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**Does the EU affect the resolution of the issue of
national identity in contested and divided
European countries?
Comparative Study of the EU peacebuilding
initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo**

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ABSTRACT

This study looks at the issue of resolving national identity in two divided and contested European countries, Cyprus and Kosovo. The aim is to see whether the EU, through its peacebuilding initiatives and ongoing missions in the two countries, is having an impact on this issue. Using the comparative method, and more specifically macro-causal analysis, we examine this impact and its significance. After showing that peace was largely influenced by the resolution of the question of national identity in both countries, we show, thanks to a structural literary study, that this question is not at the center of these initiatives, and is only considered indirectly. This is particularly detrimental to the effectiveness of the initiatives' achievements, which are then subject to numerous limitations such as lack of sustainability, or the involvement of other actors. It therefore appears that the EU, although committed to the issue, has little impact on the resolution of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo.

ABSTRAKT

Tato studie se zabývá otázkou řešení národní identity ve dvou rozdělených a sporných evropských zemích, na Kypru a v Kosovu. Cílem je zjistit, zda má EU prostřednictvím svých mírových iniciativ a probíhajících misí v těchto dvou zemích na tuto problematiku vliv. Pomocí komparativní metody, konkrétně makrokauzální analýzy, zkoumáme tento vliv a jeho význam. Poté, co jsme ukázali, že mír byl v obou zemích do značné míry ovlivněn řešením otázky národní identity, ukazujeme díky strukturální literární studii, že tato otázka není v centru těchto iniciativ a je brána v úvahu pouze nepřímou. To má negativní vliv zejména na účinnost výsledků těchto iniciativ, které pak podléhají četným omezením, jako je nedostatečná udržitelnost nebo zapojení dalších aktérů. Zdá se tedy, že EU, ačkoli se v této otázce angažuje, má na řešení národní identity na Kypru a v Kosovu jen malý vliv.

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INTRODUCTION

(A) – Introductory paragraph

The Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union¹ states: "*The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to (...) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security*". From the outset, the EU has assumed international responsibility for promoting peace, stability and security both within and beyond its borders. As such, the EU carries out peace-building actions, initiatives and missions in conflict zones where it can intervene. But how does the EU act in such complex territories?

Independent from the United Kingdom since 1960, but largely divided, the island of Cyprus has been plagued for decades by communal tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Tensions are such that the island has been geographically divided into two parts since

¹Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. Accessed July 24, 2024. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

1974: the Turkish northern part, also known as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC, but only by Turkey, which is the only state to have officially recognized it), and the Greek southern part, more commonly known as the Republic of Cyprus (RoC, which is currently the country's only internationally-recognized institutional entity). Can the EU reverse this trend by initiating dialogue between the two Cyprus, and bring peace (back) to Cyprus?

Unilaterally independent from Serbia in 2008, Kosovo is nonetheless divided, and its status is disputed in the absence of global recognition. This new country is the scene of clashes between the ²majority and minority ethnic groups: the vast majority of the country's inhabitants is of Albanian origin, while the strong Serb minority occupies many villages, particularly in the north of the country. As the simple passage of a train bearing the inscription "*Kosovo is Serbia*" through Kosovar territory in 2017² reminded us, tensions are high between the two communities and can flare up at the slightest opportunity. Given the urgency of the Kosovar situation, how can the EU get involved in promoting peace in a country with such a complex status?

Two countries, two indecisive and complex international statuses, two territories of endless communal tensions due to the lack of a national identity. A single national identity that unifies, federates, reassures and soothes. But what role, if any, can the EU play in creating this national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo? How can it be possible to create a single national identity out of two distinct communities? Is this really a guarantee of peace, or is it adding fuel to an already raging fire?

² Deutsche Welle. "Serbia Sends 'provocative' Train to Kosovo – DW – 01/14/2017." dw.com, January 14, 2017. <https://www.dw.com/en/serbia-sends-provocative-train-to-kosovo/a-37133573>.

It is the purpose of this study to attempt, without pretension, to provide answers to these important questions in the contemporary international sphere. Two divided countries, two communities in conflict, but one single objective: to do everything possible to bring peace to Cyprus and Kosovo.

(B) - Literature review

The sources used for this study are composed of analytic texts, articles and academic research on the peacebuilding missions and initiatives both in Cyprus and in Kosovo, as well as the official texts, reports and programmes of the same missions and initiatives. In any case, this study is analyzing the peacebuilding initiatives through the spectrum of the society and of the question of national identity, more than the exclusively judicial, legal, political or historical spectrum. Through this varied, multifaceted and dense corpus, some remarks can be made.

(1) A new comparison between Cyprus and Kosovo

The first remark that can be made about the literature read for this study is that the comparison between Cyprus and Kosovo is new, since no academic scholar has written a complete study about it. The academic scholar James Ker-Lindsay, professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, however should be mentioned here. He is the only one that will be used here as a source for Cyprus as well as a source for Kosovo since he wrote

or made remarks about the question of national identity in both countries³⁴. Nevertheless, we did not find any comparative paper or study directly connecting them with the field of national identity and peacebuilding initiatives, written by James Ker-Lindsay. He wrote about Cyprus and Kosovo in the same article, but more in terms of international recognition and diplomacy in a source that will not be used⁵ for its content here. This lack of proper comparison between Cyprus and Kosovo can be interpreted both negatively and positively: positively since it allows us to explore freely and in a personal way the question of the national identity and the eventual impact of the EU peacebuilding initiatives on it, but also negatively in that sense that there is no available or inspiring model for such a complete study. In this regard, we entirely have to build the comparison between Cyprus and Kosovo. To this extent, a specific aspect found in both cases regarding their EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions is the lack of broader perspective, in the sense that judicial and legal EULEX Mission is almost always analyzed only as such and not in comparison to other missions in the region, for instance. The only comparison that has been made is suggested by Pierre Le Mouel⁶, taking into consideration the Northern Irish case and giving it as a reference and an example for the Cypriot case, since there is no strong solution so far. It is notwithstanding extremely important, in order to properly analyze the efficiency and the impact of this kind of peacebuilding missions – which are said

³ Iōannēs Armakolas and James Ker-Lindsay, *The Politics of Recognition and Engagement: EU Member State Relations with Kosovo* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

⁴ James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

⁵ James Ker-Lindsay, Engagement without recognition: The limits of diplomatic interaction with contested states, accessed July 25, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274197130_Engagement_without_Recognition_The_Limits_of_Diplomatic_Interaction_with_Contested_States.

⁶ Pierre Le Mouel, “The Three Paradoxes of the EU’s Peacebuilding Strategy in Cyprus,” IACES.ie, January 26, 2021, <https://www.iaces.ie/post/the-three-paradoxes-of-the-eu-s-peacebuilding-strategy-in-cyprus>.

to have a strong social impact – to replace them into a broader viewpoint and with different contexts as it is the case here.

(2) A lack of connection between the ethnic situations and the peacebuilding initiatives

The second remark that we can make is that if the question of the ethnicities and conflicts is largely analyzed by scholars for both countries, it is only rarely connected to the peacebuilding missions in general, and even less to the EU peacebuilding initiatives. Hence, the current conflictual situation about the national identities is, in a lot of studies, perceived in a way as inevitable, and even without any possible resolution, without future considerations. In this regard, the studies of the peacebuilding initiatives represent the opposite but miss the connection with the question of the national identity, and sometimes evoke these initiatives only through the economic, geopolitical and strategic scopes, without consideration of the civil and the matters of the societies. Finally, there are more academic research regarding the UN peacebuilding missions and role in both countries than regarding the EU missions and initiatives, probably given the fact that the role of the EU in these initiatives remains recent⁷.

(3) An unequal study of our units of comparison

⁷ Eleftherios A. Michael, *Peacemaking Strategies in Cyprus: In Search of Lasting Peace* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).

We can also mention the fact that the sources are, in a way, unequal, since more papers and studies regarding the case of Kosovo exist. This can be explained by the fact that the role of the EU in the mission in Kosovo is stronger than its role in the peacebuilding initiatives for Cyprus. Indeed, if we had to rank the missions and initiatives under study by the amount of research about them, it would be: first, the EULEX mission in Kosovo, second the EU-UNDP Partnership for Cyprus, third the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community, and fourth the EuropeAid programmes in general. Since three different EU peacebuilding initiatives are considered in this paper for Cyprus, it allows us to have a similar number of sources for both countries.

(4) A broad group of scholars considered

Finally, regarding the authors, we can mention the fact that most of them are European, and that the remaining minority comes from the United States. If most of the European read for this study are from the Balkans or the Southeastern Europe, we have to note that a lot of Western European scholars will also be used here. As a matter of fact, we can as well remark that when the Western European and scholars from the United States write mostly about the EU peacebuilding missions and initiatives and center their work on that aspect, the authors from the Balkans and Southeastern Europe are more likely to focus on the question of the national identities rather than the EU peacebuilding missions, which is somewhat logical.

(5) Conclusion of the Literature review

To conclude, we can say that in regard to the literature available, as our topic was narrowed down, the sources were less and less numerous and harder and harder to find. Indeed, choosing Cyprus and Kosovo as units of comparison already reduced the literature, which was reinforced by the choice of concerning the peacebuilding missions and only the ones realized by the EU. Moreover, analyzing these missions through the spectrum of the national identity and thus placing at the same level the political, geopolitical and civil considerations cut even more the available literature. This literature review will now be completed by the theoretical framework of the main concepts used in our study.

(C) - Theoretical framework

In this part completing the literature review, we will analyze, explain and compare the main concepts of our study, as well as their main interpretations. Given that the concepts used in this study are numerous and above all very broad, we will focus on the interpretations and analyses that correspond to our subject. We will then examine the conclusions of the research already carried out on these concepts, in order to be able to incorporate them as such in this study.

(1) The notion of interventionism

Interventionism is the central concept of our study, and it is from it that the concept of peacebuilding, which will be developed later, is grafted. According to the Cambridge

Dictionary⁸, interventionism refers to *"the practice or policy of a government taking action to become involved, either in the problems of another country, or in the economy of its own country"*. So, it is already clear that interventionism rhymes with involvement, and in this sense, to intervene is to leave one's initial restrained zone (geographical or political boundaries) in order to act in a sphere that is potentially external to one's primary internal interests or considerations. To intervene, then, is above all to enjoy the ability to act on something, and in this respect, the concept of interventionism appears extremely varied and multifaceted. In the course of the research carried out as part of this study, some categories of interventionism emerged: firstly, the original interventionism, economic interventionism, which consists of influencing or regulating the economy through various mechanisms, such as policies. John Maynard Keynes⁹ was the forerunner of this approach, advocating the vision of a state that must act and have a direct influence on its economy, in order to manage it as well as possible and steer it in the directions it chooses. This view has been widely criticized, and many authors, such as Milton Friedman¹⁰, have opposed John Maynard Keynes's conception, emphasizing the self-regulating nature of economic markets. Gøsta Esping-Andersen¹¹ identifies three different types of interventionism: corporatist, social democratic and liberal, all of which can be found in the third category of interventionism (because these categories interfere with each other and overlap): political interventionism and international relations. As the name implies, this interventionism concerns states and international organizations, and the actions that make them responsible for the global political sphere. In other words, it has to do with the involvement of

⁸ Interventionism | english meaning - cambridge dictionary. Accessed July 24, 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/interventionism>.

⁹ John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment* (Cambridge, Mass: s.n., 1937).

¹⁰ Milton Friedman, Rose D. Friedman, and Binyamin Appelbaum, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2020).

¹¹ Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019).

national, regional or local actors in the political design of the contemporary world. In fact, there are several theories and conceptions of political interventionism: the constructivist conception, as theorized by Alexander Wendt¹², which postulates the role of ideas, identities and norms in shaping political interventions; and the realist conception, which sees interventionism as a tool to enable states to enjoy their full capacity to act in their individual and specific interests. Among these, we can distinguish classical realist interventionism, as conceived by Hans Morgenthau¹³, i.e. that the main driving force in international politics is the struggle for power, which legitimizes the intervention of states over others to satisfy their national interests; the neorealist conception, with Kenneth Waltz¹⁴ in particular, who postulates that the international political system is devoid of a general central authority, and that each state must therefore prioritize its own survival, which involves seeking to extend its power and influence through international intervention. We could also mention John Mearsheimer's¹⁵ offensive realism, which, inspired by Kenneth Waltz's observation, advocates that every state is therefore by nature "*aggressive*" and must intervene in order not to be the one being intervened in, and its opposite, Robert Jervis's¹⁶ defensive realism, which states that states are tempted to act defensively because they are likely to feel - wrongly - threatened by others. However, it would seem that the political interventionism that most concerns our study and peacebuilding initiatives and missions is liberal political interventionism, which generally supports intervention to promote democracy, peace, Human Rights and global stability. The author

¹² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: University Press, 1999).

¹³ Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knop, 1978).

¹⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press, 2010).

¹⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, Robert Litwak, and G. John Ikenberry, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (West Lafayette, IN: C-SPAN Archives, 2002).

¹⁶ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: University Press, 1976).

Immanuel Kant is perhaps the first reference, who in *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical sketch*¹⁷ asserts that the spread of republican values and republican forms of government, combined with the promotion of general international cooperation, is the solution to building a "*lasting Peace*". These ideas were later extended by Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points in 1918¹⁸, which advocated efforts to spread democracy and self-determination, as well as mutual aid between states. The question of liberal political interventionism is thus extremely closely linked to the question of democracy and democratic values. This is also what Michael Doyle¹⁹ said when he introduced the concept of "*Democratic peace theory*" at the dawn of the 21st century, asserting that democracy is the best regime to adopt and spread, because democracies are, in his view, less likely to go to war against each other. Here, we see that, in addition to democratic values, the liberal conception of political interventionism targets peace. This idea corresponds closely to the foundations of our study: indeed, the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus, and the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, aim to ensure the smooth running of democratic bodies in both countries, and to foster peace there. This theory is notably evoked by John Ikenberry²⁰ with the idea that political intervention is necessary, in a post-war world, to build global order and stability, especially in countries that have experienced conflict (which is the case of Cyprus with the Turkish intervention of 1974, for example, but also of Kosovo with the war of 1998/1999). Consequently, the aim of liberal political interventionism is to promote world peace and stability by spreading democratic values, through international organizations

¹⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (Spartacus Books, 2020).

¹⁸ Woodrow Wilson, Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen points" January 8, 1918, accessed July 24, 2024, https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~wggray/Teaching/His300/Handouts/Fourteen_Points.pdf.

¹⁹ Michael W. Doyle, *Liberalism and World Politics* (London: Sage, 2006).

²⁰ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

such as the UN or the EU. John Mearsheimer²¹, for example, denounces the fact that these interventions by international organizations are not as effective as they claim, and can ironically have unintended consequences such as prolonging conflict or instability in certain regions. There are also Marxist critics of the concept: Noam Chomsky²², for example, argues that these interventions serve the interests of "*imperialist states*" and are driven by strategic rather than purely democratic motives. In a way, this idea is a reinterpretation of Edward Said's²³ post-colonial critique, arguing that these interventions are merely a continuation of Western imperialism in new, more implicit forms. If liberal political interventionism attracts so much interest, from both its defenders and detractors, it is because contemporary history has given it such prominence. Indeed, the colonial and imperial eras are often seen as periods in which interventionism was applied, for better and often for worse, and this was subsequently extended by the Cold War period, as Westad²⁴ points out. Interventionism is therefore a complex and multifaceted concept, which has given rise to numerous interpretations over time. Liberal political interventionism, which seems to be the most useful in the context of our study, generally consists of intervening for the common and general good and guaranteeing peace and stability in the world, thanks in particular to the dissemination of democratic values and ideals.

(2) The notion of national identity

²¹ John J. Mearsheimer, Robert Litwak, and G. John Ikenberry, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (West Lafayette, IN: C-SPAN Archives, 2002).

²² Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance* (London: Penguin Books, 2007).

²³ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1994).

²⁴ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

The question of national identity is another conceptual notion central to our study. We will also see how important national identity is as a vector of peace and stability in the country concerned. The notion of national identity is relatively recent, having really taken off in the 19th/20th century in Europe in particular, coinciding with the formation of contemporary nation-states. In the *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*²⁵, D.P. Tolia-Kelly writes that "*National identity is a means by which culture is defined through these bounded, essentialized notions of 'being'. Being is linked to 'belonging' in notions of citizenship*". Thus, we can clearly see that national identity, rather than a territory, seems to be linked to a sense of belonging: national identity, then, means being from a country, recognizing oneself as such and being recognized as such. This was the vision put forward by Ernest Renan²⁶ in 1882, when he promoted the subjectivity of national identity. In his view, national identity is defined by a shared sense of belonging and a collective memory (and in this he echoed Pierre Nora's theory of "*places of memory*"²⁷), rather than by objective criteria such as territory or language. In this, he opposes Johann Gottfried Herder²⁸, who postulates that national identity is constructed precisely in relation to this common, shared language. However, conceptions of national identity are varied, and have evolved over time. There is the primordialist theory of national identity, as postulated by Anthony D. Smith²⁹ in his publications of the 1980s. Here, national identity is seen as natural and logical, inherent to the country in question, as it has its origins in ancient cultural traditions and the historical continuities of the territory. Anthony D. Smith

²⁵ "National Identity." National Identity - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics. Accessed July 25, 2024. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/national-identity>.

²⁶ Ernest Renan, *Qu'est Ce Qu'une Nation? : Conférence Faite En Sorbonne, Le 11 Mars 1882* (Paris: Helleu, 1934).

²⁷ Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

²⁸ Johann G. v. Herder, *Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

²⁹ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1988).

emphasizes the importance of ethnicity, myths and symbols in building a "*sense of national identity*". Modernist theory goes some way towards countering this view, by asserting that national identity is a relatively recent construct fostered by the development of contemporary industrial societies. One of the concepts that best illustrates this theory is Benedict Anderson's³⁰ "*imagined communities*" (1983), which asserts that nations are merely social constructs. There is then only a collective imagination of a community, manifested through shared political institutions or media. This modernist theory of the construction of national identities has been extended by constructivist theory, which emphasizes the fluidity and dynamism of national identities. National identities are constantly being constructed through social, political and cultural processes. Within this framework, Rogers Brubaker³¹, for example, shows that national identity is a "*construct situation*" that takes shape as a result of different evolutions and contexts that influence it (war, economic crisis, etc.). Finally, we might also mention the instrumentalist conception of national identity, which is relatively more extreme than those mentioned above, since it assumes that national identity is a tool used by ruling elites to gain influence, power or support. In this sense, Eric Hobsbawm mentions in *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780*³² that national traditions are sometimes invented by the country's elites to further their own ends and assert their influence over other inhabitants of the same given territory. It is also important to note that the concept of national identity is one that evolves over time, and has been called into question again and again in the wake of various historical events. Consequently, there is also a post-colonial current of the concept of national identity, which points to its hybrid and fluid

³⁰ Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

³¹ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³² Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

character, as Homi K. Bhabha does in *The Location of Culture*³³, for example. Finally, and importantly in the context of Cyprus and Kosovo, globalization theory acknowledges that the globalized system in which we live influences national identity. It can influence it in two ways, as Roland Robertson³⁴ puts it: either globalization, insofar as it contributes to erasing borders, erodes national identity, by creating a community surpassing those borders already surpassed by trade or the exchange of information. Or, on the contrary, it can reinforce new, perhaps more localized identities, to stand together in the face of these globalizing mechanisms. We shall now briefly focus on the theoretical background of the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, before exploring it in detail in our study.

(3) The question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo

In any case, it is clear that national identity is a key factor in building a country and ensuring peace within it. As Anthony D. Smith explains in *The ethnic origins of Nations*³⁵ and *National Identity*³⁶ a few years later, national identity is a necessary and inevitable factor for peace. He evokes the idea that national identity plays a crucial role in the cohesion and stability of societies and is absolutely necessary for world peace. Indeed, he argues, national identity provides a sense of historical continuity that helps unite communities, as well as a recognized basis for political legitimacy. He writes, for example: "*A strong national identity provides the social cohesion necessary for political stability and economic development. It fosters a sense of belonging and loyalty among citizens, which is crucial for the maintenance of peace and*

³³ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994).

³⁴ Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage Publ, 1992).

³⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1988).

³⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: Univ. of Nevada Press, 1993).

order within a nation"³⁷. Anthony D. Smith thus points out that national identity not only guarantees peace for a country, but also ensures its development and influence. Consequently, although it may be interpreted in different ways, particularly as regards its origin or purpose, national identity remains unanimously a necessary factor for peace, which is one of the pillars of our study. Indeed, in this study, we start from the premise, in the words of Anthony D. Smith, that national identity is a non-negligible peace factor for any state, yet it turns out, as we shall briefly see, that the question of national identity remains unresolved, both in the case of Cyprus and in the case of Kosovo. The question of national identity in Cyprus is complex and undecided. This is because it seems impossible for the time being to get everyone to agree on a Cypriot national identity. As Rebecca Bryant³⁸ points out, British colonialism has greatly influenced Cypriot national identities (and the use of the plural here speaks for itself). In her view, colonial policies, often based on the adage "*divide and conquer*", helped to exacerbate ethnic divisions between Greeks and Turks - divisions which have persisted and, paradoxically, been amplified in the post-colonial era, as they are simply ingrained in the Cypriot way of life. This has led to exacerbated ethnic nationalism on both sides of the island, as Nicos Trimikliniotis³⁹ argues. According to him, Greek and Turkish nationalism have profoundly influenced politics and the question of identity in Cyprus, mostly to the detriment of national identity, which is thus not currently recognized as the main identity on the island. The situation is very similar in Kosovo, with Noel Malcolm⁴⁰ noting the same phenomenon as Nicos Trimikliniotis in Cyprus, with the idea that two ethnic identities have been forged (mainly

³⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: Univ. of Nevada Press, 1993), p.16.

³⁸ Rebecca Bryant, *Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

³⁹ Nicos Trimikliniotis. *The Nation-state Dialectic and the State of Exception - Sociological and Constitutional Studies on the Euro-Cypriot Conjuncture and the National Question*. (Athens: Savvalas Editions, 2010).

⁴⁰ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short Story* (New York: New York University Press, 1998).

Albanian and Serbian) and exist as such, to the detriment of a common Kosovar national identity. According to Tim Judah⁴¹, this is due to the perpetuation of ethnic conflicts in the country. He argues that ethnic violence has crystallized the possibility of a Kosovar national identity and the prospects of reconciliation, so that for the time being, only divided ethnic identities are considered in the country.

As a result, we can already see that the question of national identity in Cyprus, as in Kosovo, does not seem to have a solution at present, a point we will develop throughout our study, which will attempt to see the role that peacebuilding initiatives and EU missions can play here, whose theoretical framework we will now analyze.

(4) The peacebuilding missions and initiatives in general

The last major and essential concept of our study is the concept of peacebuilding. The adjective peacebuilding can be used to describe actions and initiatives aimed at promoting peace or reconciliation in a given territory, and these are implemented by a variety of actors such as international organizations, for example. The concept of peacebuilding is therefore closely linked to the concept of intervention we have just seen, as Emma J. Stewart⁴² emphasizes in particular, highlighting the fact that intra-state conflicts are now widely recognized as threats to world peace and security. In this sense, they require broader intervention by international actors, and the peacebuilding process is now extended to conflicts of various kinds and origins. The word peacebuilding is most often associated first and

⁴¹ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022).

⁴² Emma J Stewart. *The European Union and conflict prevention: Policy evolution and outcome*. (Berlin: Lit, 2006.)

foremost with Johan Galtung⁴³, who theorized it in 1976, as, to summarize, the creation of sustainable peace by addressing the deep-rooted conflict and fostering conditions that enable peaceful relationships and structures. He differentiates it from peacemaking, which aims to put an end to an active conflict and establish a peace agreement between the warring parties, and peacekeeping, which consists of maintaining peace after a peace agreement has been signed. According to Johan Galtung, peacebuilding, which falls somewhere between the two, is more about creating the conditions for lasting peace by strengthening the structures likely to promote it. He also adds that the concept is multidimensional, in that it admits of political, economic and cultural measures, for example, and anchors it in the aim of achieving the concepts of "negative peace" (when there is no direct violence or war) and "positive peace"⁴⁴ (which goes beyond this by promoting social justice, equity, respect for human rights and the creation of societal structures to anchor this peace in the long term). The case of Cyprus and Kosovo, then, as divided countries with latent community tensions that only occasionally erupt into conflict, fits perfectly into this ideal of peacebuilding and the ambition to establish a generalized "negative peace". In addition to Johan Galtung's original definition, many other authors have attempted to make their own contributions. Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncos⁴⁵, for example, address the question of the temporality of peacebuilding, pointing out that it is not only a post-conflict concept, but also has stabilizing virtues that can intervene precisely to prevent the emergence of conflict. Along these lines, Rok Zupancic and Nina Pejic⁴⁶ write that

⁴³ Johan Galtung. Three Approaches to Peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, (*Impact of Science on Society* 1976), ½. PRIO Publication No. 25-9, pp. 282-304.

⁴⁴ Johan Galtung. Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, (*Journal of Peace Research*, 1969), vol. 6 (3), pp. 167-191.

⁴⁵ Eva Gross and Ana E Juncos, *Making Sense of EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Institutions, Policies and Roles* (London: Routledge, 2011).

⁴⁶ Rok Zupancic and Nina Pejic, *Limits To The European Union'S Normative Power in a Post-Conflict Society: Eulex and Peacebuilding in Kosovo*, 10 (Cham: Springer Open, 2018).

"peacebuilding is therefore essentially long-term conflict prevention and entails the activities of structural conflict prevention in a conflict-prone Setting, pre- or post-conflict". According to Stedman and Rothchild⁴⁷, there are 4 inevitable "kinds of security" for peacebuilding to be effective: it must guarantee military, political, economic and cultural security. Rudolf Schwarz⁴⁸ argues that peacebuilding actors must aim for security and welfare, while ensuring a significant degree of representation in societies at risk of conflict. John Paul Lederach⁴⁹, on the other hand, emphasizes local relations and long-term reconciliation processes. According to his holistic vision of peacebuilding, it is important to consider local actors in order to establish real and lasting peace in a given territory. Luc Reyhler⁵⁰ complements the goal of establishing lasting peace with the idea of a total absence of physical violence, the elimination of discrimination thanks to the ability of peacebuilding initiatives to transform conflicts.

However, the concept of peacebuilding is also subjected to numerous criticisms, the three main ones being as follows. In that sense, peacebuilding is criticized for being a tool of Westernization and neo-colonialism, in that it imposes a vision of peace that is mostly derived from Western countries and the virtue of their democratic systems, as Olivier P. Richmond⁵¹. Indeed, it is often associated with the idea that the Western world is trying to retain influence over territories formerly under their control, and that these countries will be indebted to them once peace has been established. Because of this exclusive Western representation of

⁴⁷ Stephen J. Stedman, D. Rothchild. Peace operations: From short-term to long-term Commitment, (*International Peacekeeping*, 3(2), 17–35, 1996)

⁴⁸ Rudolf Schwarz. Post-conflict peacebuilding: The challenges of security, welfare and Representation, (*Security Dialogue*, 36(4), 429–446, 2005).

⁴⁹ John Paul Lederach. Journey from resolution to transformative peacebuilding, *From the ground up: Mennonite contributions to international peacebuilding*, 45-55 (Oxford University Press, 2000)

⁵⁰ Luc Reyhler. Peace architecture: The prevention of violence. *The social psychology of group identity and social conflict*, 133–146. (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004)

⁵¹ O. P Richmond. Failed statebuilding versus peace formation. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48, 378–400, 2013.

peacebuilding, local considerations, local actors or local practices are frequently overshadowed or masked in these initiatives, as Roger Mac Ginty⁵². One of the criticisms leveled at the concept of peacebuilding is this widespread neglect of the specific situation and the specific country in which it takes place. However, it is not only the local aspect that is relegated to the background in peacebuilding initiatives, but also "*ordinary people*", according to Thania Paffenholz⁵³. She refers to the fact that peacebuilding initiatives are only analyzed insofar as they are carried out by international institutions, and that the everyday, spontaneous initiatives of local residents and ordinary people, though largely forgotten, are just as important and decisive, as we will also try to show in our study with the INTRAC program in Cyprus, for example. We can therefore see that the concept of peacebuilding is widely debated, and that it encounters a number of limitations and criticisms with regard to its modes of application and action. The fact remains that, most of the time, these peacebuilding initiatives are surrounded by a legal framework drawn up by international organizations such as the EU. We will now take a brief look at the theoretical background to EU peacebuilding missions and initiatives.

(5) The EU peacebuilding missions and initiatives

As stated in Article 21 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union⁵⁴, the EU, as an international organization, has a duty of peace towards the contemporary world, and must endeavor to establish and promote democratic values within and beyond its borders. From the outset, therefore, the EU has been inclined to act in favor of peace. However, it was

⁵² Roger Mac Ginty, Hybrid peace: The interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace. *Security Dialogue*, 41(4), 391–412. 2010.

⁵³ Thania Paffenholz. *Civil society and peacebuilding: A critical assessment*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010).

⁵⁴ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union.

only later, as Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncos⁵⁵ point out, that this interest took on a life of its own and became an object of study. According to them, the EU's conceptualization of peacebuilding really emerged with European Studies at the end of the 20th century, alongside the EU's institutional and policy development. Thus, the EU's approach to peacebuilding remains quite recent, leading to a certain lack of clarity of the concept within the organization and its officials, as they attest. The concept of peacebuilding as understood by the EU is highly diversified and multifaceted, and intersectional - a holistic conception of the concept reminiscent of John Paul Lederach⁵⁶. On this subject, Anna Jagiello-Szostak⁵⁷ points out that *"the EU sees the concept of peacebuilding as promoting democracy, preventing the outbreak of open conflict through economic, social, political and security reforms, supporting the rule of law and ensuring security within and outside of its Borders"*, illustrating the very general and interdisciplinary nature of the organization's peacebuilding commitment. The EU has a wide range of peacebuilding tools at its disposal, the most important of which are the CSDP missions (including the EULEX mission in Kosovo), the Council's prerogatives (which have influenced and made possible the EU's initiatives in Cyprus), and preventive diplomacy. As Rok Zupancic and Nina Pejic⁵⁸ point out, the EU's commitment to peacebuilding within and beyond its borders has been a gradual process. It wasn't until 2001 and the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts that conflict prevention became one of the major objectives

⁵⁵ Eva Gross and Ana E Juncos, *Making Sense of EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Institutions, Policies and Roles* (London: Routledge, 2011).

⁵⁶ John Paul Lederach. Journey from resolution to transformative peacebuilding, *From the ground up: Mennonite contributions to international peacebuilding*, 45-55 (Oxford University Press, 2000)

⁵⁷ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, "The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations," *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

⁵⁸ Rok Zupancic and Nina Pejic, *Limits To The European Union 'S Normative Power in a Post-Conflict Society: Eulex and Peacebuilding in Kosovo*, 10 (Cham: Springer Open, 2018).

of the EU's external relations. In this sense, Reiner Rummel⁵⁹ points out that the EU was both "a pointer of and a latecomer in conflict prevention", asserting the fact that the EU was one of the first organizations of its kind to speak out explicitly on this kind of subject, but that this came well after other sectors, such as politics, economics or agriculture, which were much more developed by the EU. At the time, the EU's peacebuilding field lagged far behind other EU fields of action. However, its priority was reaffirmed at the Consolidated version of the treaty on the European Union⁶⁰, when the CSDP was given full rights over the policy of conflict prevention and generalized peacebuilding. Since then, the EU has sought to play a role in conflict resolution and the promotion of sustainable peace. Neoliberal theories on this subject, such as Tereza Los-Nowak⁶¹, for example, that the EU plays an important, if limited, role. According to Gentjan Scara⁶², this limited role can be explained in various ways. Indeed, the author points out that the EU lacks European institutions capable of military intervention, as well as a cruel lack of experience and political unity when it comes to international contexts likely to divide its member countries. The EU's peacebuilding initiatives, and the way in which the organization puts this concept into action, have also attracted some criticism. One of the main critiques is that they impose liberal democratic values and structures that are not necessarily adapted to the local contexts in which they are trying to be implemented. Indeed, the EU's concept of peacebuilding sometimes tries too hard to impose the values of the organization, without any real concern for their ability to integrate and be effective in the

⁵⁹ Reiner Rummel. The EU's involvement in conflict prevention—strategy and practice. *Conflict prevention: Is the European Union ready?* (Brussels: TMC Asser Press, 2004).

⁶⁰ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union.

⁶¹ Tereza Łoś-Nowak, *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe (Contemporary International Relations)*, (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław, 2008).

⁶² Gentjan Scara, *The role of the EU as a Peacebuilder in the Western Balkans*, "Romanian Journal of European Affairs". vol. 14, no. 14 December 2014.

institutional landscape of the country in question, as mentioned by O.P. Richmond⁶³. The EU is also widely criticized for its limited cooperation and coordination, as discussed above, as written by Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen⁶⁴. In this sense, the EU should function with greater ease and unity, according to the author. However, it's important to remember that the EU's peacebuilding initiatives have made great strides, not least thanks to their focus on institutional reform, as Nathalie Tocci⁶⁵ argues in 2008. The EU's conceptualization and understanding of the term peacebuilding is therefore quite similar to the general definition formulated by Johan Galtung, and faces similar criticisms.

(D) – Methodology

In this section, we will present the methodology of the study, from the method used to the way the analysis is written, mentioning the use of the primary and secondary sources. Finally, we will evoke the timeline of our study and its chronological approach.

(1) The comparative method

The method used in this study is the comparative method. In this section, it will be presented and analyzed in the context of our two comparison units, Kosovo and Cyprus. The comparative method is a relatively new but much-used method. Indeed, as Thomas Welskopp⁶⁶ reminds us,

⁶³ O. P Richmond. Failed statebuilding versus peace formation. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48, 378–400, 2013.

⁶⁴ Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen. *The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy*. (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁶⁵ Nathalie Tocci. *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the Backyard*. (Routledge, 2008).

⁶⁶ Thomas Welskopp. “Crossing the boundaries? Dynamics of Contention Viewed from the angle of a comparative historian”, *International Review of Social History*, 2004.

the comparative method experienced an initial skepticism, but it seems to have developed from the 16th and 17th centuries onwards. According to Balazs Trencseny, Constantin Iordachi and Peter Apor⁶⁷, with the emergence of the "*reason of state*" paradigm at the end of the 16th century, the idea of comparing constitutions, political or economic regimes became predominant in the academic field, to the point of becoming a new genre. The systematic comparative study of countries and other units of comparison (usually states) made it possible to compare and assess the level of development of states in the era of pivotal periods, such as the Industrial Revolution. However, after a surge of interest in the first half of the 19th century, the comparative method went into deep decline. It wasn't until the inter-war years in Europe that the comparative method came back into use, as it was seen as a possible antidote to the threatening rise of nationalism, according to Balazs Trencseny, Constantin Iordachi and Peter Apor. In the decades to come, the comparative method will experience epistemological turning points such as the linguistic turn in the 1960s/1970s (which will see the emergence of the study of languages and the importance given to comparative concepts and notions), the arrival of world system analysis as defined by Immanuel Wallerstein⁶⁸ in the 1970s (with the emergence of new, less conventional, broader and more tailor-made units of comparison in the political economy), or cultural history, with the importance given to personal experience or the question of memory in the 1990s, as Thomas Welskopp⁶⁹ reminds us. Today, however, the comparative method, widely employed in the academic field, remains closely linked to Marc Bloch, considered the precursor of its use as it is understood today.

⁶⁷ Péter Apor et al., *The Rise of Comparative History* Ed. by Balázs Trencsényi, Péter Apor, Constantin Iordachi (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2022).

⁶⁸ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

⁶⁹ Thomas Welskopp. "Crossing the boundaries? Dynamics of Contention Viewed from the angle of a comparative historian", *International Review of Social History*, 2004.

As William H. Sewell⁷⁰ points out, according to Marc Bloch, for history to be intelligible and comprehensible, it must "*succeed in establishing explanatory relationships between phenomena*". The comparative method is therefore a tool for resolving any problems of understanding posed by history and the way it is transmitted. It also helps to highlight the specificity of certain cases, and to formulate problems and hypotheses for historical research. According to Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers⁷¹, the comparative method is also useful for analyzing the evolutions, dynamics and changes that can take place in different societies, with the ultimate aim of being able to better explain and understand them, individually and collectively. To do this, it is necessary to identify and analyze units of comparison, which must meet two criteria, according to Marc Bloch⁷². Firstly, these units of comparison must have a minimum of geographical proximity, i.e. they must belong to a common geographical area, as well as to a similar geographical surface. Secondly, they must be analyzed over similar, contemporary periods, so as not to be inconsistent or asymmetrical. In short, units of comparison must respect a geographical proximity and a contemporary period of analysis. He also adds that interactions between units of comparison are valued and welcomed, and that this allows causal relationships to be highlighted. As Miroslav Hroch⁷³ points out, any application of the comparative method requires a number of general prerequisites. He lists four of them. Firstly, "*the object to be compared must be defined as precisely as possible*", as was the case with the presentation of EU peacebuilding initiatives and the question of national identity in

⁷⁰ William H. Sewell, "Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History," PhilPapers, January 1, 1967, <https://philpapers.org/rec/SEWMBA>.

⁷¹ Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, The uses of history in Macrosocial Inquiry, accessed June 17, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231747596_The_Uses_of_History_in_Macrosocial_Inquiry.

⁷² Marc Bloch, Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes / Marc Bloch, January 1, 1970, <https://www.sudoc.fr/096643994>.

⁷³ Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

the divided and disputed countries of Cyprus and Kosovo. Secondly, “*the aim of the application of the comparative method must be laid down*”, in the case of our study, this means evaluating EU peacebuilding initiatives and defining criteria for their effectiveness or failure. Thirdly, Miroslav Hroch announces that “*the criteria of analysis for the objects of comparison should be established*”, as demonstrated above in the justification of the units of comparison section of this study. Finally, “*the relation of the comparative procedure to the temporal axis must be clarified*”, which is also the case here, since we are considering EU peace initiatives and missions as they have been carried out since the second half of the 20th century, and even more precisely, since the 2000s.

Finally, it is important to remember that, as William Sewell, Arend Lijphart and Neil Smelser⁷⁴ quoted by Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers corroborate, the methodology of the comparative method follows the paradigm of hypothesis testing, and that the general comparative method is born of a hypothesis, and its realization enables it to be verified or not, or to be qualified and explained.

There are, however, several different methods within the comparative method, even though they are complementary. Theda Skocpol and Margaret Sommers⁷⁵ list three: parallel demonstration theory (which emphasizes the similarities and resemblances between comparison units), contrast of contexts (which, on the contrary, emphasizes the differences between comparison units in order to demonstrate the uniqueness of each) and macro-causal

⁷⁴ William H. Sewell, Jr., "Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History," *History and Theory* 6(2) (1967):208-18; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65(3-4) (1971): 682-93; and Neil J. Smelser, *Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).

⁷⁵ Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, *The uses of history in Macrosocial Inquiry*, accessed June 17, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231747596_The_Uses_of_History_in_Macrosocial_Inquiry.

analysis (which makes it possible to analyze both differences and similarities), which is the one used in this study.

(2) The macro-causal analysis method

The macro-causal analysis method is a hybrid one, allowing us to discuss both similarities and differences between units of comparison. We have chosen it for this reason, given that our units of comparison already have similarities and differences regarding our central question. The macro-causal analysis method is therefore a "*multivariate analysis*", as Barrington Moore Jr.⁷⁶ puts it, which also has the advantage of being the only method for attempting to validate causal hypotheses about macro-phenomena. In our study of the potential impact of EU peacebuilding initiatives on the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, this method will enable us to test our hypotheses such as "EU peacebuilding initiatives play only a limited role in resolving the question of national identity in these small European countries", or "the programs of initiatives focusing directly on the issue of national identity are more likely to achieve real results in this field than those that are more general, which however will have a greater long-term impact than the former". Thanks to its ability to compare similarities and differences, as Theda Skocpol and Margaret Sommers⁷⁷ point out, macro-causal analysis is the approach that best matches the ambition of our study.

(3) Why compare Cyprus and Kosovo? The justification of our units of comparison

⁷⁶ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Aylesbury: Penguin Books, 1967).

⁷⁷ Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, *The uses of history in Macrosocial Inquiry*, accessed June 17, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231747596_The_Uses_of_History_in_Macrosocial_Inquiry.

The association of Cyprus and Kosovo may seem, at first glance, fortuitous and illegitimate, given the absence of any entire academic study comparing the two countries. Indeed, the two countries do not have the same status or history, nor do they belong to the same geographical region.

However, in the case of research into the question of national identity, national sovereignty and continental and regional (in this case, European) interventionism, Cyprus and Kosovo have many points in common that legitimize comparing them. On the other hand, these data, although common or similar, do not necessarily lead to the same results, which makes their comparison even more interesting, as it is not repetitive and allows different results and dynamics to be exposed, despite these common or similar preliminary data. In this section, these common and similar data, which give meaning to the comparative undertaking, will be cited, and then justified, as well as their divergences and discrepancies. As the method we will use for this comparative study is the macro-causal analysis method, there is no need for our units of comparison to be exactly equivalent or to have the same features: it is even better to have differences regarding their characteristics, so that the comparison can throw light on the effects of these differences. Hence, Cyprus and Kosovo do have eloquent common or similar characteristics and data, especially regarding the question of national identity and the fact that they are both subjects to peacebuilding initiatives from the European Union, but they also have differences and discrepancies regarding the very same questions or broader aspects. The first part will deal with structural data (understood as being specific to the country in question), while the second part will evoke circumstantial data (understood as pertaining more to the country's own situation and context).

The structural data

The structural data represents the data and the elements that are parts of the object under study and that define it in its proper shape and characteristics. Thus, the structural data are data sets that are not influenced by external factors, and that are *de facto* concerning the object under study, as they are part of it. In other words, the structural data as we will understand it in this section, is data that is detached from particularities and that is established and recognized as such⁷⁸.

The most evident structural data when it comes to analyzing countries is geography and geographical features. As mentioned before, Cyprus and Kosovo are not properly located in the same continent (Kosovo is considered as part of the European continent, as it shares delimitations with European countries, while Cyprus tends to be more considered as part of the West Asia, as it is located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea) but are properly associated – in different degrees – to the same continent. Indeed, if the geographical European location of Kosovo cannot be refuted as it shares delimitations with Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, the geographical location of Cyprus tends to be more questioned, as is the case for its closest neighbor, Turkey. Between Europe and the Western part of Asia, but part of the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, the geographical position of Cyprus is not connected to the European continent, an assumption which is reinforced by the island status of

⁷⁸ Definition of the adjective “structurel, -elle”, CNRTL, 2012: <https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/structurel>

the country as Jean Rossetto and Kalliope Agapiou-Joséphidès⁷⁹ suggest. However, Cyprus is connected and linked to the European continent, thanks to its culture, its way of life, its history, its political preoccupations and so on. As such, Cyprus is even considered as the gateway to Europe, as proves for instance the high number of migrants that try to join the European continent through the small island every year⁸⁰. If Cyprus is not – in geographical terms – fully part of the European continent, it can despite that be closely linked to this continent. The Europeanness of our two units of comparison is then evident, even though in both cases, it could be contested, as we emphasized it for Cyprus, and as we will develop on later for Kosovo, in the circumstantial data section.

Another evident structural similarity is the geographical stature of the two countries, as they are both small countries with a little surface area: 10,887 km² for Kosovo⁸¹ and 9,240 km² for Cyprus⁸², which ranks them respectively the 165th and 167th largest countries of the World. If their size is comparable, the number of people that live in each country is also equivalent: according to the 2022 report of the United Nations, 1,666M people inhabited Kosovo on the 01st of January 2021 while on the same date Cyprus counted 1,241M inhabitants⁸³.

Hence, given the essential structural data, Cyprus and Kosovo are comparable, as they have a strong connection to the geographical European continent and as their surface area or their

⁷⁹ Jean Rossetto and Kalliope Agapiou-Joséphidès, *La singularité de Chypre dans l'Union européenne : diversité des droits et des statuts*, n.d.

⁸⁰ Apostolos Staikos. *A Chypre, l'arrivée massive de migrants Syriens inquiète Les Autorités*. euronews.<https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/04/25/a-chypre-larrivee-massive-de-migrants-syriens-inquiete-les-autorites>

⁸¹ Perspective Monde, 17/06/2024 :

<https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?langue=fr&codePays=KSV&codeTheme=100&codeStat=AG.SRF.TOTL.K2>

⁸² Perspective Monde, 17/06/2024 :

<https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?langue=fr&codePays=CYP&codeTheme=100&codeStat=AG.LND.TOTL.K2>

⁸³ World Prospect Population 2022, File GEN/01/REV1: Demographic indicators by region, subregion and country, annually for 1950-2100, Estimates 1950-2021, United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, July 2022.

population share similar amounts. The biggest points of divergences regarding the two countries lie more in the circumstantial data, even though they still share the same essential matters when it comes to the national identity.

The circumstantial data

In contrast to structural data, circumstantial data is data that is bound to evolve - or at least not necessarily remain static - as it is influenced by a particular context or situation. Circumstantial data, while largely connected to the specific characteristics of the country in question, may also depend on contexts outside the country, or on foreign or international actors. In our study of the ethnically divided Cyprus and Kosovo, this circumstantial data is important because this context of division has its roots in fields and aspects that are not part of the structural data. Hence, it is even more eloquent regarding the fact that the “structural” logic for each country would be to have its very own and very specific national identity. Since it is not the case for Cyprus and Kosovo – or at least since this “structural” logic encounters diverging points -, we need to analyze each of these contextual and circumstantial aspects that result in this specific situation and that legitimize the comparison between the two countries.

First of all, the two countries share this ambiguous situation of recognition: if Cyprus is considered as a state, its status remains contested⁸⁴, whereas Kosovo is not officially recognized as a country by all the UN members and all the EU members⁸⁵ (Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus still did not recognize it). Cyprus is a country, recognized by the

⁸⁴ Cyprus, European Union Official Website: https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/eu-countries/cyprus_fr

⁸⁵ Kosovo, Toute l'Europe.eu : <https://www.touteleurope.eu/pays/kosovo/>

international organizations and even members of the UN and the EU, but only to a certain extent. The island, divided between the North (known as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) and the South (known as the Greek part, the Republic of Cyprus) is for instance not fully a member of the EU. Indeed, the whole island is considered to be part of the organization, making the inhabitants of the Northern part European citizens even though they live on a territory under the control of Turkey, but in the legislation of the EU, only the part recognized by the international community is taken into account (hence the Southern part – the Republic of Cyprus), which means that the laws of the organization do not apply to the Turkish community in Cyprus. The status of the island is therefore ambiguous, as it is recognized but not entirely recognized in the international community. However, the status of Kosovo is even more ambiguous, as the country is not fully recognized by the international community. In September 2020, over the 193 members of the UN, only 104⁸⁶ countries recognized Kosovo, 88 decided against and 5 abstained. Hence, Kosovo is not even considered as an international actor and does not belong to the international or continental organizations such as the EU. This ambiguity in the status of Cyprus and Kosovo makes it easier to compare them on the field of national identity, because we can therefore assure that their national identity is contested outside and inside their borders and delimitations.

However, despite this ambiguous status, they both share a strong connection to the European continent and to the EU. Indeed, Cyprus is a member of the EU and Kosovo would like to become a candidate for the organization in the years to come (with the status of “potential candidate”⁸⁷).

⁸⁶ « Lista e Njohjeve »: <https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve/>

⁸⁷ Kosovo – European Commission: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/kosovo_en

Another similarity between the two small countries is their history as they both were an old colony or possession of another bigger country. Cyprus has known a lot of situations of tutelage, by the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Ottomans and lately by the British, as the United Kingdom entirely annexed the island during the First World War on the 5th of November of 1914. The country finally obtained its independence with the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960. Kosovo experienced a similar situation as the country was closely linked to the Serbian authorities since the XIth century. From the XVth to the XXth century, the country fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and became a part of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941, before belonging to Albania under the Italian occupation from 1941 to 1945. Since then, Kosovo was an autonomous province of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, itself part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, before being administered by the UNMIK after the collapse of the USSR. Since the 17th of February of 2008, Kosovo declared its unilateral independence⁸⁸. Hence, Cyprus and Kosovo are two countries that were under the occupation of foreign and external powers for a long period, which explains the numerous influences that they have and their ethnically divided population.

The major aspect that allows us to compare Cyprus and Kosovo regarding the question of the national identity and the peacebuilding initiatives of the EU is the ethnically divided population of the two countries. The situation and the partition are in fact similar as in both cases we have a strong majority and numerous small minorities. In Cyprus, the Greek community represents the vast majority of the inhabitants of the island (77%) while the Turkish population is the strongest minority (18%)⁸⁹, while in Kosovo, the Albanian population (87%)

⁸⁸ Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 17 February 2008, <https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2008/en/56552>

⁸⁹ “The World Factbook – Ethnic Groups”. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Archived from the original on 25 June 2014.

is the crushing majority and the Serbs the strongest minority (9%)⁹⁰. Hence, we have a similar situation in which one ethnicity is dominating the other in terms of population. However, we have to highlight the difference of percentage of the minority, because where it is important in Cyprus, it seems extremely poor in Kosovo. Despite this difference of percentage of the minorities, their strength and their influence seem to be equivalent, and they can be described as strong and powerful minorities. The historian Gezim Krasniqi⁹¹ describes the Serbian minority as “*the non-dominant core*” by opposition to the “*dominant core*” which is represented by the Albanians, but all the same as a “*core*” to emphasize the importance of the minority. This designation could easily be used to define the Turkish minority in Cyprus as it is a strong political actor on the island. In addition to this ethnic division and minority/majority complex, we can mention the religious division (that often follows and encompasses the ethnic division) between Catholic orthodox and Muslims in Kosovo and between the autocephalous Greek Orthodox ‘Church of Cyprus’ and the Sunni Muslim community in Cyprus. In any case, this unequal ethnic division of both countries can be interpreted at the political level, as the minorities suffer a lack of political representation and consideration in Kosovo (and especially the smallest minorities such as the Bosniaks, the Gorani or the Croats) and in Cyprus (such as the question of the international representation of the Turkish community, which is nonexistent). Hence, in both cases, and that is an important point for our analysis, the countries are marked by a strong multiethnicity, understood as the cohabitation of different and various ethnicities on the same territory. And this multiethnicity is acknowledged in a more or less

⁹⁰ “Living Standard Measurement Survey”, from the Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2000.

⁹¹ Gezim Krasniqi, *Equal Citizens, Uneven Communities: Differentiated and Hierarchical Citizenship in Kosovo*, (*Uneven Citizenship: Minorities and Migrants in the Post-Yugoslav Space*, Routledge, London 2016), DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315677828>

official way in both countries: the Green Line in Cyprus that divides the island in two parts pulling apart the two Greek and Turkish communities, and the same extent, even though less important because of the repartition in the country, in Kosovo, where the towns located in the North and close to the delimitation with Serbia are mostly inhabited by Serbs, whereas the vast majority of Albanians lives in the rest of the land. As a matter of fact, we can argue that this common multiethnicity is perceived in a slightly identical way in Cyprus and in Kosovo: as problematic for unification and (international) representation of the countries as James Ker-Lindsay⁹² suggests. This common perception and impact of the multiethnicity also lies in the fact that both Cyprus and Kosovo are the battlefields of external and international considerations: indeed, where Cyprus is the evident battlefield of the Greek power and the Turkish power, Kosovo is the battlefield of the Serbian power against the Albanian one. In both battles, the ethnicities that are concerned are ethnicities which originally come from an external territory, another country and perceive this new land as the continuation of their own historical land (in Cyprus for instance, the Greek population talk about a “enosis” to characterize this ideal of Cyprus becoming a region of Greece, and the “Greater Albania” in the case of Kosovar of Albanian origin). Hence, in both Cyprus and Kosovo, we have a conflict in which the countries of the historical ethnicities are involved, and the object of dissension is the national identity.

We can also add that both conflicts seem to be frozen nowadays, despite all the peacebuilding initiatives and agreements that have been attempted. However, we have to

⁹² James Ker-Lindsay , Engagement without recognition: The limits of diplomatic interaction with contested states, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274197130_Engagement_without_Recognition_The_Limits_of_Diplomatic_Interaction_with_Contested_States.

highlight that the conflict as it is nowadays, with its current considerations and stakes, last since a longer period in Cyprus than in Kosovo because of the temporal interval between the two independences: the independence of Cyprus from the United Kingdom occurred in 1960, while Kosovo declared its unilateral independence from Serbia in 2008. Since decades, both ethnic conflicts have been frozen, forcing the international community to interfere as referees, as is the case of the United States for instance, which are involved in the conflict in Kosovo and in Cyprus through and with NATO. More than the actions of the United States, both countries have been subject to a lot of peacebuilding missions and initiatives since many decades. If the peacebuilding mission of the EU in Kosovo, the EULEX Mission, is still new and the first mission of that scope for the EU outside its borders, Cyprus has known a lot of them, by various actors. In total, we can count not less than 41 peacebuilding mission in the island⁹³. In the framework of this study, we will analyze those peacebuilding missions in Cyprus and in Kosovo, but, if they share the same goal of improving the relations between the different ethnicities through legal, judicial and political actions, they do not have the same legal status, or the same actors involved. For Kosovo, we will consider the EULEX Mission, which is an audacious mission from the EU by its scope and its newness. For Cyprus, we will take three initiatives: the EU-UNDP Partnership, a partnership between the EU and the UN existing since 2001, the Civil Society in Action program from EuropeAid Programme for Cyprus in general and the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community. Here, the words used are eloquent: in the case of Kosovo, EULEX is a concrete and real “mission”, whereas in the case of Cyprus we will speak about “initiatives” as they are “programmes” and “partnerships”. As

⁹³ Eleftherios A. Michael, *Peacemaking Strategies in Cyprus: In Search of Lasting Peace* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).

we will explore later, the EU is involved in both missions, however at different scales and different amounts, but both peacebuilding missions and initiatives are said to be neutral in the way they conceive each ethnicity and each national identity. In other words, in both cases, the main objective is not to raise an ethnicity as the official one over the others, but to provide peace between all the different communities, considering all of them in the peacebuilding process.

A closing remark about the links between Kosovo and Cyprus for our comparison is that Cyprus is one of the five EU member states that does not recognize Kosovo, and that it is even the only EU member state which is not contributing to the EULEX Mission.

To conclude this section regarding the putting in perspective of our two units of comparison Cyprus and Kosovo, we can argue that even though they share numerous similarities and common historical factors, the current situation as well as the trajectory seem to differ. However, the comparison in terms of national identity, ethnic conflicts and the peacebuilding missions implemented, Cyprus and Kosovo remain comparable, and make our comparative study logical and legitimate.

(4) Sources used and the literary analysis of official documents

In this study, the sources can be divided into two categories: the sources that come from academic research and scholars, and the sources that are said to be “official”, hence directly coming from the EU or equivalent institutions and the peacebuilding missions and initiatives reports. If the first ones are more considered as interpretative, and hence are mostly secondary sources, the second one, being rather factual, will correspond to the primary sources of this analysis. The primary sources of this study are therefore: first, the constitutional official texts

of the EU peacebuilding initiatives, such as the Programmes from the Council of the EU for Kosovo and the Programmes of the EU-UNDP Partnership, the Civil Society in Action Programme and the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community for Cyprus, as well as the legal amendments that introduce these initiatives into the EU agenda. These sources give us a direct and precise set of data regarding the peacebuilding missions and initiatives, their content, their actions as well as their results. Moreover, these official texts will also be analyzed in a very literary way, as we will point out and study the literary processes, and the phrases used to refer to the national identities. Indeed, we will approach the way the question of the conflicts linked with the national identities and ethnicities is evoked in these texts, through which adjectives, which expressions, to analyze and interpret the correlation between the peacebuilding process and the question of national identity in both countries. Hence, for these official sources, we will analyze their content (what is mentioned) as well as their style (how, with which literary process it is mentioned), using the structuralism method of literary analysis, as Ferdinand de Saussure⁹⁴ theorized it. Indeed, according to him and his theory of the “*signifié*” and the “*signifiant*”, we will see the connection made between the word used and their meanings, to analyze if the words “national identity” are for example mentioned, and if not, which words refer to that context. In other words, which words does the EU use in these legal texts to cover the question of national identity and what highlight is put on them, if there is one.

As for the secondary sources, hence the academic papers and the articles written by scholars, we will analyze them as sources of data without taking into consideration their literary

⁹⁴ Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (New York : Philosophical Library , 1959).

processes and aspects of style. However, as they are written by specialists, they will be useful as providing us pieces of information and interpretations of the results.

To summarize, this study will use sources as tools for factual pieces of information (the official texts, programmes and reports) as well as tools for academic analysis and impartial interpretations.

(5) The interpretation of the results of the peacebuilding initiatives

As mentioned before, the results of the EU peacebuilding initiatives – hence the realization of the actions announced in the programmes and the influences of the initiatives on the resolution of the national conflicts – will be provided by the progress reports of the EU and its organizations. However, the interpretations that we will make of them will rather be deduced and inspired from analysis written by academic scholars. To this extent, it is important to note that this study is not intended to preach morality, nor to take sides or pronounce in favor or against any particular practice. The interpretation of the results, in the context of this study, refers to the difference between what was announced and planned in the official programs, and what was actually carried out. The question of prioritizing actions will also be interpreted as a result of these peacebuilding missions and initiatives. Indeed, if a cause is defended and treated with greater importance than another, and within a tighter timeframe, then the credit given to it is different from a cause treated in the background, for example. Finally, some academic studies also make available the results of on-the-spot surveys to get an impression of the real impact of these initiatives on the ground, which will also serve as results in this study.

In short, the results of these peacebuilding missions and initiatives will be drawn from official documents and sources, but interpreted by secondary academic sources, taking care not to use a moralistic tone.

(6) Research question(s)

Our main research question is: **to what extent does the EU, through its peacebuilding initiatives affect the issue of national identity in Cyprus and in Kosovo?**

In this study, we will focus on the issue of ethnic identity conflicts, and more specifically on the question of national identity in the two countries of Cyprus and Kosovo. Our goal, by linking them to the EU's peacebuilding missions and initiatives, is to see what is being done at the European level in this area, given that the conflict is, on the ground, frozen. So, the first general question would be: is the EU, as a supranational political entity with power and competence within and beyond its borders, taking action to resolve these ethnic conflicts in Cyprus and Kosovo? As mentioned earlier, the EU is indeed a concrete actor on these issues, through partnerships, missions or, more simply, initiatives. So, the second question that can be asked is what actions is the EU carrying out to this end, and what precise role is it playing? Is it a major role, a minor role, an active role taking decisions, or a more passive role supporting decisions?

We will also be looking to see what emphasis is placed on the issue of national identity in the context of these EU peacebuilding initiatives. How important is the ethnic issue in EU peacebuilding initiatives? How are ethnic conflicts and national identity literally mentioned in the official discourse of EU peacebuilding initiatives?

Finally, considering the implementation of these initiatives, we will ask how these actions are carried out, and above all, are they in line with what was originally planned? When they have been completed, we will try to question their usefulness and effectiveness, and the role the EU can play in this kind of ethnic conflict. Does the EU ultimately play a role in resolving these ethnic conflicts through its peacebuilding initiatives? This will enable us to turn to the question of the limits facing the EU. What kind of limits, and to what extent, are they blocking the organization's initiatives? What solutions can be envisaged to circumvent them?

All these questions underlie our initial research question: To what extent does the EU, through its peacebuilding initiatives, affect the issue of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo?

All these questions will be addressed in a comparative way between Cyprus and Kosovo, enabling us to assess the differences and possible commonalities in these EU initiatives.

Our main hypothesis regarding our research question is that the EU does affect the issue of national identity in Cyprus and in Kosovo, but not with a strong impact. Also, given its member-state status, we think that the impact of the EU peacebuilding is stronger in Cyprus than in Kosovo. Finally, we think that the role of the EU is more of a supportive one than a decisionary one.

(7) The (chrono)logical approach of the study

Finally, this study will be conducted chronologically, both in terms of historical events and the analysis of the EU peacebuilding initiatives for Cyprus and Kosovo. Indeed, the plan of this study is designed to ensure that the peacebuilding process is also considered chronological. Thus, while the first chapter of the study will deal with the first phase of these peacebuilding initiatives and their planned program, objectives and actions, it will be completed by a second

chapter which will analyze the results obtained and the achievements of these planned actions. Finally, the last chapter will discuss the limits and obstacles of these EU peacebuilding missions and initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo.

ANALYSIS

Chapter one – The EU peacebuilding initiatives and their connection to the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo

In this first chapter, we will discuss the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo and their foundations, origins and principles. This will enable us to identify their *raison d'être* and, in particular, the place given to the national identity in their objectives and achievements. In fact, we will be examining the relationship and connections between these peacebuilding initiatives and the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, and the way in which it is developed in official texts and documents.

To do so, a first section will address the existing connection between the notion of peace, represented by the EU peacebuilding initiatives and the question of national identity, arguing that, although many other factors are responsible for the construction and elaboration of peace in Cyprus and Kosovo, the question of unresolved national identity is the main one. In other words, whether in Cyprus or Kosovo, the first concrete step in promoting peace is to build and resolve the question of national identity. We will therefore explore the forms and conditions under which this connection is taking place in Cyprus and Kosovo.

A second section will look at the EU's peacebuilding missions and initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo, their history, projects and objectives. After justifying in the first section the need for real peace in these two countries, and the resolution of the question of national identity as an essential prerogative for this peace, we will examine the means implemented by the EU to achieve it, i.e. the peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. This section will then introduce the origin and main dynamics of these initiatives, as well as the proposals for resolving the issue of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo.

Finally, a third section will examine the way in which this same question of national identity is considered in the official programs and texts of the EU's peacebuilding initiatives. Through a literary analysis of the founding programs of EU peacebuilding initiatives, we will see how the issue of national identity is presented, what importance is attached to it and what words are used to qualify it. The words used to describe national identity and national considerations in Cyprus and Kosovo will also enable us to compare the EU's position on this issue, and the general understanding that results from reading these documents. Thus, the importance, prioritization, consideration and qualification of the issue of national identity in EU peacebuilding initiatives will be examined.

Section 1 – Why associate these peacebuilding initiatives with the question of national identity? The connection between peace and national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo

In this first section, we look at the connection between the need for peace and the question of national identity in our two units of comparison. Indeed, we will see how, and from what

angles, one of the main causes of the current tensions in Cyprus and Kosovo is the question of national identity. In other words, to achieve peace, whether in Cyprus or Kosovo, the first and the most important step is to resolve the issue of national identity. In this section, we shall also look at how national identity is a problem in Cyprus and Kosovo, and what the direct manifestations and consequences are for the population of these territories.

First of all, it is important to note that peace depends on resolving the issue of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, as Mario Nava⁹⁵, Director-General of DG Structural Reform Support of the European Commission, suggests in the official press release presenting the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus: *"Over the past two decades, this partnership has been essential in fostering peacebuilding and reconciliation in Cyprus, bringing the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities closer while laying the groundwork for sustainable peace and prosperity"*. In this quotation, the words *"peacebuilding"* and *"reconciliation (of the two communities)"* are directly associated and clearly show the connection that exists between the two, a connection which therefore legitimizes the implementation of these peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus. The context is very similar in Kosovo, as Anna Jagiello-Szostak⁹⁶ demonstrates by extrapolating the consideration of these EU actions and asserting that Kosovo's connection to the EU and to Europe is an approach aimed at peace and a *"process of inter ethnic and interstate reconciliation"*. The need for ethnic or inter-community *"reconciliation"* to guarantee peace in Cyprus and Kosovo is clear to see.

⁹⁵ EU-UNDP Partnership In Cyprus official website – press releases: <https://www.undp.org/cyprus/press-releases/eu-undp-cyprus-partnership>

⁹⁶ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, "The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations," *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

If this reconciliation is absolutely necessary in these two countries, it is because ethnic tensions and tensions linked to the question of national identity have persisted for many decades, without any progress or prospects for change or peace having been found. In fact, both countries are ethnically divided between a relatively large majority and a more or less small minority, which challenges the ethnic majority. The island of Cyprus (North and South) is inhabited 77%⁹⁷ by Greek Cypriots, who constitute the country's ethnic majority, and 18% by Turkish Cypriots, who form a relatively large minority. The difference between majority and minority ethnicity is even more obvious in Kosovo, populated by 87%⁹⁸ Albanians of Kosovo and 9% Serbs of Kosovo. Due to historical differences and conflicts, it is hard for these communities to live together, both individually and collectively. Acts of violence by one community against the other, or by a member of one community against the other because of this ethnic difference, are recurrent and numerous in both Cyprus⁹⁹ and Kosovo¹⁰⁰.

These tensions are also part of a long-term historical context in which the presence of international players was significant: Lulzim Krasniqi and Jonuz Abdullai¹⁰¹ recall that the EU failed in its mission to settle the Kosovo war in 1998/1999 and pacify relations between Serbs and Albanians in the region, and James Ker-Lindsay¹⁰² evokes the historical tensions between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots amplified by the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974. The situation in both countries is similar: widespread ethnic and communal tensions that do

⁹⁷ “The World Factbook – Ethnic Groups”. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

⁹⁸ “Living Standard Measurement Survey”, from the Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2000.

⁹⁹ Carlos de Cueto, Marion Réau, and Hubert Peres, *La Turquie et l'internationalisation du conflit ethnique De chypre* | cairn.info, accessed July 13, 2024, <https://www.cairn.info/revue-pole-sud-2005-2-page-95.htm>.

¹⁰⁰ United Nations. (n.d.). *Conseil de Sécurité: Des tensions politiques et sécuritaires au Kosovo conjuguées à une impasse du dialogue entre Belgrade et Pristina, Selon La Représentante Spéciale | Couverture des Réunions & Communiqués de Presse*. United Nations. <https://press.un.org/fr/2023/cs15461.doc.htm>

¹⁰¹ Lulzim Krasniqi, Jonuz Abdullai. “Common Security and Defense Policy and Kosovo: A critical analysis of the EULEX Mission.” *Revista de Stiinte Politice*, no. 75: 171, 2022.

¹⁰² James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

not guarantee the peace and safety of the inhabitants of Cyprus and Kosovo have been going on for decades, and have already been the subject of attempts at resolution by international players such as the UN and the EU. There is therefore a clear need for peace in Cyprus and Kosovo, and this peace is conditional on the resolution of the problems raised by national identity and the ethnic question. Indeed, as we will see, ethnic tensions linked to national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo seem to be giving rise to exacerbated nationalism and "*ethnic insecurity*", which have a direct impact on the daily lives of Cypriots and Kosovars, to use Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic's¹⁰³ expression. One of the main manifestations of the idea that peace in Cyprus, as in Kosovo, is conditional and dependent on the resolution of the question of national identity is the shared and legitimate feeling of "*ethnic insecurity*" among the Cypriot population, as among the Kosovar population. Indeed, as Anna Jagiello-Szostak¹⁰⁴ explains in her study of Kosovo, the political and ideological differences between Kosovar Albanians and (Kosovar) Serbs are such that they are materialized by forms of violence in the daily lives of the country's inhabitants. She thus echoes Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic's expression, describing the feeling of fear and anxiety that emanates from this as "*ethnic insecurity*". This feeling of "*ethnic insecurity*" represents the generalized and recurring fear of a country's inhabitants of a common ethnic group of being the target or victim of acts of violence carried out by another ethnic group. In other words, ethnic insecurity occurs when the difference in ethnicity justifies acts of violence against a person of another ethnicity. In Kosovo, for example, there are acts of ethnic violence by the Albanian community against Serbs, particularly in the southern regions of the country, which are predominantly populated by Albanian Kosovars, and acts of ethnic violence

¹⁰³ Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic. *The politics, practice and paradox of 'ethnic security' Bosnia – Herzegovina*, "*Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*", 4 (1), p. 11, 2015.

¹⁰⁴ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, "The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations," *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

by the Serbian community against Albanian Kosovars living in the towns of northern Kosovo, some of which are overwhelmingly populated by Serbs. The dynamic is similar in Cyprus, as described by James Ker-Lindsay¹⁰⁵, though less explicit and direct due to the island's division in two and the wall separating the two separate Greek and Turkish administrations. As mentioned above, this ethnic insecurity concerns more the ethnic minorities, i.e. the places where they are least represented and where a strong different ethnic majority evolves. This is confirmed by Genc Mekaj and Kreshnik Aliaj¹⁰⁶, writing "*In Kosovo, the critical issue for most minorities has been daily security*". In Kosovo, as in Cyprus, this ethnically-motivated violence is diverse and of all kinds: "*organized violence, harassment and attacks on property*". This leads to a feeling of unprotection on the part of the national authorities in Kosovo, as Genc Mekaj and Kreshnik Aliaj write, and is precisely what serves as justification for the implementation of the EULEX Mission by the EU, as Anna Jagiello-Szostak¹⁰⁷ reminds us. Sevki Kiralp¹⁰⁸ mentions "*the Gonyeli Massacre*", the first recorded ethnic massacre on the island, dating back to 1958, when 35 Turks were killed by Greeks. This widespread violence on the island is also used by James Ker-Lindsay as a justification for the need for peacebuilding initiatives on the part of international players in Cyprus. At the same time, these ethnic tensions and the resulting widespread insecurity have helped to accentuate and exacerbate "*ethnic nationalism*", as Anna Jagiello-Szostak explains with regard to Kosovo. Indeed, while ethnic

¹⁰⁵ James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

¹⁰⁶ Genc Mekaj and Kreshnik Aliaj, Ethnic dimension in Kosovo, security and its consequences in transition | *iliria international review*, accessed July 13, 2024, <https://www.iliriapublications.org/index.php/iir/article/view/482>.

¹⁰⁷ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, "The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations," *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

¹⁰⁸ Sevki Kiralp. A history of resentment and violence: The fight for status and ethnic conflict in Cyprus (Bir hınç ve şiddet tarihi: Kıbrıs'ta statü kavgası ve etnik çatışma): by Niyazi Kızılyürek, Istanbul, (Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2016), 665 pp., ISBN 978-605-399-404-6. *Turkish Studies*, 21(3), 494–496, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2019.1629817>

nationalism is clearly one of the sources of ethnic violence, it is also one of its consequences. In the case of Cyprus, as in that of Kosovo, ethnic nationalism is both the origin and the consequence of ethnic violence, in the sense that ethnic violence helps to radicalize and accentuate ethnic nationalism. In fact, ethnic violence brings members of the same ethnic group closer together and creates a movement of solidarity and support within the ethnic group, on the model of nationalism and the functioning of national cohesion (in the sense that it is the sum of individuals that makes up the nation, and that the nation is also found in each individual). This is what Sevki Kiralp highlights when he talks about the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus, who are fighting in what he calls the "*struggle for status*". Indeed, one of the main differences between Cyprus and Kosovo in terms of the country's national identity and ethnic question is the recognition and status of the various communities. While in Kosovo, the Kosovar state is generally but not totally recognized, recognition of the island of Cyprus (or at least of its administration by the Greek part to the south) is more generalized and accepted, both in political and institutional terms. Thus, in Cyprus, one ethnic group is widely recognized institutionally, while the other is not: for while both parts of the island have their own independent administration and institutions, the Republic of Cyprus refers to the administration and institutions as administered and organized by the island's Greek authorities and community, which is not the case with the Republic of Northern Turkish Cyprus, which is not recognized. In Cyprus, therefore, as Sevki Kiralp explains, a sort of institutional battle is being waged, a battle for official status between the Greek and Turkish communities, so far won by the former. So, in addition to the exacerbation of ethnic nationalism, there is, in Cyprus more than in Kosovo, a real institutional battle for representation, for one community to prevail over the other in legal terms and international representation. This, of course, exaggerates

ethnic nationalism still further, for it extends not only to the daily lives of the island's inhabitants, whether as individuals or as communities, but also to the political offices and institutions responsible for representing Cyprus on the international stage.

We therefore have seen that, in Cyprus as in Kosovo, peace depends first and foremost on resolving the problems posed by the question of national identity. This question of national identity raises many issues for the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus, and the Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo, as it is notably responsible for a general ethnic insecurity experienced by the inhabitants of both countries, leading to a strengthening of ethnic nationalism which manifests itself in different forms depending on whether it takes place in Cyprus or Kosovo. Nonetheless, the common root of the issues raised by the question of national identity in both Cyprus and Kosovo remains bicommunality on the one hand, and multi-ethnicity on the other.

Indeed, the common factor in all these problems in Cyprus and Kosovo is the management of “*bicommunality*” on the one hand, and “*multiculturalism*” on the other. To qualify the situation in Cyprus, i.e. the fact that the island is divided into two parts according to the Greek or Turkish communities they are home to, we generally speak, as James Ker-Lindsay¹⁰⁹ does, of a “*bicommunal*” society. This refers to the fact that there are two distinct and easily identifiable communities in the same region. As the name implies with the prefix “*bi*”, this kind of society is divided into only two majority parts, which are the only ethnic groups capable of constituting real communities, as we have previously demonstrated with the ethnic composition of the island. These two communities are divided and characterized by their impermeability,

¹⁰⁹ James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

which makes their distinction all the more obvious. In Kosovo, where minorities are more numerous, and majorities less obvious, researchers speak more of "*multi-ethnicity*" or a "*multicultural*" society, as does Anna Jagiello-Szostak¹¹⁰, for example, or even the official reports of international institutions and organizations such as the EU or the UN. Indeed, unlike Cyprus, the prefix "*multi*" here qualifies the idea that society is divided into numerous communities and ethnic groups, as we have indeed seen in another section. In Kosovo, then, there is certainly an overwhelming majority (the Albanian community), but this is complemented by numerous minority communities, which do not boil down to the Serbian community alone (although it does constitute the largest minority), making Kosovar society more than a bicomunal society, a multi-ethnic and multicultural one. Moreover, although the division between the communities (and in particular the two largest Albanian and Serbian communities) is marked and spatially manifest, it is not as delineated and pronounced as in the case of Cyprus, with the partition of the island in two, and the construction of a wall in the capital Nicosia.

In all cases, whether it is the "*bicomunal*" Cypriot society, or the "*multiethnic*" Kosovar society, this mixed attribute and the way it is managed is what causes problems, according to Anna Jagiello-Szostak and James Ker-Lindsay. As they explain, it is because no viable way of administering it has yet been found that tensions are recurrent in both countries: the way it is managed by the Cypriot and Kosovar governments is insufficient, as is the representation and consideration it is given by international players.

¹¹⁰ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, "The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations," *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

Consequently, as we have shown in this section, the ethnic question, the question of national identity and therefore of which community represents the country, is, for Cyprus as for Kosovo, the initial source of the lack of peace. If there is to be peace, it is largely conditional on the resolution of this problem of national identity. As the scholars show, there is an obvious and urgent need to resolve the ethnic conflicts in Cyprus and Kosovo, and to finally establish a real national identity so that the two countries can finally enjoy full recognition on the international stage. This is what the peacebuilding missions and initiatives set up by the EU in Cyprus and Kosovo are all about, as Sabrina Petra Ramet¹¹¹ sums up in this sentence: *“In the case of Kosovo, the most significant goal of the EU was to avoid another ethnic conflict”*.

***Section 2 – What has been planned? Presentation of the origins and goals of the EU
peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo***

In this second section, we will briefly present the various EU peacebuilding missions and initiatives underway in Cyprus and Kosovo. As mentioned above, the missions and initiatives we have chosen for this study are the EU-UNDP Partnership, the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community and the Civil Society in Action Programme from the EuropeAid Programme for Cyprus in the case of Cyprus, and the EULEX Mission in the case of Kosovo. These were chosen because they are the main peacebuilding missions and initiatives in both countries in which the EU is involved as one of the main players, and they all place at their heart the question of national identity and relations between ethnic groups and communities.

¹¹¹ Sabrina Petra Ramet, F.Peter Wagner, *Post-socialist model of rule in Central and South-eastern Europe, (Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Cambridge 2010, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803185>)

The EULEX Mission in Kosovo is the largest of these, and the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community and the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus, in association with the United Nations, are the initiatives with the greatest impact, as we shall see. Given the scale and importance of the EULEX Mission, organized by the EU alone, this appears to be relatively comparable to the sum of the three initiatives underway in Cyprus. Moreover, it should be said that the three initiatives in Cyprus work in pairs and are all interconnected at some point. It should also be notified that this section will only be a brief part of the initiatives and missions since the other sections will elaborate on their achievements and limits. In this section, we will look at the origin, duration, objectives, players involved, funding and legal frameworks of these missions and initiatives, when data allows.

(1) The EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus

With regard to the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus, we have selected 3 of the most relevant and important to our study. In order of importance and influence, we will now present and analyze the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community, followed by the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus, and ending with EuropeAid's Civil Society in Action Programme. We have to mention here the fact that these initiatives are all interconnected and often cooperate with each other: we will present them individually, but their actions are often the result of their interconnection, as we will develop later. We should note, however, that official resources for these three initiatives are far less accessible than for the EULEX Mission in Kosovo.

The EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community

The EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community is an EU program set up after Cyprus joined the EU on May 01st, 2006, based on Council Regulation 389/2006¹¹². This program seems to be a more or less direct consequence of the failure of the Annan Plan¹¹³, revised and proposed in 2004 by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, which aimed to establish peace in Cyprus by reunifying the island. The Plan was put to a referendum on April 24th, 2004, and was approved by a majority of Turkish Cypriots, but rejected by a majority of Greek Cypriots: it was therefore not implemented. There were many reasons why the Greek Cypriots chose not to accept this plan, not least the striking and eloquent economic contrast between the two parts of the island, the Greek southern part being far more developed than the Turkish northern part. This is precisely the purpose of the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community, which is still underway. The objectives of this initiative, as formulated in the official program, are: *"facilitating the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot Community, with particular emphasis on the economic integration of the island, on improving contacts between the two communities and with the EU and on the preparation for the EU body of laws"*¹¹⁴. In other words, this program aims firstly to enable the economic development of the northern Turkish part of the island, and secondly to encourage interaction between the two parts of the island, thereby helping to foster

¹¹² Official Website of the Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community – Commission Europa: https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/support-turkish-cypriot-community/aid-programme-turkish-cypriot-community_en

¹¹³ Official Annan Plan – Basis for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem – Revision of the 26/02/2003: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/annan-cyprus-problem_maps_26feb03.pdf

¹¹⁴ Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32006R0389>

the development of peace between the Greek and Turkish communities. The idea is therefore simple: to put the two parts of the island on the same level of development in order to legitimize a dialogue between them, and more broadly between the two communities. The desire to unify the island, one of the pillars of the Annan Plan, is therefore reflected in this Program, which the EU is funding in a major way: 31.7 million euros for 2023 alone¹¹⁵, and 240 million euros for the current period 2021/2027¹¹⁶, making it the EU's most heavily funded peacebuilding initiative in Cyprus. However, the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community is largely complemented by the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus, which has a special status.

The EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus

The EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus is part of the wide range of partnerships that have existed between the UN (and more specifically the UNDP) and the EU for over 20 years, in more than 100 countries. The partnership between the two organizations in Cyprus began in October 2001, with the pioneering Nicosia Plan as recalled on its official website¹¹⁷, and is still in place today. Its objective and scope of action is much broader than that of the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community, since it aims to contribute to infrastructure development, private sector growth and the preservation of the island's shared cultural heritage.

¹¹⁵ “Cyprus: Commission Allocates €31.7 Million to the Turkish Cypriot Community under the 2023 Aid Programme,” European Commission Representation in Cyprus, September 12, 2023, https://cyprus.representation.ec.europa.eu/news/cyprus-commission-allocates-eu317-million-turkish-cypriot-community-under-2023-aid-programme-2023-09-12_en.

¹¹⁶ Support to the Turkish Cypriot Community – Commission Europa website: https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/support-turkish-cypriot-community_en

¹¹⁷ EU-UNDP Cyprus Partnership – UNDP.org: <https://www.undp.org/european-union/press-releases/eu-undp-cyprus-partnership>

In this way, the partnership is a comprehensive plan playing a vital role in Cyprus' peacebuilding, proposing diversified actions in all areas, while applying to and addressing both the Greek and Turkish communities. In this sense, it is a much more general initiative, since it concerns the whole island and not just a single community. The two main players are the UNDP and the EU, with the latter apparently contributing 36 million euros to the project¹¹⁸.

The Civil Society in Action Programme

The Civil Society in Action Programme, an initiative of EuropeAid, is the latest programme to be analyzed in this study. It was launched in 2007, after the EU Aid Programme, but is much less well documented than the two previous EU peacebuilding initiatives, even though it is still active nowadays (the EU just launched the IXth version of the Programme allowing it 2.25 million euros¹¹⁹). Like the EU-UNDP Partnership, this programme is fairly general and diversified; it aims as much to preserve the island's cultural heritage as it does to contribute to the programme removing landmines, as M.K. Flynn mentions¹²⁰. The Civil Society in Action Programme, which complements the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community and the EU-UNDP Partnership, is divided into three different types of action: two have to do with a clear bicomunal intent, in that they promote contacts between the two communities

¹¹⁸ “EU-UNDP Pledge to Continue Their Vital Role in Peace Building Process in Cyprus,” KYIIE, accessed July 27, 2024, <https://www.cna.org.cy/en/article/6261771/eu-undp-pledge-to-continue-their-vital-role-in-peace-building-process-in-cyprus>.

¹¹⁹ “Cypriot Civil Society in Action IX Grant Program Help Desk,” Sivil Alan, accessed July 27, 2024, <https://civicspace.eu/en/cypriot-civil-society-in-action-ix-grant-program-help-desk/>.

¹²⁰ Mary Kathleen Flynn. “PEACEBUILDING, CIVIL SOCIETY AND AID CONDITIONALITY IN CYPRUS: EVALUATING SUCCESS WITHOUT SUSTAINABILITY AND IMPACT.” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 11, no. 1, 81–87 (2016).

through simple, everyday civil actions, and the last type of action is more general, in that it focuses on "*strengthening civil society*" as a whole, and in all the issues that civil society faces in any country. In other words, the first type of action is aimed at one-to-one contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, while the second type contributes to projects to develop civil society on the Turkish side especially, and in this case is very similar to the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community. The third type of action is aimed more at NGOs and international organizations, encouraging them to invest in projects designed to boost confidence between the two sides of the island, and thus concerns projects for "*the environment, community services, transitional justice, social research, earthquake preparedness, the teaching of History and Women's issues*", as M.K. Flynn points out. In any case, these three types of complementary action, which supplement the initiatives set up by the EU Aid Programme and the EU-UNDP Partnership, have an investment (including extensions) of 29 million euros from the EU over the 2007/2012 period, according to M.K. Flynn.

(2) The EU peacebuilding mission In Kosovo

The EULEX Mission in Kosovo

The EULEX Mission was set up by the EU in 2008, and unlike the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus, has mission status, giving it greater importance and scope for action. Set

up in the wake of Kosovo's independence in February 2008, as Anna Jagiello-Szostak¹²¹ points out, the mission was originally intended to last two years, but has undergone a number of extensions and is still active today. The current mandate of the EULEX Mission began on June 15, 2023 and will last until June 14, 2025¹²², for a period of two years, as has been the case with every renewal since the mission began. The legal basis for this mission is the EU Joint Action of February 2008, which recognizes it as an actor intervening to promote peace in Kosovo, and adjusts its provisional timetable and missions. This mission follows on from previous attempts to build peace in Kosovo, in the same way that the EU's peace-building initiatives in Cyprus follow on from rejected initiatives such as the Annan Plan. As Labinot Griccevc¹²³ reminds us, the EULEX Mission is strongly inspired by the Ahtisaari Plan¹²⁴, proposed a year earlier by Martti Ahtisaari. This *"Final Status Proposal for Kosovo"* recommended supervised independence for Kosovo, while guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities in order to avoid ethnic and community tensions in the country. Unlike the EULEX Mission, which does not officially recognize the state of Kosovo, the Ahtisaari Plan advocated independence for the country, albeit backed by an international administration. Thus, the EULEX Mission was born in a complicated national context, following Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, which rekindled ethnic tensions between Albanians and Serbs in the territory and even in the region. The main ambition of the EULEX Mission is *"to support selected rule of law institutions in Kosovo on their path towards increased effectiveness,*

¹²¹ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, "The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations," *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

¹²² Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5th June 2023 : <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32023D1095>

¹²³ Labinot Greicevci. "EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo." *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* 12 (3): 283–303 (2011).

¹²⁴ Ahtisaari Plan : https://web.archive.org/web/20091009130102/http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf

sustainability, multi-ethnicity and accountability, free from political interference and in line with international human rights standards and best European practices", as stated on its official website¹²⁵. In this way, the Mission works in coordination and cooperation with the country's local institutions and authorities, in particular to ensure justice and the rule of law in Kosovo. The Mission is divided into two main pillars, each with its own distinct tasks. The first is the Monitoring Pillar, which supervises and evaluates the Kosovar judicial system. Its role is that of observer and judge, to ensure that cases of ethnic violence, among other things, are properly managed, and that it plays an active role in strengthening justice in the country. The second pillar is the Mission's Operations Support Pillar, which has a real capacity for action, as it provides operational support to the police and other key institutions in Kosovo. In a way, the Mission's Operations Support Pillar complements the mission of the Monitoring Pillar, as it moves from observation to direct action. It should be noted that the Operation Support Pillar can also be in charge of joint missions with local law enforcement agencies, to improve the coordination and efficiency of the country's security operations, for example. As a result, the EULEX mission in Kosovo aims to judge crimes, guarantee the rule of law, enable fair and equitable consideration of ethnic crimes, ensure the fundamental rights of all the country's communities, and guarantee political independence and non-interference by foreign or international powers in the internal decisions of the Kosovo government. The EULEX mission is supported by all EU member states (even those that do not recognize Kosovo), with the exception of Cyprus, which does not contribute to the mission. In addition to these EU member states, it is also supported by 5 other independent EU states: Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA. The mission, which can accommodate up to 396 staff members

¹²⁵ EULEX Mission official website : <https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16>

(according to the official website but officially more people were employed throughout the year), is financed to the tune of several tens of millions of euros per year, the main share of which comes from the EU, then from these 5 associated countries. The budget allocated to it is relatively stable: it stood at 265 million euros between April 2008 and October 2010, 165 million for the following two years¹²⁶, and now stands at 165.31 million euros for the current mandate, running from June 15, 2023 to June 14, 2025¹²⁷. This is a substantial budget, and its stability is proof of the EU's interest in this mission. Furthermore, the EULEX Mission, which works within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, is the largest mission ever launched under the CSDP of the EU. Consequently, the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, supported by the EU but not only, is a large-scale mission, backed by a substantial and relatively stable budget, which aims to guarantee the functioning of the rule of law in the country and the security of all its inhabitants through objective regulation that is not dependent on the community or ethnic group to which they belong. This large-scale mission, divided into an observation component and an action component, is still at work today, having been continuously extended since its creation in the wake of the country's unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008.

(3) Analysis and comparison of the EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo

We will now write a brief analysis comparing what we just exposed about the peacebuilding initiatives and missions of the EU in Cyprus and Kosovo. The first thing that stands out is the

¹²⁶ Liana Fix, Molly Carlough, and Lara Lázaro Touza Gonzalo Escribano. "EULEX: A Mission in Need of Reform and with No End in Sight." Elcano Royal Institute, November 15, 2021.

¹²⁷ Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5th June 2023 : <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32023D1095>

effort put in by the EU to implement these missions and initiatives. Indeed, we can already see a real willingness to act for peace in these territories on the part of the regional organization. This is evidenced in particular by a real financial investment, which seems to be rather equivalent when we compare the three initiatives in Cyprus and the EULEX Mission in Kosovo: the EU is funding the initiatives in place in both countries to the tune of around 80/90 million euros per year (for these peacebuilding initiatives and missions alone). These initiatives are therefore of real interest to the EU, which has constantly renewed them by adding new mandates and new funding, testifying to the organization's constant and ongoing involvement.

Another aspect that testifies to the EU's obvious involvement may be the relative immediacy that characterizes the launch date of these initiatives. Indeed, the EULEX Mission was set up just after the country's independence, while the European initiatives for Cyprus took place shortly after the country's accession to the organization, in 2004, suggesting that the projects were issued as early as that year.

Furthermore, it is important to note that in both cases, the EU seeks to work with players outside the organization, in order to secure the widest possible funding and the highest possible efficiency. For example, the EU is supported by the United Nations and the UNDP within the framework of the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus, while the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, although implemented by the EU and its member-states, involves 5 other states (Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United States and Turkey).

It is also worth noting the similar origins of these EU initiatives, which justify and legitimize them, as they are all more or less inspired by "plans" that have already been mentioned, but which needed improving: the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo and the Annan Plan in Cyprus. So, these initiatives seem to be improved and corrected versions of these two plans, while retaining

the same initial principle (peace between the communities and the independence of Kosovo on the one hand, the idea of peace through renewed dialogue between the two parts of Cyprus on the other).

As far as the actions taken are concerned, the least that can be said is that they share a common objective: to ensure peace between the communities in Cyprus and Kosovo. In both cases, the initiatives have very general plans (such as the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus and, to a lesser extent, the Monitoring Pillar of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo) and much more specific plans (such as the actions carried out under the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community, which targets a particular community in Cyprus, or the Operations Support Pillar of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, which supports initiatives that are sometimes very local and specific). Whether in Cyprus or Kosovo, the EU's peace-building initiatives certainly concern the population and communities themselves, but not only, in that they also aim to strengthen the institutions and legal or economic frameworks that shape civil society. These initiatives all focus on civil society in general, rather than directly on resolving the issue of national identity. Indeed, they assume that by improving the legal framework (EULEX Mission in Kosovo) or enhancing economic development in the northern part of the island (EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community in Cyprus), the issue of national identity will gradually be resolved. The resolution of national identity remains the priority and the foundation of these initiatives, but this first involves other types of action which will then enable us to address this issue directly. This is justified by the national context: in Cyprus, a geographically extremely divided country, the idea is already to encourage contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as an intermediary stage before envisaging living together, whereas this is already directly envisaged in Kosovo with the EULEX Mission. In

both cases, these actions have a similar modus operandi, ranging from the very specific to the very general, with the same objective of improving and facilitating contacts and relations between communities in tension.

In this section of our overview and analysis of EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo, we have seen that they are relatively equivalent, in terms of objectives, modes of action, origin, immediacy and even funding by the organization. The EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community in Cyprus is well supported by the very general EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus and EuropeAid's Civil Society in Action Programme, which focuses directly on ethnic issues and national identity. The EULEX Mission in Kosovo, on the other hand, embraces all these dimensions, with very broad principles and actions that can be very specific and diversified: it's as if it were, in a way, combining the three initiatives in Cyprus into one. Be that as it may, peacebuilding remains the undisputed watchword of the four EU missions and initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo highlighted in this study.

Section 3 – How does the EU interpret the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo? A critical and literary analysis of the legal basis of the EU peacebuilding initiatives in the two countries

In this third section, we will take a literary look at the legal basis of EU peacebuilding missions and initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo, focusing on how the issue of national identity is addressed. We will be looking at how this question is literally addressed, what terms are used, what importance is attached to them and what meaning is given to them. This is important

for assessing how the EU wishes to deal with the issue of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo. As mentioned in the introduction, we will do a structural analysis, inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure¹²⁸. We will therefore begin with a purely literary study of the two texts that serve as the legal basis for the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo: Council Regulation 389/2006¹²⁹ of February 27, 2006 as the general and main common basis for the initiatives in Cyprus, and Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP¹³⁰ of February 04, 2008 for the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. For the sake of general understanding and in-depth analysis, these two texts will also be complemented by a brief analysis of other official texts from Cyprus and Kosovo, such as the Constitutions of the two States. In a second stage, our literary analyses will be supplemented by those of specialists and analysts of these various peacebuilding missions and EU initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo.

The first legal basis made available to us for this study is Council Regulation 389/2006 of February 27, 2006, which proclaims the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community but is also claimed by the EU-UNDP Partnership. It is therefore the most important text in terms of the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus. For Kosovo, the legal basis for the EULEX Mission is Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of February 04 of 2008. Before examining these two fundamental texts, we propose to turn our attention to the founding texts of the states of Cyprus and Kosovo, and to see how the question of national identity is posed. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus of August 16, 1960¹³¹, already addresses the question of ethnicity and national identity in article two of Title I, although it clearly marks the

¹²⁸ Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (New York : Philosophical Library , 1959).

¹²⁹ Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R0389&from=EN>

¹³⁰ Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0124>

¹³¹ Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, 16/08/1960: <https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/cy1960.htm#1>

split between the Greek and Turkish communities. In fact, article two divides the two communities into two distinct paragraphs, to qualify them, starting with the Greek community: *"the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church;"* then the Turkish community: *"the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems;"*. Thus, in the Cypriot Constitution, the two communities are largely separated and set apart, albeit on an equal footing since the phrase that describes and characterizes them is the same. As a result, the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus attests to the equality of the two communities (and thus to the bicomunal nature of the country), but also to their clear separation. Moreover, there is no question of a common national identity. Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence on February 17, 2008¹³² also emphasizes the country's multi-ethnicity, right from article 2: *"We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. We shall protect and promote the rights of all communities in Kosovo and create the conditions necessary for their effective participation in political and decision-making processes"*, with the direct mention of *"multi-ethnic Republic"*, completed by the idea that it is home to several communities (*"all communities in Kosovo"*). As a result, the division between communities seems less pronounced in official Kosovar texts than in official Cypriot texts, and this is further confirmed in the preamble to the Constitution of Kosovo¹³³, which attests that Kosovo is *"a State of their*

¹³² Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, 17/02/2008:

<https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2008/en/56552>

¹³³ Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo: https://mapl.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/1.CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_KOSOVO.pdf

citizens", and refers to the different groups as "*communities*", as Anna Jagiello-Szostak¹³⁴ notes. However, the distinction becomes more eloquent as early as article 3, which emphasizes the Albanian community: "*the Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other Communities*". Here, we can see the preponderance of the Albanian community in the country and the distinction between it and other communities. Thus, what is important to mention in the context of our study is that the official founding texts of Cyprus and Kosovo both attest to the ethnic diversity of their territory, and ultimately, both differentiate the communities, setting them apart from one another. In both cases, too, there is no mention of the countries' national identities, terms that are totally absent from both Constitutions.

These official texts seem to influence the official texts of the EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo, as they do not directly and explicitly address the issue of national identity. Indeed, the legal basis for these initiatives acknowledges the multi-ethnic character of both countries, but does not address it head-on, or seem to propose a direct solution to the question of national identity. Council Regulation 389/2006 for Cyprus¹³⁵, for example, mentions the objective of "*facilitating the reunification of Cyprus*" right from the second article of the introduction, taking into account the current division of the island and wishing to build peace between its two parts. It also makes numerous references to the "*acquis communautaire*" and the word "*reconciliation*" between the communities, but never announces an objective of constitution or construction of a national identity, words totally absent from the text. The question of national identity is therefore implicit, indirect and never explicitly mentioned as such. The situation is similar in Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP for the EULEX

¹³⁴ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, "The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations," *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

¹³⁵ Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R0389&from=EN>

Mission¹³⁶, where the adjective "*multiethnic*" is used several times, and in this respect the country's situation is acknowledged, but remains totally neutral on the specific question of national identity, stating "*implementing a settlement defining Kosovo's future status*" in paragraph 7 of the introduction. On the other hand, the text is even more vague, failing to take into account the question of national identity in Kosovo, but rather the general ethnic tensions in the region, mentioning the search for "*stability in the region*". In the two legal bases for these peacebuilding initiatives, the word "*identity*" never appears, nor does the adjective "*national*", which shows that the EU is trying to come to terms with the official founding texts of Cyprus and Kosovo by leaving the national question untouched. National identity is in fact implicated in these initiatives, since they call for peace between the communities, but never mentioned. The EU's influence on the construction of Cypriot and Kosovar national identities is therefore implicit and indirect, and only addressed through general concepts such as "*reconciliation*", "*reunification*" and "*stability*". It is as if the EU didn't want to take responsibility for the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, and was simply trying to promote peace in these countries, without actually resolving the question of identity. This absence of any explicit, direct mention of the question of national identity goes hand in hand with the official founding texts of the two countries, which also make no mention of any concrete, recognized "*national identity*".

These findings are somehow confirmed by scholars, who also point to the fact that, in these peacebuilding initiatives and missions, the issue of national identity is not given priority. Speaking of the EULEX Mission, Sabrina Petra Ramet¹³⁷, quoted by Anna Jagiello-Szostak,

¹³⁶ Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0124>

¹³⁷ Sabrina Petra Ramet, F.Peter Wagner, *Post-socialist model of rule in Central and South-*

asserts that its main measures are "drawing of national sulkiness, persecution of indicted criminals, return of refugees and financial investments" and not directly the question of national identity as such. This prompts Pierre Le Mouel¹³⁸ to assert that the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus show a *"lack of precise EU peacebuilding goal"*. The broadness of these initiatives and the concepts of *"reunification"* and *"reconciliation"* to indirectly qualify the EU's action on the question of national identity are discussed as much in Cyprus as in Kosovo. M. K. Flynn¹³⁹ writes of the initiatives in Cyprus: *"these programmes promoted bicomunal peacebuilding as part of donor-driven support for a political settlement reunifying the island"*, highlighting the idea of *"bicomunal peacebuilding"*, still implying division over national identity in Cyprus, and masked indirectly under the idea of *"reunification"*. The same applies to Kosovo, where Anna Jagiello-Szostak¹⁴⁰ speaks of *"ethnic reconciliation in the Balkans"*, which largely echoes the "stability in the region" announced by Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP for the EULEX Mission. This *"regional reconciliation"* thus seems to ignore the worrying question of Kosovar national identity, by including it in a much broader geopolitical context, which certainly influences it, but remains general. Finally, Fred Cocozzelli¹⁴¹ mentions the *"pressure"* that the EULEX Mission can put on the Albanian community to promote multi-ethnicity and multicultural identity at all costs, without taking any direct initiative on the question of national identity.

eastern Europe, (Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989, Cambridge 2010, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803185>)

¹³⁸ Pierre Le Mouel, "The Three Paradoxes of the EU's Peacebuilding Strategy in Cyprus," IACES.ie, January 26, 2021, <https://www.iaces.ie/post/the-three-paradoxes-of-the-eu-s-peacebuilding-strategy-in-cyprus>.

¹³⁹ Mary Kathleen Flynn. "PEACEBUILDING, CIVIL SOCIETY AND AID CONDITIONALITY IN CYPRUS: EVALUATING SUCCESS WITHOUT SUSTAINABILITY AND IMPACT." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 11, no. 1, 81–87 (2016).

¹⁴⁰ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, "The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations," *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

¹⁴¹ Fred Cocozzelli, *Ethnic Boundaries and Politics in Kosovo, Ethnic Minorities and Politics in Post-Socialist Southeastern Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Thus, as we have seen in this section, the way in which the question of national identity is addressed in the official texts of EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions is rather paradoxical. These documents make no direct mention of the issue of national identity, but seem to implicitly identify it as a problem to be solved, with the words "*reconciliation*" and "*reunification*" used on several occasions. This lack of direct and clear mention of the issue of national identity gives the impression that the problem has not been prioritized, as several authors have pointed out. Thus, these initiatives and missions take into account the ethnic dimension and divisions in the population, but do not go so far as to connect it to the problems raised by a blurred and indecisive national identity, which contributes to a representation in perpetual conflict between the various communities. In short, while the EU is taking real action to improve relations between the divided communities in Cyprus and Kosovo, the organization seems reluctant to get too involved in the issue of national identity, or to simply point the finger at it. Hence, as we pointed it out in our hypothesis, the role of the EU in the solving of the question of national identity is indirect and therefore its impact is not decisive or strong, as we explained in this chapter.

Chapter two – The achievements and efficiency of the EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo

In this chapter, we will now evoke the achievements (in the simple meaning of what has been achieved and done so far) made by the missions and initiatives of the EU that we just

analyzed. We will also compare them to what was originally planned, to see if it corresponds to their programmes. Therefore, we will in a second time analyze the efficiency of these achievements and put them in the context of our study of the impact of the EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions on the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo.

Section 4 – What has been done? The achievements of the EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo

In this section, we will look at some of the actions carried out in Cyprus and Kosovo as a result of the EU peacebuilding initiatives mentioned above: the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community, the EU-UNDP Partnership and the Civil Society in Action Programme for Cyprus, as well as the EULEX Mission for Kosovo. The aim of this section is not to analyze them, but simply to mention them as examples, so that we can then consider them as actions carried out within the framework of these EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions. We have therefore selected the main achievements to illustrate the measures and actions concretely carried out by and thanks to the EU in Cyprus and Kosovo. For the sake of clarity and comprehension, we will first discuss the achievements of each peacebuilding initiative in Cyprus and Kosovo, before making a few cross-cutting remarks, echoing the presentation of peacebuilding missions and initiatives of the second section.

(1) The achievements of EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus

The achievements of the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community

As already mentioned, the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus are all more or less interconnected. But some achievements are specific to certain initiatives. Within the framework of the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community, the EU aims to develop the northern Turkish part of the island to harmonize with the southern Greek part, so that the two sides can enter relations and contacts without power struggles and with relative equality. Thanks to this program, the development of the Turkish northern part of the island has taken on a variety of directions: economic, cultural and educational, for example. The Nicosia Wastewater Treatment Plant, followed after by the New Nicosia Wastewater Treatment Plant in 2010¹⁴², in closer cooperation with the UNDP, is an eloquent example of what can be achieved through cooperation between communities. This project has many virtues, and is located in the buffer zone in Nicosia, but mainly in the Turkish northern part of the city. However, as it involves improving the sanitation infrastructure, it benefits both the Greek and Turkish communities. In fact, the plants selected treat wastewater to high standards, thereby reducing pollution and protecting the quality of the water in the aquifers as well as at the surface - an absolutely crucial issue for the health of the inhabitants and the well-being of the surrounding ecosystem. Over and above the health benefits, it also guarantees the region's economic development by providing it with stable, sustainable infrastructure, while promoting local agriculture. The project was also carried out within the framework of cooperation between the two parts of the island, and thus helped to establish contact between them. The word

¹⁴² New Nicosia Wastewater Treatment Plant – EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus official website: <https://www.undp.org/cyprus/projects/new-nicosia-wastewater-treatment-plant>

"cooperation" between the Greek and Turkish communities is often used in the project reports¹⁴³, demonstrating that it plays a real role in the peacebuilding initiatives proposed by the EU. Another achievement under the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community is the restoration of Othello Castle¹⁴⁴, located in Famagusta, in Northern Cyprus. This castle is part of the important historical heritage of the Turkish part of the island, and was in need of renovation if it was to become a viable and sustainable tourist site once again. The restoration project also received assistance from the UNDP, as part of cooperation with the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus, but was fully funded by the EU. Renovating and promoting the island's historical and cultural heritage not only helps to shed light on the Turkish part of the island, but it also helps to revive tourism in the region, and hence its economic development. Finally, another project carried out as part of the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community is the EU Scholarship Programme¹⁴⁵, initiated in 2007. This project has enabled more than 2,000 Turkish Cypriot students to study in various EU countries thanks to financial aid, contributing to the academic and professional development of the Turkish Cypriot community. Whether they stay in these countries or return afterwards, this contributes to the development of the Turkish Cypriot community and its international influence. The actions carried out within the framework of the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community are therefore varied, but all aim to enable the development of the Turkish northern part of the island, in order to guarantee equitable contacts with the Greek southern part, without any power struggles. It is important to note that the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot

¹⁴³ New Nicosia Wastewater Treatment Plant – EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus official website: <https://www.undp.org/cyprus/projects/new-nicosia-wastewater-treatment-plant>

¹⁴⁴ Othello castle restored – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus official website: <https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/othelo-castle-restored/>

¹⁴⁵ EU Scholarship Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community – Goethe Institut Cyprus official website: <https://www.goethe.de/ins/cy/en/kul/eur/eus.html>

Community is often assisted by the EU-UNDP Partnership, but since it focuses more on the Turkish part of the island, it is the one who is credited to these realizations.

The achievements of the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus

One of the first achievements of the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus was the Nicosia Master Plan¹⁴⁶, which the implementation phase began in 1986, then supported by the Partnership. This project, of which the partnership is very proud, involved the urban development and revitalization of the capital Nicosia. This has included the reconstruction or improvement of certain infrastructures and the preservation of historical sites bearing the city's cultural heritage. Among them is the restoration of the Bandabuliya Market, a landmark in the city that now hosts numerous cultural events open to both of the island's communities. This is not the only project to renovate and preserve the country's historical and cultural heritage that has been made possible by this partnership, as it has also helped restore, among others, the Hamidiye Mosque in Lefkara¹⁴⁷, the Arif Bey Aqueduct¹⁴⁸ and the Agios Sergios and Vakos Church¹⁴⁹. These efforts have not only promoted tourism on the island, but also inter-community cooperation around a general, joint renovation project. The EU-UNDP Partnership has also facilitated the initiatives of the bicomunal Technical committees (especially the TCCH – Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage), which are trying to take action on public

¹⁴⁶ International Union of Architects official website: <https://www.uia-architectes.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/UIAPresentation-of-AGNI-PETRIDOU.pdf>

¹⁴⁷ Completion of Hamidiye Mosque in Lefkara – EU-UNDP Cyprus Partnership official website: <https://www.undp.org/cyprus/press-releases/completion-hamidiye-mosque-lefkara>

¹⁴⁸ Completion of Conservation works at the Arif Bey Aqueduct – EU-UNDP Cyprus Partnership official website: <https://www.undp.org/cyprus/press-releases/completion-conservation-works-arif-bey-aqueduct>

¹⁴⁹ Agios Sergios and Vakos Church – TCCH Cyprus official website: <https://www.tcchcyprus.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Agios-Sergios-and-Vakos-Church.pdf>

interest issues such as the environment and health. For example, the partnership has trained the Technical Committee on Health to combat invasive mosquito species¹⁵⁰, an important issue for the island's inhabitants and the development of tourism. This action, implemented in both parts of the island, has also fostered cooperation between the two communities around a common health asset. Thus, the actions carried out within the framework of the EU-UNDP Partnership in Cyprus seek to promote cooperation between the Greek and Turkish parts of the country, by being deliberately general, large-scale and of public utility.

The achievements of the Civil Society in Action Programme

One of the main achievements of the Civil Society in Action Programme is that it partly enabled the development and growth of the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP)¹⁵¹, encouraged and supported by the partnership with the UNDP, as Mary K. Flynn¹⁵² recalls. This Committee is of special importance to Cypriots, as it deals with one of the most sensitive issues linked to the island's ethnic conflict: the fate of people reported missing during the intercommunal violence of the 1960s and of 1974, at the time of the Turkish invasion of the island. It is therefore a duty of remembrance, and one that is as important to Greek Cypriots as it is to Turkish Cypriots. Its mission is to find, identify and return the remains of missing people to their families, and to seek explanations as to why they died. On the period 2006/2024, several

¹⁵⁰ Technical Committee on Health “Mapping Risk for Vector-Borne Diseases (ID-V Risk)” Project Detection of *Aedes aegypti* in the island of Cyprus – EU-UNDP Cyprus Partnership official website: <https://www.undp.org/cyprus/publications/technical-committee-health-mapping-risk-vector-borne-diseases-id-v-risk-project-detection-aedes-aegypti-island-cyprus>

¹⁵¹ Committee on Missing Persons official website: <https://www.cmp-cyprus.org>

¹⁵² Mary Kathleen Flynn. “PEACEBUILDING, CIVIL SOCIETY AND AID CONDITIONALITY IN CYPRUS: EVALUATING SUCCESS WITHOUT SUSTAINABILITY AND IMPACT.” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 11, no. 1, 81–87 (2016).

reports¹⁵³ indicate that it had already identified 1,047 people reported missing. In this way, the project try to reconcile the two sides of the island, creating a sense of trust and mutual support between the two communities, driven by common interests on both sides of the Green Line. The initiative also set up the INTRAC (International NGO Training and Research Centre) Projects since 2010 to help strengthen Cypriot civil society. Through workshops and presentations, the aim is to highlight NGO initiatives aimed at community cooperation, while promoting research into the island's historical context and the search for solutions to foster peace. A notable INTRAC project was the "*Strengthening Civil Society in Cyprus*" program¹⁵⁴, which highlighted the capacity of NGOs to act on peace initiatives in Cyprus, via mentorship programs and networking events to foster a form of collaboration in the country. Finally, the 9th edition of the call for proposals for NGOs¹⁵⁵¹⁵⁶ dated June 2024, in cooperation with the EU Aid Program for the Turkish Cypriot Community, highlights the importance of investing to promote environmental issues and in particular the standards proposed as part of the European Green Deal. Consequently, the achievements of the Civil Society in Action Programme, often complemented by or in close cooperation with those of the other initiatives programmes, are intended to be more targeted, and in particular to encourage action and investment by NGOs in Cyprus.

¹⁵³ Statistics – Exhumations and identifications 2006/2024 Graph – Committee on Missing Persons official website: <https://www.cmp-cyprus.org/statistics/>

¹⁵⁴ Cyprus : Strengthening Civil Society within Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Communities – INTRAC official website: <https://www.intrac.org/projects/cyprus-strengthening-civil-society-within-turkish-cypriot-greek-cypriot-communities/>

¹⁵⁵ Cypriot civil society in action IX – developmentaid.org: <https://www.developmentaid.org/grants/view/1314307/cypriot-civil-society-in-action-ix>

¹⁵⁶ Cypriot Civil Society in Action IX Grant Program Help Desk – Civicspace.eu - <https://civicspace.eu/en/cypriot-civil-society-in-action-ix-grant-program-help-desk>

(2) The achievements of the EU peacebuilding mission in Kosovo

The achievements of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo

As mentioned above, the achievements of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo relate more to legal issues and the rule of law than the EU's initiatives in Cyprus. As Lulzim Krasniqi and Jonuz Abdullai¹⁵⁷ point out, the operational phase of the mission began in October 2008, and the mission reached its full Capacity in April of the following year, so it has been active for more than fifteen years. In fifteen years, the mission has succeeded in many initiatives, but *"the mission's most prestigious achievement is the establishment of the rule of law"*, according to G. Scara¹⁵⁸, referring to the EULEX Programme 2012 Report¹⁵⁹, which indicated that significant progress had been made in this area, with 18 out of 31 projects in the police sector already completed. In addition to these large-scale projects, Giovanni Grevi¹⁶⁰ mentions *"small-scale achievements"* such as the establishment of *"interaction between Kosovo police and EULEX prosecutors and the reopening of the courthouse in Northern Mitrovica"*, which remained closed for 8 months in 2008 due to the conflicts it provoked. In the course of their study of the mission, Lulzim Krasniqi and Jonuz Abdullai drew up a table summarizing the

¹⁵⁷ Lulzim Krasniqi, Jonuz Abdullai. "Common Security and Defense Policy and Kosovo: A critical analysis of the EULEX Mission." *Revista de Stiinte Politice*, no. 75: 171, 2022.

¹⁵⁸ Gentjan Scara, *The role of the EU as a Peacebuilder in the Western Balkans*, "Romanian Journal of European Affairs". vol. 14, no. 14 December 2014.

¹⁵⁹ EULEX Programme 2012 Report (<https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,22>)

¹⁶⁰ Giovanni Grevi, The EU rule-of-law mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), *European Security and Defence Policy. The First ten Years (1999–2009)*, (eds. G. Grevi, D. Helly, D. Keohane, Paris, 2009)
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf.

achievements of the EULEX Mission between 2008 and 2014, which we will now use to cite some of the completed measures. Thus, over this period, more than 566 decisions in Criminal Matters have been made by EULEX judges, which corresponds to the stated objective of having an impartial, competent and fair judicial system for which the direct intervention of EULEX Mission personnel was necessary. In addition, more than 40,000 cases of property disputes have been resolved thanks to the Mission, demonstrating its impact and involvement on a small scale throughout the country. Finally, the Mission has largely concentrated its action on the northern provinces of the country, where tensions are most acute and obvious, as the Serbian community is more mixed and in contact with the Albanian community. In this way, the EULEX mission helped to restore the rule of law in the municipalities of Northern Kosovo, and in particular facilitated the integration of 287 Kosovo Serb policemen in the north of Kosovo under the chain of command of the Kosovo Police. In short, the EULEX mission has contributed to making Kosovo a state governed by the rule of law, with an impartial judicial and police system that promotes integration and peace between communities. These initiatives do not stop, since as Lulzim Krasniqi and Jonuz Abdullai report, citing the EEAS report¹⁶¹, over the period from June 15, 2018 to June 14, 2020, the EULEX Mission supervised *"784 court sessions in 214 criminal and civil cases (...), war crimes cases, gender-based violence cases, hate crimes corruption cases, and cases previously dealt with by EULEX"*. As a result, the EULEX Mission in Kosovo continues to build a Kosovo where the judicial system is more impartial, fair and equal, with the aim of fostering relations between Kosovars of Albanian origin, and Kosovars of Serbian origin.

¹⁶¹ EEAS (2020). European External Action Service. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eulex-kosovo/eulex-kosovo-european-union-rule-law-mission-kosovo-civilian-mission_en?s=333

(3) Analysis and comparison of the achievements of the EU peacebuilding initiatives in

Cyprus and Kosovo

In this brief paragraph, we will make a few cross-cutting remarks on the achievements of the EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo that we have just outlined. In the case of the initiatives in Cyprus, people are generally talking about the Nicosia Master Plan for its founding aspect, but also the rise of the Committee on Missing Persons, while in the case of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, they are talking more generally about establishing the rule of law and, in particular, regulating the judicial and police systems in the northern territories of the country. It should be noted, however, that this achievement is much more general in the case of Kosovo than in Cyprus, where the initiatives singled out tend to focus on more concrete actions. These advances are nevertheless major and seem to underpin the rest of the actions undertaken by these initiatives and missions. For both countries, in addition to the diversity of the actions undertaken - although this seems to be more evident for the initiatives in Cyprus than those in Kosovo - we can note the plurality of the scales proposed: we thus range from very general achievements concerning the whole country to more specific and very local actions, which allows us, in addition to attempting to promote a communal peace, to maintain a more individual peace. It is also worth noting that, whether in Cyprus or Kosovo, most of the initiatives are part of an approach aimed at developing and strengthening civil society as a whole, so that the desire to build peace encompasses other issues and enables the development of other areas (economic, cultural, historical, etc.): peacebuilding initiatives are carried out in their own right, but also with a broader concern for the country's development

and growth. Finally, over and above the specific nature of the actions carried out by these EU missions and initiatives, the scholars point to a fact common to both Cyprus and Kosovo: the proximity, relations and aid provided by the EU are in themselves already vectors of peace and interpreted as such, both in Cyprus, as mentioned by Doga Ulas Eralp and Nimet Beriker¹⁶², and in Kosovo by Anna Jagiello-Szostak¹⁶³. In this section, therefore, we have presented and briefly introduced some cross-cutting remarks comparing the actions carried out by EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo. Having listed some of the flagship actions and achievements of these different programs, it is now a question of studying them more in consideration of the initial question of our study, the direct treatment of the issue of national identity, and also to see whether these initiatives and missions have proved effective and faithful to what they originally intended.

Section 5 – What are the results? The efficiency of these EU initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo and the potential differences with what has been planned

In this new section, we will assess the effectiveness of the missions and achievements presented earlier, by comparing them with what was initially planned, and by connecting them to the issue of national identity. We will see whether these peacebuilding initiatives and missions are true to their programmes, and whether they are deemed effective, not only by specialists, but also by the primary beneficiaries, the inhabitants of these two countries.

¹⁶² Doga Ulas Eralp and Nimet Beriker, Accessing the Conflict Resolution potential of the EU: The Cyprus conflict and Accession Negotiations, *Security Dialogue*, 36 (2), pp 175-192, 2005.

¹⁶³ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, “The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations,” *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

As far as the achievements themselves are concerned, we can say that they are fairly faithful to what was announced in the founding programs. The EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community, for example, seems to be meeting its two main objectives: to encourage the economic development of Northern Cyprus (as seen in the Nicosia Waste-Water Treatment Plant and the restoration of Othello Castle) and to facilitate the reunification of the island. These two joint actions seem to have been carried out, and all the more so as they often have two results: the economic objective no longer simply becomes a lever for achieving a peace objective, but the two objectives seem to coexist in the same timeframe. In the case of the Nicosia Waste-Water Treatment Plant, for example, the timeframe for the economic development of North Cyprus and the reunification of the island with the cooperation of the two communities was the same. In the end, both actions were carried out at the same time, making the implementation all the more effective. Moreover, the stated aim of "*strengthening civil society*" in Cyprus through the Civil Society in Action Programme and the EU-UNDP Partnership was also achieved, with the INTRAC projects of the former and support for the bicomunal Technical Committees of the latter. Regarding the EULEX Mission, as Lulzim Krasniqi and Jonuz Abdullai¹⁶⁴ show, each of the programme's verbs ("*monitor, mentor and advise*") has been implemented, thanks in particular to the mission's organizational structure, which is divided into two main pillars. Overall, thus, the achievements of the EU's peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo are faithful to the initial plans and to what had been announced in their respective programmes, both in terms of objectives and types of action.

¹⁶⁴ Lulzim Krasniqi, Jonuz Abdullai. "Common Security and Defense Policy and Kosovo: A critical analysis of the EULEX Mission." *Revista de Stiinte Politice*, no. 75: 171, 2022.

As for the central issue of national identity, here too, as announced, it is dealt with implicitly and indirectly. There are no actions or achievements on either side that highlight the question of identity, even in a general way, but rather advocate cooperation or mutual aid. Even if this helps to ease tensions, the communal separation thus seems to persist, and to be recognized as such and as inevitable. This confirms the idea that these are peacebuilding initiatives, but that they seem to be part of a restricted temporality, which raises the question of whether this peace will be lasting (as we will develop in the next section), as the question of national identity is not clearly addressed in these terms. This also gives the impression that the EU is not following through on its responsibilities and what could be done, as Doga Ulas Eralp and Nimet Beriker¹⁶⁵ points out when they write that, in the end, the *"EU's mediation potential has been limited in the Cyprus conflict"*. If the EU's initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo seem to be faithful to what was announced in their respective programs, we must now examine the question of their effectiveness: do the authors and the population evaluate these achievements as successes or failures? We will attempt to answer these questions, drawing on the studies carried out on this subject by Lulzim Krasniqi and Jonuz Abdullai.

According to scholars' studies, in general, the EU's peacebuilding initiatives and missions in both Cyprus and Kosovo have proved effective. In the case of Cyprus, Mary K. Flynn¹⁶⁶ shows that specialist reports on the question of effectiveness tend to give a good review to the Civil Society in Action Programme, for example: *"Evaluators concluded that the programme had been: relevant, effective in meeting stated objectives; fairly efficient; and coherent with*

¹⁶⁵ Doga Ulas Eralp and Nimet Beriker, Accessing the Conflict Resolution potential of the EU: The Cyprus conflict and Accession Negotiations, *Security Dialogue*, 36 (2), pp 175-192, 2005.

¹⁶⁶ Mary Kathleen Flynn. "PEACEBUILDING, CIVIL SOCIETY AND AID CONDITIONALITY IN CYPRUS: EVALUATING SUCCESS WITHOUT SUSTAINABILITY AND IMPACT." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 11, no. 1, 81–87 (2016).

other EU programmes", although a few problems concerning impact or sustainability were noted (as we will see in the next section). The program was thus judged as *"being quite successful"*. The EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community also received a *"good"* rating for effectiveness. Studies carried out on the effectiveness of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo also point in the same direction: Lulzim Krasniqi and Jonuz Abdullai¹⁶⁷ write, for example, that *"Kosovo institutions have had significant benefits from the EULEX Mission in some segments"*, particularly in the assistance given to Kosovar institutions which have seen a real improvement, as in the case of the country's Police. In conclusion, their study sums up the situation of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo as follows: *"EULEX has been active, albeit with limited results"*. If the two authors point to limited results, it is not least because, unlike the initiatives undertaken in Cyprus, the EULEX Mission is marred by a number of black spots. Indeed, according to Bertelsmann Stiftung's 2018 Transformation Index Report (BTI)¹⁶⁸, the Mission's efforts in the fight against corruption were described as *"weak"*, noting that *"high ranking corruption cases in particular were not even investigated, which creates an impression of impunity"*. Indeed, there have even been cases of corruption and scandal within the EULEX Mission, as in 2014 when an EULEX Prosecutor accused a judge hired as part of the mission of complicity with the accused party. The British prosecutor Maria Bamieh, employed by EULEX, has denounced widespread corruption in the organization of the mission, targeting in particular the Italian judge Francesco Florit, also commissioned by EULEX, who allegedly accepted bribes to close investigations. Although the EU's internal investigation did not lead to

¹⁶⁷ Lulzim Krasniqi, Jonuz Abdullai. "Common Security and Defense Policy and Kosovo: A critical analysis of the EULEX Mission." *Revista de Stiinte Politice*, no. 75: 171, 2022.

¹⁶⁸ BTI 2018 Country Report – Kosovo. *Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung*.
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1427391/488286_en.pdf

any formal accusations¹⁶⁹ the scandal quickly became a topic of discussion throughout the country, undermining the coherence and credibility of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. Indeed, since the Mission's priority is to guarantee impartiality and the smooth running of justice without external intervention, the scandal left a bad impression on public opinion and cast doubt on the Mission's effectiveness. Without saying that scandals of this kind do not occur in Cyprus, the real problem here is the fact that we are witnessing a corruption scandal in the context of a Mission that seeks to combat corruption. EU initiatives in Cyprus are more generalized, so a corruption scandal would not affect the value base and credibility of these initiatives as much, which is the big difference in terms of effectiveness with the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. In both cases, therefore, it would appear that the EU initiatives are relatively effective, as they all have shortcomings and areas for improvement. However, the corruption scandals within the EULEX Mission have considerably tainted its action, legitimacy and credibility, which is not - to this extent - the case for the initiatives in Cyprus. In terms of effectiveness and coherence, therefore, the EU's initiatives in Cyprus appear to be more credible than the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. This observation is also shared by a large part of public opinion, and condemnation of the EULEX mission in Kosovo seems to outweigh that of the EU's peace-building initiatives in Cyprus.

An important element in assessing the effectiveness of the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo is the local perception of the inhabitants. Given that these initiatives and missions were aimed directly at improving the day-to-day lives of the population, as their programmes point out, it makes sense to mention here the opinion of the people most affected

¹⁶⁹ EULEX Press Release – Reaction to Press Conference of Maria Bamieh: <https://eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,10,2618>

by these initiatives, the citizens of Cyprus and Kosovo. Generally speaking, the two EU interventions are not perceived in the same way in the two countries: as Lulzim Krasniqi and Jonuz Abdullai¹⁷⁰ note, the Kosovar population as a whole expresses great dissatisfaction with the achievements of the EULEX Mission. According to figures provided by the Kosovo Center for Security Studies¹⁷¹, the EULEX Mission ranks last among "*law enforcement agencies in Kosovo*", with only 22% public approval, compared with 42% for the Kosovo Police and even 60% for KFOR, the UN-generated Kosovo Force. In this case, as they explain, it is not the mission itself that poses the greatest problem, but the disappointment that has resulted, as expectations were too high when reading the programmes and action measures announced by the EU. In Kosovo, for example, the EULEX mission, although encouraged at the outset, quickly became unpopular and ineffective.

The situation in Cyprus is similar, although the picture is more nuanced, as expectations were lower at the outset. As the population of these two countries is at the heart of these EU initiatives, this feeling of disappointment is all the more palpable and dangerous as it can create frustration, as Ewa Mahr¹⁷² admits in particular when speaking of Kosovo and the failures of the EULEX mission. Taking the mechanism to the extreme, it is even legitimate to ask whether these initiatives are not ultimately detrimental to peacebuilding in Cyprus and Kosovo. Indeed, these relatively "unsuccessful" initiatives could lead to a kind of general popular discouragement, by making the initial tensions and the blockage to resolving the national question in Cyprus and Kosovo manifest, visible and, in a way, inevitable.

¹⁷⁰ Lulzim Krasniqi, Jonuz Abdullai. "Common Security and Defense Policy and Kosovo: A critical analysis of the EULEX Mission." *Revista de Stiinte Politice*, no. 75: 171, 2022.

¹⁷¹ KCSS (2012). Kosovo Security Barometer. *Kosovo Center for Security Studies, Prishtina*.

¹⁷² Ewa Mahr (2018). Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 39:1, 72-94, 2018.

Hence, we have seen in this chapter that the EU initiatives in Cyprus and in Kosovo have realized many actions and achievements since they were implemented. These achievements are of different importance, scale, and goal. But at the same time these initiatives seem to be only relatively efficient, even if they were generally in line with their programmes. We will in the next chapter try to analyze the limits and obstacles that they encountered and that could explain this relative efficiency.

Chapter three – The limits of the EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo

In this last chapter, we will analyze the eventual limits of the EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo, and their obstacles, in order to try to explain and find origins of their relative efficiency.

Section 6 – What are the main obstacles of these peacebuilding initiatives? The limits encountered by the EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo

(1) Questioning the lack of independence/autonomy

The EU's role in peacebuilding missions and initiatives in Cyprus as well as in Kosovo is thus very limited, and the organization is struggling to assert itself in concrete terms: to use

Karen Smith's¹⁷³ phrase, "*the EU is not always able to translate presence into actorness*". We can question here the "*autonomy*" (defined by Joseph Jupille and James Caporaso¹⁷⁴ as "*the institutional distinctiveness and independence of an actor from other actors*") of the EU in the peacebuilding initiatives and missions realized by the EU in Cyprus and in Kosovo. Does the EU play a role on its own, or does it complement a circle of players already in action? Given the EU's very limited scope for action with regard to peacebuilding missions in Cyprus, the organization seems more to complement the actions and initiatives of the UN. The EU does not appear as a second-rate player rather than as a first-rate player as Labinot Greicevci suggests¹⁷⁵. In other circumstances, this is akin to the situation in Kosovo, where the EU is working with the existing legal and judicial system to improve it, and to give it greater competence and effectiveness in the future, as pinpointed by the EULEX Mission programme. In this context, the EU also plays a secondary role, a sort of supporting role for another institution. In the case of Kosovo, this institution is local (Kosovo's national legal and judicial system), whereas in the case of Cyprus it has international status (the RoC). The EU cannot therefore act alone and accomplish the peacebuilding initiatives in which it is involved and supports other organizations and institutions, a status which is absolutely necessary for it to propose its ambitions and seek influence in this peacebuilding process. In fact, the EU seems to lack autonomy in the peacebuilding missions and initiatives it proposes in Cyprus and Kosovo. However, where both initiatives aim to complement and guarantee the long-term action of public and national institutions in Cyprus and Kosovo, the EULEX Mission is carried

¹⁷³ Karen E Smith. (2008) *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

¹⁷⁴ Joseph Jupille & James A. Caporaso. *States, agency and rules: The European Union in global environmental*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 1998).

¹⁷⁵ Labinot Greicevci. "EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo." *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* 12 (3): 283–303 (2011).

out by the EU and the EU alone, and is not the result of an association and partnership of institutional players as is the case in Cyprus with the EU-UNDP partnership. Thus, it would appear that the EU's scope for action in Kosovo, within the framework of the EULEX Mission, is greater and broader than that of the EU within the framework of the EU-UNDP partnership. In this sense, then, the EU's margin for action appears narrowly limited, given that it cannot do without the presence of another international organization. This can also explain the idea that the involvement and implementation of actions in EU peacebuilding missions is inherently restricted, and may therefore lack effectiveness, because it cannot follow through on what is proposed or suggested or desired.

(2) Questioning the long-term ambition

Another obvious limitation attributed to these EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo is the question of the long-term nature of the peace the organization is trying to establish in both countries. Indeed, analysts and specialists regularly raise the question of the long-term effectiveness of these initiatives, and upstream the type of peace they are helping to create. This questioning of the effectiveness of EU peacebuilding initiatives is similar for Cyprus and Kosovo, as both have already experienced numerous unsuccessful attempts at peacemaking by various actors in the past. Since the island's independence in 1960, and even before Kosovo's unilateral independence in 2008, since 1999 and the end of the Kosovo war (1998/1999), peacebuilding initiatives have been part of the agenda in both territories. These decades of peacebuilding attempts and failures legitimize a pessimistic and hesitant view of

these EU peacebuilding initiatives, as Eleftherios A. Michael¹⁷⁶ explains. This sense of doubt about the long-term success of peacekeeping is shared by scholars of both Cyprus and Kosovo. Indeed, Elisa Randazzo¹⁷⁷ and Pol Bargués point out that the stakes of peacebuilding missions in Kosovo have remained the same from decade to decade, with the same emphasis on the same aspects, in vain, "since 1999". There is therefore a lack of renewal in the way these missions are approached in Kosovo, with the emphasis, in their view, still on "multiculturalism" applied in an "uncritical way". In their view, this is leading to the construction of a relative peace, which is not really a peace at all, since it is not destined to last over time. Elisa Randazzo and Pol Bargués, speak of a "fictional peace" to describe the peace that has resulted from the peacebuilding missions that have been at work in Kosovo for the past 25 years. This sense of unsustainable peace-building, which does not seem to have a long-term perspective and therefore lacks effectiveness, is shared by Pierre Le Mouel¹⁷⁸, who writes that the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus are merely "preparatory implementations of peace-making strategy that still has not been successful yet". Indeed, Pierre Le Mouel points to the lack of any concrete sustainable objective for these peacebuilding missions in Cyprus, remarking that no solution has been found in decades. Furthermore, he adds that these EU peacebuilding initiatives are only "preparatory", and questions the sustainability of the actions carried out and of the peace that is likely to emerge, as suggested by Elisa Randazzo and Pol Bargués with regard to Kosovo and the EULEX Mission. Thus, we can see that one of the limits to the effectiveness of these EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo is that of the nature

¹⁷⁶ Eleftherios A. Michael, *Peacemaking Strategies in Cyprus: In Search of Lasting Peace* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).

¹⁷⁷ Elisa Randazzo, Pol Bargués. *Peace-Building and the Loop of Liberal Multiculturalism: The Case of Kosovo*, "The Western Balkans Policy Review", vol. 2, iss. 2, Summer/Autumn 2012.

¹⁷⁸ Pierre Le Mouel, "The Three Paradoxes of the EU's Peacebuilding Strategy in Cyprus," IACES.ie, January 26, 2021, <https://www.iaces.ie/post/the-three-paradoxes-of-the-eu-s-peacebuilding-strategy-in-cyprus>.

of the peace achieved or aimed for, and its sustainability, which is widely questioned by specialists. Whether they refer to "*preparatory implementations of peace-making strategy*" in the case of Cyprus, or "*fictional peace*" in the case of Kosovo, it seems that not enough attention has been paid to the long term, and that these peace-building initiatives, in Cyprus as in Kosovo, are unable to create a genuine and therefore lasting peace.

(3) Questioning the impartiality, neutrality and clarity

In the context of the EU's peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo, the question of objectivity and impartiality is a divisive one, placing limits on the effectiveness and modes of action of these initiatives. In such initiatives, in peace-building by international institutions in divided countries, neutrality plays an essential role, as it is a question of not favoring one actor over another in order to encourage peace. The aim of such initiatives, when carried out by supra-national players such as the EU, is therefore not to escalate the conflict, and not to rekindle the anger of one side over another. It would therefore seem logical that such missions and initiatives should be described and applied objectively and fairly, hence in a neutral manner, without seeking to favor one actor over another. However, in the context of states that are divided and contested on the national and international stage, and therefore claimed by other internal or external players, the question of neutrality raises more important issues. While the independence of Cyprus is now recognized worldwide, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognized as a sovereign national entity (except by Turkey), nor is Kosovo, which, although recognized by a majority of countries worldwide, is not fully recognized, even in Europe and particularly within the EU, where 5 countries are opposed to

its independence. The EU has not officially decided whether or not to recognize Kosovo, leaving it up to individual member states to decide according to their own circumstances in accordance with national practice and international law, on their relations with Kosovo, as writes Labinot Greicevci¹⁷⁹ while the EU counts the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus among its member states, but not the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and does not recognize it as a genuine national player. In this way, the EU acts and undertakes peacebuilding missions and initiatives in territories and countries which it does not fully, or not officially, recognize, which makes the question of neutrality complicated, since to recognize the independence of a state is to take a stand, just as not to recognize its independence: in the context of the independence of a state, there is no possible in-between: there is either recognition, or a lack of recognition. In this context, to act as an actor for peace through initiatives and missions in Kosovo and Cyprus is, in a way, already to pronounce on the independence of these countries, if only by the name given to them, as we saw earlier. It also means acting against neutrality and objectivity, as it favors one player over another. Conversely, not to recognize the independence of these countries is to severely restrict the EU capacity for action, since how can it justify peacebuilding initiatives in a state it does not recognize? As Lulzim Krasniqi and Jonuz Abdullai¹⁸⁰ point out, the EULEX Mission is advertised and labeled as neutral with regard to Kosovo's status, which limits its capacity for action and its power to make decisions. This neutrality of the EULEX Mission, which was not originally intended to be neutral under the Ahtisaari Plan, as Labinot Greicevci¹⁸¹ points out, is in itself an obstacle and a limit to the

¹⁷⁹ Labinot Greicevci. "EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo." *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* 12 (3): 283–303 (2011).

¹⁸⁰ Lulzim Krasniqi, Jonuz Abdullai. "Common Security and Defense Policy and Kosovo: A critical analysis of the EULEX Mission." *Revista de Stiinte Politice*, no. 75: 171, 2022.

¹⁸¹ Labinot Greicevci. "EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo." *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* 12 (3): 283–303 (2011).

effectiveness of this "*peacebuilding mission*", as it takes sides, and because it cannot, due to this neutral status, carry out certain operations, as these will be accused of taking sides with one or other of the conflicting actors. The EULEX mission, as they point out, is carried out with extreme care over what is said and done, so as not to offend or run counter to the considerations of one or other of the actors, which would undermine the mission's effectiveness by preventing it from being carried out in depth. In other words, as they put it, the EU's incapacity to officially recognize the state of Kosovo reduces the EU's EULEX Mission in Kosovo's capacity for action and peacebuilding, which is comparable to the case of Cyprus, where, as explained earlier, while the whole island is part of the EU, only the Greek part of the south is considered by the institution, and is thus given the status of a national actor. The neutrality of the EU's peace initiatives and missions is therefore in question, and places numerous limits on the institution's room for manoeuvre. Furthermore, in their implementation, it appears that these peacebuilding initiatives are not fully impartial, as James Ker-Lindsay's¹⁸² suggests, and, without explicitly acknowledging it, tend to favor one actor over another in certain measures. Indeed, a number of researchers have shown that, in practice and in their achievements, these EU peacebuilding initiatives are not necessarily as neutral as they claim to be, or as neutral as they could be. As mentioned above, the question of the neutrality of these initiatives is a tricky one, as it has no good answer and is part of a veritable vicious circle limiting the effectiveness of these initiatives. However, some aspects of these initiatives are not impartial or seem to favor one player over another, although this must be put into perspective, as it depends on how they are interpreted. In this respect, it would appear that the

¹⁸² James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus are the most partial, while the EULEX mission in Kosovo remains relatively neutral overall. According to Anna Jagiello-Szostak¹⁸³, however, the EULEX mission in Kosovo, which is neutral in essence, is somewhat biased, not least because of the institutional framework in which it operates. Indeed, EULEX is a mission that promotes justice and the proper functioning of the judiciary and legislature in Kosovo, and is therefore carried out within Kosovo's national legal framework. She says the EULEX Mission's cooperation between Kosovo's legal and legislative bodies and those of the EU contributes to giving more importance to one community than another, in this case giving the Albanian community an advantage over the Serbian community. As the Kosovar institutional framework, with its strong Albanian majority, is taken into account, and cooperates with the EU, it seems to her that the origin of this EULEX Mission, and its foundations, give greater value to the Albanian community. What she means is that the EULEX Mission aims to help and assist the Kosovar authorities, which on paper seems to run counter to Serbian considerations (it does not help the Serbian authorities, but the Kosovar authorities - which in itself already runs counter to Serbian interests by definition - the majority of whom are of Albanian origin). However, this original institutional framework is the only one to be singled out as possibly partial, but the achievements of the EULEX Mission, apart from the arguments already explained, do not suffer from a general accusation of partiality as an obstacle and limit to the smooth running of the EU peacebuilding mission.

On the other hand, in the context of its peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus, the EU does not appear to the majority of the inhabitants as an "*impartial mediator*", as James Ker-Lindsay¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ Anna Jagiello-Szostak, "The Role of the EU in Peace Building in Kosovo in the Light of Interethnic Relations," *Studia Europejskie*, October 5, 2020.

¹⁸⁴ James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

explains, due to the fact that the Greek southern part of the island is a full member of the institution, rather than the Turkish northern part. Indeed, the idea that only a divided part of the island is considered as an EU member state has an impact on the measures taken to guarantee peace on the island, since according to James Ker-Lindsay, the Greek part of the island is given more consideration and attention than the unofficial Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This also has a second level of understanding, for the Greek Republic of Cyprus is the EU, whereas the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not, and so, beyond the consideration and attention attributed, there is more room for manoeuvre regarding the Greek Republic of Cyprus, for it has the same legal framework and values as the EU, as a full member state of the institution. Thus, it is clear that the two parts of the island cannot and are not treated in the same way, given their relationship with the EU, which manages these peacebuilding initiatives. Echoing James Ker-Lindsay's ideas, Pierre Le Mouel¹⁸⁵ even claims that the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus are "*one-sided*", which he sees as one of the "*paradoxes*" of the organization's peacebuilding strategy on the island. Indeed, as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not legally recognized, the EU can only interact officially with the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, which was set up even before the Republic of Cyprus was created. In this context, even if the Commission has contacts with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, hence the Greek side, is the only recognized administrative body and therefore has the final say on everything concerning the southern as well as the northern part of the island. Pierre Le Mouel then points to the fact that the EU interacts with only one player on the island, and not both, making peacebuilding initiatives

¹⁸⁵ Pierre Le Mouel, "The Three Paradoxes of the EU's Peacebuilding Strategy in Cyprus," IACES.ie, January 26, 2021, <https://www.iaces.ie/post/the-three-paradoxes-of-the-eu-s-peacebuilding-strategy-in-cyprus>.

inherently partial and ineffective. Further than questioning the impartiality as suggested by James Ker-Lindsay, Pierre Le Mouel speaks of a "*mission as one-sided*" to qualify the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus. Thus, we see that the question of partiality and neutrality gives rise to a lively debate with regard to the EU's peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo. While there does not appear to be an optimal solution, the contested and divided status of these two countries appears to be an obvious source of limitations on the EU's scope for action. Indeed, failure to officially recognize the country in question limits the effectiveness of measures, as in the case of Kosovo, although this is mitigated by the fact that the judiciary of Kosovo alone (and not Serbia, for example) cooperates with the EU within the framework of the EULEX Mission. On the other hand, initiatives also lose their effectiveness and impact in peacebuilding when they recognize and consider only one actor with whom to interact, and that being a member state of the organization, its weight and influence on peacebuilding initiatives is consequential. If the original consideration is different, then we can highlight the fact that the dynamics are similar between Cyprus and Kosovo and the EU peacebuilding initiatives that concern them, in the sense that, in both cases, the EU interacts and seems to cooperate with one actor more than the other (the Republic of Cyprus only in Cyprus and the national legal and institutional frameworks in Kosovo). In both cases, this element seems to hamper the impact, implementation and, in a certain sense, the legitimacy of the EU's general peacebuilding initiative in the two countries.

Alongside the fact that the EU's initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo seem to lack neutrality in some cases, we can also add that they suffer from a general lack of clarity, which can be explained by a number of reasons and concerns the initiatives in Kosovo more than those in Cyprus. Indeed, many authors, when speaking of the EULEX Mission, emphasize its lack of

clarity, and the certain incomprehension that surrounds it. This problem of clarity, however, is not addressed in studies of EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus. It should be noted that Cyprus is the subject of a number of different peacebuilding initiatives, and that the EU acts through many intermediaries and in many sectors, as we have seen. However, in the face of this plurality of operations, which could be synonymous with a certain lack of clarity, we can see, as we saw earlier, that these initiatives are all interconnected, cooperating and acting together. So, even if the initiatives all have different achievements and preferred spheres of action, the fact that they communicate with each other and help each other in a way helps to clarify the situation in Cyprus, highlighting the fact that there are EU peace-building initiatives on the island with the common aim of fostering peace and development in the country. In Kosovo, the question of the mission's lack of clarity is closely linked to the newness of that kind of missions but also to the question of recognition that hovers around the country and therefore around the mission, as Labinot Greicevci¹⁸⁶, among others, addresses with Joseph Jupille and James Caporazzo¹⁸⁷. In their view, to be effective, a mission of this kind needs to be recognized as such, which they define as *"acceptance of and interaction with the entity by others"* and mark its importance *"recognition by others (...) is the sine qua non of global actorhood"*. As Labinot Grievcevcı points out, the question arises: given the contested status of country recognition, is the mission recognized as such? A line of reasoning that can be extended by mentioning the way in which the mission is viewed and understood by those who shape it and those who benefit from it, the Kosovars. In other words, recognition of the

¹⁸⁶ Labinot Greicevci. "EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo." *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* 12 (3): 283–303 (2011).

¹⁸⁷ Joseph Jupille & James A. Caporaso. *States, agency and rules: The European Union in global environmental*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 1998).

mission's objectives and actions does not seem to be the same for everyone, implying an initial lack of clarity on the part of the EULEX Mission, obviously accentuated by the country's uncertain status. For example, after interviewing EULEX officials in Pristina, Labinot Grievcevcı notes a certain "*ambiguity and confusion on the status of their mission*". Some of the officials claimed that EULEX works under Resolution 1244 of the UN, while others suggested that the mission recognizes the reality in Kosovo and works based on the Joint Action of the EU Council (4 February 2008) and Ahtisaari's proposal. In addition, a third Group held the opinion that the EULEX mandate is in between Resolution 1244 and Ahtisaari's proposal for Independence. Thus, the EULEX Mission seems to lack clarity as to its objectives, even for those who implement it. However, they are not the only ones to have different interpretations of this mission: this is also the case for Kosovar civilians, who, in addition to being almost unanimously against the Mission, whether of Albanian or Serbian origin, as Rok Zupancic and Nina Pejic¹⁸⁸ demonstrate, have different and contradictory perceptions of the objectives of the EULEX Mission. Indeed, according to them, the Serbs are in favor of "*the mission should first protect their rights in the Serbian province*", marking the non-recognition of the state of Kosovo in the process, while the Kosovar Albanians "*attach more importance to EULEX's role in helping the government establishments a Sovereign State*". The Mission's objectives do not therefore seem to be clearly identified by the two communities, who each use it to their own ends and according to their own interests. Generally, the EULEX Mission is a source of differing interpretations as to its objectives, its *raison d'être* and its achievements, and this at different levels, both for its employees and for the country's citizens. This is a clear sign of a

¹⁸⁸ Rok Zupancic and Nina Pejic, *Limits To The European Union 'S Normative Power in a Post-Conflict Society: Eulex and Peacebuilding in Kosovo*, 10 (Cham: Springer Open, 2018).

lack of clarity in the implementation of the Mission, combined with a general lack of recognition: of the status of Kosovo and of the status of the EULEX Mission. Thus, one of the limits to the effectiveness and action of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, more so than for the initiatives underway in Cyprus, is the lack of clarity.

(4) Questioning the lack of consideration of the question of national identity

Finally, another limitation of the EU's peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo that can be deduced from all those mentioned above is a certain lack of consideration for the issue of national identity, which is never tackled head-on and directly, but always indirectly and implicitly. Of course, it goes without saying that the EU cannot and will not impose a national identity on Cyprus and Kosovo, especially given their status. But what follows from our analysis is a certain detour of the question of ethnic division, which perhaps does not focus sufficiently on the lasting question of creating a real and concrete Cypriot and Kosovar national identity. Indeed, most of the limitations of these initiatives seem to point in this direction: the lack of long-term consideration common to the initiatives in Cyprus and the EULEX Mission, the uncertain and sometimes not sufficiently assumed position on the part of the EU regarding its initiatives, the cruel lack of clarity both in the eyes of the missions' employees and of the citizens of the territories concerned... As we saw at the beginning of our study, when we analyzed the missions and the terms put forward in their founding programs, the question of ethnic peace and community cooperation is widely considered, but not the final and lasting question of the elaboration of a national identity. Thus, in a way, official discourse and missions are helping to perpetuate the division of Cyprus and Kosovo into "*communities*". Yet there are legitimate doubts as to the sustainability of such a peace, which would only be a relative and

partial peace, with the fateful fundamental issue still unresolved. However, it remains important to note the EU's concrete investment in trying to improve relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, and between Kosovar Albanians and (Kosovar) Serbs in Kosovo.

In this section, we have discussed the limitations of the EU's peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo, which are likely to undermine the effectiveness of their initial objectives. We have seen that the EU tends to need to be supported and extended by other actors and international organizations, and that its autonomy of action is only relative. Many scholars also express doubts about the sustainability of the "*peace*" achieved through these initiatives, both in Cyprus and Kosovo, and denounce the fact that they do not seem to be part of a long-term vision. Moreover, as we have seen, given their organizational or institutional links with local institutions specific to a particular community (the Republic of Cyprus), or inclined to defend one community in particular (the question of the extremely minority Serb representation in the Kosovar government), their neutrality and impartiality are questionable. The EULEX mission in Kosovo also seems to suffer from a general lack of clarity, whereas this is only relative in the case of the EU initiatives underway in Cyprus. Finally, as a concluding and general limitation, we have mentioned the absence of any direct and explicit consideration of national identity, which is nonetheless the central and original problem and source of tension in Cyprus as well as in Kosovo.

CONCLUSION

(1) Structure of the study and general answer to our research question

In this study, we presented, analyzed and compared how the question of national identity was considered in the peacebuilding initiatives and missions carried out by the EU in Cyprus and Kosovo. The study was divided into three different chapters, and six interconnected sections developed with a logical and progressive thread. In this section, we will briefly review our approach and its progression. In the introduction, we justified our two units of comparison, Cyprus and Kosovo, to ensure the legitimacy and coherence of our study. Next, we presented the available literature on our subject and the theoretical frameworks that were derived from it, before announcing our chosen methodology. Our research question could then be refined as follows: To what extent does the EU, through its peacebuilding initiatives, affect the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo?

In order to best answer this question, and within the limitations imposed, we have developed three chapters. The first chapter dealt with the connection between EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions and the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo. Thus, in the first section, we sought to explain the initial connection between two joint searches: the search for peace and the search for a national identity, which, given the contexts, both become two needs: the need for peace and the need to have a national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo. In a second section, we presented the origins, *raison d'être* and objectives of the EU peacebuilding initiatives selected for this study (the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community, the EU-UNDP Partnership for Cyprus and the Civil in Society Action Program for Cyprus, and the EULEX Mission in Kosovo). Finally, we analyzed the place given to the question of national identity in the official documents of these initiatives. In the second section, we moved

on to the next phase, examining the concrete achievements of these initiatives. In the fourth section, we presented and compared some of the achievements of the peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. Then, in the next section, we analyzed these achievements in relation to the programs that described them, also questioning their effectiveness.

Finally, in the last chapter, we have continued our progressive path by introducing the limits of these EU initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo, particularly as regards the question of national identity. Following a logical and progressive line of reasoning, we have thus attempted to highlight the EU's consideration of the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, and its consequences. In the following paragraph, we will explore in detail the main findings of our study.

(2) Findings

In the course of our study and research, we have been able to draw a number of conclusions that help answer the initial question of the role of EU peacebuilding initiatives on the issue of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo. Indeed, thanks to our progressive development, we will now recall the major findings of our research.

The first general finding is that peace is absolutely necessary, not to say urgent, in both Cyprus and Kosovo. Ethnic and inter-community tensions are enduring in both countries, contributing to their division and a lack of legitimacy and/or representativeness on the world stage and in international relations. Moreover, with tensions running high in both countries, the slightest thing can ignite the situation and threaten the very lives of their inhabitants. If peace is necessary, we have also seen to what extent it is intimately connected to the question of

national identity. Indeed, the whole point of our first part is to demonstrate the extent to which the search for peace and the search for a national identity, in Cyprus and Kosovo, are linked and interconnected. In this respect, it seems that the joint efforts of the three initiatives in Cyprus are equivalent to those of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, which is unique but pioneering in its realization.

While the initiatives studied for Cyprus and Kosovo all have the same ultimate goal of reconciliation, it is important to remember that the question of national identity is never directly raised or addressed. Indeed, as we have seen, these EU initiatives have a common *modus operandi*: to act on civil society, to strengthen and legitimize it, in the hope that these actions will indirectly lead to calmer relations between communities. However, the question of national identity, central to peacebuilding concerns as we have pointed out, is never directly considered, even in the official legal texts of the initiatives, which never include the words "identity" or even "national". The EU's peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo therefore attempt to establish peace without addressing the question of national identity head-on, and without any concrete attempt to find solutions on that precise question. Moreover, this absence of direct mention of the issue of national identity is general and common to both Cyprus and Kosovo, which also raises questions about the organization's real peacebuilding capacity. In analyzing some of the achievements of these initiatives in the two countries, we found that actions confirmed words, in the sense that what was done did not directly address the issue of national identity either. We were able to say, however, that overall, the achievements were in line with what had been announced in the plans for the initiatives. On the other hand, we have seen that their effectiveness is judged to be relative, both by specialists and by the inhabitants who are the main stakeholders (especially in Kosovo, where the EULEX

Mission is not very popular and is receiving less and less approval from society). The lack of emphasis on the issue of national identity is probably one of the sources of this relative ineffectiveness, as it impacts on the legitimacy of the initiatives, already tainted by scandals, particularly in Kosovo.

Thus, another important finding of our study is that the effectiveness of the EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo is only relative and incomplete, which is probably one of the consequences of the treatment given to the issue of national identity. However, this finding is complemented by another: the EULEX Mission, because of corruption scandals and its unpopularity, seems to be considered less effective and less legitimate than the EU initiatives in Cyprus.

Finally, we have seen that these two missions face a number of limitations (they need to be complemented by the action of other players, they do not seem to take into account the "sustainable" component, necessary in the context of peace-building, they are accused of being partial or lacking objectivity) which ultimately seem to stem, in one way or another, from the failure of the EU peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo to deal directly with the issue of national identity, which seems to be the central obstacle to their complete effectiveness. Thus, the EU is only indirectly influencing the resolution of the issue of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, and thus only marginally affecting its resolution.

(3) Discussion

In this discussion section, we will interpret the results discussed above and insert them into the literature presented in the introduction. Finally, this discussion section will be completed by others such as the limitations of our study, suggestions for future research and potential openings related to our topic. The main interpretation that can be made of our findings, in order to answer the initial research question, is that the EU, through its peacebuilding initiatives and missions, affects only indirectly and therefore in a limited way the question of national identity in Cyprus as in Kosovo. In other words, the EU seems to initiate the contexts and frameworks to enable the resolution of the National Identity issue, but never addresses it directly or in the first place. This general observation is similar in the case of both Cyprus and Kosovo: the EU plays an essential and not insignificant role in civil society in both countries, trying to improve and strengthen it, but ultimately avoiding explicitly addressing the issue of national identity. This is rather in line with what we projected at the beginning of our study, namely that the EU would have an obvious role to play, as an international entity whose peacebuilding is one of its pillars in Europe as well as in its neighborhood policies, but that this role would encounter numerous obstacles, and in this sense could not be a leading one. However, this hypothesis and assertion is now complemented by the idea that the EU does not indeed have a leading role in directly resolving the question of national identity in Cyprus as in Kosovo, as the organization deals with this issue indirectly. Thus, from the outset, it seems to be deliberately avoiding and setting aside the question of national identity, to focus more on creating the contexts and frameworks that are supposed to foster its resolution. In this sense, the EU only acts as a mediator between the country and the question of its national identity, affecting it in a limited, conscious way. In addition, our study complements and confirms our theoretical concept of interventionism: EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus are multifaceted, and EU

intervention in these countries takes different forms: economic, social, political and historical. The actions linked to EU intervention in Cyprus and Kosovo are therefore extremely diversified, ranging from support for the forces of law and order in place (EULEX Mission), to the renovation of historical monuments (EU-UNDP partnership in Cyprus), to the search for former victims of conflict (Civil Society in Action Program in Cyprus). Given that the ultimate aim of these peacebuilding initiatives and missions is to establish peace by strengthening civil society, it would seem that the EU has opted for a liberal approach to interventionism. In addition, our study fits in with the idea that peacebuilding missions are stabilizing factors as we mentioned, but adds the idea that this stabilizing factor is only relative and largely limited. In this context, our study also fits in with Tereza Los-Nowak's¹⁸⁹ neo-liberal conception of EU peacebuilding, with the idea that they have an important, but also largely limited role to play, which also corresponds to Gentjan Scara's¹⁹⁰ comments on the fact that lack of experience or political unity (as seen notably in the case of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo) undermines the lasting effectiveness of the organization's peacebuilding initiatives. More generally, our study perfectly completes the field of research on the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, by clarifying it and approaching it from the point of view of EU peacebuilding initiatives. A totally legitimate point of view, given the EU's legal basis promoting a certain interventionism in such situations.

The comparison between the two countries also highlights a number of differences of degree and intensity in the issues raised by the construction of these identities. In this sense, our study seems to be legitimate and important, as it enables us to highlight possible solutions and ways

¹⁸⁹ Tereza Łoś-Nowak, *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe (Contemporary International Relations)*, (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław, 2008).

¹⁹⁰ Gentjan Scara, *The role of the EU as a Peacebuilder in the Western Balkans*, "Romanian Journal of European Affairs". vol. 14, no. 14 December 2014.

of approaching the resolution of the national identity issue in Cyprus and Kosovo, mentioning their strengths as well as their limitations. Moreover, it is set in an urgent contemporary context, which calls for greater attention to be paid to this issue in both Cyprus and Kosovo. Hence, our study complements the literature already available on the subject, by focusing on a more external and international point of view (the EU) and relating it to other dynamics with a similar tendency (the comparison between Cyprus and Kosovo). This innovative line of reasoning is an attempt to provide ideas for thought in resolving the issue of national identity in these two countries, the key factor in building lasting peace between ethnic communities in Cyprus and Kosovo.

(4) Limitations of our study

However, we must acknowledge that our study contains certain limitations, which it is important to highlight in this section. The main limitations seem to be the practical difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions, the lack of concrete solutions proposed in our study, and the relative lack of available sources on the subject.

First of all, it should be noted that it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of EU initiatives and missions, especially when they are still ongoing. Indeed, we have tried to assess, mainly by mentioning scholars' reasoning and opinion polls, the effectiveness of initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo, to see whether they had a consequent impact on the question of national identity. However, these assessments are tangential for at least two reasons: the first is that the initiatives and missions chosen are all still in operation today, and so their achievements are not definitive or complete. Thus, even if they appear to be relatively effective, particularly on the issue of

national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, they may evolve and modify the assessment made in our study. It is therefore important to remember that this study was carried out in 2023/2024 and cannot necessarily be applied to the future achievements of EU peacebuilding initiatives and missions in Cyprus and Kosovo. The second reason is the lack of fieldwork: due to a lack of time and resources, no surveys were carried out directly as part of this study in Cyprus or Kosovo, which would have provided a more real and concrete view of the situation as it is perceived and felt on a daily basis by the inhabitants, regardless of their ethnicity. As a result, this study's assessment of the effectiveness of these initiatives suffers from acknowledged limitations.

Furthermore, another limitation of our study is that, for lack of time and space, it does not present a concrete solution to attempt to participate in resolving the issue of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo. This is regrettable, as we do not wish this study to be pessimistic. On the contrary, the initiatives are good and should be extended or accentuated, and under no circumstances should the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo be considered insurmountable or without a possible positive outcome.

Finally, as the subject of our study is so specific, contemporary, new and contested, there are, as mentioned in the introduction, very few sources available on the question of the EU's role in resolving the issue of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo. This meant that we had to analyze and dissect the same sources several times, in order to achieve a certain degree of coherence, but this clearly undermines the diversity of viewpoints and perspectives on the issue. However, because As a result, our study has had - and continues to have - a number of limitations, which need to be taken into account if it is to be properly interpreted, and if it is not to be interpreted as having different stakes from those for which it was written.

(5) Future research & wider perspectives

Thus, given the limitations of this study mentioned above, we can propose a few avenues for future reflection. As suggested, carrying out a concrete field study in Cyprus and Kosovo to gather the direct opinion of local residents on the question of the EU's role in resolving national identity (with due form, of course) could constitute an interesting, as it is quite innovative, research brief. It could complement the analyses of specialists and enrich reflection on the organization's impact on these considerations. A broader study of peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus and Kosovo could also be of interest. We had to restrict our field of study to EU peace initiatives and missions in order not to exceed the format of the Master's thesis, but many other players also enter into the equation, the UN of course, but also ethnic diasporas, which have a not inconsiderable weight of representation abroad. The role of diasporas, in Cyprus as in Kosovo, in resolving the question of national identity could be extremely interesting, given the particular status of expatriates: in this case, the simple question of what nationality they consider themselves to be speaks volumes, especially if coupled with the nationality with which they are considered in the country in which they live.

Finally, a study of citizens' initiatives and civil society associations could be of interest, given the weight they can play in resolving the question of national identity in Cyprus and Kosovo, and quite simply in peace. Indeed, as we have only briefly mentioned (notably in the context of the Civil Society in Action Program in Cyprus), citizens' initiatives and local associations have a significant role to play in peacebuilding, as recognized intermediaries between national

institutions and the population. Surely their influence on these issues will increase and become essential over the coming decades. For direct collaboration between institutions and the population on the dreaded question of national identity.

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