CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

Master's Thesis

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Constructing Carthage as a Threat: A Securitization Approach to the Causes of the Third Punic War

Master's Thesis

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Year of the defence: 2024

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 31/07/2024 Juliette Anne Gisèle Begouen Demeaux

References

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Abstract

This thesis examines the causes of the Third Punic War (149 -146 BCE) through the lens of securitization theory, focusing on Cato the Elder's influential rhetoric in convincing the Roman Senate to destroy Carthage. This study is motivated by the absence of work in the literature that explains the specific process by which the Roman Senate was convinced to pursue a policy of total destruction against its century-long neighbor, an action that was considered as out of the ordinary. First presenting the historical, geopolitical, and internal dynamics in the Western Mediterranean around the second century BCE, this research then delves into the discourses of Cato the Elder, an influential Roman senator. This actor retrieved speeches are analyzed through discourse analysis and the securitization framework. The thesis demonstrates how his discourse conformed to key elements of securitization theory, portraying Carthage as an existential threat and thereby justifying urgent and extraordinary measures. By considering elements of both the linguistic and sociological approach to securitization, the study shows that Cato's securitization move was successful, not only thanks to his discourse but also due to a facilitating environment, his perceived authority, and a resonance with the audience's psycho-cultural disposition and historical consciousness. The thesis bridges security studies and ancient history by applying a modern theoretical framework to ancient events. It provides a new perspective on the Third Punic War's causes and demonstrates the securitization theory's relevance beyond its conventional modern applications.

Keywords

Securitization, Discourse Analysis, Punic Wars, Cato the Elder, Rome, Carthage, Existential threat, Speech Act

Abstrakt

Tato práce zkoumá příčiny třetí punské války (149-146 př. n. l.) optikou teorie sekuritizace a zaměřuje se na vlivnou rétoriku Katona Staršího, který přesvědčil římský senát, aby zničil Kartágo. Tato studie je motivována absencí práce v literatuře, která by vysvětlovala konkrétní proces, jímž byl římský senát přesvědčen k politice totálního zničení svého staletého souseda, což bylo považováno za neobvyklou akci. Tento výzkum nejprve představuje historickou, geopolitickou a vnitřní dynamiku v západním Středomoří kolem 2. století př. n. l. a poté se noří do diskurzu vlivného římského senátora Katona Staršího. Projevy tohoto aktéra jsou analyzovány pomocí analýzy diskurzu a sekuritizačního rámce. Práce ukazuje, jak jeho diskurz odpovídal klíčovým prvkům teorie sekuritizace, když zobrazoval Kartágo jako existenční hrozbu, a tím ospravedlňoval naléhavá a mimořádná opatření. Na základě zohlednění prvků lingvistického i sociologického přístupu k sekuritizaci studie ukazuje, že Katonův sekuritizační tah byl úspěšný nejen díky jeho diskurzu, ale také díky příznivému prostředí, jeho vnímané autoritě a souznění s psychokulturním nastavením publika a historickým vědomím. Práce propojuje bezpečnostní studia a starověké dějiny tím, že aplikuje moderní teoretický rámec na starověké události. Poskytuje nový pohled na příčiny třetí punské války a ukazuje význam teorie sekuritizace nad rámec jejích běžných moderních aplikací.

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Chapter 1 : Introduction

In 146 BCE (Before Common Era), Polybius, a Greek statesman turned political theorist and one of Rome's most influential historians, watched the city of Carthage burn after being razed, all its inhabitants killed or enslaved (De Jaeghere, 2021). Carthage was an ancient great city localized near actual Tunis, head of a mercantile empire stretching across the Mediterranean, and home to the Phoenician civilization. Between 264 and 146 BCE, the Punic city clashed with Rome in three wars, named the Punic Wars, in what is considered by some to be the largest conflict of the ancient world (Goldsworthy, 2007). The Third Punic War, fought between 149 and 146 BCE, was not a war per se but a brutal siege of the Punic capital, which ended with the complete destruction of Carthage and the annihilation of its civilization (Kiernan, 2003).

The main interest of this thesis concerns the dynamics leading to the Third Punic War. As for many conflicts, the causes of the Third Punic War are complex and debated in the literature. The existing scholarship has presented many reasons, such as economic motives, alleged treaty violations, Roman expansionism, and imperialism, as well as psychological factors related to Carthage's recovery and the Roman fear of its resurgence (Miles, 2010; Baronowski, 1995; Le Bohec, 2011). The psychological factor often refers to the role of Cato the Elder, a Roman senator who attempted to convince the Roman Senate of the existential threat posed by Carthage. However, while these explanations offer interesting insights, they fail to present the specific process by which the Roman Senate was convinced to pursue a policy of total destruction, an action that, by many accounts, exceeded the Roman norms of conflict resolution. It is in addressing this gap that securitization theory comes into play.

The securitization theory, developed as part of the Critical Security Studies at the end of the 20th century, offers a framework for understanding how issues are transformed into security matters, justifying extraordinary measures. This approach shines light on the construction of threats by actors in power and has been primarily applied to contemporary issues (Buzan et al., 1998). This thesis aims to demonstrate the applicability of the securitization theory to ancient history, specifically, the events preceding the Third Punic War, by focusing on Cato the Elder's discourse.

This thesis will focus on two research questions:

1. How does the application of securitization theory contribute to our understanding of Cato the Elder's discourse and its impact on the outbreak of the Third Punic War?
2. What means did Cato the Elder employ to portray Carthage as an existential threat and convince the Roman Senate of the necessity to destroy the Punic civilization?

Methodologically, this study adopts a qualitative case study approach, following the principal research strategy in the securitization literature (Balzacq, 2011). This research will, therefore, focus on the outbreak of the Third Punic War and Carthage's subsequent destruction. Concerning the data, this case happened more than 2000 years ago, which limits the possibility of data collection. Empirical data will be drawn from primary historical sources such as Polybius and Cato, and secondary sources will be used to address gaps and potential biases in ancient texts. The thesis will employ discourse analysis, a method favored by securitization scholars (Mikelis, 2020, p.45). It will examine fragments of Cato's speeches and actions while applying key elements of securitization as outlined by the main theorists.

Through a detailed analysis of the historical context, Cato's speeches, and their reception in Rome, this thesis aims to demonstrate how the securitization of Carthage's existence shifted the Roman Senate perception. This shift ultimately led to the adoption of an extreme policy – the complete annihilation of a civilization – that might otherwise have been considered disproportionate or unnecessary. The securitization process will thus be viewed as a primary catalyst for Rome's decision to initiate the Third Punic War.

Furthermore, this research will also demonstrate the potential for applying modern theoretical frameworks to historical events. By building a bridge between ancient history and contemporary security studies, this thesis aims to open new avenues for interdisciplinary research and enrich our understanding of how security threats are constructed and acted upon across different historical contexts.

In fine, this thesis seeks to provide a new perspective on the causes of the Third Punic War by applying securitization theory to Cato the Elder's influential rhetoric. Through this analysis, the research aims to offer a deeper understanding of the power of political discourse in shaping threat perceptions and justifying extreme actions in both ancient and modern contexts. The results will contribute to both ancient history and security studies, offering a new framework for understanding historical events and demonstrating the applicability of modern theories to ancient contexts.

Chapter 2 : Literature Review

This chapter offers an overview of the existing literature relevant to this thesis. As presented in the introduction, this research aims to apply the securitization theory to

explain the events leading to the Third Punic War. Until now, no academic work has attempted to address this subject, creating a gap in the literature. As no study uniting securitization and the Third Punic War can be found, the literature review must address those two elements in distinct sections. The first section presents the securitization theory, its development, and the debates surrounding it. The second section will look into the historical aspect and how the period between the end of the Second Punic War in 201 BCE and the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE is treated in the literature.

2.1 The securitization theory and its development

The theory of securitization is central to this research. First developed by Ole Weaver in papers published in 1995 (*Securitization and Desecuritization*) and 1997 (*Concepts of Security*), the securitization theory became widespread in 1998 with the publication of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* by Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde. These scholars were based at the Copenhagen Conflict and Peace Research Institute and, therefore, are commonly designated as the Copenhagen School. They focused on applying the linguistic turn in philosophy and social theory to security studies (Huysman, 2011, p. 371). Mixing political realism and constructivism, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde defined securitization as "when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is "normal politics" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). For the Copenhagen School, securitization is not to be confused with politicization. Politicization means the issue presented is made to be a matter of public policy, whereas securitization has the issue presented as an existential threat to those concerned. Securitization becomes a more extreme version of politicization, where actions are justified outside what is typically done (Buzan et al., 1998, p.23).

Furthermore, securitization is not a process based on objective reality; for the Copenhagen School, it: "has to be understood as an essentially intersubjective process" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.30). Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka insist on that fact and argue that the issues that are securitized are not always actual and objective circumstances but are more "the result of leaders' efforts to understand and shape the world" (2016, p. 495). The securitization can, therefore, reflect a legitimate feeling of threat, the ruling elite's wish to strengthen their international and domestic legitimacy, or, in some cases, both (Buzan et al., 1998, p.30).

The Copenhagen School gives a central place to language theory. As Ole Weaver put it, "I discuss security as a speech act" (Wæver, 1995, p.46). The speech act concept focuses on vocalization: "It is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26). While an utterance is crucial for securitization, the expression of the word "security" is not mandatory for those scholars. Therefore, the critical element is "a specific rhetorical structure," which corresponds to the expression of an existential threat that calls for immediate action out of the spectrum of normal politics and needs to be accepted by a significant audience (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26). The Copenhagen School scholars see this rhetorical structure as part of three "facilitating conditions", meaning conditions that determine the success or failure of the speech act. The other two conditions named by the first wave scholars are external. First, the securitizing actor needs to be in a position of perceived authority and, secondly, the alleged threat, who plays a significant role in the securitization move, needs to be held to be threatening by the audience (Buzan et al., 1998, p.33)

For Buzan, De Wilde, and Weaver, the illocutionary act is central to securitization. Other scholars have criticized this vision, considering it too limited. Those critics of the original securitization approach (the linguistic approach) are part of what we call the second wave of the theory, the sociological approach (Carrapico, 2014, p.602). The sociological approach scholars see plenty of problematic elements in the linguistic approach.

For Salter (2011, p.117), the limitation comes from linguistic rules constraining the speech act. He defends that the relationship between the audience and the speaker is much more complex than it appears in the first formulation of the theory, and securitization should be seen as a sociological and political process more than a linguistic one. He indeed argues that it is characterized by: "a complex effect of power, interest, inter-subjectivity, bureaucratic position, and process" (Salter, 2011, p.117).

Balzacq also sees the Copenhagen School enunciation of securitization as too limited because it does not account enough for the context and the audience. For him, the context shapes the interactions between the securitizing actor and the audience, not the other way around. Balzacq argues that the success of securitization depends on how well the audience perceives the surrounding environment (2015, p.182).

For Huysmans (2011, p.2), the securitization process is not built by the speech act but rather by the aggregation of "little security nothing" giving more importance to the broader societal and cultural context. Huysmans, therefore, disagrees with the exceptionalist rupture that is embedded in the speech act of security.

While some points of those critics are valid, this essay will not enter the academic debate on the limited formulation of the securitization theory by Buzan et al. Our case study gives a central importance to discourse and the vocalization of a threat and therefore this research will first follow the linguistic approach to the theory. Indeed, the discourses of

Cato the Elder in the Roman Senate, exemplified through his declaration *Carthago delenda est*, will be studied through the lens of the speech act. Nonetheless, important non-discursive elements given by authors of the second wave will be considered. Notably, the configuration of circumstances from Balzacq (2005, p.172), which encompasses the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power dynamics between the securitizing actor and the audience, will be considered in order to offer a more complete comprehension of Cato's securitizing move.

Since its inception, the theory of securitization has been mostly applied to modern phenomena such as terrorism and climate change (Buzan et al., 1998). Therefore, there is little literature where authors combine the study of a historical case with securitization, but it can be found. An example of it is *securitization, history, and identity: some conceptual clarifications and examples from politics of Finnish war history* (Jutila, 2018). This article by Matti Jutila presents two important points. First, it serves as a great example of how researchers can apply the theory of securitization to historical cases. Second, the author shows that political actors can use history to take an issue out of "normal politics", therefore showing how history can be used as a facilitating condition for securitization. This reflection by Jutila adds an interesting dimension to Buzan et al.'s work on securitization, which will be incorporated into this research.

2.2. Historical and academic reflection of the Third Punic War

Understanding the main actors, events, and geopolitical dynamics of the period between the end of the Second Punic War in 201 BCE and the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE is essential for our study of securitization. This section aims to offer a literature review of

both ancient and modern sources on that period, focused on what the field has established about ancient Rome and Carthage.

2.2.1 The Ancient Sources

Ancient sources on the Punic Wars can be divided into primary and secondary sources. The ravages of time have only left us with Polybius as a primary source for our period of interest (Hoyos, 2011, p.2). All the other ancient sources that reported on that period are secondary, therefore suffering temporal discrepancies and limiting their reliability. Furthermore, we do not possess any Carthaginian source; surviving records almost exclusively originate from Greek and Roman authors. This absence creates a bias favoring Roman viewpoints, even if sometimes we find sources supporting the Carthaginian side (Hoyos, 2011, p.1).

As mentioned, Polybius is our only direct witness. This Greek statesman, born around 200 BCE in Megalopolis, was taken as a hostage by Rome and spent 16 years in Italy (Champion, 2011, pp.95-96). Twists of fate put him in the path of Scipio Aemilianus, a rising Roman politician, and the two became close friends. Together, they sailed to North Africa, and Scipio, leading the Roman legions, destroyed Carthage. Polybius was, therefore, present during the Third Punic War and saw the Punic metropolis burn in front of his eyes. During his time in Italy, Polybius wrote his *Histories*, a series of 40 books in which the wars between Carthage and Rome take center stage. This monumental work starts with the first Punic War and closes with the year Rome destroyed Carthage (Champion, 2011, p.95). Regrettably, we only possess the first five books and fragments of others, but even those limited texts give us valuable information. Particularly pertinent to our research are the recovered fragments of book 6 and 36. In book 6, Polybius presents and analyzes Roman politics at his time and offers us a comparison of the Roman and Carthaginian constitutions. In book 36, Polybius focuses on the events of the Third Punic

War and offers primordial information on the interactions between Rome and Carthage, the causes of the war, including the creation of its pretext, and the destruction of the Punic city (Polybius, n.d). In terms of trustworthiness, the Greek historian is considered one of the most reliable in Ancient History and one of the best sources for the Punic Wars (Champion, 2011, p.102; Nicholson, 2023, p.1). Indeed, the rigor with which he collected his information (eyewitness, oral interviews of witnesses when he was not present, consultation of the archives of the Roman state) makes him extremely valuable (Champion, 2011, p.102).

A problem that modern historians face is the loss of a big part of Polybius's work. Thankfully, Appian of Alexandria, a Greek historian living during the second century, wrote *Punic Wars* and based an important part of his account of the Third Punic War on Polybius' lost account (Astin, 1967, p.5). Appian accounts help us complete our ancient sources. However, a significant weakness of this ancient author is his tendency to invent speeches to complement the historical narrative (Hoyos, 2011, p.2).

Another crucial ancient source is Livy. Titus Livius (Livy), a Roman historian of the 1st century BCE, left a monumental study of Roman history and used Polybius as one of his primary sources for the part concerning the Third Punic War (Hoyos, 2014, p.369). Livy's account of the Third Punic War was regretfully lost to time (Mineo, 2011, p. 123). However, Florus, from the 2nd century, wrote down the epitomes (summaries) of Livy's work, and those have been recovered. The epitome XLIX, in particular, gives us important insights for our research. In this summary, Livy, through Florus, gives us valuable information about Carthage's economy between the Second and Third Punic Wars and, even more importantly, presents the debate between Scipio Nasica and Cato the Elder in

the Senate (Florus, n.d). The loss of critical ancient accounts like those of Polybius and Livy creates a limitation in our study, and their fragmentation is challenging.

Plutarch, who lived between 50 and 120 CE, is the last of our essential ancient sources. This Greek is known as the author of *Parallel Lives*, also called *Lives of Illustrious Men* or simply *Plutarch's Lives*, a series of biographies of prominent Greek and Roman figures (Mineo,2011, p. 124). In this fascinating series, Plutarch delves into the intricate relationship between character and political action. The *Life of Cato the Elder* is of particular interest to this thesis, as it provides information about Cato's actions, discourses, and opinions from his birth to his death in 149 BCE. The embassy of Cato the Elder to Carthage is recounted in this book, as well as his return to Rome and his commitment to the Punic city's destruction.

Concerning Plutarch's reliability, the main criticism that he faces is the lack of transparency with the sources he uses. This biographer refers to Polybius and Livy but also to other writers such as Cornelius Nepos, Valerius Maximus, and even Augustus but only mentions those sources rarely (Mineo, 2011, pp.24-25). It appears that Plutarch used several authors and documents to write about each period, but some mistakes were found in his account, especially in the numbers. His detractors also mention his overuse of anecdotes, which are sometimes unreliable (Morrow, 2004, para.7). However, we possess almost the entirety of his biography of Cato the Elder, which makes this author extremely valuable.

2.2.2. The Modern Sources

Ancient historians are not the only ones who contributed to the literature of that period; recent historians are also extremely valuable sources, both in informing us about historical dynamics and in bringing us debates.

Regarding sources on the Roman system and the audience, Marianne Bonnefond-Coudry is an indispensable author. In *Le Sénat de la république romaine, de la guerre d'Hannibal à Auguste* (1989)*,* she brings us a study of the roman republic senate, from the Second Punic war until Augustus period. In this crucial book, she discusses the Senate's functioning, role, and the course of meetings and decision-making processes based on various ancient sources. The author also included a calendar of the Senate sessions involving the peace ambassadors from Carthage and the detailed discussion that took place at each meeting.
Roman politics are also discussed in the 21st chapter of *A Companion to the Punic Wars*, following the chapter on Punic politics, economy, and alliances (Hoyos, 2011, p.376). This book, edited by Dexter Hoyos, offers not only a study of both the Roman and Punic political systems at that time but also an analysis of the relevance of the historical sources, the relationship with Numidia, which will play a pivotal role in the events of the Third Punic War and a detailed account of the siege and destruction of Carthage. Combined with Adrian Goldsworthy's *The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146 BCE* (2007) and Richard Miles's *Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization* (2010), Hoyos's study will give us an essential overview of all aspects about our period of interest.

Regarding the literature on Cato the Elder, who occupies an important role in this thesis, A.E Astin reveals himself to be an important contributor. He studies the critical figure in two books, *Scipio Aemilianus* (1967) and in more detail in *Cato the Censor*, published in 1978. This study of Cato's life, discourse, and achievements is based directly on ancient accounts, mainly from Plutarch, Pliny, Appian, Diodorus of Sicily, and Florus. For Briscoe, Astin's book is the best representation of the "complex personality of Cato and the complex problems associated with him" (Briscoe, 1980, p.91).

Other authors, such as Dexter Hoyos (1987), went even more technical and critical in their studies of Cato. In an article titled *Cato's Punic perfidies*, Hoyos evaluates Cato's discourses in front of the Senate, specifically those in which the orator argues that Carthage has breached treaties with Rome and, therefore, war should be wedged. By comparing the information given by Cato in his discourses and the historical facts, Hoyos brings an exciting perspective on how Cato's propaganda was built. The Roman orator's renowned expression *Carthago delenda est*, a crucial element of our study on the speech act, is mentioned in many of the sources referenced earlier. However, the debates surrounding the utterance are not always discussed. Samuel Chabert, in *Le delenda carthago et ses origines (1913)*, brings more precision to the scholarship, studying the specific origins of this declaration. This source, while old compared to the other modern authors, summarizes well all the ancient authors' positions and interpretations.

Finally, the causes of the Third Punic War and the subsequent destruction of Carthage have fuelled many debates in modern literature.

The first group of scholars is composed of authors who followed the accounts of ancient historians to explain why Rome decided to destroy Carthage. In *Polybius on the causes of the Third Punic War*, Baronowski focuses on the historical accounts, primarily what is found in the remaining narratives of the Greek historian (1995). Baronowski also uses other ancient historians, such as Appian and Plutarch, to relate the narrative given by Polybius on the causes of the war. He mainly focused on analyzing the "pretexts of war", those events involving the kingdom of Numidia that Polybius mentions that led the Romans to start the war (1995, p.16).

In more recent years, authors have developed new scholarship on the causes of the Third Punic War. Robert Kane (2019) sees the concept of Carthaginian actions seen as a pretext for war developed by Polybius and presented in Baronowski's work as wrong. For him, the Third Punic War was *An intelligence failure from Antiquity*, where no threat actually existed, but actions were incorrectly assessed as such.

Bailey (2018), in *Rome, Carthage & Numidia: Diplomatic Favoritism before the Third Punic War*, rejects the scholarship started by Polybius that the Third Punic War was the climax of fifty years of Roman antagonism towards Carthage and argues that there was not a constant foreign policy focused on undermining Carthage. For that, he analyzes the embassies between Rome, Carthage, and Numidia in depth. He declares that Rome's attitude towards Carthage was relatively neutral at the beginning of the second century. On the contrary, Kiernan, in *The First Genocide: Carthage, 146 BC*, presents Rome's policy towards Carthage as "unusual" (2003, p.35), insisting on the premeditation of the destruction. Using Polybius, Plutarch, Livy, Virgil, and Cato himself, this author works on applying the modern concept of genocide to this ancient event. His analysis of Cato's threat creation and application of a modern concept to the Third Punic War will be precious.

This chapter offers an overview of the literature concerning securitization theory and the dynamics and actors of the third and second century BCE. It showed the evolution from the first wave of securitization, which focused more on linguistics and the actor, to the second wave, which takes a sociological approach and gives importance to both the audience and the context. Essential elements of both waves will be considered in this thesis to offer a more complete comprehension of the securitization process. Chapter 3 will now

give a broad overview of the context of the Western Mediterranean in order to accomplish the discourse analysis surrounding the securitizing move in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Chapter 3 : Historical, Geopolitical, and Internal dynamics in the Western Mediterranean around the second century BCE

Carthage and Rome have a long and complex history that needs to be understood in order to place securitization in its context. This chapter will start by giving an overview of the geopolitical dynamics in the Western Mediterranean, presenting both Rome and Carthage's political systems and their shared history. It will delve into three Punic Wars and the events leading to Carthage's destruction. Finally, the scope will be reduced to analyze the internal dynamics in more detail, especially the Roman way of waging wars.

3.1 The Actors of the Mediterranean

3.1.1 Carthage: Empire of the Sea

Carthage was founded in the late ninth century BCE by Phoenicians from Tyre, a city on the coast of modern-day Lebanon. Strategically positioned on the north coast of Africa, Carthage sat at the intersection of two vital trade routes: the east-west route from the Levant to Spain and the north-south Tyrrhenian route connecting Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, mainland Greece, and the Aegean region. From its inception, Carthage flourished as a cosmopolitan trading center, attracting settlers and merchants from diverse ethnic backgrounds (Miles, 2010, pp. 83-84). The Phoenicians were so renowned as tradesmen that the Roman historian Pliny the Elder credited them for the invention of trade (Heimburger, 2008, p. 35).

In the sixth century BCE, the collapse of Tyre, the mother city, created a power vacuum in the Levantine-Spanish trade route. Carthage quickly took advantage of it and entered a new era of prosperity (Miles, 2010, p.96). While its economy was already centered around

maritime trade, this thalassocracy used its military power to establish trading and control ports across the Western Mediterranean in Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, southern Spain, and North Africa (De Jaeghere, 2021, p.10). By the fifth century, Carthaginian influence had extended beyond its traditional sphere of the Mediterranean. Punic sailors ventured past the Strait of Gibraltar, establishing trading posts along the Atlantic coasts of Morocco and Mauritania. Greek sources even claim, based on Carthaginian travel diaries they possessed, that one of the Punic expeditions reached the British Isles, and another one sailed the coast of Africa and explored as far as modern-day Cameroon (Miles, 2010, pp. 107-110).

In the fifth century BCE, Carthage, like other Mediterranean powers of the era, was in direct interaction and competition with the Greeks. The interaction between the Carthaginian and Greek colonies, especially on the island of Sicily, resulted in open conflict for the control of the land and trade (Goldsworthy, 2007, pp.30-31). In 480 BCE, Carthage suffered a significant defeat at the hands of the Greek Syracuse in Sicily, which had important consequences for the Punic state, but not in an expected way. Indeed, this setback pushed the Carthaginians to recognize one of their principal vulnerabilities: heavy economic reliance on maritime trade (Heimburger, 2008, p.37). This realization motivated the Punic leadership to diversify its economy and look towards agriculture. The Carthaginians consequently turned their attention inland towards their rich and fertile hinterland. They swiftly leveraged these natural resources, transforming their state into an agricultural powerhouse characterized by remarkably diverse production based on advanced agricultural knowledge (Goldsworthy, 2007, pp.32-33).

Consequently, throughout the fifth century BCE, Carthage evolved from a predominantly maritime power into a formidable economic force, with both agriculture and maritime trade used to serve its interests (Heimburger, 2008, p.37). The Roman historian Appian offered a striking assessment of Carthaginian power, stating: "They became a match for the

Greeks in power, and next to the Persians in wealth" (Appian, 1899, 1.2). It is essential to insist on the fact that the Carthaginians were not passive and peaceful merchants. Carthage was a militaristic and aggressive state like other states in the Mediterranean at that time. Thanks to war and trade, it had established a widespread hegemony in the Western Mediterranean (Eckstein, 2006, p.177). At the beginning of the third century, just before the Punic Wars started, Carthage was the greatest power in the western Mediterranean (Goldsworthy, 2007, p.28).

3.1.2 Rome: From a Village to the Urbs

Rome, founded around the eighth century BCE by the aggregation of villages around the Capitoline and Palatine hills, was first a small city ruled by kings in Central Italy (Serrati, 2011, p.10). The city was founded in a strategic location with the river Tiber flowing through its heart. It was easily defendable thanks to its hilltops and on the intersection of several important trade routes, such as the salt road (Goldsworthy, 2007, p.42). Rome's monarchic system ended around 509 BC and was replaced by a Republic. This transition occurred in chaos, and the young Republic was quickly challenged by warlords attempting to take power. Faced with famine, Rome signed a treaty with the wealthy and mercantile Carthage to import grain, proving the early peaceful interaction between the two cities (Serrati, 2011, p.16).

Between the fifth and the fourth century BCE while, in the east, the Greek city-states were at their most powerful (Brooks, 2019, para.1) and, in the west, Carthage established itself as hegemonic maritime power with a booming economy, Rome kept itself busy fighting all of its neighbors. At that time, the Republic's supreme authority was in the hands of annually elected military tribunes, and Rome could already be described as a highly militarized state. By 400 BCE, Rome had evolved into a distinct society from its

neighbors, where military service was mandatory for all men, regardless of their social class, and was integral to their identity as men and their status as citizens (Serrati, 2011, p.19). Rome's victories against the other people of the *Latium* motivated the young Republic to face the Etruscans, the civilization from which the first Roman kings originated. While the Romans won significant victories against Etruscan cities such as Veii, their expansion was suddenly interrupted in 390 BCE when bands of Gauls invaded the Italian peninsula. Rome was violently sacked, but in a few decades, the Republic rebuilt itself and pursued its expansion (Demirdjian, 2008, pp. 52-54). By 290 BCE, following multiple wars against the Italic people, such as the Samnites, Rome controlled almost the entirety of central Italy (Demirdjian, 2008, p. 54). Subsequently, the Romans turned their attention southward toward the Greek colonies of *Magna Graecia*. Tarentum, one of the foremost cities in this region, sought assistance from the Greeks, prompting King Pyrrhus of Epirus to respond. This renowned general led his Hellenistic army in multiple intense battles that nearly resulted in his victory. However, supported by the Carthaginians, the Romans eventually won and celebrated their triumph in 272 BCE, (Eckstein, 2006, pp. 156-157).

The specific way Rome turned foes into loyal allies after beating them, combined with the growing citizen population, provided Rome with an extensive pool of potential soldiers, significantly outnumbering other powers' available military personnel, like Carthage's, for example (Goldsworthy, 2007, p.44). For Serrati, by the start of the third century BCE, war had become a unifying element in Roman culture and society. Rome had indeed evolved into a state that was deeply oriented towards and structured around warfare (Serrati, 2011, p.10).

3.1.3 Punico-Roman relations

During their centuries of cohabitation in the western Mediterranean, Rome and Carthage signed multiple treaties defining their spheres of influence. In book three of his Histories, Polybius examines the diplomatic history of punic-roman relations, especially outlining the six treaties signed between the two powers (Polybius, 1922, para.22-25). In his study, he showed how the powers initially respected each other's areas of control and stayed for an extended part of their history as economic, military, and political partners (Serrati, 2006, pp. 113-114; Testard-Vaillant, 2008, p.58). For example, the treaty of 348 BCE established trade and colonization zones that both powers had to respect (Demirdjian, 2008, p.55), while the 278-279 BCE treaty concerned mutual military aid. It was a defensive pact, signed between what were now two established powers, to face together the king Pyrrhus of Epirus in the south of Italy (Serrati, 2006, p.113). In 265 BCE, after having pushed back Pyrrhus and defeated the last Etruscan cities, Rome controlled the entirety of the Italian peninsula (Demirdjian, 2008, p.55). In 264 BCE, Rome, Carthage, and Syracuse were the leading powers interacting in the western Mediterranean. On the island of Sicily, those three powers collided in what is now known as the First Punic War.

Before the war, as mentioned previously, Carthage and Syracuse had a complex relationship, alternating between conflict and cooperation for the dominance of Sicily (Eckstein, 2006, pp.160-162). Syracuse, under Hiero II, allied with Carthage against Rome at the outset of the First Punic War. However, Hiero switched allegiance to Rome in 263 BCE after early Roman successes. This alliance proved crucial for Rome's logistical support in Sicily (Eckstein, 2006, pp. 184-185).

The Hellenistic multipolar system, particularly Ptolemaic Egypt, Macedonia, and the Seleucid Empire, were major powers in the eastern Mediterranean in the third century

BCE. While not directly involved in the initial conflict between Rome and Carthage, their presence and interests influenced the broader geopolitical landscape (Eckstein, 2006, pp. 5-6).

The next section will present the Carthaginian and Roman political system at the eve of the Punic Wars. The understanding of how Rome worked as a Republic and who detained power is primordial in order to understand the securitization process and actors.

3.2 The political systems

Rome and Carthage had a lot in common regarding political systems. As will be seen in the following section, both powers were first monarchies that became republics governed by two elected men who shared power with a council of older citizens. In both republics, the citizens had at least one assembly to express their will.

3.2.1 The Carthaginian Republic

The Carthaginian political system was tripartite, with the power divided between suffetes, Councils, and the People of Carthage. At its head were two suffetes, elected annually based on criteria of wealth and merit. These officials held supreme civil and religious authority but were notably excluded from military command. Their role was complemented by the Council of Thirty Elders, who served as official advisors to the suffetes and were, in turn, supervised by the larger Council of Hundred and Four. The system also incorporated a democratic element through the Assembly of the People. This body, composed of Carthaginian citizens, could be called upon to adjudicate in cases of disagreement between the suffetes and the Elders. Moreover, the assembly possessed the power to vote on such matters and propose alternative solutions, providing a check on the authority of the higher offices (Goldsworthy, 2007, pp. 33-34).

Aristotle notably praised the Carthaginian constitution for its balanced nature, which he saw as combining elements of monarchy (in the suffetes), aristocracy (in the Councils), and democracy (in the assembly). In Aristotle's view, this equilibrium fostered a level of political stability that surpassed that of contemporary Greek states (Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 34). Nevertheless, Carthage was an empire encompassing different groups of different legal statuses and rights, with a lack of integration of the subject people who were not from the city of Carthage itself (Ameling, 2011, pp.46-47).

3.2.2 The Roman Republic

The Roman Republic during the Punic Wars was, like the Carthaginian one, governed by a complex system of checks and balances between various institutions: the magistrates, the Senate, and the popular assemblies.

The magistrates

The Roman Republic's executive power was vested in elected magistrates, with the consuls serving as the most prominent figures. Two consuls were elected annually to function as chief executives and military commanders. However, the censorship, while less renowned than the consulship, was considered the most prestigious office in the *cursus honorum* (sequential order of roman public offices) and the pinnacle of a Roman politician's career (Burgeon, 2015, p. 1341; Plutarch, 1999, p. 4).

The censors, elected every five years almost exclusively from among ex-consuls, held a unique and powerful position due partly to the long duration of their term. Their responsibilities were multifaceted, including overseeing public morality, conducting population censuses, managing the senatorial ranks, letting out contracts for public construction, leasing public lands, and managing tax contracts (Burgeon, 2015, p. 1341;

Plutarch, 1999, p.4). A notable example of a censor was Cato the Elder, elected in 184 BCE, who became so synonymous with the role that he is commonly called "Cato the Censor" in historical accounts (Burgeon, 2015 p. 1341). Plutarch likens Cato's censorial role to that of a doctor and teacher tasked with healing Rome of its excesses and instilling practices of sobriety and good health (Plutarch, 1999, p. 4).

The Roman magistracy also included other key positions such as praetors (judicial officials), aediles, quaestors, and tribunes of the plebs, the latter of which was responsible for protecting the rights of ordinary citizens (Stadter, 1999, p. 433).

The Senate

The Roman Senate was the cornerstone of the Republic's political system, wielding substantial influence through its *senatus auctoritas* (moral authority), which was considered equivalent to the magistrate's powers and laws (Bonnefond-Coudry, 1989, p. 11). Bonnefond-Coudry (1989, p. 755) argues that the Senate occupied the most crucial role in the Roman Republic's governance structure. This institution served as the primary forum for political debate and decision-making, particularly in matters of foreign policy and military strategy. This meant that it served also as the primary forum for deliberations on matters of war. The Senate's responsibilities encompassed receiving foreign embassies, negotiating treaties, controlling public finances, and selecting ambassadors from its ranks—functions that were especially vital during wartime (Bonnefond-Coudry, 1989; Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 46).

The Senate's decisions were expected to be respected, with magistrates merely facilitating their implementation. Any action taken contrary to senatorial decisions was considered an abuse of authority by the magistrate (Bonnefond-Coudry, 1989, p. 754). Within the Senate, the *Princeps Senatus* held a position of particular influence. As the first to speak in

debates, he often acted as a guide during times of conflict affecting the entire city and could offer his opinion on any matter without interruption (Bonnefond-Coudry, 1989, p. 702; Burgeon, 2015, p.1398). Historian Christophe Burgeon suggests that Cato likely held this position between 154 BCE and 149 BCE, given his advanced age (in his eighties), his importance in the senatorial hierarchy, and the historiographical gap between the acknowledged *princeps senatus* role of M. Aemilius Lepidus (before) and Scipio Nasica (after) (Burgeon, 2015, p. 1398).

The popular assemblies

The Roman Republic's governance system incorporated three popular assemblies: the *Comitia Centuriata*, the *Comitia Tributa*, and the *Concilium Plebis*. These assemblies served as the channels through which Roman citizens expressed their collective will. In those assemblies, the citizens were responsible for electing magistrates, enacting laws, and voting for war (following the Senate advice).

Despite their democratic purpose, the structure of these assemblies tended to favor the interests of wealthier citizens. This bias in the voting system effectively meant that the influence of more affluent Romans often outweighed that of their less wealthy counterparts, even though the latter were more numerous (Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 44).

This section presented Carthage and Rome's political systems on the eve of the conflict. It is now time to turn our attention to what has been called the largest conflict of the ancient world : The Punic Wars (Goldsworthy, 2012).

3.3 The First and Second Punic Wars

Rome and Carthage's peaceful relationship ended in 264 BCE when Rome initiated the First Punic War over the issue of who should control Sicily, an island mainly controlled by

Carthage but only two miles from Rome's territory. Both powers justified their intervention in Sicily by claiming to assist the city-state of Messana, which was threatened by the Greek forces of Syracuse (Hoyos, 2011, p. 131). For the first time in Rome's history, a Roman army was sent outside Italy, paving the way for centuries of expansion. The war lasted 23 years and eventually saw Rome crowned as the victor (Goldsworthy, 2007, pp. 12-13). The cost, however, was very high. According to the historian Nepos, the Republic lost around 50,000 Roman citizens, 350,000 allied soldiers, and 600 ships. The conclusion of the First Punic War established Rome as the most important power in the Western Mediterranean (Eckstein, 2006, p.170).

Two decades later, the First Punic War was followed by a new conflict between the two great powers. The Second Punic War, also called by some "the War of Hannibal" in reference to the great Carthaginian general, lasted from 218 to 201 BCE (Le Bohec, 2011, p.45). The beginning of the war saw Hannibal leading the Carthaginian army, its allies and its elephants through the Alps toward Italy, winning battle after battle against the Romans and causing widespread destruction. Those early stages of the Second Punic War were particularly devastating for Rome, resulting in a considerable portion of Rome's military-age men and civilians losing their lives. In only one battle in 216 BCE, the battle of Cannae, the Romans and their allies lost between 55,000 (according to Livy) and 70,000 soldiers (according to Polybius) (Goldsworthy, 2007, pp.11-12). The strategies and tactics used by Hannibal Barca became a source of terror for all Roman generations and led him to be known as "Rome's greatest enemy" (Hoyos, 2011, p.xii). The proportions of the Second Punic War were enormous: in terms of manpower, they approached the wars of the twentieth century, and in terms of cost, a significant part of the resources of the two richest western Mediterranean states was consumed (Goldsworthy, 2007, pp.12-13). After 17 years of fighting, multiple strategies such as changing the war into a war of attrition, giving

command to the genius military commander Scipio Africanus, and Massinissa, a Numidian king allied with Carthage switching sides, Rome won the war (Kunze, 2011, p.397; Hamonou, 2008, p. 94). The conclusion of the Second Punic War solidified Rome's position as the dominant power in the western Mediterranean and the political subordination of Carthage to Rome. This shift had far-reaching consequences for all other powers in the region, setting the stage for Rome's further expansion eastward (Eckstein, 2006, p.176)

These two devastating wars, especially the dread of Rome's ruin during the first part of the war with Hannibal, instigated what was called the *metus punicus* or the fear of the Carthaginians in the Romans. Half a century after the end of the Second Punic War and decades after Hannibal's death, the *metus punicus* was still strongly present in Roman society (Le Bohec, 2011, p.434).

3.4 Geopolitical dynamics in the aftermath of the Second Punic War

The Second Punic War (218-201 BCE) saw a shift in alliances and interactions in the Mediterranean. Philip V of Macedon allied with Hannibal against Rome, leading to the First Macedonian War (Edwell, 2011, p.325). Syracuse, under Hieronymus, broke its long-standing alliance with Rome to side with Carthage, leading to the siege and fall of Syracuse (Edwell, 2011, pp.327-328). In Africa, Numidian territory, comprising northern Algeria and parts of Tunisia beyond Carthaginian control, was divided among various tribes and chieftains during the war (Kunze, 2011, p.398). The most prominent among these were the Masaesyli, led by Syphax, and the Massyli, over which Massinissa became king during the war. Those two tribes played significant roles in the region's geopolitical landscape during this crucial period of conflict between Rome and Carthage, each siding

with one of the two great city-states. At the end of the war, Massinissa was on the victor's side and was crowned as the king of all Numidians (Kunze, 2011, p.398).

3.4.1 The Return of Carthage

The conclusion of the Second Punic War resulted in a severely restrictive peace treaty for the Punic metropolis. The agreement confined Carthage to its original territory, making it lose all its overseas possessions, and mandated the restoration of all lands and properties that had pertained not only to Massinissa but also to his ancestors to the Numidian king (Morley, 2010, p.16). The city-state was forced to pay a heavy indemnity of 10,000 silver talents over fifty years to Rome. Moreover, The Punics had to surrender 100 hostages, chosen by Roman generals from their Carthaginian young men, and limit their considerable fleet to 10 vessels. The most crucial part of the treaty was that the Punic Republic was prohibited from engaging in any warfare without Rome's explicit consent, even in self-defense (Lazenby, 1998, p.228; Miles, 2010, p.409).

Nevertheless, Carthage was not left as a powerless and impoverished state. Despite its restrictive treaty with Rome, the Punic city operated what has been called a "revenge of the loser" and regained significant economic vitality in the interwar period (Miles, 2010, p.405). Its rich agricultural hinterland and robust trade networks across the Mediterranean helped it to recover financially (Morley, 2010, p. 16). After only a decade, Carthage proposed to offer early repayment of its war indemnity to Rome. The Romans refused and asked for the last installment of the war indemnity to be paid in 151 BCE, an order that the Carthaginians obeyed (Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 430).

Furthermore, the Carthaginians tried to get back into Rome's good graces by providing Roman armies fighting wars in the east with most of their grain. They supplied the legions, sometimes as a gift, with a significant amount of corn, wheat, and barley for their war in Macedonia in 200 and 171 BCE and against Antiochus in 191 BCE (Miles, 2010, p. 405).

Archaeological findings corroborate Carthage's prosperity in the interwar period, revealing the widespread construction of substantial new houses in Carthage and a thriving trade network with central Italian merchants. The Punic City circular harbor, constructed or significantly renovated during this period, further attests to the city's wealth (Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 423; Miles, 2010, p.407). However, Carthage found itself in a very precarious position. While it retained its economic vitality, the peace treaty significantly diminished its military capabilities. Indeed, the severe limitations on its activities meant that it struggled to preserve any semblance of sovereignty or maintain an effective defense (Kane, 2019, p.162). This vulnerable state left Carthage exposed to external threats, particularly from Massinissa, the king of the Numdians (Miles, 2010, p.410).

3.4.2 Diplomacy and Deception: The Interwar Struggle Between Carthage and Numidia

During the interwar period, Massinissa determined that his new territory gained from Carthage after the Punic-roman peace treaty of 201 BCE was insufficient. He decided to exploit the Roman imposed passivity on the Punics and repeatedly raided and seized Carthaginian lands for over five decades (Morley, 2010, p.14). Carthage sent numerous appeals to Rome to argue its case, and Rome answered by sending multiple embassies to North Africa to arbitrate the disputes. Nevertheless, the Roman Senate consistently sided with its ally Massinissa, denying Carthage's requests and effectively enabling the gradual erosion of Carthaginian territory (Kunze, 2011, p. 399). Indeed, Rome would rather support its loyal ally than its former enemy, which it was still suspicious of. The Numidians even played on Rome's fears, sending embassies stating that the Carthaginians were treacherous and wanted war with Rome in order for Rome to keep siding with them in their conquest of Carthaginian land (Miles, 2010, p.411).

In 162 BCE, Numidian aggression escalated with the seizure of Syrtis-Minor, a century-held Carthaginian territory. Roman arbitration, as usual, favored Massinissa's claim, further undermining Carthage's position. The Romans not only legitimized the Numidian occupation but also imposed a punitive measure on Carthage, demanding a payment of 500 silver talents to the Numidians as compensation for the Carthaginian prior use of the now disputed land (Miles, 2010, p. 418).

Ten years later, Massinissa's attacks were still going strong and Carthage territory was heavily diminished. In 152 BCE, the Numidians seized another fertile region pertaining to Carthage. The Punics appealed again, and the Roman Senate sent yet another embassy to evaluate the situation in Carthage. The man leading this embassy would become the key to Carthage's demise, Marcus Porcius Cato, also known as Cato the Elder (Miles, 2010, p.419).

3.4.3 The Rhetoric of Destruction: Cato's Influence and Nasica's Resistance

At that time, Cato was an 81-year-old senator with a well-known hatred of Carthage. During his visit, he discovered that Carthage was not the ruined state he thought it was but the dynamic merchant metropolis described previously (Miles, 2010, p.419). This realization shook him to the core, and when the magistrate returned to the Roman Senate after having ruled in favor of Massinissa, he decided to convince his fellow senators to accept his view. The censor feared that Carthage was restoring itself to its former strength and was threatening Rome. During the two years that followed, Cato, a recognized orator, tried incessantly to convince the Senate to destroy Carthage in speeches that will be detailed and analyzed further in this study (Miles, 2010, p.420). He first faced a strong opposition led by Scipio Nasica, the son-in-law of Scipio Africanus, the genius commander who defeated Hannibal and won the Second Punic War. According to Diodorus of Sicily

accounts, Nasica advocated that Rome needed an enemy to maintain political equilibrium. Indeed, the fear that Carthage generated pushed the Romans to live together in harmony (Miles, 2010, p.421). However, caution should be taken when considering Diodorus' account because he wrote in the first century and therefore knew about the fall of the Roman Republic and the events leading to it. Another argument used by Nasica was that the destruction of Carthage would be poorly viewed by foreign opinion and that the Romans lacked justification for war; there was no *iusta causa* (just cause) (Astin, 1967, p.282). A subsequent section will study this Roman need for a pretext before going to war.

3.4.4 Carthage's Final Stand and Rome's Cynicism

In 151-150 BCE, Carthage could no longer endure these attacks on its people and territory that were left unpunished by the Romans. Without the Roman authorization, but purely to defend the town of Oroscopa, which had been Carthaginian for centuries, Carthage raised an army and faced Massinissa. This battle resulted in a disaster, not only because the Carthaginian forces were crushed, but the consequences were fatal for the Punic state (Kunze, 2011, p.407). Indeed, waging a battle without Roman approval, therefore breaking the peace treaty of 201 BCE, provided the pretext for Rome to seek military intervention.

As a response, the Senate prepared for a major African expedition, but they deliberately withheld an official declaration of war. Carthage, therefore, attempted to seek peace with diplomacy. They condemned to death their own military and political leaders who had responded to the Numidian attack and sent an embassy to Rome to find a way to redeem themselves. The embassy returned with the only demand from the Senate to "satisfy the Roman people" without further explaining what they could do (Goldsworthy, 2007, p.433). During that time, Cato the Censor intensified its efforts in the Senate. He worked on convincing the Romans of the Carthaginian threat and the necessity of military action, even if the Carthaginians had not taken arms against Rome. In speeches that will be studied

further, he played on the trauma of the Second Punic War, Punic perfidy, and supposed instances of Carthage breaking agreements with Rome (Miles, 2010, p. 424).

The following year, in 149 BCE, the Roman Senate approved a declaration of war. Carthage again sent multiple delegations seeking peace. The Senate first demanded 300 child hostages from noble families, which Carthage provided (Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 434). Subsequently, the consuls formulated a second demand that the Carthaginians had to obey if they really wanted peace. They demanded the surrender of all of Carthage's weapons: 200,000 personal weapons, 2,000 catapults, and vast quantities of javelins and ammunition. All the ships the Carthaginians had in Utica harbor were also to be burned. Desperate to avoid war, Carthage complied again and became literally armless (Kiernan, 2003, p. 33; Goldsworthy, 2007, p.434). In a final, devastating demand, Rome ordered the Carthaginians to abandon their city, which would be destroyed, and move at least 15 kilometers from the sea. This meant surrendering their home, temples, and maritime identity, which had been the Carthage *raison d'être* for eight centuries.

Moreover, as Serge Lancel argued: "Such a diktat was the equivalent of a death sentence" (Miles, 2010, p.426). The Carthaginians argued that destroying a city that had already capitulated, surrendered its weapons and children, and fulfilled all other conditions would demonstrate bad faith and violate numerous values the Romans prided themselves on upholding. The Romans answered that it would be for the Carthaginians' own good because the sea had an unhealthy influence on the city's political and social life (Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 435). Unable to accept these terms, the Carthaginians began preparing their defenses, thus initiating the Third Punic War (Meyran, 2008, p. 106). Goldsworthy (2007, p. 436) describes Roman behavior as "cynical in the extreme," concealing their intention to destroy Carthage until after extracting maximum concessions.

3.4.5 The fall of Carthage: Carthago deleta est

The Third Punic War was not, as its name indicates, a war. It was a brutal siege of the Punic capital that lasted three years (Le Bohec, 2011, p.430). It is said that the final assault lasted six days and six nights and that the Carthaginians fought street by street in terrible confrontations while a gigantic fire consumed the city (Meyran, 2008, p.109). From the original 200 to 400 000 inhabitants of Carthage, historians give an account of at least 150 000 deaths during the siege. Polybius reports that the death toll was enormous, and the Carthaginians were exterminated. The 55,000 people who did not die during the siege and the taking of the city were sold into slavery (Kiernan, 2003, p.33). Benedict Kiernan, Director of the genocide studies program at Yale University, in *The First Genocide: Carthage, 146 BC* even goes as far as saying that Cato's speeches can be considered the first recorded incitement to genocide in world history.

3.4.6 Assessing Carthage's Threat to Rome

The question remains to be asked whether Carthage was a threat to Rome. The answer is negative for renowned Roman historian Adrian Goldsworthy: "By the standards of modern strategy, the war was unnecessary since Carthage does not seem to have posed a real threat to Rome" (2007, p. 425). This opinion is shared by Claudia Kunze in *A Companion to the Punic Wars*: "A closer look at Carthage's economic and military situation near the time of the Third Punic War suggests that the city, despite a recent economic upswing, was not in a position to pose any serious military threat to Rome." (2010, p.408). Indeed, as mentioned previously in that chapter, Carthage had no more navy, was sending gifts to Rome in the form of grain for the legions, and was forbidden to wage war without Rome's permission. This effectively meant that Carthage could not maintain a significant standing army. Furthermore, the city capitulated when asked to, surrendered its weapons and children, and fulfilled all conditions given by the Romans (Goldsworthy, 2007, p.436). Ben Kiernan

evaluated what was found in the literature and found that the standard historian view is that Carthage's war preparations only began after Rome's last ultimatum (2003, p.35). Richard Kane, a US intelligence officer and researcher (2019, p.165) defends in *The Third Punic War : An Intelligence Failure from Antiquity* that Carthage was not a threat but was portrayed as such by some senators who used politicized intelligence. This thesis will, in chapter 5, push Kane's point even further, showing the signs of not only politicization but securitization in Cato's discourse.

Ben Kiernan argues that the politics of destruction of Carthage was unusual for Rome because it was both planned in advance and pursued after the city's capitulation (Kiernan, 2003, p. 33). It is now time to turn our attention to the usual policy and rules of war in republican Rome.

3.5 Deciding for War: Roman Norms and Practices in Conflict Initiation

3.5.1 Inside the Senate: The Complexity of Roman Foreign Policy

As mentioned in the previous part of this study, the Roman Senate held a pivotal role in shaping foreign policy, serving as the primary forum for deliberations on matters of war. It is, however, a challenging task for any historian to reconstruct the precise functioning behind war decisions in Republican Rome. Indeed, this decision was subject to extensive debate, further complicated by the internal dynamics of the senatorial assembly. Morley (2010, p.21-22) demonstrates that rather than functioning as a monolithic entity, the Senate was composed of various factions, each potentially harboring its interests and viewpoints. These internal divisions and rivalries added complexity to the decision-making process, as different groups advocated for or against military action based on their own political, economic, or strategic considerations. What is known is that in our time of interest, the decision-making initiative was primarily confined to a small group of senior senators.

While considered indispensable, most senators primarily endorsed this elite group's proposals (Bonnefond-Coudry, 1989, p. 754). Furthermore, Morley (2010, p. 43) notes that the eloquence of an individual speaker in the Senate could sometimes be as significant in determining outcomes as the interests of larger groups.

3.5.2 The Pretext Paradox: Unpacking Roman Justifications for War

However, that does not mean that the Romans did not follow specific customs in their decisions on warfare. Some clarifications, especially concerning our conflict of interest, can be found in Polybius's surviving accounts. For this ancient historian, three elements explain Roman wars: the beginning, a pretext, and a cause. In the words of Baronowski, who offers a crucial study on *Polybius on the causes of the Third Punic War*: "A beginning is the first attempt or action in a war already decided upon. A pretext is an alleged reason for going to war. A cause is anything that genuinely influences a decision to fight a war." (Baronowsky, 1995, p.16). While the fragments of Polybius's accounts do not contain the specific beginning, pretext, and cause of the Third Punic War, historians have been able to reconstruct them. Without trying to complicate the matter more, the beginning would be when the Romans crossed to Sicily with their army in 149 BCE (Baronowski, 1995, p.16).

Now comes the question of the pretext, which is primordial. As shown in the counter-discourse of Scipio Nasica, a war could not be waged without pretext because it would transgress the core Roman values of *fides* (trust, reliability, and trustworthiness) (Miles, 2010, p.421). The Romans only fought wars that they viewed as just (*bellum iustum*), a concept that meant that they aligned with the Romans' law, religion, and moral standards (Le Bohec, 2011, p. 435). Waging a war without a pretext and moral justification could not be done. In 150 BCE, when Carthage defended Oroscopa and took up arms against Massinissa, the Romans seized the opportunity and considered that as the official pretext (Baronowski, 1995, p. 19). The Roman Senate dismissed any arguments

justifying Carthage's establishment of purely defensive units, maintaining their pretext and officially deeming Carthage's actions a treaty violation and declaring war. Rome bears full responsibility for initiating this conflict (Le Bohec, 2011, p. 435).

However, both Appian and Polybius relate that the Roman decision for war, and therefore the real cause of the Third Punic War, was decided before the apparition of the pretext and that they were just waiting for one (Baronowski, 1995, p.17). Plutarch and Appian state that the Romans declared war on Carthage, persuaded by Cato's arguments. For the two ancient historians, and likely for Polybius too as he was their source, Cato arguments showing that Rome posed a threat to Rome’s very existence was the cause of the Third Punic War. Thus, all significant historians of this period concur on the pivotal role of Cato the Elder in initiating the destruction of Carthage (Baronowski, 1995, pp. 24-25).

Chapter 3 has offered a contextual overview of the dynamics between Rome and Carthage in the Western Mediterranean until the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE. It has presented Cato’s assumed role in starting the Third Punic War. The dynamics on how this single man managed to convince the whole roman senate to take extraordinary actions will now be explored in the following sections, following the securitization theory.

Chapter 4 : The Securitization Framework

In order to understand the conceptual and theoretical framework that this analysis will follow, and the choices made by this author, it was necessary to present the events that happened, the actors involved and their actions. This has been done in the previous chapter, it is therefore time to present our securitization framework, which is designed to methodically analyze Cato’s role in the outbreak of the Third Punic War

4.1 The determining elements of securitization

The main focus of this section is to clarify some important components in the securitization theory and how they relate to our chosen case study.

In *Security: A new framework for analysis*, Buzan et al. inform us that: "A successful securitization thus has three components (or steps); existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26). Balzacq, while also mentioning the existence of a threat and the necessity of an immediate "customized policy" to undertake it, adds another element to verify the presence of securitization (Balzacq, 2011, p.3). For this renowned scholar, securitization also encompasses the use of "metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions" by a securitizing actor in a specific context. These are called heuristic artifacts.

The three elements named by Buzan et al. and the heuristic artifacts will be seen as central elements of our analysis of the vocalization. Consequently, when studying Cato's discourse, the presence of those four elements will be key.

4.2 Important concepts in the securitization theory

In this thesis securitization is conceptualized first as a speech act, where the issue is framed in the discourse as a security threat, but it also involves other crucial dimensions.

The role of the audience is therefore also seen as critical: "A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25).

Even taking into account Buzan et al consideration of the audience in the success of a securitization move, Balzacq (2005, p.178) argues that the speech act approach fails to

properly incorporate the audience and context and their weight in the process. Indeed, he writes: "securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction." (Balzacq, 2005, p.172). Balzacq conceptualization of the securitization process which includes other dimensions will consequently also be taken into account in this thesis.

This research will therefore incorporate elements of both the first and second wave of securitization, theorizing that the success of a securitizing move relies heavily on the audience and the context in which the speech act occurs. In this study, the Roman Senate constitutes the audience, whose agreement was essential to validate the threat perception. Chapter 5 will enter in more details about the role of the audience, the context and the debate surrounding those concepts.

The important concepts of the securitization theory in our case study have been determined, firstly those relating to the vocalization and secondly those relating to the role of the audience and context.

Chapter 5 : Analysis of the discourse

The first section of chapter 4 presented the four components of the securitization process that are central to the vocalization approach. This chapter will now evaluate, thanks to a discourse analysis, if we can find those elements in Cato the Elder discourse and actions. The literature review has revealed the most significant limitation of this work: the small amount of data compiled from available ancient sources. While the sources are, without doubt, very limited compared to what most modern analyses on securitization processes

contain, this chapter will prove that sufficient data is present to enable a successful analysis of the securitization process. This discourse analysis will be based on Cato the Elder's retrieved original speeches and will prove how Cato's speech can be considered a securitization move.

For Plutarch, "it was Cato above all who urged and recommended the Romans to undertake the war in the first place" (Plutarch, 1999, p.34). As this view is generally supported by historians (Astin, 1978, p.287 ; Burgeon, 2015; Scardigli, 2011, p.34; Kiernan, 2004, p.27), the dataset will focus on Cato and the different elements of securitization he invoked. It includes recovered fragments of Cato's discourses, along with first and second-hand reports on discussions and events that took place in the Roman senate around the Carthaginian question. The first determining element of securitization that we will address is the three components announced by Buzan et al. and mentioned above: "existential threat, requiring emergency action and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedures" (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24). All those components will, therefore, be presented.

5.1 Presence of "existential threat" in Cato's speeches

The presence of Carthage presented as an existential threat can be found in multiple sources that contain reference to Cato's speeches.

Starting with Appian (1899, 10.69) :

> "When they (the envoys) returned to Rome, they declared that Carthage was to them an object of apprehension rather than of jealousy, the city being so ill affected, so near them, and growing so rapidly. Cato especially said that even the liberty of Rome would never be secure until Carthage was destroyed."

Addressing the same event, Plutarch wrote (1999, p.34):

"(Cato) thought that if they did not check the incredible growth of a city which had shown its malignant hostility in the past, they would just face as much danger as they had before. (...) In his opinion they were now using the Numidians to warm themselves up for a conflict with the Romans. The words' peace' and 'treaty,' he said, were for the Carthaginians just alternative ways of describing the postponement of the war that they were waiting for the opportunity to launch."

To accentuate those statements that showed Rome as highly vulnerable to an imminent attack from Carthage, Cato summarized his views in a speech called *De Bello Carthaginiensi* (Concerning a Carthaginian war) (Malcovati, 1955, p. 78). He delivered this speech in the Roman senate in 150 BCE, the year before the start of the Third Punic War. The speech is not preserved as a coherent document - only six fragments were compiled in *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*. Fragment 195 is one of the most interesting and can be used to illustrate many aspects of this study :

"*Carthaginienses nobis iam hostes sunt; nam qui omnia parat contra me, ut quo tempore velit, helium possit inferre, hie iam mihi hostis est, tametsi nondum armis aga*" (Malcovati, 1955, p.78)

"The Carthaginians are already our enemies; for he who prepares everything against me, so that he can make war at whatever time he wishes, he is already my enemy even though he is not yet using weapons" (Astin, 1978, p.284).

In this fragment of the speech, as well as in those mentioned before, Cato refers to the *metus punicus* and calls back to this well-known fear instilled in the Roman people to insist on the fact that Rome is under constant threat from Carthage, their hereditary enemy. Not only do those elements of the dataset show the presence of an existential threat in Cato's discourse, but they also contain the declaration of the necessity of an emergency action.

5.2 From fear to deed: calls for "emergency action"

The call for emergency action, an essential element in the use of the securitization theory, is present in the fragments mentioned above and is accentuated in another episode that took place in the Senate.

Around 149 BCE, still before the start of the war, Cato went to a Senate meeting and brought with him fresh figs (depending on the report, either in a basket or hidden in his toga) (Plutarch, 1999, p.34; Le Bohec, 2011, p. 433). He displayed them to the senators and let them appreciate their freshness and beauty. He then declared that they were from Carthage and were picked only three days before (Plutarch, 1999, p.34). This visual demonstration aimed to highlight how disturbingly near the Carthaginian enemy the city of Rome was. Historians who have studied this event report that his declaration was a lie and that he must have picked them in Italy and brought them to the Senate to support his cause. At the time of the year when this event took place, six days by boat minimum were necessary to link both cities, and no fig could have been preserved fresh during this time (Le Bohec, 2011, p.433). Therefore, that episode was another way for Cato to convince the senators of the emergency in their situation, where perhaps a warship could attack them in such a short amount of time. The fact that Cato resorted to manipulation of facts (or, put simply, lied), illustrates a phenomenon that would be easily recognized in contemporary securitization processes.

5.3 A special kind of enemy: references to "extraordinary measures"

The last determining element of the presence of securitization for Buzan et al. is the call for extraordinary measures. While Cato's other speeches, including those mentioned

earlier, count as calls for extraordinary measures, none summarize it as well as his famous *Carthago Delenda Est* declaration.

After every single one of his speeches at the Senate, whatever the discussion on that day was (agronomy, taxes), Cato the Elder would add at the end of his statement: "*Carthago Delenda est"* (Carthage must be destroyed) or in Plutarch's ancient greek version: "Δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Καρχηδόνα μὴ εἶναι." (It seems to me that Carthage should cease to exist) (Pliny, 15.7; Plutarch, 1999, p.34).

We can raise the question of whether that call for destruction should be considered as "outside the normal bounds of political procedures," as the last component of securitization by Buzan et al. is characterized. Chapter 3 already established that Rome was known for its imperialism and violent foreign policy (and was certainly not an exception among its peers in this regard) (Morley, 2010, p. 17). In antiquity (and, of course, for most of the history of political interactions), war was considered a standard, normal tool of foreign policy (Eckstein, 2006, p.244). This section does not aim to offer a complete analysis of the Republican Roman way of waging wars, but it will address the exceptionalism of Cato's call for destruction.

Firstly, Cato did not make this statement once or twice. It was repeated at the end of every one of his speeches in the Senate for at least two years, until the Censor's death in 149 BCE. Ancient historians, even the pro-roman, write that by adding this call to every statement : "he surely went too far" (Plutarch, 1999, p.34). This is the first element that proves that his discourse, even in his form and not his content, was out of the ordinary.

Secondly, we can observe the outcome of the Second Punic War in 201 BCE and the Roman attitude. After their victory at the battle of Zama the Romans decided not to destroy

the Carthaginian civilization, even though they had it at their mercy and the *metus punicus* was very fresh. In the historiography, we can find different arguments for peace that was made at that particular moment, such as the necessity of moderation as demanded by the goddess Tyche/Fortuna, the pertinence of respecting foreign public opinion, which would have strongly disapproved of the destruction of Carthage, and the leniency in victory and magnanimity which were essential values of the Romans at that time (Le Bohec, 2011, p.496). Another argument made in the Senate in 201 BCE was that it was advantageous for Rome to allow a strong enemy to survive. Therefore, Cato's call for destruction was a call for an out-of-the-ordinary policy, as shown by the previous similar context but dissimilar roman attitude.

An important point that enhances this conclusion is the opposition to Cato's warmongering in the person of Publius Scipio Nasica. Ancient historians tell us that whenever Cato would declare: "Carthage should cease to exist" in the Senate, Publius Scipio Nasica Corculum, cousin of Scipio Africanus (the victorious general of the Second Punic War) would answer: "Carthage should continue to exist" (Plutarch, 1999, p.34; Astin, 1978, p.280). Nasica reused many of the arguments used five decades prior at the end of the Second Punic War, such as the fact that the destruction would have an undesirable effect on foreign opinion, but also that Rome needed a "counter-weight of fear" to preserve its own efficiency (Astin, 1978, p. 285; Plutarch, 1999, pp. 34-35). Polybius relates the fact that those arguments almost tipped the decision against the war. Nasica opposition in the senate, and the initial support of the other senators shows that Cato's call for the destruction of another civilization was not accepted as a normal policy in the roman republic.

The last point to prove that Cato's move was exceptional is the question of the pretext and the *iusta causa*. Nasica's main argument, the one that the audience was the most sensitive

to and that made the discussion between the two statesmen last two years, is that the Carthaginians had not committed any hostile action against Rome and therefore, there was no *iusta causa* (just cause) for war. As it was seen in Chapter 3 on Roman norms in conflict initiation, waging a war without this just cause would be considered breaking free of Roman rules (Astin, 1978, p. 283). It is, however, precisely what Cato suggested in fragment 195 of *De Bello Carthaginiensi* and with *Carthago Delenda Est*. Indeed, when the orator said : “The Carthaginians are already our enemies (...) he is already my enemy even though he is not yet using weapons" and repeatedly ordered : “Carthage needs to be destroyed”, he did not follow the normal political procedures, the Roman way of initiating conflict. Interestingly, a few years prior, Cato had advocated for waiting for an *iusta causa* in a conflict involving the Rhodians, advocating against the war and for leniency towards the inhabitants of Rhodes. He defended the “right” and “legalism” to only act after a just cause, and Rhodes was spared (Astin, 1978, pp. 286-287). His actions to convince the senate to destroy Carthage, therefore, can be seen as “breaking free of rules" and an action out of ordinary Roman politics, which he usually followed.

5.4 The tools of securitization: identifying the “heuristic artifacts” in Cato’s discourse

In the case studied, we can identify multiple fragments of Cato's discourses that can be characterized as heuristic artifacts. In *De Bello Carthaginiensi*, the securitizing actor mobilizes multiple heuristic artifacts such as policy tools, analogies, stereotypes, and emotions. The fragments 191: "*pueri atque mulieres extrudebantur fami causa*", 192 : "*aures nobis calliscerunt ad iniurias*" and 193 : "*homines defoderunt in terram dimidiatos ignemque circumposuerunt : ita interfecerunt*" (Malcovati, 1955, p.78) are of particular interest in our study. In those (admittedly short) fragments, Cato refers to events of Carthaginian cruelty in history of Punic-Roman relations, especially the atrocities

committed by the Carthaginians during the Hannibalic war (Astin, 1978, p.284). He, therefore, plays on well-known stereotypes and tries to create emotion in the senator's mind.

The fragment 195, seen above: "The Carthaginians are already our enemies; for he who prepares everything against me, so that he can make war at whatever time he wishes, he is already my enemy even though he is not yet using weapons" (Astin, 1978, p.284), can also be identified as using heuristic artifacts. In this speech, Cato is analogizing Carthage's military preparations and perceived threat as an equivalent of them already being outright enemies of Rome, even without open warfare. Furthermore, Cato's phrasing "prepares everything against me" taps into strong emotions of fear, hatred, and an "us vs. them" tribalistic mindset. Referring, without doubt, to the aforementioned *metus punicus*, the Censor is stoking the Roman senators' emotions by portraying Carthage as conspiring and amassing forces with hostile intent directly aimed at Rome itself. Cato evokes an emotional reaction that Rome must be on guard and potentially preempt this perceived enemy before it's too late. This call for preemptive action also makes it enter the policy tool category, asking to reshape Roman policy towards Carthage.

Furthermore, Cato's dramatic gesture of bringing a Libyan fig to the Roman Senate and using it to emphasize the proximity of Carthage can be considered an example of both metaphor and image repertoire. The African or Libyan fig is a tangible object that Cato uses in its discourse to symbolize the entire city of Carthage and, by association, the Carthaginian threat. This metaphor insists on the closeness of the Punic capital and, therefore, the danger posed by it, playing on the audience's emotions (Burnand, 2000, p.222). The fig is also presented by ancient writers as "of great size and beauty" (Cato Maior, 54, 1-2). The metaphor therefore goes further, the qualities of the fig also

representing Carthage, growing bigger and more rich and beautiful. Cato's action also fits into the concept of an "image repertoire." In this case, the image of the fresh Libyan fig serves as a powerful visual cue, creating a mental picture of Carthage's growth and alarming proximity to Rome in the senators' minds.

Finally, the utterance "*Carthago delenda est*" (Carthage must be destroyed), which Cato is said to have repeated at the end of every single one of his speeches in the Senate (Plutarch, 1999, p.34), is a powerful emotional artifact. The words are a call for primal emotions such as anger and hatred, an echo of the *metus punicus*, and an urge for vengeance or self-preservation against the perceived enemy. By repeatedly invoking this phrase, Cato tries to stir up these strong emotions among the Roman senators and populace, galvanizing them towards confrontation with Carthage. In this aspect, this discourse also enters the policy tool category in Balzacq's heuristic artifacts. Indeed, it prescribes a policy, in this case, the destruction of Carthage, and puts it at the forefront of the Roman political agenda. Cato makes it a powerful and focused policy tool by removing any other alternatives.

In conclusion, this chapter presented and analyzed the dataset, showing the interactions between the speaker and the audience and proved that all determining elements of the discourse in the securitization theory can be found in this case. Indeed it has shown that when Marcus Porcius Cato came back from Carthage, he presented the city not as a peaceful trade partner with Rome but, on the contrary, as an existential threat to the Republic that needed immediately to be taken care of (meaning destroyed), even if that was not respecting the Roman way of waging wars. This discourse analysis proved how Cato’s speech can be considered a securitization move.

Chapter 6 : Analysis of the other factors

Chapter 5 offered a discourse analysis of Cato's speeches and how they contained the crucial elements characteristic of a securitization move. While those are important, this thesis aims to offer a complete overview of the securitization process and how Cato successfully securitized Carthage. Therefore, in Chapter 6 this research will take a more global and complete approach, analyzing all conditions present in the environment which enabled Cato's securitization to be successful.

6.1 Validation of the linguistic (actor-centric) approach to securitization

6.1.1 The facilitating conditions for a successful speech-act

The previous chapter focused on Cato's discourse and looked into the vocal components of a successful securitization, and whether or not they were present in our case study. The existence of a call for emergency action, extraordinary measures, and the presence of existential threat were assessed, showing that Cato the Elder, our securitizing agent, did use a "specific rhetorical structure" in his attempt to convince the Roman Senate to destroy Carthage (Buzan et al., 1997, p.26). For the authors of the linguistic approach to the securitization theory, this rhetorical structure is only one part of the "facilitating conditions" for a successful speech act (Buzan et al., 1997, p.32). The other elements are external. First, the securitizing actor should be in a position of authority, where he has high social capital, which makes the audience more receptive to his securitizing attempt. Second, the alleged threat, in our case Carthage, should be considered threatening in the audience's minds (Buzan et al., 1997, p. 33).

This section will address Cato the Elder's authority and evaluate his importance. A subsequent section of this chapter will study the audience's interpretation of Carthage.

6.1.2 A figure of authority in the 2nd century BCE: Cato the Elder

Born in 234 BCE to a plebeian family in Latium, Marcus Porcius Cato ascended the *cursus honorum* progressively, beginning from its lowest tier. At 17 years old, he served as a soldier in the Roman army and fought in the Second Punic War, where he was distinguished for his courage. He started his political career as a *quaestor* under Scipio Africanus, the general who vanquished Hannibal, pursued as an *aedile* and then *praetor*. In 195 BCE, this *homo novus* (new man) reached the role of consul, the co-chief executive of the roman republic (Wasson, 2023, para. 1). Cato is most known not for his consulship but for being elected in the highly renowned office of the censorship in 184 BCE, the most exclusive office out of the *cursus honorum.* Only four Romans were selected for this role every decade (Burgeon, 2015, p. 1341). During his lifetime, the senator was known as a bigot, a symbol of personal austerity, and someone who despised everything Greek or Carthaginian. Cato the Censor took his role dearly and was one of the republic's most vigorous defenders of traditional Roman morals and virtues, especially vocal against foreign culture (Goldsworthy, 2007, p.419-421; Burgeon, 2015, p.1353).

As already mentioned in Chapter 3, Cato was not only one of the few censors, but he was also possibly *princeps senatus*, the first of the Senate. That position meant that he was first to speak in debates, the other senators would see him as a guiding figure through times of conflict, and he could not be interrupted when he offered his opinion (Bonnefond-Coudry, 1989, p. 702; Burgeon, 2015, p.1398).

Although Cato's role as the *first of the Senate* is not certain, he nonetheless held considerable authority in the Roman Senate. Indeed, he was perceived as a formidable speaker and sometimes considered the first Roman orator. Ancient authors highly praised his oratory skills: Pliny considered him excellent, and Quintilian described him as "outstanding in speaking" (Astin, 1978, p. 132). Plutarch also lauded Cato the Elder's

oratory in his famous *Lives of Illustrious Men*, writing that it was "at once graceful and powerful, pleasant and compelling, facetious and severe, sententious and belligerent" (Plutarch, 1999, p.14). This Greek historian also mentions that Cato's eloquence was the source of his vast power and that most Romans called him a second Demosthenes (1999, p.11). Alan Edgar Astin encapsulates the consensus on Cato's rhetorical prowess: "His exceptional command of language and powers of delivery were the principal elements in an eloquence which established him as the outstanding orator of his age" (1978, p. 8). Cato's advanced age, a significant source of authority at the time, his senatorial importance and exceptional oratory skills made him a highly esteemed figure in the Senate (Plutarch, 1999, p.27). Plutarch underscores the extent of his influence, noting that in times of crisis, the Senate looked to him for guidance, and in his absence, senators would postpone all essential discussions and votes (Bonnefond-Coudry, 1989, p. 365).

Therefore, this section has proven that Cato was in a position of authority recognized by the audience, the Roman Senate, which was a facilitating condition for his securitization move. The last condition, named by Buzan et al. (1997, p.33), was that the alleged threat (Carthage) should be held to be threatening in the audience's minds.

6.2 Validation of the sociological (audience-centric) approach to securitization

The preceding section has analyzed the presence of the essential elements of a successful securitization, for the scholars of the linguistic approach, in our case study. The analysis has proved the existence of two out of the three facilitating conditions of a successful speech act in our dataset : the rhetorical structure and the securitizing actor's position of authority. The last of those conditions is the fact that the alleged threat should be considered threatening in the audience's minds. It has not yet been addressed but will be

addressed in the following section. In chapter 4, it was declared that this thesis follows a conception of securitization where the audience and the context play a critical role in the process, following the second-wave scholars. As mentioned previously, while the first wave does mention that the audience and context play a role, visible in the third facilitating condition, the sociological approach scholarship gives it more importance. Therefore this section aims to complete our analysis of the second century BCE dynamics, going deeper into the sociological approach and the theoretical element they value in securitization. The last facilitating condition of the linguistic approach is also mentioned by second-wave scholars. Therefore, it will be seen as one of the parts of this complete analysis. It was not analyzed previously in order to avoid repetitions.

6.2.1 Theory: The call for an audience-centered analysis.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Balzacq (2005, p.172) sees securitization as part of : "a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction." Context plays an important role, as it is the specific situation where securitization occurs. Regarding the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, it is understood that the audience must be persuaded. Securitization must therefore resonate with the "audience's feelings, needs, and interests" (Balzacq, 2010, pp.25-26). In this, we find a similarity with Buzan et al. last facilitating condition, namely that the securitization effort must resonate with the audience's existing concerns and worldview to be effective. In terms of power dynamics, the authority and legitimacy of our securitizing agent were analyzed in the previous section.

6.2.2 The context

The context is consequently part of this configuration of circumstances in which the securitization takes place. Second wave scholars argue that the conditions that prevail at a specific time set the stage for how a security issue is framed and perceived (Balzacq,2015, p.182). Based on that assessment, this section intends to prove that Cato's securitizing move occurred in an environment that facilitated it.

Firstly, the year 151 BCE marked the end of Carthage's 50-year war indemnity payments to Rome (Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 430), which played a significant role in the economic context of that time. It was the end of a reliable revenue stream for the Eternal City, which meant that the Romans did not receive any more direct benefit from Carthage's existence and had to find an alternative way to enrich themselves. Moreover, it signaled Carthage's economic recovery. The Roman Republic at that time was a bellicose environment, where victory in war could mean economic gains, especially if the opponent was wealthy. Carthage's newfound prosperity made it an attractive target for conquest. The Romans, accustomed to the riches of war, could have seen Carthage's fall as an opportunity for even more significant economic gains (Miles, 2010, p. 423; Baronowski, 1995, pp. 28-29). There was also the possible motivation of certain senators to annex Carthaginian land for exploitation, as it was renowned for its fertility (Baranowski, 1995, p. 28). This economic environment can, therefore, have fostered an open ear to Cato's securitization.

However, the historical sources do not indicate any commercial motivation for Carthage's destruction, and it was many years after Carthage's destruction before any efforts were made to occupy or use its excellent site and harbor. Astin shows that the conquerors, far from claiming the land for themselves, imposed solemn curses against its resettlement (1978, p. 285). Therefore, Carthage's recovery as an agricultural and economic force played a role in the securitization move as a contextual element that helped sway the

audience. However, the economic reasons can not be considered as solid causes for its destruction.

Regarding the political environment, the Roman Republic was an imperialist state that pushed for unstoppable expansion. For John Serrati (2011, p.10), Rome was a state deeply oriented towards and structured around warfare. Chapter 3 presented Rome's expansion to the Italian peninsula during the 3rd century BCE. After the Roman victory at the battle of Zama, ending the Second Punic War, Rome was the biggest power in the Western Mediterranean, and its appetite was stronger every year(Le Bohec, 2011, p. 435).

Furthermore, as seen in Chapter 3, under Masinissa's rule, Numidia had grown more powerful than any of the prior Numidian kingdoms. Masinissa's continuous encroachment on Carthaginian territory suggested a potential threat that Numidia could eventually conquer Carthage itself and become the new North African power. This geopolitical context possibly caused concern for the Romans, who would have been keen to prevent such an outcome (Kunze, 2011, p. 408). Nevertheless, if the Roman Senate had desired to stop the Numidian annexation of Carthaginian lands, they could have done so with relative ease (Astin, 1978, p. 285). Similar to the economic situation, while this political factor can not be considered a cause for destruction, it is part of the context of which the audience is aware. One last political and social element needs to be mentioned. Roman society held war in high esteem, with many individuals engaging in military pursuits for political and social rewards. Successful military campaigns provided benefits beyond financial gains, including glory and enhanced social status. Achievements in war could elevate individuals to magistrate positions and be awarded the highest honor of Rome: celebrating a triumph (Morley, 2010, pp.27-28). However, as it was defended earlier in this study, war decisions were not made lightly in the republican Senate of the 2nd century BCE. The Romans held their values in high esteem, and one of them, the *fides*, was about trustworthiness and

reliability; therefore, only *just wars* were waged where war was really justified (or framed that way).

6.2.3 The psycho-cultural disposition of the audience

The analysis of the context is not the only aspect of the sociological approach that allows a more complete understanding of the securitization process. As theorized by Balzacq, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience also plays a big role (2005, p.172). This section aims to prove that Cato's securitization effort was effective because it resonated with the audience's existing feelings, needs and worldviews.

The audience is defined as: "those that the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issue"(Buzan et al, 1998, p.41). The Roman Senate was the one with the power to accept, reject, or challenge the securitization attempt. As presented in Chapter 3, this Roman institution served as the primary forum for political debate and especially deciding on war or peace (Bonnefond-Coudry, 1989; Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 46). Consequently, it is the Senate psycho-cultural disposition that will be analyzed.

Firstly, as mentioned multiple times in this thesis, Rome was a bellicose state, yearning for expansion. This affected the beliefs and worldviews of the Romans, pushing them to see themselves as worthy of domination over all other states. It is said that the senator Manlius Vulso declared in the Senate during his mandate in the second century BCE that all people obey the Romans, a proof of their world conception at that time (Le Bohec, 2011, p. 435). Additionally, as argued by Emmy Godwin Irobi (2005, para.8), using the psycho-cultural conflict theory, the recollections of previous traumas exacerbate individuals' anxieties and fears. Such dynamics foster a volatile mix of distrust and suspicion, ultimately

precipitating violence. In this case study, the audience was more than anything, afraid of the Carthaginians. The *metus punicus*, mentioned in Chapter 3, was still very strong even five decades after the end of the Second Punic War. The Romans remembered vividly the destruction during the war of Hannibal and considered the Carthaginians as the hereditary enemy (Le Bohec, 2011 p.434). George Franko (1996, p.425) tells us that the Carthaginians were not only the greatest enemy of Rome but also the most vilified. For historians like Astin, the fear of the Carthaginians present in the Roman Senate and population played a big part in the Roman decision (Astin, 1978, p.285).

6.2.4 History as a facilitating condition

Both in terms of context and psycho-cultural disposition, punic-roman history played an essential role in the securitization process. History is, therefore, one of the facilitating conditions of securitization. For Matti Jutila (2015, p.931): "History operates as a facilitating condition if the securitizing actor can connect his or her securitizing move to the historical consciousness of the audience". Historical references can remind the audience that a particular entity or issue has posed a significant threat in the past. This, in turn, justifies using any necessary measures to address the perceived danger (Jutila, 2015, p.931). This importance of history is found both in the first (actor-centric) and second (audience-centric) wave of the securitization theory. Buzan et al. (1998, p.33) last facilitating condition, the fact that the likelihood of successfully invoking a security threat increases when the securitizing actor can reference objects or entities that are widely regarded as threatening, refers exactly to that concept.

Cato's securitization is a perfect example of how history has been used to facilitate the condition of securitization. In his discourses, Cato made references multiple times to past Punic and Roman conflicts in order for his audience to resonate with his plea. Indeed, we

can refer back to his discourse : "(Cato) thought that if they did not check the incredible growth of a city which had shown its malignant hostility in the past, they would just face as much danger as they had before. " (Plutarch, 1999, p.34). He also gave gruesome details about the Carthaginian attitude during the Second Punic War : "They buried the men halfway down in the ground and built a fire around them; thus they destroyed them" (Gellius, 1927, p.285). Cato knew that Hannibal and the Carthaginians were still considered Rome's greatest enemy. He used Roman senators' collective memory of the brutal Punic Wars, especially the fear of the Carthaginians that resulted from it, to shape their receptiveness to his securitization move.

In conclusion, this chapter aimed to connect Cato the Elder's campaign for Carthage's destruction with the context and audience of his time. Based on the linguistic and sociological approach, Chapter 6 revealed that Cato's success in securitizing Carthage's destruction occurred in an environment that was both favorable to Cato's move and influenced by it. It was further facilitated by his authority and a psycho-culturally open audience. His use of history to facilitate his securitization move, playing with existing threat perception among the Roman audience, was greatly effective.

Chapter 7 : Conclusion

For any ancient history aficionado, the Punic Wars and Cato's famous sentence, *Carthago delenda est,* are well known, and their importance is recognized. However, the scholarship on the causes of Carthage destruction fails to further the understanding of Cato's role in causing said destruction. This thesis aimed to use the securitization theory to elucidate how Cato the Elder rhetorics persuaded the Roman Senate to initiate the Third Punic War and what means he used. A detailed discourse analysis demonstrated that Cato's

portrayal of Carthage as an existential threat in various speeches was instrumental in shifting the Roman senate opinion toward an extreme policy of total destruction. This analysis has shown in Chapter 5 that Cato's speeches and actions conformed to the discursive elements of the securitization theory (presence of existential threat, emergency action, extraordinary measures, and heuristic artifacts), which played a significant role in constructing Carthage as a threat.

Furthermore, in Chapter 6, this research demonstrated that the securitization of Carthage occurred in an environment that was both favorable to Cato's move and influenced by it. This environment and his perceived authority by the Roman senate significantly facilitated Cato's securitization. This research, moreover, proved that Cato's move was successful because it resonated with the historical consciousness of the audience. The securitization framework, therefore, provided a robust lens through which to analyze and understand these historical events.

This study has also highlighted the possibility of applying modern theoretical frameworks, such as securitization theory, to ancient historical contexts, such as the Punic Wars. By bridging the gap between contemporary security studies and ancient history, this research opens new avenues for interdisciplinary research.

In fine, this thesis contributes to both ancient history and security studies by providing a novel perspective on the causes of the Third Punic War and demonstrating the relevance of securitization theory beyond its conventional modern applications. The analysis confirms that Cato the Elder's rhetoric was a decisive factor in transforming the perception of Carthage from a rival city-state to an existential threat, thus paving the way for Rome's drastic policy of annihilation.

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