

The developments of Artificial Intelligence (AI) challenge the distribution of various social goods e.g. privacy, equality (of opportunity), interpersonal relationships, and the balance of power among different actors in unprecedented ways. Since the prevalence of some of their goods is among the very assumptions of various theories of justice, this thesis aims to reexamine the conceptual framework of J. Rawls' theory of *Justice as Fairness* and M. Walzer's *Justice as Complex Equality* to answer the question of whether they are conceptually equipped to be applied in the light of the developments of AI.

Using methods of analytical political philosophy this thesis identifies various social goods whose just distribution is challenged by the developments of AI. Building on those findings, the limitations of J. Rawls' and M. Walzer's theories of justice to address those challenges are uncovered by adhering to their own respective methodologies. The argument is that AI is challenging both theories in their very assumptions in a way that to protect one fundamental social good another one would have to be given up on, hence both theories' conceptual frameworks are insufficient to accommodate the challenges AI poses to them. Therefore, it concludes that in light of the developments of AI, new theories of justice must be developed