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**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
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Department of North American Studies

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**The Influence of US Military Units on the Peruvian  
Communist Movements Sendero Luminoso and MRTA  
during the Fujimori Era**

Bachelor's Thesis

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## **Declaration**

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on

25.04.2024

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## References

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## **Abstract**

This bachelor thesis with the name „The Influence of US Military Units on the Peruvian Communist Movements Sendero Luminoso and MRTA during the Fujimori Era“ analyze the period between 1990 and 2000, during the government of Alberto Fujimori. It approach the administration of Fujimori from military aspect, especially the influence of the U.S. military and intelligence units on the combat of the insurgents communist groups Sendero Luminoso and Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru. The thesis aims to examine whether the U.S. military and intelligence support had an influence on combating these insurgent groups. The relations and cooperations method between Peruvian and the U.S. military are analyzed. Other aspect of the thesis is examination of the support of the democracy making process in Peru by the U.S. administration. The U.S. policymakers had two main priorities in the Southern hemisphere: counterdrug agenda and democracy promotion. The thesis examines which one of these foreign policy goals was more important for the U.S.

## **Abstrakt**

Táto bakalárska práca s názvom „Vplyv amerických vojenských jednotiek na peruánske komunistické hnutia Sendero Luminoso a MRTA počas Fujimoriho režimu“ analyzuje obdobie v rozmedzí rokov 1990 a 2000 počas mandátu Alberta Fujimoriho. Práca skúma toto obdobie z pohľadu vojenského, špeciálne vplyv amerických jednotiek a jednotiek spravodajskej služby na porazenie povstaleckých komunistických skupín Sendero Luminoso a MRTA. Snaží sa zistiť, či mali americké vojenské a spravodajské zložky vplyv na porazenie týchto hnutí. Ďalším aspektom, ktorým sa táto práca zaoberá je podpora procesu demokratizácie v Peru americkou vládou. Americká vláda mala dve hlavné priority v južnej pologuli: protidrogová agenda a podpora demokratizácie. Táto práca skúma, ktorá priorita bola pre Spojené štáty dôležitejšia.

## **Keywords**

insurgency, Sendero Luminoso, MRTA, militarization, Alberto Fujimori, intelligence, CIA, democracy, corruption

## **Klíčová slova**

Povstanie, Sendero Luminoso, MRTA, militarizácia, Alberto Fujimori, spravodajské služby, CIA, demokracia, korupcia

## **Název práce**

Vplyv amerických vojenských jednotiek na peruánske komunistické hnutia Sendero Luminoso a MRTA za éry Fujimoriho

## **Acknowledgement**

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## INTRODUCTION

The 1990s were a very turbulent period globally, but especially for the United States. The drug amount circulating in the streets, its social and security impact this problem created were alarming for the government. The policymakers decided to take a step intervening in a source of the drug trade – the Andean countries which included Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. The principal idea was that if there is less primary source (coca plant) in the places of origin, less final product will reach the final destination – the United States. Therefore, the U.S. counterdrug agenda took major place in the foreign policy in the region and program such as Andean Initiative began to operate. This thesis focus on the military and intelligence aspect of the cooperation.

Southern hemisphere and Peru was considered sphere of influence of the United States. Therefore a significant amount of material and monetary support were brought into the region. However, the problem was that eliminate the coca leaves from Peruvian lands was a complex problem which was opening social, economic and security questions in coca-growing regions. Peru also welcomed new president Alberto Fujimori in 1990 who was very controversial in aspect of respecting human rights, corruption and drug trafficking. Cooperation between these two countries on military basis was very productive, however, the U.S. had concerns about the direction Peru was about to take. Peru at that time was suffering presence of terrorist insurgent groups Sendero Luminoso and MRTA. This two groups were involved in drug trafficking and were also enemies to U.S. military and foreign policy goals.

This thesis aims to answer two research questions: *(1) Had the U.S. military and intelligence impact on the defeat of the Peruvian terrorist movement Sendero Luminoso and MRTA?;* *(2) Regarding the main priorities in the U.S. foreign policy in Peru, had the priority war on drugs over support of the democracy or viceversa?* Regarding the first research question, author works with hypothesis that U.S. military and intelligence surely had impact on the defeating mentioned terrorist groups because of the material and personnel support these two institutions provided to their Peruvian counterparts who used these acquired skills and material to defeat the terrorist groups. However, this impact is indirect. The hypothesis of the second question is that the war on drugs had higher priority over the democracy. The reason is that even though the 1990s were just the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the war on drugs was more acute problem directly in the United States affecting wide range of sectors and people.

In this bachelor's thesis a significant amount of information will be worked with with the aim to capture the complexity of this case and to describe as precisely as possible the relationships in this case. This case will be put into a broader context of history. This thesis therefore is a single-case study. For the analysis of the case will be used various types of documents: books, journal articles, articles in newspapers of that time among others.<sup>1</sup>

The most important book for my thesis was *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, especially the chapter written by Isaías Rojas, Adam Isacson and Coletta Youngers, which very precisely described the complexity of the relationship and the situation. Coletta Youngers' work about collateral damage was very useful to understand and describe the harm caused to the Peruvian democracy. The most significant amount of books and articles I have read and used was from Cynthia McClintock, who is author of several publications about Sendero Luminoso and Fujimorism. The most significant were *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path*, and *The United States and Peru: Cooperation – at a Cost*.

The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter aims to introduce the reader to the complexity of the era and the problematics by presenting the actors. Each of these actors has different interest in given problematic, different starting position and limited possibility to get engaged. There are also some external factors which influence each of these actors (e.g. economic situation, ability to govern regions crucial for achieving established aims, public opinion etc.). In order to meet the length requirements of the thesis, the first chapter is able to describe these actors and the overall situation rather superficially covering only the most acute problems. The second chapter aims to delve into the problematics analyzing the rather complicated relationship between Peru and the United States primarily during Fujimori's first term and partially during his second term. The reason is that the terrorist group were defeated during the first half of the 1990s and therefore it was not necessary to analyze the whole period in order to answer the research questions. The second chapter starts with the situating the U.S. foreign policy into the global context and the support it provided to Peru. Then there is analyzed the relationship between Peru and United States on personnel level and how these cooperated together. The last part is devoted to the intelligence service, which is crucial for understanding the problematic as whole and which is closing the loop between the actors. In

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<sup>1</sup> Jan Hendl, *Kvalitativní výzkum: základní metody a aplikace* (Praha: Portál, 2005), 112.

some cases the role of the military and the intelligence service shaded into each other, therefore in the name of the thesis, the intelligence is included in the word “military”. The chapter is analyzing both of the research questions. The third chapter aims to bring arguments and resolve the second research question and therefore analyzes the priorities of the U.S. foreign policy regarding the war on drugs and democratization process in Peru. The final answers can be found in the conclusion.

# 1. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND ITS ACTORS

## 1.1. THE GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTO FUJIMORI

Alberto Fujimori was a prototypical representative of a neopopulist leader.<sup>2</sup> As every neopopulist and delegative-democracy regime arise from a deep crisis, Fujimori was not an exception.<sup>3</sup> At that time, Peru was suffering from hyperinflation, lack of job opportunities, security problems among others.<sup>4</sup> Fujimori was, indeed, the most successful neopopulist leader in the history of contemporary Latin America – he was able to take Peru from existential collapse and also during his presidency the terrorist communist groups, which made Peru suffer for years were defeated.<sup>5</sup>

Alberto Fujimori was able to solve (only) the acute problems of Peruvian society of that time, but at very high price. Soon after winning the election, he left behind his populist promises and established “shock therapy” to combat hyperinflation (up to an unprecedented annual rate of 7650 percent by the end of the García administration), which he adopted from his candidate rival Mario Vargas Llosa.<sup>6</sup> The very particular aspect of his ruling was the *autogolpe* (self-coup), when Fujimori due to the lack of cooperation between him and the Congress in April 5, 1992 suspended the 1979 Constitution, dissolved Congress and took down the judiciary. The population opted for a “strong leader” and by this step Fujimori showed his strong hand and the start of the very autocratic regime, which population was not aware of.<sup>7</sup>

As an autocrat ruling by “executive degree”, Fujimori did not limit himself to restrict only the political sector. During his regime, the free speech was restricted, human rights were not

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<sup>2</sup> Kenneth M. Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case.”, *World Politics* 48 (October 2005): 82-116, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25053953> (accessed January 8, 2023).

<sup>3</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, “Delegative Democracy” *Journal of Democracy* 5, no I (1994): 55-69, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280972428\\_Guillermo\\_O'Donnell's\\_'Thoughtful\\_Wishing'\\_about\\_Democracy\\_and\\_Regime\\_Change](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280972428_Guillermo_O'Donnell's_'Thoughtful_Wishing'_about_Democracy_and_Regime_Change) (accessed January 8, 2023).

<sup>4</sup> Kurt Weyland, “The Rise and Decline of Fujimori’s Neopopulist Leadership”, in *The Fujimori legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*, ed. Julio F. Carrión et al. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 21.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>6</sup> Ernesto García Calderón, “Peru’s decade of Living dangerously”, *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 2 (April 2001): 47, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/17106/pdf> (accessed January 8, 2023).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* 48.

respected, but the most important for this thesis – Fujimori started to take control over coca trade.<sup>8</sup> This decision was most probably the beginning of a strong system of corruption between crucial sectors of the State: military, financial sector, judiciary and legislature. Fujimori could by this measure centralize his power by detach loyal people from the rest and therefore create new base of members of each sector. Now it was in everyone interest to defeat terrorism and protect coca growers.<sup>9</sup>

Fujimori was fighting against terrorist movements and he was able to defeat them. However, it is necessary to mention that the price the state was paying for establishment of tranquility was redeemed by authoritarianism, lack of respect for human rights and democracy, and military empowerment. Fujimori did not adopt any new tool to combat, he just strengthened his ties with the military, which was many times violently executing and attacking civilians (for example in Barrios Altos in November 1991). In the rural zones he established “rondas campesinas” which were peasant units which received arms from the government. It was very difficult for the military to effectively fight against terrorist groups because the military units were not agile and mobile enough, and this was a brilliant and well timed idea because members of rondas were in touch with insurgents on a daily basis. Peasants were effective tool for defeating insurgents because many times they were victims of abuses and even murders by the part of them.<sup>10</sup> Between 1991-1992 more than 15,000 weapons were given to the ronderos excluding the large number of the weapons received illegally by drug traffickers.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, “From Revolutionary Dreams to Organizational Fragmentation: Disputes Over Violence Within Sendero Luminoso”, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, No. 4 (2002):83, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt7zvzdn.9> (accessed January 8, 2023).

<sup>9</sup> Menno Vellinga, “Some Observations on Changing Business Practices in Drug Trafficking: The Andean Experience”, *Global Crime* 6, No. 3-4 (November 2004): 383, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233321560\\_Some\\_Observations\\_on\\_Changing\\_Business\\_Practices\\_in\\_Drug\\_Trafficking\\_The\\_Andean\\_experience](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233321560_Some_Observations_on_Changing_Business_Practices_in_Drug_Trafficking_The_Andean_experience) (accessed January 8, 2023).

<sup>10</sup> Carlos Ivan Degregori, “Shining Path and Counterinsurgency Strategy Since the Arrest of Abimael Guzman,” in *Peru in Crisis: Dictatorship or Democracy*, Joseph S. Tulchin and Gary Bland, eds, (Boulder.: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 89, <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781685852665/html#contents> (accessed 21 April 2024).

<sup>11</sup> Miguel La Serna, *The Corner of the Living: Ayacucho on the Eve of the Shining Path Insurgency*, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 2012, 200, <https://shorturl.at/knzDV> (accessed 21 April 2024).

Alberto Fujimori, the president, could not accomplish all by himself. Vladimiro Montesinos, his right hand and accomplice, had a direct role in the machinery of the government, and their connection was unbreakable. Since Montesinos was in charge of policing the Congress and the judiciary, Fujimori needed him in order to avoid being impeached. For Montesinos to keep his position, authority, and business, Fujimori needed to be in power. Following Fujimori's inauguration, Montesinos quickly assumed the role of acting as both the intelligence chief and the top security adviser. He used his position inside Grupo Colina to undertake black operations in the National Intelligence Service (SIN).<sup>12</sup>

Not all American units welcomed Montesinos' ascension to the top of the Peruvian government. This fact worried the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). But Montesinos's position in authority was favorable to the CIA since he could serve as a first-hand source of information regarding security matters in Peru. As a result, a tight collaboration has existed between the two organizations since 1990. Montesinos was in a highly advantageous position because the United States' worry over the Shining Path and drugs was a top issue and Peru appeared unable to handle it on its own. However, the partnership was not without friction because Montesinos was unable to safeguard democracy, human rights, and corruption, which was one of the U.S.'s main concerns.<sup>13</sup>

Apart of involvement in counter drug activities, Vladimiro Montesinos controlled also judiciary in charge of drug trafficking cases. In September 1996 was established a new system for special courts dedicated to drug trafficking cases. However, after the judges of these courts demonstrated independence, these courts were replaced by new division of criminal court in the supreme court, which was managed by Montesinos. By this actions, Montesinos was able to create an extortion network to sold judicial rulings.<sup>14</sup> He was able to control high profile cases, for example the one where drugs were found in presidential aircraft. Only low-level military personnel were prosecuted for these cases.<sup>15</sup> The Herrera Commission concluded

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<sup>12</sup> Catherine M. Conaghan, "The Immoral Economy of Fujimorismo", in *The Fujimori Legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*, ed. Julio F. Carrión (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 121.

<sup>13</sup> Isaias Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 185.

<sup>14</sup> Coletta A. Youngers, *Deconstructing Democracy: Peru Under President Alberto Fujimori* (Washington: Washington Office on Latin America, 2000).

<sup>15</sup> "¿Dónde Están los Capos?", *Caretas*, 16 May 1996

on a base of the Townsend and Waisman Commissions that Montesinos used his position of power to form “a network to engage in illicit drug trafficking and money laundering.”<sup>16</sup> The commission also concluded that “the management of information was Vladimiro Montesinos’s principal instrument of participation in the illicit drug trade.”<sup>17</sup> According to the commission, the SIN also played a significant role in the trafficking network. Alberto Fujimori was also included in the machinery as the one who “permitted... the development of this network which connected the state with illicit drug trafficking”.<sup>18</sup> More than sixty legal proceedings against Montesinos involved direct and/or indirect links to drug trafficking.<sup>19</sup> The causes are coming to trial only recently. Between the most serious accusations are that Vladimiro Montesinos was a major drug trafficker in Peru in between 1994 and 2000, that he was connected to the Tijuana cartel in Mexico heading up cartel’s operations in Peru using army helicopters to ferry supplies for producing cocaine and the finished product between the coast and the coca-growing areas.<sup>20</sup>

## ***1.2. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH FUJIMORI GOVERNMENT***

The Fujimori era occurred at a time when considerable global transformation was also at its height. The end of the Cold War prompted the U.S. government to alter its approach to international policy. The ability of American foreign policy decision-makers to seize the opportunities presented by the alteration of the international system was, however, constrained by a number of internal issues. This was caused by the instability of domestic affairs, which began with different budget cuts and culminated in Congress's futile attempt to

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<sup>16</sup> Comisión Herrera, Congreso de la República, Segunda Legislatura Ordinaria del 2002, folio 3921, quoted in Isaias Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 208.

<sup>17</sup> Comisión Herrera, folio 3923, quoted in Isaias Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 208.

<sup>18</sup> Comisión Herrera, folios 3921- 3923, quoted in Isaias Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 209.

<sup>19</sup> Isaias Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 209.

<sup>20</sup> “Montesinos Representaba en Perú al Cartel de Tijuana de Mexico”, *La República*, 28 May 2003.

impeach the president in 1998. One could characterize the U.S. foreign policy's approach to the Latin American region as improvisational and/or subject to domestic politics.<sup>21</sup>

As previously mentioned, the end of the Cold War brought a significant shift in terms of the approach towards Latin America. While in the Cold War era which could be dated until 1989 there was a clearly bipolar system and the ideological dispute with the communism and its spreading to the southern hemisphere (the democracy promotion had a low priority), the post-Cold War approach which could be dated from 1991 to 2001 puts emphasis on the democratic principles and human rights and trying to fight communism in different manner. Thus, during the post-Cold War era the U.S. foreign policy focused on support of the democratic principles in the southern hemisphere. Bill Clinton who was the first entirely post-Cold War president introduced democracy assistance as a program within USAID. Democracy promotion filled the space left after the collapse of international communism.<sup>22</sup>

The only aspect of foreign policy that did not experience budget cuts, but rather saw an increase, was the counterdrug agenda. However, because drug manufacturing and use expanded and many American leaders were intimately involved in the drug business, the effects were more than embarrassing for the country's establishment.<sup>23</sup>

President George H. W. Bush in September 1989 declared drugs as the greatest threat to the nation and introduced the new counterdrug strategy. The principal goal of the strategy was to reduce the amount of illegal drugs entering the U.S. by 15% within two years and by 60% within 10 years. In February 1991 the policymakers decided to tighten up the amounts to 20% in the next two years and 65% up to 1991. The principal idea was that if there would be less drugs in circulation, the price would increase and it would negatively influence the purchasing power of the users. The strategy brought new international components in comparison with previous strategies, which were meant to (1) *provide economic assistance to major cocaine-producing countries*; (2) *concentrate on disrupting the activities of drug trafficking organizations rather than on crop eradication*; (3) *encourage the Andean nations*

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<sup>21</sup> David Scott Palmer, "The Often Surprising Outcomes of Asymmetry in International Affairs: United States-Peru Relations in the 1990s", in *The Fujimori Legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*, ed. Julio F. Carrión (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 228.

<sup>22</sup> David Scott Palmer, "The Often Surprising Outcomes of Asymmetry in International Affairs: United States-Peru Relations in the 1990s", in *The Fujimori Legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*, ed. Julio F. Carrión (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 228-229.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 229.



to increase their military involvement in counternarcotics-related operations; (4) enhance military support to the counter-narcotics forces in the Andean countries.<sup>24</sup>

*Andean Initiative*, the principal component of the counter-drug strategy designed to help and cooperate with countries which are the principal source of illicit drugs – Bolivia, Colombia and Peru in order to decrease export, growing and processing of the drugs. The program includes military, law and economic assistance and preferential trade agreement with these countries. Short-term goals of the strategy were (1) to damage the trafficking organizations by seizing the principal traffickers and their assets; (2) provide the support in increasing of their military and law enforcement establishments against the trade by supporting efforts to destroy labs, block delivery of chemical necessary for production and isolate extent growing areas; (3) to help these countries to strengthen their institutional capabilities and political conditions in order to take effective measures against drug traffickers; (4) to support the economies of the Andean countries in order to assist them to overcome the destabilizing effect of eliminating cocaine from the economy.<sup>25</sup>

In case of Peru, a special criteria for meeting human rights were an additional factor. In the fiscal year 1993 Peru received US\$ 163,5 million for Andean strategy, and all three countries received together US\$ 110,6 million for military assistance.<sup>26</sup>

Key document for this strategy was the *Document of Cartagena* which was the result of the summit held in the city of the same name on 15 February 1990. Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and the U.S. agreed on (1) making measures respecting human rights; (2) to cooperate in order to increase trade, development and marketing of new exports. The U.S. pledged to financially support the programs for crop substitution and crop development. The agreements regarding law enforcement and cooperation promotion were signed as well.<sup>27</sup>

Opinions on how and whether effective the program was effective, varies. Significant could be the testimony of the Secretary of State Melvyn Levitsky stated that Fujimori did made an

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<sup>24</sup> Raphael F. Perl, “United States Andean Drug Policy: Background and Issues for Decisionmakers”, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 3, vol. 34, special Issue: Drug Trafficking Research Update (Autumn 1992): 13-14, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/165923> (accessed 11 February 2024).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* 15.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>27</sup> Raphael F. Perl, “United States Andean Drug Policy: Background and Issues for Decisionmakers”, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 3, vol. 34, special Issue: Drug Trafficking Research Update (Autumn 1992): 17, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/165923> (accessed 11 February 2024).

effort to correct human rights issues, prepare the environment for alternative crop support for coca growers and involve the military to support counter-narcotics operations.<sup>28</sup>

Despite being a significant focus of the United States, the counterdrug program saw a suspension in 1994 regarding the exchange of radar information pertaining to suspicious flights. The destruction of presumed drug-carrying planes was prompted by the petition made by Peru. The occurrence of communication issues between military troops from the United States and Peru resulted in the regrettable incident of an American missionary plane being mistakenly shot down in 2001.<sup>29</sup>

The United States gave substantial technical assistance to Peruvian authorities in the Grupo Especial de Inteligencia (GEIN), aiding in the surveillance and apprehension of the leaders of Sendero Luminoso and MRTA. The capture of Abimael Guzmán, the leader of Sendero Luminoso in 1992, may be attributed to a crucial element and underlying rationale. The significance of Peruvian democracy for the founding of the United States is subject to debate. Despite Ambassador Jett's warning of the unfortunate state of democracy, his concerns were not given due significance. Barry McCaffrey, the White House drug czar, frequently visited Peru and had a strong relationship with Vladimiro Montesinos. It appears that the United States shown reluctance in severing ties with Montesinos due to his provision of vital intelligence to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).<sup>30</sup>

During the Fujimori administration, the bilateral relationship between Peru and the U.S. was rather difficult. Just a few weeks after Fujimori assumed office, Peru abruptly rejected an offer of military assistance from the Andean Initiative, stating that it had no need for such assistance. Instead, Fujimori decided for financial support to encourage alternative growth in coca-growing areas.<sup>31</sup> Another unexpected action was the autogolpe in April 1992, when Fujimori unilaterally ended military and counterdrug aid. In 1992, when the country battled

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>29</sup> David Scott Palmer, "The Often Surprising Outcomes of Asymmetry in International Affairs: United States-Peru Relations in the 1990s", in *The Fujimori Legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*, ed. Julio F. Carrión (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 234.

<sup>30</sup> Cynthia McClintock and Fabian Vallas, *The United States and Peru: Cooperation at a Cost* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 86-87.

<sup>31</sup> Ronald Bruce St. John, *La Política exterior del Perú* (Lima: Asociación de Funcionarios del Servicio Diplomático del Perú, 1999), 213.

Sendero Luminoso and shared the same goals as U.S. policy at the time, Peru got further significant help.<sup>32</sup>

New support assistance was established in late 1993 however the relationship remained tense and in words of the Ambassador David Passage “*in various senses the most complex and subtle of any in the Hemisphere*”.<sup>33</sup> Beginning in 1994, annual U.S. financial assistance to Peru climbed to more than \$100 million. By 1996, Peru had received the largest investment from USAID in all of Latin America.<sup>34</sup> The deal with the Paris Club, which was signed in 1996, and the Brady Plan, which was signed in 1997, marked the culmination of Peru's economic reinsertion. Together, these two accords decreased Peru's international debt commitments by USD 9.4 billion, or more than a third of what Peru owed to foreign creditors.<sup>35</sup>

### ***1.3. PERUVIAN TERRORIST GROUPS***

#### **Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)**

Sendero Luminoso was by its nature unique for Latin American environment, and it could be compared more to Cambodian Khmers.<sup>36</sup> It was a political and social organization which was slowly building a guerilla army. Its aim was to create an organizational base which is closely

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<sup>32</sup> David Scott Palmer, “The Often Surprising Outcomes of Asymetry in International Affairs: United States-Peru Relations in the 1990s”, in *The Fujimori Legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*, ed. Julio F. Carrión (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 232.

<sup>33</sup> David Passage (ambassador and director of the Office of Andean Affairs, U.S. State Department, interview by David Scott Palmer, by telephone, 4 June 1997 quoted in David Scott Palmer, “The Often Surprising Outcomes of Asymetry in International Affairs: United States-Peru Relations in the 1990s”, in *The Fujimori Legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*, ed. Julio F. Carrión (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 232.

<sup>34</sup> David Scott Palmer, “The Often Surprising Outcomes of Asymetry in International Affairs: United States-Peru Relations in the 1990s”, in *The Fujimori Legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*, ed. Julio F. Carrión (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 233.

<sup>35</sup> Cynthia McClintock and Fabian Vallas, *The United States and Peru: Cooperation at a Cost* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 99-100.

<sup>36</sup> Cynthia McClintock, *The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a critical caveat on democratic standards* (Washington D.C.: The George Washington University, 2000), 20, [https://www2.gwu.edu/~clai/docs/McClintock\\_Cynthia\\_06-00.pdf](https://www2.gwu.edu/~clai/docs/McClintock_Cynthia_06-00.pdf) (accessed 20 February 2024).

integrated with its constituency. Sendero wanted to create an institutional counter to the state.<sup>37</sup> The origin of Sendero Luminoso has to be found in Italian communist Antonio Gramsci, who inspired the father of the socialism in Latin America José Carlos Mariátegui and later founders of other leftist movements in Peru and Latin America. Mariátegui founded the original Partido Socialista Peruano (PSP) and after his death and especially after Sino-Soviet split in 1964-1965, the party was fragmented into pro-Soviet base (Partido Comunista “Unidad”) and pro-China base (Partido Comunista “Bandera roja”). Sendero Luminoso was found in 1969 in Ayacucho by *Abimael Guzmán*, professor of philosophy at University San Cristóbal de Huamanga. As Truth and Reconciliation Commission indicates, the ideological base of Sendero Luminoso lie between Marxism, Leninism and Maoism.<sup>38</sup>

Soon after Sendero Luminoso was strong enough to be self-sufficient, Guzmán elaborated his own ideologic interpretation, proclaiming himself “the fourth sword of communism” and calling his concept *Pensamiento Gonzalo*. This doctrine converted him into a unique leader and the omniscient and omnipresent “divinity”. The doctrine spurned Andean traditions because they were considered as the result of state oppression (difference to Mariátegui ideology) and absolute subordination of individualist needs in favor of the pluralist needs of the group. He also adopted a Leninist concept of no affiliates members which would convert themselves into professional revolutionaries, more experienced revolutionaries would form syndicates and the last group would be clandestine, which would establish the proletariat dictatorship.<sup>39</sup>

There is no doubt, that Sendero Luminoso became the most sanguinary movement of the first half of the 1990s. During the government of Fujimori, Sendero Luminoso was at its peak and was responsible for around 3000 deaths per year between 1989 and 1992.<sup>40</sup> By the year 1990,

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<sup>37</sup> Gordon McCormick, *Sharp Dressed Men: Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 13-20.

<sup>38</sup> José Manuel Moreno, “Sendero Luminoso, Narcoterrorismo y seguridad en el Perú”, *Análisis GESI 25* (2016): 2 – 3, <https://www.seguridadinternacional.es/?q=es/content/sendero-luminoso-narcoterrorismo-y-seguridad-en-el-per%C3%BA> (accessed January 8, 2023).

<sup>39</sup> Iván Ramírez and César R. Nureña, *El Pensamiento Gonzalo: La violencia hecha dogma político* (Lima: Secretaría Nacional de la Juventud – Ministerio de Educación, 2012), 1-16, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235420642\\_El\\_pensamiento\\_Gonzalo\\_la\\_violencia\\_hecha\\_dogma\\_politico](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235420642_El_pensamiento_Gonzalo_la_violencia_hecha_dogma_politico) (accessed 21 April 2024).

<sup>40</sup> Cynthia McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), 117.

the organization had a total of 25,000 active members and exerted authority over about 25 percent of the towns in Peru. The movement was not receiving any support from China or Soviet Union.<sup>41</sup>

In addition to engaging in acts of terrorism, Sendero Luminoso perpetrated another detrimental action upon the Peruvian government and society, namely, involvement in drug trafficking. During that period, Peru was recognized as a nation with the biggest coca output, which is a key crop utilized in the manufacturing of cocaine. The cultivation of coca was mostly concentrated in the Upper Huallaga Valley due to its favorable climatic conditions for the growth of this particular plant. Located inside the Peruvian selva, peasants residing in the Upper Huallaga Valley encountered limited alternatives when considering a transition to other crops, such as cocoa or corn. There were several factors contributing to the situation, with two primary ones being identified. There are two primary challenges that hinder the transportation of goods outside of the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Firstly, the absence of infrastructure is a huge barrier since there is only one route available for transportation. Secondly, the pricing of alternative crops are considerably cheaper compared to coca, with differences reaching up to 34 times.<sup>42</sup> Sendero Luminoso saw the potential to acquire supplementary financial resources for the organization and thereafter formed its units inside this particular region. The individuals in question were confronted with a rival organization known as MRTA, which had similar objectives. Both individuals were present together, but, throughout the years 1991-1992, Sendero Luminoso had a notable increase in their advantage. During this particular period, over 80% of insurgent occurrences in the UHV region were attributed to the activities of the Sendero group.<sup>43</sup>

The practice of drug trafficking yielded advantages for both parties involved: drug traffickers contributed weaponry and personnel to the movement, while in return, Sendero offered protection for the transportation of illicit substances, including advance notice of potential law

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<sup>41</sup> Cynthia McClintock, *The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a critical caveat on democratic standards* (Washington D.C.: The George Washington University, 2000), 20-21, [https://www2.gwu.edu/~clai/docs/McClintock\\_Cynthia\\_06-00.pdf](https://www2.gwu.edu/~clai/docs/McClintock_Cynthia_06-00.pdf) (accessed 20 February 2024).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Cynthia McClintock, *The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a critical caveat on democratic standards* (Washington D.C.: The George Washington University, 2000), 20-21, [https://www2.gwu.edu/~clai/docs/McClintock\\_Cynthia\\_06-00.pdf](https://www2.gwu.edu/~clai/docs/McClintock_Cynthia_06-00.pdf) (accessed 20 February 2024).

enforcement interventions.<sup>44</sup> In contrast to MRTA, traffickers most probably considered Sendero Luminoso as simply more effective.<sup>45</sup> In respect to the association with coca growers, it was their desire for Sendero to advocate for their pricing concerns. Evidently, the individuals included exhibited apprehension towards potential instances of physical maltreatment, originating from both law enforcement authorities and drug traffickers. Moreover, it is important to note that the alliance formed amongst these individuals was mostly driven by economic considerations rather than ideological alignment.<sup>46</sup>

### **MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru)**

In June 1984, the movement released a manifesto articulating its political stance. The primary ideological objective was to perpetuate the ideals put out by Luis de la Puente Uceda, the founder of MIR, and Guillermo Lobatón, a prominent leader within MIR. The MRTA aimed to function as an autonomous entity aligned with the parliamentary left, advocating for the consolidation of various leftist movements. The necessity for societal reformation arose from the need to dismantle existing political and economic institutions and establish a novel system grounded in socialist principles, encompassing elements such as land reform and popular democracy. This would also contribute to the formation of a distinct Peruvian national identity. The political objectives and direction, however, extend beyond the aforementioned rebuilding. The manifesto contains several key themes such as (1) *The problem of Yankee imperialism*: The MRTA asserted that the Peruvian economy had experienced distortion as a result of Western influence, particularly from the United States, leading to a political reliance on this particular region; (2) *An Examination of Peruvian Nationalism*: The MRTA Perspective on the Foundation of Peruvian Cultural History via Armed Struggle since the Incan Era. The transformation of Peru's combative history into a catalyst for national liberation is crucial in order to revive and reestablish the country's historical consciousness; (3) *the MRTA is a mass movement*, whose membership is open to everyone irrespective of

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<sup>44</sup> R. Gonzales, "El Retorno de lo Reprimido: El Huallaga, Un Año Después", *QueHacer* 54, August-September 1988, 46, quoted in Cynthia McClintock, "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30, 2/3, Special Issue: Assessing the Americas' War on Drugs (Summer - Autumn, 1988), 138, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/165983>.

<sup>45</sup> Cynthia McClintock, "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30, 2/3, Special Issue: Assessing the Americas' War on Drugs (Summer - Autumn, 1988), 130, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/165983>.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

their origin or socioeconomic status. It emphasizes that the pursuit of revolution is a collective duty, shared by all those who possess a shared understanding of justice.<sup>47</sup> In contrast to Sendero Luminoso, MRTA was a military organization which meant to be a political and a social force. Not only national, but it felt to be *(4) part of the international community of struggle* and it had created bonds with many revolutionary movements across Latin America (Cuba, the Sandinista Movement, M-19) but also with Libya, Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) or the Palestine Liberation Organization.<sup>48</sup>

The MRTA proved to be an unsuccessful terrorist organization due to its adoption of an inappropriate paradigmatic framework derived from the Cuban revolution. The Peruvian state apparatus exhibited a greater degree of strength and complexity compared to the dictatorship confronted by Fidel Castro, hence rendering the MRTA unable to successfully remove the regime. The group did not demonstrate effectiveness in terms of social mobilization. The endeavor was unsuccessful in establishing a stable foundation of support among various socioeconomic strata or areas. The absence of a centralized leadership or hierarchical structure resulted in the reliance on an individual's personal authority to establish their influence within the organization.<sup>49</sup>

The peruvian drug environment was controlled mostly by Colombian cartels.<sup>50</sup> As MRTA had very close relationship with the colombian revolutionary movement M-19 which was not in a good relationship with them.<sup>51</sup> Also, MRTA was working in certain way against traffickers interests because it was participating in the production process (Sendero did not).<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Gordon Mc.Cormick, *Sharp Dressed Men: Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 6-10.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 13-15.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> P. Andreas, "The US War on Drugs in Peru." *The Nation*, 13-20 August 1988, 131, quoted in Cynthia McClintock, "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30, 2/3, Special Issue: Assessing the Americas' War on Drugs (Summer - Autumn, 1988), 128, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/165983>.

<sup>51</sup> R. Gonzales, "El Retorno de lo Reprimido: El Huallaga, Un Año Después", *QueHacer* 54, August-September 1988, 68, quoted in Cynthia McClintock, "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30, 2/3, Special Issue: Assessing the Americas' War on Drugs (Summer - Autumn, 1988), 138, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/165983>.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

## 2. THE U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN PERU

The collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore the full breakdown of the international order, had a significant impact on the aims and purposes of military partnerships, as well as the influence of the US army in other nations. There was a need for another pretext under which these ties would not be reduced and the budget would remain the same. Southcom, one of the key military forces in charge of security in Latin America, had to find a response to this new predicament.<sup>53</sup>

U.S. military troops were present in many ways in the southern hemisphere. Even though they were not physically present at the region fighting counterinsurgency and/or drug traffickers, they were supporting their local counterparts in order to fulfill with the foreign policy of the U.S. Peru as a part of the southern hemisphere was seen as a potential threat and Washington was seeking to solve social and economic problems such as criminality, violence, drug trafficking via military interventions. Fighting drug traffickers provided new space for military operations against an “internal enemy”. Efforts fulfilling the new U.S. foreign policy goals in Peru – to strengthen its democracy were unlikely to be fulfilled due to the little incentive for institutional reform with which the U.S. approached its counterparts. U.S. approach towards Latin American region was not healthy also for the U.S. decision making process itself. Antidrug assistance led to a *militarization* (overinvolvement of the armed forces in aspect of governance other than external defence) of policymaking. U.S. Department of Defence had also increased its relationship with Peruvian counterpart.<sup>54</sup>

The emphasis on executing the reduction on supply overseas were (1) *interdiction* or (2) *crop eradication*. Interdiction requires US military intervention in international waters as well as close international cooperation in order to hunt down and locate drug production centers and halt drug shipments to the United States. Crop removal was more difficult since Peru, unlike Colombia, did not allow aerial fumigation. It had to be done manually, and it relied on forcibly destroying the crop. Local military groups sponsored by the United States were frequently ordered to carry out these actions, although the direct connection with the peasants proved devastating. Human rights breaches, abuses, institutional degradation, and impunity for members of US-funded units were all part of the process. However, as previously stated,

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<sup>53</sup> Adam Isacson, “The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 22.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 15-22.



Southcom did not manually eradicate crops. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Law Enforcement was in charge of daily activities, which included collaboration with local units. The regional military groups had been trained to locate, target, and destroy crops. This activities were legally institutionalized in 1993 with the signature of Presidential Decision Directive 14, which stipulated that interdiction would be the aim of the US military's own operations, while the majority of the aid to local military forces would go toward eradication.<sup>55</sup>

Under Fujimori's second term, there was a notable rise in the level of counterdrug aid provided by the United States. Several agencies were engaged, including the CIA, DEA, the National Security Agency, and the U.S. Custom Service. A total of over one hundred U.S. officials were designated for the air interdiction campaign, while around 175 military and intelligence officers were sent to conduct training programs for Peruvians.<sup>56</sup>

The United States military provided substantial material support to the Peruvian military. The United States offered weaponry, gear, collaborative drills, training at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, information exchange, and several other initiatives to educate individuals in non-conventional military functions. With assistance from the United States, Peruvian military units responsible for counterdrug operations conducted internal surveillance, intercepted suspicious aircraft, eliminated illicit crops (or directed police units to do so), patrolled territorial rivers, pursued and boarded suspicious vessels, and apprehended and interrogated civilians. The predominant approach in the United States has been to assist recipient nations in establishing whole new military and police organizations. Regarding Peru, it is worth noting that just one police unit was established, namely the Peruvian National Police Narcotics Directorate – Dinandro. Since 1990, Southcom's primary objective has been to destroy drug trafficking. The Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) system, consisting of seven radars deployed in Colombia and Peru, enabled the scanning of suspicious flights. Upon completing the data processing, the conclusive details regarding suspicious flights were transmitted to the armed forces and naval units of the host nation with the intention of intercepting suspected traffickers or compelling them to make an emergency landing. Peru has acquired several helicopters, cargo planes (C-130), small boats, and

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<sup>55</sup> Adam Isacson, “The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 22-33.

<sup>56</sup> Cynthia McClintock and Fabian Vallas, *The United States and Peru: Cooperation at a Cost* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 125.

equipment for observation, communication, and information collection. Section 506 of the FAA, which was extensively utilized from 1996 to 1999, authorized the president to provide equipment and services to other nations for the purpose "counternarcotics emergencies".<sup>57</sup>

The objective of the U.S. military in Peru was to counteract the drug trade, in which Sendero Luminoso and MRTA had a role. Therefore, these two groups were targeted by the U.S. military due to their convenience, but the military did not have a specific intention to acquire them. Both armed forces showed a lack of consideration for human rights. As a result, Sendero Luminoso exploited the situation and successfully persuaded the local population to act as their protectors and participate in the drug trade.<sup>58</sup> The group was responsible for killing the members of eradication brigades and became politically and militarily very strong in the region of Upper Huallaga Valley.<sup>59</sup> The United States officially designated the insurgent movements as "narcoguerrillas". The Peruvian and U.S. authorities perceived this intricate scenario from different perspectives: the Peruvian military forces and government officials made a clear distinction between local coca growers, the Shining Path and MRTA, and cocaine smugglers. Consequently, the military did not completely support the U.S. aggressive approach to defeat the insurgency, since they were well aware of the resulting confrontation with the local community. The primary adversary for the majority of Peruvian military officials were the counterinsurgents, even if defeating them required temporarily halting the counterdrug program. To defeat them, it is necessary to undermine their local support and prevent them from carrying out their purpose with ease. Despite the increasing worry of U.S. colleagues over insurgents and their progress, the United States either did not want or were unable to acknowledge that their counterdrug program was fueling the expansion of the insurgent movement and exacerbating the issue.<sup>60</sup>

Alberto Fujimori has complete knowledge of the nature of the U.S. objectives and aggressive counterdrug strategy. He was concerned that implementing repressive measures, particularly

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<sup>57</sup> Adam Isacson, "The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 17-22.

<sup>58</sup> Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America's Military* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 74.

<sup>59</sup> Adam Isacson, "The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 20.

<sup>60</sup> Isaias Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 186-189.

eradication, against the coca-growers would lead the farmers to sympathize with Sendero Luminoso. Therefore, in September 1990, he declined to sign an antidrug agreement with Washington due to the inclusion of measures that he deemed excessively severe. To prevent farmers from being attracted to Sendero, he introduced the Fujimori theory, which aimed to integrate coca growers into the official economy, provide them with land ownership, and enable them to access loans for cultivating alternate crops. The coca farmers would engage as legitimate participants in talks on drug control policies.<sup>61</sup> However, the priorities later changed in response to the convergence of interests. The militarization of the state and of drug control and the need for U.S. political support led to the abandonment of the initial priority given to alternative development for coca farmers, and of corruption within the military.<sup>62</sup>

A drug control agreement was signed in May 1991. It consisted of a combination of American and Peruvian requirements. The pact acknowledged the necessity of offering the farmers alternate means of generating income, and also involved the participation of the Peruvian military in counterdrug operations to ensure security.<sup>63</sup> The agreement was mutually advantageous for both states: Peru could improve its drug control efforts through militarization. This was an ideal fit for Fujimori at that particular moment, as he needed the backing of the military to maintain his government. The Washington administration minimized the significance of corruption and human rights violations in order to justify the ongoing provision of drug control and economic assistance to Peru. Following the signing of the accord, Washington verified that the Peruvian government did not exhibit any consistent or organized instances of human rights violations. The state of human rights and corruption was deteriorating. The U.S. Congress initiated surveillance of the situation in Peru and expressed opposition to the allocation of counterdrug resources. The conflict between Congress and the government led to the withholding of \$10 million intended for counterinsurgency efforts, training, weapons, and military equipment. The disbursement of

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<sup>61</sup> Isaías Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 191-192.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>63</sup> U.S. Embassy, Lima, „Nuevo Convenio“, quoted in Isaías Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 192.

USD 25 million was conditioned upon the implementation of particular enhancements in the field of human rights.<sup>64</sup>

In September 1991, the police personnel in Upper Huallaga Valley were put under the authority of the Upper Huallaga Political-Military Command to carry out operations against drug trafficking and terrorism.<sup>65</sup> In December 1991 Fujimori formally incorporated the military into the drug war.<sup>66</sup> The military has been operating in the Upper Huallaga Valley since 1980, mostly to stop the activities of the Sendero Luminoso insurgency. This recent decree expanded the authority of the military and blurred the distinction between the responsibilities of the police and the armed forces. The integration of counterinsurgency operations with drug control efforts was formally established.<sup>67</sup> The involvement of the military in drug control operations granted its personnel unrestricted access to regions where coca is cultivated. In order to isolate Sendero Luminoso, they initiated the formation of alliances with drug dealers and farmers. The Fujimori administration subsequently coerced senior military officials implicated in narcotics trade to secure political dominance over them.<sup>68</sup> Unit commanders offered protection to airports and safe passage for traffickers. Corruption in coca-growing areas was very common. Police and judges were involved as well.<sup>69</sup> Washington had full knowledge of the corruption that existed between the military forces in the Upper Huallaga Valley. It was accurately perceived that corruption undermined efforts to regulate drug activity, although it appears that the United States failed to recognize

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<sup>64</sup> Coletta A. Youngers, *Violencia Política y Sociedad Civil en el Perú: Historia de la Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2003), 243,199.

<sup>65</sup> President of Peru, Supreme Decree 137-91-PCM, 26 September 1991, quoted in Isaías Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 193.

<sup>66</sup> Legislative Decree 749 modified article 5 of Law 24150, quoted in Isaías Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 193.

<sup>67</sup> Isaías Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 193.

<sup>68</sup> Enrique Obando, “Las Relaciones Civiles Militares en Perú en la Década de los 90: Lecciones para el Futuro”, in *Las Fuerzas Armadas en la Región Andina: ¿No Deliberantes o Actores Políticos?*, Martin Tanaka ed. (Lima: Comisión Andina de Juristas, 2001).

<sup>69</sup> “Several Shades of Black”, U.S. Embassy, Lima, 16-17, quoted in Isaías Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 194.

that the cause of this was their erroneous policy. Washington persisted in asserting that corruption was just a matter of individual wrongdoing, rather than a systemic one.<sup>70</sup>

Autogolpe caused certain backfire in international scene. The Bush administration distanced itself from Fujimori government and opposed to the to the action. All aid to Peru was suspended with the exception of humanitarian and antidrug disbursements.<sup>71</sup> Fujimori reacted giving to the air force control of all air strips in the coca-growing regions and the authority to intercept any and all national or foreign aircraft in those areas.<sup>72</sup> In addition, he increased the number of battalions stationed in these areas by two-fold. The purpose of this reinforcement was to counteract the opposition from the United States to the "revolution" by demonstrating intensified efforts in drug control. A few days following the autogolpe, the Peruvian military shot down a U.S. C-130H aircraft that was engaged in photographing covert airstrips and cocaine laboratories.<sup>73</sup> However, none of the states were delving into the topic because the U.S. wanted to maintain their drug program and Peruvians needed the U.S. support in order to avoid the international isolation after the autogolpe.<sup>74</sup>

Consequently, Peru saw a cessation of military assistance for an extended period. The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is solely responsible for managing drug control aid. In July 1992, an agreement was made to support the Peruvian air forces airport control program.<sup>75</sup>

Vladimiro Montesinos employed the autogolpe as a means to solidify his authority and control, both personally and inside the military, over the Peruvian drug control campaign. He mandated that all entities involved in drug control must adhere to directives from the Armed

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<sup>70</sup> Isaias Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 194.

<sup>71</sup> Coletta A. Youngers, *Violencia Política y Sociedad Civil en el Perú: Historia de la Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2003), 245.

<sup>72</sup> President of Peru, Decree 25426, quoted in Isaias Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 195.

<sup>73</sup> "A Spy Mission Gone Wrong", *Newsweek*, 31 May 1993, 35,

<sup>74</sup> Isaias Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 195.

<sup>75</sup> U.S. Embassy, Lima to the State Department, "FY1993 POP", 16 October 1993, 3, quoted in Isaias Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 195.

Forces Operational Command. Montesinos assumed complete control over the military forces and the intelligence services of the police.<sup>76</sup>

Abimael Guzmán, the commander of the Shining Path, was caught in September 1992. Several months prior, the leaders of MRTA were also captured. Following his imprisonment, the Peruvian State no longer saw rebels as a threat.<sup>77</sup>

The eradication campaigns were conducted intermittently. In 1995, Fujimori signed a new agreement to control drug-related activities. The main demand for the United States was the restart of the eradication programs, which came back in August 1996. The notable distinction in this new agreement was the absence of any provision about human rights. Additionally, starting from April 1996, the Peruvian Army withdrew its involvement in drug control operations, although the navy and air force remained engaged in such actions.<sup>78</sup>

Hernando de Soto, a highly respected economist, served as the first head of Peruvian intelligence under the administration of Alberto Fujimori. He assumed leadership due to his influential connection in Washington and his proficiency in handling emergency circumstances. He is also the architect of the Fujimori doctrine. In January 1992, De Soto resigned from his position due to his belief that the doctrine had been compromised and sabotaged by the administration.<sup>79</sup> Vladimiro Montesinos, who had a previous military background in Peru, became his successor. The connection between Montesinos and the CIA seems to have originated in the 1970s when he was expelled from the military for an unapproved trip to Washington, during which he was accused of selling intelligence information to American operatives. Upon assuming the position of the chief of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), he assumed responsibility for designing and implementing the Peruvian campaign against terrorism and drug trafficking.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Isaias Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 196.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 199.

<sup>79</sup> Gustavo Gorriti, “Vladimiro Montesinos: The Betrayal of Peruvian Democracy. Fujimori’s Svengali”, *CovertAction Quarterly* 48, Summer 1994, <https://covertactionmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/CAQ49-1994-2.pdf> (accessed 21 April 2024)

<sup>80</sup> Coletta A. Youngers, “Collateral Damage”, in *Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform*, ed. Jo-Marie Burt and Philip Mauceri (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2004), 137.

In September 1991, Montesinos presented President Fujimori's proposal to use the military and police as the main forces in the fight against drug trafficking. The current Antidrug Police and Bureau of Illegal Trafficking Investigations will be merged into a unified organization called Dirección Nacional Antidrogas de Perú (Dinandro). Additionally, a new antidrug section called Antinarcotics Intelligence Bureau, known as Dinin, will be established within the SIN. It seems that the decision to create the SIN antidrug squad was previously deliberated with Washington. Montesinos established a clandestine intelligence network in the Upper Huallaga Valley. SIN initiated direct communication with the military intelligence personnel in the region. In 1993, the Army Intelligence Service (SIE) created eight specialized groups dedicated to collecting intelligence on drug trafficking in the Upper Huallaga Valley.<sup>81</sup> Dinin commenced its activities with the assistance of the CIA, who supplied the necessary finances and spying equipment to three SIN divisions, including Dinin. Each department had CIA operatives assigned to them for supervision.<sup>82</sup> In Peru, Montesinos exerted his influence to oust the DEA from its prominent role in the drug war and successfully replaced it with the CIA. Montesinos often met with CIA personnel. In 1998, Montesinos had acquired sufficient strength to assume full control of the military and intelligence agency. He delivered the complete set of files and material gathered by the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Interior (Digimin) to the SIN officers for his personal benefit.<sup>83</sup> The United States also played a crucial role in providing technical assistance to the Grupo Especial de Inteligencia (GEIN), which was established in 1990 to monitor the activities of Sendero Luminoso and MRTA. This assistance was pivotal in apprehending Abimael Guzmán in September 1992. The growing apprehension in the United States over the expansion of the Shining Path and the belief that the Peruvian government, particularly its military, had the capability to independently defeat the rebels, played to Montesinos' advantage.<sup>84</sup> Despite the intimate

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<sup>81</sup> Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, Lima, 28 August 2003, 760, <https://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/> (accessed 21 April 24, 2024).

<sup>82</sup> Américo Zambrano, "Huamán Azcurra Entregó Equipos de Chuponeo a Embajada de EEUU", *Correo*, Lima, 9 August 2002, quoted in Isaías Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 193.

<sup>83</sup> Gustavo Gorriti, "Vladimiro Montesinos: The Betrayal of Peruvian Democracy. Fujimori's Svengali", *CovertAction Quarterly* 48, Summer 1994, <https://covertactionmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/CAQ49-1994-2.pdf> (accessed 21 April 2024).

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

nature of the connection, it was characterized by significant friction and internal conflicts revolving around issues of democracy, human rights, and corruption.<sup>85</sup>

Montesinos served as the intermediary between Peru and the United States. As Washington started to witness positive outcomes, his level of acceptance increased. By the middle of 1990, he was recognized as the main representative for the U.S. in discussions about drug policy matters. He was fully aware of his power because in one of the meetings with the commanders of the three military units of SIN, Montesinos stated, “*We have shown that when we get tough on the drug trafficking issue, they [the United States] lower their guard*”.<sup>86</sup> Montesinos had a complete understanding of his influence over drug control policies in relation to the United States.

The U.S. government, through the CIA, provided political and economic assistance to the Peruvian intelligence agency (SIN), while being aware of SIN's involvement in human rights violations, such as the death squad actions of Grupo Colina. Washington acknowledged that SIN played a crucial role in facilitating the coordination of counternarcotics efforts, and Washington had no alternative but to provide its support.<sup>87</sup> According to reports, the CIA was offering counternarcotics assistance to the SIN antinarcotics unit, which was implicated in death squad operations. The U.S. State Department offered support to the SIN unit until the late 1990s. The CIA provided Montesinos with a minimum of USD 1 million in cash over a span of ten years, purportedly for counterdrug initiatives.<sup>88</sup> The United States continued to maintain contacts with Montesinos and SIN despite substantial and compelling allegations of his involvement in the drug trafficking and human rights crimes.

The answer to the first research question is that the U.S. military had an impact on the defeating the insurgents groups. They had direct and indirect impact. The direct impact was that the lack of consideration for human rights in the counterdrug operations when in touch

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<sup>85</sup> “Peru: Does Fujimori's Unofficial Advisor Control the Peruvian National Intelligence Community?”, *Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Counterintelligence Periodic Summary [Extract]*, 27 July 1991, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB37/docs/doc02.pdf> (accessed 20 April 2024).

<sup>86</sup> Vladimiro Montesinos, transcription of video no. 1792. Participants: General Villanueva, Admiral Ibarcena, general Bello, Congress of the Republic, Second Legislature Session, 26 November 1999, quoted in Isaías Rojas, “Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 191.

<sup>87</sup> Coletta A. Youngers, “Collateral Damage”, in *Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform*, ed. Jo-Marie Burt and Philip Mauceri (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2004), 136 -137.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.* 138.



with villagers was used by Sendero Luminoso to empower their position and gain trust and protection by the locals. The insurgents groups were involved in drug trafficking but as mentioned previously, the main interest of the U.S. was interdiction and eradication. The indirect impact the U.S. created was by providing the material and training to the Peruvian military and technical support to GEIN. Defeating the insurgents was one of the main goals of Fujimori administration. It came handy for the U.S. that Fujimori did defeat the insurgents because it was eliminating one group in the drug chain. However, it is necessary to take into account that some documents in the archives are still confidential and not available for further research.

### 3. DRUGS AND TERRORISM AS AN ENEMY TO THE DEMOCRACY

The Washington administration often views the war on drugs as indistinguishable from the war on terror in Latin America. The war on terror, as it relates to the objective of U.S. foreign policy during that period, undermines democracy in the targeted governments and thus poses a challenge for the U.S. administration. The Bush administration and the Republican majority in Congress have blurred the distinction between the two. Counterterrorism in the Andean Countries can be defined as a kind of counterinsurgency or a closely related strategy. When it comes to definitions, the concept of counterterrorism lacks clarity and specificity on its meaning and the types of illegal activities it encompasses. *USA Patriot Act* underscores the possible peril associated with the discretion that the government have in determining somebody qualifies as a terrorist. The historical context of the Cold War might potentially be used as a justification to manipulate this conflict against domestic political opposition. The war on terror might serve same objectives. The provision of counterterrorism assistance aims to address the prevalence of impunity, poverty, and inequality in the region impacted by illicit economy and violence.<sup>89</sup>

For many years, the government was preoccupied with the Cold War, which caused it to view the fight against drug trafficking as a struggle against a "internal enemy" rather than prioritizing efforts to encourage local governments to implement changes that would safeguard and promote human rights and democracy. The regional leaders had challenges in dealing with the U.S. strategy on narcotics, which was influenced by a perspective that viewed all counterdrug activities through the lens of terrorism. Frequently, institutions exclusively maintained contacts with their governmental counterparts in the region. Southcom primarily engaged with local military units and counterdrug agencies, working closely with their counterparts. Due to the financial support provided by the U.S., Peruvian institutions lacked genuine motive to share information, selectively choosing just the elements that were deemed appropriate for sharing.<sup>90</sup>

An essential factor of the U.S. involvement is the significant occurrence of collateral damage, since drug policies and militarism have severely impaired democratic processes in Peru and

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<sup>89</sup> Adam Isacson, "The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 50-56.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

undermined the observance of human rights. The implementation of U.S. drug policies in coca growing areas in Peru exerted pressure and had a significant impact on the social climate. This led to resistance and aversion among the local population, which had counterproductive consequences. The locals refused to cooperate with military personnel and instead showed a greater willingness to support and collaborate with Sendero Luminoso and MRTA. As a result, the eradication process was hindered and the volatile social climate tended to escalate into violence. The measurements obtained by U.S. politicians were not achieving any of the resolutions set. Neither the environment was more democratic nor the counterdrug program was more successful.<sup>91</sup>

During the Fujimori administration, U.S. officials publicly emphasized the importance of defending human rights and promoting democratization. However, concurrently, they provided assistance to factions that were actively eroding democratic institutions. Consequently, the United States has become an accomplice to these atrocities.<sup>92</sup>

The answer of the second research question would be that the counterdrug agenda was more important for the U.S. than the democratization process in Peru (and southern hemisphere). The reason for this conclusion is that the CIA and policymakers were fully aware that the measurements taken in order to fight the drug production were causing important collateral damage and that the principles on which those measurements were based, were close to the opposite to what democratization support should look like. CIA was in close contact with Vladimiro Montesinos, who was one of the principal reasons why Peru suffered downfall in democratic process and why corruption, extortion and human rights violations were taking place. It can be stated that CIA was a complice in causing these atrocities, which puts the U.S. foreign policy goal on promoting democracy on the hypothetical level.

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<sup>91</sup> Adam Isacson, "The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs", in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 50-56.

<sup>92</sup> Coletta A. Youngers, "Collateral Damage", in *Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform*, ed. Jo-Marie Burt and Philip Mauceri (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2004), 139.

## CONCLUSION

In the beginning of this thesis there were two research questions were set. The first one was *Had the U.S. military and intelligence impact on the defeat of the Peruvian terrorist movements Sendero Luminoso and MRTA?* The second research question was *Regarding the main priorities in the U.S. foreign policy in Peru, had the priority war on drugs over support of the democracy or viceversa?* Both of the hypotheses were confirmed.

During Cold War era the counterinsurgency was put in one basket with counterterrorism, however, in post-Cold War era there was no evidence found that this policy would continue. The primary goal for the U.S. policy makers was that drugs would disappear from the U.S. land and that there needed to be reduction of the primary product in the countries of origin. Two ways of reducing the coca plants were established: one was eradication which meant destroying the plant manually and the other one was interdiction which consisted in tracking and finding the drug production facilities in order to stop drug shipments to the U.S. There was vast cooperation established between Peruvian and the U.S. military and intelligence and Peru received monetary and material support. Therefore, the Peruvian counterparts was able to force down suspicious aircrafts, patrol territorial rivers, arrest and interrogate civilians or perform internal surveillance. The primary goal for the U.S. military was to create new units from scratch, in Peruvian case it was Dinandro. With the technology of ROTHF the Southcom was able to interdict suspicious flights. Regarding the insurgents, they were part of the drug chain and therefore they were considered as target. However, there was no evidence found that the U.S. would try to defeat them because of their leftist ideology. The concern of the U.S. was growing because insurgents were gaining power over the regions with coca. There were several counterdrug and military agreements signed between Peru and the U.S. However, after the autogolpe of president Fujimori, Washington distanced from his government and opposed this action. This bilateral dispute led to shoot down of one U.S. aircraft by Peruvian military. New control agreement came up with new U.S. administration in 1995 and restarted eradication campaigns. The new agreement lacked any clause regarding human rights.

When Vladimiro Montesinos took the office, Peruvian military and intelligence went through significant changes. CIA was supervising some Peruvian intelligence departments and Montesinos was having close relationship with CIA. Montesinos was the principal interlocutor between Peru and the U.S. in counternarcotics agenda and he was aware of his influence.

In the democracy making process, there was significant lack of interest from both sides. The U.S. was aware that by its actions and foreign policy measures a significant collateral damage was caused, Peruvian institutions were full of corruption so there was no practical space for democratization of the country. What was interesting to observe however, that the U.S. policymakers considered the corruption as failure on an individual level and they were not aware of its systemic nature. Sendero Luminoso and MRTA were defeated in early 1990s so there was no terrorist threat to the Peruvian state later, however, Peru is still fighting with corruption and non-democratical practices until today.

## RESUMÉ

Táto práca mala za cieľ odpovedať na výskumné otázky *“Mali vojenské zložky a zložky spravodajskej služby USA vplyv na peruánske teroristické hnutia Sendero Luminoso a MRTA?”* a *“Bola hlavná priorita zahraničnej politiky USA v Peru boj proti drogám alebo proces demokratizácie?”*. V prípade prvej otázky bola stanovená hypotéza, že zo strany zložiek USA tam bol preukázateľný vplyv na spomenuté teroristické hnutia. V prípade druhej výskumnej otázky sa hypotéza opäť potvrdila, po analýze literatúry sa zistilo, že boj proti drogám bol pre USA hlavnou prioritou, ktorá stála nad podporou demokratizačných mechanizmov v Peru.

Stratégia USA bola založená na znížení produkcie drogy v krajinách, kde sa prirodzene vyrábajú aby sa znížilo množstvo drogy na americkom trhu. Po analýze primárnych a sekundárnych zdrojov sa zistilo, že bolo v záujme USA zlikvidovať hnutia Sendero Luminoso a MRTA, pretože boli súčasťou obchodu s drogami. Nepotvrdilo sa, že by ciele likvidácie týchto hnutí boli motivované aj ideologickými cieľmi vzhľadom na to, že obdobie, v ktorom sa tieto skutočnosti odohrali, veľmi tesne nasledovalo po konci Studenej vojny.

Dôvodom pre tvrdenie, že boj proti drogám bol pre USA dôležitejší ako podpora demokratizácie tkvie v tom, že CIA celé roky spolupracovala s Vladimirom Montesinom aj keď vedela, že jeho praktiky neboli v súlade s dodržovaním ľudských práv, zaslúžil sa o prehĺbenie systému korupcie v Peru na všetkých stupňoch a sám bol pravdepodobne zakomponovaný do obchodu s drogami. Samotná prítomnosť domácich bojových zložiek a ich podpory zo strany USA nebola pre proces demokratizácie prospešná. Preto zahraničnopolitické záujmy USA počas Fujimoriho režimu stáli v rozpore s podporou demokratizácie v krajine.

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