European Politics and Society:
Václav Havel Joint Master Programme

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Domestic Transitions, Global Support:
EU Public Attitudes Toward North-South Climate Finance

Master's Thesis

Author: **Valentin Christoph Zanon**

Email address: **valentinchristoph.zanon01@estudiant.upf.edu**

Supervisor: **Antoni Rodon Casarramona, PhD**

Wordcount: **11 399 (including references, excluding appendices)**

Submission date: **14.06.2024**

Abstract

Public support for climate finance transfers from the Global North to the South is limited in the EU, and scientific knowledge of its determinants is equally scarce. This paper addresses this by examining EU public support for climate finance allocation to the Global South, focusing on perceptions of domestic green transitions and the role of climate justice values. Using logistic regression and mediation analyses with data from the European Investment Bank's Climate Survey 2023-2024, this study finds that positive evaluations of the fairness and effectiveness of domestic green transitions correlate with increased support for North-South climate finance. Willingness to pay domestically for poorer households both moderates and mediates this relationship. Notably, the demand for a socially equitable domestic transition is negatively correlated with support in some EU countries. These findings highlight the importance of implementing and effectively communicating fair green policies to enhance public support for international climate finance initiatives.

Table of Content

Introduction

On the first day of COP28 in Dubai, the presidency declared the achievement of a milestone: the international community's adoption of the loss and damage fund to compensate Global South countries for climate change damages predominantly caused by high-emitting, wealthy nations. However, criticisms emerged promptly. Experts pointed out that the fund's voluntary nature and its modest $700 million budget, which covers less than 0.2% of the estimated $400 billion needed annually (The Guardian, 06.12.2023), are insufficient to mitigate the impact of climate change. Critiquing what seemed to be yet another example of Global North countries, which are major contributors to climate change, showing reluctance to significantly cut emissions in accordance with the polluter pays principle and their historical responsibilities (Colgan et al., 2020; Hornborg, 2018). Even when reducing emissions, richer countries might deepen global inequalities. For instance, by merely outsourcing carbon-intense production chains to other world regions. As Peters et al. (2011) demonstrate, the Global North's domestic green transition often shifts emissions to the Global South through international trade—a practice the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism aims to address, underscoring the need for coordinated international approaches to climate action.

Urgent climate finance and transfers are critical to achieving the Paris Agreement's goals (Landis & Bernauer, 2012; Pickering et al., 2017; Graham & Serdaru, 2020). This includes grants from multilateral funds, market-based loans from financial institutions, sovereign green bonds issued by national governments, and resources mobilized through carbon trading and taxes (UNDP, 2023). Poorer countries, on balance, still heavily reliant on fossil fuels, emit more greenhouse gases per unit of economic activity than Global North countries (Gaikwad et al., 2022). Recognizing the need for a green transition in the Global South entails understanding that such structural reforms will reorder societies and may face significant societal opposition (Gaikwad et al., 2023; Blankenship et al., 2022). As the international community commits to "transition away" from fossil fuels in a "just and equitable" manner (UNFCCC, 2023), climate transfers from richer to poorer countries become increasingly important to honor shared but differentiated responsibilities and address global climate justice (Mattoo & Subramanian, 2012).

The urgency of addressing climate change is widely acknowledged in the population. Eurobarometer data (European Commission, 2023) shows that half of EU citizens consider climate change the most serious problem facing the world today. Public support for climate change mitigation is crucial for advancing the green transition and transforming carbon-intensive economies into sustainable, prosperous, and equitable systems. While research on public support for

domestic green policies is well-established, this paper focuses on citizens' attitudes toward financially contributing to global climate change efforts aimed at poorer countries. This is especially relevant since emerging economies are often more vulnerable to the consequences of climate change, particularly due to climate change-induced natural disasters (Tol, 2018). To successfully push the brake on global warming, the social-ecological transformation needs to be addressed in a socially and economically balanced manner. Accordingly, Gaikwad et al. (2023, 4) argue that "solving the distributional issues at the core of each society's position toward climate change is crucial for activating the credibility of not only national climate policy but also international climate agreements." This exact pivotal point between a perceivably fair and effective domestic green transition and its impact on public support for climate finance allocation to the Global South is the focus of this paper's research, stating the following research question:

"How do individuals' perceptions of the domestic green transition in EU countries relate to public support for climate finance allocation to the Global South?"

More specifically, I conceptualize the "design of the green transition" regarding two main factors generally understood as crucial for public support, namely perceived fairness and effectiveness, on which I will expand in the state-of-the-art section. This paper intends to answer this research question by leveraging logistic regression analysis of the European Investment Bank's Climate Survey 2023-2024, which investigates public attitudes of all 27 EU member states. The analysis of this dataset provides evidence that a positive perception of the domestic green transition indeed is correlated with higher support for North-South climate finance on the individual level. Furthermore, this relationship is influenced by individuals' values related to climate justice.

Examining the literature on this still relatively young topic, several blind spots come to light. Firstly, the vast majority of research on public support for green policies focuses on policies with a national or EU scope, such as carbon taxing, the energy transition, or sustainable transport. Secondly, the significantly smaller share of research on support for policies with a cross-national scope, specifically, North-South climate finance, has mainly focused on individual or a small set of countries such as China, the United States (US), Germany, and India. A comprehensive analysis of EU-wide public opinion, however, is missing. Thirdly, determinants of public support for assisting poorer countries facing climate change often focus on policy-specific aspects, e.g., characteristics of the recipient country, whereas the role of the domestic green transition and its perception remains unlinked with support for North-South climate finance. These are the gaps this paper seeks to expand on.

Considering public opinion in the European Union and its role in global climate change endeavors is particularly interesting as its self-identification as a normative actor might also shape citizens' values and attitudes regarding the support of the Global South, which is generally less responsible for and more vulnerable to climate change. Youngs (2004) argues that integrating liberal democratic values in the EU's foreign and security policy, especially rhetorically, is crucial to legitimate its existence interiorly before EU citizens. The interconnection between the EU's self-ascribed role and its climate change politics is well displayed in the official communication of EU institutions, which introduced the European Green Deal in 2019. The EU evokes an era of "ambitious environment, climate, and energy policies across the world" spearheaded by the EU's "'green deal diplomacy' focusing on convincing and supporting others to take on their share of promoting more sustainable development" (European Commission, 2019). Rhetoric that could cynically be perceived as euphemistic, considering that the EU's insufficient climate policies are currently heading towards temperature rises of 2-3°C which is far beyond the 1.5°C agreement resulting from the Conference of the Parties in Paris in 2015 (Climate Action Tracker, 2024). For these reasons, examining public support for North-South climate finance in the EU is particularly intriguing.

In the following sections, I overview scientific findings relevant to this field, outline the central theoretical framework, including suggested hypotheses and the assumed mechanism, and explain the research design to answer the proposed research question. Finally, the results are used to discuss theoretical contributions and policy implications and suggest future avenues of research to expand on the knowledge contributed by this paper.

State of the Art

The research landscape on public support for climate finance and transfers is characterized by its relatively limited scope within the broader discourse on climate change. Despite the urgency of addressing climate-related challenges, Kallbekken (2023) notes that this area occupies only a small portion of the evolving research field. Notably, there is growing recognition that insufficient public support constitutes a significant barrier to the mobilization of climate finance and the realization of robust international investments in sustainable initiatives (Yeo, 2019). Moreover, even carefully designed mitigation and adaptation measures often exacerbate existing disparities by distributing costs and benefits unevenly among sectors and communities (Dolšak & Prakash, 2022). In a rare inquiry into EU support, Baute (2024) illuminates the nuanced dynamics of public opinion within the supranational entity, revealing higher public support for redistributing climate finance to poorer EU countries than those with higher emissions. This finding indicates the presence of a redistributive potential within the EU context. However, while insights into this intra-EU redistribution are emerging, few studies have examined the factors that influence public support for North-South climate finance.

Determinants of public support for international climate finance

In understanding the determinants of public support for North-South climate finance, several key factors emerge from existing research, primarily focusing on the role of policy design. Gampfer et al. (2014) conducted pioneering research on public attitudes toward climate finance that leveraged survey-based experiments and revealed a notable preference for mitigation over adaptation measures. 'Donor country' citizens prefer to financially support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through investments in regenerative energy sources rather than climate resilience measures. This study is complemented by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022), providing evidence of higher support if both adaptation and mitigation measures are connected. This tension becomes clearer considering the immediate benefit of adaptation measures for recipient countries that might already experience climate change-induced natural disasters (Bergquist et al., 2022). Contrarily, Global North countries are interested in preserving the climate, hence a public good, representing an immediate benefit (Dolšak & Prakash, 2022). These competing perspectives of Global North and South interests are essential to untangle to understand and effectively implement climate finance policies.

Gampfer et al. (2014) reveal another factor concerning cross-national implications influencing public support. Namely, they identify that "burden sharing between donor countries" (Gampfer et al. 2014, 13) is a critical factor, significantly increasing public support for climate finance

initiatives more than any other measured policy-specific factor. This empirical finding confirms the theoretical reasoning of Landis and Bernauer (2012), who highlight the potential effectiveness of burden sharing in cross-country climate transfer schemes. The importance of internationally orchestrated climate finance, as initially explored by Gampfer et al. (2014), is further confirmed in other studies. Public support seems to increase if both contributor and recipient countries have a say in the usage of climate finance. Next to balanced decision-making, multilateral endeavors supporting more vulnerable countries in tackling climate change are another factor in fostering affirmative public opinion (Bechtel et al., 2022). Extrapolating from these insights, unilateralism and a lack of transparency in the design of cross-country climate finance seem to be significant obstacles.

Some inconsistencies become clear when turning towards more general determinants, which are inherently part of compensatory climate finance. For instance, Gaikwad et al. (2023) challenge the prevailing emphasis on the role of policy design in climate finance discourse and instead highlight the significance of what they define as "home bias." This bias underscores a preference among the general public for investments in domestic initiatives over funding climate measures in foreign countries. Such preferences, rooted in perceptions of local benefits, significantly influence public support for compensatory climate finance initiatives. In contradiction to this, a utilitarian argument might increase levels of public support for North-South climate finance. Namely, compensating vulnerable communities can be construed as a strategy to address climate change-induced push factors that may lead to migration, such as its constraints on economic growth and productivity (Park & Heal 2013; Burke et al. 2015). Campaigning along these lines in favor of climate finance might tend to populist anti-immigration sentiments and foster a sense of self-protection among voters. Research from Bermeo and Leblanc (2015) and Arias and Blair (2022) supports this notion, highlighting the multifaceted motivations underlying public support for climate finance.

In synthesizing existing research, it becomes apparent that public support for North-South climate finance, encompassing mitigation and adaptation efforts, has grant polarization potential and remains relatively low in industrialized countries. However, the limited research in this domain often neglects crucial domestic factors that shape public opinion. By extending the analysis to test the applicability of findings from domestic green policies to international transfers, this paper seeks to enrich our understanding of the determinants of public support for North-South transfers.

Determinants of public support for domestic green policies

Considering the significantly richer literature on the determinants of public support for domestic climate change measures, this paper draws from those insights to expand knowledge on cross-country determinants. Recent studies have highlighted the pivotal role of two key factors in garnering public support for climate change mitigation policies domestically: perceived fairness and effectiveness (Larsson et al., 2020; Bergquist et al., 2022; Maestre-Andrés et al., 2019). These findings suggest that the public's perception of the social balance of climate actions and their efficacy in reducing greenhouse gases significantly influence their level of support.

Research findings accentuate another influential factor: trust in political institutions. For instance, Hammar and Jagers (2006) ascertain the significant role of trust in politicians in shaping the discourse on implementing carbon pricing in Sweden. Davidovic et al. (2020) introduce the 'Quality-of-Government' variable, indicating that citizens residing in countries with perceivably robust government institutions demonstrate a greater willingness to support environmental taxation measures. Expanding on this argument, Fairbrother et al. (2019) reveal that political trust in one's government is as a critical moderator, influencing the relationship between climate change concerns and support for fossil fuel taxation. Notably, countries with higher levels of political trust exhibit heightened support for such measures. These insights underscore the interplay between political trust, institutional robustness, and public endorsement of climate policies.

Drawing parallels from the domestic sphere, it is imperative to examine whether these established determinants—perceived fairness, effectiveness, and trust in government institutions—also shape public support for North-South climate finance. Therefore, this paper hypothesizes that individuals who harbor greater trust in their country's ability to orchestrate a just green transition, hence tackling the two main factors of fairness and effectiveness, are more inclined to endorse climate finance allocations to the Global South.

Hypothesis 1*: Individuals who have more trust in their country's ability to design a just green transition are more likely to support climate finance allocation to the Global South.*

Further investigations regarding socio-demographic characteristics and their relationship with support for climate policies reveal various insights. A study by Arndt et al. (2023) unveils a nuanced dynamic, identifying a center-periphery cleavage in the reception of green policies. Their research underscores that policies perceived as disproportionately impacting specific segments of society, particularly in rural and suburban areas, tend to evoke opposition, especially

in economically disadvantaged regions. This underscores the necessity of accounting for regional disparities in investigating public support and elucidates the linkage between support for green policies and perceptions of fairness within the green transition. In accordance with this, Eurobarometer data (European Commission, 2022a) indicates that rural residents across the EU exhibit significantly lower satisfaction with the quality, accessibility, and affordability of public transport—widely regarded as pivotal in the green transition—compared to their urban counterparts. Therefore, addressing these regional and socio-economic disparities is crucial to fostering broader acceptance and support for climate policies.

Another set of studies revealed how different socio-demographic characteristics influence levels of support for green policies, such as income, gender, and education. Generally, higher-income individuals are less likely to support redistributive climate policies (e.g., Dabla-Norris et al., 2023). Konc et al. (2022) offer insights into the relationship between income disparities and levels of support. Accordingly, in highly unequal societies, higher-income actors exert more societal power to voice their opinions, which in turn might push down public support for such climate policies. Gender also correlates with different levels of pro-environmental attitudes, with females usually expressing more concern about the impacts of climate change (Xiao & McCright, 2012). Finally, higher-educated individuals show stronger concern about environmental issues because they are more interested in guarding social welfare (Meyer, 2015). These findings strongly suggest the necessity of controlling for socio-demographics in testing this paper's hypotheses.

Mechanism

Socio-psychological factors are assumed to wield a substantial influence on public support for climate finance allocation to the Global South (O'Garra & Mourato, 2016). The mechanism proposed in this paper expands on O'Garra and Mourato's (2016, 21) argument, referring to the displacement of responsibility. They argue that sufficient information campaigns to establish human responsibility in the changing climate are crucial to creating a sense of accountability for individuals' roles in mitigating climate change. Empirical research supports this mechanism (Heinrich et al., 2016; Brutger & Clark, 2023). Thus, public debate and campaigning have been shown to increase citizens' capacity to decipher and evaluate different models of climate financing, discerning the benefits and drawbacks associated with each. This highlights the pivotal role socio-psychological factors play in creating agency concerning climate change.

The core relationship that this paper proposes aims to connect this 'first-level agency' with the cognitive creation of affinity to climate justice from the domestic to the global level by utilizing

two cognitive theories: the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). Utilizing these psychological frameworks, this paper argues that climate justice attitudes are both mediating and moderating factors of the relationship in H1. From a TRA perspective, developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1980), individuals' attitudes and subjective norms play a pivotal role in shaping their behavioral intentions. Positive experiences with domestic green policies cultivate a favorable attitude towards climate change mitigation and foster the recognition of global fairness issues as a significant aspect of subjective norms. Under the ELM framework (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), fair and effective domestic green policies increase personal relevance, knowledge, and involvement regarding climate justice. This heightened personal investment prompts individuals to engage in more elaborate processing of the global implications of climate change, leading to a more rational and in-depth evaluation of the need for North-South climate finance. Hence, the successful implementation of socially just and effective domestic green policies serves as a tangible example that a just green transition is not only feasible but also capable of addressing social inequalities. By showcasing the potential for positive change within their own communities, individuals are prompted to recognize their agency in driving similar transformations on a global scale. In this scenario, climate justice affinity mediates the relationship between the domestic-level evaluation of the green transition and support for Noth-South climate finance. The following hypothesis is constructed to generate empirical evidence to test this proposed mechanism:

Hypothesis 2a*: Affinity towards climate justice mediates the individual-level relationship of trust in their country's ability to design a just green transition and the endorsement of climate finance allocation to the Global South.*

While personal exposure to well-designed, socially equitable climate action might drive climate justice proneness, as the outlined mechanism proposes, it seems reasonable to assume this is not its exclusive origin. Views on climate justice are estimated to be determined by a diverse set of personal values and beliefs (Wahlström et al., 2013). Therefore, sensitivity towards social inequalities deepened by both climate change and climate action and willingness to support poorer households financially could have different origins but still impact the support for compensatory climate finance. This is the main reasoning for the expected moderation of climate justice attitudes and endorsement of North-South climate finance as outlined in the last hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2b*: Affinity towards climate justice moderates the individual-level relationship of trust in their country's ability to design a just green transition and the endorsement of climate finance allocation to the Global South.*

While gathering evidence for both mediation and moderation of the same set of values might seem challenging or even overly complicated, there is sufficient theoretical grounding to estimate that this two-fold effect exists. Individual attitudes are often interconnected, especially those that are part of the same sphere, as is the case with climate change-related attitudes investigated in this paper. Therefore, accounting for various ways of influence in the research design is an appropriate strategy to make sense of how climate justice values interfere.

By testing its three hypotheses, this paper aims to bridge gaps in existing research. Specifically, it will conduct a comprehensive EU-wide investigation while integrating domestic factors that shape attitudes towards North-South climate finance—a significant step towards enhancing the understanding of public sentiment and support for combating climate change on a global scale. Leveraging statistical analysis, this theoretical framework is either underpinned or infirmed as this paper unfolds.

Research Design

Data and Case Selection

This paper investigates the relationship between perceptions of the domestic green transition and public support for North-South climate finance within the European Union. The justification for choosing the case of the EU is threefold. First, as stated beforehand, the EU has a unique role in the international community as a 'normative actor' that leverages its diplomatic power and places democratic values and the rule of law at the core of justifying foreign policy (Manners, 2008). Top officials rhetorically showcase the EU as being at the forefront of international climate action, for example, as outlined in the European Green Deal. Focusing on public opinion within the EU, therefore, provides unique insights into how this self-identity of social balance and near-altruism translates into individuals' attitudes considering the fight against climate change in Global South countries. Second, as the EU comprises a number of historically high-emitting industrialized countries, climate finance deriving from the European continent is of high relevance in global efforts to stop climate change. Finally, this paper fills a scientific gap due to the previously discussed lack of a comprehensive analysis of public opinion determinants regarding North-South climate finance within the European Union.

This paper draws its data primarily from the 2023-2024 European Investment Bank's Climate Survey, which is a representative survey of individuals' attitudes regarding climate change and climate finance as well as perceptions and preferences regarding the green transition in their respective countries (European Investment Bank 2024). It comprises data from all 27 EU member states, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea, UAE (United Arab Emirates), the UK United Kingdom), and the US from August and September 2023. The study used self-administered online surveys to ensure representativeness through country quotas and weights to balance socio-demographic characteristics. Analyzing the European Investment Bank's Climate Survey, therefore, permits a comprehensive investigation of EU public attitudes.

A first look at the global data reveals where the EU ranks in terms of global comparison. Figure 1 displays the share of the population endorsing financial transfers to Global South countries. The EU, with 60% support, ranks among the lowest, yet slightly higher than Canada (59%) and the UK (58%). The US is listed somewhat above with 63% support, while approximately three in four people are in favor of compensating Global South countries in South Korea (76%), China (74%), and Japan (72%). In all investigated countries, the majority supports North-South climate finance.



Figure 1

This first look reveals two interesting aspects for the subsequent analysis. Firstly, compared to other industrialized countries, public opinion in the EU seems more critical of compensatory climate finance, which appears somewhat contradictory to its self-ascribed role as a global leader in the fight against climate change. Secondly, there is a majority in all investigated countries supporting North-South climate finance, again seemingly disproving some existing literature concluding limited public support. This might be due to the question's wording, as it seems to be framed in a way that appeals to individuals' values regarding climate justice and stresses the responsibility of industrialized countries considering high emissions[1]. Obviously, drawing conclusions is inappropriate at this point. Nonetheless, it underlines the importance of testing Hypothesis 2 and the assumed mechanism.

A slight pattern starts to emerge in Figure 2, which displays perceptions of the domestic green transition. The EU, Canada, and the UK, which ranked at the bottom of public support for endorsement of compensatory climate finance, also rank low when evaluating the effectiveness and fairness of their respective green transition. The EU public is the most skeptical, with only 38% tending to be confident. Emerging economies generally perform much better in the public eye than industrialized countries, with China scoring 95%, the UAE 92%, and India 88%. Of course, polls from autocratic countries ought to be considered cautiously as freedom of opinion and media are very limited, and respondents might hesitate to criticize their government openly in China and the UAE. Nonetheless, the predominantly negative perception of the just green

[1] Question 17: "Your country has emitted a significant amount of CO2 in the past 200 years and is responsible for part of the climate change that is affecting some developing countries today. Do you agree that your country should financially compensate these developing countries to help them fight climate change?" (European Investment Bank, 2024)

transition in EU member states is enough evidence to investigate its relationship with climate finance endorsement further.



Figure 2

Operationalization

Since this paper leverages secondary data, providing transparency in the operationalization and measurement of the factors of interest is essential. The outcome factor, public support for climate finance allocation to the Global South, is measured utilizing Question 17 of the EIB Climate Survey[2]. As discussed before, the priming of the historical responsibility for causing climate change in participants' countries might push up the numbers for public support, which must be considered. Additionally, developing, poorer, or non-Western countries often refer to the Global South. In light of the derogatory ring the former wordings evoke, this paper utilizes the term Global South. The concept of climate finance is a relatively new, technical term. The surveys' framing of this concept as financial compensation, again, underlines its normative aspect. For this analysis, however, both terms correspond.

Moving on to the operationalization of investigated determinants of public support for North-South climate finance, it is crucial to evaluate the ability of the survey to capture such fairly latent concepts. To obtain a measure of *trust in the respective country's ability to design a just*

[2] Question 17: "Your country has emitted a significant amount of CO2 in the past 200 years and is responsible for part of the climate change that is affecting some developing countries today. Do you agree that your country should financially compensate these developing countries to help them fight climate change?" (European Investment Bank, 2024)

transition, Question 16[3] is used, which asks about the evaluation of the domestic green transition as being fair and effective. Therefore, it corresponds with a *just green transition*. Additionally, while the terms trust and confidence encapsulate slightly different aspects, they can be used interchangeably in this context. As survey questions are often toned down for the sake of accessibility and inclusivity, some quasi-equal wordings ought to be adopted while being aware of the limitations that such a slight inaccuracy might hold.

For estimating individuals' *affinity to climate justice*, two factors asking about specific personal attitudes are considered for this measure: *just transition demand*, from Question 14[4] of the survey, which assesses a general affinity toward climate justice, and *willingness to pay*, derived from Question 20[5]. The latter concept complements the more general just transition demand by including whether participants are willing to accept personal economic losses in favor of redistribution as part of the green transition. The wording of the question leaves some room for ambiguity, as a specification of who the recipients of such personal contributions would be is lacking. Considering the overall context of the survey, however, the implicit frame of all questions aims for the national level - unless explicitly stated otherwise, for example, when assessing support for North-South climate finance. Therefore, it is assumed that this question assesses the willingness to pay for poorer domestic households to cushion the economically negative consequences of the green transition. While original answers range from "Nothing" to 1, 2, 5, or 10%, a new binary factor is computed to measure individuals' willingness to pay. On the one hand, binary predictors are more suitable for a logistic regression model. On the other hand, this measure is solely supposed to indicate the general willingness to pay to design the green transition more equitably. Both factors complement each other in terms of climate justice affinity as one asks for a more general just transition demand, addressing social inequalities, while the other quantifies the willingness of actual financial contribution.

A set of additional measures is considered in the investigation to account for the potential impact of confounding factors: first, whether individuals are in self-proclaimed need of financial support throughout the green transition; second, perceiving climate change as a top-three challenge; third, the general level of economic inequality in each EU country as expressed by the Gini coefficient; and lastly, socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, education, income,

[3] Question 16: "How confident are you in your country's ability to adopt climate change policies that both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address social inequalities?" (European Investment Bank, 2024)

[4] Question 14: „Would you say that the transition to a low carbon economy can only happen if inequalities are addressed at the same time?" (European Investment Bank, 2024)

[5] Question 20: "How much extra taxes on your yearly income would you be willing to pay to finance climate policies that benefit people with lower income than yourself?" (European Investment Bank, 2024)

ideology, and living in an urban or rural environment. As several aforementioned studies show, these characteristics might correlate with attitudes toward green policies. Hence, in the statistical analysis, they are held constant.

Methodology

In testing its hypotheses, this paper leverages logistic regression with country-clustered standard errors to account for the heterogeneity within the European Union while acknowledging possible similarities within countries. Due to shared cultural, political, and socioeconomic factors, the opinions of individuals within the same country are likely to be more similar to those in other countries and, hence, interdependent. By using clustered standard errors, this possible intra-country correlation in the data is acknowledged and adjusted for. While a multi-level model would fit the data for more in-depth country-specific insights, this paper chooses to utilize a standard logistic regression model to underline the primary focus on individual-level attitudes. Additionally, this paper aims to provide original insights into the EU public opinion considering the unique self-ascribed role of the EU. Therefore, not overfitting the data at the country level is also a decision derived from the theoretical framework of this investigation.
Furthermore, given the somewhat scarce research on understanding public support for North-South climate finance, an explorative approach seems fitting to contribute new insights to the field. While methods capable of causal inference are worth pursuing in political science research, the lack of longitudinal EU data, coupled with still limited knowledge in the field, makes testing original non-causal hypotheses the appropriate next step to pave the way for empirically grounded future research. Since this paper aims to investigate the predictors of a binary outcome, support or no support, logistic regression is an adequate method to find evidence confirming or rejecting the hypotheses, widely used in public opinion research (Maalouf, 2011).
According to the methodological approach, the following evidence is needed to support each hypothesis. To confirm H1, the logistic regression analysis should reveal significant determinants of public support for North-South climate finance within the EU. The factor measuring trust in their own country's ability to adopt effective and fair climate policies should emerge as a strong predictor of supporting compensatory climate finance. Additionally, given the four-tier categorization of the trust factor, each increase in trust should be linked to an increased likelihood of support. Subsequently, various statistical analyses are implemented to test H2a and H2b that outline the proposed mechanism. To gather evidence regarding H2a, which ascribes climate justice values as a mediating factor between trust and support, formal mediation analysis is conducted using the *medeff* package in STATA as developed by Hicks and Tingley (2011).

The authors base their method on Imai et al.'s (2010) simulation-based mediation analysis approach, which is defined as being more flexible than other mediation methods. This design allows the specification of much more flexible models for the outcome and the mediation (Imai et al., 2010). To confirm H2a, this analysis should reveal several things: (1) trust in one's country to being able to implement a just green transition as a significant predictor of climate justice affinity; (2) climate justice affinity as a significant predictor of support for compensatory climate finance; (3) a decrease in the direct effect of trust on support once climate justice affinity is held constant in the model. Only the fulfillment of all three conditions can be interpreted as supporting evidence of the assumed mechanism. Of course, logistic regression exclusively explains correlation and not causation. Hence, even if the mediation analysis has a positive outcome, a proper causal inference investigation must be implemented to support this proposed mediation fully in future research.

Producing statistical evidence for moderation, as described in H2b, is somewhat simpler. The inclusion of interactions in the main model is sufficient to pinpoint changes in the relationship between the evaluation of the domestic green transition and support for compensatory climate finance. Specifically, the model includes an interaction term between trust in their own country's ability to design a just green transition and the climate justice affinity measure. The significance of this interaction term indicates whether the effect of trust in the domestic green transition on support for compensatory climate finance varies depending on the levels of the moderating variable. By including interactions, the analysis can capture the nuanced ways in which public support is shaped, complementing the findings of the mediation analysis to test H2a. This approach helps to unravel the complexity of public support for climate finance by highlighting the conditional relationships that may exist.

Confirmation of the hypotheses would validate the theoretical framework and provide some empirical evidence for the identified causal mechanisms driving public opinion on compensatory climate finance within the EU. Conversely, if the hypotheses are falsified, the logistic regression analysis may show that the selected determinants have minimal to no significant impact on public support for North-South climate finance within the EU. This outcome would suggest the need for reconsideration of the theoretical framework or identification of alternative factors influencing public opinion on climate finance. Additionally, falsification of the hypotheses could indicate potential complexities or nuances in EU public attitudes toward climate finance that warrant further exploration in future research endeavors.

Explorative Results

Even though the dataset includes weights to balance country population sizes and possibly underrepresented socio-demographic groups in the sample, whether to include them in regression analyses of survey data remains subject to debate (Feng Wang et al., 2022). Considering the explorative purpose of this paper to test and establish new relationships, producing highly representative results is not its primary goal. Additionally, running the same model with weights changes the output only marginally. Some predictor coefficients, for instance, alter merely within a 5-10% range in the odd changes. Thus, weights are not integrated in the following regression analyses.

First, I include all relevant predictors and confounders without interaction in Model 1 to pinpoint the general relationship between the perception of the domestic green transition and compensatory climate finance endorsement. Generally, the output demonstrates a significant relationship between the main predictors and the public support for North-South climate finance. The model leverages country-clustered robust standard errors to account for intra-country correlation. While most predictors show low multicollinearity with low to moderate Variation Inflation Factors, the Gini coefficient indicates relatively high multicollinearity (28.6). While centering the factor reduces this issue (new VIF of 1.05), the Gini coefficient's p-value remains higher than 0.05%, which is insufficient to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, it is excluded from further investigations for the sake of parsimony.

The main predictor coefficients reveal a clear picture, as displayed in the marginal effects plot in Figure 3. Table 1 in the appendix should be consulted for the exact results in numbers. First, every unit increase in the four-tier measure of confidence in a domestic just green transition leads to an increased odds of supporting North-South climate finance of 86-119%. Second, every unit increase in the integrated climate justice affinity measure, which is coded from 0 ("no affinity") to 2 ("high affinity"), raises the odds of support by 63-85%, considering a 95% confidence interval. Hence, the assumed primary predictors are positively associated with increased public support while holding all other factors constant.

Several robustness checks are conducted to evaluate the model. Robustness checks, including the Wald test ($P>|z| = 0.000$) and likelihood ratio test ($Prob > chi2 = 0.0000$), indicate that the model fit is significantly improved by the inclusion of predictors, confirming their unique contributions. The manual test for heteroskedasticity, $\chi 2$ of 18.99 and with a significance of 0.0001, reveals its presence in the logistic regression model. This is a common issue in such models. To minimize the drawbacks of heteroskedasticity, accounting for robust country-clustered

standard errors is more reasonable and improves the reliability of the model's explanatory power.

Figure 3: Model 1, integrated climate justice measure, without interaction



Model 2, leveraging logistic regression, is created to gain further insight into the role of climate justice affinity. The integrated measure is split into its two original factors, willingness to pay and just transition demand. Figure 4 provides the marginal effects plot of Model 2. The computed numbers are provided in Table 2 in the appendix. The main predictor, trust in the country's ability to design a just green transition, slightly varies across the two models. A one-unit increase of trust in the domestic just transition is associated with an odd boost of 63-89%. The more eye-catching result reveals itself when examining the two climate justice affinity factors. Willingness to pay is associated with an odd increase of 233-310% for North-South climate finance endorsement, which is way higher than the rise in the odds of the integrated climate justice affinity measure computed before. On the contrary, the second factor, just transition demand, is negatively associated with support, reducing the odds by 16-32% when keeping all other factors constant. Hence, individuals who expect their government to tackle social inequalities as part of green policies are, on average, less likely to support compensatory climate finance to the Global South, keeping all other factors constant. This negative effect is surprising and contrasts the expectation even though the relationship is relatively weak.

Figure 4: Model 2, separate climate justice measures, without interaction



Moderation Analysis

As outlined before, climate justice values are assumed to not only directly influence support for compensatory climate finance but might moderate the effect of the main predictor, trust in the domestic just transition. Hence, in moving on to part two of this analysis, interactions are added to the model to test this assumed moderation effect. Three logistic regression models with interaction terms for integrated and split climate justice affinity measures were tested. All confounding factors are kept in the models. Figures 5–7 provide an overview of these moderation effects, displaying the average marginal effects for the interaction coefficients.

Model 3 includes an interaction term with the integrated climate justice method. Almost all interaction coefficients are significant. Only those who have no trust in the domestic just transition and show partial climate justice affinity are not significantly different from those without climate justice affinity or trust. For the rest, every unit increase in climate justice affinity significantly increases the odds of supporting North-South climate finance. When taking into account the narrow gap between the confidence intervals of some moderation coefficients, the odd increase seems rather marginal and non-uniform. Nonetheless, there is a clear moderation effect of climate justice affinity on the correlation of trust and North-South climate finance support.

Figure 5: Model 3, integrated climate justice measure, with interaction



Due to the same reasoning as before, the two climate justice affinity measures are considered separately for Models 4 and 5 to gain more nuanced insights. Model 4 is computed, including an interaction term of trust in a domestic just transition and the demand for socially balanced climate action. The second climate justice affinity measure, willingness to pay, is held constant. While most interaction coefficients are significant, the moderation effect is relatively small, visualized by the negligible distance between the average marginal effect lines for those who demand a just transition and those who do not. Moreover, some coefficients' confidence overlap, indicating that there might not be any differences in support for some trust levels when moderated by just transition demand. On balance, the data reveals a weak negative moderation effect of just transition demand.

Figure 6: Model 4, separate climate justice measures, interaction with just transition demand



As showcased in Figure 7, a different picture emerges when testing the willingness to pay factor as a moderating variable while just transition demand is held constant. The difference in support levels for each level of trust is significantly larger than in the prior interaction models. Furthermore, the overlap in trust intervals we saw before is gone, suggesting somewhat strong moderation effects. Specifically, for those who are very confident in their country's ability to design a just green transition while also being willing to pay for poorer households in their country, the probability of supporting North-South climate finance is approximately 28.5% higher compared to those who are not willing to pay for households that are struggling throughout the green transition. The moderation effects for trust levels range between 26% and 36%. The comparatively larger confidence interval for the interaction coefficient of high trust (=4) and no willingness to pay might be due to the existence of outliers. Nonetheless, these results show that the willingness to financially support poorer households domestically clearly moderates the relationship between the trust in a fair domestic green transition and support for compensatory climate finance allocation to the Global South.

Figure 7: Model 5, separate climate justice measures, interaction with willingness to pay



In providing a better understanding of the goodness of fit for each model, Figure 8 provides an overview with some essential comparison measures. Models 1 and 3, both including the integrated climate justice affinity measure, indicate the lowest pseudo-R^2 scores. Hence, the split climate justice measures in Models 2, 4, and 5 explain support for compensatory climate finance better, which is unsurprising when considering the opposite directions of the climate justice affinity factors. Although Model 5 has a lower AIC (21356.4) compared to Model 2 (21380.6), indicating a slightly better fit, its BIC is higher (21505.2 vs. 21490.3 of Model 2). That is because BIC penalizes model complexity increased by the interaction terms more heavily than AIC. Additionally, the marginal increase of the pseudo-R^2 of 0.001 from Model 2 to Model 5 is negligible in model improvement. Thus, even though the analysis identified a significant moderation effect of willingness to pay, the interaction term might not significantly improve the overall explanatory power of the model. Therefore, while acknowledging the moderation effect, it should be recognized that Model 2 prevails for its balance between fit and simplicity.

Figure 8: Overview of Models 1–5 with goodness of fit indicators

Model Overview: Support for North-South Climate Finance

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Integrated Climate Justice Measure	X		X		
Interaction			X	(with just transition demand)	(with willingness to pay)
pseudo R-sq	0.120	0.163	0.123	0.163	0.164
AIC	22474.3	21380.6	22400.9	21373.3	21356.4
BIC	22584.0	21490.3	22573.3	21522.2	21505.2
N	18671	18671	18671	18671	18671

Mediation Analysis

Until this point, the results partly support the theoretically derived assumptions as argued in earlier sections of this paper. The willingness to pay directly influences public support for climate finance allocation to the Global South and moderates the effect of trust in the domestic just green transition, whereas the mere demand for a socially equitable green transition is even negatively associated with support in the evident dataset. Since attitudes are often complex and interconnected, it is reasonable to additionally assume a mediating role of climate justice values between the relationship of trust and support. Hence, mediation analysis is implemented to generate evidence to support or reject this assumption.

As mentioned, the mediation analysis uses the *medeff* package in STATA, which computes the average mediation effect and the percentage of the mediated share of the direct effect based on an algorithmic calculation (Hicks & Tingley, 2011). Since the treatment has to be binary, the four-tier just transition confidence is collapsed: "not confident at all" and "not really confident" are labeled as not treated observations (0). In contrast, "rather confident" and "very confident" now represent the treated observations (1). As earlier findings revealed, only one of the two climate justice affinity factors, willingness to pay, positively affects support for compensatory climate finance, so the mediation analysis is only conducted considering this factor. Consequently, the integrated climate justice affinity factor and the just transition demand factor are not handled as mediating variables.

In Model 6 (Figure 9), the relationship between trust in the country's ability to design a just green transition and public support for North-South climate finance is mediated by the willingness to pay. Firstly, the logistic regression results indicate a significant positive effect of just transition confidence on willingness to pay (coefficient = 1.186, p = 0.000) and a strong positive

effect of willingness to pay on public support for North-South climate finance (coefficient = 1.391, p = 0.000). The total effect of trust on public support is approximately 0.229, which consists of the average mediation (0.084) and the average direct effect (0.145). Hence, 34-40% of the total effect of trust in the just transition on support is mediated through willingness to pay. This suggests that, as assumed, climate justice values play a meaningful role in mediating the relationship.

However, these findings need to be taken into consideration tentatively. The pseudo-R^2 value of 0.1444 indicates that the model explains only a modest proportion of the variance in support. Moreover, mediation analysis relies on the assumption of a causal relationship and hinges on the absence of unobserved omitted variables. Due to the nature of the evident data set and the lack of an implemented method capable of causal inference, these aspects are clear limitations that should be addressed in future research utilizing different methodologies.

Figure 9: Model 6, mediation analysis of willingness to pay

Model 6: Mediation Analysis with Willingness to Pay

Effect	Mean	[95% Conf.	Interval]
ACME1	.0846886	.0771569	.0925078
ACME0	.0827715	.0750084	.09069
Direct Effect 1	.1467012	.1279637	.1658931
Direct Effect 0	.1447842	.1265934	.1631083
Total Effect	.2294727	.2103916	.247497
% of Total via ACME1	.3685728	.3421801	.4025283
% of Total via ACME0	.3602296	.3344344	.3934164
Average Mediation	.08373	.0761617	.091608
Average Direct Effect	.1457427	.1273827	.1646151
% of Tot Eff mediated	**.3644011**	.3383072	.3979724

Subgroup Analysis

A sub-group analysis was implemented to evaluate the robustness of the revealed associations in individual EU member states. Model 2, which includes all relevant predictors separately without interaction, was run to test the robustness of the general relationships. While this robustness check was initially intended for some countries representative of regions regarding economic and cultural factors and climate change efforts, some surprising outcomes led to the decision to carry out a holistic sub-group analysis of all EU member states.

The computed logistic regression outputs in Tables 7, 8, and 9 in the appendix show that the main predictor, trust in the country's ability to design a just green transition, is significantly

associated with support for North-South climate finance in almost every country. Only for Luxembourg and Malta, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. It should be noted that the relatively small pool of observations from these countries (352 from Luxembourg and 160 from Malta) gives these limitations undoubtedly less weight as a small N might introduce higher measurement error. Considering that the general correlation is observed in the majority of EU member states, it is reasonable to state that the earlier finding of trust in the fairness of the green transition being positively associated with support for North-South climate finance is relatively robust.

However, a mixed picture emerges regarding the climate justice affinity factors. The computed coefficients for both measures, willingness to pay and just transition demand, are significantly associated in the models of Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia, as shown in Table 7. While the strength of this association varies across countries, the directions remain unchanged, with the association of willingness to pay being positive and the preference for a just transition negative with support. These country outputs are uniform with the overarching EU model.

However, for the majority of EU countries, the results are different. Only the willingness to pay factor is a significant predictor of compensatory climate finance support for the models of Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden (Table 8). On the other hand, the just transition demand seems to not be significantly associated with support, limiting the weight of this factor regarding the EU level. Generally, these findings nuance the previous evidence of the willingness to pay factor being a stronger predictor than the mere preference to tackle social inequalities throughout the green transition.

Discussion

This paper expands on previous literature investigating public support for green policies by revealing the relationship between perceptions of the domestic green transition and public support for climate finance allocation to the Global South. Higher levels of trust in the fairness and effectiveness of the domestic green transition translate into the endorsement of climate finance allocation to countries that are historically polluting less while facing harsher perils of climate change. Thus, the analysis generated clear evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. The findings are consistent with the research conducted by Larsson et al. (2020) and Bergquist et al. (2022), which highlighted the significance of perceived effectiveness and fairness in gaining support for domestic climate policies. However, this paper expands this understanding to an international context. The evaluation and processing of information on the fairness and effectiveness of the domestic green transition not only acts as a basis to shape individuals' preferences on domestic green policies but also on policies with a global impact that might benefit them indirectly. Whereas earlier research revealed that policy-specific factors (Gampfer et al., 2014; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022; Bergquist et al.; 2022; Dolšak & Prakash, 2022) and the international configuration of climate finance (Gampfer et al., 2014; Landis & Bernauer, 2012; Bechtel et al., 2022) are essential in shaping support, domestic factors play an essential role in attitude formation as well. This finding is robust across almost all EU member states.

Additionally, this paper identified that support for North-South climate finance is connected with climate justice values, strengthening the proposed mechanism, which emphasizes the interplay of socio-psychological factors in attitude formation. Particularly, if individuals are willing to pay extra taxes for domestic poorer households, they are also more likely to support the Global South in the fight against climate change. Additionally, willingness to pay moderates and mediates the relationship of trust in the domestic just transition and support levels. Hence, the related pathway is twofold: Firstly, if citizens' positive perception of the effectiveness and fairness of national climate action is coupled with the willingness to support lower-income citizens, they are more open to endorsing assistance for Global South countries. Secondly, the positive perception of the green transition seems to partly increase the willingness to pay, which in turn fuels support. Hence, the analysis of the evident dataset provides evidence in confirmation of Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b.

The essential role of climate justice values in mediating public support for compensatory climate finance does two things. Firstly, it underscores the importance of normativity in citizens' preference-shaping processes when reflecting on their privileged position living in a Global North country that has historically contributed to unequal ecological exchange. Secondly, it

reveals how personal exposure to a well-designed green transition that balances effectivity and redistributive aspects can impact how individuals perceive global injustices accelerated by climate change and its impacts. “Solving the distributional issues at the core of each society,” declared as an integral condition of a successful global green transition by Gaikwad et al. (2023, 4), indeed does impact the effectiveness of globally orchestrated climate action by rallying public opinion behind the common goal of a sustainable way of living.

However, some findings of this analysis contradict the straightforward positive association between climate justice values and public support for North-South climate finance. The demand for a green transition that also addresses social inequalities is associated with slightly lower levels of support on the EU level. Notably, in some EU countries, there is no difference in support levels for those who demand socially equitable climate measures and those who do not. What appears to be a paradox becomes clearer once considering the implicit geographical context of this just transition demand. Given the overall framework of the European Investment Banks’ Climate Survey, individuals expressed this attitude against a local background, priming social inequalities as perceived on a national level, not a global one. One possible explanation for this contradiction might be the challenge of balancing local and global priorities. For many, the immediate and more feasible social inequalities within their own country might overshadow the more abstract concept of global inequality. This local focus could be driven by direct experiences with domestic social issues, such as income gaps, unemployment, and surging costs of living, which are more visible and pressing in daily life. Thus, for individuals advocating for social equity, national concerns might implicitly be prioritized, seeing socially equitable climate action as a tool to address these local problems first.

Additionally, there seems to be a geographical divide between prioritizing social equity in one’s country and globally. For some, socially equitable climate action might be seen as an exhaustible resource, which might lead to demanding a just transition domestically rather than supporting the Global South. This zero-sum thinking regarding international cooperation fits into the overall concept of “home bias” (Gaikwad, 2023), as identified in prior research. This bias can be attributed to a psychological tendency to favor one’s immediate community over distant others, especially when resources are perceived as limited. In times of economic uncertainty or social unrest, this tendency might be intensified as people become more protective of their national interests.

Conversely, the analysis revealed that those who expect to need financial support to counterbalance the negative consequences of climate measures are more willing to support Global South countries. Hence, recognizing one’s own struggles due to climate change and climate

action appears to foster a sense of shared vulnerability and solidarity, crossing national and continental borders. This issue-related empathy deriving from personal experiences seems to garner a sense of global altruism, pushing support for compensatory climate finance.

Those who stress domestic social inequalities, however, might have a stronger sense of nationalistic solidarity putting the financial struggles of their fellow citizens first. The salience of narratives priming national identity and engagement in populism seems to interfere with whether the sensitivity to domestic social inequalities develops into national or global solidarity. This phenomenon could be further understood through the lens of political rhetoric and media influence, which often shape public perceptions and priorities. Populist leaders and movements are especially fond of framing international cooperation and assistance as secondary to guaranteeing welfare for their nation's citizens. Whatever the configuration of these mechanisms might be, the analysis reveals that decision-makers actions are potent determinants of whether public support for allocating climate finance to the Global South will be fostered or limited.

Policy Implications

The findings of this paper have significant policy implications for fostering public support for North-South climate finance. As higher levels of trust in the fairness and effectiveness of the domestic green transition correlate with higher public support for climate finance to the Global South, implementing well-designed climate policies is crucial to fostering this trust. Policymakers should ensure the balance of efficiency and redistributive aspects in domestic climate action, such as redistributive use of carbon tax revenues, renewable energy subsidies, investment in green infrastructure, energy efficiency programs, or targeted support for regions currently most dependent on fossil fuels. Compelling communication campaigns should accompany such policies since a striking narrative can determine whether a policy fails or succeeds. Countering zero-sum thinking by underscoring the common good that is protected and improved by implementing swift, effective climate measures is crucial in communication efforts to drain the ground for populist messaging.

Communicative aspects of compensatory climate finance allocation weigh even more as the benefits for the electorate are more complex to observe. The rationale for supporting climate action in poorer regions still seems to be partly obscured by skepticism, as general support levels in the EU show. Underlining the high potential for greenhouse gas savings for relatively low investments, such as energy efficiency improvement measures, could be a strategy to fuel support levels for cross-continental transfers. Another approach might be to emphasize both the

societal and individual financial gains deriving from investing in the Global South by offsetting its costs against the potential damages from climate change. While no robust methodology exists yet to comprehensively and reliably calculate these costs (European Environment Agency, 2022), studies tackling the EU and the UK estimate adaptation investments at a global temperature increase of 3-4°C at around € 175-200 billion a year. If global temperatures stay within a 1.5°C rise, these adaptation investments are estimated to be only € 40 billion (Joint Research Centre, 2020; COACCH, 2022). Thus, transparent information campaigns raising awareness of this substantial potential of evading climate change costs could be decisive in rallying public opinion behind orchestrated climate action, bridging the evident geographical divide.

Limitations and Future Research

This paper has certain limitations that need to be acknowledged. Firstly, it provides limited insight into the validity of the proposed mechanisms due to the explorative methodology used instead of one capable of causal inference. This is also because of the absence of EU-wide, longitudinal surveys and comprehensive datasets, stemming from the lack of general attention towards North-South climate finance. This paper addressed this challenge by, firstly, delivering a theoretically grounded justification of the mechanism utilizing cognitive theories and, secondly, implementing a mediation analysis to pinpoint the role of climate justice values in the relationship of perceptions of the domestic green transition and support for North-South climate finance. Nonetheless, causal methodology ought to be employed to gain more robust insights and improve external validity regarding the mechanism.

Secondly, the reliance on self-reported data introduces potential measurement errors and issues of endogeneity, particularly concerning individual attitudes. While this limitation is inherent in many studies researching subjective attitudes, this paper's aim of assessing individuals' perceptions of social inequalities and subjective evaluations of "a fair green transition" could introduce even more bias. Sensitivity tests and robustness checks, as employed in this investigation, are qualified tools to reduce these issues. It is difficult, however, to fully eradicate this problem as it is inherently part of the nature of the studied phenomenon.

Lastly, this study did not account for certain controls and unobserved factors, such as media framing or more specific regional contexts, which could influence public attitudes. Studies have shown that the media coverage of the domestic and global green transition and the broader public discourse on the topic are essential in shaping personal attitudes (Chinn et al., 2020). Furthermore, media framing of climate change-induced natural disasters in the EU and abroad seems to affect individual actions (Chapman et al., 2016). One could say this paper's blind eye

on this aspect is a different side of the same coin: the lack of available surveys and datasets on attitudes towards North-South climate finance. Hence, these limitations directly lead to recommendations for future research.

Against the backdrop of the limited body of research examining determinants of public support for climate finance allocation to the Global South, several future research avenues are essential to gain more insights on this decisive theme. Firstly, comprehensive surveys ought to be carried out to provide better empirical insight not only on individual-level attitudes towards climate finance but also on perceptions of the regional public discourse and media coverage to counter the lack of data. The consideration of a potential gap between the public perception of climate action and actual performance perhaps provides further insights into the role of subjectivity and the predominant media framing of the domestic green transition in fostering support. Secondly, qualitative approaches such as in-depth interviews should be implemented to deepen the understanding of how perceptions of the domestic green transition are connected to support for compensatory climate finance, as revealed in this paper. Studying individuals' thought processes better is essential in tracing how the interplay of perceptions and climate justice values ultimately converges into support for North-South climate finance. Lastly, an important avenue for future research is to explore what this study identified as a paradox: Individuals who express the need for financial support during the green transition are more likely to endorse North-South climate finance, whereas those advocating for social inequalities to be addressed as part of climate action more generally are slightly less supportive in several EU countries. While this paper speculated that nationalistic tendencies and zero-sum thinking might cause this contradicting relationship of climate justice values, only further scientific investigation can thoroughly confirm this.

Conclusion

Against the backdrop of limited research on determinants of public support for North-South climate finance, this paper has contributed to the field by linking support levels with perceptions of the domestic green transition and climate justice values. By providing a comprehensive EU-wide analysis of how personal exposure to fair and effective green policies is associated with compensatory climate finance endorsement through garnering affinity to climate justice values, it contributed original exploratory insights that lay the groundwork for future research. The analysis gathered evidence supporting Hypothesis 1, confirming that individuals with higher trust in their country's ability to design a fair and efficient green transition are more likely to favor climate finance allocation to the Global South. These findings underline the essential role of implementing and communicating fair green policies to enhance public support for international climate finance initiatives.

The results of testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b, investigating the moderating and mediating role of climate justice affinity in this relationship, are less clear. Specifically, willingness to pay emerges as a significant factor, mediating approximately 34% of the effect of trust on support for North-South climate finance while also moderating this relationship. Interestingly, the demand for a domestic just transition is negatively associated with climate finance endorsement in some EU countries, albeit weakly. This finding suggests a potential geographical divide in the reach of climate justice affinity. Nationalistic tendencies may lead some individuals to prefer addressing domestic social inequalities over supporting poorer regions vulnerable to climate change and its consequences. Conversely, personal experiences of financial struggles during the green transition are positively associated with support for North-South climate finance. This indicates a possible development of cross-national solidarity in facing common challenges. However, as the evidence supporting this mechanism remains insufficient, further research is needed to understand these dynamics better.

In summary, this paper highlights the critical role of domestic policy perceptions in shaping support for climate finance by statistically analyzing reliable and representative data from the European Investment Bank's Climate Survey 2023-2024. For policymakers, this underlines the need to design effective and socially equitable green policies, accompanied by active communication to inform and convince people of climate action according to global fairness and cooperation. However, the study's limitations, such as the lack of causal methodology and the complete dependency on potentially biased self-reported data, should be considered when interpreting the results, particularly concerning the proposed mechanism and the role of climate justice values. There is great potential for future research to delve deeper into this interplay and

explore the dynamics of domestic perception, climate justice affinity, and compensatory climate finance endorsement in different geographical and cultural contexts to provide a more nuanced understanding. Ultimately, fostering a sense of global solidarity and addressing nationalistic barriers are crucial for achieving equitable and effective climate action on a global scale.

References

Arias, Sabrina B./Blair, Christopher W. (2022): Changing tides: public attitudes on climate migration. In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 84, p. 560–567.

Arndt, Chirstoph/Halikiopoulou, Daphne/Vrakopoulos, Christos (2023): The centre-periphery divide and attitudes towards climate change measures among Western Europeans. In: Environmental Politics, Vol. 32/2, p. 381–406.

Blankenship, Brian/Aklin, Michael/Urpelainen, Johannes/Nandan, Vagisha (2022): Jobs for a just transition: Evidence on coal job preference from India. In: Energy Policy, Vol. 165, Nr. 112910.

Baute, Sharon (2024): The distributive politics of the green transition: a conjoint experiment on EU climate change mitigation policy. In: Journal of European Public Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2024.2304609.

Bechtel, Michael/Scheve, Kenneth/van Lieshout, Elisabeth (2022): Improving public support for climate action through multilateralism. In: Nature Communications, Vol. 13, Nr. 6441. DOI: 10.1038/s41467-022-33830-8.

Bergquist, Magnus, et al (2022): Meta-analyses of fifteen determinants of public opinion about climate change taxes and laws. In: Nature Climate Change, Vol. 12/3, p. 235–240.

Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett/Leblang, David (2015) Migration and foreign aid. In: International Organization, Vol. 69/3, p. 627–657.

Brutger, Ryan/Clark, Richard (2023): At What Cost? Power, Payments, and Public Support of International Organizations. In: Review of International Organizations, Vol. 18/3, p.431–465.

Burke, Marshall/Hsiang, Solomon/Miguel, Edward (2015): Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production. In: Nature, Vol. 527, p.235–250.

Chapman, Daniel/Lickel, Brian (2016): Climate change and disasters: How framing affects justifications for giving or withholding aid to disaster victims. In: Social Psychological and Personality Science, Vol. 7/1, p. 13–20. DOI: 10.1177/1948550615590448.

Chinn, Sedona/Hart, P. Sol/Soroka, Stuart (2020): Politicization and Polarization in Climate Change News Content, 1985-2017. In: Science Communication, Vol. 42, p. 112–129. DOI: 10.1177/1075547019900290.

Climate Action Tracker (2024): EU Country Summary. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/ [07.05.2024].

COACCH (2022): Co-designing the assessment of climate change costs. Available at: https://www.coacch.eu. [08.06.2024].

Colgan, Jegg/Green, Jessica F./Hale, Thomas (2020): Asset Revaluation and the Existential Pol

itics of Climate Change. In: International Organization, Vol. 75/2, p. 586–610.

Dabla-Norris, Era/Helbling, Thomas/Khalid, Salma/Khan, Hibah/Magistretti, Giacomo/Sollaci, Alexandre/Srinivasan, Krishna (2023): Public Perceptions of Climate Mitigation Policies: Evidence from Cross-Country Surveys. Staff Discussion Note SDN2023/002. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Davidovic, Dragana/Harring, Niklas/Jagers, Sverker C. (2020): The contingent effects of environmental concern and ideology: institutional context and people's willingness to pay environmental taxes. Environmental Politics, Vol. 29/4, p. 674–696.

Dechezleprêtre, Antoine/Fabre, Adrien/Kruse, Tobias/Planterose, Bluebery/Sanchez Chico, Ana/Stantcheva, Stefanie (2022): Fighting Climate Change: International Attitudes Toward Climate Policies. In: NBER Working Paper Series, Nr. 30265. DOI: 10.3386/w30265.

Dolšak, Nives/Prakash, Aseem (2022): Three Faces of Climate Justice. In: Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 25, p. 283–301. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120 125514.

European Commission (2019): The European Green Deal. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. [08.06.2024].

European Commission (2022a): Special Eurobarometer 527: Fairness perceptions of the green transition. Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (European Commission). Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e59a33d9-d29d-11ed-a05c01aa75ed71a1/language-en. [17.12.2023].

European Commission (2023): Special Eurobarometer 538: Climate Change. European Commission. Available at: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2954. [22.11.2023].

European Investment Bank (2024): Climate Survey 2023-2024. European Investment Bank. Available at: https://www.eib.org/en/surveys/climate-survey/6th-climate-survey/world.htm [09.05.2024].

Fairbrother, Malcolm/Johansson Sevä, Ingemar/Kulin, Joakim (2019): Political trust and the relationship between climate change beliefs and support for fossil fuel taxes: Evidence form a survey of 23 European countries. In: Global Environmental Change, Vol. 59, Nr. 102003. DOI: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.102003.

Fishbein, Martin/Ajzen, Icek (1975): Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Longman Higher Education.

Gaikwad, Nikhar/Genovese, Federica/Tingley, Dustin (2022): Creating Climate Coalitions: Mass Preferences for Compensating Vulnerability in the World's Two Largest Democracies. In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 116/4, p. 1165–1183.

Gaikwad, Nikhar/Genovese, Federica/Tingley, Dustin (2023): Climate action from abroad: assessing mass support for cross-border climate compensation. Available at AARN 4470596.

Gampfer, Robert/Bernauer, Thomas/Kachi, Aya (2014): Determinants of public support for in ternational climate finance in donor countries. Available at SSRN 2463716. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463716.

Graham, Erin R./Serdaru, Alexandria (2020): Power, control, and the logic of substitution in institutional design: The case of international climate finance. In: International Organization, Vol. 74, p. 671–706.

Hammar, Henrik/Jagers, Sverker C. (2006): Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. In: Climate Policy, Vol. 5/6, p. 613–625.

Heinrich, T./Kobayashi, Y./Bryant, K. (2016): Public opinion and foreign aid cuts in economic crises. In: World Development, Vol. 77, p. 66–79.

Hicks, R./Tingley, D. (2011): Causal mediation analysis. The Stata Journal.

Hornborg, Alf (2018): Political Ecology and Unequal Exchange. In: Spash, Clive L. (edt.): Routledge Hand book of Ecological Economics. London: Routledge, p. 39–47.

Imai, K./Keele, L./Tingley, D. (2010): A general approach to causal mediation analysis. In: Psychological Methods, Vol. 15/4, p. 309–334. DOI: 10.1037/a0020761.

Joint Research Centre (2020): Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe: JRC Peseta IV final report, European Commission. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c707e646-99b7-11ea-aac4-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. [08.06.2024].

Kallbekken, Steffen (2023): Research on public support for climate policy instruments must broaden its scope. In: Nature Climate Change, Vol. 13/3, p. 206–208.

Konc, Théo/Drews, Stefan/Savin, Ivan/van den Bergh, Jeroen (2022): Co-dynamics of climate policy stringency and public support. In: Global Environmental Change, Vol. 74, Nr. 102528. DOI: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102528.

Landis, Florian/Bernauer, Thomas (2012): Transfer payments in global climate policy. In: Nature Climate Change, Vol. 2/8, p. 628–633.

Larsson, Jörgen/Matti, Simon/Nässén, Jonas (2020): Public support for aviation policy measures in Sweden. In: Climate Policy, Vol. 20/10, p. 1305–1321.

Maalouf, Maher (2011): Logistic regression in data analysis: an overview. In: International Journal of Data Analysis Techniques and Strategies, Vol. 3/3, p. 281–299. DOI: 10.1504/IJDATS.2011.041335.

Maestre-Andrés, Sara/Drews, Stefan/van den Bergh, Jeroen (2019): Perceived fairness and public acceptability of carbon pricing: a review of the literature. In: Climate policy, Vol. 19/9, p. 1186–1204.

Manners, I. (2008): The normative ethics of the European Union. International Affairs, Vol. 84, p. 45–60. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-2346.2008.00688.X.

Mattoo, Aaditya/Subramanian, Arvind (2012): Equity in climate change: an analytical review. In: World Development, Vol. 40/6, p. 1083–1097.

Meyer, Andrew (2015): Does education increase pro-environmental behavior? Evidence from Europe. In: Ecological Economics, Vol. 116, p. 108–121. DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.018.

O'Garra, Tanya/Mourato, Susana (2015): Are we willing to give what it takes? Willingness to pay for climate change adaptation in developing countries. In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy. DOI: 10.1080/21606544.2015.1100560.

Park, Jisung/Heal, Geoffrey (2013): Feeling the Heat: Temperature, Physiology and the Wealth of Nations. NBER Working Paper No. 19725, National Bureau of Economic Research. Available at: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w19725/w19725.pdf. [11.05.2024].

Peters, Glen P./Minx, Jan C./Weber, Christopher L./Edenhofer, Ottmar (2011): Growth in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008. In: Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, Vol. 108/21, p. 8903–8908.

Petty, Richard/Cacioppo, John (1986): The Elaboration Likelihood Model Of Persuasion. In: Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 19, p. 123–205. New York: Academic Press.

Pickering, Jonathan/Betzold, Carola/Skovgaard, Jakob (2017): Special Issue: Managing Fragmentation and Complexity in the Emerging System of International Climate Finance. In: International Environmental Agreements, Vol. 17, p. 1–16.

The Guardian (06.12.2023): $700m pledged to loss and damage fund at Cop28 covers less than 0.2% needed. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/06/700mpledged-to-loss-and-damage-fund-cop28-covers-less-than-02-percent-needed. [16.12.2023].

Tol, Richard (2018): The economic impacts of climate change. In: Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 12, p. 4–25. DOI: 10.1093/reep/rex027.

UNDP (02.10.2023): What is climate finance and why do we need more of it? Available at: https://climatepromise.undp.org/news-and-stories/what-climate-finance-and-why-do-we-need-more-it. [16.12.2023].

UNFCCC (13.12.2023): COP28 Agreement Signals "Beginning of the End" of the Fossil Fuel Era. Available at: https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era. [16.12.2023].

Wang, Feng/Wang, H./Yan, J. (2022): Diagnostic Tests for the Necessity of Weight in Regression With Survey Data. In: International Statistical Review, Vol. 91, p. 55–71. DOI: 10.1111/insr.12509.

Xiao, Chenyang/McCright, Aaron (2014): A Test of the Biographical Availability Argument for Gender Differences in Environmental Behaviors. In: Environment and Behavior, Vol. 46/2, p. 241–263. DOI: 10.1177/0013916512453991.

Yeo, Sophie (2019): Where climate cash is flowing and why it's not enough. In: Nature, Vol. 573 (7774), p. 328–332.

Youngs, Richard (2004): Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity. In: Journal of common market studies, Vol. 42/2, p. 415–435.

Appendix

Table 1: *Integrated climate justice affinity measure, without interactions*

	Model 1
Trust in Domestic Just Green Transition	0.701*** (0.0417)
Climate Justice Affinity	0.551*** (0.0328)
Climate Change as Top 3 Challenge	0.694*** (0.0575)
Need Support during the Green Transition	0.250*** (0.0513)
Age	-0.166*** (0.0286)
Ideology	-0.106*** (0.0155)
Lower Income	0.0629 (0.0443)
Higher Income	-0.0466 (0.0467)
Female	0.0370 (0.0363)
Urban	0.106* (0.0420)
Higher Education	0.0438 (0.0503)
Lower Education	0.129* (0.0615)
Gini	-0.0125 (0.0158)
_cons	-1.347*** (0.154)
N	18671
pseudo R-sq	0.120
AIC	22474.3
BIC	22584.0

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0 .01, *** p<0.001

Table 2: *Separate climate justice affinity measures, without interactions*

	Model 2
Trust in Domestic Just Green Transition	0.563*** (0.0368)
Willingness to Pay	1.308*** (0.0533)
Just Transition Demand	-0.285*** (0.0536)
Climate Change as Top 3 Challenge	0.556*** (0.0543)
Need Support during the Green Transition	0.334*** (0.0577)
Age	-0.113*** (0.0304)
Ideology	-0.112*** (0.0138)
Lower Income	0.0845 (0.0491)
Higher Income	-0.0749 (0.0465)
Female	0.0825* (0.0378)
Urban	0.0471 (0.0504)
Higher Education	0.0110 (0.0511)
Lower Education	0.166* (0.0682)
_cons	-1.058*** (0.148)
N	18671
pseudo R-sq	0.163
AIC	21380.6
BIC	21490.3

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0 .01, *** p<0.001

Table 3: *Integrated climate justice affinity measure, with interaction*

	Model 3
Not trustful # Partial affinity	-0.0280 (0.154)
Not trustful # High affinity	1.169*** (0.200)
Not really trustful # No affinity	0.457** (0.160)
Not really trustful # Partial affinity	0.716*** (0.158)
Not really trustful # High affinity	1.421*** (0.148)
Rather trustful # No affinity	1.203*** (0.202)
Rather trustful # Partial affinity	1.650*** (0.170)
Rather trustful # High affinity	2.014*** (0.174)
Very trustful # No affinity	1.518*** (0.213)
Very trustful # Partial affinity	2.290*** (0.209)
Very trustful # High affinity	2.845*** (0.215)
Climate Change as Top 3 Challenge	0.690*** (0.0589)
Need Support during the Green Transition	0.251*** (0.0567)
Age	-0.163*** (0.0289)
Ideology	-0.106*** (0.0150)
Lower Income	0.0593 (0.0462)
Higher Income	-0.0531 (0.0457)
Female	0.0368 (0.0362)
Urban	0.0938 (0.0505)
Higher Education	0.0324 (0.0526)
Lower Education	0.142* (0.0649)
_cons	-0.242 (0.194)
N	18671
pseudo R-sq	0.123
AIC	22400.9
BIC	22573.3

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0 .01, *** p<0.001

Table 4: *Separate climate justice affinity measures, interaction with just transition demand*

	Model 4
Willingness to Pay	1.313*** (0.0534)
Not trustful # Demand	-0.445*** (0.132)
Not really trustful # No demand	0.240* (0.117)
Not really trustful # Demand	0.0239 (0.119)
Rather trustful # No demand	0.962*** (0.122)
Rather trustful # Demand	0.628*** (0.125)
Very trustful # No demand	1.496*** (0.150)
Very trustful # Demand	1.286*** (0.191)
Climate Change as Top 3 Challenge	0.559*** (0.0551)
Need Support during the Green Transition	0.329*** (0.0584)
Age	-0.112*** (0.0300)
Ideology	-0.112*** (0.0139)
Lower Income	0.0827 (0.0494)
Higher Income	-0.0744 (0.0464)
Female	0.0888* (0.0377)
Urban	0.0433 (0.0501)
Higher Education	0.00737 (0.0510)
Lower Education	0.168* (0.0674)
_cons	-0.276 (0.156)
N	18671
pseudo R-sq	0.163
AIC	21373.3
BIC	21522.2

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0 .01, *** p<0.001

Table 5: *Separate climate justice affinity measures, interaction with willingness to pay*

	Model 5
Just Transition Demand	-0.282*** (0.0537)
Not trustful # Willing to pay	1.622*** (0.127)
Not really trustful # Not willing to pay	0.593*** (0.0752)
Not really trustful # Willing to pay	1.827*** (0.0939)
Rather trustful # Not willing to pay	1.251*** (0.105)
Rather trustful # Willing to pay	2.469*** (0.108)
Very trustful # Not willing to pay	1.600*** (0.162)
Very trustful # Willing to pay	3.218*** (0.169)
Climate Change as Top 3 Challenge	0.555*** (0.0549)
Need Support during the Green Transition	0.329*** (0.0580)
Age	-0.112*** (0.0300)
Ideology	-0.111*** (0.0139)
Lower Income	0.0837 (0.0485)
Higher Income	-0.0736 (0.0461)
Female	0.0883* (0.0380)
Urban	0.0437 (0.0505)
Higher Education	0.00507 (0.0509)
Lower Education	0.164* (0.0679)
cons	-0.539*** (0.155)
N	18671
pseudo R-sq	0.164
AIC	21356.4
BIC	21505.2

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0 .01, *** p<0.001

Table 7: *Subgroup-analysis (1)*

	Austria	Croatia	Czechia	Poland	Bulgaria	Romania	Finland	Portugal	Slovakia
Just Transition Confidence	0.580***	0.354**	0.847***	0.426***	0.658***	0.656***	0.742***	0.508***	0.512***
	(0.105)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.144)
Willingness to Pay	1.383***	1.114***	1.651***	1.357***	1.339***	1.549***	1.899***	1.480***	1.407***
	(0.173)	(0.164)	(0.193	(0.172)	(0.179)	(0.170)	(0.189)	(0.168)	(0.264)
Just Transition Demand	-0.549**	-0.434**	-0.920***	-0.320*	-0.625***	-0.407*	-0.631***	-0.461*	-0.836**
	(0.179)	(0.164)	(0.188)	(0.162)	(0.186)	(0.176)	(0.187)	(0.230)	(0.262)
N	815	808	842	834	847	866	841	854	412

Robust standard errors in parantheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0 .01, *** p<0.001

Table 8: *Subgroup-analysis (2)*

	Spain	Italy	Denmark	Sweden	Ireland	Germany	Netherlands	Estonia	Latvia
Just Transition Confidence	0.694***	0.613***	0.878***	0.388***	0.794***	0.718***	0.632***	0.668***	0.937***
	(0.125)	(0.119)	(0.125)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.175)	(0.182)
Willingness to Pay	1.371***	1.269***	1.235***	1.512***	1.226***	1.495***	1.398***	1.248***	1.180***
	(0.193)	(0.181)	(0.189)	(0.178)	(0.167)	(0.174)	(0.182)	(0.299)	(0.283)
Just Transition Demand	-0.338	-0.339	0.106	-0.152	-0.106	-0.208	-0.0775	-0.463	-0.0889
	(0.211)	(0.193)	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.174)	(0.182)	(0.192)	(0.273)	(0.322)
N	876	787	819	844	860	887	777	412	405

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0 .01, *** p<0.001

Table 9: *Subgroup-analysis (3)*

	Belgium	Cyprus	France	Greece	Hungary	Lithuania	Slovenia	Malta	Luxembourg
Just Transition Confidence	0.408***	0.489**	0.648***	0.406***	0.318***	1.009***	0.620***	0.110	0.299
	(0.114)	(0.154)	(0.125)	(0.0923)	(0.0941)	(0.171)	(0.158)	(0.242)	(0.175)
Willingness to Pay	1.578***	1.078***	1.126***	0.878***	1.031***	1.265***	1.109***	1.476**	1.373***
	(0.185)	(0.263)	(0.184)	(0.160)	(0.165)	(0.257)	(0.243)	(0.450)	(0.266)
Just Transition Demand	-0.154	-0.348	0.128	-0.346	-0.264	0.131	-0.427	-0.0373	0.472
	(0.188)	(0.290)	(0.188)	(0.181)	(0.172)	(0.275)	(0.246)	(0.516)	(0.304)
N	773	352	781	861	769	411	419	160	352

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0 .01, *** p<0.001