

## Report on Daniele De Santis

### *Transcendental Idealism and the Sea of Suffering: A Study of Husserl and Heidegger*

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#### Introduction

First and foremost, it must be said that the originality, significance, and general tenability of the study are beyond question. As the tone-setting motto-quotation from Ludovico Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso* suggests, the author aims to provide a new interpretation of the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, one that reverses certain central aspects of earlier interpretations that have come to be taken for granted: "If you wish the truth not to be hidden from you, turn the story around." By any measure, this is a very ambitious work.

The author states the purpose of the work in the Introduction:

Put simply, the goal of the present book is to analyze and understand the Husserl-Heidegger discussion *from the standpoint of Husserl himself*, without this implying that the author's ambition is to side *with* Husserl *against* Heidegger. On this matter, our position is clearly presented by what we affirm at the very end of the first chapter: "Heidegger is not *Brutus*, nor is Husserl our *Anthony*." And the question for us is not to decide or establish who is right and who is wrong. What we want to understand is the sense of Husserl's "criticism of Heidegger," if we can put it this way. Or, even better: the sense of what could be called Husserl's reaction and response to Heidegger on the basis of a famous letter which the latter sent to the former in 1927. What is at stake is not only the sense of Husserl's reading of the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time*, but first and foremost of the conception that he has of his own phenomenology as a transcendental enterprise. In this respect, the expression ["Husserl's reaction or response to Heidegger"] entails in the following a double meaning: it embraces both (a) Husserl's criticism of the "analytics of Dasein," and (b) and [sic] the way in which he understands his own phenomenology in response to Heidegger's questions from the letter of 1927.

In other words: given the series of systematic questions which Heidegger raises in his 1927 letter to Husserl in relation to the project of *Being and Time*, the problem we set out to tackle is how Husserl reacts to them, both in the sense of clarifying the implications of his reading of *Being and Time* (whose core he famously and polemically describes as a mere "philosophical anthropology") and of understanding how he re-shapes his phenomenology so as to be able to address Heidegger's own concerns and questions in a way far more appropriate than in the analytics of Dasein. This presupposes two things: in the first place, that after the publication of *Being and Time* and Heidegger's letter of 1927 Husserl actually re-shapes some of the fundamental tenets of his own transcendental phenomenology, that is, what the latter is properly about, and in the second place, that a specific text can be identified in which all of this actually takes place. (pp. 8–9)

It is not clear, however, that "this presupposes two things" without further ado, at least not the two things that follow. After all, Husserl was *already* re-shaping some of the fundamental tenets of his transcendental phenomenology long *before* the publication of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* of 1927 and his letter to Husserl of 22 October 1927, and it may not be possible to identify a specific text, at least not any one particular text in any emphatic sense, in which all of this actually takes place. By the way, this reader expected to read: "Heidegger is not *Brutus*, nor is Husserl our *Caesar*." (Cf. p. 40.) But this can, of course, be a matter of one's personal perspective on these historical figures and their works. In any case, the author clearly comes to praise Husserl, not to bury him, even as he lets Heidegger emerge as "an honorable man".

The author continues with a line of thought that will determine the direction of the entire study:

Now, contrary to what the readers may expect, we believe (and try to demonstrate over the course of Chapter 1) that if there is any text in which Husserl's response to Heidegger (in the second sense of the two meanings above) can be found, this is not *The Crisis of European Sciences*, but rather the *Cartesian Meditations*. Of course, we do not mean to deny (see the Conclusion) that the arguments, and the archeology developed in *The Crisis* also bear upon Heidegger. To the extent that for Husserl Heidegger is guilty of the mistake already and originally made by Descartes, the great archeology of the *Crisis*, in which Husserl traces the crisis of philosophy back to the manner in which it had developed from Descartes onwards, also includes Heidegger (yet regarded only as one of the many symptoms or expressions of the crisis). But it is in the *Cartesian Meditations* that Husserl works out a conception of the transcendental subjectivity, therefore of phenomenology, which he regards as an alternative to the one systematically developed in *Being and Time*. (p. 9)

Here the author gets ahead of himself, at least for this reader, and probably for many readers. First, what is "the mistake already and originally made by Descartes" and how does it involve Heidegger, and is it true that in the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl "works out a conception of [...] transcendental subjectivity [...] which he regards as an alternative to the one systematically developed in *Being and Time*"? That he works out a conception of phenomenology as an alternative to the one developed in *Sein und Zeit* is clear.

The point is that one way to weaken a strong case is to overstate it. It seems that the author is doing this when he writes:

This [reading *The Crisis* as Husserl's response to Heidegger] is precisely the line of thought that we will not pursue. By the time of the *Crisis*, in fact, Husserl has already brought to conclusion his personal "confrontation" with the author of *Being and Time*. And here by confrontation we mean the period of time that runs from the already mentioned Heideggerian letter of 1927 through Husserl's lecture on *Phenomenology and Anthropology* of 1931 (the same year in which there appears the French edition of the *Cartesian Meditations*). (10)

Yet *The Crisis* is only the last in a long series of texts of Husserl that have as their leitmotif the crisis of the sciences, the crisis of philosophy, the crisis of culture, and the crisis of the meaning of life. This series stretches from Husserl's Fichte Lectures of 1917–1918 through his Kaizo ["Renewal"] Articles of 1922–1924 to *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* itself of 1936, and includes the Prague Treatise of August 1934, the Prague Letter of 30 August 1934, the Vienna Lecture of 7/10 May 1935, and the Prague Lectures of 14/15 November 1935. Thus, while it may be true in some limited sense that "by the time of the *Crisis* [...] Husserl has already brought to conclusion his personal 'confrontation' with the author of *Being and Time*", it does not follow that that confrontation is somehow *over and done* in any trajectory sense "by the time of *The Crisis*", by which time the author clearly means "before the time of *The Crisis*", i.e., 1931. There is, e.g., a text titled "Anthropologische Welt", which contains revisions of the Third Part of *The Crisis* and elaborations of its concluding part from the end of August 1936 and in which Husserl still criticizes the way in which Heidegger deals with death in *Sein und Zeit* (*HUA* XXIX, 332). In any case, Husserl's "confrontation with Heidegger" is still going strong in his correspondence, e.g., in his letters to Dietrich Mahnke from 1931 to 1933/1934 (e.g., *Briefwechsel* III, 473–502). From the beginning to the end (cf. p. 553 ff.), then, the author does not adequately clarify to what extent *both Cartesian Meditations and The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Sciences* constitute integral parts of Husserl's reactions and responses to Heidegger's critique of his transcendental phenomenology. At the same time, one must recognize that the author's shift of focus and emphasis away from *The Crisis* and toward *Cartesian Meditations* as Husserl's principal response to Heidegger's critique represents a real paradigm shift in the interpretation of the philosophical relationship between these figures. As such, one should meet and greet it as a

welcome supplement to the usual way of approaching the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger.

These reservations notwithstanding, the author explains the structure of the study as built around a commentary on Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*:

If, [sic] the present investigation could also be regarded as a commentary on the *Cartesian Meditations*, systematically it takes as a point of departure the way in which Husserl re-thinks the nature of the transcendental subject, hence what phenomenology is about. At stake is the subject's individuality and "concreteness;" for the re-elaboration of the nature of the subject results in a re-shaping of the nature of phenomenology, hence in a quite specific conception of the overall system of philosophy and the distinction between first philosophy, the many ontologies (and second philosophies), and finally what Husserl calls last philosophy or metaphysics. It is clear then to what extent the Husserl- Heidegger confrontation becomes for us the *causa occasionalis* in order to provide an overall interpretation of Husserl's system of philosophy from the standpoint of his position from the 20s onward. This also explains the structure of the work: with the three parts that correspond to the distinction just evoked between first, second and last philosophy. (p. 10)

The author, then, reads Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* and not *The Crisis* as "the fundamental text" in which Husserl "responds" to Heidegger: "it is here, in fact, that Husserl sketches an overall idea of the system of philosophy (from its phenomenological foundations to metaphysics understood as its culmination) which he deems both alternative to that of Heidegger and also able to tackle the questions and concerns which the latter first raised in his letter of 1927" (p. 11).

The author proceeds to explain the tripartite structure of the study in terms of the tripartite structure of Husserl's response to Heidegger's critique:

The work is hence divided into three parts which perfectly correspond to the distinction between *first philosophy*, the many *ontologies* and, finally, *metaphysics*. The reason why the first part is far longer than the other two should not be too difficult to fathom. For according to Husserl (and based upon the questions raised by Heidegger in his letter), everything hinges upon how we understand or misunderstand the nature of the transcendental subjectivity, i.e., its concreteness and individuality. Two claims are here advanced: first, that the idea of the transcendental subject which Husserl sets forward in the *Meditation* is irreducible to the region "pure consciousness" of *Ideas I*. Which also means that also the two relevant conceptions of "phenomenology" do not coincide at all. Secondly, and no matter how strange this may sound, that it is in §41 that one can find the theory which Husserl himself deems alternative to Heidegger's position in *Being and Time*: we are of course referring to his phenomenological-transcendental "idealism." In sum, Husserl does not propose to the reader his idealism *in spite of Heidegger*, but precisely because of him. (p. 11)

After his analysis of how Husserl redefines the nature of the transcendental subject, and hence of how his transcendental idealism should be understood, the author plans to move on to the second part of the study, at the center of which is the problem of being in general and the concept of region of being in particular. Finally, the third and final part of the study is devoted to "metaphysics in the Husserlian sense" (p. 12). In this part the focus is on Husserl without Heidegger, whereas in the first two parts the focus shifted between them.

The author clarifies "the reason behind the title of the work", a title which should arouse considerable curiosity in the careful reader, in the following manner:

The three parts bring to expression the three different aspects of Husserl's criticism of Heidegger, therefore the way in which he thinks the system of philosophy should be properly developed on the basis of the correct understanding of the nature of the transcendental subject (and its distinction from its "human" self-apperception in the world). And this is also the reason behind the title of the work: *Transcendental Idealism and The Sea of Suffering* stand for the two poles between which our investigation of Husserl stretches, with the former referring to phenomenology as first philosophy and the latter to the dimension of metaphysics in a new sense (as Husserl himself calls it). Finally, the very last chapter elaborates upon Husserl's own "Cartesianism" by clarifying the sense of his neo-Cartesian reform of philosophy. Here a brand new concept is brought in, that of *Lebensform* or "form-of-life" by which the present work already hints at its possible future developments. (12)

Since both “transcendental idealism” and “the sea of suffering” are motifs borrowed from Husserl and not from Heidegger, it is evident that the study takes its two defining motifs not from Heidegger but from Husserl. Yet the author writes immediately: “Whether Husserl is right in criticizing Heidegger the way he does; and whether we are correct in drawing the conclusions which we actually draw, we leave to the reader to decide.” (p. 12) In fact, however, it soon becomes clear in the reading that the author’s sympathies lie far more with Husserl’s response to Heidegger’s critique than vice versa, and that hence the study has very much the character of an *apologia pro phaenomenologia Husserliana*. There is nothing wrong with this approach, though it is misleading to convey the impression, intentionally or unintentionally, that the study aims to represent a judicious, i.e., fair and balanced, account of the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. In fact, this reader shares the preference of the author for Husserl’s philosophy over Heidegger’s, and for valid philosophical reasons.

In his subsequent remarks, the author emphasizes the key role of Chapter 5 (including its accompanying coda), Chapter 6, and the Appendix in the task of properly understanding Husserl’s transcendental idealism: “Nevertheless, the case with the *Appendix* to the first part is different [from that of the Codas 1–4, 2–4 of which are in Part Two]. Although it could be easily regarded as a sort of pause which we take from the course of our thoughts, its importance is crucial, for it concerns the way in which, over the course of Chapters 5 and 6, we try to interpret Husserl’s transcendental idealism, i.e., the position such doctrine occupies within Husserl’s philosophy.” (p. 13) Indeed, in the judgment of this reader, the author’s reconstruction of Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a response to Heidegger’s critique turns out to be the most important part of the study with respect to the philosophical relationship between them. To employ another metaphor, it seems safe to say that the systematic attempt at a tenable interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism emerges as the Ariadne’s thread by means of which the author seeks to guide the reader through the labyrinth that is the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger.

In general, however, it might be better to use the Introduction to simply provide a brief synopsis of the three parts and twelve chapters of the work in ca. 12 pages framed by a short narrative at the beginning and at the end. In particular, for example, the long digression on “hegemonic discourse” regarding “the idealism-realism debate” (pp. 14–17) seems unnecessary at this early stage in the study.

The author is to be commended on being very open about the use of previously published material in the study (p. 18). It is not possible to judge the merits of the differences between the chapters of the study and the previous studies which they elaborate or reproduce. This reader has read the study as a new work that should be able to justify itself on its own merits without the benefit of the several particular studies that preceded and were integrated into it.

At the end of the Introduction, quoting a famous passage from *The Name of the Rose*, the author states: “Yet, I can easily confess that the present book was happily written exclusively ‘out of pure love of writing.’” (18) “Exclusively ‘out of pure love of writing’”? Really? Does this mean that the study was not also or not at all composed out of a pure or any desire at all to clarify the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger? It certainly seems to suggest it.

## Elaboration

Following the Table of Contents and the author’s guidelines regarding how to read the study, the structure and content of the work are as follows:

- PART I: The Transcendental Subject, or, of First Philosophy
  - Chapter 1: Confusion and Obscurity of the Subjects
  - Chapter 2: Concreteness of the Subject: Dasein

- Chapter 3: Concreteness of the Subject: The Monad
- Chapter 4: Exemplary Entities
- Chapter 5: The Nomos of the Transcendental
  - Coda 1: Remarks on the Person in CM V
- Chapter 6: Primum Concretum and Transcendental Idealism
  - Appendix: Of a Hegemonic Discourse about the History of Early Phenomenology: Outline of a Paradigm Revision
- PART II: Being and Beings
  - Chapter 7: Region, Dasein, Being
  - Chapter 8: Dasein, Determination Judgments and the Essence
    - Coda 2: Remarks on Agamben's Remark on Heidegger
  - Chapter 9: Regions of Beings
    - Coda 3: Husserl, Heidegger, and Two Aristotle Interpretations: A Reading Hypothesis
    - Coda 4: *Phaenomenologia sub species regionis*: A Geography yet to be Written
- PART III: Metaphysics, or, of Last Philosophy
  - Chapter 10: Husserl Metaphysicus
  - Chapter 11: The Sea of Suffering
  - Chapter 12: Forms-of-Life and the Reform(s) of Philosophy

Regarding the structure of the work, the author explains that each part (I–III) includes a number of chapters (numbered progressively throughout the work), that every chapter includes a number of paragraphs, and that some chapters are followed by a coda, the function of which changes depending on the chapter in question (p. 13). Above and beyond this work, however, the notion of coda is already beset with a certain ambiguity, so that the author tries to explain the various functions of the idea in this work: the function of Coda 1 to Chapter 5 is to anticipate an analysis of the person in *CM V* to be more systematically developed later; the purpose of Coda 2 to Chapter 8 is to discuss a reading of Heidegger connected to the author's own hermeneutical hypotheses; and the goal of Codas 3 and 4 to Chapter 9 is to show the readers how the discussions introduced in that chapter could be further developed.

There are problems here, however, with the titles and/or placements of the codas. In the Table of Contents and the Introduction the codas are labeled as Coda 1 to Chapter 5, Coda 2 to Chapter 8, and Codas 3 and 4 to Chapter 9 (p. 13). Yet in the text itself Coda 1 is confusingly labeled as Coda 2 on p. 189, Coda 2 is confusingly labeled as Coda 3 on p. 368, Coda 3 is confusingly labeled as Coda 4 on p. 405, and Coda 4 is confusingly labeled as Coda 5 on p. 409. As a result, there is no Coda 1 in the text. Finally, in the Conclusion the author writes of “Coda 2 to Chapter 5” (p. 514), whereas in the Introduction he wrote of “Coda 1 to Chapter 5” (p. 13). Hence the question: Were there originally, or were there originally intended to be, five codas? If so, where is Coda 1 in the text? Did it get edited out?

In any case, the author adds an odd remark to his observations regarding the codas: “In all cases, however, the readers can easily skip the codas, with the overall meaning and implications of our arguments being minimally affected.” (p. 13) Intent and effect can be two different things, but this remark suggests that it might have been better to streamline the study by eliminating the codas altogether as unnecessary excurses. Hamlet calls him a “tedious old fool”, but Polonius is right when he says: “Brevity is the soul of wit.” (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act 2, Scene 2)

As the author indicates, and as this reader finds, “the case with the *Appendix* to the first part is different” from the cases of the codas because, although it could be easily regarded as a sort of pause which we take from the course of our thoughts, its importance is crucial, for it concerns the way in which, over the course of Chapters 5 and 6, we try to interpret Husserl's transcendental idealism, i.e., the position such doctrine occupies within Husserl's philosophy” (p. 13). Thus, on the presupposition that *Cartesianische Meditationen* is the primary locus of Husserl's response to Heidegger's critique of his transcendental phenomenology, the set of texts that comprise Chapter 5, Coda 1 (not Coda 2), Chapter 6, and the Appendix to Part I constitutes the crux of the study.

Perusing the structure and content of the study in a holistic manner, this reader is reminded of a controversial passage in a letter of Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden of 24 October 1926:

Heidegger hat seit seiner Habilitationsschrift [*Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* of 1916] nichts veröffentlicht. Eine sehr große Arbeit über Sein und Zeit, die seinen prinzipiellen Standpunkt enthält, ist eben im Druck [it appeared in 1927], aber er hat nach (ich glaube) 14 Bogen aufgehört zu drucken und darum stockt das *Jahrbuch [für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung]*. Husserl schätzt den ganzen Mann und diese Arbeit sehr hoch ein, trotzdem ihm eben erst aus den Druckbogen die Differenzen zwischen ihnen recht klar geworden sind. Soviel ich aus den Äußerungen von Hörern und besonders [Fritz] Kaufmann entnehmen kann, handelt es sich dabei im wesentlichen um die philosophische Bewältigung der Realität und des konkreten Lebens, d. h. alles dessen, was Husserl ausschaltet. Und das scheint mir doch der Punkt, nach dem die ganze philosophische Bewegung der letzten Jahre konzentrisch Hintendiert. (*Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe* 4, Letter No. 101)

In this light, the study reads like a refreshing repudiation and resounding refutation of the view, which was then widespread among Stein and her friends and associates, and which is still now widespread among friends of Heidegger and foes of Husserl, that in *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger's realism enables "the philosophical coping with reality and concrete life, i.e., all that which Husserl brackets out" of *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie and phänomenologischen Philosophie*, and that, by implication, Husserl's failing lies somehow with his idealism.

### Complication

There is an enormous amount of draft and detail in the study that invites to serious engagement. Indeed, there is so much here that one hardly knows where to begin. Yet one must begin somewhere, and there is no better place to begin than with the defining role of Husserl's transcendental idealism in his response to Heidegger's critique of his transcendental phenomenology. In fact, there is nothing more fundamental to the author's account of Husserl's response to Heidegger than his account of the origin and development of Husserl's conception of transcendental idealism.

In Chapter 5, "The Nomos of the Transcendental" (pp. 145–195), the author specifies his claim that Husserl's *Cartesianische Meditationen* of 1931 (but not *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* of 1936) represent his primary reaction and major response to Heidegger's critique of his transcendental phenomenology, specifically Husserl's attempt to answer the questions that Heidegger raised in his letter of 22 October 1927 in connection with their collaboration on an article on phenomenology for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*—an article that never materialized, at least not as the result of a collaborative effort (see Husserl, *Briefwechsel* IV, 144–148). In that chapter the author interprets § 41 of *Cartesianische Meditationen*, titled "Die echte phänomenologische Selbstausslegung des *ego cogito* als *transzendentaler Idealismus*", as Husserl's direct response to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (1927), § 32, titled "Verstehen und Auslegung". The author claims that it is in § 41 of his *Cartesianische Meditationen* that Husserl "officially develops" his transcendental idealism (p. 145). On the author's interpretation, then, Husserl's introduction of transcendental idealism emerges as his way of justifying transcendental phenomenology in his confrontation with Heidegger's critique.

Yet there is a conflict, or an inconsistency, and perhaps even a contradiction, in the study's account of the origin and development of Husserl's concept of transcendental idealism. On the one hand, the author claims that Husserl does not use the term *transcendental idealism* in 1913, and, on the other hand, he claims that Husserl does use the term *transcendental idealism* in 1913. For example, the author writes: "In fact, even if Husserl never resorts to the phrase 'transcendental idealism' in 1913 to refer to phenomenology [...]" (p. 199) And he writes: "[...] Husserl *seems* to have started using the phrase transcendental idealism to designate his conception of phenomenology during the summer semester of 1913 [...], immediately after the release of *Ideas* (April 1913) [...]" (pp. 204–205) Even in light of the author's admirable

systematic attempt to draw fine distinctions between different genres of Husserl's presentations and publications, i.e., esoteric, semi-public, public, and exoteric remarks and texts (pp. 203–205), such statements are difficult to reconcile. This makes it difficult to understand the author's argument. In fact, the statements threaten to undermine the otherwise legitimate distinctions that the author does indeed succeed in making.

The point is that both claims about Husserl's usage or non-usage of the term *transcendental idealism* in 1913 cannot be true at the same time and in the same respect. So how was it really? And what is going on here? Over long segments of the text one can get the impression that the author attempts to downplay Husserl's early expression of transcendental idealism in *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* of 1913 in order to emphasize his later articulation of transcendental idealism in *Cartesianische Meditationen* of 1931. As it turns out, however, there is no need to do any such thing because, as the author himself also eventually seems to want to argue, what is at stake here are two radically different versions of transcendental idealism, one associated with transcendental subjectivity without further ado and another associated with transcendental monadology in particular.

### Clarification

In the end, then, the quotation from Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso* that serves as the motto of the study may be unintendedly ironic: "If you wish the truth not to be hidden from you, turn the story around." In fact, the author aims to provide an original, significant, and tenable interpretation of the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, one that reverses certain aspects of earlier interpretations that have come to be taken for granted, as well as an original, significant, and tenable interpretation of Husserl's transcendental idealism, one that especially and crucially hinges on the timing of the introduction and development of transcendental idealism in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. For this purpose the author argues that Husserl's *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* of 1913 focuses on transcendental subjectivity and does not present transcendental phenomenology as transcendental idealism; that the *Cartesianische Meditationen* of 1931 introduce Husserl's monadology and present transcendental phenomenology as transcendental idealism; and that therefore his transcendental idealism follows on his monadology (p. 148: "[...] the doctrine of transcendental idealism discussed in §41 [of CM] is a most direct consequence of the re-elaboration of the transcendental subject and its mode of being already pursued in the very same *Meditation*"). Hence this sequence of ideas: first transcendental monadology, then transcendental idealism. The author states this sequence and emphasizes it repeatedly (e.g., pp. 188, 555).

A typical, pivotal quotation in the author's attempt to relocate Husserl's transcendental idealism from *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* to *Cartesianische Meditationen* is:

Now, there are only three texts published by Husserl in which his own phenomenology is *publicly* presented as a form of "transcendental idealism": the *Paris Lectures/Cartesian Meditations, Formal and Transcendental Logic* and the *Nachwort* to *Ideas I*. And all of them were composed during the period of Husserl's "confrontation" with Heidegger: between the end of 1927 (after Husserl's first reading of *Being and Time*), January 1928 (Husserl's discussion of *Being and Time* with Heidegger) and June 1931 (when Husserl gives the *Phenomenology and Anthropology* lecture). Even if we will have to come back to these issues later on, let us note the following. If we consider that the *Cartesian Meditations* appeared only in French, that *Formal and Transcendental Logic* explains only how "transcendental idealism" *should not be*

*mis-understood*, and that the *Nachwort*'s remarks about TI explicitly refer the reader to the *Meditations*, it follows that, at least *publicly*, Husserl never presented the German reader with any official, systematic assessment of TI. (p. 153)

These formulations raise several issues. First, it is not accurate to say that *Formale und transzendente Logik* “explains only how ‘transcendental idealism’ *should not be mis-understood*”, because in § 66 of that work Husserl uses the term “phänomenologischer Idealismus” (not “transzendentaler Idealismus”) three times in the course of clarifying it as distinguished from “psychological idealism”, and devotes two-thirds of that paragraph (or section) to explaining *how the term is to be understood* (*HUA XVII*, 178–179). It is also not wholly accurate to say that “the *Nachwort*'s remarks about TI explicitly refer the reader to the [*Cartesian*] *Meditations*”, because the “*Nachwort*” contains only two remarks that refer the reader to that work, and one of them is not about TI but about transcendental phenomenology in general (*HUA V*, 140), while the other is about the admittedly closely related problem of solipsism (*HUA V*, 150). It is totally accurate, however, to say that the “*Nachwort*” explicitly and emphatically refers the reader to the transcendental idealism of *Ideen*, stating forcefully: “Ich darf hier aber nicht versäumen, ausdrücklich zu erklären, daß ich hinsichtlich des transzendental-phänomenologischen Idealismus durchaus nichts zurückzunehmen habe, daß ich nach wie vor jede Gestalt des üblichen philosophischen Realismus für prinzipiell widersinnig halte, nicht minder jeden Idealismus, zu welchem er sich in seinen Argumentationen in Gegensatz stellt, den er ‘widerlegt.’” (*HUA V*, 150–151; cf. 149–155) Indeed, there are many more references in the *Nachwort* to *Ideen* than to *Cartesianische Meditationen*, and they confirm what Husserl writes about phenomenology and idealism in the earlier work, i.e., that phenomenology is not a form of “subjective idealism” but that it represents an alternative form of idealism, one that is philosophically tenable (*HUA III/1*, § 55). What other form could it possibly be than transcendental idealism?

Hence it is an exaggeration to characterize § 41 of *Cartesianische Meditationen* as “Husserl’s only public and official presentation of TI” (p. 188). Chapter 6, “Primum Concretum and Transcendental Idealism” (pp. 196–261), with its elaborate typology of Husserlian texts, established with a view to determining exactly in which one(s) Husserl refers to transcendental idealism or describes transcendental phenomenology in terms of transcendental idealism, changes nothing essential here (pp. 203–207). There are distinctions that do not make a difference. After all, one should not presume to second-guess Edith Stein, Roman Ingarden, and all the other hearers of Husserl’s lecture “Zum transzendentalen Idealismus” in Summer Semester 1913 (*HUA XXXVI*, 73–79: the title is from Husserl, not from the editors of the volume), which directly followed the publication of *Ideen* in the spring of that year, by suggesting that they were not witnessing Husserl do phenomenology in the form of transcendental idealism—when they thought, discussed, and recorded that they were doing exactly that. The argument of the Appendix to Part One of the study also does not change anything essential here (pp. 262–295).

Therefore, without objecting “that [...] Husserl is simply replacing the ‘idealism’ of *Ideen* with the ‘idealism’ of the *Cartesian Meditationen*, the idealism of *consciousness* with the idealism of the *monad*” (p. 188), one can observe that there is clear, convincing, and compelling evidence that in fact *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* does present transcendental phenomenology as transcendental idealism; that the *Cartesianische Meditationen* introduce the monadology; and that therefore the monadology follows on the transcendental idealism. The point is that, properly understood, the decisive difference between *Ideen* and



*Cartesianische Meditationen* is not the absence of transcendental idealism in the former and its presence in the latter, but rather the fact that transcendental idealism and transcendental phenomenology grounded in transcendental monadology fit together more coherently than transcendental idealism and transcendental phenomenology founded on “mere”, i.e., unnuanced, transcendental subjectivity. Basically, then, the transcendental idealism of *Cartesianische Meditationen* is, in fact, at least compared with and contrasted to the transcendental idealism of *Ideen*, a new and improved version.

Therefore, on this point, this reader concurs with the author when he writes: “[...] the account [of TI] offered in the *Meditations* is far superior to that of the *Logic* and the *Nachwort* due to its highly systematic character” (p. 188, n. 169; cf. 199, 202, 221, etc.). This reader would go even further, however, and say that the account of transcendental idealism presented in *Cartesianische Meditationen* is far superior to that of *Ideen*. The reader also concurs with the author that there is a big difference between the case in which “a concept can be at work in a certain text, even if its explicit presence is nowhere to be found (as is the case with the term/concept ‘transcendental idealism’ in *Ideen*)”, and the case in which “one could take for granted that—*although a certain term (or concept) is nowhere to be explicitly found* in a certain text or context—its latent presence can be equally assumed without further ado” (p. 204). This may be as close as the author comes to admitting what many of Husserl’s students and associates regarded as self-evident upon reading his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* in 1913, i.e., that *the term transcendental idealism* may be absent there but that *the concept transcendental idealism* is present there. It is also what Husserl would confirm, shortly after the publication of the work in spring 2013, in his lecture “Natur und Geist” in Summer Semester 1913, one installment of which he himself designated with the title “Zum transzendentalen Idealismus” (*HUA XXXVI*, 173–179).

Yet the distinction between the two forms of transcendental idealism is one thing, and the distinction between the two manifestations of transcendental subjectivity is another. These two distinctions criss-cross in the development of Husserl’s thought between *Ideen* and *Cartesianische Meditationen*. The threads of the criss-crossings seem to get entangled between the author’s different interpretations of the roles of Husserl’s main works in his reaction and response to Heidegger’s critique. Husserl’s *Ideen* of 1913 is certainly not a reaction or response to Heidegger (it could not possibly have been), but the “Nachwort” to it of 1930 equally certainly is, and it refers directly and explicitly back to, among other things, the transcendental idealism of *Ideen*. Therefore the study has not closed but rather reopened the question concerning what the distinction between the two different versions of transcendental idealism means for a judicious assessment of the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. Indeed, this is one of the strongest merits of the study. If the question concerning the origin and development of transcendental idealism in Husserl’s work is to be correctly answered, and if the complicating factors of subjectivity and monadology are to be addressed as well, the “reversal” that the author proposes needs to be reviewed and it may need to be substantially revised or even partially reversed. This takes away nothing from the stimulating and even inspirational character of the study. Yet, once again, there is no need for exaggerations that only serve to cloud the real issues.

## Conclusion

The “Conclusion” of the study is elucidated as “(Notes for Future Research)”. There are 5 sections here. They are not labeled with titles or identified as rubrics.

## 1. At end of “our long journey” the author recapitulates

[...] the thesis according to which if there is any text in which Husserl’s response to Heidegger (if there must be any such thing) could be found, it is not *The Crisis of European Sciences* but the *Cartesian Meditations*. It is in this text that Husserl presents a first radical re-elaboration of some of the central tenets of his phenomenology that directly address Heidegger’s concerns. Of course, this does not mean or imply that the *Crisis* would have nothing to do with Husserl’s confrontation with Heidegger. Quite the opposite. In fact, insofar as Heidegger is regarded by Husserl as committing or re-committing the same error as Descartes, the grandiose archeology of the *Crisis*, through which Husserl aims at tracing the crisis of philosophy back to the development of modern philosophy from Descartes all the way to Kant, necessarily also includes Heidegger, but exclusively as one of the manifestations of the crisis itself. By contrast, in the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl proposes a re-elaboration of the nature of the transcendental subjectivity which is far from being superimposable to the concept of “pure consciousness” of 1913, and which does not represent the focus of the *Crisis*. (p. 553)

On the basis of this first, textual thesis, the author advanced a second, theoretical thesis, for Husserl’s objection that Heidegger confuses the transcendental subject with its anthropological determination does indeed entail a much deeper claim, i.e., that he is conflating different parts of the system of philosophy. There are three aspects here: (1) that Heidegger confuses transcendental subjectivity as the field of investigation of phenomenology as a “first philosophy” and the anthropological subject as the field of investigation of “philosophical anthropology” as one of the many possible eidetic or a priori sciences; (2) that he erroneously identifies transcendental subjectivity with anthropological subjectivity, which undermines the possibility of all the ontologies other than the fundamental one; and (3) that the analytics of *Dasein* ascribes to transcendental subjectivity, and thus, to the realm of first philosophy, characteristics that properly pertain to the domain of metaphysics or “metaphysics in a new sense”. Thus Husserl criticizes Heidegger for having “transcendentalized” some of the “factual” and therefore strictly speaking “irrational” aspects of human existence. The three parts of the study mirror these three aspects of Husserl’s metacritique of Heidegger’s critique.

There is a certain imbalance here, however, in two respects, insofar as (1) the author writes too much about *Cartesianische Meditationen* and too little about *Die Krisis* as Husserl’s response to Heidegger’s critique, and (2) too much about Husserl and too little about Heidegger period. In the end, the author concedes: “Of course, the objection could be made to the effect that Husserl’s criticism is more revealing of his own view on phenomenology than of Heidegger’s position. It is true; but the same could be affirmed of all the critical points which Heidegger himself usually makes against Husserl’s phenomenology.” (p. 554) But this is a rather insipid conclusion to draw from such a rich study. Perhaps it is true, but even if it is, it still poses the question concerning Heidegger’s possible and actual responses to Husserl’s criticisms. This direction of inquiry is very much worth looking into.

2. The author argues that for Husserl the problems of “the *locus* of the transcendental” and “the *nomos* of the transcendental” are closely connected. Whereas the former concerns the place of the transcendental, namely, the nature of the entity that “harbors” it, the latter corresponds to the issue of the “intelligibility” of the entities. The way in which Husserl conceives of the “*locus*” and the way in which he understands the “*nomos*” are inextricably linked: “The latter is expressed, in fact, by Husserl’s transcendental idealism as is presented in § 41 of the *Cartesian Meditations* and as a most direct consequence of the re-elaboration of the field of investigation of phenomenology: this being no longer regarded as the region pure consciousness, but as a concrete ego or monad. And TI directly follows from such re-elaboration.” (p. 555)

Here the reader would like to make two observations: (1) This description makes it sound, again, as if Husserl first introduces transcendental idealism in *Cartesian Meditations* (thus it is not in *Ideas*), the shift from transcendental subjectivity to transcendental monadology occurs in *Cartesian Meditations*, and therefore transcendental idealism follows from transcendental monadology. Yet this brief account does not do justice to the rich description in the study itself. Rather, it is more accurate to say that there is already a version, and certainly at least a proto-

version, of transcendental idealism in *Ideas*, that the shift from transcendental subjectivity to transcendental monadology does occur in *Cartesian Meditations*, and that therefore transcendental monadology follows from (or on) new and improved transcendental idealism insofar as it clarifies and confirms it. (2) In addition, once the structures of the monad—the concrete subject, the human person—have been elucidated, the issue of the “*locus*” of the transcendental can also be addressed under the aspect of what Husserl calls “metaphysics in a new sense”, including from the perspective of the irrational dimension of human existence in the world. Thus indeed there emerges a new concept, that of *Lebensform*. Now transcendental idealism is not a mere doctrine, but rather the *form* of a certain *life*: the *life* of the philosopher. It may be true that “the concept of form-of-life could be only introduced here [in the study] and not really expanded on” (p. 555). Yet it is not possible to deal with the question concerning the life of the philosopher, which, if it is anything at all, is an examined life in the Socratic sense (Plato, *Apology of Socrates* 38a), without taking into consideration Husserl’s concepts of *Ruf*, *Beruf*, and *Berufung*, which comprise leitmotifs of his research manuscripts in *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie* (HUA XLII)—of which see more below.

3. The author proceeds to explain how he intends “to understand the philosophical form-of-life as it emerges in Husserl’s *Briefwechsel*”, paying special attention to the letters of the 1930s (Husserl died in 1938), giving special place to transcendental idealism, and granting the reader an anticipation of the direction of his research:

But if the concrete ego is always an absolutely individual one [...], and if to study the idea of philosophy is to understand an individual life whose *form* coincides with TI itself, then our future research will concern itself with the *form-of-life* of the philosopher as it manifests itself in an absolutely individual form-of-life: here, that of Husserl himself. The ambition will be to write neither a factual nor a philosophical biography of the human being known as “Edmund Husserl.” Rather, the ambition or the task is to understand the philosophical form-of-life as it emerges in Husserl’s *Briefwechsel* (with special attention to the letters written from the beginning of the 30s all the way to his death). As a sort of anticipation, this is also the reason why, already during the third part of the present work (see in particular Chapter 11, §§3, 6), Husserl’s letters were evoked. In his letter to Baudin, Husserl speaks of TI as his own *consolatio philosophiae*; the words he uses to write about the death of his son mirror what he would write as regards the irrational nature of our existence and vice versa (he writes manuscripts in which the events of his life are directly present); and at the beginning of the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl invites the readers to do what he has already personally done *semel in vita*. It would be a mistake to believe that we (and Husserl himself) have been conflating “philosophy” and “life,” the arguments the former is supposed to produce and the experiences the latter goes through. The fact that Husserl himself resorts to his own philosophical terminology to talk about (his own) factual life should be seen as a sign of the inseparability of the two (*life* and *philosophy*) once the concept of *Lebensform* has been introduced. When Husserl writes to Ingarden that his “future horizon” (*Zukunftshorizont*) is shrinking more and more (*wird ja stetig kleiner*) (Husserl 1968, 99); when he talks of the situation in Germany at the end of 1933 by mentioning *the Schicksal of the non-Arians* (Husserl 1968, 83)—all such phrases (primarily the term *Schicksal*) should be understood technically. Just as a technical meaning is to be attributed to Husserl’s confession to Baudin above: for they are the words of a *life* which expresses its own *form*, thereby regarding the world itself—thus, its irrationalities—from the perspective of that *consolatio philosophica* which is TI itself as a form-of-life. It is no accident that Husserl himself speaks of it as “my normal anomaly” (*meiner normalen Anomalität*) (Husserl 1968, 92): the reason is that the life of the philosopher, his or her form-of-life, displays a normativity (a *norm* or *norm-ality*) which radically differs from that of all the non-philosophical “forms-of-life” (whatever one might want to mean by such ambiguous and vague turn of phrase).

Here the author repeats what he wrote earlier in the study, i.e., that in his “famous 1934 letter to Émile Baudin” Husserl writes that transcendental idealism is his *consolatio philosophica* (see p. 485 ff.). Thus, to recall the title of the study, *Transcendental Idealism and the Sea of Suffering* [...], transcendental idealism would be precisely that dimension of Husserl’s philosophy that saves him from being lost at sea in the irrational ocean of a contingent *Schicksal* and threatening metaphysical meaninglessness. Yet, contrary to what the author tries to get him to say, Husserl does not say, at least not in the “famous 1934 letter to Émile Baudin”, that transcendental

idealism is his *consolatio philosophica*, but rather that transcendental phenomenology is. Here is what Husserl writes:

Sie bemerken, verehrter Abbé Baudin, wie viel die transz[endentale] Phanomenologie in ihrer ausgereiften Entwicklung für mich persönlich als *consolatio philosophica* bedeuten konnte. Ihr Wort von der “*philosophischen Sahara*” und dem “*nackten*” *Selbst* kann dem wirklichen Sinn dieser Philosophie nicht genug thun. Kein gewöhnlicher “Realist” ist je so realistisch und so concret gewesen als ich, der phänomenologische “Idealist” (ein Wort, das ich übrigens nicht mehr gebrauche). Die Methode der ph[änomenologischen] Epoché und Reduction setzt die Existenz der Welt, genau als was sie uns jeweils galt und gilt, voraus, und wir in dieser Methode reflectierend—jeweils ich, der sich Besinnende—sind in der voll concreten Welthabe. Aber Diese Concretion nehmen wir als phanom[enologisch] Eingestellte unvergleichlich ernster als die über reale Welt Redenden, aber leider ganz abstract über sie und Realitat und Existenz Hinredenden. (*BW VII*, 16 [8 June 1934])

From this it is evident that it is not transcendental idealism but rather transcendental phenomenology “in its mature development” that Husserl identifies as his *consolatio philosophica*. Yet, when one philosophizes with a hammer, everything looks like a nail, and the author proceeds repeatedly but misguidedly to argue that Husserl says that transcendental idealism is his *consolatio philosophica* (pp. 486, 493–495), adducing (pp. 492–495) another text from another context, *HUA XLII*, 400–408 (“*Consolatio philosophiae ...*”), to make his questionable point. (Note: The 527 pages of texts in *HUA XLII* contain only one reference to “phänomenologischer Idealismus”, on p. 17.) The author also even asserts that for Husserl the genuine philosopher is “a human being for whom TI is the one and only *consolatio philosophiae*” (p. 536), that, “in his letter to Baudin, Husserl speaks of TI as his own *consolatio philosophica*” (p. 556), and that he “writes the letter to the Abbey Baudin and reflects on TI as his own *consolatio philosophica*” “and [on] TI as the sole form of *consolatio philosophica*” (p. 557). The author’s interpretation culminates in the claim that Husserl’s letter to Baudin amounts to a “confession”, “for they are the words of a *life* which expresses its own *form*, thereby regarding the world itself—thus, its irrationalities—from the perspective of that *consolatio philosophica* which is TI itself as a form-of-life” (p. 556).

The same objection holds for the author’s interpretation of Husserl’s letter to Roman Ingarden of 10 July 1935, where, contrary to what the author tries to get Husserl to say, he does not write that transcendental idealism is his “normale Anomalität”, and where, in fact, he does not even mention transcendental idealism. See Roman Ingarden, ed., *Edmund Husserl: Briefe an Roman Ingarden, Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl*, 92.

That Husserl also argues, as he does in *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§ 40–41, that transcendental idealism and transcendental phenomenology are inseparable, is relevant, even crucial, but it is a different matter insofar as according to Husserl they are clearly distinct but inextricably linked. In addition, the author here (but not elsewhere: p. 204) omits the fact that in the same letter to Baudin Husserl mentions in parentheses that he no longer uses the word “Idealist”. Indeed, he claims to be a “Realist”, one even more “realistic” than the “usual ‘realist’” who talks about “the real world”, “reality”, and “existence”.

Therefore, to recall once again the title of the study, *Transcendental Idealism and the Sea of Suffering [...]*, it is not transcendental idealism but rather transcendental phenomenology that saves Husserl from being lost at sea in the irrational ocean of contingent *Schicksal* and metaphysical meaninglessness. One effective way to weaken a strong case is to overstate it—to claim what the evidence does not justify.

At the same time, this reader concurs with the author’s intention, as far as he understands it, when he writes that “the ambition of our future research will be that of writing about a *life* (Husserl’s) that writes about its (philosophical) *form* and from the standpoint of its (philosophical) *form*, thereby shedding light (if possible) upon the very idea of philosophy according to Husserl against the backdrop of his reflections on the (‘irrational’) political situation of Germany and Europe in the 30s.” (p. 557) In fact, the world is still waiting for a

philosophical biography of the human being Edmund Husserl, whereas Heidegger seems to be blessed with a new biography every several years.

Flowing in the wake of the questionable interpretation of transcendental idealism as Husserl's *consolatio philosophica*, the connection between Husserl's personal, philosophical, and professional situation in the mid- to late-1930s and Delio Cantimori's book on the history of Anabaptism seems imaginative at best, and "the structural analogy between Cantimori's project and Husserl" appears speculative at worst. In no case can it in any way substitute for a rigorous analysis of Husserl's situation.

Finally, it is true that Husserl regularly employs the rhetoric of "heroism" in his research manuscripts on the irrational dimensions of our existence. In fact, Marco Cavallaro has a fine paper on this topic, "'I Want, Therefore I Can': Husserl's Phenomenology of Heroic Willing", in Cavallaro and Heffernan, eds., *The Existential Husserl: A Collection of Critical Essays*, 45–64. So does Nicholas De Warren in the same volume, "'Mag die Welt eine Hölle sein': Husserl's Existential Ethics", 65–86. The author goes too far, however, in the direction of suggesting that Husserl views human existence as a war or kind of war, whereas Husserl stops at describing the character of existence as a struggle between rationality and irrationality. (Describing the world as a place in which there are irrationalities, however frequently occurring, is not the same thing as describing the world as an irrational one. The "consolatio philosophiae"-text [No. 29] of *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie*, e.g., is very clear about this. See *HUA XLII*, 400–408.) As Husserl knew all too well from the fate of his son, Wolfgang, who fell at the battle of Verdun in 1916, there is a big difference between *Kampf* and *Krieg*. In the end, after much speculation in this direction, the author softens his tone to account for the distinction between struggle and war. In any case, Husserl's most penetrating existential question is: "*Kann ich leben in einer 'sinnlosen' Welt?*" (*HUA XLII*, 307) The author misquotes this question as: "*How can I live in a 'sense-less' world?*" (p. 474) In doing so, he attributes to Husserl the view that the world is indeed "sense-less" or meaningless and turns the question into one concerning *how* I can live in it. But that is definitely not Husserl's view. The point is that for Husserl it is the duty of rational agents to live the best ethical lives that they can "against *the dark horizon*" of meaninglessness or senselessness (*HUA XLI*, 309). Bernhard Obsieger's excellent study, "Husserls Frage: 'Kann ich mein Leben leben, ohne dass ich es wollen kann?'" (*Phänomenologische Forschungen* 2015), is extremely relevant to this entire topic. One does not need to exaggerate the darkness of Husserl's worldview in order to highlight the heroic elements in his philosophy.

4. Bracketing the question concerning the author's talk of transcendental idealism as a "form-of-life", the question concerning normativity in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is not only popular at the present time but also extremely important at any time. Here is where Husserl's conception of rationality as involving three realms of human activity comes into play, the three realms being the theoretical, the axiological, and the practical. This articulation is already present in *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Erstes Buch* (§ 139) and it becomes increasingly important in Husserl's lectures and research manuscripts on ethics and metaethics (*HUA XXVIII*, *HUA XXXVII*, *HUA XLII*, *HUA XLIII/2*). The primary and ultimate question in Husserl's phenomenological ethics and metaethics is: Is there an absolute ought (*ein absolutes Sollen*), and, if there is, on what is it founded or in what is it grounded? It is an additional and indispensable question how transcendental idealism fits into this holistic picture.

5. Departing from reflections on Kadir Filiz's 2021 skeptical remarks on the fruitfulness and usefulness of pursuing Husserl's conception of philosophy as transcendental phenomenology involving transcendental idealism and arriving at reflections on Husserl's concept of crisis, the author expresses the view that the crisis of the sciences of which Husserl writes in *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* is, holistically regarded, a crisis of philosophy, a crisis of reason, and a crisis of life. This conclusion follows from Husserl's holistic approach to reason and rationality as encompassing the three realms of human

endeavor, theoretical, axiological, and practical. This reader concurs with the author's holistic approach to Husserl's holistic approach. The author's observations here improve on his passing note 367 on p. 449 regarding the concept of *Krisis* in Husserl. This is not about agreeing or disagreeing with Trizio (2016) or Heffernan (2017) or Trizio thereafter. In *Die Krisis* Husserl argues that the only effective way to respond to the *Krisis*—or, more accurately, the *Krisen*—of which he speaks is with phenomenological sense-reflections (*Besinnungen*) on the history, method, and task of philosophy. On the assumption that an accurate diagnosis of a malady is a necessary condition for an effective remedy, Heffernan's 2017 paper aims to formulate a precise concept of the *Krisis* of the European sciences with which Husserl operates in this work. Thus it seeks an answer to the question: What exactly, according to Husserl, is “the ‘crisis’ [*Krisis*] of the European sciences”? There have been two different tendencies in the literature on this question. According to the traditional interpretation, the *Krisis* of the European sciences lies not in the inadequacy of their scientificity but in the loss of their meaningfulness for life. According to a novel suggestion, the *Krisis* lies not in the loss of their meaningfulness for life but in the inadequacy of their scientificity. These readings are mutually exclusive because each claims that the other misidentifies the *Krisis* as something that it is not. The argument advanced by Heffernan, however, is that, given the many different senses of *Krisis* in *Die Krisis*, an adequate understanding of the *Krisis* that Husserl identifies requires not a disjunctive but an inclusive approach. Therefore the paper proposes that Husserl's *Krisis* of the European sciences is *both* a crisis of their scientificity *and* a crisis of their meaningfulness for life. The relevance of this result to Husserl's philosophical and historical sense-investigations in *Die Krisis*—as well as to the present critical situation of philosophy—is self-evident. See Heffernan, “The Concept of *Krisis* in Husserl's *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*”, *Husserl Studies* 33 (2017), 229–257. Subsequent attempts to show that Heffernan is wrong about Husserl's concept of *Krisis* have only generated more reductionist confusion. As Husserl says at the beginning of *Die Krisis*: “Bloße Tatsachenwissenschaften machen bloße Tatsachenmenschen.” (*HUA* VI, 4) Nothing could be more un-Husserlian than arguing that the crisis of the sciences is reducible to a crisis of their scientificity.

#### Appendix: Amicable Addenda or Friendly Amendments

In addition, this reader proposes the following amicable addenda or friendly amendments—with the emphasis on the words *amicable* and *friendly*—to the study, which surely will and should see publication in some book form.

1. The title of the study, *Transcendental Idealism and the Sea of Suffering: A Study of Husserl and Heidegger*, expresses both a philosophical position and a defining metaphor. But do the two elements fit together? Does the metaphor fit the material and the method? A problem with employing this title is that both elements of it refer much more clearly and strongly to Husserl and his work than to Heidegger and his. As the author writes:

The three parts [of the study] bring to expression the three different aspects of Husserl's criticism of Heidegger, therefore the way in which he thinks the system of philosophy should be properly developed on the basis of the correct understanding of the nature of the transcendental subject (and its distinction from its “human” self-apperception in the world). And this is also the reason behind the title of the work: *Transcendental Idealism and The Sea of Suffering* stand for the two poles between which our investigation of Husserl [sic] stretches, with the former referring to phenomenology as first philosophy and the latter to the dimension of metaphysics in a new sense (as Husserl himself calls it). (p. 12)

In fact, “the two poles” of the study seem to relate to the author's attempts to approach Husserl alone and not Husserl and Heidegger together. A great deal of the study focuses on Husserl's transcendental idealism as his response to Heidegger's critique, and one whole chapter, 11, titled “The Sea of Suffering”, attempts to portray Husserl's entire worldview as one in which the

human condition is defined in terms of a “sea of suffering”. Yet, as several texts in *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie* demonstrate (HUA XLII, 169 [cf. 582], 231, 317, 390), Husserl’s entire worldview is actually defined by a firm and unshakable *Vernunftglaube*, a rational faith or faithful reason. This is true even of the text-in-context from which the author lifts the reference to “the sea of suffering” (HUA XLII, 406). Usually the context is the question concerning the meaning of life or a meaningful life, that is, a valuable, virtuous, and happy or blessed life (HUA XLII, 169–176, 228–235, 297–333, 383–391). First and foremost, Husserl’s concept of *Vernunftglaube* involves seeking and finding an answer to the question: “*Was muss geglaubt werden, damit die Welt doch einen Sinn haben kann, damit Menschenleben in ihr vernünftig bleiben kann?*” (HUA XLII, 238) The question concerning what must be believed in this regard is based on the demand that the world make “sense” or that it have “meaning”: “Die Welt muss einen ‘Sinn’ haben.” (HUA XLII, 238) The question concerning what one must believe in order to live a meaningful life in a meaningful world is not abstract and theoretical but concrete and practical, and not only metaphysical but also existential; it is about how I should live my life as well as how we should live our lives and participate in the lives of others (HUA XLII, 203, 254–255, 407). Given the intimate connection between, even the complete inseparability of, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and his transcendental idealism (HUA I, 119; HUA V, 150–153; HUA XXXVI, passim), the evidence that he adduces for his commitment to *Vernunftglaube* is crucial. Husserl’s concept of *Vernunftglaube* relates first and foremost to a human being’s existential attitude toward and vital position on the question concerning the meaningfulness of the world and the possibility of a meaningful life in it (HUA VIII, 354–355; HUA XXV, 273–274 [cf. 387]; HUA XXXV, 304; HUA XLII, 169–176, 203, 216–217, 230–231, 237–238, 254–255, 261, 317, 390, 407–408). Finally, if the study is to be, according to its subtitle, “a study of Husserl and Heidegger”, then one of the two major elements of its title should relate to Heidegger. In any case, “transcendental idealism” should remain because, as was indicated above, it emerges as the author’s chosen Ariadne’s thread to lead the reader through the labyrinth that is the relationship between these two thinkers.

2. The author does well to mention, several times, the heroic and tragic fate of Husserl’s son Wolfgang, who fell at the Battle of Verdun in the First World War, and its impact on the Husserl family (pp. 474, 496, 558). But is it really possible to talk meaningfully of “the sea of suffering” in Husserl without so much as touching on his own heroic personal struggle with persecution under the anti-Semitism following the First World War and the National Socialism leading to the Second World War? Not to mention Heidegger’s own anti-Semitism and involvement with National Socialism and the sad *Bruch* in their personal, philosophical, and professional relationship? Yet the study does not mention either anti-Semitism or National Socialism. But perhaps these are topics that the author plans to bring up when he draws upon Husserl’s correspondence (p. 556). Here Husserl’s extensive correspondence with Dietrich Mahnke will prove to be of special importance (*Briefwechsel* III, 391–522), including insofar as it also makes reference to Husserl’s chronic struggles with bouts of depression.

3. One must grant a special place to Husserl’s “Nachwort zu meinen *Ideen*” of 1930 in the interpretation and understanding of his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Erstes Buch: Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* of 1913. While he claims that there have been “misunderstandings” (“Mißverständnisse”) on the part of his readers and “imperfections” (“Unvollkommenheiten”) on his own part, and while he admits that he could have expressed himself more clearly, Husserl reaffirms in the “Nachwort”, in the strongest terms, his commitment to transcendental idealism as he articulates it in *Ideen*. Thus it would be a misreading to try to understand Husserl better than he understood himself in this matter (HUA VI, 71–74, esp. 74) by trying to argue that there was little or no or only weak transcendental idealism in *Ideen* because Husserl does not use the term *transcendental idealism* there. Given the fact that Husserl himself reaffirms the transcendental idealism of *Ideen* in the “Nachwort”, it makes much more sense to recognize that although the term itself was absent there the thing itself was present there. Therefore it is hard to see how the mere absence of the

term is in any significant sense meaningful. It is certainly not dispositive in any respect. “Retrospection” (e.g., p. 71) does not necessarily involve “retro-projection” (e.g., pp. 208, 241).

4. In his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* of 1913 Husserl neither asserts nor denies—*expressis verbis*—that his philosophy as articulated therein presents or represents a form of idealism. He lets the text speak for itself, and insofar as he denies that it represents a “subjective idealism”, which he clearly opposes as untenable, he also suggests that it does indeed represent another form of idealism, one that is tenable. See, e.g., § 55: “Schluß: Alle Realität seiend durch ‘Sinnggebung’. Kein ‘subjektiver Idealismus’”. It is an iconoclastic, arguable even idiosyncratic, interpretation of *Ideen* to read it as not presenting and defending any form of idealism. This is the main reason why so many of Husserl’s students and associates read it in the way in which they did. It made perfect sense to do so then. It still does now. See Heffernan, “Stein’s Critique of Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism”, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 95 (2021), 455–479, and “A Tale of Two Schisms: Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s Move into Transcendental Idealism”, *The European Legacy* 21 (2016), 556–575. The fact that Stein, as well as many others, were not able to understand the full range of Husserl’s different articulations of his different versions of transcendental idealism from *Ideen* to *Cartesianische Meditationen*, is another matter. It is striking, e.g., that in her 1931 (*Revue Thomiste*) review of *Cartesianische Meditationen* Stein does not differentiate between different versions of Husserl’s transcendental idealism but ends with the question whether it is possible to do phenomenology of constitution without accepting transcendental idealism (Stein, *Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe* 9, 159–161).

5. Given its emphasis on *Cartesianische Meditationen* as the decisive text in Husserl’s response to Heidegger’s critique of his phenomenology, the study should have made more and better use of the concepts of *Evidenz* in Husserl and *Erschlossenheit* in Heidegger. Beginning with § 5, “Evidenz und die Idee der echten Wissenschaft”, *CM* is a treasury of Husserl’s observations on evidence as that which justifies human beings in holding the opinions that they hold and making the judgments that they make, opinions and judgments which, by forming and influencing their habits (*Habitualitäten*), constitute human beings to be who they are. For Husserl, philosophy is science, rigorous science. The best statement of this viewpoint is, of course, his famous essay “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft” (*Logos* 1910/11 [*HUA* XXV, 3–63]). For Heidegger, on the other hand, philosophy and science are two radically different enterprises. It is no accident that it was only after Heidegger’s inaugural lecture in Freiburg on July 24, 1929, “Was ist Metaphysik?”, in which Heidegger makes clear that he thinks that philosophy and science are two different things that have little or nothing to do with one another, that Husserl, who was present at the lecture, subjected Heidegger’s writings, especially *Sein und Zeit* (1927) and *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929), to a serious scrutiny. Husserl had actually helped proofread *Sein und Zeit*: “Es macht mir viel Freude.” (See Husserl–Fritz Kaufmann, ca. 20 April 1926, *Briefwechsel* III, 347.) Yet the lecture must have given Husserl long pause, especially since he had personally seen to it that Heidegger was named his successor at Freiburg: “Lieber Freund. Kommissionsbeschluß: unico loco. Absolutes Stillschweigen selbstverständlich. Wir grüßen Sie herzlichst. EH.” (See Husserl–Heidegger, 21 January 1928, *Briefwechsel* IV, 151.)

6. Any treatment of the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger should take into account the serious differences in their *Weltanschauungen*. See Dilthey, *Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen*, in Max Frischeisen-Köhler, ed., *Weltanschauung, Philosophie und Religion in Darstellungen von Wilhelm Dilthey [et al.]*, 3–51 (Berlin: Reichl, 1911); Husserl, “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft” (1911), now in *HUA* XXV, 3–62; Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (1919); Heidegger, “Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers, ‘Psychologie der Weltanschauungen’” (1919/1921), in Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9: *Wegmarken*, 1–44 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976); and Edith Stein, “Die weltanschauliche



Bedeutung der Phänomenologie” (1930/1931 [unpublished]), now in *Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe* 9 (Freiburg, Basel, and Vienna: Herder, 2014), 143–158. In an exemplary manner, Stein starts by investigating the influence of phenomenology on worldviews and ends by uncovering the influence of worldviews on phenomenology—and phenomenologists.

7. Husserl was asking and answering many of Heidegger’s “existential” questions and questions of “Existenzphilosophie” before they were Heidegger’s questions or the questions of the “Existenzphilosophen”. See his “Fichte Lectures” (1917–1918); Kaizo Articles (1922–1924); and the entire series of *Krisis*-themed texts starting and running long before the actual *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* (1936). Hence it is necessary to pose the question concerning Husserl’s *Existenzphilosophie*. For in fact Husserl developed a *phenomenology of existence*. Thus he was not only involved in transcendental phenomenology as a one-sided or multi-faceted inquiry into questions concerning evidence, knowledge, and truth, as well as logic, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of science, but he was also already engaging in his own kind of existential phenomenology—long before “its time”. Indeed, this is one of the most salient points of departure in the “Nachwort zu meinen Ideen” of 1930. There Husserl writes that there are no questions that *Existenzphilosophie* asks or answers that transcendental phenomenology does not also ask and answer. In this regard, the author’s remark in n. 377 on p. 464 is difficult to understand. In fact, Heffernan deliberately avoids talk of an “existentialist Husserl”. Other contributors in Marco Cavallaro and George Heffernan, eds., *The Existential Husserl: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Cham: Springer, 2022), are more liberal and inclusive in their usage of the designation “existentialist” with respect to Husserl. Compare Heffernan, “The Existential Husserl: A Very Brief Introduction”, in *The Existential Husserl*, 1–30, and, e.g., Sophie Loidolt, “Is Husserl’s Later Ethics Existentialist? On the Primal Facticity of the Person and Husserl’s ‘Existential Rationalism’”, in *ibid.*, 145–162, as well as Nicholas De Warren, “‘Mag die Welt eine Hölle sein’: Husserl’s Existential Ethics”, also in *ibid.*, 65–86.

8. The author mentions Camus twice in the study (pp. 36 and 498–499). It is true that the concept of the absurd (pp. 498–499) makes one think of Camus as well as of Kierkegaard. Heffernan has a study of Camus’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenology as a form of existentialism, i.e., a kind of philosophy that seeks to leap to essences, e.g., to avoid the conclusions of the philosophy of the absurd. It would also be helpful to acknowledge that Camus did not advocate a philosophy of the absurd. Rather, he articulated it. And in fact there is a reading of his works according to which he reduced the philosophy of the absurd to the absurd. In any case, Camus understood existentialism radically differently from Sartre and others of his time. Yet the author does not mention the primary source of Camus’s systematic critique of Husserl (*Le Mythe de Sisyphe*), nor Heffernan’s forceful rebuttal from Husserl’s viewpoint. See “Camus and Husserl and the Phenomenologists”, in Peter Francev, Maciej Kaluza, and Matthew Sharpe, eds., *Albert Camus: Philosopher Among Philosophers—A Collection of Critical Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 177–198. This is an important point because phenomenology, *Existenzphilosophie*, existentialism, and the philosophy of the absurd are different developments that eventually intertwine and interact.

9. What about Husserl’s metaphysics (*HUA* XLII)? Without going into detail, this reader must say that he has the impression that this part of the study is underdetermined because there is just much more there both quantitatively and qualitatively. How about appealing already to *HUA* III, 7–8, as a starting point—thus taking Husserl at his word and understanding *Ideen* as “prolegomena to any future metaphysics that might come forth as science”? Mainly and mostly, however, Husserl’s detailed *Besinnungen* on “Gott und die Welt” in *HUA* XLII, 137–263, “Metaphysik: Monadologie, Teleologie und philosophische Theologie”, are underused. These texts stretch from 1908/1909 to 1934 and represent a treasury of Husserl’s reflections on the connections between metaphysics, monadology, teleology, and philosophical theology. Thus analyses of them would have fit perfectly into the landscape of a narrative on the development

of “Husserl metaphysicus’s” concept of monadology. The *Besinnungen* are singularly lacking, however, in references to transcendental idealism.

10. What about Husserl’s metaethics? This part is seriously underdetermined. Husserl’s metaethics stands in marked contrast to Heidegger’s “beyond good and evil-ness”. See *HUA* XLII, 263–527, “Reflexionen zur Ethik aus den Freiburger Jahren” (1916–1935). Also underused are the other three Husserliana volumes of texts articulating Husserl’s ethics and metaethics, *HUA* XXVIII (*Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908–1914*), XXXVII (*Einleitung in die Ethik: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924*), and XLIII/2 (*Wille und Handlung: Texte aus dem Nachlass [1902–1934]*). In *HUA* XXVIII only one locus (p. 177) is referenced, and only twice (on pp. 444–445 and 449), and in *HUA* XXXVII only one locus (p. 293) is referenced, and only twice (on pp. 163 and 167). Husserl’s long-standing interest in ethics stands in marked contrast to Heidegger’s chronic lack of interest in questions concerning ethics and metaethics.

11. The author’s criticism of the editors of Husserliana volume XLII for selecting the title “Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie” for that volume are unjustified, because nothing that the editors write in this regard (in *HUA* XLII, xix–xxv) “entails a quite negative value judgment on Husserl’s way of proceeding” or suggests that “Husserl would not be phenomenologically entitled to tackle [these problems]” (p. 467). To the contrary. What about Husserl’s concept of *Besinnung* or *sense investigation*? Husserl views human beings as beings who make sense of things, especially of things that do not seem to make sense. The fact is that things do not simply make sense without further ado. We must make them make sense. If we do not, then they will not. This aspect of Husserl’s philosophy, which involves a chronic struggle of rationality against irrationality, may be the one that comes closest to being “existential” or even “existentialist” (*sit venia verbo*). Husserl approaches especially “limit phenomena of phenomenology”—birth, death, metaphysics, and metaethics—via *Besinnung* or *Selbstbesinnung* or *Weltbesinnung*. To understand the concept of *Besinnung-Selbstbesinnung-Weltbesinnung* in *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie* (*HUA* XLII), however, one must expand the hermeneutical horizon. Husserl already employs the expression *Besinnung* at one place in *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900/1901) (*HUA* XIX/1, 25) to characterize the phenomenological investigations of the *sense* of “the things themselves” (*HUA* XIX/1, 10). Yet only after *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1913), in which the expression *Besinnung* does not occur, does he develop this approach, for instance, in the Londoner-Vorträge (1922), the *Vorlesungen: Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1922/1923), the Kaizo-Artikel (1922–1924), and the lectures on *Erste Philosophie* (1923/1924). Husserl systematically applies the “method of *Besinnung*”, as “radical *Besinnung*”, for the first time in *Formale und transzendente Logik* (1929) (*HUA* XVII, 9–17, 21). He also operates with phenomenological “*Besinnung*” or “*Selbstbesinnung*” in *Cartesianische Meditationen* (1931) (e.g., *HUA* I, 179–180). “Historical *Besinnung*” or “historical Rückbesinnung”, finally, is the guiding method of Husserl’s late historical-philosophical investigations in *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* (1936) (e.g., *HUA* VI, 3–5, 16 etc.). The fact that Husserl does not write anywhere (in Husserliana) of “die Methode der *Besinnung*” is not dispositive, because he does write several times of the “Methode der *Selbstbesinnung*” (*HUA* I, 37, 119, 179) as well as of the “Methode der radikalen *Selbstbesinnung*” (*HUA* XXXIV, 175). *Besinnung-Selbstbesinnung-Weltbesinnung* is also the method that Husserl applies in innumerable passages of *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie*.

12. Husserl’s research manuscripts are, as usual, a special issue. For long stretches the study draws very heavily on *Cartesianische Meditationen*. There is nothing wrong with this approach, especially since the author introduces an interesting interpretation of the role of this text in the development of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Yet it would also be interesting to know which of Husserl’s research manuscripts support the interpretation that has been advanced here. Given what is known about Husserl’s research manuscripts, this will involve much more work. Indeed, Husserl had trouble keeping up with himself in this regard. See Husserl–Adolf Grimme,

5 March 1931, *Briefwechsel* III, 90: “In der That, der größte u. wie ich sogar glaube wichtigste Theil meiner Lebensarbeit steckt noch in meinen, durch ihren Umfang kaum noch zu bewältigenden Manuscripten.” See also Husserl–Paul Natorp, 1 February 1922, *Briefwechsel* V, 151–152: “[...] Vielleicht arbeite ich, mit aller menschlich möglichen Anspannung der Kräfte, nur für meinen Nachlaß.” See finally Husserl–Flora Darkow, 28 February 1923, *Briefwechsel* IX, 168: “Die Erndte meines Lebens ist aber noch nicht abgeschlossen, meine größten Arbeiten noch unveröffentlicht. Eine große Sorge!”

13. Husserl’s *Briefwechsel* should indeed play a much more significant role in the study looking forward. The author mentions wanting to make more use of it (p. 556). Yet a case in point is Husserl’s telling Letter to Alexander Pfänder of 6 January 1931, which is woefully underused. See Husserl, *Briefwechsel* II, 180–184. There is only one reference to this rich letter in the study, on p. 153, where it is incorrectly referenced as contained in “Hua-Dok III/4” (on this reference system it should be “Hua-Dok III/2”), and the author’s commentary on it does not touch at all on *the philosophical content* of Husserl’s radically critical reaction to his reading of Heidegger’s works in the summer of 1929. Instead, the author uses the letter only to date Husserl’s study of Heidegger’s works. But *the philosophical content* is the main topic of the letter, e.g., with its revelatory remarks regarding Heidegger’s “Tiefsinn” and “geniale Unwissenschaftlichkeit” etc. (Hua-Dok III/2 or *Briefwechsel* II, 184). The same holds for Husserl’s voluminous correspondence with Dietrich Mahnke, which is only barely mentioned in n. 22 on p. 33 of the study. But it is in some of these letters that one finds some of Husserl’s most bitter recriminations against Heidegger and his philosophy, as well as about Husserl’s suffering from anti-Semitism and persecution under National Socialism. See, e.g., Husserl–Mahnke, 17 October 1921, and Husserl(s)–Mahnke, 4/5 May 1933, *Briefwechsel* III, 431–435, and 491–502, respectively. Moreover, there are letters in which Husserl describes how he moved from philosophy of mathematics to philosophy *überhaupt*, e.g., Husserl–Arnold Metzger, 4 September 1919 (*Briefwechsel* IV, 407–414). Finally, there are Husserl’s most revealing “Persönliche Aufzeichnungen” of 1906, 1907, and 1908, which provide invaluable insights into the intellectual-existential motives that led him to choose a life of philosophizing (*HUA* XXIV, 442–449).


14. Where is Husserl’s *Gott* in all this? He enters the picture very late, that is, on pp. 453–454, 485 (n. 404), 497 (n. 427), and 499 of the study. The last reference contains a questionable interpretation. Can one seriously speak of God as a “translation” of the account of transcendental idealism? Can one seriously suggest that transcendental idealism is Husserl’s theology? In fact, Husserl’s God is the primary and ultimate maker of meaning. Once again, Husserl’s *Besinnungen* on “Gott und die Welt” in *HUA* XLII, 137–263, “Metaphysik: Monadologie, Teleologie und philosophische Theologie”, are underused. These texts stretch from 1908/1909 to 1934 and represent a treasury of Husserl’s reflections on the connections between metaphysics, monadology, teleology, and philosophical theology, and again analyses of them would have fit perfectly into the landscape of a narrative on the development of Husserl’s concept of monadology. The world of Husserl, who as a convert from Judaism became a “free Christian” and “undogmatic Protestant” (Husserl–Rudolf Otto, 5 March 1919, *Briefwechsel* VII, 206), is, teleologically speaking, a “Gotteswelt” (*HUA* XLII, 252, 261–262, 317, 378, 390), not in the sense of an unrealizable ideal but in the sense of a world worth striving for and working toward, a world in which faith, hope, and love make a real difference.

15. Last but certainly not least, Husserl’s central concept for defining and even determining the character of the life of the human being is *vocation*. Yet there is only one occurrence of the word “vocation” in the entire study (on p. 524), and it is not in the sense in which Husserl uses the word in almost innumerable texts and contexts in *HUA* XLII—as a word search of that Husserliana volume demonstrates. Yet even a superficial perusal of *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie* shows that there is hardly any conceptual cluster more central and fundamental to Husserl’s philosophy of life or of a “form of life” than that of *Ruf* (call), *Beruf* (position [“job”]), and *Berufung* (vocation). Indeed, it is hard to imagine that Husserl, “old-worldly” as he

was, thought—very much against the presently dominant *Zeitgeist* in the field of “happiness studies”—that a human being could live a meaningful life without a genuine vocation.

### Recommendation

By any reasonable measure, there is a great deal to philosophize about here. *Sed philosophia longa et existentia brevis*. Thus the observations in this report are intended as collegial and constructive suggestions for improvement which the author should seriously consider before proceeding to a publication of the study in the form of a book. The study is brimming and bursting with interesting and important insights that invite and inspire, and the author is to be commended on a fine work that is sure to have a very forceful impact on the literature on phenomenology in general as well as on that on Husserl and Heidegger in particular. The conscientious treatment of the development of Husserl’s conception of idealism as a response to Heidegger’s critique of his transcendental phenomenology alone is worth the price of admission. Therefore I recommend the Habilitation Dissertation *Transcendental Idealism and the Sea of Suffering: A Study of Husserl and Heidegger* by Dr. Daniele De Santis for further procedure.



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