

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**  
**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**Institute of Political Studies**  
**Department of Political Science**

**The Sartrean Political Perspective and Successive  
Existentialist Conceptual Application**

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# **The Sartrean Political Perspective and Successive Existentialist Conceptual Application**

Bachelor's thesis

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For the programme of *PPE* - Politics, Philosophy, and  
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2024

## Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on  
22 April 2024

Iris Arsikj



## References

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## Abstract

The thesis investigates the political-philosophical thoughts of Jean-Paul Sartre, Philip Pettit, and Noam Chomsky, canvassing their respective axioms on freedom and its confines, and expounding on modernist societal affairs. Namely, issues such as political administration, commonwealth disparity, and various societal dimensions of individual self-governance. By representing both leftist and republican discourse, the present study shall therefore elucidate multiple rousing dichotomies. What pertinence does the individual hold in policy appertaining to the maximisation of equity? Is opinion on the implementation of justice intrinsic or extrinsic? An in-depth analysis through Sartre's lens on material constructivism is demonstrated in a chronologically coherent substructure: firstly, offering opposition in the form of Pettit's pragmatic republican principles, and simultaneously revealing a nexus of his and Sartre's lines of thought. The ensuing supplementary angle will show a permeation of existentialist influence, seconded through a dimension of leftist reformist thought, through Chomsky's controversial appraisals. An interrelation between liberty and non-domination, draws deliberately on humanist entanglements within revisionist societal paradigms and a growing indispensability of systematisation. Sartre's vision of a societal fusion - a blend of communist economic organisation availing of existentialist themes - ultimately emphasises the tension between collective governance and individualism.

## Abstrakt

Tato disertační práce zkoumá politicko-filozofické myšlenky Jeana-Paula Sartrea, Philipa Petitta a Noama Chomského, které se zabývají jejich pohledy na svobodu, spravedlnost a společenskou nerovnost. Analyzuje jejich přístupy k politické správě, individuální svobodě a sociální spravedlnosti, přičemž porovnává levicový a republikánský diskurz. Čtenář je seznámen s republikánským přístupem Petitta, existencialistickým myšlením Sartrea a kritickými pohledy Chomského. Práce přináší hlubší pochopení jejich teorií a jejich aplikace na současnou společnost. Zjišťuje, jak jednatel ovlivňuje politiku směřující k maximální rovnosti. Dále se zabývá otázkou, zda je prosazování spravedlnosti vnitřní nebo vnější. Analýza se soustředí na spojení mezi svobodou a nedominací a rostoucí nezbytností systémování ve společnosti. Sartreova vize spojení komunistické ekonomické organizace s existencialistickými tématy zdůrazňuje napětí mezi kolektivním řízením a individualismem.

## Keywords

Liberty, Existentialism, Marxism, Republicanism, Sartre

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## INTRODUCTION

The analysis I posit aims to gauge how Jean-Paul Sartre's writing has influenced the political sphere, as portrayed by contemporary political theoreticians; utilising a comparative method of analysis of works by Sartre and present day political philosophers Philip Pettit and Noam Chomsky. I will execute a critical evaluation of their respective postulation, abutting to a synthesis on the framing of free will in society. The composite blend of ideas explores the notion of liberty and self-governance of individuals, inspecting varying edifications of freedom across the political spectrum. The scholars' theories are contextualised inside their respective philosophical framework and postulations. The rendered conceptualisations of non-confinement will move beyond independent abstractions of freedom, into a more significant interplay of notions for deliverance. In the present ethos, licence acts as a point for relevantly defining a purpose in an increasingly technologically enmeshed world. By viewing them through Sartre's conceptualisation of existentialism as humanism, I will expound on the organisational frameworks of modern individualism and its unfaltering ramifications for the human condition. Inspecting varying critiques of free will, the central concern of the thesis is to examine the source of tenor within, and beyond, leftist assessment. As a result, multiple abstractions come into view.

Within the philosophy of liberty and Marxism, varying hypotheses about safeguarding universal human rights have been set forth. "Marxists fall back on the dialectic and make of the superstructure a synthesis that does, to be sure, proceed from conditions of production and of material existence, but whose nature and laws of development have a real "independence"..." (Sartre, 1946, p. 1) By utilising a variation-finding comparative methodology, the thesis will analyse the far-reaching scheme of Marxist solutions of dire societal issues. Supposing that improvement based around materialist footing in a society is impossible, (Sartre, 1946, p. 1) the initial position of Sartrean humanism is embraced to guide the course of the comparison, making way for a variance of perspectives such as Philip Pettit's republican values on one end, and Noam Chomsky's intense convictions on the other. However, the dissimilarity between these philosophers' theories is not downright. In the scrutinisation of their incongruity, certain parallels

become apparent. The criteria for comparison sets out to highlight the uniqueness and effectiveness of the philosophers' theories, while simultaneously pivoting back to the durability of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist philosophy. The aspects of their theories highlighted in this comparison is self-rule and free rein - the individual, alongside societal organisational conventions - the system.

Highlighting from eminent books such as Sartre's *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (1957), Pettit's *The Common Mind: An essay on psychology, Society, and politics* (1993), and Chomsky's *Imperial ambitions: Conversations on the post-9/11 world* (2005), the thesis will pick out important conceptualisations, with the intent to collate their (dis)similarities. The intended correlative nature of the arguments will be strengthened by supporting literature from journals, essays, and lectures from the three philosophers. The initial back-and-forth between Sartre and Pettit establishes a grounds for the central ideas on justice and organisational confines. The sequence of the research is organised chronologically to demonstrate the progression of these ideas over time. Given that Chomsky's selected writings are the most recent of the assortment, the section covering him serves as a supplementary component, intended to provide an alternative viewpoint rooted in recent decades. This perspective considers the rise of securitisation and technological advancements which have profoundly changed the landscape of modern society. This drastic shift in view and cognisance is more advantageously explored as an add-on, rather than as a part of the initial comparison, so as to not convolute or befog the legacy theories discussed by Sartre and Pettit.

Society's propensity for insufficient adherence to prerequisites for the collective welfare, paired with oversights in the alteration of ineffective policy, ineluctably usher disputes concerning the productivity, reverence and structural make-up of the justice system. Individuals are both contributors and beneficiaries of just policies, and their contribution is crucial for policies to effectively tackle systemic issues. In this milieu, opinions on societal affairs can be viewed as both intrinsic and extrinsic. I believe this multifaceted, layered interaction between the individual and the system is worthy of consideration. The individuals' intrinsic position, shaped by unique

experiences and observations, is instrumental to reaching a deeper comprehension of societal trials and potential solutions. Concurrently, the extrinsic sway such of cultural norms, political ideologies, and monetary stakes also significantly configure individuals' opinions. Furthermore, they can impact the creation and execution of unbiased stratagems.

Liberty theory describes the process of practicing volition within the agreed-upon arrangement of human union which forms modern civilisation. As said by one of the founding figures of contemporary theories of liberty, John Stuart Mill: "...liberty of the individual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities" (Mill, 1859, p.78). By participating and engaging in society, one agrees to be governed in exchange for protection within the societal order. The main discourse herein revolves around particular aspects of our environment which prevail as the strongest indicators of our free will. "The twentieth century is replete with examples of regimes which have instructed their subjects that solidarity or the service of the state comprise true justice, real freedom, genuine democracy or the greatest happiness, wrapping up all tensions and incipient conflicts in a totalitarian cocoon which silences the clamour of otherwise inescapable debate" (Knowles, 2006, p. 76). The perception of law and order is critical to the hypothesis of freedom.

Seeking truth and fairness, laws shouldn't intercede to judge in contexts where there is an incongruity with public tenets. The created policy ought to object the potential malice and discerned unjustness in the community. Conversely, it must allow room for the consideration of persons who introduce opposing views. This encapsulates a verifiable moral standard for discourse and reform, often glossed over but nevertheless pursued by many. (Mill, 1895, p. 51, 52)

First of all, how does individual awareness affect compliance in systems of authority? Hypotheses relating to freedom frequently advance the upsides of resilience and pluralism, recognising that people have different convictions, ways of life, and therefore situational assessment. As long as they do not violate the rights of others, a society that values liberty should allow for a wide range of personal choices and expressions. Law and order is conceptualised as a defence against oppression and a way to safeguard fair conditions for citizens.



That being the case, how can a government instate a system that ensures the most favourable exercise of liberty? Important rights include those that confer the power to speak freely, or those which prevent the state from interfering with individuals' free rein. This set of viewpoints is frequently connected with customary progressivism, which endorses that the public authority's job should be to provision individual authority and maintain social order.

"Inevitably, outright freedom has to be a property of choices in the first place, choosers in the second; a choice will be free outright so far as it is unobstructed, while a chooser will be free outright so far as his or her choices are free." (Pettit, 2006, p. 133)

The republican concept of freedom, defines liberty as freedom with non-domination, rather than direct democratic contribution of all the populace involved. The distinction between freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination is elementary. While freedom as non-interference supposes the truancy of interference enough for freedom, freedom as non-domination insists on the truancy of any capacity for "any individual or corporate agent – to interfere arbitrarily in their life or affairs." (Pettit, 1997, p. 391) Although the distinction between these two impressions of liberty may materialise subtly, a more intense contemplation presents hidden depth to their dissimilarity. (Pettit, 1997, p. 391)

In this thesis, I aim to explain the interchange and balance between individual opportunity, social justice propositions, and political praxis through an analysis on the relevance of independent thinking in shaping discussions about public policy. The question at hand centres around what constitutes a pertinent stance in legislative policy - one which would maximise non-confinement in the modern landscape of political rapport. Postulations for a correct claim to freedom fluctuate in accordance to the level of subjugation an individual is anticipated to undertake without friction. An abstraction which gets further deviated by qualms about the credence of the system itself. Complications, such as a vacancy of meaning, assume the free-thinking individual. Utilising qualitative methodology, I endeavour to blend key positions and stances from across the political spectrum, and explore how they relate the core ideas of existentialist realism, a theory proposed by French political philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For these reasons, I trust that Sartrean convention is an adequate starting point for the exploration of justice partisanship.

## 1. INTRODUCTION ON JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

By and large, Sartre's political philosophy insists on individual responsibility, freedom, and social justice. These principles are applicable in a wide range of real-world contexts, ranging from political activism and ethical decision-making, as well as social justice and education. He scrutinised the idea of a foreordained class-cognisance, contending that people effectively make their own importance and reason in an apparently unconcerned world. Sartre's commitment with communism mirrors a perplexing exchange between systemic analysis and existentialist humanism, highlighting the tension between aggregate social powers and individual independence in the means of understanding and reforming society. (Sartre, 1964, p. 3)

Sartre dismisses the thought of the existence of a widespread human instinct (a “genus”, ascertained as an inborn or essentialist denotation for existence) that characterises all people. He saw existence in advance of embodiment, a presupposition - implying that the individuals have physical existence foremost; what follows afterward is a characterisation of themselves through their actions, pursuits, and decrees. In his 1943 book *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre investigates major inquiries relating to presence and perception. “Reflection is a recognition rather than knowledge. It implies as the original motivation of the recovery a pre-reflective comprehension of what it wishes to recover. ...thought is an act which engages the past and shapes its outline by the future” (Sartre, 1943/1957, p. 156). To have an undoubtedly veritable existence, Sartre claims, one must doubt every bit of what surrounds or confines them. (Sartre, 1943/1957, p. 156)

He drew inspiration from Marxist ideas, particularly in his first writings. He claimed that in order for freedom to be effectively executed man’s purpose “should not be only to fall into the gorges rigorously marked out by the materialist. ... Intelligent Marxists admit of a certain contingent element in history, of course, but only to say that if socialism fails, humanity will sink into barbarism.” (Sartre, 1946, p.36) Therefore, a philosophy of revolution for the oppressed masses, which embraces a perspective outside both bourgeois idealism and the fleeting persuasion tied to materialism, advocates as a philosophy of mankind laying claim to a guarantee of solicitous

egalitarianism. This position is close to birthright; if it is upheld. The obscurity tied to materialism arises from its dual nature, insisting simultaneous focus on social stratum and the realisation of absolute righteousness at different times. (Sartre, 1946, p.37)

Later on, he abandoned these ideas and drifted towards the more complex existential abstractions he is famous for. Though, he had always expressed a certain scepticism towards communism in practice, even when his writing gravitated around the Marxian ideology. Substantially, due to his existentialist view of meaning, and conclusive lack thereof. "But, say the Marxists, if you teach man that he is free, you betray him; for he no longer needs to become free; can you conceive of a man free from birth who demands to be liberated?" (Sartre, 1946, p. 30) Taking the fact that there is no meaning as given, the system cannot assign meaning through any apparatus, and a contention forms: why amuse the interposed restraints of personal freedom that come with abiding by a high-handed ideological value system? "To this [Sartre replies] that if man is not originally free, but determined once and for all, we cannot even conceive what his liberation might be. Some may say, "We will release human nature from its determining constraints." These people are fools." (Sartre, 1946, p. 30)

This thesis examines the case for this entanglement on the subject of liberty, with a strong emphasis on the above-mentioned complexities examined with the help of a substantial part of Sartre's philosophy, which majorly concerns the individual. The presented line of argument shall therefore elucidate the above-described paradigmatic shift of perspective, through different lenses, with an unabating emphasis on individualism. Jean-Paul Sartre appraised a societal configuration based on a fusion between communist financial organisation with existentialist accents pertaining to individual coordination. The theory's nuanced tie to socialism mirrors a modern discussion between the fundamental consideration of being, alongside the utilisation of existentialist humanism. What ensues is a deft exploration of the strain between downright dominion and individual independence.

## 1.1 SARTRE ON MARXISM

In his writings such as *Materialism and Revolution* (1949), *Search for a Method* (1957), *Existentialism is a humanism* (1946), and others, Sartre advocated for Marxist doctrines and saw these ideas as a means of combating capitalism and its short-comings, hence promoting social justice. According to him, Marxism made way for a framework that understands people's underlying principles, creating a clearer analysis of how power is distributed among societal groups. (Sartre, 2004/1960, p.138) Sartre's view is that determinism doesn't expose opportunity to the extent of mere theoretical regulation, yet to the potentiality of enlightening a specific path of determinism. Such determinism, achieved solely through human venture, attests to the limitless idiosyncrasy of life. Furthermore, in this outlook on determinism, which substantiates itself in viability of human action, the cause to an effect becomes almost identical to the means to an effect. Sartre saw Marxism as a way to promote freedom and moral solemnity, both of which he believed were being attacked in the capitalist nation. The premise of what can be considered a relevant action lies within a framework comprising the inner workings of the system. (Sartre, 1946, p. 29)

One such example of militant positionality in the namesake of the oppressed majority is his early oeuvre *Materialism and Revolution*, first published in 1946. Various passages highlight a "contemporaneity" of the material constructivism approach, hence stipulating salient hypotheses treating authority dynamics, though perhaps in a more "generalised" format of stipulation for Sartre's supposition. "... materialism is a *human attitude*, with all the subjective, contradictory and emotional aspects involved in such an attitude, it ought not to be presented as a rigorous philosophy, as the doctrine of objectivity. ... I should define it as the subjectivity of those who are ashamed of their subjectivity. It is, of course, also the irritation of those who suffer physically and who are familiar with the reality of hunger, illness, manual work and everything that can sap a man's strength." (Sartre, 1946, p. 9)

In this method of proposed functioning, opportunity is to be found exclusively in the demonstration, and as mentioned before, becomes unified with attempted advantageous demonstration. There exists not a righteousness of certain virtues, yet virtue itself comes into play through its outcomes. It's anything but an internal ethicalness granting individuals to disengage from systematic functioning. However, it is, in actuality, the ability to commit one's self in ongoing societal proceedings and to fabricate a foreseeable future. The positioning constructs the individual a future which empowers them to comprehend and revise the present more effectively. (Sartre, 1946, p. 29)

As the historical context eventuated to a somewhat dogmatic enthronement and solidification of traditional communism, Sartre increasingly harboured reservations about the sufficiency of such holistic forces ushering change in the public spheres. Although Jean-Paul Sartre's ideals initially conformed with Marxism, he later developed his very own complex political vision that would distinguish him from such traditional epistemology.

Rather than the difficulty which presents itself to the individual in the utilisation of personal freedom, alongside all ostensible misdirections, to show him that the goal and seeming potentate is the material - an object - makes it easier to engage in the apparatus of a materialist-driven order. The object, in this case the capital, allows the individual to, through his efforts, obtain an opportunity to influence the world, and, thusly, his own circumstances. (Sartre, 1949, p.30) Assuming that such materialist realism is representative of social designs ad rem, it is then clear that this narrative yields a dismissive sentiment of the modernist world. Sartre's reformist mindset does not demand exceptional emblematic articulation of the current formality of public policy; it is a perspective that empowers the individual to contrive what's to come from the available components. (Sartre, 1949, p.30)

"Marxists, to whom I have said [his objection], have answered: "Your action is limited, obviously, by your death; but you can rely upon the help of others. That is, you can count both upon what the others are doing to help you ... and upon what they will do later, after your death, to take up your action and carry it forward to its final accomplishment which will be the revolution..." (Sartre,

2007, p. 35) His idea, presented here, meteorically contradicted the notion that humans have control over their own predestination. This example illustrates a fundamental disagreement with Sartre's growing conviction that individual autonomy and control over one's agency are paramount.

Political activities, the existentialist thinker would expound at last, demanded a strong baseline and background rooted in individual determination to achieve definitive impact. He believed that the fabric of a better society necessitated it to be woven from the accountability of its citizens through the fulfilment of their obligations. Sartre elucidates this point by stating that at the time when a man subscribes to something — with complete apprehension that he isn't just opting for what he will be, but simultaneously settling on the idea that this reasoning applies for the entire of humanity — in such an instant, a man cannot escape from the cognitive abstraction of outright significant obligation. There is a tensivity tied to rationale. Unquestionably, many individuals feel that by doing the thing which they are doing, they commit nobody except themselves to anything. (Sartre, 2007, p. 26)

“They [young people of the time] are now told to choose between materialism and idealism; they are told that there is nothing in between and that it must be one or the other. ... Thus, they are hounded even in their thoughts, which are poisoned at the source, and they are condemned to serve unwillingly a philosophy they detest or to adopt out of discipline a doctrine in which they are unable to believe. They have lost the carefree quality characteristic of their age without acquiring the certainty of maturity.” (Sartre, 1946, p. 1)

Young individuals are confronted with a binary choice: the tangible realm of materialism or the abstract domain of idealism, with no possible convergence between these two. This stark dichotomy leaves them perplexed and disenchanted. (Sartre, 1946, p. 35) The conventional views on materialism prevent any cognitive genesis of “how matter could give rise to the *idea* of matter.” (Sartre, 1946, p. 1) On the other hand, idealism is seen as a deceptive narrative, a tool of the affluent to stealthily obscure the despotic truth through the dilution of reality into mere

conceptualisation. Unripe generations find themselves at an aporetic crossroad, coerced into aligning with false dichotomies of ideologies that they neither fully grasp nor genuinely endorse.

This statement underscores the profound ethical responsibility accompanying each decision, challenging the notion that individuals' actions are insular and lacking of a broader societal consequence. Sartre's insights reveal the complexity of personal and collective agency in the pursuit of societal transformation.



## 1.2 SARTRE AND EXISTENTIALISM

Sartre dismissed the concept of determinism and ideas expressed by any predicament stipulating a divine intervention or characterising human behaviour as a continuation of predetermined disposition; a view positing that our lives and actions are preordained by a progression of innate instincts. He contended, instead, the possibility that people are defined by a contingent outside power prescribing a more or less virtuous state of affairs and thereby complementing the individual prerogative. A personal autonomy. This rejection of theistic and atheistic forms of determinism defers to the larger focus on individual freedom found in his numerous philosophical opuses. The ones crucial for this thesis 'line of argument are *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (1943), as well as *Existentialism is a Humanism* (1945), and the earlier *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1937), which subsequently served as segments for the basis of the book *Critique of dialectical reason* (1960), but whose exemplar can be seen in prior works such as the 1957 book *Search for a Method*.

The French thinker stated, in his 1945 lecture *Existentialism is a Humanism*, that in observance to atheistic existentialism the existence of a person precedes their essence. Such anteriority of the tangible versus the spiritual highlighted the importance of choice and personal freedom, over clerical definitions or concepts of individuality, rooted in succession.

“Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it.” (Sartre, 2007, p. 22) This precedence of existence over essence underscores the primacy of individualised choice against predefined moral or existential categorisations that follow from one's entry into the world. Sartre rejected determinism for this reason, as it suggests that our lives and actions are predetermined by factors such as divine will, or as the continuum of inherent instincts.

At its core, Sartre's argument states that the universe of human subjectivity, the universe all humans reside in currently, within or outside an over-seeing system, is the only one that can be

considered tangible. This potentiality of subjectivity outside of theism is what Sartre called existential humanism. "This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must ... [seek] an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation, that man can realize himself as truly human." (Sartre, 2007, p. 53) This is humanism, since we remind man that there is no lawmaker except for himself; that him, consequently deserted, should choose for himself; likewise in light of the fact that it isn't by turning around upon himself, however consistently by looking for, past himself, a point which is one of freedom or of some specific acknowledgment, that man can understand himself as really human.

What Sartre imparts about human existence is that man is a being of accumulated meaning. The parsimonious individual could not even begin to comprehend life's substance, without going through the consummate extant present. Ascribing meaning to one's existence depends upon what has been made available. "Sartre ... asserts that "freedom has to come from a purifying reflection or a total disappearance of the affecting situation." ... he seems to be holding out the idea that there is some unaffected form of knowing...[but] is by no means clear that he is entitled to this reduction ... his emphasis is clearly on the eidetic reduction" (Solomon & Sherman, 2003, p. 170).

Modern society has erected significances and consequences of otherwise unbridled implications. It has done so based on the grounds that in society, the individual emanates meaning. Using dialectical reasoning, the individual surpasses all that which is naturally given. "What we call freedom is the irreducibility of the cultural order to the natural order." (Sartre, 1957/1963, p. 152) In that vein, humans created methodologies of purpose and justification, concurrently promoting certain ideas which benefit favoured groups of people within the society. Accordingly, the aim of social critique shifts from mere categorisation - to a reorganisation of the amassed apparatus of rules and regulation, so as to better pertain to an essential propounded meaning. Herein lies a new dimension for the scour of significance.

To encapsulate Sartre's perception of the individual's role within society, one could look to his essay *The Transcendence of the Ego*, in which he avers four clear statements, stating precisely

his postulations. He refers to the individual as “the I” and boils down his theory into the following statements. The first two of the four are most important when thinking in terms of policy arrangement or the individual’s perception of a “just” system. The first declaration states that “The I is an existent. It has a type of concrete existence ...” (Sartre, 2004/1937, p. 9). He proceeds this claim with a certitude that any transcendence from the physical realm is simply “2. ... a special kind of intuition which grasps it behind reflected consciousness, in a way that is always inadequate.” (Sartre, 2004/1937, p. 9) The perception of the self is exactly what creates the disconnect between the internal and external life of the individual. Sartre argues that this is what makes “the I” flawed when deciding which systemic disposition and level of governmental interference is most befitting for himself or others.

### 1.3 SARTRE BETWEEN MARXISM AND HUMANISM

Yet, as his ideas developed, Sartre became more reserved when drawing inspiration from the thesis of his described existential communism. Seeing how he scrutinised the abstraction of a foreordained class-cognisance, Sartre's separation from the commitment of collectivism mirrors a perplexing exchange between underlying examination and existentialist humanism, highlighting the pressure between aggregate social powers and individual independence in understanding and changing society. Disagreeing with the notion that economic factors determine history, given that he thought people have the power to control their own fate. In his own words this economic status "defines human beings". (Sartre, 1960/2004, p. 111) By this logic, political activities should have a strong baseline rooted in a determination to better society in terms of one's own accountability and furtherance. Neo-marxist contemporaries of Sartre, such as Herbert Marcuse, produced their own accounts of Sartre and his existentialism in the 1940s; renouncing his claims to Marxism more considerably in the academic sphere.

"The concept of the genus man is thus at the same time the concept of the abstract-universal and of the ideal man-but is not the concept of the "realite humaine." ... The activities, attitudes, and efforts which circumscribe [Sartre's] concrete existence are, in the last analysis, not his but those of his class, profession, position, society. In this sense is the life of the individual indeed the life of the universal, but this universal is a configuration of specific historical forces, made up by the various groups, interests, institutions, etc., which form the social reality. "(Marcuse, 1948, p. 334)

Marcuse is referencing one of two Sartrean concepts from his work *Being and Nothingness*. The first is being for-itself (*pour-soi*), which is the concept describing presence of awareness, comprising in its own action and purposive nature. Then, this is contrasted by being in-itself (*en-soi*), which is the liable and difficult state of common things. The difference bears a partiality to Kant's qualification between the point of view of freedom of opportunity at variance with that of familiarity with the normal phenomenal world. (Oxford University Press, nd.) "Pour-soi" is the subjective reality, "en-soi" is the objective.

Marcuse would firmly argue that Sartre's attribution of certain essential qualities to the concept of "pour-soi" erroneously universalised these qualities as representative of humanity in general, rather than acknowledging their contextual and historical specificity. To this regard, Sartre's interpretation overlooked Marx's assertion that man - in his actual historical existence - has not yet achieved the full realisation of his potential as a genus (Marcuse, 1948, p. 334).

This oversight, Marcuse contended, led Sartre to neglect the understanding that the historical forms of society have hindered the development of general human faculties. The life of an individual, as Marcuse posited, is ultimately shaped by class, profession, societal position, and other specific historical forces, and thus any theory aiming to address the concrete existence of humans must necessarily stem from a comprehensive theory of society. The assertion here is that Sartre's context as a person alters his "pour-soi" to a degree not agreeable for a person laying claim to Marxist philosophy. Furthermore, as "en-soi" is the continuation of this notion, the initial contrariety invalidates the larger abstraction of the objective nature of Sartre's society. Sartre survived a progression of major social shifts that influenced his existential way of thinking. Born in 1905, he was a child through the entire duration of the The Second World War, experienced the Great Depression in his 20s, and struggled with functioning without the use of his right eye - which he lost at the age of three. However, he was born into a relatively fortunate household. He was provided with classical schooling, and later entered academia, teaching philosophy at multiple different schools, though never committing to a classical university position. (Reynolds & Renaudie, 2022, p. 3)

Despite these intellectual confrontations, it is imperative to recognise Sartre's endorsement of Marxist principles. He perceived Marxism not only as an ideological counter to the rising tide of capitalism and its inherent flaws but also as a vital framework for promoting social justice and advancing societal welfare. According to him, Marxism made way for a structure that understands people in society's underlying principles and thus creating a clearer analysis of how power is distributed among societal groups. He also saw Marxism as a way to advance freedom and individual solemnity, both of which he believed were being attacked in capitalist nations. In one of

his most notable works, *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960), often referred to as only *The Critique*, Sartre writes:

“The swindle of capitalist exploitation is based on a contract. And though this contract necessarily transforms labour, or praxis, into an inert commodity, it is, formally, a reciprocal relation; it is a free exchange between two men who recognise each other in their freedom; it is just that one of them pretends not to notice that the Other is forced by the constraint of needs to sell himself as a material object. ... competition and antagonism between workers moderate their demands; the employer himself has nothing to do with it.” (Sartre, 1960/2004, p. 110)

Yet Sartre’s communist ideas quickly overturned when faced with the concept of a vanguard party representing the interests of the working class. This particular form of political consortium was questioned by Sartre, who espoused the idea that real freedom could only be obtained via active individual participation in political decision-making. “We should also bear in mind that the association of Sartre and Marxism was—and is still—one of the principal disparaging clichés deployed by the many “Sartrophobes” for whom Sartre the Marxist, Sartre the Commie, even Sartre the Maoist was an effective way of short-circuiting any discussion of Sartre’s ideas. Alongside these many detractors however, there remain a number of Sartre enthusiasts who persist in reading Sartre as an existentialist Marxist” (Betschart, 2019, p. 78). Existentialist Marxism differs from any socialist system contrived to date. Sartre’s political thought placed a strong emphasis on personal responsibility and freedom. He thought that people are inherently free and that the steps we take can greatly determine our circumstances through our actions. For that reason, it is our right to do exactly that. Consequently, political action should bear the motivation of maintaining accountability for any individual within the society, rather than see the more zoomed-out view of conventional communist ideology. Sartre’s view does not agree that such a great determinism within Marxian ideology is, or should be, tethered to the party presiding over general civil authority. This ascendancy (which clears the way for the mishandling of power) goes against the whole concept of holding every individual equally accountable. (Sartre, 2007, p. 31)

“It is precisely this expulsion of man, his exclusion from Marxist Knowledge, which resulted in the renaissance of existentialist thought outside the historical totalization of Knowledge. ... Marxism will degenerate into a non-human anthropology if it does not reintegrate man into itself as its foundation.” (Sartre, 1957/1963, p. 179)

Sartre believed in the foundations of Marxism, and no doubt was in concurrence with many of the theories by Marx and Engels which he perused. However, it is evident that Sartre did not agree with the pragmatic reverberations of the belief system. He did not blame the ideology itself, attributing the bastardisation of the teachings to a shortcoming of purposeful implementation; describing an improper carrying out of the ideological teachings by opportunistic leadership.

“The essential discovery of Marxism is that labour, as a historical reality and as the utilisation of particular tools in an already determined social and material situation, is the real foundation of the organisation of social relations. This discovery can no longer be questioned. What we are arguing, however, is this: the possibility of these social relations becoming contradictory is itself due to an inert and material negation re-interiorised by man” (Sartre, 2004/1960, p. 152). The dogmatisation of labour laws paired with thinly veiled assurances that the financial reward of the labour will be redistributed proved to be false. “But the undeniable result of what has some times been called the 'palaeotechnical' period was the partial destruction of the structures of the old society, the proletarianisation of certain groups and their subjugation to the two inhuman forces of physical fatigue and scarcity” (Sartre, 2004/1960, p. 154). Rather than a fully immersive commitment to a class-less, non-profit based system, communist governorship plummeted into a vain and deceitful nosedive. Sartre drew his last breath in 1980, when communist canons were still a compelling force in many countries' landscapes. By this time, he had fully committed himself to more high-concept philosophical play writing, in most part focused around various examples of his existentialist reasoning. That being the case, his judgement on the trajectory of communist misinterpretation can now evidently be seen as reasonably far-sighted. (Reynolds & Renaudie, 2022)

To boot, the unorthodox individualist approach to inter-human connections is Sartre's way to understand and experience a described universal objectivity in its material form. This idiosyncratic theory has exceptional qualities which prevent it from dissolving it into rudimentary criticism. Sartre urged a reconsideration of totalitarian aspects of the Marxist ideology which were causing it to become less effective. "Although is it still structured through a series of oppositions, the *Critique* delivers a sophisticated social ontology that both addresses some weaknesses in Sartre's earlier work and unifies the social and political reflections of much of his later work" (Reynolds & Renaudie, 2022, para. 6). Sartre's stance cannot be abridged straightforwardly due to his varying stances and various mid-way rationales which he defended throughout his vocation. Nonetheless, his commentary (even his modulation on Marxist ideas such as alienation) still undoubtedly resonate, and cannot be brushed off as outdated. (Sartre, 2004/1960, p. 99)

In present day, plausibly more than ever, atheist existentialism with an emphasis on individual freedom such as the one Sartre described prevails.



## 2. PHILIP PETTIT AND REPUBLICANISM

Philip Pettit has become especially notable in his arguing in favour of republicanism, which refers to a political philosophy that attaches importance to freedom, non-domination, and a prevailing public honourableness. Pettit's republican perspective on the significance of political institutions in protecting individual liberty contrasts with Sartre's existentialist accentuation on radical freedom and personal responsibility. Pettit emphasises the significance of socio-political coordination for the fostering of conditions allowing unfeigned freedom within the wider social milieu, in contrast to Sartre, who advocates for a revolutionary approach to individual opportunity. Moving onto republicanism, Philip Pettit's support for political values based on non-dominance within institutions is, in point of fact, in line with Sartre's concerns about autonomy and assuming personal freedom.

In general, Pettit's work focuses on the significance of political values and their implications within institutions with the aim of shaping individual freedom and advancing social justice. (Goodin et al., 2007, p. 384) Pettit's idea of non-domination is implying that domination could lead to a restriction of choice. The individual may choose to censor oneself morally or pertaining to more general means of standardised societal expectations, but these factors do not exclusively necessitate the permeation of a stronger ideology which rejects interference. Interference in this sense is not viewed as "as the evil opposed to freedom", rather, the degree to which domination ought to be restricted, as well as how the conciliation processes are set in place for different constituents, both hold a larger focal point in the tenets of the theory. (Pettit, 2002b, p. 349)

Republican ideals should cover stratagems to dealing with public and pro-democratic matters, the well-being of the people, and utilising equity; creating means to achieve a well-balanced societal order. Individuals, by maintaining personal freedoms, do not succumb to the power of the other; rather, their individual contrivances. "The republican must be actively committed, therefore, to investigating the possibilities of productive state activity, in particular activity designed to enhance the protected status of citizens;" (Pettit, 1993, p. 224) Practical application of this notion should be applied when structuring political institutions, by limiting the

power of the authority and preventing these individuals from putting despotic limitations into policy. Republican reasoning customs assert universalised criteria for limiting subjugation, particularly for an act of legal or governmental interference. Such capricious, non-systemic interference and obstruction, gives erratic power to a distinctive individual or group of individuals, which may not follow the common interests of those impacted. “Historically, it is a goal for both citizens and states, to celebrate both their independence from potentially powerful neighbours and a republican constitution in which citizens (usually a portion of the adult male population) held public office and lived in accordance with the law. ... It is glossed by Pettit as ‘non-domination’: someone dominates or subjugates another, to the extent that

1. they have the capacity to interfere
2. on an arbitrary basis
3. in certain choices another is in a position to make” (Knowles, 2006, p. 85, 86)

Pettit remarks that power must be exercised in a manner that tracks the public's welfare and worldview rather than the decision maker's own personal welfare or worldview. In the case of an overstep, the intervention executed by the state should be set about by the common good - something of benefit for the affected civil society, as measured through interpretation of what the procedural quota requires, as measured by those affected by the action. These procedures are what is defined as a fair rule of law. (Pettit, 2007, p. 392)

Republican government is, in this way, one where opportunity is viewed as aligned with fairness in a “free state”, or just, in a country that is self-overseeing and not under the influence or subjection of any individual or gathering. It is plausible that a person might show, just on the basis of choice behaviour, what it is that answers to his or her avowable net interest. “If agents are minimally rational and well-informed, and if the context is one where only self-regarding wants are in play, then presumably they will individually choose among different alternatives in a manner that reflects what they are disposed to avow as their net interest. ... This means that there

is no escaping the need for people to make judgements, and presumably deliberatively informed judgements, about what their interests as citizens are.” (Pettit, 2004, p. 158) The requirement for consideration and judgment is cased fairly by the assumption that the opinion towards a proposed action that puts the individual at an advantage as a resident, will be similarly shared with the opinions of any other person within the populace.

“[Republicanism] sees the *res publica*, or common good, as the very object toward which civic life should oriented and directed. It therefore combines a theory of power with a theory of freedom as well as a theory of the individual and the broader political context within which it is embedded. ... this is a broad and expansive view of republicanism as a general theory” (Thompson, 2018, p. 4)

Pettit believes in self-rule in terms of republican tradition. “If your social standing shields you fairly effectively against arbitrary interference, it will generate a high probability of your escaping such interference ... No matter what your preferences are, and no matter what the feelings of others happen to be, your social standing will still serve you well. It will provide a protective field that makes you resistant to the arbitrary incursions of others. It will ensure that, intuitively, you are in control of what you choose.” (Pettit, 2006, p. 136) According to him, freedom and equality are crucial ideas to keep in mind when forming political principles. He maintains that they reinforce one another and that this is the reason why it is important to burgeon fairness in society; in order to free people from oppression and unstable governing. This viewpoint may be implemented in areas such as social services, where initiatives to promote equity can serve to ensure that individuals can follow their aims (or supposed “purpose”) and all-the-while be provided with necessary aid without hindrance from an unfair use of authority. (Pettit, 2004, p. 160, 164)

Philip Pettit's approach to dealing with the individual presents an idea of opportunity as non-control through his non-domination hypothesis. With regards to the hypothesis, Pettit underlines the requirement and necessity for a political framework that safeguards individual freedom. “Pettit’s republic is designed to ensure that the government can reliably track the common interests of its citizens, who can then contest and review decisions through judicial, tribunal,

ombudsman-like, multi-cameral, and localized institutions.” (Laborde & Maynor, 2008, p. 10)

In his point of view, a government ought to disseminate power generally among its residents and forestall any centralisation of force that could prompt authoritarian tendencies. This necessitates different institutional components, such as sectoring capacity and abilities, and a functioning common society that considers people with great influence responsible. “Freedom as nondomination differs from freedom as noninterference in invoking the notion, not just of interference, but of interference on an arbitrary basis. An act is perpetrated on an arbitrary basis, we can say, if it is subject just to the arbitrium, the decision, or judgment, of the agent; the agent was in a position to choose it or not choose it, at their pleasure.” (Pettit, 2007, p. 392)

## 2.1 INTERCONNECTING PETTIT AND SARTRE

In the fathoming and reshaping of civil designs, Sartre challenged the idea of a foreordained human essence. Putting forward, instead, a supposition that people possess the ability to shape their own importance and reason in the midst of an explicit indifference of the world around them. The comparison which this following portion of the thesis undertakes, is to broaden the scope through a different taste of paradigmatic refashioning; juxtaposing Sartre's conviction with the fastidious spotlight on independence shone by republican ideals.

Contemporary political philosopher Philip Noel Pettit's writing places a strong emphasis on the role that political institutions play in determining individuals' freedom and fostering social justice. His main political views include theories surrounding the concepts and issues of republicanism and democracy. Philip Pettit hasn't written substantially about Jean-Paul Sartre, though he has brought him up on several instances in his books. In his book *The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics* Pettit pulls ideas from the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides and his notion that individuals are only ever truly free if they are not subject to preemptory rule or despotism. This view relates to a similar point made by Sartre; namely, his emphasis that freedom is non-domination, a concept which Pettit has also written about in his canon on republicanism. Sartre's idea of radical, individually-defined freedom asserts that people are, in every respect, free to design their own lives, as well as to choose their own ideals and beliefs. These ideas received particular attention from Pettit in his review of implementation in regards to Sartre's design. Despite recognising the significance and consequence of individual liberty, Pettit critiques Sartre's theory for failing to take into account the significant role that socio-political systems hold in terms of clearly establishing individual freedoms. Sartre implies that humans perceive a preexisting "world of being", which stems from the contents of their intentional consciousness. That through consciousness alone, a world already tailored to meet human concepts and requirements comes into fruition. (Pettit, 1968, p. 181)

“The result is that Sartre’s phenomenology is distorted. It becomes the description of a hypothetical process only vaguely similar to man’s intentional construction of his meaningful world” (Pettit, 1968, p. 181)

Pettit maintains that an individual’s freedom is dependent on the social and political institutions surrounding them, rather than the individual existing as an entirely free being within the socio-political vacuum. Two of his three main axioms of liberty include “alien” obtrusion of personal freedom; referring to the possibility, and the positionality of the “alien control” respectively.

(Pettit, 2008, p.104) He claims Sartre is led by a Parmenidean logic to freeze being. The described state of being and deducible sentiment imply, for the political sphere, the concept of oneness. The individual. The act of being cannot in any way be distinguished from any “otherness” because it is foreign to being itself. The two are one and homogeneous. (Pettit, 1968) In this argument, we can see the degree of the correspondence between the positions of Sartre and Parmenides. Like his precursor, Sartre characterises the act of being within confines concerning self-personality, and essentially its escalated syndication; Sartre sees it as immutable.

“But Sartre even goes farther and agrees with Parmenides to the extent of regarding being as one and homogeneous. ... He argues that there is no otherness within being, no sense in which one being and we must talk as if there were many—is not the same as another. This, of course, rules out both qualitative and numerical differentiation.” (Vincent, 1994, p. 56) He says that existence cannot be bound by its negation - not being. It is outright positive, with no alternative. The being is itself for as long as it prevails but simultaneously wears itself out through being. It is a highly solitary theory of existence.

According to Pettit, Sartre’s perspective fails to acknowledge the weight of social collaboration and solidarity. Pettit believes that such forms of strictly subjective understanding of freedom, such as Sartre’s, ignore social cohesion and unanimity - common archetypes required for an orderly and just society. “A central aspect of the positive program of communitarianism concerns the ways that communities should govern themselves, in particular the manner that collective deliberation operates and the grounds upon which it is justified. On the liberal view,

collective deliberation is necessary to establish and maintain legitimacy of the authority structure of the state.” (Pettit, 2002a, p. 142) Autonomy transcends the notion of each man for themselves. Self-governance warrants being influenced by a dominion that one either accepts or doesn't strongly oppose. (Pettit, 2002a, p. 146)

Ultimately, Pettit criticises Sartre's theories for ignoring the abutting conditions of the headway of society and mainstream ideology, as well as the noteworthiness of inter-human contact in the establishment of a just way of life. Albeit, he acknowledges the significance of Sartre's conceptualisations regarding freedom and human action. In *The Critique*, we can see an example of what Pettit was criticising:

“The basis of comprehension is complicity in principle with any undertaking, even if one then goes on to combat or condemn it. Any new end, once determined, is set against the organic unity of all human ends. In certain pathological states (e.g. 'de-personalisation') man appears as the representative of an alien species because he is no longer seen in his teleological reality, that is, because the link between the patient and his own ends is temporarily broken. To anyone who believes himself to be an angel, the activities of other people will seem absurd, because he tries to transcend the human undertaking by having nothing to do with it.” (Sartre, 1960/2004, p.101)

So, the associations made within the reasonable field on the globe are determining factors of a valid critique on the lack of a more genuine connection between everybody within the select society and the society itself. When formulated, the analysis needs to be characterised by the experience of the multitude of people who have been unified through - in this case - praxis, or on a larger scale, alienation within capitalist society. Furthermore, though he challenges the limits of a rationalistic field, Sartre remains bound together inside this field by the unification. A relation can be found here to the aforementioned criticism by Marcuse, which points out a similar discrepancy.

A link to Sartrean Marxism, or rather, communitarian properties in the theory, can be seen in Pettit's way to deal with the individual within this system. It converges with his thoughts on deliberative majority-ruled organisation. He accepts that singular office is most likely

inescapable in a majority rule society which utilises a vote-based system. The individual is urged to participate in proactive pondering on open presented issues. “In Pettit’s recent words, the people should be able to act as “editors” of policy in addition to the more traditional authorial role they play through their elected representatives” (Laborde & Maynor, 2008, p. 10) Partaking in the vote-based process, people can shape aggregate choices and impact public strategies, hence genuinely affecting their own daily routines and the existences of others. This implies that the major overlap between human opinion and emotion is creating the “being” which is doing the “acting” (as in the amounting to proactivity), in order for the system to function. Continuous practice provides an established framework: “...for the most part, the norms that govern our mode of thinking, communication, and self-expression function as unchosen structuring devices within which all these acts of reflection take place. Such norms are not simply options we can choose to ignore, nor are they ‘facts’ about the world that can be discovered, they are rules that constitute the thinking and acting (and self-conceptions) that make up our world” (Pettit, 2002a, p. 131, 132). In this extract, we see the clear disparity between Pettit’s points of reference for self-governing as opposed to Sartre’s unwavering support for self-sovereignty that was previously discussed. In comparison to Pettit’s clearly formulated ordinance for the scope of personal freedom, Sartre’s margins of reality seem more pensive and musingly dreamy in comparison.” Sartre stresses the philosophical significance of the relationship between imagination and freedom, which are both necessarily involved in our relationship to the world.” (Reynolds & Renaudie, 2022, para. 3)

In his later existentialist philosophy, Jean-Paul Sartre relieved emotional absolutes and implied each person can or should tailor one’s obligations of accountability based on their individual perception of the concern. “If this were the case, there would be no things outside of our experience. ... He was, nevertheless, of the opinion that people ought to be allowed to make their own decisions and be held accountable for the outcomes of those decisions. This is interwoven with the realities of their existence as a sentient being containing multitudes of emotional ranges..” (Gusman, 2022)



The interactions that humans have with sources of their morality (and therefore existence) are nuanced; facts of their conditions - and proposed sources of the aforementioned - have been, and still remain, miscellaneous in opinion. In Philip Pettit's 1968 paper *Parmenides and Sartre*, he writes:

“For Sartre, as for Parmenides, being is the very essence of things and excludes any pre-ontological identity such as that of being a chair or a tree. Starting, as Parmenides does, from this self-identical and at least intensively exclusive being, Sartre draws much of the same implications... He does not talk of the impossibility of being ever beginning or ending. He prefers to lay stress on the raw inevitable quality of being; ... Being simply is, without reason, and that is the end of the matter... For Sartre being is absurd or superfluous—it is simply there—and in his mind, this is the way to say that it is absolute, without conditions, eternal.” (Pettit, 1968, p. 171)

The direct collation of political-philosophical points of view of Jean-Paul Sartre and Philip Pettit has added profundity on top the already ascertained details of individual and cultural composition. While Sartre accentuates revolutionary, separately extensive opportunity alongside his existentialist schematics, Pettit underlines the importance of social and political coordination when constructing a system for individual opportunity. From the standing position of Pettit's evaluate, Sartre's stipulations present as fairly optimistic, neglecting to remain operational in the full extent of socially coordinated effort. Pettit's accentuation on non-domination and the diversification of tasks in political structures details the need of defending individual opportunity inside a more commodious social setting.

On one hand, Sartre's existential humanist way of thinking is hospitable to reflection regarding the individual's shaping of their own fate, while Pettit's republicanism highlights the significance of norm-oriented expectation management based on social alignment. It clearly illustrates the unconventional but hyper-individualistic configuration of one's lifestyle, versus a lifestyle which comes pre-configured within convention, urging you to continue in the steps of orthodoxy (palpably some elbow room). Through basic undertaking with different frames of

reference, one gains a better fine-tune to the outset of an original hypothesis of free will, equity, and views on administrative bodies.

The perils of unchecked power and the potential limiting effect it could inflict on an individual's liberty are highlighted by Pettit's theory of non-domination. In contrast to Sartre's existential humanism, Pettit's focus on such principality in the structuring of social justice systems gives a complementary perspective. This discourse on the complexities of individual agency within societal frameworks bridge the political-philosophical perspectives of Jean-Paul Sartre and Philip Pettit.

## 2.2 PETTIT ON MARXISM

Among his writings, like his 2001 book *A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency*, Philip Pettit most notably contends that Marx's views on how social and economic systems interact are still relevant today, but his predictions about the eventual capitalistic collapse have not come to pass in modern democratic society. "The dialectic that Pettit employs in support of this conception of freedom is directed principally in opposition to the conventional liberal understanding of freedom as non-interference. ... Pettit observes, however, that the mere absence of actual interference is not sufficient to secure an attractive form of freedom. That is because the absence of actual interference is compatible with the capacity to interfere arbitrarily, and the capacity to interfere arbitrarily can, in certain domains, create forms of abject vulnerability" (Fuerstein, 2015, p. 13). According to Pettit's perspective, freedom is inextricably linked to individual responsibility. A person can be considered as free when they are not subject to arbitrary power, while simultaneously maintaining responsibilities to one-another and the system at large. "Our very conception of what it is to be free makes a linkage between being free and being responsible. Someone who did not see why that connection had to obtain would fail to understand what freedom was or what holding someone responsible was." (Pettit, 2001, p. 18) This differs Marxist viewpoints, which place a greater emphasis on administrative structures and the strength of collective action, than on personal agency. Marxism frequently criticises concepts relating to individual accountability as being restrictive or beguiled by a classist economic conditioning.

Moreover, Pettit questions the perception of historical determinism, which holds that progress is inevitable and that history's trajectory is predetermined. In a 1982 paper focusing on Jürgen Habermas' Neo-Marxist analytical ideas, Pettit says that "[the] model mooted by Habermas is better characterized as an artistic one, for it suggests that at least some of the needs which a just society should fulfil appear under the right conditions, as if out of nowhere: that like the need that one finds satisfied in a novel form of art, they are undetectable in advance of their appropriate objects. If we think that many significant human needs are of this kind, then we may expect people under ideal conditions (of communication) to develop interests of which we can have no inkling,

interests that are without precedents or parallels. All of which, doesn't bode well for Habermas' theory of justice. Pettit regards it as "conceived for the purpose of grounding social criticism, involves him willy-nilly in countenancing the enterprise of political philosophy, and it means therefore that he must modify the Marxist theory of ideology which would deny the validity of that pursuit." (Pettit, 1982, p. 227, 228) In addition to this, Pettit contends that Marxism undervalues the significance of cultural and political elements by emphasising economic issues as the main driver of social interactions. He asserts that a more thorough view of society would take into consideration the intricate interactions between political, cultural, and economic variables. (Pettit, 1997, p. 236) Ultimately, Pettit's opinions on Marxism are critical but nuanced, and he acknowledges that his ideas are still vital to modern social and political philosophy.

Pettit has stated, on the topic of private economic power and functioning, that a "market-friendly" organisational model is substantially far from being detrimental to republican individualistic opportunity, as the market can lessen reliance and control when promoting equanimity in the freeman to patron dynamic. He provides the explanation that no one would be dependent on any one master in a supposed fruitful labour market, and consequently no one would be subject to the clutches of an overseer controlling their requisites. This view is substantially moderate in collation with communist ideology, considering it does give assurance that a less competitive, less individualistic scenario could be an option for socio-economic structuring. Following the line of reasoning for republicanism discussed in the section above, in a case of arbitrary obstruction the individual in question could, and should, be able to go forward toward a different enterprise which comply with the progressive procedure and use their power appropriately. (O'Shea, 2020, p. 5)

### 3. NOAM CHOMSKY'S POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Noam Chomsky is a contemporary academic widely eminent for his work in the field of linguistics. However, he has also made a substantive imprint in political literary theory. Firmly established in numerous leftist beliefs, Chomsky advocates for democracy and inveighs against state and corporate power. His engagement with Marxism extends insights into the dynamics of authority, the structuring of capitalism, and ideas about societal reform. Chomsky proposes that regardless of the normative standpoint or ideology which political theorists may hurry to defend, whether it is the preservation the status quo or an endeavour for reform, we are inescapably met with a rudimentary preconceived notion of the nature of actuality and humankind itself. (Edgley, 2000, p. 24) Chomsky contests that normativeness innately rests upon defined elucidation of supposed facts in the matter of human disposition. Unlike the Marxist outlook, which sought to capsize cause and effect through an analysis of socio-economic factors, then remedying them through the socialist ideology, Chomsky turns the focus towards the basal presumptions that occur in established regulatory claims. According to him, understanding the essence of human nature provides a pivotal insight into the formation of guiding normative ideals and their correspondence to factual truths within socio-political discourse. (Edgley, 2000, p. 25)

In his book *Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the post-9/11 world* (2005), Chomsky states that social security is rooted in a formula that is, upon more profound examination, deeply subversive in nature. Despite the fact that the community benefits from this safety net collectively, it remains a contentious topic. Chomsky is more specifically talking about American society, with the notion that the representative Western frame of mind has an indubitable influence throughout most developed countries in the world. Similarly, this is the case for less developed countries aiming to progress. He professes that, in the modern arrangement of capitalist society and its burgeoning, the appreciation of more general societal support has become "something that has to be driven out of people's heads: the principle that you care about other people. Social Security is based on the assumption that we care about each other, that we have a communal responsibility to take care of people who can't take care of themselves, whether they're children or the elderly. ...

There is huge pressure to turn people into pathological monsters who care only about themselves, who don't have anything to do with anyone else, and who therefore can be very easily ruled and controlled. That's what lies behind the attack on Social Security.” (Chomsky, 2005, p. 145, 146)

The “attack” he recounts in this statement references individualist culture and norms cultivated by governments in line with conventional Western leadership. “In short, the world that the U.S. has sought “to create in its image” through international institutions is one based on the principle of the rule of force.” (Chomsky, 1997, p. 21)

While Chomsky's theory rejects economically deterministic views regarding polity, it does acknowledge that structural advantages exist and are constantly changing thanks to state manipulations of the national political economy. To put it another way, his theory acknowledges that the direction and momentum of the economy's metabolism cannot be sustained on its own and require constant regulation. This view clearly distinguishes Chomsky from the “capital-logic” creed of Marxist thinkers. (Edgley, 2000, p. 120)

When analysing social peculiarities, it is normal to consider presuppositions suggesting specific fundamental components that will give a causal clarification of noticed examples of consistencies in those peculiarities. “The point is that Chomsky's work has an intended atheoretical quality to it. ... He wants to stop us from standing back from the picture so that we take in only its form and structure which allows us to remove our feelings about its content, precisely because we ignore the detail. In Chomsky's view, if we do stand back and consider only the structure, we end up with arcane discussion and debate.” (Edgely, 2000, p. 4)

Chomsky's scrutinisation of cultural customs and designs reverberates with Sartrean existentialism in more than one way. His selection of accounts depicting later stage capitalist standards (enforced by government and corporate powers) substantiates the need for a heightened consciousness of one's actions inside cultural structures and administration. Much like Sartre, Chomsky highlights the significance of perceiving these basic suppositions, and coupling power elements, in determining political discourse and civil establishments. By encouraging individuals to recognise and oppose stringent designs, both Chomsky and Sartre advocate for a more genuine

and less encumbered type of worldly presence. Besides, Chomsky's commitment with communism lines up with select parts of Sartre's political outlooks, especially in their common evaluation of capitalist double-dealing, and the quest for individual rights. (Chomsky & Waterstone, 2021 p. 20)

He foregrounds the centrality of individual agency and the indispensable importance of confronting domineering systems, advocating for a society where individuals exercise independence and responsibility, with an idealistic subtlety of notwithstanding formalities or certitudes with capitalist roots which detail against his idea of an ultimate form of liberty.

“There are things practically everybody can do, and if you are from a privileged sector of the population, then there are even more opportunities. You can speak, you can write, you can organize, you can reach out to other people. If you keep doing it, it can have an impact”  
(Chomsky, 2012, p. 99)

While Chomsky's viewpoint unwontedly veers from common communist economic determinism, he identifies its principal benefits arising in enterprise-driven social conditioning. Chomsky's evaluation gives prominence to the need for consistent management of potentially unrestrained impetuses of interference. Chomsky comments against the mingling of interests exclusively held by repressive institutions, much like Pettit's notion of non-domination.  
(Chomsky & Waterstone, 2021 p. 21)

Drawing from a liberal conceptual practice, Chomsky's perspectives resonate with significant subject matters found in Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist convictions, as well as in Philip Pettit's republican proposition of freedom. Chomsky's critique of systemic hegemonic authority and his call for social security echo Pettit's concerns about domination and the need to stimulate a political climate where the individual is not submitted to arbitrary interference.

## CONCLUSION

When a philosopher takes a stance on so many of the major socio-political proceedings of their time, and in such a taut yet extensive manner as Jean Paul Sartre, it is almost predestined that they will be regarded as a contentious (or at the very least an ambivalent) figure; both in their lifetime, and when speaking of them retroactively. Be that as it may, the examination of the relevance of Sartre's lectures and writings explored in this thesis demonstrates not only the influence, but also the durability and soundness of Sartrean philosophy in the modern political landscape. The analysis conducted in this thesis has bridged the political-philosophical terrain related to, and beyond Sartre's ideas and postulations. Philip Pettit and Noam Chomsky both provide captivating outlooks on the apparatus of justice, and their respective ideas on the calibre which contours social policy are both pivotal and pertinent to the modern-day discussion of the prior.

The philosophers' ideologies all respectively exhibit nuanced interactions with the ideas of Karl Marx, whose communist critique of capitalism and support for welfarism have considerably changed the configuration of the academic and socio-political landscape. Marx's evaluation of class struggle, alienation, and autocratic regimes can be directly interrelated to both Jean-Paul Sartre's and Noam Chomsky's theories. When discussing notions of political responsibility - both of the individual and the government - it is crucial to recognise the importance of Karl Marx's scrutinisation of private enterprise. Sartre's existentialist humanism consolidates Marx's concerns on social division and materialism, underscoring individual agency and the desire for deliverance. Noam Chomsky's revolutionary anarchism, falls directly in line with libertarian socialism, reverberating Marx's disparagement of imperialist domination, expanding it into a contemporary critique of venture capitalism.

The republican theory of Philip Pettit does share similar concerns with Marxist principles in its respect for collective self-governance and critique of domineering governing practices. However, in his postulations, Pettit prioritises democratic institutions and political participation as a replacement to Marx's insurgent grand design. The (dis)similitude in the comparison of aspects of both theories creates an amusing back and forth; uncovering how republican values can tally up to Marxist thinking, as well as providing valid criticism in tandem.



The purposeful choice of the three thinkers was made with the intention of presenting a range and relatedness spanning between both republican and leftist ideologies to accurately represent individually-oriented and systematic political organisation; with each individual philosopher contributing notable perspectives on free reign and governance. The groundwork which the existentialist philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre provides is still very much apposite to this comparative analysis, because it provides a fundamental framework for comprehending how an individual's status in society interrelates with the larger societal structures. The deconstructive nature of existentialism offers a more profound inquiry into individual freedom and responsibility. In the face of existential absurdity, the existentialist philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre places an emphasis on individual accountability in the quest for freedom. Essentially, Sartre's line of thinking directs us to deliberate self-rule and the absurdity of existence as an instrument in the engagement of individuals within the system; shaping significant recommendations about one's awareness and sense of freedom. This way of thinking advocates for a systematic arrangement that focuses on the individuals' independence and the refusal of oppressive societal designs. The republican theory of Philip Pettit also criticises potential overbearing policy by weighing on the concept of freedom as non-domination: the protection of individuals from arbitrary interference or insistence from the state or other individuals.

By viewing the contradistinction between individual and systemically beneficial policy, policymakers can use the overlapping frame of mind to their advantage. When arranging establishments and laws, making certain that political partaking remains impartial, thus averting an unjust concentration of power. On a note akin to that of Pettit, Noam Chomsky scrutinises domineering structures, unfair pooling of power, while also touching on how mass mediums must be checked, in order to cultivate essential sets of tactics addressing foundational disparities in the advancement of civil rights. Chomsky's ideas are important, because they address and challenge the pitfalls of the capitalist system and encourage accountability and civility.

Individual autonomy is spotlighted in the context of societal contexts by Sartre's existentialism, a conceptualisation which interlinks with that of freedom as non-domination, spotlighted by Pettit's

republican principles. Chomsky's accounts provide necessary present-day perspectives on equity and governance. By probing the compromises between notions of freedom, justice, and power, Sartre, Pettit, and Chomsky all collectively cast light on the twists and turns of modern socio-political discourse. The feature of Chomsky's political ideology adds depth to the discussion, as the thesis navigates the undercurrents of Marxist thought, the successive trajectory of existentialist humanism, and the intellectual enmities of the two throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century; expounding on an element of utmost importance - establishing the interpretations necessitating a citizen's free will. The evocation of existentialist humanism expands on the importance of justice as an administrative virtue. Broached scrutiny of late-stage capitalism discerns modernist political discourse and a search for more meaningful conduct. The common ground connecting their reasonings maintains an estimable prerogative reporting the behaviour of authority. Their, at times convergent, but nonetheless cogent views on how to redress negligent jurisdiction show the reader a prognosis of the relentless political climate; all-the-while providing us with a wider context behind the venture for a meaning.

Conclusively, successful policy is that which embarks to apprehend the entanglement of societal organisation and simultaneously safeguards individual freedom. Justice as a virtue must be placed high in the pecking order of requirements, especially in the context of inclusive policy planning. Pettit shows us that a congruence between liberty and non-domination must be struck, in order to warrant fair engagement and prevent malpractice in society. This thesis 'main research question asked what a proper framing of free will in a liberal society encompasses. Starting from Sartre's existentialist humanism, the datum provided navigates where the balance between autonomous self-rule and systemic order lies. As a result, the work accentuates that mindful involvement is required to pursue just policy and individual freedom. It prompts us to re-examine criterion of what is considered just, in a greater pursuit of an advanced and emancipated social order. It provides the reader with a chance to think about how individuals 'freedom ought to be balanced with the welfare of the community, paving the way for a progressively innovative approach to the equitable administration of polity.

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