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**Impact of Portugal on the European Union Training
Mission in Mozambique**

Master's thesis

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Study programme: Political Science

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Year of the defence: 2024

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
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Bc. Leonard Snopko

January 3, 2024

References

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Abstract

The thesis deals with the European Union Military Training Mission (EUTM) in Mozambique, which has been operational since 2021. The EU built on the foundations of the Portuguese training mission, which started training a few months earlier. Portugal, in particular, is a long-standing partner of its former colony on the African continent, with which it has regularly updated its bilateral Defence Cooperation Framework Programme – ‘Programa-Quadro’ – since the Carnation Revolution. In response to the insurgency by the militant group Ansar al-Sunna wa Jama’a (ASWJ) in Mozambique's northern region, Cabo Delgado, in October 2017, Portugal explored adding a new sixth cooperation Project with Mozambique to their Framework Programme. It was to support the training and capacity-building of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) for counter-insurgency operations. The formalisation of this project took place in Lisbon in May 2021 with the signing of a new ‘Programa-Quadro’ by both the Portuguese and Mozambican Ministers of National Defence. Simultaneously, Portuguese officials took the opportunity of the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2021 to discuss the implementation of the EUTM Mozambique. It was to build on the Portuguese training mission to strengthen the FADM capabilities with their equipment and to create a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The thesis explores the mandate for establishing the mission, signed by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, in July 2021, and also supported by a request from Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi from September 2020 for non-executive military assistance. The thesis primarily focuses on the impact of Portugal on the establishment of the EUTM Mozambique and its subsequent course.

Keywords

Cabo Delgado, EUTM, FADM, Insurgency, Mandate, Mozambique, Portugal, Project 6, QRF, Security

Abstrakt

Diplomová práca opisuje vojenskú výcvikovú misiu Európskej únie (EUTM) v Mozambiku, ktorá operuje v krajine od roku 2021. EU pri jej tvorbe stavala na základoch Portugalskej výcvikovej misie, ktorá začala pár mesiacov pred EUTM. Práve Portugalsko je dlhoročný partner svojej bývalej kolónii z Afrického kontinentu, s ktorou od doby Karafiátovej revolúcie pravidelne aktualizuje bilaterálny Rámcový program spolupráce v oblasti obrany, tzv. Programa-Quadro. V reakcii na povstanie militantnej skupiny Ansar al-Sunna wa Jama'a (ASWJ) v severnom regióne Mozambiku Cabo Delgado, v októbri 2017 sa začalo Portugalsko zaoberať možnosťou o doplnenie nového Projektu 6 v Programe obrannej spolupráce s Mozambikom. Mal podporovať výcvik a budovanie kapacít Mozambických ozbrojených síl (FADM) pre oblasť protipovstaleckých operácií. K potvrdeniu Projektu došlo podpisom nového Programa-Quadro v Lisabone, v máji 2021, obidvomi ministrami národnej obrany Portugalska ako aj Mozambiku. Portugalskí predstavitelia zároveň využili príležitosť predsedníctva v Rade EU v prvej polovici 2021 k prerokovaniu možnosti uskutočnenia EUTM v Mozambiku. Mala nadviazať na Portugalskú výcvikovú misiu s cieľom posilniť spôsobilosti FADM pomocou ich zlepšenia ich vybavenia a vytvorením Síl rýchlej reakcie (QRF). Zároveň sa práca zaoberá mandátom na zriadenie misie, ktorý bol podpísaný Vysokým predstaviteľom EU pre zahraničné veci a bezpečnostnú politiku, Josepom Borrellom, v júli 2021, podložený žiadosťou mozambického prezidentom Filipem Nyusim zo septembra 2020 o nevykonnú vojenskú pomoc. Práca sa zameriava na vplyv Portugalska na založenie EUTM v Mozambiku a jeho následný priebeh.

Kľúčové slová

Cabo Delgado, EUTM, FADM, Povstanie, Mandát, Mozambik, Portugalsko, Projekt 6, QRF, Bezpečnosť

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1. Introduction

The thesis explores the European Union training mission (EUTM) in Mozambique, which started in October 2021 and is currently underway. Portugal, as a long-standing partner of Mozambique, played a crucial role in forming this mission, closely monitoring the deteriorating security situation since the insurgency broke out in the country's northern region, Cabo Delgado, in October 2017. The militant Islamist group *Ansar al-Sunna wa Jama'a* (ASWJ) operates in this region, demanding the purification of religious life and the return of the Cabo Delgado tribal area – from Mocímboa da Praia to Palma – to Islam.¹ Initially, ASWJ lived in isolation from most of society, building only mosques in the local region. The situation changed after the attack on the police station in Mocímboa da Praia on October 5, 2017, since when the ASWJ has been constantly fighting the government and the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM). Although the group's specific demands are neither explicitly stated nor widely known, the movement has its economic interests in the rich mineral deposits, especially natural gas, discovered in Cabo Delgado after 2010.²

The decision to select this thesis topic was shaped by the relatively limited academic focus on this former Portuguese colony compared to other African countries. My previous studies sparked my interest in conflicts caused by terrorist and Islamist groups, particularly in the strategies used by separatist organisations, especially in African countries. While my thesis addresses the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado, it is worth noting that Mozambique remains one of the safest countries in Africa despite these challenges. In my thesis, I focus primarily on the response and actions of Portugal in the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado. This former colonial power has long played an important role in the development of a bilateral security programme with the African country. Their partnership has become the basis for the creation of a fourth EUTM, which is also operating in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and Somalia. A 12-nation EU mission, currently led by Portuguese Brigadier General João Gonçalves, has been operating in the Mozambican capital Maputo as well as Katembe and Chimoio since October 2021. The insurgency by militant Islamists occurred in one of Mozambique's 11 provinces, Cabo Delgado. The

¹ Nuno Lemos Pires (Army Major-General, Defence Policy Director), Personal Interview with the Author, 9 March 2023 [Unpublished Interview].

² Thomas Heyen-Dubé, and Richard Rands, "Evolving doctrine and modus operandi: violent extremism in Cabo Delgado," *Small wars & insurgencies* 33, no. 3 (2022): 442-443, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1936956> [Accessed 24 Nov. 2023].

intentional targeting of civilians by Islamist militants is a source of concern for the international community, including the EU.

In my thesis I am posing two research questions:

- What are the strategic interests of Portugal in EUTM Mozambique, given its historical colonial relationship with Mozambique and ongoing defence cooperation initiatives?
- Is the operation driven by Mozambique's request for military assistance from its long-time partner, Portugal, to be present in a country hit by an insurgency or by Portugal's strategic international objectives in the region?

To answer these research questions, it is important to define terms and concepts relevant to my subsequent case study research. The introductory chapter explains the process of creating military, civilian and training missions in which the EU is internationally involved. It defines the specific instruments to achieve their establishment, who can design and implement them. The effective maintenance of the mission and operation mandate should be justified and planned in advance. At the same time, I also define terms such as 'insurgency' and subsequent 'counter-insurgency' that give rise to a given mission mandate. I talk about what must precede them, how they can be implemented and who is involved. Using the example of the 2017 Cabo Delgado insurgency, I methodologically point out that Portugal's foreign and security policy set the stage for the establishment of EUTM Mozambique in 2021.

In the following section, it is important to mention Portugal's current security relations with Mozambique based on the past. One of the highlights of Portugal's colonial history came with economic problems in the 1920s. Although the government of António de Oliveira Salazar brought changes in Portugal, during his decades of rule, and tightened his control over the colonies, the desired economic change in colonial administration did not occur. This resulted in resistance in the colonies that led Mozambicans to the independence movement and the decolonization process in the mid-20th century. Since independence from Portugal in 1975, however, Mozambique has maintained a significant partnership with Portugal through several security agreements. Following the emergence of an Islamic movement in the northern region and its subsequent radicalization, which resulted in the October 2017 uprising, Portuguese and Mozambican officials were forced to revisit the Defence Cooperation Framework Programme – *Programa-Quadro* – In May 2021. The decisive point was the terrorist attack in Mocímboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado province in 2021,

when Portugal immediately expressed concern after the attack and offered its former colony support and bilateral cooperation. Portugal provided direct training and support to the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces to improve their counter-insurgency capabilities. It has subsequently played an important role in shaping the EU response to the situation in Mozambique.

In Chapter 6, I refer to the course of the first half of 2021, when Portugal held the Presidency of the Council of the EU, which provided an opportunity for proposals to establish EUTM Mozambique. Following Mozambique's request for EU assistance in Cabo Delgado in September 2020, Portugal, during the Council discussions, emphasized broader priorities. This included the importance of EU international policy, especially in the context of EU-Africa relations. Following the attacks on the city of Palma in March 2021, which also suspended a major investment project by the French company *TotalEnergies*, Portugal began to advocate a swift EU response to the Cabo Delgado insurgents. The main objective was to create the EUTM Mozambique, which would increase the effectiveness of FADM in the fight against insurgents. One way to do this was to build the capacity of FADM units to create the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). In the chapter I examine how EUTM Mozambique has built on the foundations of the previous training mission of the Portuguese Armed Forces, which started in May 2021. Two months later, the mandate of EUTM Mozambique was approved and it subsequently became operational in October 2021.³

2. Analysis of the Literature Used

For my master's thesis, I drew inspiration and necessary information from a diverse range of book and web sources, academic articles, and, most importantly, primary sources such as those from the European Union, the Portuguese Ministry of National Defence, and speeches of key actors in EUTM Mozambique. As a primary source, I would highlight the interview with Major General Nuno Lemos Pires in early March 2023, where he provided insights into EUTM from the perspective of the mission's first Force Commander. He also shared the 'EUTM publication of 2022,' which he contributed to after the mission's successful first year. Thanks to this publication, I could visually see the development of EUTM, from its formation and launch to the training of FADM and the development of the future QRF. In 2023, I interned at the *Direção-Geral de*

³ Josep Borrell, "COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021 on a European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique)," *EUR-Lex*, July 13, 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D1143> [Accessed 16 Dec. 2023].

Política de Defesa Nacional (DGPDN) of the Ministry of National Defence, which gave me access to the latest versions of *Programa-Quadro* between Portugal and Mozambique.

The introductory chapter of the thesis focuses on the chosen theoretical framework, where I sourced information from official EU websites, treaties, and documents created and provided by the Strategic Communication Department of the European External Action Service (EEAS). This Department gave me access to the *Lisbon Treaty* with its specific Articles on the functions of EU bodies, a closer look at the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Military Planning and Command Capability (MPCC), and definitions for EU military, civilian, and training missions. Initially, Steven Metz assisted me in defining the term ‘insurgency,’ and subsequently, NATO documents, along with the latest publication from 2023 by Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald, provided definitions to clarify the concept of ‘Counter-insurgency.’

In the following chapters, the publication ‘The Origins of War in Mozambique: A History of Unity and Division’ by authors Sayaka Funada-Classen and Masako Osada provided the best framework for an overview of the historical relationship between Portugal and Mozambique. They described in detail the situation in Mozambique from the time of colonisation to the Carnation Revolution with the emergence of the FRELIMO movement. Salazar’s administration of the Portuguese colonies was succinctly expressed by Poddar Prem in his publication ‘A historical companion to postcolonial literatures – continental Europe and its empires.’ Insights into the subsequent emergence of anti-colonial movements in Mozambique were drawn from Francisco Proença Garcia’s article ‘O Emergir dos Movimentos Independentistas em África. Os Casos de Angola, Guiné e Moçambique.’ The subsequent subchapter on the War for independence in Mozambique primarily relies on the reflections of Adrian Hastings in 1974 about the war in Mozambique and the article ‘Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s’ by Walter C. Opello.

The main part of the thesis dedicated to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is based on an interview with Major General Nuno Lemos Pires and the publication provided by EUTM in September 2022. Throughout, I am accompanied by the Cabo Ligado website, regularly capturing the most significant events in the northern region of Mozambique based on data from the ACLED agency and statements from key actors in EUTM Mozambique through monthly and weekly reports. The French company *TotalEnergies* also reports on the current situation of the major

natural gas investment project in Cabo Delgado on its website. Information on Portugal's intention to create a training mission in Mozambique was based on official information from the website of the Ministry of National Defence of Portugal and the latest versions of *Programa-quadro* provided by DGPDN. The mandate to establish EUTM Mozambique – *Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143* from July 2021, signed by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU, Josep Borrell – is available on the official EU website with its legal documents. Among the world press and news agencies, I mostly used the sources of Reuters, Club of Mozambique and Euractiv, where the statements of key actors of EUTM Mozambique were also captured.

3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The basic theoretical framework for understanding and explaining my work is institutional liberalism – neoliberalism – which minimizes the importance of cooperation between international institutions for mutual benefit and peace between countries. Normally, the international order is stable where states respect international formal and informal rules and regulations. However, according to this theory, if a hegemonic individual state emerges in the international environment, this can be prevented by designing appropriate institutional means (mechanisms). Riots, insurgencies, or a poor security situation can only make cooperation more difficult but cannot prevent it.⁴ The conceptual framework, which best characterises the Portuguese impact on the EUTM Mozambique, is the definition of the concepts of mission – military, civilian and training. This thesis is one case study of EUTM Mozambique in which I examine and analyse the dynamics of the mission and the current results of the counter-insurgency in Cabo Delgado.

EUTM Mozambique was established with a core mandate based on EU foreign policy objectives. This includes upholding and promoting EU values and interests; contributing to global peace, security, and sustainable development; contributing to solidarity and promoting mutual respect among peoples, advocating for free and fair trade, eradicating poverty, and ensuring the protection of human rights – all while strictly adhering to international law.⁵ The EU's objectives are set out in Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty. The thesis is based on several points of this Treaty, in

⁴ AKM Khairul Islam, "CO-OPERATION UNDER ANARCHY NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 70, no. 3 (2009): 863, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42742767> [Accessed 28 Dec. 2023].

⁵ "Aims and values," *European Union*, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values_en [Accessed 17 Dec. 2023].

particular on the Union's external action and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The EU ensures coherence between the various areas of its external action, which is the responsibility of the Council of the EU and the European Commission. Coherence and cooperation between these bodies is the responsibility of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council.

Under a mandate from the Council, the High Representative directs the Common Security and Defence Policy, and his proposals contribute to the EU's strong position on the international stage. He can make proposals to the Council on possible strategic interests and objectives of the Union. His subsequent decisions may concern the Union's relations with a particular country or region beyond its borders or may take a thematic approach. They define their duration and the resources to be provided by the Union and the member states.⁶ In the case of this master's thesis, the EU training mission and its work in Mozambique was heavily influenced by Portugal.

3.1 Theory of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in the Case of Cabo Delgado

This thesis explores the dynamics of insurgency and counter-insurgency in Mozambique's restive northern region, Cabo Delgado. The theoretical part of the *insurgency* includes the characteristics of an organised armed operation by non-state actors against the government and its institutions operating throughout the country. Insurgencies are often characterised by political, legal, and ethical ambiguity. There is irregular asymmetric violence through psychological warfare. Insurgents use more difficult terrain to fight state troops, avoiding battlefields where they would be at a disadvantage. To avoid defeat, they try to postpone decisive actions to maintain control over territory. The alliance with violent Islamic extremism determines the strategic importance of the insurgency.⁷

Al-Shabaab (ASWJ), which operates in Cabo Delgado, does not proclaim links with *Al-Shabaab* operating in other parts of Africa. However, Islamic extremism cultivates links between

⁶ "CONSOLIDATED VERSIONS OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION," *Official Journal of the European Union*, June 7, 2016, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016ME/TXT&from=EN> [Accessed 28 Dec. 2023].

⁷ Steven Metz, "RETHINKING INSURGENCY," *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College* (June 2007): 1-3, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11642> [Accessed 25 Dec. 2023].

insurgents who share the same ideology and support each other. During insurgencies, both the insurgents and the government focus on each other, often leaving certain parts of the country with minimal security and control.⁸ Mozambique's initial hesitation to tackle the Cabo Delgado insurgency prompted the EU to create a military training mission in October 2021 to train FADM to fight the insurgents.

Counter-insurgency (COIN) involves comprehensive security operations to bring stability and security to the environment, using all available instruments of power. It combines civilian and military efforts to defeat irregular armed forces engaged in insurgency while supporting legitimate governance and the rule of law. The aim is not only to provide short-term security, but also to identify and remove the sources of unrest in order to prevent further insurgency. Long-term operations may involve governance improvements, economic development, and the restoration of basic services. Delayed government response or failure to confront insurgents can lead to insecurity, while the opportunists – the insurgents – can use the authorities' indifference to their advantage and expand their actions.⁹ COIN forces, consisting of both local and indigenous forces, may seek assistance from international military and civilian agencies to help in the fight against the rebels. Achieving the objective requires unity of effort among groups that did not cooperate until the outbreak of the insurgency is essential. A key aspect is to build a capable and professional security force that should be able to protect the population, provide security and conduct targeted counter-insurgency operations.¹⁰ For the Mozambican government, international support was essential to strengthen its efforts to fight the Cabo Delgado insurgency. Mozambique had the opportunity to seek support from international partners, including neighbouring countries and regional organizations, in addressing the insurgency. In this case, Portugal plays a pivotal role in the EU training mission, which is an important partner in the fight against the insurgency, providing training, medical equipment, and humanitarian assistance to FADM.

⁸ Dorina A. Bekoe, Stephanie M. Burchard, and Sarah A. Daly, "Extremism in Mozambique: Interpreting Group Tactics and the Role of the Government's Response in the Crisis in Cabo Delgado," *Institute for Defense Analyses* (March 1, 2020): 5, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep36469> [Accessed 26 Nov. 2023].

⁹ Andre D. Rakoto, Gary Rauchfuss, and Gabriella Lurwig-Gendarme, "COUNTERINSURGENCY: A GENERIC REFERENCE CURRICULUM," *NATO International*, September 4, 2017, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_09/20170904_1709-counterinsurgency-rc.pdf [Accessed 25 Dec. 2023].

¹⁰ Paul D. Williams, and Matt McDonald, *Security Studies* (Milton: Routledge, 2023), 491-492.

3.2 Military and Civilian Mission

Examining the dynamic evolution of military and civilian missions and analysing their shared roles and distinct contributions to complex challenges, it is important to examine and understand the joint efforts to carry out these missions. After the end of the Cold War, the global community witnessed the emergence of phenomena referred to as “new wars” or “hybrid wars”. These conflicts involve various forms of warfare – conventional, irregular, or disruptive – using tactics that obscure their true nature. They include armed clashes of a conventional nature, or counter-insurgency and police campaigns, with actors seeking humanitarian aid or certain landscape recovery efforts. In addition, these conflicts often involve military and police forces, civilian state organisations, transnational frameworks, and non-state actors. The conflicts involve a wide range of missions, from purely military tasks to security and civilian roles. In particular, they involve specially created and temporary organisational formations, each tailored to the specific requirements of the mission.¹¹

Military mission is a structured and coordinated military operation entrusted to a country’s armed forces or military organisations. When actors participate in military missions, they deploy military personnel abroad, primarily to restore peace or prevent conflict. Organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU) are also involved in these missions with a wide range of activities, including combat operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and defence. In terms of structure, military missions involve the deployment of forces, a command – the governing body – and logistics officers who are jointly responsible for the use of military force when required. A form of observer mission refers to a military mission of unarmed military personnel to monitor whether the previously warring parties in a former conflict area are complying with the terms of a peace agreement and ceasefire.¹²

On the other hand, *civilian missions* focus more on non-military and non-combat operations, where objectives and tasks are predefined. Unlike military missions, civilian operations are usually led by non-military government or international agencies, such as the UN, EU, International

¹¹ Eyal Ben-Ari, Thomas V. Brond, and Uzi Ben-Shalom, *Military Mission Formations and Hybrid Wars: New Sociological Perspectives*, (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2020), 3-4.

¹² Aiden Warren, and Damian Grenfell, *Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century*, (United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 299-300.

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), diplomatic missions and humanitarian organisations.¹³ The civilian missions, predominantly with non-executive mandates, can strengthen the capacity of partner countries, monitor borders in the conflict zones, and advise national institutions in diplomacy, conflict negotiation, development, or in humanitarian assistance. In certain circumstances, they can take on an executive role, focusing on political, social, and economic issues in a particular region. Their deployment can occur at any stage of the conflict cycle. The lead actor can design them to be flexible, agile and effective in achieving the stated objectives.¹⁴ Importantly, civilian missions sometimes operate in tandem or separately from military missions. Their goals may include peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and support for stability and development. Therefore, civilian missions use economic, diplomatic, humanitarian and cultural policy instruments, emphasising only methods without the use of coercive means.¹⁵

In many complex conflict and post-conflict environments, situations arise where military and civilian missions coexist, working together to address challenges related to conflict resolution or the reconstruction of conflict-affected countries. Effective coordination and collaboration between military and civilian components are crucial for achieving comprehensive and sustainable solutions in such situations. Applying these characteristics to the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mozambique, the military mission involves a peace operation in the conflict zone of Cabo Delgado, focusing on security and violence prevention in this province. On the other hand, civilian missions could include diplomatic efforts to mediate a peace agreement, provide humanitarian assistance, or manage and build institutions in the post-conflict society.¹⁶

It can be argued that EUTM Mozambique shows characteristics of both military and civilian missions. In the thesis, I detail how EUTM focuses primarily on training and assisting the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces in enhancing their military capabilities and equipment, aligning with the characteristics of a military training mission. However, it is important to take

¹³ “The ICRC’s mandate and mission,” *International Committee of the Red Cross*, <https://www.icrc.org/en/mandate-and-mission> [Accessed 25 Dec. 2023].

¹⁴ Strategic Communication of the EEAS, “Civilian CSDP Compact Q&A,” *The European External Action Service*, May 23, 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/civilian-csdp-compact-qa_en [Accessed 25 Dec. 2023].

¹⁵ Karen E. Smith, “Beyond the civilian power EU debate.” *Politique européenne* 17, no. 3 (2005): 64-65, <https://doi.org/10.3917/poeu.017.0063> [Accessed 30 Aug. 2023].

¹⁶ Strategic Communication of the EEAS, “Civilian CSDP Compact Q&A.”

into account that EUTM activities may also include elements of civilian missions, for example through the CSDP, the EU's instrument for dealing with civilian crises in the world. In cooperation with regional states in Africa, NGOs and other actors, the EU contributes financially and materially to post-conflict stabilisation and development in Mozambique.¹⁷ EUTM reflects the current complexity of modern conflicts in the international environment. Many missions in conflict-affected regions, such as Mozambique, require a comprehensive strategy that includes military, diplomatic, humanitarian, and development efforts. This hybrid approach is designed to address a wide range of challenges, promote stability, and contribute to long-term peace and security. “*There is no security without development, just as there is no development without security,*” said Major General Nuno Lemos Pires in the EUTM publication after the first successful year of the mission.¹⁸

3.2.1 EU Missions and Operations

Within the framework of the CSDP, the EU plays a central role in activities related to peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention, and strengthening global security. This is an integral part of the EU's holistic approach to crisis management, utilising both civilian and military resources. Approximately 4,000 individuals actively contribute to the promotion of peace and security, working towards stability and resilience in vulnerable environments. Since 2003, 37 CSDP missions and operations have taken place in the EU, Africa and Asia regions.

The 21 ongoing CSDP initiatives include 12 civilian and 9 military missions and operations, where the EU also focuses on *training missions* that provide specific training and capacity-building support to a country's military forces or security institutions.¹⁹ Training missions may include a range of activities, such as training in various military disciplines, terrains, institutional capacity development, leadership training and support to operational effectiveness. The current EU military training missions in the CAR, Mali, Somalia and Mozambique operate under the Military Planning and Command Capability, a single command in Brussels. The EU decided to establish a permanent operational MPCC framework for non-executive military missions in line with the *Council*

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Carlos Filipe Henriques Pereira, Teresa S. de O. Bastos, Pedro F. F. Saial, and Pedro M. C. D. Marques, “First Year: European Union Training Mission in Mozambique,” *EUTM-MOZ* (2022): 26-27, <https://online.fliphtml5.com/ayrme/dmno/#p=1> [Accessed 9 M. 2023].

¹⁹ Strategic Communication of the EEAS, “EU Missions and Operations,” *The European External Action Service*, January 17, 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/EU-mission-and-operation_2023_2_0.pdf [Accessed 25 Dec. 2023].

Conclusions of 14 November 2016, the EU global strategy on security and defence. The MPCC assumes responsibility at the strategic level for the operational planning and leadership of EU non-executive military training missions.²⁰

4. Historical Profile of Mozambique-Portugal Relations

Portugal, as the world's colonial power at the time, discovered Mozambique on January 25, 1498. A group of Portuguese sailors and translators led by Vasco da Gama landed off the coast of Quelimane, just a few kilometres from the mouth of the Zambezi River. As there were several mini sultanates with local Arab traders, travellers disguised as Moroccan Muslims were part of the crew of sailors to make friends with the population.²¹ Since then, Portugal occupied the country for more than four centuries, until 1975, when it was forced to leave after more than a decade of fighting during the Mozambican War of Independence.

Compared to the other countries at that time, Portugal was during the sixteenth century the trade superpower along the African coast. Until the late nineteenth century, Portuguese colonial rule on the African continent focused on exploitative economic activities, such as the slave and ivory trades.²² Trading bases located mainly in the coastal regions of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique were used almost exclusively for the slave trade to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean – the American coastline – especially to Brazil. This scenario persisted throughout the 19th century, undergoing certain modifications as time passed. The Berlin Conference, that took place from 1884 to 1885, was one of the most important international meetings that happened during this period. The main task of the colonial powers was to ensure economic development in all designated territories of Africa for their effective occupation.²³ Portugal's problem was that it had no real military or administrative control over the vast colonies it claimed for itself. It could not quell uprisings led by African leaders, even within the *prazos*, located in the Zambezi River area

²⁰ Strategic Communication of the EEAS, "The Military Planning and Conduct Capability - MPCC," *The European External Action Service*, June 8, 2017, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/mpcc_factsheet.pdf [Accessed 25 Dec. 2023].

²¹ Mustafah Dhada, *The Portuguese Massacre of Wiriyamu in Colonial Mozambique 1964-2013* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Pub, 2015), 41-42.

²² Tatak Mentan, *Africa in the colonial ages of empire: slavery, capitalism, racism, colonialism, decolonization, independence as recolonization, and beyond* (Mankon, Bamedna, Cameroon: Langaa Research & Publishing CIG, 2018), 130-131.

²³ Roberta Holanda Maschietto, *Beyond Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Empowerment Promotion in Mozambique*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 85.

in central Mozambique, which was seen as the area where Portugal held the most dominant sway. They did not even have much of an endeavour to establish a government or explore the interior of the continent in an attempt to link its colonies. Portuguese colonies were officially recognized five years following the Berlin Conference.²⁴

Following the political upheaval prior to World War I, the new republican government in Portugal encouraged citizens to identify with the nation through its colonial empire rather than the monarchy's history. These political changes necessitated a more 'effective' approach to colonial territory, leading to the establishment of the Ministry of Colonies and an administrative overhaul. *The Republican Colonial Law* of 1914 aimed to clarify contradictory policies, distinguishing between assimilated '*assimilados*' Africans, now considered citizens, and indigenous '*indígenas*' Africans, who were compelled to work against their will. '*Assimilados*' were permitted to reside in urban areas, while '*indígenas*' were confined to rural villages.²⁵

Essentially, the core element of Portuguese colonial dominance in Mozambique was the utilization of indigenous labour, and this fundamental aspect remained largely unchanged even after slavery was abolished. Despite alterations in the nature of Portuguese colonial governance from the late 19th century to the early 20th century, African communities continued to coordinate diverse forms of resistance, including both armed and non-violent forms of opposition. There were several desperate efforts to mobilize the masses as rebel leaders tried unsuccessfully to convince the locals that the only way to end exploitation was to dismantle the colonial system. Portuguese authorities, who alibi-like denied the impact of these manifestations, confidently predicted that Africans had been permanently pacified.²⁶

However, the rebellion in 1917 – Barue uprising – showed Portuguese colonialists the opposite situation, when an alliance of local communities launched an anti-colonial resistance that Portugal was not prepared for. Rebels, situated mainly in the Bárue region, intensified their resistance against the Portuguese colonizers. The primary objective was to liberate their homelands and to expel the Portuguese, along with their African collaborators who played a role in upholding the

²⁴ Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique: A History of Unity and Division* (African Minds: 2013), 57.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 67.

²⁶ Allen F. Isaacman, "The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique," *Africa Today* 22, no. 3 (1975): 47, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185520> [Accessed 29 Oct. 2023].

oppressive system. The strategy took shape in March 1917, as rebel forces divided into three primary armed groups, united in their aim to oust the Portuguese from the districts of Sena, Tete, and Zumbo. Over the following three months, they achieved significant successes on the battlefield. These triumphs did not last long, and the rebels were decisively suppressed by the end of 1917.²⁷

4.1 The Salazar government's policy towards the colonies

Portugal faced a significant financial burden due to its involvement in World War I, leading to a record-high debt. By 1920, the budget deficit had surged twelvefold compared to the monarchy's final days. Additionally, the prices of goods commodities had risen more than 400% within five years. This created a state of crisis in both the Portuguese economy and politics. At the beginning of 1920, the escudo's value dropped sharply against the pound sterling – from 7.9 to 109.4 in 1918 – contributing to capital outflows.

During this period, textile factories in northern Portugal had begun operating, signifying the nation's shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy. However, the worldwide spike in cotton prices, which surged tenfold between 1915 and 1922, coupled with currency devaluation, compelled Portuguese textile factories to pay over double the amount of their external debt for cotton imports. To address the trade deficit, it became imperative for the Portuguese government and the cotton industry to significantly increase the proportion of cotton produced in the colonies as a share of total production, raising it from 5% – with a third originating in Mozambique. Simultaneously, they aimed to boost the proportion of textile goods made in Portugal that were sold in colonial markets from 25%. The economic crisis caused mounting frustration among Portuguese citizens, who viewed their government as ineffective in utilizing colonial resources. They deemed their representatives as incompetent, unable to capitalise the resources obtained from the colonies. This dissatisfaction with failures of colonial policies culminated in political turmoil in Portugal ultimately resulting in a change of governance.²⁸

A coup in 1926 led to the rise of a military dictatorship, which eventually evolved into the Portuguese '*Estado Novo*'. This corporatist regime, characterized by autocratic rule under the

²⁷ Isaacman, "The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique," 48-49.

²⁸ Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique*, 73-74.

leadership of one of Portugal's most unyielding figures, António de Oliveira Salazar, endured for four decades. Salazar, a professor at the University of Coimbra, held sway over Portuguese politics until 1968, when he suffered a stroke. Embracing the belief in Portugal's right to assert itself as a colonial power, he introduced a new constitution and colonial act that institutionalized racial discrimination. Despite the shifting global sentiment against European colonialism after World War II, Salazar remained resolute in considering the colonies as an integral part of Portugal. As the international community appealed for an urgent solution of the problem of the colonized countries, Salazar transformed – renamed – the colonies into 'overseas provinces' in an attempt to portray Portugal's imperial history as a narrative of a 'pluricontinental nation.'²⁹ However, Salazar failed to realize the growing threat of armed resistance in his colonies in Africa.

During the early 1930s, the major European powers dominated the geopolitical scene. While Portugal possessed the world's third-largest colonial empire, following the United Kingdom and France, and controlled substantial territories in Africa, as well as smaller Asian colonies, it had maintained its status as a peripheral nation for many decades, marked by its modest dimensions and size and importance.³⁰

In the 1950s and 1960s, while several major African colonial powers were embarking on decolonization, Portugal maintained its colonial empire. This was largely driven by their enduring economic underdevelopment. As the economies of its colonies began to grow, especially through crop cultivation, Portuguese immigration to Africa increased sharply. Activist organisations in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique have therefore begun to eagerly push for political change. Political movements such as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), and the Union of the Guinean and Cape Verdean People (PAIGC) organized protests and labour strikes in urban areas, which were suppressed by Portuguese authorities. After the massacres committed by Portuguese forces and the loss of thousands of African lives in spontaneous uprisings of the early 1960s, local political activists in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique adopted a rural guerrilla warfare approach.³¹

²⁹ Prem Poddar, *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures - Continental Europe and Its Empires* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 434.

³⁰ Marcia Goncalves, "The Scramble for Africa Reloaded? Portugal, European Colonial Claims and the Distribution of Colonies in the 1930s," *Contemporary European history* 30, no. 1 (2021): 2-3, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777320000314> [Accessed 28 Oct. 2023].

³¹ Poddar, *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures*, 439-440.

The situation with the types of resistance at that time was diverse. While both Guinea-Bissauan PAIGC and Mozambican FRELIMO were preparing coordinated action against colonial rule, Angola's activists were divided among various mutually antagonistic political organizations. In the case of Mozambique, although FRELIMO faced numerous splits and internal conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s, it remained the overwhelmingly dominant liberation organization in the country.³² In response, Portugal conducted brutal counter-insurgency offensives, with the financial participation of NATO. In this context, the operations involved helicopter units, village militias, private combat forces, and even the use of napalm. To strengthen its position, Portugal deployed several thousand extra troops and integrated a number of African recruits into the colonial army to combat the indigenous liberation forces. As a result, thousands of villagers were compelled to relocate against their will.

The culmination of events occurred on June 16, 1960, when a local protest was held in Mueda, a small town in the district of Cabo Delgado, against the policy of forced labour imposed by the colonial administration. The Portuguese authorities responded to the demonstration with brutal force, leading to a violent confrontation in which many Africans were killed.^{33, 34} It is believed that this was a demonstration of power by the Portuguese colonists, who were determined to prevent independence movements out of their sphere of influence. The Mueda Massacre became a symbol of the oppression endured by Mozambicans under Portuguese colonialism, bolstering the momentum of the independence movement. Two months after events from Mueda, the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) was formed in Bulawayo in South Rhodesia with their counterparts in Nyasaland, the migrant workers from the Tete District who formed the African National Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI). The third notable group, National African Union of Mozambique (MANU) was formed in 1959 from pre-existing small factions in Tanganyika (now Tanzania). Its primary mission was to unify the Mozambican Makonde people³⁵

³² Ibid. 440.

³³ The exact number of casualties remains uncounted to this day. Eyewitnesses spoke of several dead, Frelimo spoke of more than 100 dead.

³⁴ Michel Cahen, "16 de Junho de 1960. Massacre de Mueda, Moçambique," *HAL Open Science* (May 2018): 42-43, <https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02469518/document> [Accessed 2 Nov. 2023].

³⁵ Ethnic group with communities living in the southern part of Tanzania and the northern part of Mozambique, especially in the province of Cabo Delgado. In Tanzania, the group is known as the Makonde, while in Mozambique, they are referred to as the Maconde.

living in that region and – discreetly – align their interests with those of Tanzania.³⁶

African leaders expressed concerns about the potential for fragmentation within liberation movements. In contrast, MANU, UDENAMO, and UNAMI sought common ground. It's essential to note that none of them enjoyed significant support within Mozambique. They were created outside Mozambique by exiles and migrant workers. MANU was founded by the Maconde people in northern Mozambique and operated in Tanzania and Kenya. UDENAMO was established in Southern Rhodesia by the Ndau from central Mozambique, while UNAMI operated in Nyasaland, consisting of individuals from the Tete District in the northwest. Last but not least, all three organizations were the primary anti-colonialist or 'proto-nationalist movement,' which created the basis for unification into one movement, FRELIMO.³⁷

UDENAMO participated at the first meeting of the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) in Casablanca, in 1961. They condemned colonial oppression, particularly characterized by the systematic practice of forced labour, by the shameful exploitation of the work of Africans, by the total absence of political and human rights, by the cultural obscurantism in which the African population was kept. They also affirmed the right of the Mozambican people to self-determination, national independence and supported them in their struggle for emancipation.³⁸

4.2 FRELIMO against Portuguese Colonial Rule

It's generally accepted that the subsequent association of the three main independence movements played a pivotal role in organizing, advocating, and ultimately declaring Mozambique's national independence. On June 25, 1962, *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO), was founded at the Arnautoglu Community Centre in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika, where delegates elected a provisional Supreme Council for the new organisation, pending a national congress. Eduardo Mondlane, the visionary and leader who was visiting Tanganyika from the USA, led meetings with fellow Mozambican nationalists. By the meeting's conclusion,

³⁶ Francisco Proença Garcia, "O EMERGIR DOS MOVIMENTOS INDEPENDENTISTAS EM ÁFRICA. OS CASOS DE ANGOLA, GUINÉ E MOÇAMBIQUE," *Revista Portuguesa de História* 1, no. 1 (December 2021): 10-11, https://www.defesa.gov.pt/pt/defesa/organizacao/comissoes/cphm/rphm/edicoes/ano1/n12021/movlibert/Documents/2-%20RevPHM_I_1_Francisco%20P%20Garcia.pdf [Accessed 2 Nov. 2023].

³⁷ Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique*, 223-224.

³⁸ Garcia, "O EMERGIR DOS MOVIMENTOS INDEPENDENTISTAS EM ÁFRICA," 11.

Mondlane was elected as the first President and played a central role in shaping its course.³⁹

Three months following FRELIMO's formation, in September 1962, at the First Congress they identified that, "*the largest cause of the weakness of resistance against colonialism in Mozambique throughout history was the division amongst Mozambicans and it is this solidarity that constitutes the fundamental weapon to fight against the Portuguese colonialism.*"⁴⁰ Hence, its ideology was notably defined by a strong anti-Salazarism. Immediately, this expansive liberation front held a broad nationalist character and received international support from neighbouring countries north of Mozambique – Malawi, Zambia, Southern Rhodesia, and Tanzania.⁴¹ These initial stages in shaping FRELIMO's ideology eventually led the organization to transition from mere liberation rhetoric to a substantive vision of an independent Mozambique.

4.2.1 The Mozambican War of Independence

The independence war was initiated in September 1964 when small guerilla units crossed the Rovuma River, the boundary dividing Mozambique from Tanzania to the north. FRELIMO guerrillas continued to attack predominantly colonial administrative structures in northern Cabo Delgado province and western Niassa province. In the beginning, FRELIMO faced equipment shortages, limiting their ability to directly confront the well-armed Portuguese forces. Instead, they focused on destabilizing Portuguese colonial rule at its base. They launched frequent attacks on administrative buildings and infrastructure such as bridges, roads, and communication lines.⁴² One of the major clashes with the insurgents unfolded in Mueda, the town where numerous Africans had endured violence and massacres at the hands of Portuguese colonial forces in the summer of 1960.⁴³ This incident marked the beginning of the decade-long conflict that lay ahead for the people of Mozambique. From September 1964, resistance to Portuguese rule gradually rose throughout the north of the country, characterized by sporadic attacks.

³⁹ "Início da Guerra em Moçambique," *República Portuguesa: Defesa Nacional*, <https://www.defesa.gov.pt/pt/defesa/organizacao/comissoes/cphm/rphm/edicoes/ano1/n12021/resistdomcolonial> [Accessed 26 Nov. 2023].

⁴⁰ Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique*, 231.

⁴¹ Marçal De Menezes Paredes, "A construção da identidade nacional moçambicana no pós-Independência: sua complexidade e alguns problemas de pesquisa," *Anos 90* 21, no. 40 (2014): 133, <https://doi.org/10.22456/1983-201X.46176> [Accessed 2 Nov. 2023].

⁴² Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique*, 242.

⁴³ Robert T. Huffman, "Colonialism, Socialism and Destabilization in Mozambique," *Africa Today* 39, no. 1/2 (1992): 15, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4186800> [Accessed 6 Nov. 2023].

FRELIMO made substantial progress in its objectives and its influence during the latter part of the 1960s. The first period of the conflict extended from 1964 to 1968, during which FRELIMO consolidated its power in the northern districts of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, ultimately achieving liberation from Portuguese rule. Within these years, a fundamental strategy was developed and implemented for the establishment of a new identity in the liberated zones. Despite the fact that the armed conflict was predominantly concentrated in the far northern areas of the country, the liberation movement achieved notable success throughout the country. In July 1968, at the movement's Second Congress, which was now conducted within Mozambique, Eduardo Mondlane was re-elected as the movement's president. However, in February 1969, circumstances took a turn when Mondlane was tragically assassinated under mysterious circumstances.⁴⁴ His life was ended by the explosion of a bomb hidden in a hollowed-out book he received in the mail. This event triggered leadership struggles characterized by both personal and ideological conflicts. Nevertheless, internal tensions within the movement had already emerged prior to Mondlane's tragic death. On one side, Uria Simango advocated a racially exclusive approach, aiming to exclude non-blacks from participating in the movement, while his adversaries, Samora Machel and Marcelino dos Santos, adhered to Mondlane's legacy, insisting that FRELIMO was fundamentally an interracial movement, welcoming the participation of people of all races. They also stressed the importance of maintaining the movement's independence from external influences. Simango was eventually declared *persona non grata* by the Tanzanian government after attempting to form a rival nationalist organization and was ordered to leave the country. Following this event, Samora Machel, the military commander, emerged as the undisputed leader and new President of FRELIMO.⁴⁵ On the counterpart, in 1969, General Kaulza da Arriaga assumed his role in Mozambique as the new commander of all Portuguese ground forces, ultimately rising to the position of Commander in chief in 1970, tasked with the mission of restoring the situation.⁴⁶ Over the following years, an extended strategic struggle unfolded between the two commanders-in-chief, Machel and Arriaga.

⁴⁴ Adrian Hastings, "Some Reflections upon the War in Mozambique," *African Affairs* 73, no. 292 (July 1974): 264-265, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/720807> [Accessed 6 Nov. 2023].

⁴⁵ Walter C. Opello, "Pluralism and elite conflict in an independence movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s," *Journal of southern African studies* 2, no. 1 (1975): 77-78, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057077508707943> [Accessed 10 Nov. 2023].

⁴⁶ Hastings, "Some Reflections upon the War in Mozambique," 265.

The dynamics of the independence war were complex. FRELIMO achieved considerable military success on the Makonde Plateau, around northwestern Cabo Delgado and along the shores of Lake Nyasa. Although the movement faced substantial casualties when the Portuguese response in the late 1960s included stronger counterinsurgency measures, it gradually became apparent that the Portuguese were no longer handling the situation effectively, with their forces confined to Mueda and other smaller bases in the far north.⁴⁷ When General da Arriaga departed the country in the latter half of 1973, he left behind an army with limited capabilities. Although FRELIMO failed to defeat the Portuguese forces in a conventional battle, the sphere of resistance among the local population expanded.⁴⁸ Portuguese administration under Marcelo Caetano, the Prime Minister from 1968, began to consider granting greater autonomy to Mozambique. Since 1973, Caetano and FRELIMO had actively negotiated the terms of their independence and the cessation of the fighting. Portugal indirectly intended to forge a strong political alliance between the white settlers and their African puppets.⁴⁹ FRELIMO, of course, would not accept this.

However, the enormous toll imposed by the colonial wars on Portuguese society and the economy contributed to the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon on April 25, 1974, when General Antonio de Spínola and military officers overthrew the Caetano government in Portugal. The revolution marked the end of the '*Estado Novo*' regime in Portugal and ushered in a period of political and social change. This led to the subsequent decolonization, with Portugal recognizing the right to self-determination for its African colonies.⁵⁰ In the Mozambique case, the new Portuguese government and FRELIMO signed the Lusaka Peace Treaty in September 1974 that led Mozambique to gain independence on June 25, 1975.⁵¹ Portugal formally acknowledged its sovereignty, bringing an end to the era of Portuguese colonial rule. The process of decolonization did not necessarily lead to a deterioration in relations between Portugal and Mozambique. The transition to independence was negotiated, and diplomatic ties were established.

⁴⁷ Walter C. Opello, "Guerrilla War in Portuguese Africa: An Assessment of the Balance of Force in Mozambique," *Issue (Waltham, Mass.)* 4, no. 2 (1974): 35, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047160700007113> [Accessed 13 Nov. 2023].

⁴⁸ Hastings, "Some Reflections upon the War in Mozambique," 268.

⁴⁹ Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique*, 268.

⁵⁰ Poddar, *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures*, 440.

⁵¹ Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique*, 269.

4.3 Transformations: Mozambique in the Post-War Years

FRELIMO, under the leadership of Samora Machel, transitioned from a liberation movement to the ruling political party. The difficulties were exacerbated by the departure of Portuguese colonial administrators and professionals, leaving not only Mozambican authorities, but also factories, businesses, and social services to deal hastily with the situation at the time. Within a year of independence, probably as much as 90% of the white Portuguese population left.⁵² The divergence of views on the direction the newly formed country should take was sparked by a clash between Mozambicans that escalated into a 16-year conflict.

Shortly after Mozambique gained independence in 1975, the new FRELIMO's opponent the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO), saw the light of the day. The anti-communist rebel group RENAMO was formed in neighbouring Rhodesia, in collaboration with disappointed Mozambicans. Advocating a conservative, market-oriented approach, RENAMO stood in opposition to FRELIMO's socialist and centralized model. The conflict escalated into a violent civil war that turned into guerrilla-style fighting in 1976.⁵³ After Zimbabwe⁵⁴ gained independence in 1980, RENAMO gradually shifted its base to Mozambique, leading to unprecedented massacres in the country in the mid-1980s. The country was roughly divided between these two factions. However, following the death of FRELIMO's president, Samora Machel, his successor, Joaquim Chissano, implemented a policy of dialogue. Negotiations between Lisbon and Maputo began in Rome in 1990 and eventually led to the signing of the General Peace Accords in 1992. The UN established the mission to oversee disarmament, demobilization, refugee resettlement, and organize the elections. Despite delays, elections were held in 1994, with FRELIMO securing a narrow parliamentary majority. RENAMO, as the second strongest party, won 45% of parliamentary seats.⁵⁵

An estimated one million lives were lost, and extensive damage was inflicted upon the country's infrastructure. The post-war aftermath left Mozambique grappling with a stalled

⁵² Ibid. 386.

⁵³ On April 18, 1980, Rhodesia transitioned from the unilaterally declared independence of Rhodesia to the independent Republic of Zimbabwe.

⁵⁴ Éric Morier-Genoud, Michel Cahen, and Domingos Manuel do Rosário, *The War Within: New Perspectives on the Civil War in Mozambique, 1976-1992* (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2018), 2.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 7.

economy. The legacy of the armed conflict remains a contentious issue in present-day Mozambique.⁵⁶ Portugal did not actively interfere in the Mozambican Civil War, with limited involvement and no explicit alignment with either party. The post-Carnation Revolution period witnessed significant political changes in Portugal, marking a departure from its colonial legacy.

Since the end of the civil war, Mozambique has made progress in rebuilding its economy and infrastructure. The significant discovery of natural gas reserves off its coast in the early 21st century holds the promise of economic opportunities and increased foreign investment. Nevertheless, persistent challenges like political tensions, sporadic violence, and economic inequalities remain. It is in recent years that Mozambique has faced security problems in the northern region, including the emergence of extremist groups that have led to displacement and a humanitarian crisis that continues to be closely monitored by the international community, led by Portugal.

5. Insurgency in Cabo Delgado

The long-term unstable situation in Africa, characterised above all by a tight grip on democratic values and the role of the sovereign state, facilitates the growth and spread of international non-state wars. War today manifests itself largely asymmetrically, with a non-state group opposed to the state, it has no clear origin, no principles, and can arise in any place and at any time.⁵⁷ We could see this in the example of the northern part of Mozambique, where on 5 October 2017 armed individuals attacked the state police at the Mocímboa da Praia district headquarters in Cabo Delgado province. This armed precedent has raised concerns and a number of questions among Mozambicans about the nature of the “group” and its motivation.⁵⁸

There are several theories that justify why and under what circumstances the group was formed. The main motive and driving force behind this Islamist group is the desire to establish an Islamic State in Mozambique.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Malyn Newitt, *A Short History of Mozambique* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 170.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 202-203.

⁵⁸ Mauro Tiago Njelezi, “Insurgency and subversion: An analysis of the modes of operation for understanding the attacks in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique,” *African security review* 31, no. 4 (2022): 353-354, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2022.2054719> [Accessed 6 Sep. 2023].

⁵⁹ Ibid. 354.

5.1 Emergence of Jihadism in a Gas-rich Area in Northern Mozambique

From 2010 to 2014, some Islamic radical groups started to emerge from lower Mozambique to the north, not only in Capo Delgado. Many young members of these groups were sent to Arab countries at that time, such as Saudi Arabia or Sudan, to study in *Wahhabi*, *Deobandi* and exceptionally *Salafist* schools. Unfortunately, Mozambique did not pay attention to them.⁶⁰ When they were coming back from Arabic countries, they started opening radical mosques all around Capo Delgado, especially in the tribal area, from Mocímboa da Praia to Palma. It spread really fast in a country with predominantly indigenous African religions and a significant Christian population. The Islamist militants from northern Mozambique are primarily associated with *Salafi jihadism* by its nature. It's crucial to recognize that this characterization does not include the diverse range of movements with radically different goals, ideologies, religious traditions, and methods. When examining Islamic theology more broadly, it is noteworthy that *Salafi jihadism* represents a minority perspective within the broader *Salafi* movement, as the majority of its followers reject violence and terrorism. *Salafism* itself is a conservative and puritanical Islamic movement seeking to return to what its adherents believe as the original teachings and practices of Islam. In the context of Cabo Delgado, *Salafi jihadism* adopts a more militant and radical approach, advocating the use of violence, including terrorist attacks, to achieve its goals.⁶¹

Over time, these crucial characteristics have also emerged in the *Ansar al-Sunna wa Jama'a* movement in Cabo Delgado. The movement, which translates to 'supporters of the prophetic tradition of the congregation,' began as a non-violent Islamist sect that by 2014 had established itself mainly in the cities of Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia. The group is referred to as *Al-Shabab* – 'the youth' in the local Arabic language – not only by the state forces but also by the local population. It is important to note that the local *Al-Shabaab* is not a continuation of the extremist *Al-Shabaab* sect operating mainly in Somalia and Kenya. In the absence of official communications from the militant movement, most actors in the international community use ASWJ or *Ansar al-Sunna* as the group's name.⁶² ASWJ began to denounce the 'corrupt' and 'degenerate' forms of Islam practiced in Cabo Delgado and demanded the purification of religious

⁶⁰ Pires, Personal Interview with the Author.

⁶¹ Heyen-Dubé, "Evolving doctrine and modus operandi," 438-440.

⁶² Bekoe, "Extremism in Mozambique," 5.

life by preaching a return to Islam. It can be argued that until 2017, the ASWJ was content to live in isolation from mainstream society. It separated its community from the secular governance of the country. They slowly spread their ideology of Islam along with the construction of mosques to other neighbourhoods, especially Ancuabe, Montepuez and Quissanga.⁶³

Gradually, however, their highly atypical religious practices and aggressive recruitment campaigns in several mosques throughout the province of Cabo Delgado quickly brought them into conflict with local religious authorities. ASWJ's violent extremism began to increase in response to government repression and their mismanagement of the land. The authorities gradually began to expel them from towns and districts and arrest their followers. At the same time, they tried to cut the sect off and live in a counter-community based on their radical *Salafist* ideology. Fearing the threat of suppression, the ASWJ responded by militarizing their movement. This was not only for seemingly ideological reasons, but it was also a matter of the organization's survival. Support among certain sections of the population and also, and most importantly, finances, were high in a region rich in mineral resources. Arguably, the movement secured steady sources of income through organized crime and interaction with informal traders who had extensive ties to the Cabo Delgado business cabal.⁶⁴ The main reason for the emergence of the ASWJ as a militant movement may not only be the radicalisation of the Islamic population following disputes with the secular authorities in the northern province of Mozambique. In all likelihood, it may also be the interest of business elites to exploit the armed group's capabilities for their economic interests in the region.

5.2 Natural Resources as the Roots of Mozambique's Struggle

Parallel to the emergence of the militant movement in Cabo Delgado, significant natural gas resources were discovered in Mozambique in 2010. As can be seen in 'Map 1.1', made by the French company *TotalEnergies*, the Cabo Delgado region has abundant natural gas reserves, especially between Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. The main liquefied natural gas (LNG) hub is located offshore near Mocímboa da Praia in 'Area 1', divided into Golfinho and Atum in the north and Prosperidade, Orca, Tubarão, and Tubarão Tigre down the Mozambican coast.

⁶³ Heyen-Dubé, "Evolving doctrine and modus operandi," 442-443.

⁶⁴ Ibid.



Map 1.1 Total Closes the Acquisition of Anadarko's Shareholding in Mozambique LNG

Source: "Total Closes the Acquisition of Anadarko's Shareholding in Mozambique LNG," *TotalEnergies*, September 30, 2019, [https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-closes-acquisition-anadarkos-shareholding-mozambique-lng#:~:text=The%20Final%20Investment%20Decision%20\(FID,in%20Asia%20and%20in%20Europe](https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-closes-acquisition-anadarkos-shareholding-mozambique-lng#:~:text=The%20Final%20Investment%20Decision%20(FID,in%20Asia%20and%20in%20Europe) [Accessed 26 Nov. 2023].

Mozambique's first liquefied natural gas (LNG) project was developed by the oil company Anadarko, which coordinated the entire development of the project. The attacks in Mocimboa da Praia in October 2017 by the ASWJ did not initially affect the project's development plan.⁶⁵ In 2019, the French company *TotalEnergies* took over the LNG project with its own investment plans. *TotalEnergies* acquired Anadarko's 26.5% stake in an LNG project in Mozambique, with production expected to start by 2024.⁶⁶ However, the project quickly became the target of local militant groups that threatened the economic interests of the multinational in the country. We can now say the substantial natural gas reserves were one of the main reasons for the conflict in Cabo

⁶⁵ "Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)," *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project* (October 30, 2023): 2, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep53846> [Accessed 26 Nov. 2023].

⁶⁶ "Total Closes the Acquisition of Anadarko's Shareholding in Mozambique LNG," *TotalEnergies*, September 30, 2019, [https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-closes-acquisition-anadarkos-shareholding-mozambique-lng#:~:text=The%20Final%20Investment%20Decision%20\(FID,in%20Asia%20and%20in%20Europe](https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-closes-acquisition-anadarkos-shareholding-mozambique-lng#:~:text=The%20Final%20Investment%20Decision%20(FID,in%20Asia%20and%20in%20Europe) [Accessed 26 Nov. 2023].

Delgado. The violence has disrupted major gas projects and raised fears that it could spread to neighbouring countries.

“(...) And immediately when natural gas came in, a lot of money came into the country, but nothing came into Capo Delgado. So, when people felt they were being pushed aside, one thing added to another. Of course, this will generate a greater willingness, especially among young people, to join these groups. That’s why the fights started in 2017.”⁶⁷

5.3 Watershed in Cabo Delgado: The Attack on Mocímboa da Praia

The initial ASWJ attack occurred on August 27, 2017, targeting a police station in Nametil village, Nampula province. They killed a police officer, seized weapons, and took ammunition. The situation escalated further on October 5 when 30 Islamic militants attacked the police station in Mocímboa da Praia, resulting in the deaths of three police officers with two armed attackers. At the time, however, it was not believed that a fundamentalist or terrorist group could be behind the attacks. Throughout the next year, the ASWJ continued a series of attacks on local civilians in the Cabo Delgado region. There were also several violent clashes with the Mozambican government. Initially, Maputo assumed that local decentralized officials, headed by a religious community, would be able to confront and subsequently suppress the spread of the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado. The government eventually mobilised and deployed police forces in the region and initiated large-scale arrests of suspected members of the group. It subsequently succeeded in prosecuting numerous alleged members of the movement in Pemba, the capital of Cabo Delgado province. Simultaneously, police started shutting down mosques in the region that the group had established in previous years, leading to increased discontent among local residents.⁶⁸

Since the attack on the police station in Mocímboa da Praia, the unpredictability of ASWJ attacks, and support among the local Arab population allowed the insurgency to grow rapidly. The first half of 2020 witnessed a series of assaults in cities in northern Mozambique, including mainly Palma, Quissanga, Muidumbe, and Macomia. The insurgents targeted military and administrative

⁶⁷ Pires, Personal Interview with the Author.

⁶⁸ Bekoe, “Extremism in Mozambique,” 7.

structures such as garrisons, police stations, and then even medical centres and schools. By August 2020, the group successfully took control of Mocímboa da Praia, maintaining their hold for a year. The rebels adjusted their tactics of attack, particularly shifting their targets. Overall, in 2020, civilians played a smaller role in ASWJ's political violence compared to preceding years, signalling a change in focus towards taking over the state and undermining LNG investments.⁶⁹ However, until the summer of 2020, when they drew attention and raised the neighbours' concerns, the numerous Islamic militants had surrounded around 3,000 local residents and displaced more than 800,000 people.⁷⁰ At this time, there was also a change in the chairmanship of the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC), which Mozambique took over from Tanzania for one year in August 2020. During Mozambique's chairmanship of the SADC, there was a unique opportunity to discuss the possibility of military assistance. Hence, between 2020 and 2021, the rebels from Cabo Delgado faced an intense military campaign from neighboring countries, particularly the *Rwandan Security Forces* (RSF) and the *Southern African Community Development Mission in Mozambique* (SAMIM), an ongoing SADC peacekeeping mission.⁷¹

The members of the SADC, as a regional defence superpower, did not want to just stand by and watch the situation and agreed to a three-month mission of South African forces in June 2021. South Africa sent nearly 1,500 troops to Mozambique to prevent jihadists from seizing the northern part of the country. Hence, in July, Mozambique made an official request for military intervention by neighbouring countries to help quell the jihadist insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Botswana, along with Rwanda, began sending a force of 1,000 men into the country during July. At the end of the same month, the Angolan National Assembly approved the deployment of military personnel as part of the SADC mission to deal with the Islamic militants.⁷² In response to this generous assistance from neighbours, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi, who had long opposed any foreign intervention, praised the military mobilisation of African countries in a televised speech on July 25 as they will “*help Mozambican forces restore peace and stability.*”⁷³

⁶⁹ “Islamic State Mozambique (ISM),” 5-6.

⁷⁰ “The Islamist insurgency in Mozambique,” *Strategic comments* 27, no. 6 (August 2021): 4-5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2021.1971435> [Accessed 25 Nov. 2023].

⁷¹ “Cabo Ligado Monthly: August 2021,” *Cabo Ligado*, September 15, 2021, <https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-august-2021> [Accessed 28 Nov. 2023].

⁷² “The Islamist insurgency in Mozambique,” 5-6.

⁷³ Louis Koen, “THE CABO DELGADO INSURGENCY AND MOZAMBIQUE’S OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FOREIGN INVESTORS WITH FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY,” *Obiter* 43, no. 2 (2022): 189,

On March 24, 2021, the insurgency reached its peak when ASWJ militants attacked the city of Palma. This marked yet another triumph for ASWJ's ambition to establish a caliphate in Cabo Delgado province, following the capture of the key port city of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020. Additionally, the violence prompted the French company *TotalEnergies* to reconsider its investment plans for a substantial natural gas project in Mozambique's northern region.⁷⁴ This prompted the intervention by both SAMIM and RSF, whose troops were strategically deployed in the districts of Palma where the bloody attack took place, as well as in the town of Mocímboa da Praia, which is key to the LNG project.⁷⁵ After the attacks, President Nyusi, along with military commanders, declared that the militants were successfully driven out of Palma, and a significant number of rebels had been killed. "There were shots, but the situation is under control," an anonymous member of the unit said on April 15. Nyusi added, "We do not declare victory, because we are fighting terrorism." In addition, he promised amnesty to Mozambicans who had joined the ranks of the jihadists.⁷⁶ The RSF successfully liberated and regained control of both district headquarters in August 2021, one year after the ASWJ seized the town of Mocímboa da Praia.

The terrorist attack on Palma in March highlighted the seriousness of the conflict in Cabo Delgado province. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), nearly 670,000 people had to be evacuated prior to the violence in Palma.⁷⁷ Journalist Alex Perry, who conducted the initial survey, revealed that 209 people were kidnapped and 1,193 killed by shooting or beheading during the first 12 days of the rebel assault on Palma. Although estimates by government entities are significantly lower, no official total of the attack's death toll has been provided.⁷⁸ Since then, the international community has had the authority to label the insurgents as terrorists with confirmed affiliations to ISIS. These acts include beheadings, rape, sexual enslavement, kidnapping and the recruitment of child soldiers. Human Rights Watch documented in September 2021 that ISIS-Mozambique abducted hundreds of boys as young as 12. The

<https://doi.org/10.17159/obiter.v43i2.11293> [Accessed 23 Nov. 2023].

⁷⁴ Pires, Personal Interview with the Author.

⁷⁵ "Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)," 6.

⁷⁶ "MOZAMBIQUE: Fresh Palma Clashes," *Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series* 58, no. 4 (May 2021): 23133A-23134A, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2021.09969.x> [Accessed 26 Nov. 2023].

⁷⁷ "Grave concern for women and children targeted in northern Mozambique," *United Nations*, March 30, 2021, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1088662> [Accessed 26 Nov. 2023].

⁷⁸ Tom Goul, "Over 1,190 killed in 2021 Palma massacre, new survey finds," *Zitamar News*, June 22, 2023, <https://www.zitamar.com/over-1-190-killed-in-2021-palma-massacre-new-survey-finds/> [Accessed 26 Nov. 2023].

terrorists trained these boys as combatants and compelled them to engage in combat against government forces.⁷⁹ Over the course of 2021, ISIS-Mozambique persistently carried out attacks in Cabo Delgado province and expanded its influence into previously secure southern areas.

The insurgency, at this point, showed no signs of weakening or any possibility of reaching a ceasefire in Cabo Delgado. The government seemed to acknowledge its shortcomings in dealing with the insurgency. It could no longer rely solely on the assistance of the RSF and SAMIM, which also lacked the necessary command infrastructure. As the first Force Commander of EUTM Mozambique, Brigadier General⁸⁰ Nuno Lemos Pires, said in an interview: “[Mozambican] police, of course, had neither the numbers nor the expertise to deal with this kind of threat. They were not prepared, they did not have the resources, they did not have the preparation, they did not have the attitude.”⁸¹ From this point on, the Mozambican government was forced to rethink the modernization of training and equipment for the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces.

6. From Portuguese Military Assistance to EUTM Mozambique

By the end of 2020, Mozambique discreetly engaged in discussions with the EU about possible assistance, which would include training its security forces and providing medical equipment and humanitarian aid. European countries, such as France with economic interests in the LNG project, and Portugal, as a long-term partner with enduring relations since decolonization, showed interest in the EU’s involvement in Cabo Delgado. On September 16, Mozambican Foreign Minister Veronica Macamo sent an explicit request for military assistance to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU, Josep Borrell.⁸² Later on, the EU formally agreed to provide humanitarian and security assistance to Mozambique in response to their request. The Mozambican government indicated that the assistance will not involve EU troops on the ground in Cabo Delgado. Josep Borrell said in response that the EU “*encourages and supports the development of an integrated approach to deal with armed violence in Cabo Delgado.*” Some EU

⁷⁹ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mozambique,” *U.S. Department of State*, February 6, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mozambique/> [Accessed 28 Nov. 2023].

⁸⁰ At that time, he held the military rank of Brigadier General and is currently a Major General.

⁸¹ Pires, Personal Interview with the Author.

⁸² Joseph Hanlon, “Mozambique: Will EU provide military help? – By Joseph Hanlon,” *Club of Mozambique*, September 29, 2020, <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-will-eu-provide-military-help-by-joseph-hanlon-172715/> [Accessed 5 Nov. 2023].

countries, especially France and Portugal, expressed interest in speeding up the entire process. The EU approached this matter cautiously, aiming primarily to assess the situation concerning the Mozambican government's actions and its military units in Cabo Delgado, which showed no signs of a specific strategy.⁸³

Portuguese Minister of Defence, João Gomes Cravinho, visited Mozambique at the end of 2020, regarding the deployment of “*a team of Portuguese military personnel*” to enhance bilateral defence cooperation, including training and guidance to local security forces. “*We are talking about a non-executive mission,*” Cravinho emphasized, stating that Portugal is preparing to support Mozambican authorities in exercising their sovereignty. From early 2021, the Portuguese team was to work with the Mozambican government to develop a strategy, including the training of QRFs, marines, and military in tactical air control. Cyberdefence, cartography, hydrography, and collaboration in the defence industry were identified as “*areas of specific interest.*” With Portugal set to assume the Presidency of the Council of the EU in January 2021, Cravinho expressed his intention to strengthen Maputo's request for support, which had already been formally submitted to Brussels. “*This is a very favourable coincidence. We will use this presidency to strengthen the EU's response to the needs on the ground,*” he added in conclusion.⁸⁴

On December 15, 2020, Borrell informed the European Parliament, “*We are waiting for the green light from Mozambique to send out a security experts' mission.*” The EU was only waiting for the approval of the Mozambican authorities. However, Borrell pointed out that it was Mozambique creating unnecessary bureaucratic regulations, potentially limiting the movement of EU representatives in the country. It was unclear whether the Nyusi government genuinely wanted to involve the EU or if it preferred solely engaging in bilateral discussions with specific EU member states, particularly Portugal.⁸⁵ During Cravinho's state visit to Mozambique in December 2020, both Ministers of National Defence of Mozambique and Portugal consulted on the new cycle of bilateral cooperation. They reviewed the proposed Defence Cooperation Framework

⁸³ “Cabo Ligado Monthly: October 2020,” *Cabo Ligado*, November 16, 2020, <https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-oct-2020> [Accessed 28 Nov. 2023].

⁸⁴ Editors of Lusa, “Mozambique: Portugal to provide military training, logistics in fight against Cabo Delgado terrorists,” *Club of Mozambique*, December 11, 2020, <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-portugal-to-provide-military-training-logistics-in-fight-against-cabo-delgado-terrorists-179901/> [Accessed 28 Nov. 2023].

⁸⁵ “Cabo Ligado Monthly: December 2020,” *Cabo Ligado*, January 15, 2021, <https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-dec-2020> [Accessed 28 Nov. 2023].

Programme – *Programa-quadro* – for the period 2021-2026. They agreed on the possibility of incorporating new areas of effort to accompany changes in the security environment. This primarily involved the Armed Forces of both countries, where special forces – QRFs – were to be established. A new bilateral cooperation was expected to be established to address Mozambique’s needs more effectively in the fight against terrorism.⁸⁶

6.1 “Programa-quadro” for Defence Cooperation

A historical milestone in the relationship between Mozambique and Portugal came in the late 1970s, when the Carnation Revolution initiated a process of political change in Portugal’s relations with its former African colonies, bringing the independence of its former colonies and also the establishment of specific bilateral agreements. Notably, since 1976, Portugal has committed to strengthening defence cooperation by signing the General Cooperation Agreement (*Acordo Geral de Cooperação*) with Mozambique. This collaboration took a step further on December 7, 1988, when both countries modified their commitment to enhance and complete the cooperative relationship and signed the Technical Cooperation Agreement (*Acordo de Cooperação Técnica no Domínio Militar*) in the military domain. Mozambique expressed its ongoing interest in expanding collaboration in the defence sector, especially by integrating FADM soldiers into Portuguese contingents engaged in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The Cooperation Framework between the countries should be built upon full independence, respect for sovereignty – non-interference in internal affairs – and the reciprocity of interests.⁸⁷ The last reinforcement of the Cooperation Agreement took place in Maputo on July 4, 2012, when countries committed to deepen and actively engage in bilateral defence cooperation, with a specific focus on contributing to security production.⁸⁸

Defence field cooperation with Portugal’s partner countries is an integral part of the country’s external defence activities, complementing and strengthening its foreign policy. It aims to

⁸⁶ República Portuguesa - Defesa Nacional, “Bilateral Meeting between the Ministers of National Defence of the Republic of Mozambique and the Portuguese Republic – joint communique,” *Club of Mozambique*, December 11, 2020, <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/bilateral-meeting-between-the-ministers-of-national-defence-of-the-republic-of-mozambique-and-the-portuguese-republic-joint-communique-179866/> [Accessed 28 Nov. 2023].

⁸⁷ “ACORDO DE COOPERAÇÃO ENTRE A REPÚBLICA É A PORTUGUESA DE MOÇAMBIQUE NO DOMÍNIO DE DEFESA,” July 2012 [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

⁸⁸ “Resolução da Assembleia da República n.º 63/2015,” June 12, 2015, <https://files.diariodarepublica.pt/1s/2015/06/11300/0373503738.pdf> [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

strengthen mutual relations through active participation in international peace and security efforts, while regularly building and reforming the security sector. This strategy increases Portugal's credibility and recognition at international level. The long-term training, qualification, and development of the armed forces of the Portuguese-speaking African countries is also a fundamental pillar of defence cooperation. This training is developed through two programmes: the Military Training Programme and the Portuguese Training Programme.⁸⁹

Training programs, along with any other international cooperation in defence policy, are structured predominantly based on bilateral agreements. These agreements are specified by certain principles outlined in Framework Programmes that define cooperation strategies. The latest Framework Programme for Defence Cooperation – *Programa-Quadro de Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa* – with Mozambique for the period 2021-2026 includes projects of a technical-military nature, training actions, assistance related to maritime security, the creation of conditions for the joint participation of Portuguese Armed Forces in peace and humanitarian missions, and the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN. In addition, this programme also addresses gender equality and peace, justice, and effective institutions.⁹⁰

Programa-Quadro de Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa significantly touches upon Mozambique's sovereignty, giving it strategic importance in the relationship between the two states. Mozambique and Portugal closely work within defence structures and military units, enabling the exchange of experiences and the implementation of capacity-building, training, and education actions. Hence, it is believed that Portugal can not only monitor but also intervene directly in potential risks and threats, such as responding to emergencies, maritime security, natural disasters, and currently, namely terrorism. Taking the example of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Portugal can enhance training and capacity-building in counter-insurgency operations through a practical training component for special forces. Portugal achieved this by defining a new Framework for bilateral defence cooperation for the years 2021-2026, aligned with the Strategic Cooperation Programme (*Programa Estratégico de Cooperação*) concluded between the two states. This involves cooperation in the following areas:

⁸⁹ “Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa,” *República Portuguesa: Defesa Nacional*, <https://www.defesa.gov.pt/pt/pdefesa/cdd> [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

⁹⁰ “Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa,” *República Portuguesa: Defesa Nacional*, <https://www.defesa.gov.pt/pt/pdefesa/cdd> [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

- 1) *Estrutura Superior da Defesa e das Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM)*
 - Supporting the Higher Defence Structure and the FADM,
- 2) *Exército de Moçambique*
 - Supporting the Mozambique Army,
- 3) *Marinha de Guerra de Moçambique*
 - Supporting the Mozambique Navy,
- 4) *Força Aérea de Moçambique (FAM)*
 - Supporting the Mozambique Air Force,
- 5) *Ensino Militar*
 - Supporting the Military Academy, the Higher Institute of Defence Studies, and the NCO School of the Defence Forces of Mozambique,
- 6) *Formação e capacitação das Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique em operações de contra terrorismo*
 - Supporting the training and capacity-building of the FADM in counter-terrorism operations.⁹¹

Since 1995 – based on Article 3 of the Technical Cooperation Agreement in the military domain from 1988 – Technical-Military Cooperation Framework Programmes have been successfully developed between Portugal and Mozambique. These Framework Programmes generally focus on the importance of training and qualification of military personnel, support to logistics, administration, health system, equipment and operation of institutes, schools, and military training centres. The organisation of some military units, such as Special Forces, Marines, Air Force, and Military Police (PM), aims to strengthen their respective capabilities. The result is significant added value for the Ministry of National Defence and the FADM.⁹²

⁹¹ “PROGRAMA-QUADRO DE COOPERAÇÃO NO DOMÍNIO DA DEFESA ENTRE PORTUGAL E MOÇAMBIQUE PARA O PERÍODO DE 2021-2026,” May 10, 2021 [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

⁹² “COOPERAÇÃO TÉCNICO-MILITAR LUSO-MOÇAMBICANA PROGRAMA-QUADRO (2005-2007).” July 2005 [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023]; “COOPERAÇÃO TÉCNICO-MILITAR LUSO-MOÇAMBICANA - PROGRAMA-QUADRO 2008-2010,” 2008 [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023]. “COOPERAÇÃO TÉCNICO-MILITAR PORTUGAL-MOÇAMBIQUE - PROGRAMA-QUADRO 2010-2013,” March 2010 [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023]; “Programa-Quadro de Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa entre o Ministério da Defesa Nacional da República Portuguesa e o Ministério da Defesa Nacional da República de Moçambique para o período 2018-2021,” February 19, 2018 [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

The most significant point of the latest version of the *Programme-Quadro* is *Clause 2*, where the signatories agree that ‘Project 6’ will support the training and capacity-building of Mozambique Defence Armed Forces in counter-terrorism operations. The Framework Programme was signed by João Gomes Cravinho, Minister of National Defence of Portugal, and Jaime Neto, Minister of National Defence of Mozambique, in Lisbon in May 2021.⁹³ No previous agreement mentioned cooperation between the two countries in counter-terrorism nor counter-insurgency activities. Hence, based on the events of the previous year 2020, it can be argued that the March attack on the town of Mocímboa da Praia and, most importantly, Mozambique’s subsequent request for international support in the fight against insurgents added an important ‘Project 6’ to *Programa-Quadro*. The year 2021 was crucial for Mozambique, with its long-time partner, Portugal, holding the presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of the year. The creation of the EUTM was thus on the table. It seemed unclear whether the Nyusi government was interested in cooperating with the EU or whether it prefers bilateral agreements only with certain EU members, particularly Portugal and France. However, the latter are unlikely to act independently of the collective effort.⁹⁴

6.2 Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU as the opportunity for a joint mission in Mozambique

At the beginning of 2021, Portugal was taking over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU, starting on January 1 until June 30, 2021, when Slovenia succeeded Portugal. The Programme for the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU 2021 details the main priorities and lines of action, and it is summed up in the motto “*Time to deliver: a fair, green and digital recovery*”. The Programme was adopted by the Council of Ministers on December 17, 2020, and it is in line with the Strategic Agenda for the EU. In view of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe from early 2020, Portugal has prioritised vaccination campaigns and economic recovery. In addition, it said that key areas include promoting social inclusion and job creation, advancing the digital transformation, addressing climate action through the European Green Deal, promoting the rule of law within the EU, and focusing on advancing the digital

⁹³ “PROGRAMA-QUADRO DE COOPERAÇÃO NO DOMÍNIO DA DEFESA ENTRE PORTUGAL E MOÇAMBIQUE PARA O PERÍODO DE 2021-2026,” May 10, 2021 [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

⁹⁴ “Cabo Ligado Monthly: December 2020,” *Cabo Ligado*, January 15, 2021, <https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-dec-2020> [Accessed 28 Nov. 2023].

transformation through measures such as promoting innovation and strengthening connectivity. In the area of defence and security, Portugal announced its intention to implement the December 2020 proposals revising the Network and Information Systems Security Directive, known as NIS Directive. Moreover, they sought to contribute to discussions on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, to strengthen the EU's role in global affairs and to promote cooperation on international issues in line with commitment to multilateralism. Specific measures included addressing regional security challenges and strengthening the EU's negotiating efforts.⁹⁵

During the EU Council in Portugal, Portuguese Foreign Minister Augusto Santos Silva travelled to Maputo from January 19 to 21, representing the High Representative Josep Borrell. The European Commission Vice-President asked Silva to discuss the development of plans for possible support for training and military equipment, humanitarian assistance to displaced populations and coastal surveillance missions.⁹⁶ In an exclusive interview with DW Africa, minister Cravinho confirmed that Mozambique was one of the main points of the Portuguese Presidency, alongside the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. The Portuguese Minister of Defence revealed that following an inspection in Maputo in January, a Portuguese-led technical mission had proposed a bilateral training support programme to develop counter-insurgency capabilities. This programme focussed on special operations, such as commandos and marines within the Mozambican army, with plans for implementation by April. The team consisted of 60 Portuguese instructors and support personnel, providing logistical support and equipment associated with the training programme. The main part of the discussion concerned outlining the possibility of expanding the mission as part of a broader EU support programme, particularly under the CSDP. *“In the first month of the Portuguese EU Presidency, in January, my colleague, Foreign Minister Augusto Santos Silva, went to Maputo on behalf of the EU, and not only on behalf of Portugal,”* emphasized Cravinho.⁹⁷ Meanwhile, Santos Silva called on the EU to increase its efforts to provide

⁹⁵ Lucienne Attard, “Priority dossiers under the Portuguese EU Council Presidency”, *European Parliamentary Research Service*, January 2021, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/659434/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)659434_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/659434/EPRS_BRI(2021)659434_EN.pdf) [Accessed 14 Dec. 2023].

⁹⁶ Joana Haderer, “Portuguese FM Augusto Santos Silva set off to Mozambique,” *Euractiv*, January 20, 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/portuguese-fm-augusto-santos-silva-set-off-to-mozambique/ [Accessed 14 Dec. 2023].

⁹⁷ João Carlos, “Cabo Delgado: Formação de militares poderá começar em abril,” *DW Africa*, February 9, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/pt-002/cabo-delgado-portugal-diz-que-forma%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-militares-poder%C3%A1-come%C3%A7ar-em-abril/a-56512717> [Accessed 14 Dec. 2023].

military and security assistance to Mozambique. However, it is the government of President Nyusi that had been showing a reluctant attitude towards international cooperation, relying rather on the support of private military groups from South Africa, such as the *Dyck Advisory Group* and the *South African Paramount Group*, with little success. The Portuguese Foreign Minister addressed towards the EU report bluntly: “*What we have to do is increase our cooperation with Mozambique in the three dimensions, which means significant enhancing of the security dimension.*” As per his statement, the provision of training facilities to Mozambican forces should be “manageable” from the EU. “*The phenomenon of terrorism and Mozambique has to be addressed. It is a European interest to participate in managing that situation and addressing that challenge,*” Santos Silva added.⁹⁸

“*In March 2021, when Palma was attacked, that was, of course, the coup de grâce. Everybody realized that the threat was already too high and international participation was necessary,*” General Pires highlighted this pivotal moment in Portugal’s international politics, when Palma was attacked by insurgents on 24 March.⁹⁹ About 100 insurgents, organized into two groups, entered the city, targeting government officials and launching attacks on governmental structures. During the attack, hundreds of people, predominantly foreign workers linked to the gas industry, were hiding in the Amarula Palma hotel. This workforce was important to the international response, as the Mozambican government and *TotalEnergies* had recently announced the resumption of work on a natural gas project near Palma.¹⁰⁰ *TotalEnergies* had previously suspended operations and evacuated employees due to insurgent attacks earlier in the year. Although the French energy company had its site with facilities on the Afungi peninsula, 10km south of Palma, the vital support infrastructure, including suppliers and labour, was located in affected Palma. In a statement on March 28, the militant group described the Palma attack as an IS operation, asserting that they had killed 55 people. It was their first statement about an attack by Mozambican rebels since last year.¹⁰¹ In response to the Palma attack, the African Union issued a statement on 31 March calling

⁹⁸ Benjamin Fox, “EU must step up military assistance to Mozambique, says Portuguese presidency,” *Euractiv*, February 1, 2021, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/eu-must-step-up-military-assistance-to-mozambique-says-portuguese-presidency/> [Accessed 14 Dec. 2023].

⁹⁹ Pires, Personal Interview with the Author.

¹⁰⁰ Christina Goldbaum, “Insurgents Seize Mozambique Town, Killing Several People; Fate of Hundreds Unknown,” *The New York Times*, March 27, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/world/africa/27mozambique-insurgents-attack.html> [Accessed 16 Dec. 2023].

¹⁰¹ Joseph Hanlon, “Mozambique Palma attack: Why IS involvement is exaggerated,” *BBC*, April 17, 2021,

for “*urgent and coordinated regional and international action to address this new threat to our common security.*”¹⁰²

The EU Foreign Affairs Council on security issues held in early May 2021 discussed, among other things, the response to Mozambique’s request for EU assistance in the affected Cabo Delgado region previous September. EU defence ministers, led by the High Representative Josep Borrell, progressed in considering the feasibility of an EU training mission in Mozambique. “*I have given clear instructions to the services to accelerate work because we need to respond to the Mozambique request with a certain sense of urgency,*” Borrell stressed in his announcement.¹⁰³ The EUTM Mozambique could be a pilot project in a new European Peace Facility (EPF) to provide the Mozambican government with military equipment. Until then, the EU had only organised technical and training missions, such as EUTM in the CAR, Mali, and Somalia, but without equipment. The first “*trained and equipped mission*” should be the Mozambique mission.¹⁰⁴ This was a key moment for Portugal and the EU to decide whether it wanted to be a key global actor in crises like the one in Mozambique.

European missions and operations were on the table during the informal meeting of EU defence ministers with High Representative, Josep Borrell, at the end of May. In a discussion with African counterparts, who also joined this meeting, Borrell stressed the need for cooperation in defining and promoting international norms and standards., especially in war-affected countries. There is “*no security without development, no development without security,*” Borrell addressed to the African officials. “*Today, there are more than 3,000 European soldiers, police officers and civil servants, currently serving in 10 missions across the continent, from Libya to the Central African Republic... And I hope that in the near future, it will also be in Mozambique.*” He reminded his colleagues that the EU had already sent a fact-finding mission to Mozambique to discuss the possibility of such a mission with the local authorities.¹⁰⁵ Simultaneously, Portuguese Defence

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56773012> [Accessed 16 Dec. 2023].

¹⁰² Moussa Faki Mahamat, “Statement of H.E. Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, on the terrorist attacks in Mozambique,” *African Union*, March 31, 2021, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210331/statement-chairperson-terrorist-attacks-mozambique> [Accessed 16 Dec. 2023].

¹⁰³ Council of the European Union, “Foreign Affairs Council (Defence), 6 May 2021,” *European Council*, May 6, 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2021/05/06> [Accessed 17 Dec. 2023].

¹⁰⁴ Tobias Pietz, “EU Crisis Management: Back to the Future,” *Internationale Politik - Quarterly*, June 3, 2021, <https://ip-quarterly.com/en/eu-crisis-management-back-future> [Accessed 16 Dec. 2023].

¹⁰⁵ Josep Borrell, “Informal meeting of Defence Ministers: Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep

Minister, Joao Cravinho, signed a new five-year bilateral defence cooperation programme with Mozambique in May. Thanks to the new *Programa-quadro*, Portugal could send another 60 soldiers to Mozambique in the next months. They were thus able to join the 60 Portuguese military trainers who arrived in Mozambique during April. “*An important project has been added to train Mozambican military personnel and the result is that the programme will see four times more Portuguese troops working with their Mozambican counterparts,*” Cravinho said, confirming the continuation of the important foreign cooperation between Portugal and Mozambique.¹⁰⁶

6.3 Mandate to Establish a Mission

Long-standing communication between Mozambique and the EU, notably with Portugal, reached its conclusion on July 12, 2021, with the issuance of *Resolution (CFSP) 2021/1143* by the Council of the EU to establish the European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique. The Council set up a comprehensive framework for EU and Member States’ cooperation with Mozambique on joint actions for security and humanitarian assistance and for full human rights monitoring in the Cabo Delgado region. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) endorsed a Political Framework for Crisis Approach in Cabo Delgado and considered it necessary to train the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces to fight against insurgents in the affected region of the country through the CSDP. The deployment of a non-executive EU-CSDP mission in Mozambique was welcomed by President Nyusi, who personally endorsed the idea in a letter from June 3, 2021. Subsequently, on June 28, the EU Council approved a crisis management concept for the planned mission in Mozambique that would not only rely on the provision of military equipment for the use of lethal force. It was the handling of the crisis in Cabo Delgado that was supposed to demonstrate the Union’s integrated approach for peacebuilding, conflict prevention through dialogue support, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, and the promotion of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda.¹⁰⁷

Borrell at the press conference,” *The European External Action Service*, May 28, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/informal-meeting-defence-ministers-remarks-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-press_en [Accessed 16 Dec. 2023].

¹⁰⁶ Catarina Demony, Emma Rumney, and Ed Osmond, “Portugal to send another 60 troops to Mozambique on training mission,” *Reuters*, May 10, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/portugal-send-another-60-troops-mozambique-training-mission-2021-05-10/> [Accessed 16 Dec. 2023].

¹⁰⁷ Borrell, “COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021.”

One of the crucial strategic objectives of EUTM Mozambique mandate was to foster effectiveness and efficiency of FADM in order to form the future QRF. Hence, the EUTM Mozambique shall support FADM by:

- providing military training to FADM and their leadership, which involves operational preparation, specialised counter-terrorism training, education on protecting civilians – especially women and girls in conflict – and ensuring compliance with human rights law, international humanitarian law, protection of civilians, and respect for the rule of law,
- supporting the development of QRF control structures and mechanisms, such as a sustainable operations cycle and QRF leadership training,
- instructing the use and maintenance of equipment during training, which shall be equipment other than military equipment designed to provide lethal force,
- establishment of a knowledge management cycle to monitor the conduct of the trained units after their deployment in Cabo Delgado, through close coordination with Mozambican authorities, assessing their compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law.

In this way, EUTM Mozambique should contribute to the Union’s awareness of the current security situation in the affected Cabo Delgado region. It would provide expertise and knowledge to Mozambican officials in military matters. The Union delegation in Maputo should also consider the presence of other international political actors – the United Nations, African Union, Rwandan Security Forces, Southern African Development Community, Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), several NGOs, and bilateral partners such as the United States or key regional actors – for coordination activities. The financial means of the mission and its activities shall be managed in accordance with *Decision (CFSP) 2021/509*. The Council Resolution proposed a cost of EUR 5,160,000 for EUTM Mozambique, of which the percentage of the reference amount was 30% for commitments and 15% for payments. The Council shall decide to launch EUTM Mozambique following the approval of the Mission Plan and Rules of Engagement. The mission is expected to end two years after achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

7. EUTM Mozambique - Assessment and Comprehensive Analysis

Following the EU Council Resolution of July 2021, EUTM Mozambique was officially launched on October 15 with the objective of providing support to the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces through a mission focused on training and capacity-building with a non-executive mandate – It will not engage in military operations. The framework of EUTM Mozambique is based on the Portuguese training mission – part of *Programa-Quadro* for 2021-2026 - with 60 trainers that Minister Cravinho signed in May 2021.¹⁰⁹ An important milestone was reached in addressing the terrorism in the Cabo Delgado, as the bilateral Defence Cooperation Framework Programme between Portugal and Mozambique, with plans and commitments from Project 6, evolved into a multilateral agreement involving the EU in the fight against terrorism.¹¹⁰ Portugal indeed retained the lead role in the programme, which was commanded for the first year of operation by Portuguese Brigadier General Nuno Lemos Pires. Instructors from 12 EU countries are participating in the training – Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden.

About 140 military personnel were split among training bases in Mozambique, for both commando training and marines.¹¹¹ Project 6, now under EUTM Mozambique, continues to advise on the training of eleven QRFs. Five companies of Mozambican marines are training in Katembe, near Maputo, and another six companies of Army special forces are training in Chimoio, a town in the middle of Mozambique.¹¹² The other two Air Force Tactical Control Group training sites are located near Maputo at Mavalane airport and Nacala, where the EUTM trains helicopter pilots.¹¹³ Full Operational Capability was declared on September 9, 2022, during the Transfer of Command ceremony, ensuring that the mandate of EUTM Mozambique will end within two years. When the mission ends, the FADM will have its own trainers who will be properly trained and

¹⁰⁹ Council of the European Union, “EU Military Training Mission in Mozambique set to start its operations,” *European Council*, October 15, 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/10/15/eu-military-training-mission-in-mozambique-set-to-start-its-operations/> [Accessed 17 Dec. 2023].

¹¹⁰ Direção-Geral de Política de Defesa Nacional, “ENVOLVIMENTO DE MILITARES PORTUGUESES NO EXTERIOR: Forças e Elementos Nacionais Destacados, Autoridade Marítima Nacional (Policia Maritima), Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa (CDD), 2º semestre de 2022,” *Defesa Nacional*, March 23, 2023, https://www.defesa.gov.pt/pt/comunicacao/documentos/Lists/PDEFINTER_DocumentoLookupList/20230323_DGP DN_2SEM_ENVOLVIMENTO-MILITARES-PT-EXTERIOR.pdf [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

¹¹¹ Council of the European Union, “EU Military Training Mission in Mozambique set to start its operations.”

¹¹² Pereira, *First Year: European Union Training Mission in Mozambique*, 46-47.

¹¹³ Pires, Personal Interview with the Author.

qualified to continue working independently.¹¹⁴

The EUTM Mozambique is considered a pioneering mission as it focuses on training eleven QRFs under FADM. It is the first CSDP mission to utilise the European Peace Facility (EPF) mechanism – train & equip concept – providing both emergency and general assistance measures to complement the training of the FADM. The common costs for EUTM Mozambique were initially estimated at EUR 15.16 million for two years.¹¹⁵ However, over the course of the mission, the final EPF budget has reached EUR 89 million for 36 months. This EU instrument mainly finances training of eleven QRFs, including individual and collective equipment, ground mobility equipment, and field hospitals.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, in December 2021, the Council of the EU adopted a EUR 20 million assistance measure to support the continued deployment of the RSF in Cabo Delgado province, which had been operating in the country since July 2021. The measure enabled the RSF to acquire collective and personal equipment. It also covered the costs associated with the strategic airlift of sustaining RSF in Cabo Delgado.¹¹⁷

The mission aims at commanding a responsibility that counteracts the effects of transnational terrorism, extending the Portuguese training model and promoting dialogue with regional countries. The Portuguese Command is therefore responsible for the implementation of general assistance measures.¹¹⁸ The integration of training programmes into the broader strategic framework of its security forces will determine the long-term effectiveness of the initiatives in Maputo.

7.1 Portuguese Force Commanders in EUTM

The Political and Security Committee (PSC), under the responsibility of the Council of the EU and the High Representative, is responsible for the political control and strategic direction of EUTM Mozambique.¹¹⁹ This includes in particular the authority to set planning documents,

¹¹⁴ Pereira, *First Year: European Union Training Mission in Mozambique*, 302-303.

¹¹⁵ Council of the European Union, “EU Military Training Mission in Mozambique set to start its operations.”

¹¹⁶ Pereira, *First Year: European Union Training Mission in Mozambique*, 46-47.

¹¹⁷ Council of the European Union, “European Peace Facility: Council adopts assistance measures in support of the armed forces of five countries,” *European Council*, December 1, 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/> [Accessed 17 Dec. 2023].

¹¹⁸ Direção-Geral de Política de Defesa Nacional, “ENVOLVIMENTO DE MILITARES PORTUGUESES NO EXTERIOR.”

¹¹⁹ Strategic Communication of the EEAS, “EUMC: European Union Military Committee,” *The European External*

including the mission plan, and the chain of command. The PSC's powers therefore also include taking decisions on the appointment of EU Mission Force Commanders. On the other hand, the decision-making power – objectives, scope, general conditions for the execution of the tasks of EUTM Mozambique and the possibility to terminate the training mission – is retained by the Council.¹²⁰

Vice-Admiral Hervé Bléjean, Director of Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), was appointed as the Mission Commander. The MPCC, based in Brussels, is another EU instrument that seeks to respond to security threats outside its borders more quickly, efficiently, and effectively and is responsible for the operational planning and conduct of EUTM Mozambique.¹²¹ However, Brigadier General Nuno Lemos Pires served as the first Force Commander of the EU Mission at the headquarter in Maputo until the transfer of command in September 2022. Even before commanding the EUTM, Brigadier General Pires, as Deputy Director-General for National Defence Policy in the Portuguese Ministry of National Defence, played a central role in the development of the new Framework Programme between Portugal and Mozambique for the period 2021-2026. He was one of the initiators of the implementation of Project 6 of *Programa-Quadro* and subsequently coordinated and implemented this Project in close contact with the Mozambican authorities, making several trips to Mozambique from late 2020 to June 2021.¹²² He created the right conditions for EUTM in Maputo, Katembe and Chimoio to train eleven QRFs, made up of marines and commandos, reinforced with elements from the Air Force as Tactical Air Control Parties. The units are trained not only for the most demanding combat operations in any type of terrain – land, sea, urban, rural, jungle, etc. – but attention is also paid to the moral and civic training of the military. Every member of the QRFs should set an example of humanity by demonstrating basic ethics and respect for the population. The protection of the population has always been at the centre of all work. The structure and operation of similar QRFs has proven itself in various regions of the world, from Afghanistan to the CAR. Brigadier General

Action Service, January 24, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eumc_en [Accessed 25 Dec. 2023].

¹²⁰ Strategic Communication of the EEAS, “The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC),” *The European External Action Service*, November 11, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/military-planning-and-conduct-capability-mpcc_en [Accessed 25 Dec. 2023].

¹²¹ Council of the European Union, “EU Military Training Mission in Mozambique set to start its operations.”

¹²² Strategic Communication of the EEAS, “CV of Brigadier General Nuno Lemos Pires,” *The European External Action Service*, January 4, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eutm-mozambique/cv-brigadier-general-nuno-lemos-pires_en [Accessed 3 Nov. 2023].

Pires said this type of force was best suited to Mozambique's counterterrorism capabilities in Cabo Delgado.¹²³

As FOC was declared on September 9, 2022, Brigadier General Pires transferred his Command to Rogério Martins de Brito, a Portuguese Navy Commodore. His background is primarily in special operations, where he provided military assistance mainly in Asia and Africa. He has also participated in various seminars and conferences on counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and asymmetric threats.¹²⁴ During his tenure at EUTM Command, he delivered a lecture on the QRF military training at the Center for Strategic Analysis (*Centro de Análise Estratégica*) located in Maputo at the end of July 2023. He stressed that despite some challenges and logistical limitations during the operation in Cabo Delgado, the mission was progressing well. “*The results obtained are very good, judging by the return of the population to their areas of origin, opening of roads, support for integration in communities,*” contributing to “*tranquillity and peace that is gradually returning to Cabo Delgado.*”¹²⁵

The Center for Strategic Analysis is one of the defence components of the CPLP in Maputo. It is responsible for research, study, and the exchange of knowledge in the field of defence and strategy among CPLP members. It updates and subsequently applies doctrines related to strategic approaches in defence, considering the needs of the member states.¹²⁶ Furthermore, Portugal, as an important member of the CPLP, committed to technically support the CPLP Centre for Strategic Analysis (CAE) by signing *Programa-Quadro* 2010-2013.¹²⁷ Portugal seeks to develop relations with all countries with which it has historical and cultural links. This is reflected in the CPLP, which aims to promote cooperation between countries where Portuguese is an official language. The organisation of seven countries focuses on cooperation in the culture, education, and health, but also on political and diplomatic consultation in areas such as justice, science, technology,

¹²³ Pereira, *First Year: European Union Training Mission in Mozambique*, 302-303.

¹²⁴ Strategic Communication of the EEAS, “CV COM Martins de Brito,” *The European External Action Service*, August 29, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/CV%20COM%20Martins%20de%20Brito_29AUG22_ENG%20.pdf [Accessed 3 Nov. 2023].

¹²⁵ Jornal Notícias, “EU military mission with positive results in Cabo Delgado,” *In Defense of Mozambique*, July 27, 2023, <https://defesamoz.info/f/miss%C3%A3o-militar-da-ue-com-resultados-positivos-em-cabo-delgado> [Accessed 3 Dec. 2023].

¹²⁶ “Sobre nós,” *Centro de Análise Estratégica (CAE/CPLP)*, <https://caecplp.org/about-us/> [Accessed 3 Dec. 2023].

¹²⁷ “COOPERAÇÃO TÉCNICO-MILITAR PORTUGAL-MOÇAMBIQUE - PROGRAMA-QUADRO 2010-2013,” March 2010 [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

socio-economic development and also defence.¹²⁸ The signing of the CPLP Defence Cooperation Protocol (*Protocolo de Cooperação da CPLP*) in 2006 is another part of Portugal's defence policy, linking the country with its international defence partners. This component has its own organisation, structured around meetings of defence ministers, armed forces commanders and other senior figures in national defence policy and military information services.¹²⁹

The current Force Commander of the EUTM Mozambique as of September 15, 2023, is General Pilot João Carlos de Bastos Jorge Gonçalves. His military profile is mainly associated with the Air Force in Portugal. In recent years, he served as Head of the Air Operations Centre at the Air Command and was appointed Chief of Staff in October 2021. In early 2022, he took over as Commander of the Azores Air Zone and in the same year also became Director of Air Operations. He served in the cumulative roles until he assumed command of EUTM Mozambique.¹³⁰ The appointment of General Pilot Gonçalves as the third Force Commander of the EUTM Mozambique from the ranks of the Portuguese Armed Forces reflects another fact of Portuguese commitment and self-interest in the success of the mission. This continuity can also be attributed to the common Portuguese language, which facilitates effective communication and cooperation between Mozambique and Portugal within the mission.

7.2 Facts and Figures from Mozambique

The most recent visualisation of the security situation in Mozambique, made through the ACLED website with the date of December 8, 2023, shows the number of fatalities since October 5, 2017, when the ASWJ attacked the police station in Mocímboa da Praia, resulting in the death of police officers. The death toll across the country has risen to more than 4,700 deaths, mainly in battles and violence against civilians. Explosions (remote violence) and riots have claimed dozens of casualties.¹³¹

¹²⁸ "CPLP - Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries," *Turismo de Portugal*, https://www.turismodeportugal.pt/en/quem_somos/cooperacao-internacional/Pages/cplp-comunidade-dos-paises-de-lingua-portuguesa.aspx [Accessed 2 Dec. 2023].

¹²⁹ "Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa," *República Portuguesa: Defesa Nacional*, <https://www.defesa.gov.pt/pt/pdefesa/cdd> [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

¹³⁰ Strategic Communication of the EEAS, "Mission Force Commander, Brigadier General João Gonçalves," *The European External Action Service*, August 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/EUTM%20MOZ%20MFCdr%20BGEN%20Jo%C3%A3o%20Gon%C3%A7alves_AUG23.pdf [Accessed 3 Nov. 2023].

¹³¹ "Cabo Ligado Update: 7 August-3 September 2023," *ACLED Data*, September 6, 2023,




Chart 1.1 Number of Fatalities from 05/10/2017 - 08/12/2023

Source: ACLED, “TIME PERIOD: 05/10/2017 - 08/12/2023,” *ACLED Data*, December 8, 2023, <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard/444C2396A1483ABF938725FE630DE5F9> [Accessed 30 Dec. 2023].

ACLED’s chart shows the peak of the attacks occurred in the first half of 2020, just before the deployment of RSF and SAMIM units. Since then, the number of fatalities in the country has been decreasing significantly, primarily thanks to the EUTM. The curve on the graph demonstrates a clear downward trend from 2020 onwards, with the largest attacks occurring in the first half of 2021, in particular the attack on the city of Palma in March that year, a pivotal moment in Portuguese security policy regarding the Cabo Delgado conflict.¹³² The official number of casualties is still unclear. The IS group claimed after the attacks that the insurgents killed 55 people in the fighting alone.¹³³

Following the Palma attack, all personnel of the Mozambique LNG project were immediately withdrawn from the Afungi peninsula. *TotalEnergies*, as one of Mozambique’s main international trading partners, has since held several discussions with the Mozambican government and its regional and international partners, but has no plans to return to Cabo Delgado province unless there is a sustained restoration of security and stability.¹³⁴ “*When I will see that life is back to normality, which means having some state services and population, then the project can restart,*”

<https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Cabo-Ligado-Update-152.pdf> [Accessed 26 Dec. 2023].

¹³² “TIME PERIOD: 05/10/2017 - 08/12/2023,” *ACLED Data*, December 8, 2023, <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard/444C2396A1483ABF938725FE630DE5F9> [Accessed 30 Dec. 2023].

¹³³ “Cabo Ligado Monthly: November 2023,” *ACLED Data*, December 14, 2023, <https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Cabo-Ligado-Monthly-November-2023.pdf> [Accessed 26 Dec. 2023].

¹³⁴ TotalEnergies, “Total declares Force Majeure on Mozambique LNG project,” *TotalEnergies*, April 26, 2021, <https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project> [Accessed 28 Dec. 2023].

TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanne stressed in early 2022 regarding its USD 20 billion – which is EUR 18 billion euros – LNG project. *TotalEnergies* had intended to produce its first cargo under the project in 2024. “*A lot of progress has been done and frankly in a very short period of time,*” Pouyanne commented on the support of international and mainly regional military forces. *TotalEnergies*’ return to Mozambique is conditional on a return to normal life in towns that have remained largely abandoned – notably Palma and Mocímboa da Praia – without any public services.¹³⁵ “*TotalEnergies has indicated that it intends to restart its LNG project in Mozambique in January 2024,*” an anonymous government source close to the project told Reuters in December 2023. “*TotalEnergies has asked financiers to obtain approval for the Mozambique LNG project to restart in the first quarter of 2024,*” revealed a second source with direct knowledge of the project’s financing.¹³⁶

During her trip to Maputo on December 18, 2023, the Portuguese Minister of Defence, Helena Carreiras, in a meeting with the Mozambican Minister of Defence, Cristóvão Chume, expressed the need to consolidate the work already done by EUTM Mozambique. “*We continue to share the idea that there should be continuity in this mission, which is now being re-evaluated,*” Carreiras said regarding working with EUTM members to continue the mission “*whether in this form or in a revised form.*” EUTM Mozambique, as part of its two-year mandate starting in September 2022 following the announcement of the FOC, will assess the future of its presence in Mozambique in the near future. “*For us, the barometer of stability in Cabo Delgado is the number of people who are returning to their areas of origin,*” stressed Minister Chume, while highlighting international efforts in the fight against terrorism. “*Portugal was one of the first countries to appear on the ground when Mozambique asked for international support and began training the marines and commandos,*” Chume said towards the end of his meeting with his Portuguese counterpart.¹³⁷

The security situation in the northern region of Mozambique is continuously improving, thanks

¹³⁵ Manuel Mucari, Emma Rumney, and Alexander Smith, “TotalEnergies aims to restart \$20 billion Mozambique LNG project in 2022,” *Reuters*, February 1, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/totalenergies-aims-restart-20-billion-mozambique-lng-project-2022-2022-01-31/> [Accessed 28 Dec. 2023].

¹³⁶ Wendell Roelf, and Nick Zieminski, “TotalEnergies to restart its delayed Mozambique LNG project in early 2024 –sources,” *Reuters*, December 22, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/totalenergies-restart-its-delayed-mozambique-lng-project-early-2024-sources-2023-12-22/> [Accessed 28 Dec. 2023].

¹³⁷ Editors of *Lusa*, “Mozambique: Portugal wants EU military training mission to continue,” *Lusa: Agência de Notícias de Portuguesa*, December 18, 2023, <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-portugal-wants-eu-military-training-mission-to-continue-251039/> [Accessed 28 Dec. 2023].

to the EUTM, which is carrying out its mandate as planned. Since the beginning of 2023, many internally displaced people have been able to return to their areas of origin. However, the security situation in Cabo Delgado still remains volatile, with occasional attacks by militant groups. Returns should therefore be voluntary, dignified and take place only when security and safety conditions are met, and services are available. More than 2 million people are still in need of protection, food assistance, health and nutrition services, education, water, sanitation, and shelter. Approximately 3.5 million people face severe food insecurity, and one third of them are from the affected region of northern Mozambique. The EU is taking an integrated approach to the humanitarian needs of Mozambicans. It identifies short, medium, and long-term humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, and security actions in accordance with international humanitarian law, human rights, and the rule of law.¹³⁸

In the third quarter of 2023, according to a report from the Directorate-General for National Defence Policy (DGPDN), an average of 782 Portuguese soldiers participated in international missions such as UN, NATO, EU, Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency), as well as bilateral and multilateral frameworks. The latest count of troops deployed worldwide is a variation of more than -40% compared to second quarter (n=1314). This is because a number of missions and operations with very significant contingents have already completed their commitments for 2023. This was not the case in the ongoing EUTM Mozambique. Portugal has deployed an average of 101 soldiers on EU missions in the third quarter, which is 14% of all the missions it is currently participating in. Since the establishment of EUTM, Portugal has consistently contributed approximately 60 military personnel to the mission.¹³⁹ As of the latest update in December 2023, the mission currently acquires a contingent of 117 people,¹⁴⁰ 65 of whom are from Portugal – 48 military personnel based in Maputo, 15 in Chimoio, and two in Brussels.¹⁴¹ Portugal’s involvement in EUTM Mozambique represents more than half of its total

¹³⁸ Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), “Mozambique,” *European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations*, November 16, 2023, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/mozambique_en [Accessed 26 Dec. 2023].

¹³⁹ Directorate of Strategic Defence Planning Services, “Relatório,” *Directorate-General for National Defence Policy (DGPDN)*, November 11, 2023, https://www.defesa.gov.pt/pt/comunicacao/documentos/Lists/PDEFINTER_DocumentoLookupList/20231031-Relatorio_Envolvimento-militares-exterior_3TRI-2023.pdf [Accessed 1 Dec. 2023].

¹⁴⁰ Editors of Lusa, “Mozambique: Portugal wants EU military training mission to continue.”

¹⁴¹ Direção-Geral de Política de Defesa Nacional, “ENVOLVIMENTO DE MILITARES PORTUGUESES NO EXTERIOR.”

engagement in EU missions, surpassing deployments in the CAR, Mali and Somalia. The report, provided by the Directorate of Strategic Defence Planning Services of the DGPDN, shows that Portugal holds the position of Force Commander of two EU missions, not only the EUTM Mozambique but also the EUTM in the CAR. The DGPDN has evaluated the activities of the Portuguese military forces abroad showing the responsibilities associated with the command of EUTM Mozambique. It highlights the prominence of Portuguese military personnel in EU military and training missions and concentrates on their strong commitment to long-term peace and security in countries affected by insurgency and war.¹⁴² Portugal focuses on solutions that mitigate and neutralise the effects of transnational terrorism in the region and expand the EUTM, which is based on the Project 6 of *Programa-Quadro* 2021-2026. This programme has engaged countries and organisations from the region, as well as the international community, in cooperation and dialogue with Mozambique. Portugal has commanded the EUTM since its launch in 2021 and will continue to do so in the following year, 2024.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Directorate of Strategic Defence Planning Services, “Relatório.”

¹⁴³ Direção-Geral de Política de Defesa Nacional, “ENVOLVIMENTO DE MILITARES PORTUGUESES NO EXTERIOR.”

8. Conclusion

In responding to the posed research questions in the introduction of this work, I can confirm that Portugal was one of the initiators of a military and training mission in Mozambique, which, after a few months in 2021, evolved into EUTM. Portugal, as a long-standing partner of Mozambique, has been building bilateral cooperation in the security field since the 1970s. Following the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon in 1974, political changes occurred in Portugal's relationships with its former African colonies. With Mozambique, it strengthened defence cooperation by signing the General Cooperation Agreement – *Acordo Geral de Cooperação* – in 1976, which has been modified several times over the years. Portuguese foreign policy emphasized the necessity of training, qualification, and development of the armed forces of Portuguese-speaking African countries as a key aspect of its security cooperation. Such collaboration with Mozambique occurs through the bilateral Framework Programme for Defence Cooperation – *Programa Quadro de Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa*. Currently, this programme is complemented by Project 6, supporting the training and capacity-building of the Mozambican Armed Defence Forces in countering terrorist attacks.

Until the establishment of the EUTM, Mozambique was strengthened by Islamist groups, most notably *Ansar al-Sunna wa Jama'a* (ASWJ), which gradually took over large areas in the gas-rich northeastern province of Cabo Delgado. Mozambique discovered huge gas reserves near the city of Palma in 2010, which attracted foreign investment mainly from the French company *TotalEnergies*, which took over the LNG project in 2019 with its own investment plans. However, since the outbreak of insurgency in October 2017, regular clashes have occurred between ASWJ and FADM. The initial weak attitude of Mozambican officials towards the troubled northern region of the country led them to lack not only military equipment, but also well-trained counter-insurgency units. The only way to deal with the spreading insurgency was to call in help from abroad. Therefore, since the summer of 2020, neighbouring countries, notably the RSF and the SAMIM, which operates as a SADC peacekeeping mission in Mozambique, have joined the fight against the Cabo Delgado militant groups. Later on, Mozambique acknowledged its shortcomings in the fight against the insurgency and could not rely solely on the assistance of the RSF and SAMIM, which lacked the necessary command infrastructure. The European Union, led by the High Representative, Josep Borrell, formally agreed to provide humanitarian and security

assistance to Mozambique in response to their September 2020 request. France and Portugal in particular have expressed interest in accelerating the process.

The militant attacks on Palma in late March 2021 were considered the biggest escalation of the insurgency, disrupting major LNG project plans and withdrawing local workers from the Afungi peninsula. *TotalEnergies* does not plan to return to Cabo Delgado province until security and stability is restored in the region. It was also for this reason that EU Member States, which were concerned about the situation, began to realise the seriousness of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Increased awareness of this insurgency has been initiated by Portugal, particularly during its Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2021.

In May 2021, the Portuguese Minister of National Defence, João Gomes Cravinho, signed a new bilateral Cooperation Programme until 2026, ensuring the provision of 60 instructors from Portugal for the training of FADM in the fight against insurgents in Cabo Delgado. On October 15 of the same year, the EU launched a military training mission in Mozambique following a request from the Mozambican government the previous year to support its armed forces through a training and capacity-building mission. Expanding from the previous Portuguese Defence Cooperation Programme, the EUTM training programme involved 12 EU member states working closely with other international and regional allies. EUTM Mozambique stands out for its new European Peace Facility (EPF) mechanism – train & equip concept – which aims to train eleven QRFs under FADM to protect civilians and restore security in Cabo Delgado province. The Council of the EU adopted the final support of EUR 89 million for 36 months. The mission, with a non-executive mandate upon reaching Full Operational Capability (FOC) in September 2022, declared it will end in two years when the FADM is properly trained and qualified to continue working independently.

The EU, particularly with the leadership of Portugal, which has the closest relationship with Mozambique among EU member states, is providing support to their Armed Forces through a training and capacity-building mission to protect the civilian population and restore security in the Cabo Delgado province. Portugal's strong position in the mission is also evident from internal perspective. The significantly higher number of Portuguese military personnel currently deployed in the EUTM compared to other EU countries and the fact that the mission has not yet been led by a Force Commander outside the Portuguese troops shows the additional strength of the Portuguese presence in Mozambique. The Portuguese EUTM Force Commanders and their Portuguese part of

the mission can also rely on their language, which is also spoken in Mozambique. Portugal's active foreign and security policy towards its African partner played a key role in the creation of EUTM Mozambique. The mission was able to build on the foundations laid by Portugal. Among the most important figures of this mission can be counted Mozambican president, Filipe Nyusi, and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell. Mozambique's request from September 2020 for EU assistance in the militant-occupied Cabo Delgado region prompted Borrell to approve the EUTM Mandate in July 2021 – *Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143*. At the same time, Portuguese officials such as the Minister of National Defence, João Gomes Cravinho, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Santos Silva, were instrumental in making the mission a reality thanks to their initiative. Major General Nuno Lemos Pires became the first Force Commander of the EUTM Mozambique to train FADM units thanks to a previous successful mission by the Portuguese Armed Forces. The current security partnership between Mozambique and Portugal, which has seen a number of state visits by foreign ministers, defence ministers and various other state officials in recent years, is an example of the strong ties between the two countries. This cooperation contributes significantly to the successful achievement of the objectives of EUTM Mozambique.

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