

Geopolitical Constitutions in New Confucianism: The Case of Qian Mu

Abstract

This thesis explores the geopolitical component of Contemporary New Confucianism and uses Qian Mu's discussion as the main context for New Confucian scholars. The study found that Qian Mu's views were affected by the geopolitical environment. Before 1949, when Qian Mu was in mainland China, his political views were more concrete and he would use Western terms to interpret Chinese history. However, after the mainland was ruled by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 and Qian Mu moved to Hong Kong and then to Taiwan, he emphasized the differences between Chinese and Western cultures and reduced his discussion of actual policies. Qian Mu regards the Chinese Communist Party and the Taiwanese independence movement as derivatives of Western culture and attributes all problems to the cultural level. Therefore, he advocated reviving traditional Chinese culture to confront Western culture to solve these problems. This thesis also quotes the concept of "post-Chineseness" proposed by Professor Chih-yu Shih, highlighting the impact of Qian Mu's identity strategy on geopolitics and Contemporary New Confucianism.

Keywords: Qian Mu, New Confucianism, geopolitics, critical geopolitics, post-Chineseness

Contents

I. Introduction	3
1. Motivation and Problematic	3
2. Literature Review	6
(1) The Historical Background of New Confucianism	6
(2) Brief Introduction of Critical Geopolitics	8
(3) Identity Politics: Intersection of New Confucianism and Geopolitics	12
3. Methods	16
(1) Purposes	17
(2) Topics	17
(3) Methods.....	17
(4) Framework	20
(5) Limitations	20
II. Qian Mu and New Confucianism	21
1. Qian Mu's life	21
2. Is Qian Mu a New Confucian scholar?	24
III. The geopolitical background of New Confucianism	28
1. "Orthodoxy" and geopolitics	28
2. The Geopolitical Dilemma of New Confucianism	31
3. The relationship between Qian Mu's thought and geopolitics.....	34
IV. Repositioning China: The Genealogy of Qian Mu's Argument	35
1. Periodization of Qian Mu's Works.....	35
2. Qian Mu in Mainland China	37
(1) Chinese Style Democracy	37
(2) Geopolitics: China's Capital	41
3. Qian Mu in Hong Kong	45
4. Qian Mu in Taiwan	48
(1) Against Communism	48
(2) Oppose Taiwan Independence	52
(3) Against Western Political Theory	56
5. Changes in Qian Mu's discussion	59
V. The Particularity and Universality of New Confucianism	61
VI. Conclusion	64
VII. References	66
Appendix: List of Qian Mu's Works	76

I. Introduction

1. Motivation and Problematic

Since the Opium War in 1840, China has experienced profound changes unseen in three thousand years. Since the Self-Strengthening Movement (自強運動) of the late Qing Dynasty, the Reform Movement of 1898 (戊戌變法), the Revolution of 1911 (辛亥革命), and the New Culture Movement (新文化運動), China has taken a large-scale approach to “Total Westernization (全盤西化).” However, there is still a group of scholars who firmly believe that traditional Chinese culture, dominated by Confucianism, is still valuable to today’s China. They are committed to combining "democracy" and "science" in Western modernization values with traditional Chinese philosophy. Representatives include Xiong Shili (熊十力), Liang Shuming (梁漱溟), Zhang Junmai (張君勱), Feng Youlan (馮友蘭), Fang Dongmei (方東美), Tang Junyi (唐君毅), Mou Zongsan (牟宗三), Xu Fuguan (徐復觀), and Qian Mu (錢穆) discussed in this thesis.

When New Confucian scholars face challenges from the West, they must first face self-questioning: What is China? In ancient times, China regarded itself as the center of civilization. Before facing challenges from the West, the ancient Chinese would not have had an identity crisis of “Why am I Chinese?” However, since 1840, Chinese culture has been completely questioned. At first, people thought that China’s lagging behind the West was simply a matter of artifacts, so they “learned from the barbarians’ best strategies to control them (師夷之長計以制夷).” After the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, Chinese elites turned to pursuing reform of the political system. Later, even political reforms failed to satisfy most Chinese intellectuals. After the foundation of the Republic of China, intellectuals launched a

“social revolution” and a “cultural revolution.” “Confucian ethics cannibalizes people (禮教吃人)”, “No filial piety (非孝)”, “Beat Against Confucius’ Shop (打倒孔家店)”, “Throwing thread-bound books into the toilet (線裝書扔茅廁裡)”, “Abolition of Chinese characters (廢止漢字)” and other ideas are heard endlessly. ¹The cultural confidence of the Chinese people is about to collapse under the constant erosion of the Western tide.

At this time, New Confucian scholars were determined to revitalize traditional Chinese culture. The most important basis for reviving Chinese culture is to reconstruct the identity of the Chinese people. Politically, this effort to reconstruct Chinese identity manifests itself as China using its historical resources to reshape itself into a nation-state under the Westphalian system. In academic terms, scholars also use China’s historical resources to philosophically explain “what is China.”

Qian Mu (錢穆), the main research subject of this thesis, is a representative of cultural conservatism among New Confucian scholars.² This thesis will focus on how Qian Mu “reconstructed China” in his works. After the Chinese Communist Party built its regime in 1949, some New Confucian scholars fled to Hong Kong and Taiwan to avoid the disaster; those who stayed on the mainland were almost strangled by politics. Therefore, the active center of New Confucianism in the second half of the 20th century was actually in Hong Kong and Taiwan, not in the mainland. Therefore, it is called “Hong Kong and Taiwan New Confucianism”. Qian Mu was a very active member of the New Confucianism in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Therefore, it is even more necessary for us to explore the challenges Qian Mu faced and the

¹ Qian Mu, 2009, *Outline of National History*, Beijing: The Commercial Press, p. 912.

² Zhai Zhicheng, 2019, Qian Mu’s path to academicianship, *Journal of the Institute of Modern History*, Academia Sinica, Issue 103 (March 108, the Republic of China), 91-126.

impact he suffered in the process of reconstructing and repositioning China.

First of all, an issue that cannot be ignored is the geopolitical particularity of the area where Qian Mu lives (Hong Kong and Taiwan). Hong Kong was a British colony until Qian Mu's sojourn. When Qian Mu settled in Taiwan, Taiwan had only been freed from Japanese colonial rule for 23 years. However, after Taiwan broke away from Japanese colonial rule, it quickly became the "anti-communist base" of the Republic of China, which considered itself the orthodox regime representing all of China. In what way did this interesting geopolitical factor influence the thought of New Confucianism (especially Qian Mu)? Are Qian Mu's thoughts different in his early years in mainland China and after he settled in Taiwan? How different? The above issues are all attempted to be explored and explained in this thesis.

New Confucianism has evolved on the tracks of WWII, the Chinese Civil War, and the Cold War. This thesis seeks to reveal these geopolitical traces, as well as the footprints of an immigrant scholar, Qian Mu, who struggled to gather the meanings of life through intellectual maneuverings. Geopolitics reduced New Confucianism to an essentialist position regarding the authenticity of geopolitical China. New Confucianism's self-reduction to essentialist China is ironically a Western product and served the purpose of Western geopolitics to conceptually fix China on some essentially exotic otherness. In short, in front of the geopolitical forces, New Confucianism opted for an inward-looking approach and this inward turn committed a self-centralizing and romanticizing cultural essentialism. What this thesis attempts to fill is the lacuna in the New Confucianism debates regarding the forces of geopolitical conditions that shaped the evolution of scholarship.

2. Literature Review

(1) The Historical Background of New Confucianism

To understand Qian Mu's ideological background, we must first understand the urgent concerns of the Chinese scholars as a whole in the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republic of China. Among this group of Chinese scholars, the most important was what later became the "New Confucianism" school. After the Opium War, traditional Chinese thought represented by Confucianism was fully challenged. At this time, scholars who still had feelings for traditional Chinese culture wanted to save Confucianism and preserve traditional Chinese culture, so they began their grand philosophical reconstruction work.

Taiwanese New Confucian scholar Cai Renhou (蔡仁厚) once organized the academic contributions of contemporary New Confucianism into five key points:

1. Expressing the principles of mind and nature: reviving the wisdom system of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism in the world
2. Express the meaning of "Outer King": answer the questions of political ethics and achievements in Chinese culture
3. Unblocking Chinese philosophy: unblocking the joints of the evolution and development of Chinese philosophy history
4. Accommodating Western Philosophy: Translating and Annotating the Three Critiques and Integrating Kant's Philosophy
5. Crossvergence of Chinese and Western Philosophy: Guiding the Road to

Connecting Chinese and Western Philosophy”³

To sum up, the specific approach of New Confucian scholars is nothing more than the following three steps: The first step is to translate traditional Chinese philosophy into Western vocabulary to communicate with Western philosophy. The second step is to use modern academic methods to prove that concepts that Westerners value (such as democracy and science) can be found in traditional Chinese classics. The third step is to try to prove from the perspective of Chinese philosophy that Chinese philosophy can better achieve the goals of Western philosophy even if it adopts the standards of Western philosophy.

The most recognized representatives of modern New Confucianism are the “Three Saints” Ma Yifu (馬一浮, 1883~1967), Xiong Shili (熊十力, 1885~1968), and Liang Shuming (梁漱溟, 1893~1988) who first advocated New Confucian philosophy.⁴ The eight contemporary NewConfucian scholars with great influence are known as the “Eight Great Masters”. They are Xiong Shili (熊十力, 1885~1968), Liang Shuming (梁漱溟, 1893~1988), Zhang Junmai (張君勱, 1887~1969), and Feng Youlan (馮友蘭, 1895~ 1990), Fang Dongmei (方東美, 1899~1977), Tang Junyi (唐君毅, 1887~1969), Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909~1995), Xu Fuguan (徐復觀, 1904~1982). These scholars have more or less explained whether Chinese philosophy is compatible with freedom and democracy.⁵

³ Cai Renhou, 2009, The path opened by contemporary New Confucianism under the impact of Western culture - commemorating the centenary of the birth of Mr. Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. *Chinese Studies*, 28(1), 1-7.

⁴ See Wang Ruhua, 2012, *The Three Saints of Modern Confucianism (Part 1): Records of Friendship between Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, and Ma Yifu*, Taipei: Xinrui.

⁵ He Xinquan, 1996, *Confucianism and Modern Democracy: A Study of Contemporary New Confucian Political Philosophy*, Preparatory Office of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica.

All in all, the psychological motivation that inspires New Confucian scholars to engage in research is mainly the challenge of Western thought. It is precisely because of the impact of Western thought that New Confucian scholars actively want to reconstruct Chinese philosophy, and even hope that the new Chinese philosophy can surpass Western philosophy. For example, Mou Zongsan translated Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", "Critique of Practical Reason" and "Critique of Judgment", intending to use Kant's philosophy to connect Chinese and Western philosophy, and even proposed that "the inner sage creates a new outer king (democracy, science) (內聖開出新外王)" concept.⁶ Another example is Tang Junyi's transformation of the "absolute spirit" in Hegel's philosophy into the "spirit of Chinese culture."⁷ The third example is Fang Dongmei, who studied deeply the Huayan (華嚴宗) philosophy of Buddhism, hoping to surpass Western philosophy.⁸ In addition to being familiar with traditional Chinese classics, most New Confucian scholars have also gone deep into Western philosophy and Indian philosophy to respond to the challenges of Western modernity.

(2) Brief Introduction of Critical Geopolitics

After World War II, geopolitical theories flourished. "Unipolarism" is represented by Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski (1928~2017), who regarded Eurasia

⁶ Mou Zongsan, 1985, *Moral Idealism*, Taipei: Student Bookstore, 1-5.

⁷ Jiang Nianfeng, 1991, *Postwar Taiwan Experience and Hegel in the Thoughts of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan*, in Lai Zehan and Chun-chieh Huang (Editors), *Taiwan's Development Experience after the Restoration*, 37-100. Taipei: Sun Yat-sen Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Academia Sinica.

⁸ Du Baorui, 2011, Fang Dongmei's basic position on Chinese Mahayana Buddhism as both religion and philosophy. *Journal of National Taiwan Normal University: Language and Literature*, 56(2), 1-31. <https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=20745192-201109-201306110043-201306110043-1-31>. Date viewed: April 3, 2024.

as a big chessboard. The United States should prevent the emergence of opponents on the chessboard that can compete with the United States.¹⁹ Scholars such as Samuel Phillips Huntington (1927~2008), Saul Bernard Cohen (1925~2021), and Robert David Kaplan (1952~) all expressed their concerns about the future world situation.²⁰ The most representative one is Huntington's work *The Clash of Civilizations*, which proposes that the clash of civilizations will be the main mode of conflict in the future world.²¹

In the rapidly changing world after World War II, new geopolitics scholars also began to reflect on some of the presuppositions of traditional geopolitics. This group of scholars is called the "Critical Geopolitics." In 1976, French geographer Yves Lacoste (1929 ~) founded the Journal of Geopolitics *Hérodote*.²² Yves Lacoste argued that modern states teach geography in compulsory education to make it easier to wage war by the goals set by the state. From this perspective, geographers and geopolitics are colluding with political power. However, the real task of geographers should be to critically analyze geopolitics. The essence of geopolitics is related to the imagination and practice of rulers.²³

Another scholar of Critical Geopolitics was Gearóid Ó Tuathail (Irish: Gerard Toal, 1962~).²⁴ For Ó Tuathail, geography is undoubtedly about power. Geography is

¹⁹ Brzezinski, Z. (2016). The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. Basic books.

²⁰ Cohen, SB (1963). Geography and politics in a world divided. *Naval War College Review*, 16(1), 6. Kaplan, RD, & Rieff, D. (2000). The coming anarchy. *World Policy Journal*, 17(2), 95-96.

²¹ Huntington, SP (2020). The clash of civilizations?. In *The new social theory reader* (pp. 305-313). Routledge.

²² Hepple, LW (2002). Géopolitiques de gauche: Yves Lacoste, Hérodote and French radical geopolitics. In *Geopolitical traditions* (pp. 284-317). Routledge.

²³ Lacoste, Y. (2012). *Hérodote*, (3_4), 14-44.

²⁴ To show respect, when Gearóid Ó Tuathail is mentioned below, it will be called by its original Irish name.

never a “neutral and objective” given, but rather a product of history and power. Modern geographical mapping itself is a kind of power writing. He inherited the research on “governability” from Michel Foucault (1926~1984) and proposed the term “geopower”. “Geopower” refers to the use of geographical knowledge as an ensemble of technologies of power concerned with the governmental production and management of territorial space.²⁵

In addition, Ó Tuathail also puts forward a more radical criticism of traditional geopolitics. He believes that classical geopolitics originates from a Eurocentric and Western-oriented perspective, and as an emerging discipline, many concepts in geopolitics are informal and unclear.²⁶ The true meaning of “geopolitics” is that dominant intellectuals, institutions, and political practitioners produce the politics of global political space in the practice that constitutes “global politics.”²⁷ “Political space” is produced through practice and is not a “natural existence” as imagined by classical geography. He criticized the point geopolitics represented by Mackinder as actually “an incitement to a new imperial identity.”²⁸ Thus, it is not geography that shapes identity, but geographers shape identity, and identity reshapes geography.

Postmodern geopolitics turns more to language analysis. For example, Klaus Dodds (1969~) proposed three different but interrelated levels of analysis of “geopolitics”, namely practical, formal, and popular. Practical geopolitics refers to the

²⁵ Tuathail, G. Ó., & Toal, G. (1996). *Critical geopolitics: The politics of writing global space* (Vol. 6). U of Minnesota Press. 9.

²⁶ Tuathail, G. Ó., & Toal, G. (1994). *Problematizing geopolitics: survey, statesmanship and strategy*. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 259-272.

²⁷ Tuathail, G. Ó., & Toal, G. (1996). *Critical geopolitics: The politics of writing global space* (Vol. 6). U of Minnesota Press. 185.

²⁸ Tuathail, G. Ó., & Toal, G. (1996). *Critical geopolitics: The politics of writing global space* (Vol. 6). U of Minnesota Press. 85.

geopolitical reasons put forward by governments and the armed forces and bureaucracies they support. Formal geopolitics refers to the research ideas generated by academics and think tank scholars. Popular geopolitics, on the other hand, refers to geographical references in mass media, whether depictions in mass-market magazines, movies, or cartoons.²⁹

John A. Agnew (1949~) bluntly pointed out the shortcomings of classical geopolitics. He first pointed out that “sovereignty and territory are same” is the biggest geopolitical myth. There is always sovereignty beyond territories in the world.³⁰ He also proposed the concept of “territorial trap”, that is, from the perspective of classical geopolitics, countries have exclusive rights and sovereignty within their territories, which divides politics into domestic politics and foreign politics. Territorial sovereignty is the only effective sovereignty. National boundaries encompass the boundaries of society. However, these myths about sovereignty overly elevate the status of sovereign states and limit our understanding of power.³¹

The leftist scholar Paul Routledge (1943~) then used the idea of “anti – geopolitics.”³² He believes that “anti–geopolitics” is a resistance movement that aims to put the power of everyday life ahead of exploitation by states and multinational corporations. Therefore, resistance should be decentralized and ubiquitous, such as the resistance of the Zapatistas (Neozapatismo /Neozapatism /Z apatismo) to globalization and neoliberalism.³³

²⁹ Agnew, JA, Mitchell, K., & Toal, G. (Eds.). (2008). *A companion to political geography*. John Wiley & Sons. 207.

³⁰ Agnew, J. (1994). The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory. *Review of international political economy*, 1(1), 53-80.

³¹ Agnew, J. (2017). *Globalization and sovereignty: Beyond the territorial trap*. Rowman & Littlefield.

³² Routledge, P. (2003). *Anti-geopolitics. A companion to political geography*, 236-248.

³³ See Subcomandante Marcos. *The streams, when they descend, have no way of returning to the*

To sum up, the geopolitics of this era has begun with various postmodern reflections on classical geopolitics. What this thesis focuses on is how the “identity” factor that the critical geopolitical school focuses on affects philosophers’ discourse of geography, and how these discourses reshaped the political landscape and then promoted new identities.

(3) Identity Politics: Intersection of New Confucianism and Geopolitics

With the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China in 1949, a large number of New Confucian scholars fled to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and even overseas. As for the New Confucian scholars who escaped from the mainland, in addition to their existing mission of “Connecting Chinese and Western philosophy,” they also had a huge problem lingering in their minds: the Communist Party of China, which has a very different philosophical stance from New Confucianism, has conquered China (at least geographically), then does the real China still exist? Taking a step back, what is the real China? When the People’s Republic of China has been established and claims to be the only legitimate representative of China in terms of sovereignty, what should “China” be in the eyes of this group of New Confucian scholars?

At this time, geopolitics and New Confucianism subtly intersected. One of the importance of critical geopolitics is to unearth subjective factors that have not been paid attention to by geographers in the past, such as “identity.”³⁴ Identity affects

mountains except beneath the ground. May 28, 1994 [2024-03-25]. <http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/mexico/sp000655.txt>

³⁴ Koopman, S., Dalby, S., Megoran, N., Sharp, J., Kearns, G., Squire, R., ... & Toal, G. (2021).

political culture.³⁵ And political culture will reproduce geopolitics.³⁶ For example, some commentators pointed out that Japan during World War II was able to transform Western geopolitical theory and form the concept of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (大東亞共榮圈)” precisely because Japan had a cultural foundation that was different from Western Europe.³⁷

In the same way, when New Confucian scholars view “China,” they are not limited to “People’s Republic of China.” Especially with the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the government of the People’s Republic of China, which occupied mainland China, took the initiative to draw a clear line with traditional Chinese culture. This kind of behavior is not so much a challenge to New Confucianism as it provides a valuable opportunity for New Confucian scholars to reconstruct China. New Confucian scholars are either forced or voluntarily construct an ideal China outside of real politics.³⁸

New Confucian scholars reject China represented by the Communist Party, they are naturally motivated to use China’s historical resources to demonstrate the existence that higher than “sovereign China.” Prominent ones include the concept of “Cultural China” proposed by overseas New Confucian scholar Tu Weiming (1940~).³⁹ Coincidentally, Lucian Pye (1921~2008) once put forward the statement that “China is a civilization, masquerading as a nation-state.”⁴⁰ All signs indicate that New

Critical Geopolitics/critical geopolitics 25 years on .

³⁵ Campbell, JR, & Rew, A. (Eds.). (1999). Identity and affect: experiences of identity in a globalizing world. Pluto Press.

³⁶ Tuathail, G. Ó., & Toal, G. (1996). Critical geopolitics: The politics of writing global space (Vol. 6). U of Minnesota Press. 185.

³⁷ Watanabe, A. (2018). Greater East Asia Geopolitics and its geopolitical imagination of a borderless world: A neglected tradition?. *Political Geography*, 67, 23-31.

³⁸ Bresciani, U. (2023). Reinventing Confucianism: New Confucian Movement. Passerino Editore .

³⁹ Wei-Ming, T. (1991). Cultural China: The periphery as the center. *Daedalus*, 1-32.

⁴⁰ Pye, LW (1992). The spirit of Chinese politics. Harvard University Press. 235.

Confucianism has the motive to establish another Chinese identity apart from political China. This Chinese identity may have been exploited by Cold War politics, but it may live longer than the Cold War.

Political scientist Chih-yu Shih (1958~) once proposed the concept of “Post-Chineseness (後華性)” to analyze this phenomenon of identity reconstruction.⁴¹ When Chih-yu Shih studied overseas Chinese groups, he found that many overseas Chinese have quite conflicting feelings about “China”. On the one hand, they are proud that their ancestors came from China and that they possess certain characteristics of Chinese culture. These characteristics are also deeply engraved in their identity. On the other hand, they reject being called “(politically) Chinese.” This contradictory identity was originally called “Chineseness (華人性)” by academic circles.

However, based on countless past studies, it is meaningless to attempt to define what Chineseness is. It was under this situation that Chih-yu Shih proposed “post-Chineseness” to explain how Chinese people identify themselves and each other. In the concept of “post-Chineseness”, Chinese people can flexibly adjust between the two identity strategies of “connection” and “difference” according to changes in every circumstance. This flexibility inevitably causes an otherwise stable identity to take on different character traits depending on the situation.⁴²

Chih-yu Shih proposed “prior resemblance”, that is, “imagined resemblance.”

⁴¹ Shih, CY (2022). *Post-Chineseness: Cultural politics and international relations*. State University of New York Press.

⁴² Chih-yu Shih and Li Huiyi, 2017, From “Chineseness” to “Post-Chineseness” - Notes on Malaysian Chinese Studies, *Prospect & Exploration*, 15(5), 49-65.

The connotations of this characteristic are diverse and can include genes, geographical culture, language, history, values, norms, customs, memories, institutions, members or membership status, licenses, threats, interests, tasks, etc. to make assumptions as the link between each other.⁴³ In short, based on a common point that precedes the beginning of the relationship, the two sides can establish a relationship, which is called “prior resemblance”. Another mode of building relationships with people is “improvised resemblance.” Improvised resemblance is an identity strategy in different circumstances. Its characteristic is that it almost necessarily relies on various profit-giving behaviors from both sides, just like the “gift” in interpersonal relationships.⁴⁴ If there is insufficient prior resemblance, it may lead to alienation or disgust between the actors. At this time, if both sides want to develop a relationship, they must develop improvised resemblance. However, the need to develop improvised resemblance arises not only from a desire to build a relationship but also from a desire to deteriorate it.⁴⁵

Among the many New Confucian scholars who fled mainland China, there was a hidden identity premise within their group. The premise of this identity is: that the CCP is not the real China. With this “prior resemblance”, New Confucian scholars were able to use a common language to build relationships with each other, and it was also easy for them to establish a common anti-communist consciousness with the government of the Republic of China (Taipei). And this “prior resemblance” can

⁴³ Chih-yu Shih, 2019, Integration of “relationship equilibrium” theory and Chinese and Western relationship theories – the “post-Chineseness” agenda of China’s international relations, *World Politics Studies*, 2019(2), 21.

⁴⁴ Chih-yu Shih, 2019, Integration of “Relationship Balance” Theory and Chinese and Western Relations Theories - The “Post-Chineseness” Agenda of China’s International Relations, *World Politics Studies*, 2019(2), 24.

⁴⁵ Chih-yu Shih, 2019, Integration of “Relationship Balance” Theory and Chinese and Western Relations Theories - The “Post-Chineseness” Agenda of China’s International Relations, *World Politics Studies*, 2019(2), 24.

easily be exploited by Taipei. Taipei took advantage of this imagined resemblance to launch a “Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (中華文化復興運動)” that was completely different from the Cultural Revolution in mainland China.⁴⁶ Therefore, in the real political environment, New Confucian scholars are motivated to develop “improvised resemblance.” They may cooperate with the authorities in publicity, or they may protect the “orthodoxy” in their hearts by strengthening the scholar community. All in all, their identity is influenced by the “prior resemblance” of geopolitics and they must deny the legitimacy and rationality of the CCP. After arriving in Taiwan and overseas, they used “improvised resemblance” and established a new Chinese discourse and Chinese identity based on their “prior resemblance.”

“Prior resemblance” is the identity that already exists. However, identities can also change when struck by strong geopolitical events, such as war or civil strife. Therefore, in geopolitical events, philosophers often show their creativity and use their “improvised resemblance.” The purpose of their “improvised resemblance” varies. It may be pure sentimentality about the current situation, it may be to extend the life of their school, or it may be to serve the ruling authorities. However, geopolitics does influence philosophy no matter what. Through reflection, philosophers will shape new political identities. The new political identity will shape new “prior resemblance” and thus promote a new geopolitical vision. This thesis reveals this interactive relationship.

3. Methods

⁴⁶ In 1966, when the Chinese Communist Party launched the Cultural Revolution, the government of the Republic of China launched the opposite “Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement” in Taipei. The “Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement” sponsors artistic and cultural activities, publishes a large number of ancient Chinese books, and formulates “Instructions for National Life” to show that it is an orthodox representative of Chinese culture.

(1) Purposes

This study has the following two main research purposes:

- A. By digging into Qian Mu's spiritual world, this thesis sorted out his views on Chinese history and Chinese politics, and then fully discussed the changes in his political views.
- B. Taking Qian Mu as an example, this thesis sorted out the lives of New Confucian scholars, and then initially unearthed the evidence that modern Chinese political thought has been profoundly influenced by geopolitics.

(2) Topics

This study has the following three research questions:

- A. What is Qian Mu's "discourse on China"? How did it change depending on the geographical environment?
- B. How were Qian Mu's political views affected by geographical factors?
- C. What is the relationship between New Confucianism and geopolitics?

(3) Methods

This research will adopt documentary analysis, historical analysis, and genealogy methods.

A. Document analysis

This study will explore Qian Mu's earlier and later writings, and cite secondary Qian Mu research to explore Qian Mu's discussion of "China" in his political discourse. Literature analysis is to read and collect a large amount of literature, interpret and resolve the concepts, arguments, and factual context of related issues, and analyze and compare the discussions of relevant scholars to answer the research questions. Specific literature sources include special books, translations, special book papers, journal articles, dissertations, seminar papers, journals, official documents, newspapers, and online materials.

The primary data in this study focus on Qian Mu alone and are supported by political commentary on the current situation and the opposition to Qian Mu. For example, Qian Mu's book *Private Words on Politics* written after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War is a very important research material. In terms of secondary data, this study will widely collect papers on Qian Mu by New Confucians from Hong Kong and Taiwan and New Confucians from Mainland China. This thesis also uses the geopolitical perspective represented by Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John A. Agnew to reflect Qian Mu's views and learn about the geopolitical factors in New Confucianism.

B. Historical Analysis

Historical analysis uses the perspective of development and change to deeply explore the ins and outs of a certain objective fact and social phenomenon. By analyzing and comparing different stages of development, it can clarify its

development context and reveal its future trends. Qian Mu lived his life from the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the establishment of the Republic of China, to his migration to Taiwan. During this period, he always displayed the intellectuals' concern for the country and the people and proposed many ideas. Therefore, the historical analysis of this study should focus on the historical moment. What efforts did Qian Mu make to reconstruct Chinese identity? Furthermore, mature political thought must not stay outside of realistic geopolitics. If Qian Mu can be the one of New Confucianism, then does the New Confucian thinker have a hidden geopolitical psychological motivation when proposing their ideas? These questions must be answered more completely through historical analysis.


C. Genealogy

Genealogy originated from anthropological and historical research and aims to trace the origin and development of individuals or concepts. Through genealogy, researchers focus on factors such as bloodline, inheritance, and power relations, explore the history and background of things, and reveal the process of their formation and transformation. In postmodern social science, genealogy is used to deconstruct power structures, expose processes of truth construction, and emphasize the value of trivial data and contingency.⁴⁷ This study will focus on exploring Qian Mu's writings from the earlier and later periods of his life, and obtain clues to Qian Mu's "construction of China" from them. Through the research method of genealogy, we can understand how the concept of "China" struggled in the real political situation and became clear step by step.

⁴⁷ Shao Xuanlei, 2007, Genealogy as a research method, *Taiwanese Journal of Political Science*, (34), 151-174.

(4) Framework

This thesis adopts Chih-yu Shih's theory of post-Chinese nature and explores the "prior resemblance" in which Qian Mu developed his writings. Specifically, it is what kind of historical events Qian Mu experienced, where and under what circumstances, and what kind of "China" he wrote. And this kind of discussion, as a kind of "improvised resemblance", how to reconstruct the geopolitical discussion and how it affects the flow of New Confucianism. The mutual penetration and influence between geopolitics and New Confucianism is the focus of this thesis.



Source: author

(5) Limitations

Although this study tries its best to collect Qian Mu's discussions in all periods, it is still impossible to include all fifty-four volumes of Qian Mu's work in the analysis. Therefore, the material can only be based on Qian Mu's work which is related to politics. Qian Mu's politics-related works mainly include *Outline of National History* (1940), *Culture and Education* (1942), *Private Words on Politics* (1945), *The Theory of Cultural Studies* (1950), *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture*

(1967), *The Spirit of Chinese Culture* (1971), *World Situation and Chinese Culture* (1975), *Chinese Nationality and Chinese Culture from the perspective of Chinese History* (1979). This research will use the above-mentioned works as the main materials to analyze Qian Mu's thoughts.

Since this study focuses on Qian Mu, other New Confucian scholars will be mentioned only when necessary. Qian Mu alone cannot represent the whole picture of New Confucianism, which is a major limitation of this study. In addition, this study is limited by time and space. The main geopolitical theory of dialogue is critical geopolitics. Finally, this study focuses on the interactive relationship between New Confucianism and geopolitics. Therefore, it will not deeply explore the philosophical connotation of New Confucianism, nor can it construct a complete set of theories critical of geopolitics in depth, so the material collected may be relatively one-sided. This can be said to be the biggest limitation of this study.

II. Qian Mu and New Confucianism

1. Qian Mu's life

Qian Mu (錢穆), courtesy name Binsi (賓四), was born on July 30, 1895, in Wuxi, Jiangsu (江蘇無錫). He was one of the greatest historians in China in the 20th century.⁴⁸ Qian Mu entered a private school at the age of six and later transferred to Guoyu School (果育學校), a new-style school. While studying at Guoyu School, he was inspired by his teacher Qian Bogui (錢伯圭). Qian Bogui was a revolutionary and

⁴⁸ Courtesy name is another name for traditional Chinese scholars, which is used in interactions between ordinary scholar-bureaucrats. In Chinese tradition, it is impolite to call people by their names, so scholars often call each other by their names. Therefore, Qian Mu is also called Qian Binsi.

advocated that the Han Chinese should overthrow the Manchu emperor and move toward Western-style democracy. Qian Mu was deeply influenced by it throughout his life. Although he accepted his teacher's nationalist ideas, he did not fully accept the idea that Western-style democracy could solve all problems.⁴⁹

After the Revolution of 1911 and the establishment of the Republic of China, Qian Mu began to teach in primary and secondary schools near his hometown. It was not until 1930 that he became famous for publishing the *Chronology of Liu Xiang and his son Liu Xin* (劉向歆父子年譜), and was recommended by the famous historian Gu Jiegang (顧頡剛) to teach at Yenching University (燕京大學).⁵⁰ After the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, Qian Mu taught at National Southwestern Associated University (西南聯大), West China University (華西大學), Sichuan University (四川大學), and other universities. In 1940, Qian Mu published *Outline of National History* (國史大綱), one of his masterpieces. The book *Outline of National History* soon became a classic in the field of Chinese history, and it is still being reprinted to this day.⁵¹ Qian Mu's original hope was to “awaken the soul of the nation” through this history work.⁵² He particularly emphasized that when studying the *Outline of National History*, one should have “warmth and respect for the history of the nation.” Therefore, some commentators call the *Outline of National History* a “national epic” that is both infiltrated and based on nationalism.⁵³

⁴⁹ Qian Mu, 1994, *Remembering My Parents at Eighty Years Old & Miscellaneous Memories of Teachers and Friends, Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 51, Taipei: Linking Books, 36.

⁵⁰ Qian Mu, 1994, *Remembering My Parents at Eighty Years Old & Miscellaneous Memories of Teachers and Friends, Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 51, Taipei: Linking Books, 153.

⁵¹ Yu Yingshi, 2016, *Outline of National History - From internal structure to external influence, Disquisitions on the Past & Present*, 29, 3-16.

⁵² Hu Chusheng, 2015, *Using the history of the country to reveal the soul of the country — A closer look at Qian Mu's "Outline of National History", Academic treatises under the flames of war — A closer look at ten literary and historical works during the Anti-Japanese War*, Taipei: Taiwan Student Book Company, 1-29.

⁵³ Chun-chieh Huang, 2000, Qian Binsi's view of “national history” in his historiographies: connotation, method and significance, *Historical Inquiry, NTU*, 26, 1-37.

After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, China quickly fell into a civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. On August 14, 1949, the leader of the Communist Party of China Mao Zedong (毛澤東) published an article *Abandon Illusions and Prepare for Struggle* (丟掉幻想，準備鬥爭), in which he named Hu Shi (胡適, 1891~1962), Fu Sinian (傅斯年, 1896~1950) and Qian Mu as “a small number of people controlled by the reactionary forces of U.S. imperialism and its Chinese lackeys”.⁵⁴ Therefore, Qian Mu left the mainland in the autumn of 1949 and went south to Hong Kong to teach at the private Huaqiao University in Guangzhou (廣州私立華僑大學) and became the dean of the Asian School of Literature and Business (亞洲文商學院).⁵⁵ In 1950, the Asian College of Liberal Arts and Business was renamed New Asia College (新亞書院), and Qian Mu became the principal. New Asia College was one of the predecessors of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (in October 1963, the Chinese University of Hong Kong was established, and three colleges, United College, Chung Chi College, and New Asia College, became the founding members). In 1965, Qian Mu resigned as principal of New Asia College and left Hong Kong to be a visiting scholar at the University of Malaya.

In 1967, Qian Mu arrived in Taiwan. In 1968, President Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) specially built the “Sushu Building” (素書樓) for his residence on the banks of Waishuang Stream in Taipei. In the same year, Qian Mu was elected as an academician of Academia Sinica. Around 1978, Qian Mu became blind, but he still

<https://doi.org/10.6253%2fntuhistory.2000.26.01>

⁵⁴Mao Zedong, 1949, Throw away illusions and prepare for struggle, Chinese Marxist Library, <https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19490814.htm>. Date viewed: April 3, 2024.

⁵⁵ Qian Mu, 1994, *Remembering My Parents at Eighty Years Old & Miscellaneous Memories of Teachers and Friends*, *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 51, Taipei: Linking Books, 289-291.

taught his disciples orally and continued to write books. In 1990, the “SuShu Building Incident” occurred. Democratic Progressive Party legislator Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and others accused Qian Mu of “appropriating public property.” When Qian Mu heard this, he moved out of the SuShu Building angrily.⁵⁶ Three months after moving out of SuShu Building, Qian Mu passed away on August 30, 1990, at the age of 95. After Qian Mu’s death, his widow took his ashes back to his hometown on the mainland, and was buried on the shore of Taihu Lake.

2. Is Qian Mu a New Confucian scholar?

“New Confucianism” is more often a label given by Westerners to certain Chinese scholars at the beginning. Therefore, there is a lot of controversy in distinguishing “who is the New Confucian?” According to scholar Liu Shuxian (劉述先), New Confucianism in the narrowest sense refers to Tang Junyi (唐君毅), Mou Zongsan (牟宗三), and Xu Fuguan (徐復觀) who participated in drafting *A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture : Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Cultural Outlook*, as well as their master Xiong Shili (熊十力).⁵⁷ However, Liu himself later proposed another broad definition of New Confucianism, namely the famous “four groups in three generations” structure:

“The first group of the first generation: Liang Shuming (梁漱溟, 1893~1988), Xiong Shili (熊十力, 1885~1968), Ma Yifu (馬一浮, 1883~1967), Zhang Junmai (張君勱, 1887~1969). The second generation of the first generation:

⁵⁶ Jiang Huizhen, 2010, President Ma recalled Qian Mu: Injustice will never happen again, China Times. <https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20100831000461-260115>. Date viewed: April 3, 2024.

⁵⁷ Liu Shuxian, 2002, An examination of modern New Confucian studies, *Bulletin of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy*, 20, 371.

Feng Youlan (馮友蘭, 1895~1990), He Lin (賀麟, 1902~1992), Qian Mu (錢穆, 1895~1990), Fang Dongmei (方東美, 1899~1977). The second generation and the third group: Tang Junyi (唐君毅, 1909~1978), Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909~1995), Xu Fuguan (徐復觀, 1903~1982). The third generation and the fourth group: are Yu Yingshi (余英時, 1930~), Liu Shuxian (劉述先, 1934~), Cheng Zhongying (成中英, 1935~), and Tu Weiming (杜維明, 1940~)”⁵⁸

Although Qian Mu is not included in Liu Shuxian’s New Confucian figures in the narrow sense, he is a representative figure of New Confucianism in the broad sense.

As a disciple of Qian Mu, Yu Yingshi (1930~2021) criticized the narrow sense of New Confucianism and even wrote an article *Qian Mu and New Confucianism* to draw a clear line between Qian Mu and New Confucianism.⁵⁹ In the article *Qian Mu and New Confucianism*, Yu Yingshi divided the definition of New Confucianism into three types: the first is that “anyone who has no prejudice against Confucianism and studies it seriously” can be a New Confucian. The second is to use philosophy as the standard. Only those who have interpreted and developed Confucian philosophy can be called New Confucians. The third type refers specifically to Xiong Shili and his disciples. Yu Yingshi believes that the first definition is too broad and seems empty and meaningless. As for the second type of definition, because Qian Mu is a historian, he has always had doubts about whether Chinese thought can be called “philosophy.” Therefore, Yu Yingshi believed that Qian Mu did not intend to take the path of philosophy, so he did not belong to the second category of New Confucianism. And

⁵⁸ Liu Shuxian, 2008, *On the Three Great Era of Confucian Philosophy*, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 192.

⁵⁹ Yu Yingshi, 1991, *Qian Mu and New Confucianism, Still remembering the scales on the water blown by the wind - Qian Mu and modern Chinese scholarship* (Taipei: Sanmin Book Company), 31-98.

Qian Mu is not a disciple of Xiong Shili, so certainly he cannot fall into the third type of definition.⁶⁰

And Yu Yingshi also unceremoniously criticized the “opening theory (開出說)” of New Confucian scholars. New Confucian scholars (such as Mou Zongsan) advocate that “Confucian Orthodox can develop democracy and science”, that is, good values such as democracy and science can be developed based on the ontology of Chinese philosophy. Yu Yingshi believes that this is the inheritance of China’s “elitism” tradition. When the old Western Christian orthodoxy and the Marxist new orthodoxy abdicate, New Confucian scholars are eager to seize the position of orthodoxy in the new era. He believes that this mentality is a kind of “conscience arrogance.” He criticized New Confucian scholars who only wanted to use their own cultivation and philosophical knowledge to solve many complex historical and social problems.⁶¹ As a historian, Qian Mu is of course different from this kind of people.

Yu Yingshi’s stern article quickly aroused a response from New Confucian scholars. New Confucian scholars including Yang Zuhan (楊祖漢), Liu Shuxian (劉述先), Luo Yijun (羅義俊), Huo Jinming (霍晉明) all wrote articles to refute Yu Yingshi’s statement.⁶² However, we still have to face the question raised by Yu Yingshi, that is, how to define New Confucianism? Who can be considered a New

⁶⁰ Yu Yingshi, 1991, Qian Mu and New Confucianism, *Still remembering the scales on the water blown by the wind - Qian Mu and modern Chinese scholarship* (Taipei: Sanmin Book Company), 57-61.

⁶¹ Yu Yingshi, 1991, Qian Mu and New Confucianism, *Still remembering the scales on the water blown by the wind - Qian Mu and modern Chinese scholarship* (Taipei: Sanmin Book Company), 98 .

⁶² Yang Zuhan, 1994, On Yu Yingshi's criticism of New Confucianism, in Mou Zongsan et al., edited by Yang Zuhan, *Confucianism and the Today's World*, Taipei: Wenjin Publishing House, 147-177. Liu Shuxian, 1996, *Transcendental Introspection of Contemporary New Confucianism*, Contemporary Chinese Philosophy: Issues, New Jersey: Bafang Cultural Corporation, 1-67. Luo Yijun, 1994, Research on contemporary New Confucianism in the past ten years and the so-called sect problem, in Mou Zongsan et al., edited by Yang Zuhan, *Confucianism and the Today's World*, 113-146. Huo Jinming , 1992, "Opening theory" as I understand it - Impressions on Mr. Yu Yingshi's “Qian Mu and New Confucianism”, *Twenty-first Century*, October 1992, 134-138.

Confucian scholar?

The broadest definition of New Confucianism criticized by Yu Yingshi, that is, “anyone who has no prejudice against Confucianism and studies it seriously can be called New Confucian” is not a meaningless label, but can truly be regarded as a definition of New Confucianism. First of all, there are very few people who have feelings for the Chinese cultural tradition and are willing to conduct in-depth research. At least they are not the mainstream of Chinese academics in the 20th century.⁶³ Furthermore, the statement that Qian Mu had no intention of pursuing philosophy seems worthy of further discussion. This can be seen especially in Qian Mu’s article cited by Yu Yingshi:

“The term philosophy was translated from the West and does not exist in China. Therefore, I often say that China has no philosophy, but I cannot say that the Chinese people have no thoughts. Western philosophical thought focuses on exploring the truth, but it cannot be said that the Chinese do not value the truth. This is especially true for scholars in the pre-Qin period (先秦諸子) and Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties (宋明理學). Modern Chinese people have taken the lead in calling them philosophy, which is not unreasonable. However, there are major differences between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy, which cannot be ignored”⁶⁴

Qian Mu only said in the article that Chinese thought cannot be confused with Western philosophy. This does not mean that Chinese people have no philosophy, nor

⁶³ China’s official academic system was Marxism after 1949. The academic status of New Confucianism is marginal in both mainland China and Taiwan.

⁶⁴Qian Mu, 1984, *Academic Review of Modern China*, Taipei: Dongda Book Company, 21.

can it be inferred that Qian Mu does not want to elaborate his thoughts. Although Qian Mu was a historian with profound literacy in Chinese history, he was also very interested in Western thought and often compared Chinese and Western philosophy. From this point of view, Qian Mu certainly has his thoughts (philosophy), but his thoughts are not the same as those of Xiong Shili and others.

Therefore, this thesis believes that all scholars who have no prejudice against Confucianism and are willing to study it seriously can be counted as New Confucians. Under this definition, Qian Mu is undoubtedly a New Confucian.

III. The geopolitical background of New Confucianism

1. “Orthodoxy” and geopolitics

In Chinese history, scholars have been quarreling over the issue of “orthodoxy (正統).” “Orthodoxy” can be explained by splitting it into two parts: “Zheng (正)” and “Tong (統).” That is to say, Confucians believe that a true ruler must have both “moral integrity” and “the power to unify the territory” to be considered “orthodox.”

⁶⁵ However, historical development is not necessarily so smooth, such as the Shu Han (蜀漢, 221~263) or the Southern Song Dynasty (南宋, 1127~1279). In the eyes of Confucian scholars, their morality seemed more legitimate, but they could not unify China. The question at this time is, where is the orthodoxy? In a “moral” regime? Or is it in a “powerful” regime?

⁶⁵ Wang Qingjia and Hu Xiaobai, 2017, Metanarrative of Chinese historiography: Examining the meaning of orthodoxy through the theory of “Cultural China”, *Jianghai Academic Journal*, (1), 33-41.

This problem has troubled generations of Chinese scholars, including the famous Southern Song Dynasty Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130~1200). Before Zhu Xi, official history books from Chen Shou's (陳壽) *Three Kingdoms* (三國志) to Sima Guang's (司馬光) *Zizhi Tongjian* (資治通鑑) all regarded Cao Wei (曹魏, 220~266) as the orthodox when describing the Three Kingdoms era (220~280).⁶⁶ There is no other reason, because Cao Pi (曹丕), the founding emperor of Wei, usurped the throne from the last emperor of the Han Dynasty (漢朝), Emperor Han Xian (漢獻帝), and Cao Wei inherited most of the territory and population of the Han Dynasty. However, for Zhu Xi, this issue was not just a purely historical issue, but more of a political philosophy issue.

Zhu Xi lived in the Southern Song Dynasty (1127~1279). At that time, the Song Dynasty was no longer able to unify the entire territory of China, and even formally surrendered to the Jin people (Jurchens) in the north. Under such geographical conditions, Zhu Xi's Taoist theory took the Shu-Han as the orthodoxy.⁶⁷ In the same way, when referring to the Northern and Southern Dynasties (南北朝, 420~589), he also regarded the Southern Dynasties as orthodox. This phenomenon was discovered by the Siku officials (四庫館臣, a group of scholars responsible for compiling the *Sikuquanshu*, 四庫全書) during the Qianlong reign of the Qing Dynasty (1735~1796) :

“There is no doubt that Chen Shou is wrong. In terms of the political situation,

⁶⁶ The unique historian Xi Zaochi (?~383) went against the mainstream and was called the Shu Han orthodoxy. See Wang Wen-jin, 2012, Xi Zaochi and the Construction of Zhuge Liang's Myth, *Bulletin of The Department of Chinese Literature National Taiwan University*, 38, 71-120. <https://doi.org/10.6281%2fNTUCL.2012.38.03>.

⁶⁷ Yang Jingjing, 2012, Zhu Xi's theory of Shu-Han orthodoxy, *Journal of Yichun University*, 34(1), 94-97.

It is easy for Xi Zaochi (習鑿齒) to recognize Shu Han as orthodox, but it is difficult for Chen Shou to recognize Shu Han as orthodox. By the time of Xi Zaochi, the Jin Dynasty (晉朝) had already moved to the south. What happened was similar to that of the Shu Han regime. Those two regimes both favored peace and stability but fought for orthodoxy. This is in line with public opinion at that time. Chen Shou was a courtier of the Jin Dynasty, and the Jin Dynasty inherited the lineage of the Wei Dynasty. To accuse Wei of being a pseudo-regime is tantamount to admitting that Jin is a pseudo-regime. How can it be practiced in that time? This is because Taizu of the Song Dynasty (宋太祖) usurped and established a state similar to Wei, while the Northern Han (北漢) and Southern Tang (南唐) were similar to Shu Han. Therefore, Confucian scholars in the Northern Song Dynasty avoided this and did not think that Wei was a pseudo-regime. After Emperor Gaozong (宋高宗) settled on the left side of the Yangtze River, it was similar to Shu Han, and all the Wei areas in the Central Plains (中原) were included in the Jin Dynasty (金朝). Therefore, Confucian scholars in the Southern Song Dynasty rose one after another to recognize Shu Han as the orthodox. They all discuss history based on the situation at that time, and there are no certain principles to follow”⁶⁸

As early as the Qing Dynasty (1644 ~1912), scholars have keenly noticed that calling a historical dynasty orthodox or not is not a simple historical issue, but more about the geopolitical situation of the current dynasty.⁶⁹ No wonder Benedetto Croce (1866~1952) said: “All history is contemporary history.”

⁶⁸ Ji Yun (editor-in-chief), 2015, *Wenlange Sikuquanshu, General Catalog*, 1549, Hangzhou: Hangzhou Publishing House, 19.

⁶⁹ Lin Meiling, 2010, The Historian Consciousness as Reflected in the History Branch of Qinding Siku Quanshu Zongmu, *Journal of The Institute of Chinese Literature Shih Hsin University*, (6), 69-86. <https://doi.org/10.30120%2fJICLSHU.201007.0004>.

2. The Geopolitical Dilemma of New Confucianism

The same dilemma (or opportunity) as Zhu Xi also happens to contemporary New Confucian scholars. After the fall of the mainland in 1949, Marxism-Leninism became the official dogma of China. However, neither Marx (1818~1883) nor Lenin (1870~1924) were Chinese. From the perspective of Chinese nationalism, the CCP is simply usurping the Republic of China, the only legitimate China. The representative of China's nationalist perspective is Chiang Kai-shek (1887~1975):

“The evil Marxism-Leninism and communism that the bandits plagiarized from the Soviet Union originated from cruelty and will surely die from cruelty! And we uphold the Three People's Principles (三民主義) of the National Revolution created by the founding father. We start from benevolence, and we will surely succeed in benevolence!”⁷⁰

In Chiang Kai-shek's view, the Chinese Communist Party, which aimed at class struggle and class revolution, was rather extremely evil. The Three People's Principles that he believed in was the true Chinese orthodoxy. He said in a speech titled “The Soul of China”:

“The Three People's Principles ... are completely inherited from the orthodoxy of our history and culture, which has been passed down for thousands of

⁷⁰ Qin Xiaoyi, editor-in-chief, 1984, Collection of Thoughts and Speeches of President Chiang Kai-shek, 28, Party History Committee of the Central Committee of Kuomintang, 476-477. http://www.ccf.org.tw/cccf001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1655:0010-34&catid=192:2014-06-12-03-08-29&Itemid=256. Date viewed: April 4, 2024.

years ... The morality of the Prime Minister and the revolutionism of the Prime Minister completely inherit the orthodoxy of China's history and culture for five thousand years.⁷¹ At that time, a representative of the Soviet Union asked the Prime Minister: 'Where is the starting point of the philosophical foundation of your revolution? Where did your revolutionaryism come from?' The Prime Minister told him at that time: "We in China have a nation-founding spirit from Yao (堯), Shun (舜), Yu (禹), Tang (湯), Wen (文), Wu(武), Duke of Zhou (周公), and Confucius have been the orthodox thoughts passed down by sages for thousands of years.⁷² This is the orthodoxy of our Chinese nation. My revolutionary thoughts and revolutionaryism are inherited from this orthodoxy. I am now It is to inherit the orthodoxy of our Chinese nation and to continue to carry forward the orthodox spirit passed down by the ancestors of our Chinese nation"⁷³

However, no matter how morally noble the Three People's Principles are, it cannot change the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has already taken power in mainland China. Therefore, New Confucianism must find another explanation in its political philosophy.

In 1958, something happened that was of epoch-making significance for contemporary New Confucianism. Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai, and

⁷¹ Sun Yat-sen is honored as "Prime Minister" in the Kuomintang, and as the "Founding Father" in the Republic of China.

⁷² Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, and Duke of Zhou were famous rulers in ancient China, and they were all known for their benevolent governance.

⁷³ Qin Xiaoyi, editor-in-chief, 1984, Collection of Thoughts and Speeches of President Chiang Kai-shek, 12, Party History Committee of the Central Committee of Kuomintang, 350-351.

http://www.ccf.org.tw/cccf001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2787:0046-1&catid=134:2014-06-10-07-55-46&Itemid=256. Date viewed: April 4, 2024.

Tang Junyi jointly published *A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of Chinese Academic Research and the Future of Chinese Culture and World Culture Outlook* (hereinafter referred to as the “1958 Manifesto”).

The *1958 Manifesto* quite clearly acknowledged the source of its problem:

“Marxist-Leninist thought has no positive foundation in the requirements of the objective spiritual life of the Chinese nation ... No matter how tortuous China’s political development will be in the future, we cannot predict them one by one, but Marxist-Leninist thought itself will always be denied. And we can assert that the objective spiritual life of Chinese culture must move in the direction of democratic nation-building”⁷⁴

The *1958 Manifesto* pitted Marxism-Leninism against Chinese culture and emphasized that democratic constitutionalism is the key to solving China’s political contradictions. However, for China to accept democratic constitutionalism, it must be rooted in China’s traditions. Only by first understanding the eternal and ever-new universal value of Chinese culture can Western democracy and science settle down in China.

Although New Confucian scholars and politicians such as Chiang Kai-shek had different arguments for demonstrating what China’s orthodoxy was, they all unanimously attacked the Communist Party of China, which took Marxism-Leninism as its teacher. And the ideological resources they can mobilize also come from the

⁷⁴ Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai , and Tang Junyi, 1958, *A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of Chinese Academic Research and the Future of Chinese Culture and World Culture Outlook*, 19. <https://6744278.s21i.faiusr.com/61/ABUIABA9GAAG8Kv3tgUorNiu9AI.pdf>. Date viewed: April 4, 2024.

“orthodox” expositions of Confucianism in the past. Therefore, we can say that the Chinese people who opposed the Communist Party at that time, whether they were politicians or philosophers, shared a certain “prior resemblance.” This prior resemblance is caused by geopolitical oppression on the outside; but on the inside, it is the discourse of their shared traditional Chinese culture.

3. The relationship between Qian Mu’s thought and geopolitics

Surprisingly, Qian Mu did not sign the *1958 Manifesto*. According to Yu Yingshi’s recollection in the article *Qian Mu and New Confucianism*, there were three main reasons why Qian Mu did not sign the *1958 Manifesto*.⁷⁵ First, Qian Mu insisted on not establishing any sects. He was deeply worried about the sectarian barriers that the *1958 Manifesto* might create. Secondly, the *1958 Manifesto* made the philosophical conclusion that “the thoughts of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties were closer to the idealistic philosophy of Western Kant and below at that time.”⁷⁶ Qian Mu does not completely agree with this conclusion. Some New Confucian scholars use the words of Kant and Hegel to interpret Chinese philosophy, which Qian Mu is not familiar with and does not accept. Thirdly, the *1958 Manifesto* contains the statement that “the study of mind and nature (心性之學) is the core of Chinese academic thought.” This view is quite personal to Xiong Shili and is the position of the School of the Heart (陸王心學).⁷⁷ This position is quite different from

⁷⁵ Yu Yingshi, 1991, *Qian Mu and New Confucianism, Still remembering the wind blowing on the water - Qian Mu and modern Chinese scholarship* (Taipei: Sanmin Book Company), 67-69.

⁷⁶ Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai, and Tang Junyi, 1958, *A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of Chinese Academic Research and the Future of Chinese Culture and World Culture Outlook*, 3. <https://6744278.s21i.faiusr.com/61/ABUIABA9GAAG8Kv3tgUorNiu9AI.pdf>. Date viewed: April 4, 2024.

⁷⁷ The two main streams of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties were the “Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism (程朱理學)” represented by Cheng Hao (程顥, 1032~1085) and Zhu Xi (朱熹,

Qian Mu's position of respecting Zhu Xi.

However, the fact that he did not sign the *1958 Manifesto* does not mean that Qian Mu was not affected by the geopolitics of the time, nor does it mean that Qian Mu did not have a “prior resemblance” with other New Confucians. On the contrary, as a historian, Qian Mu's struggle over whether to sign the *1958 Manifesto* itself represented that he was deeply influenced by the geopolitics of the time, but in the end, he made different political judgments due to different professions. And to what extent, in what way, and to what extent was Qian Mu affected by geopolitics? How can he reconstruct Chinese discourse, bring into play his improvised resemblance, and then influence the discourse of contemporary New Confucianism and the geopolitics of China? This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

IV. Repositioning China: The Genealogy of Qian Mu's Argument

1. Periodization of Qian Mu's Works

To explore how Qian Mu's thoughts are affected by geopolitics, we must start from two aspects. The first aspect is the time dimension, and the second aspect is the discourse dimension. The hypothesis is that Qian Mu's “discourse on China” will change depending on the geographical environment. In the time dimension, Qian Mu's life can be divided into three periods, namely the Mainland period (1895~1949), the Hong Kong period (1950~1966), and the Taiwan period (1967~1990). In terms of

1130~1200), and the second by Lu Jiuyuan (陸九淵, 1139~1193) and Wang Yangming (王陽明, 1472~1529). The “Lu Wang Xinxue” (also as know as the School of the Heart, 陸王心學) represented. Under this classification, Qian Mu was more inclined to Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism, but he was different from Xiong Shili, whom inclined to Lu Wang Xinxue.

discussion, Qian Mu's works on political discussion mainly include *Outline of National History* (1940), *Culture and Education* (1942), *Private Words on Politics* (1945), *The Theory of Cultural Studies* (1950), *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture* (1967), *The Spirit of Chinese Culture* (1971), *World Situation and Chinese Culture* (1975), *Chinese Nationality and Chinese Culture from the perspective of Chinese History* (1979).

Among them, *World Situation and Chinese Culture* (1975) is a collection of essays, and the two articles most relevant to politics are *China: The Center of the World's Storm* (1951) and *World Situation and Chinese Culture* (1973). From the above analysis, it can be seen that in addition to Qian Mu's residence, changes in the political environment in mainland China also profoundly affected Qian Mu's works. In 1937, the Anti-Japanese War broke out. In 1945, China won the Anti-Japanese War. In 1949, the mainland fell into CCP. In 1966, the Cultural Revolution broke out. In 1971, the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations. In 1979, the Republic of China severed diplomatic relations with the United States. It can be seen that Qian Mu's discussions on politics were mostly concentrated after these historical events. A brief table is as follows:

years	Qian Mu's residence	Major events in China	Works
1940	mainland	Anti-Japanese War	Outline of National History
1942			Culture and Education
1945		Victory of the Anti-Japanese War	Private Words on Politics
1950	Hongkong	The mainland	The Meaning of Culture

1951		fell	China: the center of the world's storm
1967	Taiwan	Cultural Revolution	Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture
1971			Chinese Cultural Spirit
1973			World Situation and Chinese Culture
1979		Republic of China and the United States cut off diplomatic relations	Chinese nationality and Chinese culture from the perspective of Chinese history

Source: Author

2. Qian Mu in Mainland China

Qian Mu started his career in textual criticism. His early works did not involve much in real politics. It was not until the *Outline of National History* that he began to develop his political discussion by exploring Chinese history. Regarding the discussion of this period, in addition to the famous “Chinese-style democracy” theory, there are also many discussions on actual geopolitics. To put it simply, they all stem from the urgent need for nation-building.⁷⁸

(1) Chinese Style Democracy

Qian Mu has said many times that traditional China's political system has its rationality and cannot be summarized as a dark autocracy. In the introduction to

⁷⁸ Yan Hongzhong, 2006, Positions and Institutions - Qian Binsi and the Study of Chinese Political History, *Historical Inquiry, NTU*, 38, 105-158.

Outline of National History, Qian Mu defended China's traditional system at length:

“The commentators also doubted that China's political system has no civil rights and no constitution. However, civil rights also have their own ways and institutions of expression. If they can follow this way and preserve their institutions, this is the founding constitution and law, and there is no need to seek it in vain. Since the Qin Dynasty, China has been a large country with a vast territory and a large population. The system of democratically elected representatives practiced in modern Europe and the West was beyond the control of our ancestors. The country can indeed hold examinations every year to select outstanding civilians from all over the country so that they have the opportunity to participate in politics, and it also establishes objective service performance regulations as the criterion for advancement and retreat in official positions”⁷⁹

In *Culture and Education*, Qian Mu took the lead in naming it “Chinese-style democracy”:

“Traditional Chinese politics is neither an autocratic monarchy, an aristocracy, a military government, nor a class dictatorship, which I won't bother to elaborate on. However, China's traditional political system should be regarded as a democratic political system, which is unquestionable. If we are careful with our words, we should call it ‘Chinese-style democracy’”⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Qian Mu, 1996, Introduction, *Outline of National History*, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 14-15.

⁸⁰ Qian Mu, 1994, Chinese Democratic Spirit, *Culture and Education*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 41, Taipei: Linking Books, 114.

This line of thinking continues in the same vein. In *Private Words on Politics*, Western theories are also introduced to explain that China is a democratic government:

“Western scholars divide government systems into three categories: 1. Autocratic monarchy. 2. Aristocracy. 3. Democracy. Strictly speaking, there has been no aristocracy in China since the Qin and Han dynasties. Traditional Chinese politics is not aristocratic. Although China has a monarch, it is certainly not an autocratic monarchy. Just like England, although it still has a monarch, it does not prevent it from being a democratic government. Traditional Chinese politics is neither aristocratic nor autocratic monarchy. It must be a democratic system of government”⁸¹

The reason why China is a democratic government is that the Chinese people can participate in national politics through imperial examinations and other methods. If we deny that China is a democratic government based on the fact that China does not have a parliament, it would be superficial:

“Traditional Chinese politics is not without civil rights, and these kinds of civil rights can be called ‘direct civil rights’, which directly exercise administrative power. The first emergence of civil rights in the West was only the indirect supervisory power. China’s traditional civil rights were a direct right to exercise. Therefore, in the West, the people and the government are in opposition, but in the traditional Chinese concept, the people and the government are one. If you say China’s traditional political system does not

⁸¹Qian Mu, 1994, *Traditional Chinese Politics and the Five-Power Constitution*, *Private Words on Politics*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 5-6.

have a parliament, it means that traditional Chinese politics has no democratic rights. This is superficial”⁸²

It can be seen that in Qian Mu’s discussion, China is a democratic government with “direct civil rights”, which is different from the representative system of “indirect civil rights” in the West. Qian Mu also seemed to hint that Chinese-style democracy is institutionally superior to that of the West.

Qian Mu also believes that the “Three People’s Principles” proposed by Sun Yat-sen are democratic politics suitable for China’s national conditions. They are very different from Soviet-style democracy and British and American democracy. Chinese-style democracy is a “politics for the whole people”:

“Therefore, we know that Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s original intention of ‘returning political power to the people’ should be to realize the Three People’s Principles and dissolve the Kuomintang in the unity of the whole people to realize his ideal ‘Chinese-style democracy.’ It is by no means that returning political power to the people is the same as following the Anglo-American style of democracy. The so-called democracy does not even mean taking the path of British-American democracy and further moving into Soviet-style democracy. However, the views of ordinary Chinese people today seem to be a chaotic exchange between the political consciousness of the Anglo-American school and the political consciousness of the Three People’s Principles.

Responding to this awareness and moving towards peace and goodwill is

⁸² Qian Mu, 1994, *Traditional Chinese Politics and the Five-Power Constitution*, *Private Words on Politics*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 7.

certainly a suitable way to build a nation. However, its final trend should be ‘politics for the whole people’ rather than ‘party politics.’”⁸³

However, this argument has attracted strong refutation from Chinese political scientists and philosophers, such as Xiao Gongquan (蕭公權, 1897~1981), Hu Sheng (胡繩, 1918~2000), Zhang Junmai (張君勱, 1887~1969), Xu Fuguan (徐復觀, 1903~1982), all wrote articles to refute Qian Mu.⁸⁴ For example, Xiao Gongquan believes that ancient Chinese methods of restricting monarchy, such as divine punishment, ancestral family laws, prime ministership, examinations, etc., are unable to play a full role.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the ministers selected from the common people do not necessarily represent the interests of the common people. On the contrary, the bureaucracy also encourages the autocratic monarchy.⁸⁶ But in any case, “Chinese-style democracy” represents a tendency of Qian Mu’s discussion during this period, that is, to cope with the urgent needs of nation-building, some practical political theories need to be developed.

(2) Geopolitics: China’s Capital

After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, Qian Mu wrote *Private Words on Politics*, in which many discussed China’s geopolitical issues. Among them, *On the Capital* and *The Issue of the New Capital after the War* are the most representative.

⁸³ Qian Mu, 1994, Trust and Hope for the Founding of the Nation, *Private Words on Politics*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 291.

⁸⁴ Yan Hongzhong, 2006, Positions and Institutions - Qian Binsi and the Study of Chinese Political History, *Historical Inquiry, NTU*, 38, 105-158.

⁸⁵ Xiao Gongquan, 1982, The Essence of Chinese Monarchy, *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, Complete Works of Mr. Xiao Gongquan, Taipei: Linking Books, 66.

⁸⁶ Xiao Gongquan, 1982, The Essence of Chinese Monarchy, *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, Complete Works of Mr. Xiao Gongquan, Taipei: Linking Books, 74-75.

First, Qian Mu demonstrated the rationality of establishing Xi'an (西安) as the capital from the perspective of "balanced regional development":

"Since 1840, the economic and cultural heart and arteries are not in China. Half of the coastal areas, from Liaoshen (遼瀋), Yanqi (燕齊), Jiangsu (江蘇), Zhejiang (浙江), Fujian (福建), and Guangdong (廣東), are still alive. The farther away from the sea, the deeper into the land, the deeper into the heart of China. The symptoms become more severe as the disease progresses. Xi'an is at the intersection of half dryness and half prosperity. About the outer periphery of Xi'an. It is called Tibet, it is called Xikang (西康), it is called Qinghai (青海), it is called Xinjiang (新疆), it is called Gansu (甘肅), it is called Ningxia (寧夏), it is called Shaanxi (陝西), it is called Mongolia, it is called Suiyuan (綏遠), it is called Chahar (察哈爾), which already accounts for more than half of China, and their culture and economy are special. If you want domestic peace today, you must face the reality of these ten areas. We must first settle these ten districts so that they can have a balanced life, not only in terms of economic and material aspects but equally important in terms of education and culture. These ten regions must be brought into balance with the southwest, northeast, and southeast. This disease of partial dryness and failure will be eliminated, and then we can talk about unity, and then we can talk about security. Otherwise, internal troubles will originate from these ten areas, and external disasters will take advantage of them. There is never a person in the world who is unable to achieve success but can have a happy life and a sound physique"⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Qian Mu, 1994, On the Capital, Private Words on Politics, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 70.

He also said:

“Today, the capitals in the history of China are divided into five districts. The one in the center is called Luoyang (洛陽), the northwest district is Chang’an (長安), the northeast district is Yanjing (燕京), the southeast district is Jinling (金陵), and the southwest district is Chengdu (成都). Others are not discussed. Chengdu is only a capital of separatist territory. According to the terrain, there is no reason why the national capital should be located in the southwest. Jinling was also relatively peaceful. Although Nanjing was the capital of the country in the early Ming Dynasty, it was only a short-lived phenomenon and cannot be accurately calculated. Jinling is located in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. For example, in the human body, it belongs to the navel, not the head area. Although the capital of Peking was established nearly a thousand years ago, it was generally a stronghold for the northeastern ethnic regime to oppress the whole country, except for the Ming Dynasty for 300 years. If we coordinated the overall situation of China and took advantage of two thousand years of experience in founding the country, China’s new capital would still face the northwest, and Luoyang would not be as suitable as Chang’an”⁸⁸

Obviously, among the five alternative capital plans of Luoyang, Xi’an, Peking, Nanjing, and Chengdu, Qian Mu particularly favored Xi’an as the capital. This is the

⁸⁸ Chang'an (長安) is the old name of Xi'an (西安); Yanjing (燕京) is the old name of Peking (北平), which is now called Beijing (北京) by the CCP; Jinling (金陵) is the old name of Nanjing (南京). Qian Mu, 1994, The issue of the new capital after the war, *Private Words on Politics*, collected in *The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 195.

historical reason that Xi'an was the capital of China's prosperous Han and Tang Dynasties.⁸⁹ However, this idea partly inherits Sun Yat-sen's theory of land power:

“Speaking from today, with the rapid development of air traffic, continental countries become more important, while maritime colonization, it is almost like the tide is about to recede. In the future of New China, its front door will turn to the northwest ... Mr. Sun Yat-sen bathed in the new tide of the ocean and looked forward to the future, his eyes turned to Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet, and he said, ‘If you want to conquer the vassal, the capital will be Xi'an, if you want the continent, the capital will be Ili (伊犁).’ Why? It is said that this is indeed strange, but in fact, it is not surprising at all”⁹⁰

In the article *Faith and Hope in the Founding of the Nation*, Qian Mu even put forward sixty-four suggestions. The content includes practicing the Three People's Principles, developing science, developing industry, developing compulsory education, and even optimistically hopes to unite Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand to contribute to the world with peace in East Asia.⁹¹ Regarding the capital issue, Qian Mu once again emphasized that the construction of New China should focus on the northwest, so Xi'an should be the capital.⁹² All in all, *Faith and Hope in the Founding of the Nation* can be regarded as the “wish list” that Qian Mu constructed under extremely optimistic circumstances after the victory of the Anti-

⁸⁹ Qian Mu, 1994, The issue of the new capital after the war, political science private remarks, *Private Words on Politics*, collected in *The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 198.

⁹⁰ Ili is in Xinjiang, China, close to the border between China and Kazakhstan. Sun Yat-sen's words were rather bold, but Qian Mu praised them highly. Qian Mu, 1994, On the Capital, *Private Words on Politics*, collected in *The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 1994, 79.

⁹¹ Qian Mu, 1994, Trust and Hope for the Founding of the Nation, *Private Words on Politics*, collected in *The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 282. \

⁹² Qian Mu, 1994, Trust and Hope in the Founding of the Nation, *Private Words on Politics*, collected in *The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 288.

Japanese War.

Looking at Qian Mu's discussions during his time in mainland China, as China's relative status in the world gradually improved, his discussions also tended to be optimistic and provide suggestions for practical policies.

3. Qian Mu in Hong Kong

In 1949, as the Kuomintang suffered successive defeats in the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, a large number of scholars fled south, and some of them fled to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Qian Mu was also among this group of scholars. In the autumn of 1949, he went to Hong Kong to teach. During his stay in Hong Kong, he, like many New Confucian scholars, focused on reflecting on why the Chinese Communist Party gained power in mainland China. Ultimately, he attributed this issue to a cultural issue:

“In my opinion, today's China issue, and even the world issue, is not just a military, economic, political, or diplomatic issue, but a cultural issue for mankind throughout the world”⁹³

He even put forward the slogan: All problems arise from cultural issues. All problems are solved by cultural issues.⁹⁴ The cause of cultural problems does not lie in Chinese culture, because Chinese culture is reasonable and stable. Even if an external virus

⁹³ Qian Mu, 1994, Why should we talk about culture studies, *The Meaning of Culture*, collected in *The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 37, Taipei: Linking Books, 1.

⁹⁴ Qian Mu, 1994, Why should we talk about culture studies, *The Meaning of Culture*, collected in *The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 37, Taipei: Linking Books, 3.

invades, China can eventually recover by relying on its constitution:

“In terms of the coordination and evolution of the entire cultural system, China is relatively reasonable and stable. Therefore, cultural diseases in Chinese history were often caused by external evils. If it is said to be sick in itself, it is just a temporary weakness. The so-called weakness refers to external evils. China has a large land area, a long defense line, and a long-standing social stability and peace. It is easy to expose weaknesses, but this is not an underlying disease. Therefore, although there have been several foreign invasions in Chinese history, they cannot shake the essence of Chinese culture and cannot overthrow the entire system of Chinese culture. The Chinese finally relied on this cultural potential to eliminate foreign invasions and continue to assimilate foreigners”⁹⁵

And who exactly is the “external virus” of this cultural problem? One, of course, refers to Western imperialism:

“In these fifty years, China experienced two opposite trends. One is lurking at the bottom, which is the passion for self-esteem and self-respect that the Chinese nation is constantly seeking to struggle against due to its five thousand years of accumulation of traditional culture and long-term oppression by Western colonial imperialism. The other issue is revealed at the top, which is the extreme lack of confidence, extreme inferiority complex, and outward dependence of Chinese intellectuals and the ruling class on the traditional

⁹⁵ Qian Mu, 1994, *Comparison of Chinese and Western Cultures*, *The Meaning of Culture*, collected in *The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 37, Taipei: Linking Books, 72.

culture of their motherland. They are only willing to blindly worship the West and are unwilling to look back and understand themselves”⁹⁶

Under the oppression of Western imperialism, the Chinese people developed an extreme inferiority complex and then needed total Westernization. However, Chinese culture is a truly peace-loving culture. ⁹⁷ It is impossible for Chinese people to sincerely believe in foreign Marxism:

“I dare to tell the whole world that as long as they have a little understanding of China’s five thousand years of traditional culture; as long as they have a little insight into the true demands that have been hidden in the hearts of China’s 450 million people over the past fifty years; they will I will never believe that China will become a communist country that believes in Marxism, let alone a satellite country that is the tail of the Soviet Union. If today’s temporarily successful CCP regime is mistaken for representing the public opinion of China, it will deepen China’s tragedy and will turn into a deeper and greater tragedy for the world’s mankind”⁹⁸

During his time in Hong Kong, Qian Mu began to shift from practical policy suggestions to abstract cultural discussions. Qian Mu generally believes that the success of the Chinese Communist Party is a “foreign virus”, but the essence of Chinese culture is good. To cure the “disease”, which refers to the Chinese

⁹⁶Qian Mu, 1994, China: the center of the world’s storm, *World situation and Chinese culture*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 43, Taipei: Linking Books, 43.

⁹⁷Qian Mu, 1994, China: the center of the world’s storm, *World situation and Chinese culture*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 43, Taipei: Linking Books, 45.

⁹⁸Qian Mu, 1994, China: the center of the world’s storm, *World situation and Chinese culture*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 43, Taipei: Linking Books, 46.

Communist Party, we can only start with cultural issues.

4. Qian Mu in Taiwan

In 1966, Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution. Red Guards (紅衛兵) across mainland China chanted the slogan “Revolution is not guilty, rebellion is justified (革命無罪，造反有理)” and destroyed historical monuments everywhere. Countless ancient books, calligraphy and paintings, stone tablets, and works of art were destroyed, and China fell into a crazy and dark decade. In Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek went against the trend and launched the "Chinese Cultural Revival Movement" to show that he was the orthodox Chinese culture. In 1967, Qian Mu arrived in Taiwan and was invited to give speeches at various military bases. The speeches were eventually compiled into the book *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture*.

(1) Against Communism

Since Chinese culture itself has no disease, then where does the disease lie? The disease is in the West. There were no big problems with Chinese culture, but for more than a hundred years, the Chinese people have learned from the West and acquired various ideas, which has confused people’s minds. The Communist Party took the opportunity to seize power when the Chinese people felt most inferior to their own culture:

“Unfortunately, over the past 100 years, China has been unable to withstand the powerful impact of Western culture, and its national self-esteem and cultural self-confidence have been wiped out. Not only must military,

economics, and politics learn from foreign countries, but also literature, art, and even daily life must learn from foreign countries. We are abandoning our cultural traditions without hesitation and delay. The highest ideal and greatest hope of a large number of young people is to study abroad. Before he went abroad, he had no idea about the reality of Chinese society and the essence of culture. Studying abroad means specializing in various things. Regardless of whether you can be deeply proficient in the subject you are studying; you do not have a deep understanding of the social reality and cultural essence of the country where you study abroad. After returning to China, not only was it impossible to communicate between China and the West, but also the experts in their respective fields could not communicate with each other. Just like a person who is suffering from all kinds of diseases and does not know where the disease is but seeks magical prescriptions from overseas, the magical prescriptions he obtains are of various types. When he comes back, he throws in random medicines, making the illnesses worse. Only science has no borders, however, those who study science feel that they have no place to spread within the country after returning home. As a result, thoughts became increasingly confused and people's hearts were shaken, hoping for another change, and the Communist Party took advantage of the opportunity to steal the country"⁹⁹

Because Western culture prefers “materialism” and “struggle”, the ideas of Darwin and Marx were born.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, carrying forward Chinese traditional culture not

⁹⁹ Qian Mu, 1994, Chinese Culture and the Future of Humanity in the World, *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture*, collected in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 104-105.

¹⁰⁰ Qian Mu, 1994, Chinese Culture and the Future of Humanity in the World, *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture*, collected in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 103-104.

only saves China but also saves mankind:

“Let’s talk about it again. The only other human being in the world today who has an excellent culture that is broad and profound enough to compete with modern European and Western culture is China. Chinese culture ‘emphasizes the distinction between humans and animals’, ‘emphasizes the distinction between justice and benefit’, ‘values peace’ rather than struggle, and ‘discusses right and wrong’ regardless of ancient or modern times. It is the opposite of the above-mentioned thoughts of Darwin and Marx. In other words, it is contrary to the modern trend of thought. We must not give up on ourselves, be far-sighted, and be considerate. Only by promoting Chinese culture can we not only save China but also save mankind. This is a major responsibility and mission for the Chinese people at present”¹⁰¹

Qian Mu also believed that Mao Zedong was afraid of traditional Chinese culture:

“As long as Chinese culture exists, communism will inevitably be eliminated ... not to mention Mao Zedong’s three red flags. Mao Zedong also understood this truth and was under this pressure. Therefore, this time he wanted to have a ‘Great Cultural Revolution (文化大革命)’ to ‘eliminate the Four Olds (破四舊)’ because he was afraid of the existence of China’s inherent culture”¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Qian Mu, 1994, Chinese Culture and the Future of Humanity in the World, *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture*, collected in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 103-104.

¹⁰² Qian Mu, 1994, Prospects for the Future of Counterattack and Restoration, *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture*, collected in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 159.

He also criticized Westerners for looking at China's issues very superficially. Because they do not understand China, they sometimes feel that the Chinese Communist Party has inherited Chinese traditions, and sometimes they feel that the current China is a "New China" that has been baptized by the West, which is contradictory:

"Recently the Communist Party took over the country. There is a reason for this. That is to say, it was like Hongxian Monarchy (洪憲稱帝). There was no reason for it at that time.¹⁰³ But when we know that Yuan Shikai (袁世凱) and Mao Zedong appeared in modern Chinese history, it was just an accident, but it was by no means inevitable or common. Westerners take it as a matter of course, which is a big mistake. Therefore, we must not discuss the future of the CCP in mainland China with the Westerners in front of us. Even though the chaos on the mainland is now very obvious. There is no lasting reason for the CCP to end its power struggle, but Westerners are stubborn, subjective, and rational, and they will never listen to our opinions. This is not surprising. I recall that sixty years ago when I was a child, the Westerners thought that China could be divided up and left to their own devices and control. Only sixty years have passed, and today, they seem to believe that the mainland's political power is unshakable. Do they think that sixty years ago was just a traditional old China, so it is not worthy of their attention? Today's mainland has accepted the baptism of the West. Communist thought is also a tributary of Western thought, so they believe that now is a 'New China' that has got rid of China's old traditions. So why do they grow pale with fear when talking about

¹⁰³ Hongxian Monarchy, referring to the fact that Yuan Shikai (1859~1916) abolished the Republic of China in 1916 and changed the name of the country to "Empire of China." This Empire lasted for 83 days and finally failed.

it? In other words, their mentality of bullying good and fearing evil will never change. This is unacceptable. As for some of them who say that Communist China is completely Chinese tradition, that is even more ridiculous. How can we talk to them about historical evolution and the future of mankind with such little knowledge?”¹⁰⁴

He believes that the Chinese Communist Party will never be in power for long. The emergence of Mao Zedong is an accident in Chinese history, not inevitable, just like the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (太平天國, 1851 ~ 1864):

“The Communist movement emerged from the New Culture Movement, and it respected Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. How was it different from Hong and Yang (洪、楊) who respected Heavenly Father and Heavenly Brother?¹⁰⁵ However, religion is still cosmopolitan, and worshiping Marx and Lenin is Westernized”¹⁰⁶

Moreover, “history is still determined by humanity and natural law, not material and force.” Therefore, brutal communism will never gain a foothold in China.¹⁰⁷

(2) Oppose Taiwan Independence

¹⁰⁴ Qian Mu, 1994, People, Things and Principles in History, *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture*, collected in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 193.

¹⁰⁵ Hong Xiuquan (1814~1864) and (1823~1856) were the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion. They used Christianity (as Hong Xiuquan understood it) as a rallying cry to rebel against the Qing Dynasty. Hong Xiuquan claimed to be the second son of God, with Jesus as his brother and Heavenly Father as his father, so he called himself "Heavenly Father" and "Heavenly Brother".

¹⁰⁶ Qian Mu, 1994, Preface 2, Chinese nationality and Chinese culture from the perspective of Chinese history, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi* 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 8.

¹⁰⁷ Qian Mu, 1994, Prospects for the Future of Counterattack and Restoration, *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture*, collected in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi* 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 161.

In 1971, the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations. As the CCP's regime gradually stabilizes and the hope of counterattacking the mainland becomes increasingly slim, different political opinions have emerged in Taiwan, and the voice of "Taiwan independence" is gradually rising. Qian Mu opposed Taiwan's independence and compared Taiwan's independence with the independence of Manchukuo:

“Before and after our war of resistance against Japan, we had the so-called independence of Manchukuo. Foreigners did not understand China and believed that the Manchus should have an independent Manchukuo. The League of Nations at that time also sent representatives to investigate. Even though they knew that the Japanese were behind the incident and that it was an international conspiracy, it still seemed that Manchuria was somewhat reasonable to be independent. Today some people are trying to stir up Taiwan's independence. Isn't it the same as Manchukuo's independence at that time?”¹⁰⁸

However, Qian Mu's main reason for opposing Taiwan's independence is not an international conspiracy, but is still based on cultural and identity factors:

“We cannot imitate Mao Zedong's catastrophe, which is to cut off the accumulation of China's ancestors with a single knife. It is endless here and cannot be connected there. If Taiwan became independent today, would Taiwan have a history? A country between heaven and earth must have a history, but how will this history be written? It is said that we are revolutionary

¹⁰⁸ Qian Mu, 1994, Accumulation and Innovation in Culture, *Chinese Cultural Spirit*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi* 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 199.

and independent, but where we come from, our ancestors have lived in Taiwan for how long, and we always push it up, talking about Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功) and Tang Jingsong (唐景崧).¹⁰⁹ We cannot say that Taiwan is independent today. From today on, Taiwan has elected a new president. But how did he grow up and what education did he receive? It cannot just be said that he studied in the United States and Japan. We cannot cut off Chinese history, we cannot abandon Chinese culture, and we cannot say that we have no family ancestors and are just an adopted foster son from another family seeking independence”¹¹⁰

He also said:

“The main reason lies in the blood of Taiwanese people. Since they have thousands of years of cultural traditions, it is not easy for another ethnic group to control them. In the end, Taiwan was sent back to China. At that time, wouldn’t it be shameful and ridiculous to sing loudly about independence? Extremely childish and absurd. That can be compared with Zheng Chenggong and Tang Jingsong. Those who open the skylight and speak out are still just Chinese people who have thought in the past hundred years. They want to cut off Chinese culture and follow foreign countries. You should know that the

¹⁰⁹ Zheng Chenggong (1624~1662), also known as “Koxinga”, is a Chinese national hero. He followed the Ming Dynasty as the orthodoxy and resisted the Qing Dynasty. In 1661, Zheng Chenggong attacked the Dutch who colonized Taiwan and successfully occupied Taiwan, using Taiwan as a base for reviving the Ming Dynasty. Tang Jingsong (1841~1903) was the last governor of Taiwan Province during the Qing Dynasty. On the eve of Taiwan’s cession to Japan in 1895, Taiwanese gentry did not want to be controlled by Japan and advocated Taiwan’s independence and the establishment of the “Democratic Republic of Taiwan (臺灣民主國).” Tang Jingsong briefly took office as the president of the Democratic Republic of Taiwan, but soon after, the Democratic Republic of Taiwan failed and Tang Jingsong fled back to the mainland.

¹¹⁰ Qian Mu, 1994, Accumulation and Innovation in Culture, *Chinese Cultural Spirit*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 200.

Chinese people in the past hundred years have been just as shameful, ridiculous, childish, and absurd as they are today in arguing for Taiwan's independence. In the past hundred years, the Chinese people have only wanted to put themselves aside and imitate foreign countries. They think it is a modern new trend and new movement in the new era, and they regard themselves as the new figures leading this movement. So, our Republic of China has been in such a situation over the past sixty years. Mao Zedong wanted to learn from Lenin and Stalin, but I don't know if he could succeed. Today's Taiwan independence elements want to learn from the American George Washington, and the thoughts and theories of our large numbers of intellectuals and young people over the past century will lead everyone down the wrong path. We don't have to blame them alone. Recently, President Chiang Kai-shek has risen to advocate cultural revitalization. This is our centenary and millennium plan. Each of us has the responsibility to study "how to revitalize the culture." The potential power of our culture will finally be irresistible. If we say today that we are Chinese, we also clearly think that we are Chinese, and our intellectual ideals are to learn from foreign countries. If we call others our fathers is ridiculous, how much more ridiculous should we call others me?"¹¹¹

Obviously, in Qian Mu's eyes, Mao Zedong imitated Lenin and Stalin. Taiwanese independence activists are imitating Washington. The two imitate different objects, but without exception, they are both ridiculous. The reason for these ridiculous claims is precisely the lack of understanding of Chinese tradition and the unwillingness to appreciate Chinese culture.

¹¹¹ Qian Mu, 1994, Accumulation and Innovation in Culture, *Chinese Cultural Spirit*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 203-204.

From the above discussions, we know that Qian Mu's reasons for opposing Taiwan's independence are consistent with his reasons for opposing communism. China's diseases must find solutions from Chinese culture. If Western medicine is introduced rashly, it will only make the disease worse.

(3) Against Western Political Theory

In the 1970s, although the Republic of China claimed to be a member of the "Free World," it was repeatedly betrayed by Western countries. At this time, Western countries began to recognize the People's Republic of China. At this time, Qian Mu had seen through the superficial division between "democracy" and "non-democracy" in Western political science:

“Those of us overseas who are not under the control of communist totalitarianism at the moment seem to only think that we are on the side of the free world and only hope that the free world will overwhelm the communist world. This is our future. Unexpectedly, the situation changed again. The Mainland Communist Party entered the United Nations. The Western European countries that we have always admired recognized the mainland's regime. Where is the dividing line between the so-called 'Free World' and the 'Communist World'?”¹¹²

He believes that the traditional Chinese distinction between “kingdom (royal, 王道)”

¹¹² Qian Mu, 1994, *World Situation and Chinese Culture*, *World Situation and Chinese Culture*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 54.

and “hegemony (domineering, 霸道)” is a better way to classify political power:

“If we compare China’s founding with modern Western empires, China’s founding was royal, while Western empires were domineering. Invading colonies and enslaving foreign nations are the conditions for establishing an empire, which is completely different from the royal way that China has built its country since the beginning. Therefore, today’s China should not only continue to use its national tradition and national spirit as the basis for its founding of the country but also use this spirit to contribute to the world and serve as the only important indicator of new trends in the world today”¹¹³

Therefore, only when the countries divided during the Cold War escape the poison of Western politics can the world usher in a new situation:

“Especially in China, the Soviet Union supported the Communist Party to seize power, and the government moved to Taiwan, which also caused the country to be divided into two. This, like Korea, Vietnam, and Germany, all go against the general trend of the world moving forward. We must take ‘anti-communism and restoration of the country’ as our main goal. If Japan, Vietnam, and Germany are not reunited, they will still cause disputes, making it impossible to solve other problems in the world. To do this, every nation in the world must gain complete internal autonomy, and then they can hope for peace and cooperation among themselves”¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Qian Mu, 1994, World Situation and Chinese Culture, *World Situation and Chinese Culture*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi* 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 55.

¹¹⁴ Qian Mu, 1994, World Situation and Chinese Culture, *World Situation and Chinese Culture*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 50.

Qian Mu repeatedly emphasized that every nation has its own unique life, and every nation must seek regeneration from its own old culture:

“Therefore, there will be only one way for the world in the future. When all nationalities are liberated, you are free, you are autonomous, and everyone no longer fights, then you can embark on a new path. World War I and World War II were all about fighting for colonies. Now that they have awakened, the flags of the British Empire have been taken down all over the world, and there are few left like Hong Kong. The world has changed, so we have only one way: one nation can follow its own culture ... Only we can save ourselves. In other words, they seek regeneration from their respective old cultures”¹¹⁶

Therefore, in terms of practical actions, Qian Mu no longer seeks to formulate actual policies, but instead focuses on education, culture, and identity:

“The first thing is to understand history. Second, we must understand education. The third point is that you should not be afraid, we must know how to “conserve”. There are very few things left in China today. We should know how to keep them and never throw them away. All you have to do is take a look at the current Palace Museum. There are many old Chinese things here, dating back hundreds and thousands of years, that have been preserved to this day. These are ancient Chinese artifacts. For example, in Taiwan, there are Zheng Chenggong Yanping Junwang Temple (鄭成功延平郡王廟) in Tainan

¹¹⁶ Qian Mu, 1994, Preface 2, *Chinese nationality and Chinese culture from the perspective of Chinese history*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Linking Books, 16.

and Wufeng Temple (吳鳳廟) in Chiayi. These can fully represent the great historical and educational significance of Chinese culture in Taiwan.¹¹⁷ Only by allowing us to recall old Taiwan can we hope for a new Taiwan. The new Taiwan is coming from the old Taiwan. We should know how to conserve old Taiwan”¹¹⁸

It can be said that Qian Mu’s discussion of his last days in Taiwan was a “conservative” discussion. Most people in China for more than a hundred years have longed to save the country with new systems and new ideas. Qian Mu instead returned to the position of adhering to Chinese culture: only conservatism can save the country.

5. Changes in Qian Mu’s discussion

From the analysis of this chapter, we know that Qian Mu was affected by the geopolitical situation, and his previous and later discussions changed. This change has two aspects. The first aspect is the reduction of actual policy suggestions; the second aspect is the change in attitude towards the West. However, amidst the changes, there are also constants, and what remains unchanged is his confidence in Chinese culture. When Qian Mu was in mainland China, although he also criticized the West, he was not very strong. He even used Western concepts such as “democracy” in the hope of communicating the differences between China and the West. It was not until the CCP was established and the Republic of China was betrayed everywhere in the world that

¹¹⁷ Wu Feng (1699~1769) was an official in Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty, responsible for translating between Han people and aborigines. He died at the hands of the aborigines. Although there are different opinions on the reasons why the aborigines killed him, the Japanese government and the government of the Republic of China have long promoted him as a hero who sacrificed himself to eradicate the aboriginal custom of head hunting.

¹¹⁸ Qian Mu, 1994, *Prospects and Reviews of Culture, Chinese Cultural Spirit*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Linking Books, 239.

Qian Mu began to vigorously criticize the West. The targets of his criticism were not only the Soviet Union but also boldly criticized British and American democracy.

Qian Mu's most important argument during his time in Taiwan was to prove that Communist China was not the real China. When there was no hope in the actual policy, Qian Mu put his hope in the Chinese cultural tradition behind him. He believes that any ideas that are against Chinese culture will not last long in China. This conclusion applies to any nation in the world. In the 1980s, the crazy Cultural Revolution ended, and the "Renaissance of Confucianism" boomed again in mainland China, which can be said to support Qian Mu's judgment.¹¹⁹

Qian Mu's efforts in Taiwan can be said to be to create a path for Chinese civilization. This arduous road can be achieved by denying the West, denying the Chinese Communist Party, and denying Taiwan independence. His strategy to achieve these three negations is also very simple, which is to constantly repeat the Chinese tradition and use the Chinese tradition he understands to fight against the West (after all, the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan independence are also the West in a certain sense). China is often reconstructed as the opposite of the West. As a result, Qian Mu's later discussions were more abstract than his earlier ones, and he placed more emphasis on the differences between China and the West than on the similarities. This can be said to be a consistent display of his identity strategy. This identity strategy can be described as Qian Mu's "improvised resemblance" in Taiwan under the background of Cold War geopolitics.

¹¹⁹ Jiang Qing, 1989, The practical significance of the revival of Confucianism in mainland China and the problems it faces (Part 1), *Legein Monthly*, (170), 29-38. <https://doi.org/10.29652%2fLM.198908.0004>. Jiang Qing, 1989, The practical significance of the revival of Confucianism in mainland China and the problems it faces (Part 2), *Legein Monthly*, (171), 22-37. <https://doi.org/10.29652/LM.198909.0006>.

V. The Particularity and Universality of New Confucianism

As an academic school in Chinese culture that responds to Western culture, New Confucianism is undoubtedly extremely special in China and even the world. Including Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and others, their brilliance in the history of philosophy also has a unique place in the world.

However, it cannot be denied that New Confucian scholars are affected by geopolitics and have the need to re-examine identity. This need to re-evaluate identity is universal.¹²⁰ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe once again faced the question of “Who am I?”¹²¹ Due to geographical reasons, Turkey is struggling between European culture and Islamic culture, seeking to establish its own identity.¹²² Although British colonization is gone forever, India is still hesitant between the name “India” or “Bharat.”¹²³ Even the need to identify who is a “terrorist” is in the aim to reconstruct the geopolitical picture.¹²⁴

In terms of Taiwanese politics, Taiwanese people are divided over their Chinese identity. Those who identify with China and consider themselves the motherland of overseas Chinese regard Taiwan as an “Anti-Communist Restoration Base (復興基地).” Those who believe that China is their homeland but Taiwan is not the homeland

¹²⁰ Dijink , G. (2002). National identity and geopolitical visions: Maps of pride and pain. Routledge.

¹²¹Batt, J. (2001). European identity and national identity in Central and Eastern Europe. In *Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration* (pp. 247-262). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

¹²² Rygiel, K. (2002). Stabilizing borders: The geopolitics of national identity construction in Turkey. In *Rethinking geopolitics* (pp. 118-142). Routledge.

¹²³ Deepak, JS (2021). *India, that is Bharat: Coloniality, civilisation , constitution*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

¹²⁴ Coleman, M. (2003). The naming of ' terrorism' and evil 'outlaws': geopolitical place-making after 11 September. *Geopolitics*, 8(3), 87-104.

of other overseas Chinese see themselves as “overseas Chinese” like the Chinese in Southeast Asia. If you neither consider China to be your motherland nor Taiwan to be the homeland of overseas Chinese, you will regard Taiwan as a purely “Chinese country”, similar to Singapore. However, under the circumstances of being unable to abandon ties with overseas Chinese and needing to fight communism, many Taiwanese politicians do not regard China as their motherland but regard Taiwan as the motherland of overseas Chinese. This state of identification is what Chih-yu Shih calls “overseas Chinese at home (海內華人)”. Is not the identity strategy of “overseas Chinese at home” a compromise between Taiwanese people’s Chinese cultural identity and Taiwanese local consciousness?¹²⁵

Thirty-four years after Qian Mu’s death, President Xi Jinping of China (People’s Republic of China), to build “Xi Jinping Cultural Thought”, wanted to “combine the basic principles of Marxism with China’s excellent traditional culture” and re-evaluated Qian Mu’s status positively.¹²⁶ The collapse of the CCP regime that Qian Mu expected did not happen, but the CCP did abandon its previous line of belittling Chinese culture and (at least on the surface) wanted to return to the traditional Chinese path. Of course, it can be said that Qian Mu’s thoughts were used by the CCP, but if the CCP wanted to use Qian Mu’s thoughts to construct its core ideas, does not it mean that Qian Mu reconstructed China?

The “improvised resemblance” played by Qian Mu reconstructs the discourse on China and restructures New Confucianism and geopolitics. Geopolitics and New

¹²⁵ Chih-yu Shih, 2005, Overseas Chinese at Home? The Ancestor Discourse in Taiwanese Identity Politics, *Review of Global Politics*, (10), 141-157.

¹²⁶ Zhang Qian, 2024, Hong Kong media: Xi Jinping builds his own cultural thought by re-evaluates Qian Mu, Central News Agency. <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202401080026.aspx>. Date viewed: April 6, 2024.

Confucianism influence each other, transcending the dichotomous framework of the “free world” and “communist world” of the Cold War era. The Cold War has passed, but Qian Mu’s ideas are still at work. It can be said that the geopolitics created by Qian Mu will last longer than the geopolitics of the Cold War.

Returning to the three research questions posed at the beginning. First, how Qian Mu’s discourse of China is affected by the geographical environment. Through document analysis, this thesis understands that Qian Mu has different discussions in different geographical locations and different geographical situations. During the mainland period, Qian Mu viewed China as a geographical entity. After arriving in Hong Kong and Taiwan, “China” gradually became a cultural and identity concept.

Second, how Qian Mu’s political views are affected by geographical factors. Through document analysis and genealogical analysis of Qian Mu’s works, it can be found that Qian Mu’s political views changed depending on the challenges he wanted to respond to at the moment. When Qian Mu wrote *Outline of National History*, China’s main enemy was Japan, so Qian Mu did not reject the interpretation of Chinese history through Western concepts. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Qian Mu turned to look for the cultural attribution of the CCP’s success. In his later years, when faced with the challenge of the Taiwan independence movement, Qian Mu chose to firmly believe that all forces that oppose traditional China can be explained by essentializing traditional China and opposing it to the West.

Third, the relationship between New Confucianism and geopolitics is shown in the research framework of this paper. The political perspective developed by New

Confucian scholars is a cultural remedy that reflects surrender to geopolitical failure. Ironically, New Confucian scholars, such as Qian Mu, have chosen a self-centered and romanticized cultural essentialism. Qian Mu defined China as the opposite of the West. However, this claim precisely acknowledges the dominance of Western geopolitics and unknowingly serves the purpose of Western geopolitics, which is to conceptually fix China in something inherently exotic. However, the resilience of Confucianism itself exceeds the imagination of New Confucian scholars. After the Cold War, Confucianism continued to exert its power and reconstitute the Chinese Communist Party.

VI. Conclusion

This thesis explores the geopolitical factors of contemporary New Confucianism, focusing on Qian Mu's discussion. This thesis answers three major research questions:

1. How is Qian Mu's discussion of China affected by the geographical environment?
2. How are Qian Mu's political views affected by geographical factors?
3. What is the relationship between New Confucianism and geopolitics?

Regarding the first question, this thesis points out that Qian Mu's discussions on China were more specific during his time in mainland China, and he still liked to use Western concepts to describe China's history. However, after 1949, Qian Mu paid more attention to the differences between China and the West and put forward less relevant discussions on actual policies. Analyzing Qian Mu's identity strategy, we can see that Qian Mu regards both the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan's independence as derivatives of the West. Qian Mu defined China as the opposite of the West.

Regarding the second question, this thesis points out that Qian Mu's political views were influenced by different geopolitical enemies of China (the Republic of China) at different stages. Qian Mu's political views were mainly derived in response to the challenges of various thoughts to traditional China.

Regarding the third question, this thesis borrows the "post-Chineseness" framework proposed by Chih-yu Shih to illustrate the mutual influence and mutual penetration between New Confucianism and geopolitics. Qian Mu was indeed influenced by geopolitics and traditional Confucian discourse, but his discourse on reconstructing China also influenced contemporary New Confucianism and current Chinese geopolitics.

New Confucian scholars pursued cultural renaissance, yet ironically replicated Western dominance. Because otherness is what the West wants to see China become, and because cultural remedies reflect a surrender to geographical failure. However, this is not the fate of New Confucianism, as the Chinese Communist Party is currently trying to reconnect with Confucianism. This last development suggests a dialectical trajectory——Confucianism's tenacity exceeds the imagination of New Confucianism through its reconstitution of Chinese socialism and party leadership on the one hand. However, on the other hand, it simultaneously implies the same inward turn probably now occurring in the PRC likewise faces a geopolitical challenge.

VII. References

Chinese Resources

- Cai Renhou, 2009, The path opened by contemporary New Confucianism under the impact of Western culture - commemorating the centenary of the birth of Mr. Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. *Chinese Studies*, 28(1), 1-7. (蔡仁厚，2009，在西方文化沖激下當代新儒家開顯的道路－紀念唐君毅牟宗三二先生誕生百周年。漢學研究通訊，28(1)，1-7。)
- Chih-yu Shih and Li Huiyi, 2017, From “Chineseness” to “Post-Chineseness” - Notes on Malaysian Chinese Studies, *Prospect & Exploration*, 15(5), 49-65. (石之瑜、李慧易，2017，從「華人性」到「後華人性」－馬來西亞華人研究簡記，展望與探索月刊，15(5)，49-65。)
- Chih-yu Shih, 2005, Overseas Chinese at Home? The Ancestor Discourse in Taiwanese Identity Politics, *Review of Global Politics*, (10), 141-157. (石之瑜，2005，海內華人？台灣人身份政治中的祖先論述，全球政治評論，(10)，141-157。)
- Chih-yu Shih, 2019, Integration of “Relationship Balance” Theory and Chinese and Western Relations Theories - The “Post-Chineseness” Agenda of China’s International Relations, *World Politics Studies*, 2019(2), 19-40. (石之瑜，2019，「關係均衡」理論與中、西方關係理論之整合－中國國際關係的「後華性」議程，世界政治研究，2019(2)，19-40。)
- Chun-chieh Huang, 2000, Qian Bin’s view of “national history” in his four historiographies: connotation, method, and significance, *Historical Inquiry, NTU*, 26, 1-37. <https://doi.org/10.6253%2fntuhistory.2000.26.01> (黃俊傑，2000，錢賓四史學中的“國史”觀：內涵、方法與意義，臺大歷史學

報，26，1-37。)

Du Baorui, 2011, Fang Dongmei's basic position on Chinese Mahayana Buddhism as both religion and philosophy. *Journal of National Taiwan Normal University: Language and Literature*, 56(2), 1-31.

[https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=20745192-201109-](https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=20745192-201109-201306110043-201306110043-1-31)

201306110043-201306110043-1-31. Date viewed: April 3, 2024. (杜保瑞，2011，方東美對中國大乘佛教亦宗教亦哲學的基本立場。師大學報：語言與文學類，56(2)，1-31。)

He Xinquan, 1996, *Confucianism and Modern Democracy: A Study of Contemporary New Confucian Political Philosophy*, Preparatory Office of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica. (何信全，1996，儒學與現代民主：當代新儒家政治哲學研究，中央研究院中國文哲研究所籌備處。)

Hu Chusheng, 2015, *Using the History of the Country to Reveal the Soul of the Country — A Closer Look at Qian Mu's "Outline of National History"*, *Academic Treatises under the Flames of War — A Closer Look at Ten Literary and Historical works during the Anti-Japanese War*, Taipei: Taiwan Student Book Company, 1-29. (胡楚生，2015，以國史昭蘇國魂——錢穆《國史大綱》探微，烽火下的學術論著——抗戰時期十種文史著作探微，臺北：臺灣學生書局，1-29。)

Huo Jinming, 1992, "Opening theory" as I understand it - Impressions on Mr. Yu Yingshi's "Qian Mu and New Confucianism", *Twenty-first Century*, October 1992, 134-138. (霍晉明，1992，我所了解的「開出說」——有感於余英時先生的〈錢穆與新儒家〉，二十一世紀，1992年10月號，134-138。)

Ji Yun (editor-in-chief), 2015, *Wenlange Sikuquanshu General Catalog*, 1549, Hangzhou: Hangzhou Publishing House. (紀昀主編，2015，文瀾閣欽定四

庫全書·總目，1549，杭州：杭州出版社。)

Jiang Huizhen, 2010, President Ma recalled Qian Mu: Injustice will never happen again, *China Times*.

<https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20100831000461-260115>. Date

viewed: April 3, 2024. (江慧真，2010，馬憶錢穆：不公不義不再發生，中國時報。 [https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20100831000461-](https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20100831000461-260115)

260115。瀏覽日期：2024年4月3日。)

Jiang Nianfeng, 1991, Postwar Taiwan Experience and Hegel in the Thoughts of Tang

Junyi and Mou Zongsan, in Lai Zehan and Chun-chieh Huang (Editors)

Taiwan's Development Experience after the Restoration, 37-100. Taipei: Sun

Yat-sen Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Academia Sinica. (蔣年

豐，1991，戰後台灣經驗與唐君毅、牟宗三思想中的黑格爾，收於賴澤

涵、黃俊傑（主編）光復後台灣地區發展經驗，37-100。臺北：中央研

究院中山人文社會科學研究所。)

Jiang Qing, 1989, The practical significance of the revival of Confucianism in

mainland China and the problems it faces (Part 1), *Legein Monthly*, (170), 29-

38. <https://doi.org/10.29652%2fLM.198908.0004>. (蔣慶，1989，中國大陸

復興儒學的現實意義及其面臨的問題（上），鵝湖月刊，(170)，29-38。

<https://doi.org/10.29652%2fLM.198908.0004>。)

Jiang Qing, 1989, The practical significance of the revival of Confucianism in

mainland China and the problems it faces (Part 2), *Legein Monthly*, (171), 22-

37. <https://doi.org/10.29652/LM.198909.0006>. (蔣慶，1989，中國大陸復興

儒學的現實意義及其面臨的問題（下），鵝湖月刊，(171)，22-37。

<https://doi.org/10.29652/LM.198909.0006>。)

Lin Meiling, 2010, The Historian Consciousness as Reflected in the History Branch of

Qinding Siku Quanshu Zongmu, *Journal of The Institute of Chinese Literature*

Shih Hsin University, (6), 69-86.

<https://doi.org/10.30120%2fJICLSHU.201007.0004>. (林美伶，2010，《四庫全書總目》所反映的史家意識，世新中文研究集刊，(6)，69-86。

<https://doi.org/10.30120%2fJICLSHU.201007.0004>。)

Liu Shuxian, 1996, *Transcendental Introspection of Contemporary New*

Confucianism, Contemporary Chinese Philosophy: Issues, New Jersey:

Bafang Cultural Corporation. (劉述先，1996，對於當代新儒家的超越內省，當代中國哲學論：問題篇，紐澤西：八方文化事業公司。)

Liu Shuxian, 2002, An examination of modern New Confucian studies, *Bulletin of the*

Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, 20. (劉述先，2002，現代新儒學研究之省察，中國文哲研究集刊，20。)

Liu Shuxian, 2008, *On the Three Great Era of Confucian Philosophy*, Hong Kong:

Chinese University Press. (劉述先，2008，論儒家哲學的三個大時代，香港：中文大學出版社)

Luo Yijun, 1994, Research on contemporary New Confucianism in the past ten years

and the so-called sect problem, in Mou Zongsan et al., edited by Yang Zuhan, *Confucianism and the Today's World*, 113-146. (羅義俊，1994，近十餘年當代新儒家的研究與所謂門戶問題，收入牟宗三等著，楊祖漢主編，儒學與當今世界，113-146。)

Mao Zedong, 1949, Throw away illusions and prepare for struggle, Chinese Marxist

Library, <https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19490814.htm>. Date viewed: April 3, 2024. (毛澤東，1949，丟掉幻想，準備鬥爭，中文馬克思主義文庫，

<https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19490814.htm>。瀏覽日期：2024年4月3日。)

Mou Zongsan, 1985, *Moral Idealism*, Taipei: Student Bookstore. (牟宗三，1985，道

德的理想主義，臺北：學生書店。)

Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai, and Tang Junyi, 1958, *A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of Chinese Academic Research and the Future of Chinese Culture and World Culture Outlook*.

<https://6744278.s21i.faiusr.com/61/ABUIABA9GAAg8Kv3tgUorNiu9AI.pdf>.

Date viewed: April 3, 2024. (牟宗三、徐復觀、張君勱、唐君毅，1958，為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言：我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途之共同認識。

<https://6744278.s21i.faiusr.com/61/ABUIABA9GAAg8Kv3tgUorNiu9AI.pdf>

。瀏覽日期：2024年4月3日。)

Qian Mu, 1984, *Academic Review of Modern China*, Taipei: Dongda Book Company, 21. (錢穆，1984，現代中國學術論衡，臺北：東大圖書公司，21。)

Qian Mu, 1994, *Chinese Cultural Spirit*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38. (錢穆，1994，中國文化精神，收於《錢賓四先生全集》38。)

Qian Mu, 1994, *Chinese nationality and Chinese culture from the perspective of Chinese history*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Taipei: Linking Books. (錢穆，1994，從中國歷史來看中國民族性及中國文化，收於《錢賓四先生全集》40，臺北：聯經。)

Qian Mu, 1994, *Culture and Education*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 41, Taipei: Taipei: Linking Books. (錢穆，1994，文化與教育，收於《錢賓四先生全集》41，臺北：聯經。)

Qian Mu, 1994, *Private Words on Politics*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 40, Taipei: Taipei: Linking Books. (錢穆，1994，政學私言，收於《錢賓四先生全集》40，臺北：聯經。)

Qian Mu, 1994, *Remembering My Parents at Eighty Years Old & Miscellaneous Memories of Teachers and Friends*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 51,

Taipei: Taipei: Linking Books. (錢穆，1994，八十憶雙親師友雜憶，《錢賓四先生全集》51，臺北：聯經。)

Qian Mu, 1994, *The Meaning of Culture*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 37, Taipei: Taipei: Linking Books. (錢穆，1994，文化學大義，收於《錢賓四先生全集》37，臺北：聯經。)

Qian Mu, 1994, *Twelve Lectures on Chinese Culture*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Taipei: Linking Books. (錢穆，1994，中華文化十二講，收於《錢賓四先生全集》38，臺北：聯經。)

Qian Mu, 1994, *World Situation and Chinese Culture*, in *Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi*, 38, Taipei: Taipei: Linking Books. (錢穆，1994，世界局勢與中國文化，收於《錢賓四先生全集》38，臺北：聯經。)

Qian Mu, 2009, *Outline of National History*, Beijing: The Commercial Press. (錢穆，2009，國史大綱，北京：商務印書館。)

Qian Mu's former residence, Chronicle of Mr. Qian Mu's works.

<http://chienmu.utaipei.edu.tw/%E9%8C%A2%E7%A9%86%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E8%91%97%E4%BD%9C%E5%A4%A7%E4%BA%8B%E7%B4%80/>. Date viewed: April 1, 2024. (錢穆故居，錢穆先生著作大事紀。瀏覽日期：2024年4月1日。)

Qin Xiaoyi, editor-in-chief, 1984, *Collection of Thoughts and Speeches of President Chiang Kai-shek*, Party History Committee of the Central Committee of Kuomintang. (秦孝儀主編，1984，總統蔣公思想言論總集，中國國民黨中央委員會黨史委員會。)

Shao Xuanlei, 2007, *Genealogy as a research method*, *Taiwanese Journal of Political Science*, (34), 151-174. (邵軒磊，2007，作為研究方法的系譜學，政治科學論叢(34)，151-174。)

Wang Qingjia and Hu Xiaobai, 2017, *Metanarrative of Chinese historiography*:

Examining the meaning of orthodoxy through the theory of "Cultural China",
Jianghai Academic Journal, (1), 33-41.

Wang Ruhua, 2012, *Three Sages of Modern Confucianism (Part 1): Records of Friendship between Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, and Ma Yifu*, Taipei: Xinrui.
(王汝華，2012，現代儒家三聖（上）：梁漱溟、熊十力、馬一浮的交誼紀實，臺北：新銳。)

Wang Wen-jin, 2012, Xi Zaochi and the Construction of Zhuge Liang's Myth, *Bulletin of The Department of Chinese Literature National Taiwan University*, 38, 71-120. <https://doi.org/10.6281/2fNTUCL.2012.38.03>. (王文進，2012，習鑿齒與諸葛亮神話之建構，臺大中文學報，38，71-120。)

Xiao Gongquan, 1982, *Constitutionalism and Democracy, Complete Works of Mr. Xiao Gongquan*, Taipei: Taipei: Linking Books. (蕭公權，1982，憲政與民主，蕭公權先生全集，臺北：聯經。)

Yan Hongzhong, 2006, Positions and Institutions - Qian Binsi and the Study of Chinese Political History, *Historical Inquiry, NTU*, 38, 105-158. (閻鴻中，2006，職分與制度——錢賓四與中國政治史研究，臺大歷史學報，38，105-158。)

Yang Jingjing, 2012, Zhu Xi's theory of Shu-Han orthodoxy, *Journal of Yichun University*, 34(1), 94-97. (楊靜靜，2012，朱熹蜀漢正統論，宜春學院學報，34(1)，94-97。)

Yang Zuhan, 1994, On Yu Yingshi's criticism of New Confucianism, in Mou Zongsan et al., edited by Yang Zuhan, *Confucianism and the Today's World*, Taipei: Wenjin Publishing House, 147-177. (楊祖漢，1994，論余英時對新儒家的批評，收入牟宗三等著，楊祖漢主編，儒學與當今世界，臺北：文津出版社，147-177。)

Yu Yingshi, 1991, Qian Mu and New Confucianism, *Still remembering the wind*

- blowing on the water - Qian Mu and modern Chinese scholarship*, Taipei: Sanmin Book Company, 31-98. (余英時，1991，錢穆與新儒家，猶記風吹水上鱗—錢穆與現代中國學術，臺北：三民書局，31-98。)
- Yu Yingshi, 2016, “Outline of National History” - From internal structure to external influence, *Disquisitions on the Past & Present*, 29, 3-16. (余英時，2016，*《國史大綱》發微——從內在結構到外在影響*，古今論衡，29，3-16。)
- Zhai Zhicheng, 2019, Qian Mu’s path to academicianship, *Journal of the Institute of Modern History*, Academia Sinica, Issue 103 (March 108, the Republic of China), 91-126. (翟志成，2019，錢穆的院士之路，中央研究院近代史研究所集刊，第103期（民國108年3月），91-126。)
- Zhang Qian, 2024, Hong Kong media: Xi Jinping builds his cultural thought by re-evaluating Qian Mu, Central News Agency.
<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202401080026.aspx>. Date viewed: April 6, 2024. (張謙，2024，港媒：習近平構建文化思想 重新評價錢穆，中央社。<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202401080026.aspx>。瀏覽日期：2024年4月6日。)

English Resources

- Agnew, J. (1994). The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory. *Review of international political economy*, 1(1), 53-80.
- Agnew, J. (2017). *Globalization and sovereignty: Beyond the territorial trap*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Agnew, JA, Mitchell, K., & Toal, G. (Eds.). (2008). *A companion to political geography*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Batt, J. (2001). *European identity and national identity in Central and Eastern Europe*.

- In *Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration* (pp. 247-262). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Bresciani, U. (2023). *Reinventing Confucianism: New Confucian Movement*. Passerino Editore.
- Brzezinski, Z. (2016). *The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives*. Basic books.
- Campbell, JR, & Rew, A. (Eds.). (1999). *Identity and affect: experiences of identity in a globalizing world*. Pluto Press.
- Cohen, SB (1963). *Geography and politics in a world divided*. *Naval War College Review*, 16(1), 6.
- Coleman, M. (2003). The naming of ‘terrorism’ and evil ‘outlaws’: geopolitical place-making after 11 September. *Geopolitics*, 8(3), 87-104.
- Deepak, JS (2021). *India, that is Bharat: Coloniality, civilization, constitution*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Dijink, G. (2002). *National identity and geopolitical visions: Maps of pride and pain*. Routledge.
- Hepple, LW (2002). *Géopolitiques de gauche: Yves Lacoste, Hérodote and French radical geopolitics*. In *Geopolitical Traditions* (pp. 284-317). Routledge.
- Huntington, SP (2020). *The clash of civilizations?* In *The New Social Theory Reader* (pp. 305-313). Routledge.
- Kaplan, RD, & Rieff, D. (2000). *The coming anarchy*. *World Policy Journal*, 17(2), 95-96.
- Koopman, S., Dalby, S., Megoran, N., Sharp, J., Kearns, G., Squire, R., ... & Toal, G. (2021). *Critical Geopolitics/Critical Geopolitics 25 years on*.
- Lacoste, Y. (2012). *Hérodote*, (34), 14-44.
- Pye, LW (1992). *The spirit of Chinese politics*. Harvard University Press. 235.

- Routledge, P. (2003). *Anti-geopolitics. A companion to political geography*, 236-248.
- Rygiel, K. (2002). *Stabilizing borders: The geopolitics of national identity construction in Turkey*. In *Rethinking geopolitics* (pp. 118-142). Routledge.
- Shih, CY (2022). *Post-Chineseness: Cultural politics and international relations*. State University of New York Press.
- Subcomandante Marcos. *The streams, when they descend, have no way of returning to the mountains except beneath the ground*. May 28, 1994 [2024-03-25].
<http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/mexico /sp000655.txt>
- Tuathail, GO, & Toal, G. (1994). *Problematizing geopolitics: survey, statesmanship and strategy*. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 259-272.
- Tuathail, G. Ó., & Toal, G. (1996). *Critical geopolitics: The politics of writing global space* (Vol. 6). U of Minnesota Press.
- Watanabe, A. (2018). *Greater East Asia Geopolitics and its geopolitical imagination of a borderless world: A neglected tradition?* *Political Geography*, 67, 23-31.
- Wei-Ming, T. (1991). *Cultural China: The periphery as the center*. *Daedalus*, 1-32.

Appendix: List of Qian Mu's Works

Years	Works	Publisher
1918	Analysis of the Analects of Confucius	Shanghai Commercial Press
1919	Memorial Collection of Mr. Zhu Huaitian	Shanghai self-published version
1925	Essentials of the Analects of Confucius	Shanghai Commercial Press
1926	Essentials of Mencius	Shanghai Dahua Bookstore
1929	Duke of Zhou	Shanghai Commercial Press
1930	Mozi	Shanghai Commercial Press
	Wang Shouren	Shanghai Commercial Press
	Chronology of Liu Xiang and his son Liu Xin	The seventh issue of the Journal of Yenching University
1931	Summary of Chinese Studies	Shanghai Commercial Press
	Hui Shi, Gongsun Long	Shanghai Commercial Press
1932	Research on Laozi	Shanghai Dahua Bookstore
1935	The first and second volumes of the Series of Years of the Pre-Qin Philosophers	Shanghai Commercial Press
1937	Chinese Academic History in the Past Three Hundred Years	Shanghai Commercial Press
1940	Outline of National History	Shanghai Commercial Press
1942	Culture and Education	Chongqing National Book Publishing House
1945	Private Words on Politics	Chongqing Commercial Press
1948	Introduction to Chinese Cultural History	Shanghai Zhengzhong Bookstore
1949	Chinese Religion, Society, and Outlook on Life	Taipei Free China Society
1950	Chinese Social Evolution	Taipei Institute of China Studies
1951	Research Notes on Zhuangzi	Hong Kong Southeast Printing Company
1952	The Meaning of Culture	Taipei Zhengzhong Bookstore

	Chinese Historical Spirit	Indonesian Tiansheng Daily
	Political gains and losses in China's past dynasties	Hong Kong self-published edition
	Chinese Intellectual History	Taipei Chinese Cultural Publishing Commission
1953	New Theory of National History	Hong Kong self-published edition
	Overview of Neo-Confucianism in Song and Ming Dynasties	Taipei Chinese Cultural Publishing Commission
	Interpretation of the Four Books	Taipei Chinese Cultural Publishing Commission
1955	Summary of Yangming Studies	Taipei Zhengzhong Bookstore
	Popular Speeches on Chinese Thought	Hong Kong self-published edition
1957	History of Qin and Han Dynasties	Hong Kong Xinhua Printing Co., Ltd.
	Mr. Wang Yangming's Biography and Excerpts of Great Learning	Hong Kong Life Publishing House
	Analysis of Zhuangzi and Laozi	Hong Kong New Asia Research Institute
1958	The Key of Learning	Hong Kong Nantian Book Company
	A Common Discussion on the Modern and Ancient Texts of Confucian Classics in the Two Han Dynasties	Hong Kong New Asia Research Institute
1960	Thoughts on the Lake	Hong Kong Life Publishing House
	Nation and Culture	Taipei United Publishing Center
1961	Chinese Historical Research Method	Hong Kong Monteggia Foundation
1962	An Examination of Place Names in Historical Records	Hong Kong Taiping Book Company
1963	Lectures on Chinese Literature	Hong Kong Life Magazine

	New Interpretations of the Analects of Confucius, Volumes 1 and 2	Hong Kong New Asia Research Institute
1968	Twelve lectures on Chinese culture	Taipei Sanmin Bookstore
1969	Chinese Culture Series (1) (2)	Taipei Sanmin Bookstore
1970	Introduction to history	Taipei Central Daily News
1971	Chinese cultural spirit	Taipei self-published edition
	Zhu Xi's New Research Volumes 1 to 5	Taipei self-published edition
	Outline of Zhu Xi's School	Taipei self-published edition
1973	Chinese Historical Masterpieces	Taipei Sanmin Bookstore
1974	Copies of Poems by Six Neo-Confucian Schools	Taipei Chung Hwa Book Company
	Confucius and the Analects	Taipei Taipei: Linking Books Publishing Co., Ltd.
	Biography of Confucius	Taipei Comprehensive Monthly Publishing House
1975	Chinese Academic General Meaning	Taipei Student Bookstore
	A Brief Biography of Confucius & New Edition of The Analects of Confucius	Taipei Guangxue Press
	World Situation and Chinese Culture	Taipei General Post Office
1976	Soul and Heart	Taipei Taipei: Linking Books Publishing Co., Ltd.
	Historical and Cultural Essays	General Political and Warfare Department of the Ministry of National Defense, Taipei
	Collection of Essays on the History of Chinese Academic Thought (1)	Taipei Dongda Book Company
1977	Collection of Essays on the History of Chinese Academic Thought (2)	Taipei Dongda Book Company
	Collection of Essays on the History of Chinese Academic Thought (3)	Taipei Dongda Book Company
1978	Collection of Essays on the History of Chinese Academic Thought (4)	Taipei Dongda Book Company
	Collection of Essays on the History of	Taipei Dongda Book Company

	Chinese Academic Thought (5)	
	Collection of Essays on the History of Chinese Academic Thought (6)	Taipei Dongda Book Company
1979	Collection of Essays on the History of Chinese Academic Thought (7)	Taipei Dongda Book Company
	Chinese Nationality and Chinese Culture from the Perspective of Chinese History	Chinese University of Hong Kong
1980	Collection of Essays on the History of Chinese Academic Thought (8)	Taipei Dongda Book Company
1981	Whispering Alone by Waishuang Stream	Taipei Student Bookstore
1982	Ancient History and Geography Theory Series	Taipei Dongda Book Company
1983	Remembering My Parents at Eighty Years Old & Miscellaneous Memories of Teachers and Friends	Taipei Dongda Book Company
	Notes on Three Neo-Confucian Books of the Song and Ming Dynasties	Taipei Dongda Book Company
	Chinese Literature Essays	Taipei Dongda Book Company
1984	Modern Chinese Academic Essays	Taipei Dongda Book Company
1987	Whispering in Blind Old Age	Taipei Dongda Book Company
1989	A Brief Review of Chinese History	Taipei Dongda Book Company
	The Remaining Manuscripts of New Asia College	Taipei Dongda Book Company
1990	Harmony Between Human and Nature	manuscript

Source: compiled by the author from the website of Qian Mu's former residence¹²⁷

¹²⁷ Qian Mu's former residence, Chronicle of Mr. Qian Mu's works.
<http://chienmu.utaipei.edu.tw/%E9%8C%A2%E7%A9%86%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E8%91%97%E4%BD%9C%E5%A4%A7%E4%BA%8B%E7%B4%80/>. Date viewed: April 1, 2024.