "*an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism*" (p. 174). Carter uses Mudde's (1995, in Carter, 2018) work to identify the most featured characteristics mentioned in these definitions: racism, xenophobia, nationalism, authoritarianism, anti-democratic sentiment, and populism. However, the far right is not easy to define simply based on its features; no one individual actor or group defines the far right or embodies all its characteristics (Baele et al., 2021). One possibility is to abstract its more unique features, particularly its unique (plat)forms and forms of communication, copycatting, its penchant for conspiracy theories, and its ideological malleability.

The far right is fond of utilizing both social and traditional media sources to their advantage, yet the internet is where the far right's discourse is most salient. This discourse does not always come in the form of regular posts; quite frequently, a specific brand of humor in the form of memes, "shitposting", trolling is employed by the online far right (Baele et al., 2021; THOMAS, 2020). This type of communication is typically spread on fringe message board sites like 4chan, specifically in their politics (/pol) sections (Baele et al., 2021). Manifestos are particularly important to far right attackers. Breivik, Tarrant, and others have uploaded "manifestos" of varying lengths, with many being inspired by Breivik to both upload manifestos and commit violent acts, i.e., copycatting (Macklin & Bjørgo, 2021). As Kupper et al. (2022) note, Tarrant has also served as inspiration, moreso than Breivik, for other killings.

Another characteristic unique to the far right is its use of conspiracy theories. While conspiracy theories are not entirely unique to the far right, Basit (2021) highlights conspiracy theories such as QAnon, The Great Replacement, and 5G have had a profound effect on the ideology of the far right. These conspiracy theories have been weaponized by far-right violent extremists to encourage attacks and radicalize, particularly during the COVID-19

pandemic (Gunaratna & Pethő-Kiss, 2023; liram Koblentz-Stenzler & Pack, 2021). The far right often used conspiracy theories related to vaccines and 5G as talking points. The online elements of the far right are not the only ones who propagate these beliefs; public figures, such as political leaders and celebrities, who either identify with the far right or are supportive of the conspiracy theory do as well (L. Koblentz-Stenzler & Chavez, 2023). Furthermore, conspiracy theories have been found to be used to argue issues of identity and agency, construct power perceptions, and in general act as a device for framing of specific issues (Sapountzis & Condor, 2013). According to Sapountzis and Condor, they work within a larger framework of social identity theory and present a clear and more powerful antagonist to the in-group. Within the far right, this teleological mode of thinking is often constructed as cabals of hyperlocal, local, national, and international actors working together to eliminate the in-group such as in the Great Replacement and Great Reset conspiracy theories.

Last, the malleability of far-right ideologies is probably one of its most distinct features; as Baele et al. (2021) note, different versions of the far right exist in similar subcultures, all with distinct features. One clear example of this is the disagreement with Tarrant's choice of target on different chan sites (Baele et al., 2021). As Kyler Ong (2020) notes, this element of fractionalization "has fostered a culture of culling and cherry-picking ideologies that fit a particular individual's preconceived notions of the world…" (p. 2). This fractionalization is particularly relevant in the subcultures of different fringe sites. Another example is the fact that far right conspiracy theories have found ground in areas outside of Europe, North America, and Oceania. In particular, the Love Jihad conspiracy theory echoes the Great Replacement conspiracy theory, positing that Muslim males are converting and impregnating Hindu females to create a majority (Gökarıksel et al., 2019).

1. Literature Review

The role of discourse, content, and the construction of individual worldview perceptions are imperative to the study of extremism, radicalization, and terrorism. In the contexts of both jihadi extremism and the far right, they have been used to create and foster perceptions that lead to violence against soft targets, which can be defined as *civilians, any non-military or government institution with high concentrations of people* (Zdeněk Kalvach, 2016). The larger body of literature is not ignorant of the strategic role that discourse and content play in processes of radicalization, yet much of the literature is not directly concerned with the content as the primary focus or as a motivating element.

The first section looks at the larger literature on radicalization and explores the most salient theoretical models of radicalization, in which there are two subsections, first it looks at the "Whys" of radicalization, with a sub-section on grievances and their relation to the prevailing theoretical framework of this paper. Then, the "How" of the models are explored. The "How" contains a sub-section exploring the relation of how content works at the psychological level, expanding on the first section to bring the literature review itself full circle.

1.1 Models: How and Why?

Radicalization has been approached from different conceptual angles: psychological, individual, and collective; micro, meso, macro. This section explores the theoretical models and other literature in terms of *why* and *how* radicalization happens. Exploring the intersections and departures in radicalization literature gives a holistic view of the phenomenon itself rather than attempting to argue theoretical points of view. Furthermore, this is done with the intention of applying a more comprehensible view of radicalization and

the associated literature, particularly given that there are previous articles that have summarized and discussed the different models. Following this, this paper views the construction of ontological (in)security as being the "seed" from which radicalization "sprouts" and seeks to understand radicalization from a more practical and operationalizable perspective. Thus, the literature review takes this perspective rather than only the theoretical.

1.1.1 Why?

The study of terrorism, radicalization, and extremism came to immediate relevance in the wake of 9/ll, therefore Islamist groups and lone wolf Islamists in western society were the primary group studied for the better part of twenty years. What are generally dubbed micro and macro-level factors play a crucial role in the "why" of radicalization, that is, why radicalization happens. Micro factors are often considered the personal and psychological factors that influence the individual, while macro factors are largely still individual, they originate from the external world, such as public policy or social relations.

Nowhere is this view more present than in Veldhuis and Staun's (2009) Root Cause Model in which factors are split into two categories: Micro and Macro. Micro factors are considered at the individual and social levels. At the individual level, personal characteristics and experiences are considered, and at the social level, issues of identity, interaction and group processes, and relative deprivation are considered. In the macro category, globalization, poor social integration into the dominant culture, modernization, and international relations are given focus. Looking at the personal and psychological processes or features McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008) first step in their pyramid model describes personal victimization, personal grievances, and political grievances as the catalysts for the

radicalization process[1]. Similarly, Wiktorowicz (2004) argues that repression, torture, and other acts act as crises that "*shakes certainty in previously accepted beliefs and renders and individual more receptive to the possibility of alternative views and perspectives*" (p. 7). From Wiktorowicz's point of view, the crisis could be initiated by fateful moments in life such as job loss or the death of someone close. This extends to larger-scale factors such as racism, and humiliation, a sense of cultural weakness, and even blocked social mobility.

Moghaddam (2005) and Horgan (2005) expand on the idea of the cognitive opening, but from a different perspective. Moghaddam notes that while personal factors may be involved in the radicalization process, the factors are more psychological than material (p. 162). Parallel to Velhaus and Staun (2009), Moghaddam (2005) notes macro factors such as poor integration and international relations may cause grievances to emerge, particularly among minorities. Departing from this, however, Moghaddam does not consider micro or macro factors, but rather that these elements cause a psychological perceived deprivation, specifically "*fraternal* deprivation" (p. 163). John Horgan (2005) perceives push and pull factors as affecting the process of becoming radicalized. The factors he mentions are "emotional vulnerability", social or political grievances, "identification with victims", belief that violence is the answer, rewards for martyrdom or participation, association with those already involved (p. 85). In *The Psychology of Terrorism* (Horgan, 2005), he recognizes that there may be a catalyst event, however, he notes that the event described may be given more importance or unreliable.

Identity crises and feelings of abstracted social impotence and exclusion prompted

[1] It must be mentioned that McCauley and Moskalenko identify radicalization as happening at the group and "mass" levels as well. While this thesis does not discard the idea that groups and masses are radicalized, it does support the view that radicalization happens first and foremost on the individual level; the latter are made up of individuals, therefore it follows that it must be the individuals in the group that are radicalized and have the choice of subscribing to the prevailing group logic or not.

by larger-scale factors are both accepted and discarded (Silke, 2008; Silke & Brown, 2016). This view is also present at the first floor of Moghaddam's Staircase model, noting feelings of an absence of choice or agency (p. 163). However, the cause of the crisis depends on the individual but may vary between deeply personal issues and events and group or societal-level issues. Returning to Velhaus and Staun (2009), at the micro-level, identity is an important factor, and as such, globalization and modernization (p. 34). Moghaddam also highlights globalization as a threat to personal or collective identity as a factor (p. 163), particularly regarding those attempting to integrate into a new society or as a minority. Furthermore, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) discuss Ted Kaczynski and his aversion to the growth of technology and aversion to an unwanted future, although psychological issues are all but discarded as a factor in radicalization (2008, p. 419, 2011, pp. 24–26), Kaczynski's personal experience with psychological experiments must not go disregarded.

Some scholars recognize socioeconomic factors as not being particularly relevant given the personal and individual-dependent nature of radicalization, and in some contexts, that may be the case (Post et al., 2003; Sageman, 2004; Schuurman et al., 2018). Silke (2008), however notes social marginalization, discrimination, and status/personal rewards as factors in radicalization. Yet, combining these views with those of McCauley and Moskalenko at the group or social level may reveal insights as to why some individuals may become radicalized or join extremist groups in the absence of socioeconomic factors. As Post et al. (2003) found, factors such as economic support and perceived community acceptance played a role in whether or not an individual joined an Islamist group. Yet the study is limited by only considering terrorists from Palestinian groups rather than taking from a more diverse sample group.

Thus, the "whys" of radicalization can be described as individual-dependent and

varied. The literature illustrates a dynamic and flexible phenomenon that is dependent largely upon the individual and their circumstances. While individual material and psychological factors may play a role in radicalization, the literature shows that their coinciding with larger abstract systems and circumstances play a pivotal role. The issue here is that there is a gap in the "why". This gap is evident in the fact that there are those who suffer these grievances, yet do not resort to extremism or violence. The gap is also reflective of some of the disagreements, such as that regarding the influence of socioeconomic factors. A look at the literature makes it clear that grievances undoubtedly contribute to radicalization, but do they contribute to radicalization or something else?

Grievances

Sherry Lowrance (2006) states that "Without grievances, there would be no reason to engage in most forms of political action" (p. 169). Rather than identifying grievances in a micro/meso/macro structure, Ajil (2020) identifies three ideal grievance types: socioeconomic; racial, ethnic and religious; and political. Ajil suggests that grievances should not be ignored or depoliticized to allow for a more comprehensive study of radicalization that ventures outside the post-9/11 academic box in which the subject has found itself.

Moral outrage at violence against one's identified (opposite) ethnic and religious groups, particularly in the context of international conflict, has been discussed as an element found at the beginning of radicalization processes (Sageman, 2011). Lowrance (2006) discusses the relationship between ethnic identity and grievances. She states that minority individuals face difficult choices, particularly in states (or dominant majorities) seen as subjugators of the minority. This choice is often one of choosing sides either with the state/majority or with the minority group. Her findings are that the stronger one clings to a

specific identity; the more prevalent grievances are. It is the latter part here that is particularly relevant, yet not all who harbor grievances stemming from an ethnic or cultural identity are a minority, such as the case with the far right.

Lakhani's (2014) account of the intricacies of radicalization from the perspective of Muslims in the UK also give an account of how grievances affect the target individual and how the radicalizer may weaponize these grievances. Lakhani explores Muslim social, ethnic, religious, and national identity, comparing these aspects to exclusion, discrimination, and the treatment of Muslims in the media. Thus, they connect these phenomena to the construction of an "us vs. them" perception of Muslims vs. the "west".

Following this, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) note that "social exclusion may create conflict" and that a "Lack of economic opportunity may…contribute to…an oppositional identity" (p. 739). They draw on a plethora of prior literature to understand how economic conditions are connected to identity, particularly those identities linked to gender and poverty. Social identity grievances play an important role in radicalization. As Lowrance (2006), Lakhani (2014), and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) found, an individual's social identity (culture, ethnicity, religion) are easy targets for those seeking to radicalize. Lakhani gives the example of the UK's Muslim diaspora. Here, the same could be applied to the far right; one of the Christchurch shooter's claims, is that the "White European Christian" is under attack. The attack comes at the individual along with their tradition, culture, and the entirety of their existence. While the lack of the minority element is present in reality, it is an integral part of the narrative of "The Great Replacement" conspiracy theory. Furthermore, it neatly represents a narrative that frames an ontological threat to its constituent population.

Marsden and Copeland (2020) found large-scale indicators such as a country's GDP are unreliable as an indicator of radicalization, yet they note that those in the middle of the socioeconomic spectrum are more likely to engage in terrorism than those at the extremities.

Concurrently, they found that weak economies and times of general global economic hardship increase the possibility of terrorism and extremism. Furthermore, Singer, et al. (2019), like Giddens, notes specialization and an acute compartmentalization of not only knowledge, but social life combined with other rapid transformations led to fewer opportunities for social and economic mobility, and thus an exacerbation of (economic) anxiety. According to their study, individuals lacking sufficient financial security and/or perceive societal economic conditions as negative are more likely to be more supportive of harsher punishments for criminals (pg. 197).

Subsequently, Katz (2008) notes how anxieties produced by a future with limited economic prospects negatively affect children (primarily in the US). She highlights this by pointing out that increased competition and limited economic possibilities while consumerism is drastically pressed on younger generations has negative effects on children. She writes that all of this is happening in a sociopolitical and economic environment in which the boundaries between childhood and adulthood are torn down and hopes for the future are channeled into the child as the reliever of anxiety over the future.

Both Singer et al. (2019) and Katz's (2008) studies illustrate the role that economic insecurity plays in building anxiety. In the manifesto examined here, the following sentence is present,

> *"For too long those who have profited most from the importation of cheap labour have gone unpunished. The economic elites who line their pockets with the profit received from our own ethnic replacement."*

In market economies, the preoccupation over one's financial situation and socioeconomic standing may lead to preoccupations regarding the future. Such worry is characterized by a lack of control over the future. Tarrant, for example, relates financial and socioeconomic grievances to those he holds regarding his social identity, which he largely sees as integral

to his own existential identity.

Political grievances can largely be incorporated into the former two types of grievances: for example, minority representation and deficient civil rights for specific groups. These issues and local political issues such as (perceived) repression or persecution of specific groups fuel negative perceptions of unjust governments and corruption (Akram, 2014; Tanner, 2011).However, these grievances follow for societies wherein the repression or violence is directed toward those of opposing political ideology such as in Latin America where while repression often takes the form of excluding indigenous voices, violence has typically been between opposing political and economic ideologies.

Relative to the framework of ontological security, the processes of globalization can be seen as a threat to traditional society (Kinnvall, 2004; Ozer, 2019). For example, Cuesta and Murshed (2013) identify the inequalities brought about by globalization as a potential source of polarization and relative deprivation. Moghaddam's (2008; 2005) works underscore psychological implications of globalization: constant cultural negotiation; absence of trust due to local ties and traditional structures; impacts of distant events on the individual, leading to an uncertainty and anxiety relative to agency in immediate and global surroundings; and social group reactions to the threat posed by globalization to their social identity.

Like Hogg (2021), Ozer and Obaidi (2022) identify group identification as reducing uncertainty-induced anxiety and a strong defense of worldview and ethnic identifications. Furthermore, they note that exclusionary reactions as occurring when "identity salience is high and a cultural threat is present" (p. 119). In other words, when individuals are more frequently exposed to issues regarding their (social) identity and there is a perceived threat to that identity, then they are likely to have exclusionary reactions. The authors highlight this as compromising "the founding ingredients for radicalization trajectories fueled by

globalization and intergroup contact" (p. 120). Furthermore, Ozer et al. (2023) found that one negative reaction to globalization is ethnic defense, in which one feels the safety of their sociocultural context is threatened. They posit that this, combined with globalization can foster a "radicalized emphasis and salience on ethnicity" (p. 24). Lastly, the authors highlight that globalization can be seen as facilitating processes of mutual radicalization in which inter-group conflicts are fueled by technological advancements brought on by globalization. These can be seen to have spurred on the processes of radicalization and brought them into the digital realm.

Yet, it seems that the answer to the role grievances play in radicalization and extremism has been confused. One positive example comes from Lakhani (2014), who attempts to establish a link from grievances and social processes to radicalization. This is particularly relevant given the number of authors that highlight identity, globalization, socioeconomic concerns, modernity, and other real or perceived existential threats to existence as influencing factors. However, these are not representative of radicalization so much as ontological insecurity.

What this means is that while grievances play a role in radicalization, their role is relative to an individual's sense of ontological security more than radicalization. As seen from the example above of Tarrant's manifesto, ethnic and socioeconomic grievances fit a narrative that reveals Tarrant's own insecurities. It's illustrative of grievances that have either been artificially constructed or formed organically and have subsequently threatened the individual's self-biography. These grievances are then capable of being fit into the mold of an extremist narrative. This narrative provides a black and white explanation and a culpable party for the reason the individual feels such ontological insecurity, the threat to their future existence.

If ontological insecurity becomes the central "why" and grievances become the

building blocks of that sense of insecurity, then the next question is how were they weaponized to engender a sense of ontological insecurity, and how was this sense of ontological insecurity subsequently utilized? It is quite clear that content, narrative, and strategic communication play an integral role in reaching the individual to utilize grievances to foster a sense of ontological insecurity. Yet, it seems that in the study of terrorism, radicalization, and extremism, the content itself is often overlooked. Is it because it is assumed that its effects are implied? Is it because academics and practitioners are afraid of appearing to sympathize with terrorists (Ajil, 2020)? While these questions are out of scope, the examples of Lakhani's sample, the London bombers, and Tarrant give some clues to bing answering the question of how the grievances were utilized, and as such, how content works in relation to radicalization.

1.1.2 How?

Regardless of academic perspective, it seems that social networks, both in-person and digital, play an essential role in how radicalization (and recruitment) happens. Horgan and Taylor (2006) describe the pathway involved in the radicalization process as individually and contextually dependent, although identifying the individual is not clear-cut. As Horgan (2008) notes, the question that profiling seeks to answer and the factors above do not necessarily constitute a movement toward terrorism or extremism but are particularly relevant at the initial stages.

Thus, academics and practitioners such as Wiktorowicz (2004), Sageman (2004), and Bakker (2006) employ Social Movement Theory to explain how radicalization happens as a social process. They support the idea of the cognitive opening as the catalyst for radicalization. Subsequently, an individual's prior association with radicalized individuals

or exposure to radical ideas is another impetus for the process. As Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) notes, Wiktorowicz and Sageman differ in their views regarding networks and approach; Wiktorowicz approaches radicalization from a top-down perspective, meaning that while the event that causes the cognitive opening is a factor, radicalization itself happens at the group level through socialization. Sageman (2004, in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 804) takes a broader perspective, looking at extremist groups on an international level rather than the local level. He argues that radicalization in the contemporary world happens as a bottom-up process, through the medium of the internet.

Following association is participation in discussions centered on grievances and social or political issues such as discrimination. In these community settings, radical worldviews and the individual's social identity are (re)constructed. Moghaddam (2005, p. 165) notes that "*the terrorist organization becomes effective by mobilizing sufficient resources to persuade recruits to become disengaged from morality…and morally engaged in the way that morality is constructed by the terrorist organization."* Subsequently, he notes "*isolation, affiliation, secrecy, and fear*" as tactics utilized by terror organizations as persuasive elements, but that once in, views are constructed, and perceptions changed. Thus, in-group and out-group "us vs. them" attitudes promoted, but that despite this, there must be a belief that violence is the only answer and a "just means to an ideal end" (p. 166).

Aidan Kirby (2007, p. 416) argues that the self-starter (terrorist) phenomenon be analyzed "in the appropriate context." The context is one in which contemporary methods of mass communication provide nearly unfettered access to information and global peer-to-peer connection. Meleagrou-Hitchens et al. (2017) have highlighted the usefulness and utilization of social media as a platform for dissemination and social networking. Their study looked at both far right and radical Islam, particularly its function as a social network that works in ways similar to real-life social networks. As such, former top-down hierarchical

systems and the requirement of explicit and direct support from the organizations working within the system are no longer central to radicalization; radicalization and involvement in extremist groups has become horizontal (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 804). Although, a good question would be: Was it ever not? Much discussed here indicates that despite the factors that may "prime" someone for radicalization or joining extremist groups or communities, the element of the social network is imperative.

While radicalization may be viewed as a puzzle or process, what are its inner workings? Whether it be (forcibly or otherwise) attending IRA (Horgan, 2005) training camps, immersing oneself in discussions with radical religious peers, or participating in radical online forums, what is happening? Constructing desires and influencing individuals through the proper construction of communication is well understood by marketing departments and psychologists (Abid et al., 2023; Braca & Dondio, 2023; Peighambari et al., 2016), so why is the same process ignored when studying the radicalization process?

How: Content, Social Networks, and Socialization

The role of extremist content has been explored in a limited manner in the larger literature relative to terrorism, extremism, and radicalization. Extremist groups, particularly the far right and jihadist groups, understand the effectiveness of content's grassroots nature given the direct line of communication with the individual citizen (Brachman, 2006; MELEAGROU-HITCHENS et al., 2017). Implications regarding research and policy are particularly relevant given its direct and global reach and strategic nature.

Jarret M. Brachman (2006) looked at content type and distribution relative to jihadi terrorism. He notes that the internet, specifically, has been a multi-functional tool used for propaganda dissemination, planning, and *"identify, recruit, and socialize new membership"* (p. 151). Like the far right, Jihadi content on the internet has been disseminated on discussion

forums utilized these to spread videos, audio, provide training, and even offer jihadi "job openings". One specific content area where the far right and violent Islamists have converged is in the domain of interactive entertainment, video games (p. 156). These convergences are striking and allow for another dimension of content to incorporate into an already wide variety.

Video has played an important role in both ideologies. James Farwell (2011) highlighted the role that video and the content in video has played in Islamist extremism. He argues that the media sphere is where the battle is fought, and that *"kinetic operations are geared to achieving political information effects, not winning tactical military engagements."* (p. 18) More specifically, he highlights that videos construct the wet as an existential, obliterating threat to Islam; how through the strategic and tactical articulation of discourse and images, charismatic leaders such as Bin Laden have been constructed as political or religious heroes. Farwell gives examples of *nasheed* being utilized in Taliban videos. He notes the use of combat successes and gives one example illustrating the Taliban's using the death of a Muslim teenager and the discourse within the video, which claims that the individual was killed by those who had "abandoned" the religion. Furthermore, Roxanne L. Euben (2015) has explored themes of humiliation and masculinity in Islamist discourse. She noted that much of the rhetoric around humiliation involves themes of emasculation of Muslim men's ability to protect the Muslim world and that the role of women's bodies as holy sites in need of salvation from degradation by rapacious western men. This is similar to the Love Jihad discussed earlier with women, and more specifically their bodies, being portrayed as a salvation from destruction for the cultural identity.

Studying the far right, Kupper et al. (2022) has looked at the intertextuality of far-right discourse regarding copycatting through the contagion lens. They note that this

intertextuality reveals a 5-stage model, in which the first step is studying the manifestos of previous attackers and corresponding live-streams. They note that these function as an instruction manual for the attacker. Subsequently, the composure of a new manifesto that includes content referential of previous attackers. Then, an attack announcement on their chosen platform. At this stage, the tactic is employed to provoke reactions by *"intended and unintended"* (p. 15) audiences. Finally, the broadcast of the act itself.

Baele et al.'s (2021) study underscores the fragmentation of the far right on *"chan"* boards. The note that the far right has become increasingly fragmented due to radicalization in specific niches. This study is particularly relevant as it reveals insights into how the ideology can be twisted and violent or extremist ideas and "blame" can be cherry-picked, illustrating how different versions of a single ideology can be construct different sources of anxiety. It does not, however, illustrate how they are constructed, only that they are.

While the literature highlights the utilization of media, distribution of content, and differing elements of ideology, they contain brief accounts of the intended consequences. Furthermore, only one includes examples of specific material intended to cause anxiety or radicalization, but in a context different from this study. Although the literature's insights are valuable, other literature may be more helpful.

Therefore, Terror Management Theory (TMT) and Uncertainty-Identity Theory (UIDT) are effective lenses for how the social aspect of radicalization occurs at the content and discourse levels. TMT has primarily looked at the effects of mortality salience, the exposure to death. UIDT looks at how uncertainty and anxiety affect the individual. The combination of the two is effective here, particularly since both theorize that exposure to death and death anxiety causes individuals to adhere more to groups. Mortality salience, exposure to death or death-related content, and death anxiety is highly prevalent in the content, even if that death lies far in the future or abstracted from the individual's immediate

existence. Furthermore, while the discourse is consumed at the individual level, it is also shared and consumed collectively and discussed at the group level, whether that group be several people in the same room, or people living far away connecting on online forums.

TMT ‘s exploration of mortality salience has several implications regarding group identification, culture and self-esteem, worldview and in-group defense, and idolatry and hero-worship. Champions of TMT (Greenberg et al., 1994; Pyszczynski et al., 1997, 1999) suggest that mortality salience provokes identification with cultural institutions and groups, specifically those that confirm their worldview. Mortality salience and identification with the in-group also promotes a more ardent defense of the worldview and the in-group (Greenberg et al., 1994; Pyszczynski et al., 1997). Furthermore, in-group defense has also been explored regarding the favorability of those who promote the in-group culture, and the opposition to opponents of the in-group and in-group culture (Pyszczynski et al., 1997, p. 5). Devraj-Kizuk (2014) explores TMT in relation to religious extremism, highlighting how the roles of hero and anti-hero may cause individuals to perform acts that essentially cross their moral red lines.

As Hogg (2014), following Hofstede (1983, 2001), notes, the need to relieve the anxiety caused by uncertainty occurs particularly *“in times of great social upheaval and transformation”* (p. 340), when individuals become uncertain about their (potential) mortality status, and when uncertainty is high in general. In UIDT, anxiety emanates from this uncertainty and can reduce anxiety through self-categorization, which allows for a depersonalization of the self (p. 226). In turn, this depersonalization opens up the opportunity for the self and its features to be governed by the prescriptive and descriptive prototype of the in-group. In the case of extremist groups, this prototypical depersonalization occurs in reference to *“highly orthodox prototypes”* (Hogg, 2000, p. 243), prototypes that offer very clear prescriptions and descriptions of the ideal individual.

Nathaniel Swigger (2013), studying how social media affects views on democracy, highlights the similarities between socialization both online and in the real world. He notes that in both cases, social networks set norms and expectations (p. 591) and that individuals who were previously politically inactive may become politically active due to online contacts. Laurel Anderson and Deborah Brown McCabe (2012) define socialization as *"the preparation of newcomers to become members of an existing social group"* (p. 241) that constructs the individual as a positive group prototype. In this process, longer-involved members instruct novices to develop the desired prototype.

As the literature discussed above, in the "How" section, insists, social networks and socialization are key. UIDT and TMT's positions on self-categorization, worldview defense, and depersonalization are valuable here; these networks foster extreme worldviews that insulate the individual from external perceptions and cause the individual to depend on them for social inclusion and interaction (MELEAGROU-HITCHENS et al., 2017). In much of the content and discourse of extremist subcultures, mortality salience and existential anxiety is deeply embedded in the content, given that much of the basis for the ideology is centered on the destruction of the subscribing group. Furthermore, Castano et al. (2011) found that individuals' political views were further fortified by mortality salience and reminders of existential anxiety.

It seems that much of the socialization process is affected by exposure to anxiety-inducing material. For instance, Blee (1996) highlights that individuals who joined racial groups in the United States were socialized to the belief that the Jewish community was behind a grand conspiracy. The excerpt from Sageman's book on the London bombers illustrates this well, as does Tarrant. Tarrant was part of a much broader online community that utilizes attack simulations, spreads hateful and violent rhetoric, often underpinned by conspiracy theories and disinformation. While not a comprehensive list of all versions of

extremism, this list quite clearly illustrates socialization to content threats to the individual's and group's future.

Ideologies play an important role in the socialization process. Donald Holbrook and John Horgan (2019) write that *"ideology, in the form of some sort of engagement with political or religious beliefs and ideas, typically defines acts of violence as terrorism..."* (p. 5). Furthermore, they highlight how ideology defines social roles and *"the pull of immaterial rewards such as salvation through martyrdom"* (p. 7). One example is the Great Replacement, which assigns the roles of heroes, victims, and villains to specific actors, identifying one as a "*great evil*" (Devraj-Kizuk, 2014, p. 60) that must be purged from the earth for the victims to continue their existence. However, the ideology may vary depending on the social network or group in which the individual participates. Subsequently, the ideology fits into the group narrative. As stated above in the section on Grievances, the (extremist) narrative gives easy explanations and supplies the individual with the threat to their future existence.

This study is primarily focused on the objective of this content referent to the individual's ontological security. Therefore, while grievances are utilized for the purpose of fostering ontological insecurity, the reason for the individual's overall ontological insecurity is given focus through the group's ideology. This is the construction of the existential threat. The individual is introduced to this ideology by longer-serving members, who socialize newer or prospective members through exposure to content that promotes the ideology.

2. Theoretical Framework

Ontological security was first defined by Giddens (1991) as "a sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual"

(p 243). This section deconstructs this concept for operationalization in the context of the current work. However, a clarification is in order; Giddens does not define identity in the traditional sense of a social identity or that which can necessarily be assigned; Giddens's version of identity is much more complex. In Giddens's terms, identity is the individual's continual and reflexive construction of themselves in relation to the perceived and unconsciously present the external world. Therefore, rather than being defined strictly by an individual's economic class, skin color, religion, or ethnicity, the individual is conceived as a constantly evolving self-biography. Trust and faith in an absence of anxiety is the existential crux upon which the safety and stability of this self-biography is maintained.

In Chapter 2, Giddens asks: "How is faith in the external world achieved in terms of psychological development? What creates a sense of ontological security that will carry the individual through transitions, crises, and circumstances of high risk?" Giddens highlights the significance of trust, hope, and courage, as relevant to the unconscious emotional commitment required to have "faith". Trust and the concept of a routine, formed in the early years of life between infants and their caretakers instill within the individual both a perception of reality and trust that the reality and routines which they experience will not be perturbed by anxiety; as individuals come to trust the world around them, and that the routines they have cultivated and nurtured through their creation and subsequent maintenance will exist in absence of any aberration.

This world becomes their "normal" world and is taken for granted and exists unconsciously. In other words, individuals experience trust on a profound level that exists in a framework of networks of ordered and predictable social interactions connected cultivated by the individual and the rest of society, which both unconsciously consider routine. These networks consequentially cultivate an unconscious trust, a faith, in the world around individuals and that they will not be introduced to any anxiety that might disturb any element

therewithin. Thus, absent these routines, whether conscious or unconscious, there is also experienced an absence of an emotional acceptance of external reality, subsequently introducing insecurity; one's acceptance of this external reality, Giddens writes, is the seed of self-identity, where one learns the differentiation between themselves and the external world. This self-identity is only secure because it is built upon the preceding trust of external reality, and thus both conscious and unconscious routine, and routine elements that create the networks that bind and secure trust in that external reality, which thus provide us with our Ontological Security, our security of "being" and security in who we are.

The primary threat to ontological security is anxiety, which Giddens defines as essentially an unorganized, objectless fear, the center of which is the idea of loss, initially of the absence of the primary caregiver, but later of one's "awareness of self-identity", which is essentially a threat to one's sense of existing as a separate entity from the external world (p. 45). Giddens's explanation of anxiety differs from what is thought of as a conventional fear precisely because the threat that anxiety poses is an *internalized* threat and has no known origin. The need for a sense of security, and an existence free from anxieties that may threaten one's identity and the stability provided by the trust that one develops early on in the stability provided by routine, networks, and acceptance and of the external object world (including the absence, and the mastery of absence, of the caretaker and others). Therefore, it is necessary to comprehend how we understand the "other".

As such, individuals develop a self-biography, a self-narrative, that needs constant maintenance to ensure the continuance of stability. Maintenance of the individual's "self-biography" is where reflexivity comes in. This maintenance comes in many forms; to stave off anxiety, the individual is constantly reinventing themselves and adjusting to the external environment to stave off the anxiety. Ontologically insecure individuals experience: a lack of continuity regarding their autobiography, subsequently experiencing feelings of anxiety

about “being obliterated, engulfed, crushed, or overwhelmed by externally impinging events.” (p. 53); Obsessive worry over possible risks to their existence. One of the solutions that individuals seek is to “blend with the environment” to escape perceived threats or dangers.; individuals fail to develop a sense of self-trust.

Hence, ontological insecurity refers to an experience of existential uncertainty arising from the interruption or cessation of trust in the existential foundations of reality at both emotional and cognitive levels. This disturbance disrupts or dismantles the usual assumptions about the everyday aspects of life that are typically accepted without question. According to Giddens the umbrella source of ontological security is the loss of self-identity, but under that would be control, followed by the sub-categories of the future and change in the external world. He writes *“There are risks which we all confront, but which, as individuals – and perhaps even collectively – none of us can do much about.”* (p. 131).

Regarding the future, Giddens writes that in contemporary society, the options presented and the risks associated with them are more intense than in traditional society; traditional society, he writes, was dominated by religious notions of fate and destiny, yet modern society no longer operates on such beliefs, but rather “open human control of the social world” (p. 109). Yet, he writes, notions of fate and destiny have not disappeared; they have transformed into “*fateful moments”*, or *“consequential changes”*, which are distinct from the conventional “soup vs. salad” situation. These moments of consequential change and choice, Giddens writes, are most distressing when coinciding with “alarms”.

Alarms are described as unwanted events that potentially penetrate the identetical shell. These moments are such that they cause the individual to question “routinized habits of relevant kinds” (p.131). The image that Giddens paints regarding anxieties related to the future and consequential moments of decision is pungent and illustrates that one major source of anxiety comes from a lack of control over these relevant moments; these moments

are connected in the way that consequential moments have an effect on the path one's future may take, therefore obliging the individual to take stock of all possibilities and associated risks of choices available to the chooser. However, should the individual not be able to adapt to the possibility of change, the change itself, or the moment of questioning routine, therein may lie the advent of anxiety and ontological (in)security. This occurs either through the discontinuation of the self-biography or the perception that such change presents or has a high possibility to present a threat to the individual's existence.

3. Methodology

This thesis utilizes Norman Fairclough's method of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and discursive psychology (DP). These methods were chosen due to their flexibility and the need of a thorough, bottom-up approach. Fairclough's version of CDA aims to link language, power, and ideology (2001). DP looks at language with respect to creating social outcomes. Fairclough's method focuses on revealing connections to actors' relative power, focusing on "*the ideological nature of language*" (p. 2). It assumes, as does DP, that language and is a social phenomenon and an integral part of society and vice versa. As such, language is constructed and constructive, seeing language as a medium of exercising power and reinforcing social structures or enacting "social struggles". One of these social struggles is the ideological struggle that takes place through language and "over" language and discourse (p. 73). Fairclough's method is generally titled the Three-Dimensional Model; it looks at how the larger social context influences discourse and how text is utilized to reinforce the dominant ideologies and power structures or revolt against them. While the manifesto does convey some elements of gaining power over the cognitive reasoning of the intended audience, it is not created by elites. This is important in respect to Fairclough's model

because it is a sociological model typically utilized to study elite discourse.

Several features of Fairclough's model make it applicable to the material. First, its ability to be used with other methods, whether it be with quantitative methods or other critical methods of analysis (Fairclough, 2003). This work incorporates DP to supplement the findings of the analysis and sometimes draws on analytical empirical elements from DP. Using the two methods in conjunction, the analysis would be too limited in its findings and not provide an accurate picture of the text. Second, its ability to work at multiple levels, thus the incorporation of a three-tiered (macro, meso, micro) model is possible within Fairclough's own three-tiered framework. Fairclough's model can be used at the textual and discursive levels, while applying them to the larger structure of the text. This makes the application of DP and the three dimensions of Fairclough's analysis a much less arduous task than if the text was taken line-by-line. Third, it's interoperability with DP. Discursive psychology and Fairclough's functional views to language's role in social interactions are similar, integrating textual and discursive features to analyze discourse and the construction of not only the text itself, but utilizing the construction of text to understand the construction of discourse, narratives, and how discourse works strategically. This makes DP an ideal candidate to reinforce the analysis where Fairclough's method where needed, particularly given the content's sensitivity.

Discursive psychology (DP) is a social psychological research method developed principally by Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter (1992). Critical psychologists emphasize the linguistic construction of events with the objective of performing a specific function in a specific context (Gibson & Jacobson, 2018). DP is part of social constructionism, a movement that asserts that knowledge and understanding are constructed socially. Sally Wiggins's (2017) definitive textbook outlining the theory and use of DP as a research method was used as a guide for applying the principles and selected analytical elements.

According to Wiggins (p. 8), there are three core principles upon which DP functions: construction, social context, and action-orientation.

First, discourse is both constructed and constructive, meaning that the nuances of language, such as the verbal and non-verbal characteristics of speech create the discourse itself. Therefore, the constructed discourse is also constructing a version of the world, what we consider to be reality. Next, that it is situated within a social context. For Wiggins this means that it is always situated in an interactional context, meaning that discourse always occurs in social interactions, such as online fora. Second, that it always occurs within a rhetorical framework, where implicit alternate realities are countered by the dominant rhetoric. Finally, discourse is action-oriented within the social framework, meaning that discourse serves a purpose, that it is intentional to the social context in which it occurs. Everything from diction to semantics and syntax is vital to understanding discourse, the role of discourse in social interactions, and how discourse is utilized to achieve a social outcome (see Wiggins, 14-15).

3.2 Selection

Dealing with the resources utilized in this thesis is delicate; there are a number of perceived realities involved which include power, authority, and agency. The following material was selected for study based on its availability and their impact on global politics and individuals. Given that a grand part of the discourse analyzed in IR and security studies is focused on elites, it must be noted that elites, specifically political leaders, are not often the individuals writing their speeches nor are they unaware of how to disguise or blur reality to control social perceptions and create a dominant discourse. Studying the discourse of what

are assumed to be everyday individuals and the manifesto of an individual who has committed violent acts due in part to content of specific websites gives a more grounded view of the social and psychological perspectives of extremist content.

A single case is used for the opportunity of a more profound textual deconstruction. In this case, the content studied is the Christchurch shooter's manifesto. The Christchurch Manifesto was chosen for several reasons: first, its real-life representation of online far-right sub-cultures. Such features include its use of self-depreciating, sarcastic humor, trolling, and hero worship. Second, its textual qualities given the larger social and political contexts in which it was written. Third, its impact on global society regarding both (primarily western) politics, copycat killings, and the amount of content present in the document.

The 74-page document influenced various copycat events and sparked high-level government debate on firearms control at a time of tensions in the west regarding the topic conjunctionally with debates around the impact of racial supremacy and extremism. Last, the contemporary far-right has become a group that interacts socially at all levels and ideological promotional materials are often written or published (whether digital or physical) in English., although it is not limited to western or primarily English-speaking societies (Yaoren & Abdul Nasir, 2021).

4. Analysis

The following analysis presents a single case study that applies discursive psychology within Fairclough's method of CDA as outlined in *Language and Power* (2001). It employs a three-tiered approach - macro, meso, and micro - to deconstruct the text of an extremist manifesto. This deconstruction first looks at the wider structure of the argument and features of the discourse that allow for the construction of the narrative to take place. It then delves into

identity construction within the larger swaths of text, building upon the previous by exploring the larger strategic discursive elements employed to construct identities between the reader and audience, the "other", and the broader society to examine how Tarrant constructs and manages stakeholder identities. Finally, the analysis looks at the deeper textual choices to further construct identity and give the impression of an ontological security issue.

This section aims to assess the impact of the document relative to ontological security. Breaking from the standard analytical concept of external factors like grievances and profiling, the chosen approach offers a more intimate and thorough understanding of the intricacies of extremist materials and their influence on the individual. Understanding the roles that actors play in the text's narrative is pertinent to understanding how identity is not only constructed, but in the context of ontological security, how it is managed and utilized to create social outcomes (Wiggins, 2017). Thus, analyzing deeper textual elements and choices, and combining some elements of provide insight into how the other becomes a threat to the identity of the intended audience through the repetition of words and various other concepts. This work uses the terms text, and "the writer" or Tarrant's name as separate identifiers where and when considered necessary. The intention is to separate the author and the text itself; while the two are undoubtedly connected, the purpose of the study is not to psychoanalyze the author, but to achieve the goals set out by this work in terms of the selected material.

4.1 Macro: Power Dynamics and Textual Structure

This section serves as a macro analysis of the textual structure, covering the macro elements

of genre and structure, and writing style to assess the text as a whole. The more specific features of the text are covered in section 5.1b and 5.1c. Combining Fairclough's method of CDA and discursive psychology should reveal the construction of ideology, power dynamics, and intended effect on the reader. For the practical part of the structural analysis, CDA will be the analytical framework, while DP will provide insights into the social and psychological functions of the text relative to the analysis, although some elements of DP will be utilized for the practical aspect as well.

4.1.1 Genre and Text Structure

The structure of a text, situated both within and without its generic context, can illustrate and inform about ideology, power dynamics, social contexts, and how a text is either situated, or the role it plays in the wider social world. Fairclough (1993, 2003, 2013) extensively discusses genre and structure. In terms of Fairclough's meaning, genre is an abstract term referring to general forms of writing and discourse, not necessarily in terms of what is commonly thought of as fiction or non-fiction sub-genres, but in terms of the social relations of texts and discourse, such as accident reports, phone calls, job interviews, and other social and textual interactions. These typical genres feature what Fairclough calls "generic structure". This is how the text is organized based on which genre in which the text is situated. It must be noted that not all texts are organized or have a generic structure (Fairclough, 2003, p. 216).

Briggs and Bauman (1992) highlight intertextuality as a determining element of genre. The manifesto's intertextuality (Kupper et al., 2022; Macklin & Bjørgo, 2021) illustrates its inclusion into the *socially deviant/illicit* genre. This genre is characterized by a lack of structural elements, hate speech, and violent rhetoric, which is heavily present in

the manifesto. Intertextuality here is highlighted in the manifesto in phrases identified by Kupper et al (2022), such as Tarrant's statement of working as a *"kebab removalist"*, referenced by a separate shooter (p. 17). Furthermore, Tarrant followed Anders Breivik's lead in several aspects, such as the self-interview portion of his manifesto, the tedious preparations. Yet, Tarrant was influenced by others and heavily influenced others.

Regarding how genre and intertextuality affect this work, the *socially deviant/illicit* genre is part of an emerging genre. This genre has been identified as working in primarily offensive or radical contexts. In fact, Kupper, citing genre studies works (Bojsen-Møller et al., 2020; Gales, 2011), identifies this genre as intentionally socially upsetting and negatively affecting targets (p. 17), noting that rather than functioning as a threat, it serves a "community-building function" when such socially incorrect ideas are embraced, lending validity and usefulness to the user. These are both impactful lenses for this study; it means that since the genre is conducive such expression and functions in its specific constructive manner, the manifesto, working within the genre, intends for the reader to be part of this community, whether or not they already are. This inclusive function is built upon when looking at the writing style.

4.1.2 Writing Style

Fairclough (1993, 2001) and Misztal (2002) have written extensively about the shift to informality in text and discourse. Two crucial elements of this shift are the decreasing prevalence of asymmetry and inequality between stakeholders in social interactions. Asymmetry in discourse is conceptualized as the difference between one stakeholder and the other, and inequality may or may not include the asymmetry that sets one stakeholder in a more authoritative position in relation to the other. Thus, social interactions can denote

inequalities in power, authority, control, and knowledge. Markers of asymmetry may include direct address, modality, hedging, lexical choices, and pronoun use among others and form elements of the writing style of a text. Removing these markers causes a shift in power relations, and thus symmetry, seemingly equalizing both participants' status both socially and in the context of the interaction. This is what Fairclough terms the "democratization" of discourse (2003). Yet, Fairclough notes that this democratization cannot be entirely decoupled from the strategic uses of communication (1993). Expanding upon Habermas (2015), Fairclough (1993) uses the term "synthetic personalization" to describe the strategic use of the informalization of language and discourse by media to create the illusion of an individualized interaction with a large audience. He defines it as *"the simulation of private face-to-face discourse in public mass-audience discourse"* (p. 216).

Tarrant's manifesto is notably informal in style and lexicon, removing many markers asymmetry between himself and the reader. This symmetry between Tarrant and the reader allows the text to speak to the reader on an individual level. Being spoken to on a personal level rather than spoken down to by the author, as Habermas (2015) argues, invokes a sense of inclusion in the reader rather than one of exclusion or, particularly, condescension. This is accomplished by employing several characteristics, such as the first-person perspective, direct address, shifts in vocabulary, negative tonal and lexical choices, and a lack of honorifics when writing about specific members of society. By employing these characteristics and writing in an informal style, the text is made accessible to a larger audience from varying socioeconomic spheres.

Therefore, the text positions Tarrant and his intended audience as equals in terms of ideology and power, which further positions them as equals in a struggle against an unspecified "other". The positioning of the two as equals allows for a building of consensus and corroboration between both stakeholders regarding those responsible for disrupting what

Tarrant sees as “traditional” society. In terms of ontological security, many of the lexical features regarding “traditional” society, culture, and ethnicity corroborate Giddens’s thoughts on societal change relative to an individual’s sense of continuity and value in a changing society. Thus, the text employs informal discourse to shape stakeholder positions, foster consensus on social, economic, political, and identity issues, ultimately constructing an ontologically insecure social reality for Tarrant and the reader. While these are macro features of the text, how they function is at the textual level through the utilization of micro elements such as pronouns and lexical choices.

4.2 Meso: Stakeholder Identity and Narrative Construction

The stakeholders in the text can be identified as “heroes”, “victims”, and “villains”. The strategy for performing this part of that evaluation follows from (Horton-Salway, 2012) work, and asks: Who are the heroes? Who are the villains? Who are the victims? In other words, with whom does the text attempt to identify and whom does the text identify as the “other”? Giddens (1991), while not speaking explicitly about the “other”, highlights the construction of self-identity and “otherness” through social interactions, as a referential mechanism. What follows is a structure of how individual agency functions within society and social structures, including specific groups to which one might belong.

In the context of contemporary society, Giddens (1991) identifies the blurring of "traditional" social structures and self as a source of anxiety. This blurring can lead to either increased reflexivity and adaptation or, conversely, to ontological insecurity. Fairclough (p.123-124) notes that subject positions and identities in a narrative can be determined by understanding who is involved, their relational dynamics, and the roles played by each

stakeholder. In this case, it is observed that the subject positions are set between those who do not align to a perceived ideal type of traditional society, an "other", and those relatively powerless in comparison. It must be noted that these positions sometimes either change, or roles are migrated to highlight a different type of other. Understanding how stakeholder identities are constructed and function in relation to one another reveal how the text constructs ontological threats and insecurity for the reader and the wider audience in relation to a plethora of actors, including society itself.

To do this, the text employs frames, schemata, and script (Fairclough, 2001, p. 132). Frames look at who the subject is; schemata how the subject is expected to act; and scripts look at how the subjects act in relation to one another, either reinforcing or challenging traditional roles and social convention.

Following up on the macro analysis, the objective is a clear understanding of bottom-up identity construction for the reader to further feelings of ontological and existential insecurity. The previous section evaluated how Tarrant's identification with the reader is constructed utilizing strategic power-balancing in the more abstract textual, discursive, and literary elements. Social and ontological identity construction within the narrative takes place in a narrower manner. This section looks at how the discursive elements are employed through the separation of groups into "heroes", "victims", and "villains". However, the text utilizes that same symmetry to strategically communicate to the reader asymmetry relative to the power held between specific parts of society and create the "other", or "villains". The outcome of these representations, according to their prescribed relational and social roles and behaviors, attempts to vilify specific actors and victimize or glorify others, and in the case of Tarrant himself, martyrize.

4.2.1 Heroes, Villains, and Victims

The manifesto itself can be thought of as being in an "ethnopluralist frame", a "white supremacist" frame, or even "The Great Replacement frame". The frame here, however, is at a less abstracted level because to understand who and how Tarrant understands the social world around him, it's necessary to understand how the actors are perceived from his perspective and the perspective of the text. The different frames in this section can be identified by looking at lexical and textual choices, agent-subject distinction, imagery and symbolism.

For example, Tarrant does not explicitly specify who his intended audience is, but from the text, it can be discerned that his intended audience is the "white European Christian" (see further discussion on inclusive pronouns). The primary marker of this is direct address, such as in the statement,

> "*Our people are losing their birthright — a future. A future for their children and a future for our people*."

terms are frequently used as synonyms used to describe "all" white people in "European" states. This follows from the larger frame of "The Great Replacement", framing who the "hero" and the "victim" is in the text, and indicating there is an existential threat that will destroy the "European Christian" race by slowly replacing them with the "other" (in this case, "Muslims"). The other becomes the villain. Furthermore, Tarrant's use of informal language to position himself strategically and symmetrically in relation to the reader is intended to reach the reader at the level of their innermost identity, thus laying the groundwork for identity construction through building rapport with the reader.

The hero (frame) is one in which one is willing to risk death or be martyrized in battle or battles (schemata) against a perceived enemy (script). The following excerpt is an

example of such a narrative:

> "*Even at Vienna in 1683 we Europeans still lost over fourteen thousand good men. That was during a triumphant VICTORY. Do you believe you are better than these men? More deserving of life? More skilled and courageous? You are not. If they could die, so can you. Expect death, expect struggle, expect loss that you will never forget. Do not expect to survive, the only thing you should expect is a true war and to die the death of a true soldier.*"

In the context of the manifesto, the frame of hero is someone whose expected role in society is to fight various enemies and commits violent acts outside of socially-sanctioned violence such as formal instances of war or battle declared by states against their scripted "villain". This is evident in the text through the following statement,

> "*If you were to kill sixty armed invaders having shown the will and the intent to bring harm to your nation and people, you would be hailed a hero, given your nations highest civilian honours, paraded before the media and the adoring public. But kill sixty unarmed invaders having shown the will and the intent to bring harm to your nation and people, and you will be considered a monster, dragged through the streets, ridiculed, attacked,your character assassinated in every way it can be and finally tried in court and imprisoned for the rest of your life*."

Looking at the two examples above, the lexical choices such as "*we Europeans*", "*true soldier*", "*skilled"*, "*courageous"* are coupled with comparisons to historic and contemporary political, religious, military, and violent extremist events and figures. Such events and figures within the larger text include the Battle of Vienna 1638 (Charles Martel) in which a coalition European forces routed Ottoman forces; Pope Urban II, who initiated the First Crusade; and Anders Breivik, the Norwegian domestic terrorist who believed himself to be a leader of the Knights Templar. They frame the hero as a "noble defender" of

a European “race” and Christianity, particularly against an Islamic invasion, and as a “martyr”.

Notable next is the contrast between those who commit socially-sanctioned violence and those who commit violence not sanctioned by formal ruling political factions in a formally declared state of war against those whom the text refers to as “*invaders*”. This contrast is stark regarding how such actions may be received at the societal level. The imagery attributed to society as a castigator and jailor provides the script the remainder of society must follow in relation to Tarrant’s “hero”. This script follows to further highlight the “martyr” frame by attributing the expectation of the “heroic” actions having a negative effect on the “hero”. These include character assassination, being “*dragged through the streets*”, “*ridiculed*”, “*considered a monster*”, imprisonment, and even death.

Moreover, Tarrant’s description of his motivation and how he positions himself in relation to larger society and in relation to the “villains” furthers the construction of the “martyr” identity within the “hero” frame. Regarding Tarrant’s own place in the events and their position in the text, he portrays himself as a victim, a bystander, and a martyr. One example of this in the biographical section, in which Tarrant speaks about a trip through France and seeing “*invaders*” in “*every French town*” and seeing the results of the 2017 French elections and feeling powerless to do anything about the fact that the “*internationalist, globalist, anti-white, ex-banker won.*” The description of French President Emmanuel Macron here, and later statements in the text not only identify the “villains” but construct the “hero” as an individual who supports autocracy and opposes authority and democratic systems.

Near the end of this section, he writes “WHY WON’T SOMEBODY DO SOMETHING?” four times, three of them in succession. His identity is clearly and intentionally constructed as much more than what is portrayed in the initial “*Who am I?*”

section; Tarrant portrays himself as a victim, as the greatest victim of what he seems to write as his own tragedy elevating himself and attempting to construct himself not only as a martyr, but also to build sympathy as a sort of powerless and agentless tragic hero. This sets the textual and psychological tone of the text as much as the views expressed earlier in the introduction. Furthermore, the agency attributed to the "villains" in the larger social context positions the heroes as victims in a wider struggle against globalization, and a powerful ethnic, racial, and regarding some of the villains, religious, force bent on destroying "culture" and "tradition". This further constructs the identity of the "hero" by providing an "ethnopluralist" frame, highlighted when he states that he represents,

> "*Millions of Europeans and other ethno-nationalist peoples that wish to live in peace amongst their own people, living in their own lands, practicing their own traditions and deciding the future of their own kind*."

Therefore, the identity of the hero has another, and for this analysis, final frame, the "ethnopluralist" that sees the "villains" as those who should not be in lands considered by Tarrant to be white, European, and Christian, but are praised as respectable human beings if staying "*in their own lands*".

Meanwhile, Villains in the traditional context are given attributes and frames of "evil-doer", "malevolent", "power-hungry", "greedy", "egotist" and sometimes even "tragic victim", which may help an audience garner sympathy. Very broadly speaking, traditional villains are expected to be the antithesis of the hero, attempting to either perform any morally negative deeds such as robbery, murder, or conquest, or simply to provide a foil to a protagonist.

The "Villains" in the context of this text are of a dual nature and constructed in rather broad terms, lacking any notions of sympathy. The frames attributed to the villain are divergent from the archetypal villain. Here, the reader experiences a villain that is

"atraditional", "immigrant", "(Islamic) invader", "enemy", "globalist", "(blood) or (race) traitor", and society at large. The expectation of these "villains" is not to simply perform morally negative deeds and serve as plot foil, but to (attempt) to replace an entire group, thereby erasing its existence. The following passages from the manifesto illustrate the villains' overall frame, schemata, and scripts,

> "*Mass immigration will disenfranchise us,subvert our nations, destroy our communities, destroy our ethnic binds, destroy our cultures, destroy our peoples.*"

and

> "*This is ethnic replacement.*
> *This is cultural replacement.*
> *This is racial replacement.*
> *This is WHITE GENOCIDE.*"

The villains are framed as monstrous, evil, invasive, genocidal, and insidious, but most of all, the villain is framed as a powerful ontological threat, a multi-pronged force bent on erasing Tarrant's version of a "normal" world formed around the pillars of ethnicity, culture, and race. Specifically of note are the use of the words "*disenfranchise*" and "*destroy*", in fact, the repetition of the word "*destroy*" and its absolute and extreme nature makes clear that "mass immigration" is among the intangible ontological threats faced by the larger society to which Tarrant refers.

The words "enemy", "invaders", and "(blood) traitors" are more than the frame through which the villain is constructed; these are words that Tarrant uses within the text to construct the villain. Unlike in how Tarrant constructs, the identity of the "heroes", the lexical choices of villain construction are more straightforward. These words function

similarly to the historical references found in the passage above, invoking a militaristic threat, albeit one that comes from both inside and out. One example of the militaristic nature of the language and the framing and constructed schemata for the "invaders" is the following,

> "*To most of all show the invaders that our lands will never be their lands, our homelands are our own and that, as long as a white man still lives, they will NEVER conquer our lands and they will never replace our people.*"

"Immigrants", for example, are occasionally mentioned throughout the text, although the lexically chosen "invaders" is utilized far more frequently than the term "immigrants". Furthermore, the lexical choices of "*invaders*" and "*conquer*" invoke images of war and conquest and are utilized in other sections of the text along with statements that state a need to "*crush*" the "*invaders*". The term invaders is used specifically for Muslims as Tarrant mentions "…*attacks on the West by islamic invaders*…", noting that an outside force is a primary cause of instability and ontological danger, seemingly ignoring phenomena such as lone wolf terrorists, and even right-wing violent extremism, the goal of which in his version is to destabilize and cause internal strife within Western states from the inside, specifically the US.

The internal threat is given the frame of "(blood) or (race) traitors". Traitors are identified as (white) Muslim converts, celebrities, high-profile politicians, globalists, "*illegal and legal drug dealers*", and anyone not "European" in "*European lands*" (his list includes "*Roma, African, Indian, Turkish, Semitic or other*.") Blood traitors are Muslim converts, and race traitors are both converts and the other groups mentioned. Schemata for each of these frames vary slightly, but in general are attributed the role of destruction, erasure, and replacement of what the discourse identifies as an endangered culture, race, and ethnicity. For example, Tarrant identifies celebrities as being nihilists, drug addicts, and pedophiles, identifying them as a specific cause of moral and cultural destruction, thus

contributing to the radicalization of men in the west. Notably, western women are only attributed the role of victims and, through images at the end of the manifesto, attributed "traditional" roles while non-western women are not mentioned throughout the text.

Those who hold the agency in the relationship are the "villains"; in many instances, "invaders" are given great agency at the textual, discursive, and social levels. These individuals are considered as having more power, more authority, and more overall control in the relationship. Those subjected to this power are generally considered as the "heroes" and "victims". In other cases, however, it is the elites and different institutions, often characterized as faceless and ambiguous entities, who are considered those with agency and power, and everyone else as subjects under control. An example where we see this is the speaker's views on democracy, where it is expressed that:

> "*Democracy is mob rule and the mob itself is ruled by our enemies. The global and corporate run press controls them, the education system(long since fallen to the long march through the institutions carried out by the marxists)controls them, the state(long since heavily lost to its corporate backers) controls them and the anti-white media machine controls them*."

In the excerpt above, the enemies mentioned are the press and the media, the education system, and the state, which are faceless ideas exerting power and control over billions of people. The purpose of the text in the excerpt seems to have been to convince the reader that there are specific systems in place that allow public and private entities to control the masses and turn them against those the text poses as the "hero", which again, is sometimes ambiguous and contradictory. The state and corporations are not the only alternative controlling agents; in the following excerpt, the text lashes out at elites as responsible for the immigration of those considered "invaders",

> "*For too long those who have profited most from the importation of cheap labour*

have gone unpunished.The economic elites who line their pockets with the profit received from our own ethnic replacement. These greed filled bastards expect to replace our people with a race of low intellect, low agency, muddled, muddied masses just so their own wealth and power can increase."

In this case, rather than being seen as having a clear choice, those considered as "enemies" are now relegated to a lower standing, being imported like goods at the hands of greedy elites aiming to replace "white Europeans". Another excerpt which echoes the same sentiment is in the section entitled "The Radicalization of Western Men", where elites have fallen away, and the writer lashes out at "society", but gives no indication as to what "society" is, but that the actions of society as the agent have subjected "western men",

"The truth that they are expected not to combat these myriad, unending and dedicated interlopers, but to embrace them, accept their own disenfranchisement, accept the loss of their fathers lands, their own impoverishment, their own REPLACEMENT."

In this instance, the agent has become amorphous, turning that which is perceived as normal and an integral element of the web to which individuals are accustomed into an enemy.

Tarrant himself maintains his state as a subject, and in many cases as a victim; there are instances in which he seems to feel that the only agency he has is in his choice of violence and is often the receiver of actions rather than the agent performing them. This leaves the rest of the world, excluding those of his choosing, responsible, and by his logic, should therefore be held accountable. Tarrant is also never exactly clear on who the "enemy" is nor what "culturally European" means when he asks himself "*Who do you consider white?*". An example was given earlier of the naming of Muslims, "(blood or race) traitors", public and private entities, but when abstracted, the "villains" become rather vague and amorphous to larger elements of society in general.

By abstracting the villains as an ever-present threat at-large from inside and out that is bent on the destruction and erasure of what Tarrant considers as an endangered segment of society that is ethnically, culturally, and racially superior, he constructs the villains and the ensuing sub-groups as an ontological threat. Therefore, the construction of these groups invokes anxiety and ontological insecurity not only through removing trust in "normality" and the networks upon which the reader may rely as predictable, but it also removes control, and instills a fear of the future and change in the external world that will cause not only the loss of one's self-identity, but the erasure of a larger identity that affects the reader or the "victims" personally. Tarrant positions the only salvation as "revenge" on the villains in the form of socially unsanctioned violence.

4.3 Micro Constructions of Identity, Relational Authority and Power Relations, Legitimacy, and Accountability

The objective of this section is to provide an insight into identity and power relations as perceived at the textual level. The previous sections have analyzed the text in structural and narrative terms, while only slightly delving into the textual elements utilized to reach the individual, manage, and construct identity and ontological insecurity. Here, the textually constructive elements and their quantity are explored and analyzed individually. For instance, the quantity of specific words or phrases, which Fairclough (2001, p. 108) mentions this as a cohesive device that connects the same idea to different sections, provides a particular quality to the text that connects not only ideas throughout the text, but reinforces assumptions or constructions of power, identity, and ideology for both producer and consumer.

4.3.1 Pronouns and Minimizations, Lists, and Contrasts

Identity and role construction continue to be prominent features of the deeper textual and lexical choices, particularly regarding comparison and contrast. In the contemporary world, individuals have the opportunity to redirect their life and reconstruct their self-identities to reinforce optimism for the future without consulting experts (Giddens, 1991, pp. 137–143). Furthermore, Giddens (1991, 196) notes the difficulty some may have of defending against doubt in high-pressure circumstances, thus leading them to look to "overarching systems of authority" and giving them a "*pragmatic authoritarianism*" or toward authorities that provide "clear-cut answers" (p. 143).

Both Fairclough (2001, pp. 104–107) and Wiggins (2017, p. 123) note the importance of pronoun and other textual features as identifying power relations and identity. Specifically, the pronouns "you", "we", and "us" can denote inclusivity and exclusivity, depending on the context of their use. These pronouns can act as a constructive mechanism for both an ideological narrative and the reader's self-identity. Specifically, the use of "you" can, and does, establish Tarrant's agency over the reader in several instances, thus breaking the power symmetry. Breaking the power symmetry in this way in the text moves Tarrant from being a victim and a martyr to being an authority figure, both placing the reader beneath him regarding agency and expertise, such as in the following quote in which Tarrant presents himself as an authority on birthrates and immigration,

> "*If there is one thing I want you to remember from these writings, its that the birthrates must change.*"

Other sections include this lack of symmetry as well, and with this positioning, the imposition of agency and authority over the reader as an authority on topics of ethnicity, culture, race, and tradition.

In Tarrant's manifesto, the pronoun “you” takes on multiple roles. Initially, it seems to serve as an inclusive, indefinite pronoun, referencing a general “you”. However, its function shifts significantly within the self-interview section, where “you” transitions to a self-referential pronoun and is used 80 times. In this section, it alternates between referencing Tarrant himself in the questions and adopting an inclusive, indefinite form in the answers. The third use of 'you,' occurring 34 times, takes on a more admonishing tone, primarily appearing in a rant towards the end of the second section.

This multifaceted use of “you” highlights Tarrant's manipulation of reader identities, positioning them as both oppressed victims and responsible for holding the “other” accountable through violent actions. Thus, “you” in the grammatical sense plays a more profound role than mere direct address addressed in the macro section, ultimately serving to solidify the division between Tarrant and his audience and the “other”. The various uses of “you” illustrate Tarrant’s management of the identities of the reader, himself, and those he sees as opposing his view of the world.

Continually, the utilization of “we”, and “us” operationalizes inclusiveness to draw the reader into the broader social context as on the author’s “side”. This is supposed to allow for credibility through symmetry. The inclusivity induced by “we” and “us”, particularly given the repetition of these words, is evident of an attempt to not only establish symmetry, but also persuade the reader that they are not alone, but part of a larger collective. A collective that the author and the text see as faultless. The pronouns *we* and *us* are used 101 and 22 times, respectively. Both are utilized in the inclusive manner, with the objective of creating solidarity, primarily against a clear “other”.

The other, or the “villains”, in the text are often referred to explicitly as “invaders”, yet there is a shift to utilizing “them” and “they” in the text, 26 times and 52 times in the context of both violence and separation of one from the other. The shift from a specific

extreme case referent to a pronoun here is significant. “Them” and “they” are indicative of two things: first, an underscoring of the “us” vs. “them” dichotomy, serving much the same purpose as “you”, “we”, and “us”; and second, an emotional distancing that functions as a diminishing mechanism of status or worthiness, and in this case humanity. In this way, the text asserts the potential agency of the human “victim” group over the “villains”, thus shifting them to potential “heroes” capable of taking control of a future painted by the text as bleak. This construction of the ontological threat as less than human allows for leeway in terms of dealing with the threat, permitting the use of violent means to eliminate the perceived existential threat.

As a final note on pronoun use, the first-person pronoun “I” is used approximately 149 times. In the text, the speaker uses this term to both build inclusivity and consensus, and separate themselves from the “living”, attempting to construct the impression that the speaker is a canonized martyr. In doing this, the speaker attempts to remove all blame from themselves, particularly when employing minimizations such as in the “autobiography” section, where it states,

“*I am **just** a regular White man, from a regular family.”*

Minimizations such as “*just*” are not only important to constructing accountability, but also the construction of reality and identity (Wiggins ibid). Here, the minimization aspect and downplaying of the speaker’s own importance within society and to their own movement provides an inclusionary aspect to the text. This is one important mechanism that Tarrant uses in the text to establish symmetry, telling the reader “We are the same.” and “If I did it, you can, too.” Another purpose minimizations serve within the text is to aggrandize the scale, gravity, and importance of the speaker’s ideals, “movement”, and purpose, attempting to communicate to the reader, “I am but a small pawn in the larger game.” The word “*just*”, particularly, serves a third purpose: downplaying other aspects to highlight others in a

manner much more compartmentalized than that of the first and second, such as in a section on "diversity",

> "*Unity, purpose, trust, traditions, nationalism and racial nationalism is what provides strength. Everything else is* ***just*** *a catchphrase.*"

Utilizing minimizations in this way allows for a creation of symmetry that pits one group (Tarrant and his sympathizers) against another (everyone else) while also undermining reflexive efforts to manage identity in the contemporary world. Therefore, the use of minimizations in the text also serves to galvanize ideological and ontological divisions, bolstering support for the intangible "victims" and extremist ideologies.

The example above includes two discursive devices that illustrate Tarrant's beliefs: listing and vagueness. While the latter is more narrative-focused, listing is a common practice used to build rapport and make claims seem more factual (Wiggins, 2017, pp. 157–158), particularly three-part lists. The list above includes six parts and functions differently than the three-part lists used commonly to end a sentence, in fact, the list above is used to highlight the importance of what is presented in the list, which is presented in more detail than "*Everything else*".

This excerpt comes from a section in the manifesto entitled "*Diversity is weak*". While not the only list in the manifesto nor the section, this final statement is the most illustrative in the section of Tarrant's ideological views and his expression of authority, it also reveals the items he sees as important. The list prioritizes unity over trust, tradition, and even the racial aspects of Tarrant's brand of extremism. Furthermore, the vagueness with which diversity is labeled gives a quality of minimization; the "*Everything else*" here is ambiguous and objectless, so it is uncertain what the text means by diversity or if it is possibly a combination of ideals.

In the text, Tarrant appears to desire to fulfill the role of this authority, not only as an

equal, but as one who is knowledgeable enough to speak down to the reader in the manner a preacher or primary teacher would[2]. Thus, what follows is Tarrant utilizing the symmetry that the text constructs through footing shifts of "you" to the inclusive pronouns of "we" and "us" to assert this authority over the reader to impress upon the reader the need to hold specific groups accountable for that of which they are accused. The text's use of these pronouns and the shifts both within the pronouns themselves and between them are evidence of a stark division; The shifts between the agency and collective subjection represent a stark separation between Tarrant and his audience, and the "other".

The use of pronouns and shifts, combined with minimizations, listing, and the multi-purpose use of vagueness highlight how the text uses these discursive techniques and textual elements to manage the identity of both the reader and himself in relation to one another, and in relation to the "other" and the larger social world. This is specifically a world that Tarrant views as an ever-enclosing, all-encompassing and enveloping threat. These uses work to illustrate Tarrant's perspective while exemplifying and solidifying the assignment of position in the larger social world and accountability. Thus, Tarrant is assigning his reader a firm identity set in contrast to what he sees as a threat to further existence of the "victim" group.

The text makes assumptions of the future as endangered or nonexistent for the "white European Christian" if action is not taken to preserve it, therefore posing the present as what Giddens terms a "fateful moment". In terms of the text, it's "now or never" to take action against the threat posed by a dangerous, possibly non-existent future. By presenting the external world in this way, the text works to isolate the reader by assigning them what Tarrant perceives as a social group in danger of extinction.

[2] Note the contrast of expertise vs. authority (see Giddens, p. 195), in this case, Tarrant poses himself as an authority who is an expert on issues of tradition, culture, race, and ethnic replacement.

4.3.2 Modality and Modal Verb Use

Modal qualities of text can also often indicate relative authority and agency. Fairclough notes that the grammatical features of the three modes of sentence (declarative, imperative, and interrogative) situate the subject and the modalities expressed in texts may give an evaluation of the speaker's own representation of reality (p. 104). According to Wiggins (Wiggins, 2017, p. 73), modal verbs imply "degree of ability, obligation, intention or permission to be able to perform that activity."

The text predominantly employs declarative statements that assert the speaker's authority, particularly in discussions of immigration, race, and culture. Modal verbs indicating possibility or lack of obligation, such as "would", "should", and "could", are used a combined number of (61 times), whereas "is" (233), "are" (137 times) and "will" (161 times) are used authoritatively, reinforcing the author's perceived expertise, especially on topics related to race, ethnicity, immigration, and fertility rates, with statements such as,

> *"Mass immigration **will** disenfranchise us,subvert our nations, destroy our communities, destroy our ethnic binds, destroy our cultures, destroy our peoples." (*p.6)

The use of "is" functions much of the way "will" does. Throughout the work, these conjugations are utilized in the objective fashion, often reinforcing statements such as those above as factual. These constructions present the conspiracy theory as absolute fact, a clear ontological and existential threat, and reinforce violence as the only option,

> Q: "*Democracy is the only solution, why are you committing to force?*"
>
> A: "*Democracy is mob rule and the mob itself is ruled by our enemies… Prepare for war, prepare for violence and prepare for risk, loss, struggle, death.*

Force is the only path to power and the only path to true victory."

The tonality of *"are"* differs from simple ontological statements of existence such as "Those flowers are blue." and is instead used to express a perceived authority, certainty, and implied expert knowledge. Those where the perceived authority is most present is race and ethnicity, immigrants, and fertility rates. Other areas where the speaker asserts authority are regarding culture and traditions, assigning blame, and the assumption that there will be a "following", or an uprising based on the statements in the text like the one above.

Despite the predominance of declarative statements, an entire section is given to answering questions. Interrogatives can serve various purposes (Fairclough, 2001, p. 105). They can be for simple requests for information, such as "Where is the bathroom?" or calls to action as seen near the beginning of the manifesto when Tarrant writes "WHY WON'T SOMEBODY DO SOMETHING?" This question serves both purposes, but it also sets the tone of the manifesto. However, most of the interrogative statements in the text are contained within the "interview", or auto-biographical", portion.

In that section, there are four discernable elements employed to reach the reader. First, symmetry, identification, and rapport-building (which subsequently also acts as an induction mechanism itself, almost like a hook). The second is the repetition and regurgitation of the conspiracy theory. The last two are the pursuit of legitimacy and an evasion of accountability. The latter two are quite complex given that the text uses tactics that attribute extremist actions to Tarrant, yet at the same time the "villains" are held accountable through a complex layering within the same section.

Symmetry and rapport-building have been discussed lengthily in other sections, yet here, the implementation of the self-interview/interrogation as a strategy for galvanizing the "hero" and "victim" identity tactical and unique. Particularly earlier on in the text, Tarrant asks "*Who are you?*" and responds to himself with

> "*Just a ordinary White man,28 years old. Born in Australia to a working class,low income family.*"

which combining minimalization with class, income, racial, age identifiers, and the grammar mistakes within, gives the impression that the writer is attempting to identify with an audience. Thus, the interrogative in this section offers the opportunity to solidify the "hero" identity as a "regular guy", lowering Tarrant to what he may see as his audience's level, or the level of the general public.

Regarding the second element, lists and repetition are again encountered. In the following statement, however, we encounter an Extreme Case Formulation (ECF) (in bold) as well,

> "*Yes, **beyond all doubt**, anti-immigration, anti-ethnic replacement and anti-cultural replacement*."

The response above is in response to the question, "*Was the attack anti-immigration in origin?*" Given that ECFs are designed to defend claims, identity management, and stake/investment management for extreme or exaggerated claims (Wiggins, 2017, p. 154), utilizing them in a declarative statement that is a response to an interrogative reveals Tarrant's strategic use of this particular modality. Primarily, it's illustrative of the author's investment in the conspiracy theory's ideology and dedication to extremism and violence.

This in turn shows how the text uses a three-part list to reinforce these tenants and through the interrogative can construct a threat, by answering the interrogative and combine an ECF with repetition of the tenets of a conspiracy theory with a negative prefix (*anti-*) to construct a threat by promoting it. Furthermore, this combination of textual, grammatical, and discursive techniques and tactics reinforces the use of violence as the only method of countering what the text constructs as an ontological threat. The latter is particularly exemplified in the response to the question, "*Democracy is the only solution, why are you*

committing to force?"

Legitimacy is pursued by Tarrant taking accountability for motives by isolating himself from "mainstream" external groups and material motives. Tarrant explicitly separates himself from specific political and group affiliations within the bounds and realm of those with which someone committing such an attack would normally be identified. This helps remove doubt as to the motives behind the attack, such as conservative beliefs like those of Front National, Brexit supporters, Donald Trump, Christians, neo-Nazis, antisemites. However, he does strategically frame political beliefs and ideologies to convince the reader of his own agency in taking the decision to support the conspiracy theory that is supported by the text. These include a surface rejection of xenophobia and claims of Islamophobia while at the same time identifying as a racist and racial supremacist. Furthermore, he renounces fame or martyrdom, although the rhetoric in the rest of the text tells a different story regarding this. In one instance, the following question is asked: "*Did the groups you support/are aligned with order or promote your attack?*", to which the response is given as,

> "*No.No group ordered my attack, I make the decision myself. Though I did contact the reborn Knights Templar for a blessing in support of the attack, which was given.*"

Many of these questions appear in the latter of the first part of the "interview" section. What the answers are largely illustrative of is someone strategically managing their identity by tactically answering questions in a manner that attempts to express agency. Such a tactic seeks to lend legitimacy through taking accountability by removing it from specific groups and attributing a group affiliation to those not thought of as social groupings associated with the ideologies professed by the conspiracy theory and the actions taken.

Yet, while assuming responsibility for the violence he committed, Tarrant uses the interrogative text in this section to ultimately hold the "villains" accountable for the attack.

The fourth element of this portion of the text is the removal of accountability. While this involves the regurgitation of conspiracy theory ideals, there is also a significant portion where the text goes into detail regarding the death of a young girl at the hands of those against which the text was written thereby attempting to play upon the pathos of the reader while holding the primary villain group, "Islamic invaders", accountable not only for the death of the girl mentioned, but also larger social issues. The crimes here being those of rape and murder. The question to which he responds is "*Why did you carry out the attack?*" The answer he gives assigns overall accountability to the "villains" and strategically works to do this at the social, discursive, and textual levels through corroboration (Wiggins, 2017, p. 160) of his claims.

The imperative mode is characterized by opening with a verb rather than a subject like a declarative sentence would and finishing with the object of the verb. Imperative statements can also serve multiple purposes (Fairclough, 2001, p. 105). In the case of this text, it serves as an asymmetrical device to call others to action, thus relieving the reader of some agency, thus further reducing the options available for adaptation to the broader social world. One characteristic of imperative speech and writing is urgency; imperative speech and text generally contains overtones of urgency, which in the case of Tarrant's manifesto lends itself to collaboration with rushed sentences and grammatical mistakes to give the impression of someone with little time left in a general sense. The third section uses imperative statements at the end of each sub-section. There are multiple instances of violent speech such as "KILL THE RAPISTS, HANG THEIR FAMILIES".

Another layer must be added to the imperative; the employment of direct address (Fairclough, 1993, p. 115). While the imperative expresses multiple calls to action and separates the text or author and the reader regarding agency, the imperative uses direct address, which also lends itself to providing synthetic symmetry. Yet, this depends on the

group addressed. When addressing those considered "victims" (seen as potential heroes or recruits), the text both calls for the deaths of high-profile politicians or public figures and makes calls for the "veneration of ancestors" and to "*work for the children*". In another, the text states for the potential hero to "EXPECT A SOLDIERS FIGHT AND A SODIERS DEATH", to "BLITZ TO DOMINANT POSITIONS", to "STOP RUNNING, START FIGHTING". More include words such as "*wait*", while others include calls to "*remove*" and "*retake*". The section only addresses the "villains" once, telling them to "FLEE TO YOUR OWN LANDS", illustrating and expectation of being read by the stakeholder, but ultimately indicating that the stakeholder is lower in priority than the other stakeholders.

Ultimately, the imperative modality primarily works to encourage the potential "heroes" to embrace death and resort to socially unsanctioned violence against the "villain". This encouragement comes in the form of an inadequate balance of agency, situating the reader or the intended audience below Tarrant, subjecting them to his dominance of authority and knowledge while seeking to manage symmetry through implicit direct address applied in the imperative. Much of the language is militaristic and characteristic of a fear of the future. The imperative modality used also gives an impression of urgency and a "loud" tonal quality. These statements further serve to express an extreme case of endangerment to which there must be a reaction.

5. Discussion

This thesis addresses two central research questions. First, it investigates whether extremist content strategically employs discourse to foster ontological insecurity. The analysis revealed that content, such as the Christchurch manifesto, operates strategically by utilizing discursive tactics to construct and manage agency, identities and social roles, and power and

status. The manifesto does all of this while positioning its narrative within the context of "The Great Replacement" conspiracy theory, which posits an extreme and obliterating threat. This threat is disruptive of the "normal" social world and pits a "new" society against a "traditional" society, constructing a bleak or nonexistent future.

To address the second question, that of the relationship between ontological insecurity and processes of radicalization, its role must be highlighted as a critical tool. As prior research has shown, content types are similar across ideologies and are part and parcel of one larger ideological body. Kupper et al. (2022) and Macklin and Bjørgo (2021)'s exploration of live streams highlight their role as a narrative dissemination mechanism and narrative support. Live-streamed massacres are filled with narrative quotes, both spoken and written on weapons, and expose individuals to gruesome images of death. Videos and books consumed by the London bombers were similar in content and played a role in their radicalization. They all contained elements of mortality salience and constructed an insecure future that was possibly nonexistent or either one of repression. This study is similar to Brachman's (2006) discussion of video games in the context of Islamist extremism, which can serve training and ideological functions. This is also true of video games shared on the far right (Brekk, 2022).

Thus, the broader research aligns with the mainstream literature, which supports social networks as an integral element, and other literature on conspiracy theories, ideology, and socialization. It contextualizes the manifesto, placing it in a larger illicit genre and social milieu. The literature on socialization and ideology illustrates that as individuals become drawn into ideologies and narratives, they are socialized to think in a depersonalized manner, putting the group first, and insulating themselves from outside narratives. In the case of Tarrant and many of the copycats that came after, this happened in the auspices of chan /pol boards. Marc Sageman (2011) posits that in cases of (violent) extremism, the online and in-

person ecosystems work in a similar manner; the sharing of like-minded content and discourse between socially networked and associated individuals is imperative.

The existing theoretical frameworks are helpful but incomplete. In discussions on the radicalization process, the content aspect is largely overlooked. Particularly, the content and accounts of it are given credence as to having had some effect on the individual serving as an enlightening tool or waking someone up to a grand truth but did not answer the question of how that process happened. Yet, the content relative to the particular extremist ecosystem of which it is a part is integral to understanding how content functions relative to the individual in these larger extremist bodies could lead to revealing insights on how to go about preventing radicalization into different ideological strains of extremism.

Furthermore, this lends this work to being consistent with and readily adaptable to the aforementioned theoretical models by bridging the gaps between grievances and radicalization. Most of the mainstream research suggests that grievances and social networks play an important role in radicalization. Research such as this contributes to this larger body of literature by focusing on what role they play in the process and how they are weaponized in conjunction to social networks to give a clearer picture of radicalization processes than was formerly accessible.

Limitations

The construction of ontological insecurity in extremist-produced content is imperative to understanding radicalization as a practical phenomenon. Thus, more intertextual and content-level interactions may prove helpful in future research. Such content includes speeches of politicians, business leaders; pamphlets of right-wing, left-wing, or Islamist extremist groups; disinformation campaigns; and online content such as forums;

subsequently, the Christchurch Manifesto itself follows and forms part of a greater body of extremist content.

The analysis is not comprehensive of the text, nor does it nor is it able to attempt to provide an analysis of the individual's psychological state, life, nor provide a complete picture of the individual as a whole. The selections utilized were done so to best represent the surrounding social, discursive, and textual context with the purpose of deconstructing the text itself and exploring it in the most comprehensive manner possible using the selected framework. Extremist materials serve a specific purpose, and the motivations and any impact that the materials have largely lie directly with the individual and more indirectly on broader social levels. Thus, determining the method and materials that fit both one another, the theoretical lens, and that provides the most objectivity is challenging.

This determination may depend on the content, the researcher, and various other factors. Extremism, radicalization, ideologies, and the degree of commitment to ideologies, beliefs, and causes vary depending on the person, the place, time, social context, and any number of elements. Thus, this paper takes the stance that although profiling is not generally considered an ethically nor objectively sound method, each version of extremism has its own features, and thus profiling the version of extremism would be helpful for understanding how to combat extremism.

Conclusion

This thesis attempted to explore a connection between ontological security and extremist content, and moreover, how that connection affects radicalization. It finds that extremist content is purposeful; therefore, this thesis illustrates its discourse's active constructive role in reinforcing or fostering extremist perceptions and social identities with the objective of

radicalizing and engendering ontological insecurity. Radicalizing individuals and groups do not use only one method; the body of content reaches from the mainstream to the periphery and is present in all mediums, from the latest technological mediums such as social media and video games to books, images, and music.

This paper's application of a mixed-method discourse analysis to a single case, the Christchurch shooter's manifesto, allowed for a more thorough exploration of the intricacies of the chosen extremist materials and illustrated how the discourse within is strategically constructed for the purpose of either radicalization or to incite violent events. It revealed intricate mechanisms at the textual, discursive, sociological, and psychological levels, and underscored the strategic construction of extremist-produced radicalization materials, emphasizing their power to undermine individual ontological security through careful manipulation of identity, discourse, and grammatical choices. The language used throughout was found to employ tactics strategically aimed at inducing Giddens's version of anxiety and eroding trust in society and the individual's reality.

While the analysis itself may be too narrow to find an explicit connection to radicalization, the broader work on extremist groups and terrorism suggests that there is a high likelihood that ontological insecurity is an important piece of the puzzle. This is because the broader literature highlights the role of grievances, social networks, and socialization, yet does not explore their effect on the individual. However, the works explored here suggest a process of grievance weaponization, and through social networks and socialization, a fostering of ontological insecurity within the broader context of the group ideology for the purpose of radicalization.

This makes the implications for policymakers and security practitioners important. Understanding not just the why or the how, but understanding what works, why it works, and subsequently how it works gives a clearer view of policy and strategies that can be

implemented to preventatively combat radicalization. Cantle and Thomas (2014), for example, call for more individual-focused preventative initiatives, and Voogt (2017) looks at the Australia's CAPE model, an initiative designed to combat online narratives. Initiatives such as CAPE are positive steps toward preventing radicalization online, but just as important is what can be done earlier and at the systemic level outside of community programs. One example is Estonia's cyber security strategy, where media literacy and internet awareness are given priority (Communication, 2019). Given that the internet plays such an important role in the social aspect of radicalization and extremism, education and awareness are imperatives to ensuring that extremist groups have fewer individuals to work with and socialize into violent and hateful ideologies, particularly those that support acts such as those committed in New Zealand and others that have been "inspired" by such events.

List of References

Abid, A., Roy, S. K., Lees-Marshment, J., Dey, B. L., Muhammad, S. S., & Kumar, S. (2023). Political social media marketing: a systematic literature review and agenda for future research. *Electronic Commerce Research*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-022-09636-7

Ajil, A. (2020). Politico-ideological violence: Zooming in on grievances. *European Journal of Criminology*, *19*(2), 304–321. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819896223

Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000). Economics and identity. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *115*(3), 715–753.

Akram, S. (2014). Recognizing the 2011 United Kingdom riots as political protest: A theoretical framework based on agency, habitus and the preconscious. *British Journal of Criminology*, *54*(3), 375–392. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azu013

Anderson, L., & McCabe, D. B. (2012). A Coconstructed World: Adolescent Self-Socialization on the Internet. *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing*, *31*(2), 240–253. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41714272

Baele, S. J., Brace, L., & Coan, T. G. (2021). Variations on a Theme? Comparing 4chan, 8kun, and Other chans' Far-Right "/pol" Boards. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *15*(1), 65–80. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26984798

Bakker, E. (2006). *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, their Characteristics and the Circumstances in which they Joined the Jihad: an Exploratory Study*.

Basit, A. (2021). Conspiracy Theories and Violent Extremism. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, *13*(3), 1–9. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27040260

BLEE, K. M. (1996). BECOMING A RACIST: Women in Contemporary Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazi Groups. *Gender & Society*, *10*(6), 680–702. https://doi.org/10.1177/089124396010006002

Bojsen-Møller, M., Auken, S., Devitt, A. J., & Christensen, T. K. (2020). Illicit genres: The case of threatening communications. *Sakprosa*, *12*(1), 1–53. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.5617/sakprosa.7416

Borum, R., & Neer, T. (2017). *Terrorism and Violent Extremism BT - Handbook of Behavioral Criminology* (V. B. Van Hasselt & M. L. Bourke, Eds.; pp. 729–745). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61625-4_41

Bötticher, A. (2017). Towards Academic Consensus Definitions of Radicalism and Extremism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *11*(4), 73–77. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297896

Braca, A., & Dondio, P. (2023). Developing persuasive systems for marketing: the interplay of persuasion techniques, customer traits and persuasive message design. *Italian Journal of Marketing*, *2023*(3), 369–412. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43039-023-00077-0

Brachman, J. M. (2006). High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda's Use of New Technology. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, *30*(2), 149–164. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45289652

Brekk, F. (2022). *Shadows of the Internet* (J. Havlicek, Ed.). Institute for Politics and Society. www.politikaspolecnost.cz/en/

Briggs, C. L., & Bauman, R. (1992). Genre, Intertextuality, and Social Power. *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology*, *2*(2), 131–172. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43102167

Cantle, T., & Thomas, P. (2014). *Taking the Think Project Forward-The Need for Preventative Anti-*

Extremism Educational Work.

Carter, E. (2018). Right-wing extremism/radicalism: reconstructing the concept. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, *23*(2), 157–182. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2018.1451227

Castano, E., Leidner, B., Bonacossa, A., Nikkah, J., Perrulli, R., Spencer, B., & Humphrey, N. (2011). Ideology, Fear of Death, and Death Anxiety. *Political Psychology*, *32*(4), 601–621. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41262882

Communication, M. of E. A. and. (2019). *Cybersecurity Strategy Republic of Estonia*. file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/kyberturvalisuse_strateegia_2022_eng.pdf

Copeland, S., & Marsden, S. (2020). Economic influences on radicalisation. *Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats*, 12.

Crone, M., & Harrow, M. (2011). Homegrown Terrorism in the West. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *23*(4), 521–536. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.571556

Cuesta, J., & Murshed, S. M. (2013). Greed, Grievance, and Globalization. *A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence, and Development*, 50.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010). Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *33*(9), 797–814. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.501423

Devraj-Kizuk, S. (2014). A Science of Evil: An Exploration into Terror Management Theory, and a Psychoanalytic Theory of Extremism. *Eureka*, *4*(1 SE-Reviews), 57–66. https://doi.org/10.29173/eureka17850

Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). Discursive psychology. In *Discursive psychology.* Sage Publications, Inc.

Euben, R. L. (2015). Humiliation and the Political Mobilization of Masculinity. *Political Theory*, *43*(4), 500–532. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24571716

Fairclough, N. (1993). *Discourse and Social Change*. Wiley. https://books.google.cz/books?id=3H3AoOmjX-oC

Fairclough, N. (2001). *Language and Power*. Longman. https://books.google.cz/books?id=ZRHCNMN3qqUC

Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. Taylor & Francis. https://books.google.cz/books?id=dsoi4TyCFkMC

Fairclough, N. (2013). *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. Taylor & Francis. https://books.google.cz/books?id=nf7cAAAAQBAJ

Farwell, J. P. (2011). A weapon of violence. *Atlantisch Perspectief*, *35*(6), 17–22. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48580904

Freedman, L. (2007). Terrorism as a Strategy. *Government and Opposition*, *42*(3), 314–339. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44483200

Gales, T. (2011). Ideologies of Violence: A Corpus and Discourse Analytic Approach to Stance in Threatening Communications. *International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law*, *17*(2 SE-Thesis Abstracts), 299–302. https://doi.org/10.1558/ijsll.v17i2.299

Gibson, C., & Jacobson, T. E. (2018). Habits of Mind in an Uncertain Information World. *Reference &*

User Services Quarterly, *57*(3), 183–192. https://www.jstor.org/stable/90019883

Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Kindle Edi). Wiley.

Gökarıksel, B., Neubert, C., & Smith, S. (2019). Demographic Fever Dreams: Fragile Masculinity and Population Politics in the Rise of the Global Right. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, *44*(3), 561–587. https://doi.org/10.1086/701154

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., & Breus, M. (1994). Role of consciousness and accessibility of death-related thoughts in mortality salience effects. In *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (Vol. 67, Issue 4, pp. 627–637). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.627

Gunaratna, R., & Oreg, A. (2010). Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *33*(12), 1043–1078. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.523860

Gunaratna, R., & Pethő-Kiss, K. (2023). How Far Right Extremists Exploited the Coronavirus Crisis. In *Terrorism and the Pandemic* (NED-New, pp. 87–103). Berghahn Books. http://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.2809000.7

Habermas, J. (2015). *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Volume 1* (Issue sv. 1). Polity Press. https://books.google.cz/books?id=RmSzCgAAQBAJ

Hoffman, B. (2006). *The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists*. RAND Corporation PP - Santa Monica, CA. https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT262-1.html

Hofstede, G. (1983). National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based Theory of Cultural Differences among Nations. *International Studies of Management & Organization*, *13*(1/2), 46–74. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40396953

Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations*. sage.

Hogg, M. A. (2000). Subjective Uncertainty Reduction through Self-categorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *11*(1), 223–255. https://doi.org/10.1080/14792772043000040

Hogg, M. A. (2014). From Uncertainty to Extremism: Social Categorization and Identity Processes. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *23*(5), 338–342. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721414540168

Hogg, M. A. (2021). Uncertain Self in a Changing World: A Foundation for Radicalisation, Populism, and Autocratic Leadership. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *32*(2), 235–268. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2020.1827628

Holbrook, D., & Horgan, J. (2019). Terrorism and Ideology. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *13*(6), 2–15. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26853737

Horgan, J. (2005). The psychology of terrorism. In *The psychology of terrorism.* Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203496961

Horgan, J. (2008). Individual Disengagement: A psychological analysis. In *Leaving Terrorism Behind* (1st ed., pp. 17–29). Routledge.

Horton-Salway, M. (2012). Gendering attention deficit hyperactivity disorder: A discursive analysis of UK newspaper stories. *Journal of Health Psychology*, *18*(8), 1085–1099. https://doi.org/10.1177/1359105312456326

Katz, C. (2008). Cultural Geographies lecture: Childhood as spectacle: relays of anxiety and the reconfiguration of the child. *Cultural Geographies*, *15*(1), 5–17. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474474007085773

Kinnvall, C. (2004). Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security. *Political Psychology*, *25*(5), 741–767. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792342

Kirby, A. (2007). The London Bombers as "Self-Starters": A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *30*(5), 415–428. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701258619

Koblentz-Stenzler, liram, & Pack, A. (2021). *Infected by Hate:* International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30926

Koblentz-Stenzler, L., & Chavez, K. (2023). *Trump's Indictment and the Weaponization of Conspiracy Theories by the Far-Right*. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep51468

Kupper, J., Christensen, T. K., Wing, D., Hurt, M., Schumacher, M., & Meloy, R. (2022). The Contagion and Copycat Effect in Transnational Far-right Terrorism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *16*(4), 4–26. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27158149

Lakhani, S. (2014). *Radicalisation as a moral career: a qualitative study of how people become terrorists in the United Kingdom*. Cardiff University.

Lowrance, S. (2006). Identity, Grievances, and Political Action: Recent Evidence from the Palestinian Community in Israel. *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique*, *27*(2), 167–190. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445046

Macklin, G., & Bjørgo, T. (2021). Breivik's Long Shadow? The Impact of the July 22, 2011 Attacks on the Modus Operandi of Extreme-right Lone Actor Terrorists. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *15*(3), 14–36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27030880

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *20*(3), 415–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2011). *Friction: How radicalization happens to them and us*. oxford university Press.

MELEAGROU-HITCHENS, A., ALEXANDER, A., & KADERBHAI, N. (2017). The impact of digital communications technology on radicalization and recruitment. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, *93*(5), 1233–1249. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48571593

Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). *Definition of Radicalize*. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radicalization

Misztal, B. (2002). *Informality: Social theory and contemporary practice*. Routledge. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203003626

Moghadam, A. (2008). The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology. *CTC Sentinel*, *1*(3), 3.

Moghaddam, F. (2005). The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration. *The American Psychologist*, *60*, 161–169. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161

MUDDE, C. A. S. (1995). Right-wing extremism analyzed. *European Journal of Political Research*, *27*(2), 203–224. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1995.tb00636.x

Nielsen, R. K., Cornia, A., & Kalogeropoulos, A. (2016). *Challenges and opportunities for news media and journalism in an increasingly digital, mobile, and social media environment*. https://rm.coe.int/16806c0385

Ong, K. (2020). Ideological Convergence in the Extreme Right. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, *12*(5), 1–7. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26954256

Ozer, S. (2019). Towards a Psychology of Cultural Globalisation: A Sense of Self in a Changing World. *Psychology and Developing Societies*, *31*(1), 162–186. https://doi.org/10.1177/0971333618819279

Ozer, S., & Obaidi, M. (2022). *Globalization and Radicalization: The Rise of Extreme Reactions to Intercultural Contact, Sociocultural Disruption, and Identity Threat BT - Globalized Identities: The Impact of Globalization on Self and Identity* (I. Katzarska-Miller & S. Reysen, Eds.; pp. 107–130). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04644-5_5

Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., & Anjum, G. (2023). Extreme Reactions to Globalization: Investigating Indirect, Longitudinal, and Experimental Effects of the Globalization–Radicalization Nexus. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 01461672231167694. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672231167694

Peighambari, K., Sattari, S., Kordestani, A., & Oghazi, P. (2016). Consumer Behavior Research: A Synthesis of the Recent Literature. *SAGE Open*, *6*(2), 2158244016645638. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244016645638

Post, J., Sprinzak, E., & Denny, L. (2003). The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists∗∗ This research was conducted with the support of the Smith Richardson Foundation. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *15*(1), 171–184.

Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1997). Why Do We Need What We Need? A Terror Management Perspective on the Roots of Human Social Motivation. *Psychological Inquiry*, *8*(1), 1–20. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449118

Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1999). A dual-process model of defense against conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts: An extension of terror management theory. In *Psychological Review* (Vol. 106, Issue 4, pp. 835–845). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.106.4.835

Rapoport, D. C. (2016). It Is Waves, Not Strains. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *28*(2), 217–224. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112278

RAPOPORT, D. C. (2022). *Waves of Global Terrorism: From 1879 to the Present*. Columbia University Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/rapo13302

Ruby, K. G. (2004). Securitizing terror: Ontological security and the US response to 9/11. *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*.

Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt3fhfxz

Sageman, M. (2008). A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *618*(1), 223–231. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317051

Sageman, M. (2011). *Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sageman, M. (2019). *The London Bombings*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Incorporated.

https://books.google.cz/books?id=nw2EDwAAQBAJ

Sapountzis, A., & Condor, S. (2013). Conspiracy Accounts as Intergroup Theories: Challenging Dominant Understandings of Social Power and Political Legitimacy. *Political Psychology*, *34*(5), 731–752. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43783733

Schmid, A. P. (2012). The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *6*(2), 158–159. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26298569

Schmid, A. P. (2016). Research on Radicalisation. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *10*(3), 26–32. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297594

Schuurman, B., Bakker, E., & Eijkman, Q. (2018). Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *30*(1), 97–115. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1158165

Sedgwick, M. (2010). The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *22*(4), 479–494. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.491009

Silke, A. (2008). Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization. *European Journal of Criminology*, *5*(1), 99–123. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370807084226

Silke, A., & Brown, K. (2016). *'Radicalisation': The Transformation of Modern Understanding of Terrorist Origins, Psychology and Motivation* (pp. 129–150). https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813140127_0009

Singer, A. J., Chouhy, C., Lehmann, P. S., Stevens, J. N., & Gertz, M. (2019). Economic anxieties, fear of crime, and punitive attitudes in Latin America. *Punishment & Society*, *22*(2), 181–206. https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474519873659

Speckhard, A., Shajkovci, A., Wooster, C., & Izadi, N. (2018). Mounting a Facebook Brand Awareness and Safety Ad Campaign to Break the ISIS Brand in Iraq. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *12*(3), 50–66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26453135

Swigger, N. (2013). The Online Citizen: Is Social Media Changing Citizens' Beliefs About Democratic Values? *Political Behavior*, *35*(3), 589–603. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43653084

Tanner, S. (2011). Towards a pattern in mass violence participation? An analysis of Rwandan perpetrators' accounts from the 1994 genocide. *Global Crime*, *12*(4), 266–289. https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2011.616054

Taylor, M., & Horgan, J. (2006). A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *18*(4), 585–601. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550600897413

THOMAS, E. (2020). MANIFESTOS, MEMETIC MOBILISATION AND THE CHAN BOARDS IN THE. In *COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2020*. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25133.7

Veldhuis, T., & Staun, J. (2009). *Islamist radicalisation: A root cause model*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael The Hague.

Voogt, S. (2017). Countering far-right recruitment online: CAPE's practitioner experience. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, *12*(1), 34–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2016.1215510

Wiggins, S. (2017). *Discursive Psychology: Theory, Method and Applications*. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473983335

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). *Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam*.

Yaoren, K. Y., & Abdul Nasir, A. (2021). *Extreme Right-Wing Ideology Arrives in Singapore*. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/extreme-right-wing-ideology-arrives-in-singapore/

Zdeněk Kalvach. (2016). *BASICS OF SOFT TARGETS PROTECTION GUIDELINES*. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiQkLXaj7qDAxXugv0HHZMJDroQFnoECEQQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mvcr.cz%2Fchh%2Fsoubor%2Fbasics-of-soft-target-protection-guidelines.aspx&usg=AOvVaw3aNIaAELFvPZGtdX9b3O62&opi=89978449

Appendices

The following appendices are referential for each section, yet the second is referential for all sections as much of the analysis overlaps. Qualitative aspects of the data were gathered and coded according to the chosen research methods. Quantitative aspects of the data were performed using Microsoft Word's "Find" function and manual counting procedures as access to automated software was not a viable option.

Appendix A: Meso-level Analysis

Meso		Quote	Stakeholder				Discursive Elements				Power Relations	
			Frame	Sub-frame	Schema	Script	Key Vocabulary or Phrases	Imagery/Symbolism	Pronouns (Possessive pronouns marked with an asterisk*	Honorifics	Agency	No Agency
		Even at Vienna in 1683 we Europeans still lost over fourteen thousand good men. That was during a triumphant VICTORY. Do you believe you are better than these men? More deserving of life? More skilled and courageous? You are not. If they could die, so can you. Expect death, expect struggle, expect loss that you will never forget. Do not expect to survive, the only thing you should expect is a true war and to die the death of a true soldier.	Hero	Noble Defender/ Martyr	Death Militaristic Action	Defend against invading force Embrace the invitablility of death	"we Europeans" "Skilled" "Corageous" "Expect Death" "Expect Struggle" "Expect True War" "Expect...the death of a true soldier"	War, Glory, Immortality	We You	N/A	+ (Heroes)	- (Victims)
		If you were to kill sixty armed invaders having shown the will and the intent to bring harm to your nation and people, you would be hailed a hero, given your nations highest civilian honours, paraded before the media and the adoring public. But kill sixty unarmed invaders having shown the will and the intent to bring harm to your nation and people, and you will be considered a monster, dragged through the streets, ridiculed, attacked,your character assassinated in every way it	Hero	Martyr	Commit socially-unsanctioned violence	Defend against (Muslim) invaders	Kill invaders "intent to bring harm to your nation or people"	Killing invaders "dragged through the streets"	You your*	N/A	- (Heroes)	+ (Villains/ Society)
		The people worthy of glory, the people blessed by God Our Lord, moan and fall under the weight of these outrages and most shameful humiliations. The race of the elect suffers outrageous persecutions, and the impious race of the Saracens respects neither the virgins of the Lord nor the colleges of priests. ... ASK YOURSELF, WHAT WOULD POPE URBAN II DO?	Hero	Noble Defender/Religious Warrior	Holy War	Defend against invading "saracen" force	"raise up the Holy War" "lead us into combat"	Religious War Castigator	N/A	+	N/A	N/A
		I have read the writings of Dylan Roof and many others, but only really took true inspiration from Knight Justiciar Breivik	Hero	Noble Defender/Religious Warrior/Martyr	N/A	Defend against invading anti-Christian force Embrace the invitablility of death	Knight Justiciar	N/A	I	+	N/A	N/A
		Who do you represent? Millions of European and other ethno-nationalist peoples that wish to live in peace amongst their own people, living in their own lands, practicing their own traditions and deciding the future of their own kind.	Hero	Ethnopluralist	oup representatio	Represents people	Among their own people	Peace and Coexistence	You	N/A	N/A	N/A
		The second event was the 2017 French General election...The internationalist, globalist, anti-white, ex-banker won. It wasn't even close. The truth of the political situation in Europe was suddenly impossible to accept.My despair set in.My belief in a democratic solution vanished.	Victim Villain	Victim: Bystander Villain: Traitor	Victim: Helpess witness Villain: Globalist and anti-white	Victim: Watch destruction helplessly Villain: foster invasion and replacement	Truth Globalist, anti-white, despair "belief...vanished"	N/A	N/A	-	+ (Villains)	- (Victims)
		Mass immigration will disenfranchise us,subvert our nations, destroy our communities, destroy our ethnic binds, destroy our cultures, destroy our peoples.	Villain	Replacement Enemy Immigrant Atraditional	Disenfranchise destroy	Disenfranchise and destroy culture, tradition, community, nation, people, ethnicity	Disenfanchise Subvert Destroy	N/A	Our*	N/A	+ (Villains)	- (Victims)
		This is ethnic replacement. This is cultural replacement. This is racial replacement. This is WHITE GENOCIDE.	Villain	Immigrant Replacement Atraditional	Destruction Replacement	Destroy traditional society Replace	Replacement Genocide Racial	N/A	N/A	N/A	+ (Villains)	- (Victims)
		To most of all show the invaders that our lands will never be their lands, our homelands are our own and that, as long as a white man still lives, they will NEVER conquer our lands and they will never replace our people.	Villain	slamic) Invade	Militaristic Action Destroy Replace	Conquer "white European Christian" lands Destroy "white European Christian" culture Replace "white European Christian" people	Invaders "...attacks on the West by islamic invaders..." "...I could no longer turn my back on the violence..." conquer NEVER Replace white man	N/A	our*	N/A	+ (Villains)	- (Victims)
		Something that had been a part of my life for as long as I could remember, cynicism in the face of attacks on the West by islamic invaders, was suddenly no longer there. I could no longer bring the sneer to my face, I could no longer turn my back on the violence. Something, this time, was different. That difference was Ebba Akerlund.	Villain/Vict	slamic) Invade	Invade Replace	Invade "white European Christian" lands	Attacks islamic invaders violence	Sneer to my face	I	N/A	+ (Villains)	- (Victims)
		Both illegal and legal drug dealers are our racial enemies, ruining the health, wealth, family structure, culture and future of our people.These peddlers of filth are active in every nation and behave without any thought of their impact on their societies.	Villain	Enemy (Blood/Race) Traitor	Destroy	Ruin traditional society Destroy future	Racial enemies "ruining....our **people**." "peddlers of filth"	N/A	our*	N/A	N/A	N/A
		The invaders must be removed from European soil, regardless from where they came or when they came. Roma, African, Indian, Turkish, Semitic or other. If they are not of our people, but live in our lands, they must be removed.	Villain	Invader	Invade Replace	Ruin traditional society Destroy future Invade "white European Christian" lands	Invaders "must be removed" removed	N/A	they our*	N/A	N/A	N/A
		Democracy is mob rule and the mob itself is ruled by our enemies. The global and corporate run press controls them, the education system(long since fallen to the long march through the institutions carried out by the marxists)controls them, the state(long since heavily lost to its corporate backers) controls them and the anti-white media machine controls them.	Villain	Society Democracy (Institutional Systems) Globalist Enemy (Blood/Race)Traitor Atraditional	Anti-white Greedy	rase white society (?	Mob fallen global corporate-run press Marxists control lost anti-white media *machine*	N/A	them	N/A	+ (Villains)	- (Victims)
		For too long those who have profited most from the importation of cheap labour have gone unpunished.The economic elites who line their pockets with the profit received from our own ethnic replacement. These greed filled bastards expect to replace our people with a race of low intellect, low agency, muddled, muddled masses just so their own wealth and power can increase.	Villain	Enemy (Blood/Race) Traitor	Greedy Replace	Import cheap foreign labor to maximize profits replace white workers	Importation unpunished elites "ethnic replacement" greed *bastards* replace **our people** race low intellect low agency muddled muddled masses wealth power	N/A	their* our*	N/A	+ (Villains: Economic elites)	- (Victims /Villains: Immigrants)
		The truth that they are expected not to combat these myriad, unending and dedicated interlopers, but to embrace them, accept their own disenfranchisement, accept the loss of their fathers lands, their own impoverishment, their own REPLACEMENT.	Victim	Docile	Acceptance	Accept loss Not fight back	Expected Not to combat unending myriad interlopers embrace them accept loss their own replacement	N/A	They them their*	N/A	+ (Villains)	- (Victims)
		To take revenge on the invaders for the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by foreign invaders in European lands throughout history. To take revenge for the enslavement of millions of Europeans taken from their lands by the Islamic slavers. To take revenge for the thousands of European lives lost to terror attacks throughout European lands. To take revenge for Ebba Akerlund.	Hero Victim	Avenger Docile	Militaristic Action Take revenge	Castigator	Revenge invaders "deaths...forelgn invaders" European lands enslavement islamic slavers lives lost terror attacks take revenge	N/A	Their*	N/A	+ (Victims /Villains)	N/A

Appendix B: Micro-level Analysis

Micro		Quote	Textual Elements					Purpose
			Minimization	Lists	Vagueness	Extreme Case Formulation	Modality	
		I am just a regular White man, from a regular family.	Just	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Symmetry/Identity Construction
		Unity, purpose, trust, traditions, nationalism and racial nationalism is what provides strength. Everything else is just a catchphrase.	Just	X	X	N/A	None	Asymmetry/Narrative Construction/Legitimacy Construction
		Mass immigration will disenfranchise us,subvert our nations[sic], destroy our communities, destroy our ethnic binds, destroy our cultures, destroy our peoples.	N/A	X	N/A	X	Declarative	Legitimacy/Accountability Construction
		Q: "Democracy is the only solution, why are you committing to force?"	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Interrogative	Credibility
		A: "Democracy is mob rule and the mob itself is ruled by our enemies... Prepare for war, prepare for violence and prepare for risk, loss, struggle, death. Force is the only path to power and the only path to true victory."	N/A	X	N/A	X	Declarative	Narrative and Ideological Reinforcement/Legitimacy Construction
		Just a ordinary White man,28 years old. Born in Australia to a working class,low income family.	X	X	N/A	N/A	N/A	Symmetry/Legitimacy Construction
		Q: Was the attack anti-immigration in origin?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Interrogative	Credibility
		A: Yes, beyond all doubt, anti-immigration, anti-ethnic replacement and anti-cultural replacement.	N/A	X	N/A	X	Decarative	Asymmetry/Accountability Construction
		Q: Did the groups you support/are aligned with order or promote your attack?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Interrogative	Credibility
		A: No.No group ordered my attack, I make the decision myself. Though I did contact the reborn Knights Templar for a blessing in support of the attack, which was given.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Declarative	Legitimacy
		KILL THE RAPISTS, HANG THEIR FAMILIES	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Imperative	Accountability
		EXPECT A SOLDIERS FIGHT AND A SODIERS DEATH	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Imperative	Identity Construction
		STOP RUNNING, START FIGHTING	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Imperative	Identity Construction
		FLEE TO YOUR OWN LANDS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Imperative	Identity Construction

Appendix C: Pronouns and Modality

Pronouns		Shifts
I	149	Total
You	247	Total
	80	Self-referrent
	34	Admonishing
	104	Asymmetrical/Preaching
	7	Inclusive
	22	Emnical
In-Group/Heroes &Victims		
We	101	Total
	94	Inclusive
	6	Identity Construction Othering
	1	In-text, non-referrent
Us	22	Total
	21	Inclusive
	1	Hypothetical, Self-Referential
Our*	147	Total
	147	Inclusive
Out-Group/Other/Villains		
They	112	Total
	52	Emnical
	8	Inclusive
	15	Object/Event/Issue-referrent
	2	Affiliation Distancing
	5	Ethnopluralist ID Construction
	4	Dylan Thomas/Rudyard Kipling
	6	Despective
	11	Victim/Flock-Referrent
	9	Hero/Ancestral Worship

Key:	
In text, non-referrent	Not utilized referential to any specific group or for purposes of ideology
Object/Event/Issue-referrent	Referring to an event or physical objects, or issues not groups or for ideological nor narrative construction
Affiliation Distancing	Tarrant attempts to establish legitimacy by distancing himself from political groups, e.g. Front National, Brexit, etc.
Despective	Those whom Tarrant perceives as useless, but not a threat, the public, gun owners

Their*	0	Total
	6	Dylan Thomas/Rudyard Kipling
	58	Emnical
	21	Victim
	42	Hero Construction/Hero/Ancestor Worship/Ethnopluralist
	9	Inclusive
	5	Despective
	11	Uncategorized

Them	57	
	26	Emnical/Othering
	15	In-group
	3	Object-referrent
	2	Ethnopluralist
	10	Victim
	1	Kipling
	6	Ancestor/Hero Worship
	5	Despective

Verbs	Use/Total	Category: Absolute/Modal
Is	233/240	Absolute
Are	137/173	Absolute
Will	161/161	Absolute
Would	23/23	Modal
Should	19/19	Modal
Could	19/19	Modal