

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**  
**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**Institute of Political Studies**  
**Department of Security Studies**



**Jan Juráš**

**End of Australia Hedging between US  
and China: AUKUS Security Pact**

Master's Thesis

Thesis supervisor: PhDr. Vít Strátecký, M.Phil., Ph.D.

Study programme: Security Studies

Submitted on 31 July 2024

## **DECLARATION**

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.
4. I further declare that the actual text of this thesis, including footnotes, has 105 975 characters including spaces.

In Brno on 31 July 2024

Jan Juráš

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I hereby express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor, PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D, for his guidance, persistence, and valuable remarks. Apart from that, as always, I would like to thank my family and friends, especially MJ for the support of my entire academic studies, which I am extremely grateful for.

## **REFERENCES**

JURÁŠ, Jan. *End of Australia Hedging between US and China: AUKUS Security Pact*. Praha, 2024. 58 pages, Master's thesis (Mgr.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of Security Studies. Supervisor PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D.

**LENGTH OF THE THESIS:** 105 975 characters (including spaces)

## **ABSTRACT**

For more than two decades, Australia has been successfully conducting a hedging strategy between the US and China, as it benefited both – the Australian economy through intensive trade with China and Australian security through close cooperation with the US. But in September 2021, Australia signed an enhanced strategic security pact with the US and UK – so-called AUKUS, thanks to which, *inter alia*, the Royal Australian Navy will obtain nuclear submarines. The establishment of the AUKUS represents a shift from a pragmatic hedging strategy toward balancing with the US against China. This thesis explains the reasons behind this dramatic change in the Australian foreign policy from a (neo)realist and constructivist approach in order to fill-in a theoretical gap and explain why middle powers might abandon hedging. From the neorealist approach, the concept of Balance of Threat is used in order to explain the unparalleled rise of China and the threat it represents to Australia's security. Aggregated powers, proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions of China were examined. However, the importance of cultural affinity, shared identity, and common history between all three states that belong to the Anglosphere are also examined. Overall, this thesis introduces hedging strategy – arguably one of the most heated neorealist concepts in the IR theory nowadays and applies it to the creation of the AUKUS Security Pact. From a wider perspective, this thesis also contributes to the academic debate about why middle powers choose to hedge in the first place and why they might abandon such an approach.

## ABSTRAKT

Austrálie po více než dvacet let řídila svojí zahraniční politiku strategií hedgingu mezi USA a Čínou, což prospívalo Australské ekonomice díky intenzivnímu obchodu mezi Austrálií a Čínou, a z druhé strany čerpala z výhod úzké bezpečnostní spolupráce s USA. V září 2021 ale Austrálie podepsala s USA a Velkou Británií pakt o posílení strategické bezpečnosti – tzv. AUKUS, kdy díky této spolupráci získá australské královské námořnictvo jaderné ponorky, což představuje jednu z největších australských investic do bezpečnosti Austrálie, ale není to jediná výhoda pramenící z tohoto paktu. Založení AUKUSu představuje posun od strategie pragmatického hedgingu k politice vyvažování hrozby Číny dohromady s USA. Práce vysvětluje důvody této dramatické změny v australské zahraniční politice z neorealistického a konstruktivistického přístupu, zaplňuje teoretickou mezeru a vysvětluje, proč jsou střední mocnosti nuceny opustit politiku hedgingu. Z neorealistického přístupu je v práci použit koncept rovnováhy hrozeb, vysvětlující rapidní vzestup Číny a hrozby, kterou představuje pro bezpečnost Austrálie. Práce bere v potaz a zkoumá nárůst moci Číny, její blízkost a vzestup útočných schopností země. Práce se však také zabývá významem kulturní spřízněnosti, sdílené identity a společné historie mezi všemi třemi státy AUKUSu patřící do anglosféry. Celkově tato práce představuje starategii hedgingu, což jeden z nejvýznamnějších neorealistických konceptů v současné teorii mezinárodních vztahů a aplikuje ji na vysvětlení důvodů pro založení bezpečnostního paktu AUKUS. Z širší perspektivy tato práce také přispívá do akademické debaty o důvodech, proč se střední mocnosti rozhodly pro politiku hedgingu a proč by jej mohly také opustit.

## **KEYWORDS**

Australian foreign policy, Hedging, AUKUS Security Pacts, Balance of Power Theory, Balancing, USA, China, Alliance, Security

## **KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA**

Australská zahraniční politika, hedging, AUKUS bezpečnostní pakt, teorie rovnováhy moci, vyvažování, USA, Čína, aliance, bezpečnost

## **TITLE**

End of Australia Hedging between US and China: AUKUS Security Pact

## **NÁZEV PRÁCE**

Konec australské politiky hedging mezi USA a Čínou: AUKUS bezpečnostní pakt

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....</b>	<b>13</b>
1.1 Realism and Balance of Power Concept .....	13
1.2 Structural Realism and Balance of Power .....	14
1.3 Theoretical Introduction to Balancing.....	15
1.4 Theoretical Introduction to Bandwagoning.....	16
1.5 Walt’s Balance of Threat.....	17
1.6 Balance of Interest.....	18
1.7 Australian Realism .....	18
1.8 Constructivism.....	19
<b>2. METHODOLOGY PART .....</b>	<b>21</b>
2.1 Balancing and bandwagoning.....	21
2.2 Hedging .....	22
2.3 Hedging for the purpose of this thesis.....	23
2.4 When is hedging likely to occur? .....	24
2.5 Structural uncertainty .....	24
2.6 End of hedging strategy.....	25
2.7 Australian identity and unique factors.....	26
<b>3. HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA HEDGING FOREIGN POLICY .....</b>	<b>27</b>
3.1 Howard Coalition Government (1996-2007) .....	27
3.2 Rudd-Gillard Labor Government (2007-2013) .....	27
3.3 Abbot-Turnbull-Morrison Coalition Government (2013-2021).....	28
<b>4. AUKUS.....</b>	<b>31</b>
4.1 Initial need for Advanced Cooperation.....	31
4.2 Explaining what AUKUS is .....	32
4.3 Further development after signing of AUKUS.....	34
4.4 Conclusion and implications of the formation of AUKUS .....	35
<b>5. ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF AUKUS CREATION .....</b>	<b>36</b>
5.1 Structural uncertainty and application of the Balance of Threat.....	36
5.2 The power of shared identity and values in making of AUKUS .....	42
5.3 Conclusion and analysis of AUKUS creation .....	45
<b>6. CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>7. LIST OF AUTHORITIES.....</b>	<b>49</b>



---

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
AUD	Australian dollar
AUKUS	Australia-United Kingdom-United States Security Pact (2021)
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (1951)
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BoI	Balance of Interest
BoP	Balance of Power
BoT	Balance of Threat
ChAFTA	China–Australia Free Trade Agreement (2015)
EU	European Union
GNP	Gross National Product
ICBM	InterContinental Ballistic Missile
IR	International Relations
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
QSD	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (2007)
SCS	South China Sea
WB	World Bank

## INTRODUCTION

*There is a problem with Australia's vision of its future. On the one hand, we assume China will just keep growing indefinitely, buying more and more [resources]. On the other hand, we expect America to remain the strongest power in Asia. We will have a very nice future if both of these things happen. The problem is that they cannot both happen at once".*

*(White, 2010: 1)*

For more than 20 years, Australia has managed to hedge its security and economic policy between two great powers – China, as Australia's most important economic partner, and the United States of America (**US**) – its most trusted security ally. Representatives of Australia were persistent in their belief that Australia would not be forced to choose sides between these two great rivals and for more than two decades Australia has been able to conduct a foreign policy composed of two pillars – warm and successful trade and economic relations with China and its investors and enhanced and unprecedented security and military cooperation with the United States.

This approach in IR theory is known as a hedging strategy and, on the balancing-bandwagoning continuum, it lies exactly in the middle (Bloomfield, 2016: 262-263). The term '*hedging*' comes from the investment circles and in its simplest explanation, it means insurance against a negative event. In the field of international relations, hedging is described as '*a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality*' (Goh, 2006: 2). To put it simply, states are adopting a hedging approach as a middle route. This pragmatic approach has benefited the Australian economy while at the same time providing a strong and stable alliance with the US.

But as White predicted already in 2010, this hedging strategy conducted by Australia could not last. From the mid-2010s, the relations between Australia and China began to deteriorate rapidly. In September 2021, in a joint declaration representative of Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom surprisingly announced the creation of an advanced and comprehensive strategic security pact called AUKUS with its main focus on assisting the Royal Australian Navy (**RAN**) to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Moreover, the cooperation also includes other areas of security, such as participation in the development of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and cyber security.

By signing the AUKUS Security Treaty, Australia has abandoned its hedging position between China and the US and committed itself to balance with the US against China. The creation of the AUKUS is described by many IR scholars and security analysts as the most significant shift in Australia's foreign policy since the Second World War. It is also the first time in history that a non-nuclear country will possess nuclear-powered submarines, but

not nuclear weapons (Shi, 2022: 263). What has caused such a dramatic U-turn in Australia's 20 years of successful and pragmatic foreign policy represented by the hedging between China and the US?

This thesis is not just analysing a newly created AUKUS Security Pact but is examining longer objectives of Australian foreign policy. It is trying to prove that Australia has been engaging in hedging policy for almost two decades and by signing the AUKUS Security Pact profoundly shifted its foreign policy. This thesis also tries to explain the reasons behind the shift in Australian foreign policies. It is analysing it from a (neo)realist and constructivist approach and is also trying to fill a theoretical gap of why middle powers might abandon the hedging approach by explaining the Australian example. This is yet another example of a paradigm that as competition between the US and revisionist great power intensifies, the US is much more likely to sustain a credible coalition with its closest allies.

The aim of this thesis is thus to examine Australian foreign policy between the US and China for the last two decades, analyse it and explain the main factors that led Australia to sign the AUKUS. The two hypotheses this thesis shall prove (un)true are: **(1)** Australia has been engaging in hedging for more than two decades before signing the AUKUS Security Pact in 2021 by which it shifted toward balancing against China, and **(2)** the main factor for the abandonment of hedging and creation of AUKUS is the disappearance of the structural uncertainty caused by the rise of the threat posed by China to Australia security.

The thesis is a case study that is focused on the foreign relations of Australia towards the US and China in the last two decades with an emphasis on the establishment of the AUKUS Security Pact. It operates with primary sources such as proclamations of politicians, governmental white papers, statistics, and memoranda as well as secondary sources such as academic books and articles. Both hypotheses should help to fill the theoretical gap and contribute to the wider academic debate of why middle powers might abandon hedging and why the US is in a stronger position than commonly anticipated, as when the competition between the opposing superpowers intensifies, the US's ability to make deep and enhanced security alliances greatly improves to sustain dependable coalitions.

In the first chapter of this thesis, the theoretical framework will be set by introducing two main IR theories – realism with an emphasis on the Balance of Power concept and constructivism with its significance to shared identity and values in alliance formation. Theoretical origins of concepts of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging as well as structural uncertainty and unique Australian factors will be presented. The second chapter will present a methodology by introducing concrete processes and steps in order to prove or disprove the hypotheses. Concepts of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging as well as structural uncertainty together with the Australian identity and its unique factors of fear of abandonment and its *status quo* status will be introduced from the practical perspective. In

the third chapter, a historical overview of Australian foreign policy towards China and the US will be analysed in order to prove the first hypothesis. Fourth chapter discusses the establishment of the AUKUS Security Pact and the subsequent chapter deals with a thorough analysis of the reasons behind the AUKUS Security Pact and the profound shifts in Australian foreign policy that it represents. In conclusion, all findings will be presented, and the hypothesis shall be (un)proven.

## 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Firstly, a theoretical framework will be introduced. Currently, two main and opposing theoretical approaches are used in the field of international relations (**IR**) to study and explain Australian foreign policy behaviour and alliance formations – (i) realism and (ii) constructivism. These two approaches are selected as they best explain the motivation that led Australia to sign the AUKUS treaty – which is power (*realism*) and identity (*constructivism*).

This thesis primarily operates with the structural realist paradigm to explain Australia's foreign policy behaviour and explain the formation of the AUKUS treaty with the US and UK in 2021. The theoretical framework of this is based on the “Balance of Power” theory, which is ideal for analysing the dynamics of relations between Australia, China, and the US. The concept of “Balance of Threat” is also essential for this thesis. Moreover, related concepts derived from IR theories such as bandwagoning, balancing, and hedging will be introduced in detail.

Besides the realist approach and concepts derived from it, this thesis also acknowledges the important role of the cultural and identity variable, which is present among the three protagonists of the AUKUS treaty as they all share the same belonging to the anglosphere. This constructivist approach also helps to explain the swift and close cooperation between Australia, the UK, and the US based on their shared identity and values.

There are of course other IR theories that could be used and applied to the cause of Australia and AUKUS, but it is not in the scope of this thesis, and neither is its aim, to use and apply other IR theories (such as liberalism) and realism and constructivism were selected as the most appropriate and fitted for the purposes of this thesis.

### 1.1 Realism and Balance of Power Concept

Realism is considered by many to be the most prominent theory of international relations. It is also the oldest concept of IR theory, and we can track its roots way back to the Ancient Era, as History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides is considered the first realist work. In this book, Thucydides examines relations between ancient Greek city-states, and he notes that the rising power and might of ancient Athens in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC led to the establishment of the opposition of other Greek city-states led by Sparta to halt this dangerously rising power of just one city-state (Thucydides, 1985). Thucydides' work has laid down the foundations of the realist school and the concept of Balance of Power.

Realism is trying to describe the relations between the nations as they are and as Morgenthau argues, they consider foreign policy and society as being “*governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature*” (Morgenthau, 1993: 4). A key concept for the realist

is power and its ability to be demonstrated by respective states, as realism believes that states are rational actors pursuing their own interest in the archaic system of international relations by exercising power (Tow, 2001: 3).

## 1.2 Structural Realism and Balance of Power

For this thesis, the works of structural neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer are the most important theoretical frameworks. The concept of Balance of Power (**BoP**) was first introduced and developed by Kenneth Waltz in his academic work titled “*The Theory of International Politics*”. Waltz has shifted from classical realism towards (structural) neorealism, as he maintained some core claims of classical realism but in addition, he also incorporated inputs from the behaviourists. Waltz concluded that the anarchic state of the international system significantly affects states' behaviour and his concept of BoP outlines how the system tends to balance any changes in power distribution (Waltz, 1979).

The concept of Balance of power is considered to be one of the most prominent in the IR theory by a large part of IR scholars. Jervis, who highly contributed to this concept, argues that BoP is crucial for the identification of the character of international relations as it also explains the resilience of the modern international system (Jervis, 1997: 131). In the eyes of neorealists, there are two types of states: great powers, which dictate the order of global politics, and small secondary powers, which react to the actions of these great powers (Mearsheimer, 2014: 30-36). According to Waltz, great powers are characterised by having a strong military and economic predisposition which enables them to shape the world's affairs, and in addition, they often also possess nuclear weapons (Waltz, 1993: 45-52).

The basic concept of the BoP is rather simple. As structural realist believes, states primary goal is to survive in the state of international anarchy - thus they primarily seek security (Glaser, 2016: 17-18). But when the *status quo* is challenged and one state becomes too powerful and a threat to the world order, other states tend to seek and form alliances against this new threat in order to survive (Sheenan 1996, 8). Thus, as Walt argues, the formation of an alliance is mostly viewed as a response to some sort of threat (Walt, 1985: 4). But some states do not predominantly seek as much power as possible; they are rather interested in maintaining the existing balance of power within the structure and maintenance equilibrium in the face of more powerful actors (Golovics, 2017: 363-365).

The Concept of Balance of Power was later extended by the Balance of Threat (**BoT**) theory. This new concept was first introduced by Stephen Walt in the 1980s in his article titled ‘*Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power*’ (1985) and later advanced in his book *The Origins of Alliances* (1987). The main shift from Waltz's concept is on the emphasis from the power to the importance of threat in the anarchic system of international relations.

Moreover, the aspect of motives of potential threat is important as in Walt's BoT theory, the political relations between states are considered crucial. Thus, the most important aspect is no longer just the respective power of each state, but rather the potential threat posed by the respective state (Walt, 1985: 3-8).

### **1.2.1 Balancing vs. bandwagoning**

In his work, Walt is trying to answer the question of how states choose their allies in order to preserve their security. He has identified two main contradicting strategies, which states can choose from – *balancing* and *bandwagoning*.

Balancing behaviour is best described by the traditional realist theory of power. According to this theory, states are forming alliances mainly to deny one state to reach a globally dominant position. States are thus forming alliances to protect one another against the common threat, as only by their mutual opposition this aspiring hegemonic state can be defeated (Walt, 1985: 5). Contrary, when a state decides to align with the principal source of the threat, this is called bandwagoning (Walt, 1985: 4-6). The implications on the most basic level are that when states choose to balance, they tend to be more secure because the principal source of the threat will face the combined opposition, while in the case of bandwagoning, aggression is rewarded and thus the security situation is more prone to possible conflicts (Yeung, 2016: 14-16).

Walt is still considering power as one of the main driving factors for states to form alliances, but the power alone is not sufficient as the level of threat is equally important for the state to decide whether to adopt a balancing or bandwagoning approach against the threat. Walt's BoT thus complements the classical Balance of Power theory, mainly developed by Kenneth Waltz, who supports Walt's approach and modification of his theory and highlights the practical application and development of his theory.

## **1.3 Theoretical Introduction to Balancing**

Balancing, as presented above, is thus one of the most important concepts derived from the BoP and BoT theory. But how can a state balance a rising threat? There are two main types of balancing, as Waltz distinguishes between internal and external balancing (Waltz, 1979: 168).

### **1.3.1 Internal Balancing**

Internal balancing can be described as an increase in the state's military and economic capacities to be able to face a rising threat. Waltz argues that this internal balancing was predominantly important during a bipolar world and the era of the Cold War between the

US and USSR. Internal balancing led to the arms races, as both rival states tended to prefer to increase their military capacity instead of looking for alliances (Waltz, 1979: 168). Mearsheimer has added his latent power theory, as he argues that state power is not defined solely by its current military capacities and economic development, but it is also important to account country's size, population, and natural resources wealth, which is a prerequisite for gaining financial, technological and personal resources for conducting wars (Mearsheimer, 2014: 73). To put it simply, resources and population large enough can shift states from the emerging power to the great power. The perfect example of this latent power is, for example, China, whose unprecedented rise in the last two decades is the most important reason for AUKUS's creation.

### 1.3.2 External Balancing

External balancing is, on the other hand, characterized by forming alliances and exploiting allies' resources. External balancing is more flexible, unlike internal balancing, as an accumulation of more power is usually much quicker in this way. The primary goal of forming alliances is to help the balancing state reduce its need for its resources by sharing the burden among many allies in order to collectively survive and enhance security (Sheenan, 1996: 56). Historically, this approach was adopted by Great Britain toward conflicts on the European continent, as traditionally, the British supported the alliance of smaller states to suppress any rising power which could endanger British Empire (Churchill, 1948: 207-208). In addition to this, states are also motivated to external balancing as they also want to increase their own influence, because should they choose bandwagoning instead, their contribution would be minimal to the great power and subsequently their influence would be diminished (Bloomfield, 2016: 260-261).

However, alliances can bring risks and threats as well. From Ancient Roman fabulist Phaedrus, we know that "*an alliance with a powerful person is never safe*". Snyder is pointing to the fact that often, an ally might fail to defend its allies and leave it vulnerable to attack, as this happened for example to Czechoslovakia before the Second World War (Snyder, 1984: 465-467). Jervis also argues that some problems can be caused by the size of the alliance itself, as more members also mean more internal disputes between the respective members which increases the inefficiency and disorganisation to address the external rising power (Jervis, 1997: 110).

## 1.4 Theoretical Introduction to Bandwagoning

Bandwagoning behaviour, on the other hand, is led by the assumption that is it more convenient for a state to ally with the principal source of threat rather than to ally against it. This assumption was used for example by the German admiral Alfred von Tirpitz when he developed a "Risk Theory". Tirpitz had assumed that if Germany would create a strong Navy, then Great Britain would try to avoid confrontation with it and either bandwagon



with Germany or at least stay neutral (Rock, 1988: 344-348). Bandwagoning is adopted with the aim either to appease and avoid war or to share spoils of wars (as happened at the beginning of the Second World War between Hitler and Stalin) (Schweller, 1994: 82).

## **1.5 Walt's Balance of Threat**

According to Walt, states are primarily responding to the threat by conducting alliances with states that do not pose such a threat and choose to balance together against the bigger threat (Walt, 1987: 23-25). Walt is however pointing out that sometimes, states might choose to bandwagon with the source of threat, such for the example in the case of isolated states (Ibid: 30). In order to determine the scale of the potential threat, Walt has designed a four key factors of threat sources: (i) aggregated power, (ii) proximity, (iii) offensive capability and (iv) offensive intentions.

### **1.5.1 Aggregated power**

Aggregated power describes the power of states in the way of classical BoP, based on the state's size of total resources, its geographical size, military and economic capacity, and population. An example of aggregate power was a US strategy of containment introduced by Kennan, which stated that the US should intervene against any state controlling the aggregated power bigger than the resources of Eurasia (Walt, 1985: 8).

### **1.5.2 Proximity**

Proximity means the size of a threat based on the geographical distance between two states, as bigger the proximity, the bigger the threat is. Proximity of adversary states also includes the creation of spheres of influence, as for example some states decide to bandwagon and become a sphere of influence for the state that imposes a threat, and thus the proximity between states might be smaller because of this.

### **1.5.3 Offensive capability**

Offensive capabilities means that a state's threat is determined by the extent of its offensive capabilities as states with considerable offensive power represent far greater danger than those with minimal military forces.

### **1.5.4 Offensive intentions**

Offensive intentions mean the intentions of respective states. Some states (such as Russia and China) have a revisionist tendency and as such their conduct is perceived as much more hostile and aggressive. Thus, the countermeasure and balancing against such states are much more likely to occur than against states with peaceful and nonaggressive tendencies.

As Walt argues, bandwagoning with aggressive and hostile states is only possible in the case when the threatened state is eager to obtain something really valuable that the adversary can actually offer (Walt, 1985: 13).

## 1.6 Balance of Interest

Walt's BoT concept was further developed by Randall Schweller in his academic article *Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back* (1994). In his work, Schweller mainly criticizes too narrowly defined concepts of balancing and bandwagoning. Schweller states that “*the aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted*” (Schweller, 1994: 74). His concept of Balance of Interests (**BoI**) is adding yet another variable important for states when they are considering joining alliance – expectations of gains and promises of profit.

Schweller is critical in the suggestions that self-preservation and maintenance of the *status quo* are the only driving concerns of states as they are conducting their foreign policy. In his work, Schweller identifies two types of states – those that are prone to defend and maintain the *status quo* and protect their values, and states that tend to have revisionist tendencies, which are willing to disturb the *status quo* in order to achieve territorial gains. (Schweller, 1994: 100-105). Thus, alliance choices are further influenced by the compatibility of political goals. *Status quo* powers often align with other proponents of the *status quo*, while those opposing the *status quo* tend to form alliances of their own. (Ibid: 88). What this also means is that bandwagoning - the act of aligning with a stronger adversary— is likely to occur even with an aggressive state or alliance, which is the opposite view of Walt (Ibid.:104).

## 1.7 Australian Realism

Concerning Australia and Realist Theory, Australian scholar Michael Wesley argues that Australia has developed its own kind of tradition of realism. Wesley described the origin of this unique tradition by the fact that “*Australia has always been a rich, isolated status quo state*” (Wesley, 2017: 325). As such, Australian Realism has a certain unique characteristic, such as systematic pessimism, as Australians are concerned about the preservation of the *status quo*, adherence to the norms of international law, and maintaining order and stability. Another typically Australian feature – experimentalism – is characterised by the focus on the international image and position of Australia abroad and pragmatism, putting emphasis on practical goals and aims in foreign affairs and international politics. Different types of realist traditions that originated from North America and Europe have developed in Australia thanks to the above-mentioned, which is more reliable on maintenance of the *status quo*, practicality, and concrete aims and cautious about political bargaining. (Ibid.: 325-327).

## 1.8 Constructivism

Constructivism is the other main opposing theory to realism. Constructivism, unlike realism, explains how states are conducting their foreign policy with identity factors. The founding father of constructivism, Alexander Wendt, argues that Constructivism provides insights into why and how strategic actors have enabled structural change within world politics (Wendt, 1992). The Constructivist school sees international politics as a social construct guided by two major principles: (i) firstly, shared ideas and values, not material forces, are the most influential factors in state relations, and (ii) secondly, the nature of these shared ideas is in the terms of identities and interests of the agents. (Wendt, 2016: 1-5). The nature of international politics then depends on how the actors construct their identities concerning others. Identities and therefore also interests are formed out of interactions. (Wendt, 1992: 402). It is important to mention that constructivism is not entirely rejecting the importance of the material factors, but it argues that besides them, there exist other factors “*which exist only because we attribute a certain function or meaning to them.*” (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007: 134).

### 1.8.1 Constructivism and security

Constructivists approach security as context specific. They believe that security is shaped by actors’ social interactions and is articulated and negotiated within specific social and historical contexts. Constructivists delve into how security acquires meaning and analyse its implications for political practice within a given setting (McDonald as cited in Williams, 2018, p. 65). In addition, social constructivism focuses on human consciousness or actor awareness of their place in world affairs. Constructivism thus examines the most critical aspect of international relations as the social aspect (Ibid).

For this reason, Constructivism provides a different approach to research on alliance formatting, as is the main premise of Constructivists that alliances are created based on shared identity and values (Suh, 2007: 7). There is a little surprise that all three countries that signed the AUKUS treaty – Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – are culturally, ideologically, linguistically, and historically close and linked to each other. In addition, there all are part of the Anglosphere, which is according to Vucetic an international and civilizational entity inside the global society with special relations of its members. States such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are all characterised by their cultural proximity with common traditions, same language, and shared values (Vucetic, 2018: 1-5, 10). To put it simply, the more similar two or more states are, the more likely they are to be allies. This can explain why Australia has been fighting Germany in both World Wars, despite being so distant to Europe. Germany did not pose any threat to Australia, yet the colonial loyalty to Great Britain was “*not one of*

*all to one but all to all, to the British ideal and way of life wherever it was to be found*” (Williamson, 1965: 180-181).

It is also important to note that several alliances and institutional cooperation between the above-mentioned countries have already been established – such as the Five Eyes Alliance or ANZUS.

Overall, the factor of shared identity and values is indeed important for the study of alliance formation. Australian unique identity is also influencing Australia's behaviour in foreign policy, as Australia is a middle power that is trying to overcome its isolation. However, Walt is correctly pointing out that identity is only one of the many factors and the author of this thesis is also assuming that security matters and strategic concerns are taking precedence over the shared identity. Walt concludes that “... *although ideology does play a role in alliance choices, it is usually a subordinate one.*” (Walt 1985: 24). This thesis is thus predominantly working and focusing on states' material motives to explain AUKUS, originated from realist paradigms presented in the first part of this thesis, but main constructivist aspects in the creation of AUKUS will be presented as well.

## 2. METHODOLOGY PART

The second chapter of this thesis deals with the methodology and presents the main concepts which are used in order to prove or disprove the hypothesis of this thesis. The methodology part is a bridge between the theoretical part and empirical part and is supposed to introduce specific processes and steps of the analysis. A quantitative method will be used as the basis for my research.

A case study concerns Australian foreign policy between the US and China from the 1990s to the present day. The empirical data will be presented in the next chapter and will be mainly based on the thorough study and analysis of the primary and secondary literature. Government proclamations, white papers, and news articles regarding the conduct of Australian foreign policy will be analysed. But before that, several key methodological concepts, which are derived from already presented IR theories of realism and constructivism, will be presented in greater detail.

As already briefly presented in the theoretical part, balancing and bandwagoning are key concepts of conducting foreign policy derived from the Balance of Power theory. Let's look at these concepts from the more practical optics in order to apply them to the Australia case. Then a new concept that is crucial to this thesis – hedging – will be presented, as well as a methodological concept of structural uncertainty, by which we can demonstrate the significant shift in the Australian foreign policy from hedging towards balancing with the US by signing the AUKUS security pact in 2021.

### 2.1 Balancing and bandwagoning

As it was already mentioned, the main aim of the balancing is to check and block a rising power that poses a threat. As Elman defines it, it is a “*countervailing policy designed to improve abilities to prosecute military missions in order to deter and/or defeat another state*” (Elman, 2003: 8). Extended by Vasquez, both the external and internal balancing (as they are explained in subchapters 1.3.1 Internal Balancing 1.3.2) “*involves blocking the ambitions of the other side, taking actions to prevent it from achieving its goals of dominance*” (Vasquez, 2003: 91). For small and middle power, such as Australia is, the balancing means to cooperate and align with one great power against another one (Giorciari, 2019: 531). Schweller defines balancing as “*the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the territorial occupation or political and military domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition.*” (Schweller, 1994: 72). Deriving from Schweller's definition, it is important to realise that balancing actually involves some sort of military power that is targeted against the real threat.

Bandwagoning, on the other hand, is when a state is cooperating with a greater power for its economic or/and security concerns. According to Schweller, balancing and bandwagoning are not necessarily opposing strategies (Schweller, 1994: 74) He also argues that balancing is much less common as it is expansive and primarily conducted for self-preservation as a precaution approach, while bandwagoning is more common and practical for states to gain some profit from it. Bandwagoning is a willing cooperation with great power in order to benefit from it, regardless of its willingness or necessity (Ibid.: 81-93).

## **2.2 Hedging**

But in the past three decades, a new concept of state behaviour alternates with balancing and bandwagoning – hedging – has gained prominence in the theory of IR. It is somewhat of a mixture of the above-mentioned concepts of balancing and bandwagoning which were first developed in the Cold Era. The idea of hedging was introduced as IR scholars have been looking for new concepts, that would explain behaviour of certain states in the post-Cold Era politics and world order (Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019: 367).

Hedging is trying to explain and address several crucial questions about current IR theory and practice. The most important of these questions is how states are conducting their foreign and strategic policies in a highly uncertain and rapidly changing international environment. Hedging provides an answer that states do not actually need to choose just between balancing and bandwagoning, but instead of choosing a clear side to either side with or against a rising threat, states might opt to try to mitigate risks and maximize its gain by not choosing sides and be friendly with both sides (Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019: 367-369).

### **2.2.1 Definitions of hedging – another vague and ambiguous concept?**

Since the concept of hedging was first introduced into the IR theory, endless discussions about its definitions and conditions are present as it has remained ambiguous and vague in theory as well as in practice. But it is however fair to say that even concepts such as balancing and bandwagoning are also ambivalent, with vague and disputed definitions (Liff, 2016: 420-424).

Evelyn Goh defines hedging as a “*middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another*” (Goh, 2006: 8). Most IR scholars are in accordance that hedging is a security strategy that allows states to maintain all options between two opposing powers. The state is thus given as much time as possible to decide which side it will take in the competition between the great powers. According to Koga, Hedging aims to maintain diplomatic flexibility, secure advantageous strategic positions, and mitigate risks to keep strategic options open by pursuing equidistant engagement.” (Koga, 2018: 638). Kuik

further argues that hedging seeks to “*offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects*” (Kuik, 2008: 168)

Hedging is often labelled as an ‘insurance policy’ that is characterised by ‘*not putting all eggs in one basket*’. What this means is that states are free to conduct multiple policy options, signalling strategic ambiguity, and displaying deference and defiance (Lim and Cooper 2015: 698-701). Thus, hedging can be found as a combination of defence, diplomatic, economic or legal means, constituting what can be called a military hedge, political hedge, legal hedge, and economic hedge (Lai and Kuik, 2021: 278-280).

As described by Fortier and Massie, hedging is a security strategy that involves a state combining cooperation and competition in its alignment towards great powers, as a means of risk management. This strategy is used to avoid risks turning into threats. (Fortier and Massie, 2023: 467-469). But is it important to bear in mind that hedging is different from non-alignment, as it goes beyond neutrality, and it is an actively led policy. States that decide to hedge are fully aware of their position in the great power competition and are trying to get the most out of this. As Korolev puts it: “*non-alignment avoids risks, whereas hedging hedges them*” (Korolev, 2023: 3).

### **2.3 Hedging for the purpose of this thesis**

To sum it up, hedging can be seen as a combination of both concepts (bandwagoning and balancing). It can be defined as a portfolio of strategies. To safeguard its security, a state can enhance its security relations with both rising and declining powers. This strategy can help mitigate the risks posed by the former’s intentions and the latter’s decline (Lim and Cooper, 2015: 699).

It is also important to mention that hedging can be considered a multidimensional concept, consisting of economic, security, political, and even cultural matters and tools, but this thesis is however working with the paradigm that hedging is a security strategy that is used by states to neutralize its risk. Hedging is thus an alternation towards more commonly known concepts of balancing and bandwagoning.

Hedging is arguably one of the most influential concepts of IR theory for the study of the Asia-Pacific Area in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019: 368) and as such, it is vital for this thesis which is analysing foreign affairs of Australia towards China and the US. As the security concept that combines cooperation and conformation with rival powers, the hedging behaviour is often most visibly seen in the states' behaviour of its military forces, such as the level of spending on the military, what type of weapons and military technology is a state pursuing as well as where to deploy them (such as positing of its naval and military bases and participation in military operations and exercises) (Liff, 2016: 432-434).

## 2.4 When is hedging likely to occur?

Now, as the concept of hedging has been presented as a security strategy for the purpose of this thesis, it is also important to mention in which situations are states likely to adhere to hedging behaviour in the conduct of their foreign policy. As it is argued by Korolev, the probability of hedging behaviour by middle powers is more likely to occur when competition between two or more great powers is relatively low, as those great powers are not (yet) on the same level as of their respective powers, meaning that one power is significantly more powerful than the other (Korolev, 2023: 4-9). Thus, to demonstrate the historical example, in the early 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR and the bipolar world, the US was an undisputed world hegemon, which enabled hedging to become an attractive security concept for the middle powers to maximize their agendas.

But as the competition between two or more rival great powers intensifies, hedging is becoming less and less lucrative for states as the potential threat is much more real, and choosing a side might be more convincing to guarantee its survival and enhance states' security. But it is important to note that simply the fact that great power rivalry becomes more intense does not automatically make hedging behaviour less credible. From the view of neoclassical realism, unit-level perception filters systemic-level factors (Lobell et al, 2009: 42-74). The conduct of a foreign policy is also very much dependent on its leadership. In the case of hedging, this poses a decision on state leaders if they genuinely believe that the intensification of rivalry between the great powers means an immediate and genuine threat to middle-power interests and security, or, if in the situation when one declining power is challenged by revisionism of emerging power, hedging still can be pursued without posing a real threat to middle power interests (Fortier and Massie, 2023: 467-469).

## 2.5 Structural uncertainty

As it is argued by Korolev, most of the studies have identified that structural uncertainty is a prerequisite for hedging behaviour (Korolev, 2023: 4). Hedging occurs in the state of uncertainty, whereas certainty over great powers' capabilities and intentions leads to clearer alignments such as balancing or bandwagoning (Haacke 2019, 393–394).

As with the definition of hedging, the definition of structural uncertainty is vague as a condition related to the nature of the international environment (Korolev, 2019: 423). Smith in his study of failed hedging conducted by Ukraine defines structural uncertainty as the “*permissiveness of the regional geopolitical environment*”, related to the ever-present hostility between great powers, which is something that middle powers conducting heading must always take into account (Smith, 2020: 590-592). Lee is further adding that hedging



behaviour is uncommon to occur if the regional security situation is based on solid and old blocks-and-camps logic, containing actual and real threats from great powers, and lacks flexibility (Lee 2017, 26). Fortier and Massie contend that a second-tier state may engage in hedging only when it views the balance of power as ‘ambiguous’, with neither the ascending nor the declining great power posing a clear security threat (Fortier and Massie 2023, 5). Korolev defines structural uncertainty in the eyes of a realist great power struggle: “*When powerful actors are in intense confrontation, the structural uncertainty decreases, and smaller states start experiencing increasing difficulties with both equidistancing from great powers and pursuing counteracting policies that constitute hedging*” (Korolev, 2019: 425).

In other words, middle powers are inclined to hedge when structural uncertainty is rather high, but as the struggle between the great powers intensifies, which makes the geopolitical situation nonpermissive, those states are pressed to choose a side. This is because in those situations, smaller powers don’t have enough space to effectively conduct a hedging strategy (Korolev, 2023: 5).

To sum it up, there should likely be a gradual abandonment of the hedging behaviour as clashes between the rival powers have become more frequent since 2008. But at the same time, we could expect a return to hedging during the presidency of Donald J. Trump as US allies have started to genuinely question US willingness as well as its capacity to be a reliable string patron against possible revisionism behaviour from emerging great powers such as China and Russia (Fortier and Massie, 2023: 468-469).

## **2.6 End of hedging strategy**

But why states might abandon the hedging strategy? So far, the existing studies of hedging (such as Goh, 2006; Liam and Cooper, 2015; Kuik 2016 and Haacke 2019) have been focusing on identifying, classifying, and clarifying various hedging patterns, but they have largely overlooked the issue of why hedging could fail or, more precisely, why a middle power would opt to abandon its hedging strategy in favour of more unambiguous balancing (Korolev, 2023: 2). This shift from hedging to balancing occurs mainly due to two primary reasons: Firstly, a dominant great power, in its pursuit of prevailing over peer competitors and bolstering its influence, pressures its less powerful neighbours to align with its coalition and secondly, smaller states, sensing a heightened external menace, choose to align more closely with one of the rival great powers to enhance their security (Korolev, 2023: 5).

Smith argues that sometimes, hedging behaviour might fail and middle powers can pay a high price for it. This can be easily illustrated by the ongoing Russian-Ukraine war, as Ukraine’s attempt to obtain greater autonomy and deepen its cooperation with the EU and NATO has resulted in a severe punishment by Russia – one of the revisionist great powers, which is now attacking Ukraine territorial integrity (Smith, 2020: 590-592).

Only a few studies (Ciorciari, 2019; Smith, 2020; Korolev, 2019 and 2023, and Fortier and Massie, 2023) have been trying to analyse the reasons behind the states' abandonment of conducting hedging. They mostly found out that the intensification of rivalry between great powers (and when structural uncertainty is high) and recklessness of state representatives are among the most common reasons, but no comprehensive statistic is yet available. This thesis is trying to fill this theoretical gap by providing reasons for the Australian abandonment of the hedging approach by signing the AUKUS security pact in 2021.

## **2.7 Australian identity and unique factors**

As was also mentioned in the first chapter, not only material factors but also other factors originating from constructivism can be a motivation for Australia to form an alliance with the US and UK. In this regard, two unique features are important to mention here in the methodology part as they will be then used in an analytical part of the motivations behind the creation of AUKUS and abandonment of the hedging policy.

Australia has a unique geographic situation, which hugely contributed to its so-called “*fear of abandonment*”. This fear has affected Australian foreign policy in its vehement refusal of isolationism (Gyngell, 2017: 289). Because of this, Australia is very active in its international engagement and participation of its army and navy in many military operations together with its closest allies such as the US and UK.

Australia is also characterised as a middle power promoting multilateralism, which adheres to international world order and the rule of international law and is conducting active and independent diplomacy (Carr, 2014: 80-82).

This thesis is thus working on the premise that Australia is a middle power with an active and global foreign policy that tends to rely on the *status quo*, international cooperation, and promotion of western values, which they share with other countries such as the US, UK, Canada, and New Zealand through their shared identities as part of Anglosphere.

### **3. HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA HEDGING FOREIGN POLICY**

This thesis is trying to prove that Australia has been successfully conducting a hedging foreign policy between China and the US from the late 1990s until 2021 when the AUKUS treaty was signed. Thus, in this chapter, a brief modern historical context of Australian foreign policy and relations with China and the US will be presented with an emphasis on international politics and national security to demonstrate concrete real examples of how Australia has been conducting its unique hedging policy.

During most of the Cold War Era, Australia was mostly balancing against China and bandwagoning with the US, as Australia was indirectly involved in the Korean War and during the 1950s and 1960s was trying to contain Beijing. Australia has been moving toward a more neutral approach toward China ever since Canberra established a direct bilateral relationship with the People's Republic of China in 1972 under Labour Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (Goldsworthy, 2001: 329-338). With the exception of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and the backing of US support of Taiwan during the 1995-1996 Strait crisis, the two countries have enjoyed positive and cooperative relations (Harris, 2005: 227-228). In addition, Australia has been historically one of the main exporters of raw materials to China.

#### **3.1 Howard Coalition Government (1996-2007)**

The Coalition government led by John Howard between 1996 to 2007 had strengthened economic cooperation with China while at the same time deepened its security cooperation with the US by participating in Trilateral Security Dialog, which was formed between Australia, the US, and Japan (McDowall 2009, 100). From the official Australia's Foreign Policy White Paper from 2003, we can read that the Australian "*Government will pay particular attention to securing long-term vitality of our successful partnership with Japan and to building a strategic economic partnership with China*" (Australian Government 2003, xv). It was at the end of the Howard government in 2007, when China became the largest trading partner in Australia on imports, and two years later, China also became Australia's largest export market. However, enhanced security cooperation with the US and its allies continued even despite these economic changes. Howard Coalition Government has thus started to slowly conduct its hedging policy.

#### **3.2 Rudd-Gillard Labor Government (2007-2013)**

In 2007, the Australian general elections were won by the Labor Party after 11 years in opposition. During 2007-2013, when Australia was government by Labor prime ministers (by Kevin Rudd from 2007-2010 and by Julia Gillard from 2010-2013) Australia have continued with its pragmatic hedging foreign policy (Bloomfield, 2016: 264). This period is characterised by great improvement of economic relations with China, which were even

backed by making concession in reducing Australian military cooperation with the US and its allies. Right after his election victory in 2008, Rudd have decided to cease Australia's participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (**QSD**) between the US, India, and Japan, which has demonstrated Australia's willingness to hedge between two rivals. Moreover, it was later revealed that Rudd's actions were taken without prior consultation with the US and angered Washington (O'Connor, 2010). However, it is attributed that thanks to this shift China has become much more economically active in Australia. Julia Gillard, replacing Rudd in 2010, has however resumed enhanced military and security cooperation with the US, as evidenced by the placement of the US Marine forces at the military base near Darwin in the Northern Territory (ABC News, 16<sup>th</sup> November 2011). But once again, Gillard also further developed bilateral economic relations with China, as in 2013, Beijing alone was responsible for nearly 32% (AUD 78.1 billion) of Australian exports and 18.8% (AUD 44.5 billion) of imports in 2012–2013 (McDougall, 2014: 323).

During the Labor Government, we can see a hedging policy at its peak, as Rudd even slightly departed from security cooperation with the US in order to appease China. The hedging approach in those years was also visible in the statements made by high-level politicians. Gillard has for example said that *“for Australia, this is not an either-or question [...] Australia can maintain a close strategic alliance with the US while also enhancing its friendship with China, despite Beijing's growing military and economic clout in the Asia-Pacific”* (Franklin and Sainsbury, 2011). In general, Australian officials have softened their statements of potential threats posed by China and instead believe that China will become a valuable and responsible partner in global affairs. This can be further demonstrated by the passages from the 2012 and 2013 official governmental white papers, which proclaimed that China was not seen as an adversary, its rise and strength were welcomed and embraced and even called its militarization legitimate. It also stated that the future would be a combination of cooperation and competition between the China and US and thus Australia will not be forced to choose between them (Korolev, 2023: 8-9).

### **3.3 Abbot-Turnbull-Morrison Coalition Government (2013-2021)**

There was another change in the government, as in 2013 Toby Abbot was sworn in as a new Prime Minister. Abbot, who was PM from 2013 until 2015, renewed harsher criticism against Chinese revisionism in 2013, but at the same time, in 2014, the Australia-China relationship was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership (Coorey, 2014). Moreover, former Coalition Minister of Defence, David Johnston stated in 2014 that *“we see there is a balance between our relationship with China and sustaining our strong alliance with the United States”* (Roggeveen, 2013). In 2015, despite the US trying to prevent it, Australia applied to join the Chinese Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (**AIIB**) as a founding member, together with South Korea. In addition, The China–Australia Free Trade Agreement (**ChAFTA**) entered into force on 20 December 2015 (Korolev, 2023: 8-9). All

this demonstrated that Canberra is more than willing to continue with its hedging strategy as the Abbot government (2013-2015) was increasing its economic cooperation with China while in the security area, the Abbot government was pushing for a more balanced approach toward China, as Chinese aggressive military actions in the South China Sea have meant that Australia increased its military budget and Abbott was boosting alliances with India and more importantly with Japan (Bloomfield, 2016: 268).

### 3.3.1 Turning against China

However, in mid-2010, Australia has started to reassess its policy toward China. Australia has been boosting its military cooperation with Washington, as the US presence has ever since 2016 become more diversified and robust (Greene and Canna, 2017). Australia has also been critical and willing to be part of the US pivot to Asia. But as Pan and Korolev argue, still in 2017, Australia's international security alliance with the US was carefully conducted to avoid provoking China (Pan and Korolev 2021: 126). In 2018, Australia has passed the National Security Legislation Amendment Act in which security threats from China were not specifically targeted (Pan and Korolev, 2021: 127). Canberra also stayed neutral during the China-US trade war under the Trump presidency, as Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop stated that Australia is a neutral state and distancing Australia from the US on China-related matters (van Nieuwenhuizen, 2019: 191-193). Even in 2018, Coalition Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said that: "*it is a mistake to assume that China will assume vis-à-vis the United States the role of the Soviet Union in the Cold War*" and that "*we look forward to working with China on Belt and Road Initiative projects*" (Needham, 2018).

The first hints of abandoning of hedging and commencing balance with the US started during the period of PM Malcolm Turnbull in 2017 as he proclaimed that he feared that China was about to impose a new Monroe Doctrine on the Indo-Pacific Area and to establish dominance over it (Collinson 2017). Julie Bishop, a foreign Minister in Turnbull's administration, has invited the US to "*play an even greater role as the indispensable strategic power in the Indo-Pacific*" and that "*China's authoritarian system is poorly compatible with the Australian style liberal democracy*" (Korolev, 2023: 10-13). More anti-Chinese legislation was introduced in 2017 and 2018, as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (**ASIO**) released its annual report on security threats in which in great detail described the influence of China on the politics of Australia. This resulted in a new anti-interference legislation. Moreover, Australia has become the first country in the world to ban Chinese tech giant Huawei from participating in Australia's 5G telecommunication network (Korolev, 2023: 10).

### 3.3.2 COVID Era

In 2019, Australia cancelled its joint military exercises with China – a step that Fortier and Massie view as "*the abandonment of any pretence of hedging*" (Fortier and Massie 2023, 8). The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the US-China rivalry and accelerated the downward

trend in Australia-China relations. Australia has been alerted by the level of Chinese influence on its universities, companies, and political processes and actually decided to ban various Chinese investments solely based on the nationality of its investors. Moreover, Australia has rejoined the naval Malabar exercise together with the US, Japan, and India in 2020 (Korolev, 2023: 10-13).

The election of Joe Biden in 2021 only deepened the great rivalry between the United States and China, as the Biden administration and its foreign policy diminished structural uncertainty about the US-China power struggle and by deepening US engagement in the Indo-Pacific area. Joe Biden has described the US-Australia alliance as one of Washington's "*greatest strategic assets*" (Greber, 2021). This alliance was also, according to Biden, "*built an unsurpassed partnership and an easy mateship grounded on shared values and shared vision*" (Galloway and Knott, 2021).

During the Turnbull (2015-2018) and Morrison (2018-2022) governments, security measures aiming to halt Chinese influence in the security area were even strengthened, as it became clear that communist China is not to be bound by any norms of international law and is pursuing aggressive expansive policy, as China refused to participate in the international arbitration regarding the South China Sea territorial disputes with the Philippines and refused to accept its ruling on the matter in July 201 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No. 2013-19) Moreover, Australia has adopted a set of new anti-espionage laws and decided to entirely ban foreign political donations in 2017, as it feared that China is using its increasing economic ties for gaining political influence in Australia (Suri, 2020: 3-5).

### **3.3.3 Chapter conclusion**

From the above-mentioned, it can be concluded that Australia has been engaging in hedging policy between the US and China for almost two decades and that the shift from the heading towards balancing occurred between 2019 and 2021. This thesis argues that the most significant act of a shift from hedging towards balancing behaviour was the signing of the AUKUS pact in September 2021, which also represents the complete abandonment of the hedging strategy. Thus, the first hypothesis that this thesis set was proven true.

## 4. AUKUS

AUKUS officially began with the joint announcement on 15<sup>th</sup> September 2021 by representatives of all three participating states – Scott Morrison, then Prime Minister of Australia, Boris Johnson, former British conservative Prime Minister, and the US president Joe Biden. Together, they proclaimed that their governments were establishing ‘*an enhanced trilateral security partnership*’ (The White House, 2021). In addition, the three governments would cooperate together in the first instance to deliver new nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. However, there would also be a focus on cooperation in the development of advanced defense technology, covering ‘*cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities*’ (Ibid). This chapter will deal with the formation of AUKUS and its significance and consequences.

### 4.1 Initial need for Advanced Cooperation

In 2020, a drastic shift occurred in Australian security policy, as a long-anticipated document named the ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’ was published. In its introduction, it is stated that “*Australia’s strategic environment has deteriorated more rapidly than anticipated*” and the security and economic competition between the US and China is directly mentioned as one of the reasons for this deterioration (Australian Government - 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 2020: 3).

The document also mentions the immediate implication for Australia, as this competition is threatening the *status quo* of entire Australia immediate region of Asia-Pacific (Ibid.: 3-11). The most pressing concern and change from 2016 is the fact that China has completed several military and naval bases in the area which pose a significant security concern for Australian security. This document further predicts that conflict with China “*while still unlikely ... is less remote*” (Ibid.: 14). From this, we can see that Canberra has finally officially started to see China as a direct threat, not just as a risk. Perhaps more significantly, the document also updated the previous anticipation that Australia will have at least ten years of warning time to prepare for any eventual attack – a so-called strategic warning time (Ibid.: 14). With the rapid development of Chinese military capacities over the years 2016-2020, it is no longer the case that Canberra will have time to update its military and security capacity in time.

Morrison’s government, alarmed by the findings of the Strategic Update, has realized in 2020 that it needs to quickly react, especially by altering its Military and RAN to these new threats. The US already started its ‘Pivot to Asia’ during the Obama administration, and ever since that US-Australian security cooperation has risen significantly. Traditionally, the Australian army was structured as an army that is centred around its expeditionary forces, which are most likely to be deployed as a part of international coalition missions worldwide

(Fortier and Massie, 2023: 470). But from 2020, – as Australia switched to balancing against China, a new structured army was necessary – as its new primary focus was now to be able to act in the immediate region of Pacific Asia.

The first concept of the AUKUS treaty was discussed between the leaders of three nations at Britain’s G7 summit in June 2021 and it arose in the first instance from Australia’s hunger to replace its aging fleet of six conventional submarines of Collins class, which were in the service of RAN from 1990s (McDougall, 2023: 567-568). Australian representatives realized that conventional submarines were no longer sufficient for new Australian army goals and as such, Australia has decided to cancel its deal with France signed in 2016, in which then-Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull has ordered 12 French conventional versions of nuclear submarines of *Barracuda* class. The estimated cost of this deal was nearly 50 billion Australian dollars, with planned delivery by the mid-2020s (McDougall, 2023: 567-568). But this deal had to be cancelled as conventional submarines have no longer been fit for the Australian new reality. The cancelation led to a period of temporary strained relations between Australia and France, which escalated as France decided to recall its diplomats from Canberra and Washington (France24, 17 September 2021).

## 4.2 Explaining what AUKUS is

So, what exactly is AUKUS? It is a new security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US. It involves a new high-level mechanism of consultations on security matters, the enhancement of military interoperability, and the development of joint capabilities in areas such as hypersonic and long-range missiles, nuclear submarines, cyber security, quantum technologies, and artificial intelligence. The collaboration will provide Australia with long-range land-attack and maritime strike capabilities, increasing its ability to project power over considerable distances, like in the South China Sea, and enabling Canberra to deter any alleged Chinese aggression (The White House, 2021).

Firstly, it is important to highlight that even though AUKUS does not directly mention its goal to halt China, this security pact is indeed aimed at countering the unprecedented rise of Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific area (Evans, September 2021). As it was stated during the Joint Statement by the leaders of the US, Australia, and the UK, the AUKUS pact will “*sustain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific*” and will help allies “*to protect our shared values*” (TheWhite House, 2021). It is argued by Reilly that Australia has lately returned to its core values in conducting its foreign policy and that it represents a bipartisan consensus in Australian politics shared by both main political parties – Coalition as well as Labor (Reilly, 2020, 120-123). By signing the AUKUS Pact, Reilly’s claim was proven to be correct.



#### 4.2.1 Core objectives of AUKUS

To get more into AUKUS, it is in its nature to strengthen the cooperation and collaboration of the joint forces and capabilities in areas such as nuclear submarines, cyber security, hypersonic weapons, and artificial technology. Development in all those areas should result in providing Canberra with sufficient and modern long-range land-attack and naval strike capabilities so Australia can project its forces over a considerable distance. It also will provide Australia with sufficient A2/AD deterrence power to defend itself against any possible Chinese presence in the Australian region of interest of Pacific-Asia. Australian Navy is also projected to be able to hit targets in a contested zone of the South China Sea (Fortier and Massie, 2023: 472).

However, most IR scholars agree that at the heart of the AUKUS treaty lies the US willingness to share its nuclear propulsion technology with Australia, as this technology was shared only with the United Kingdom in the past. Conventional Collins class submarines will be replaced by at least 8 nuclear-powered submarines which should cost more than 112 billion US dollars (Fortier and Massie, 2023: 472). In addition, by having a US nuclear submarine, the Australian Royal Navy should be prepared for enhanced cooperation and operations with the US and UK and in the case of emergency could operate far from its shores off to the coast of China and Taiwan. As argued by Vergun, this approach is consistent with the US “*integrated deterrence*” strategy, which is described as cooperation between partners to create “*a combat credible force across all domains and across the full spectrum of conflict to deter aggression in the face of the pacing threat from China and the acute threat from Russia*” (Vergun, 2022).

Biden’s statement about the AUKUS establishment highlights that “*the relatively benign security environment we have enjoyed for many decades in our region is behind us. We have entered, no doubt, a new era with new challenges for Australia and for our partners and friends and countries right across our region*” (Parliament of Australia, 2021).

Part of the AUKUS pact is also an enhanced presence of American and even British military and Navy forces in Australia. This is especially important to avoid a so-called ‘capability gap’ before Australian new class submarines and other capacities are delivered to Down Under. Australia is thus being now more dependent on its allies for protection as is developing its self-reliant capabilities (Fortier and Massie, 2023: 472).

By its decision to join the AUKUS Security Pact, Australia simply did not just replace French submarines with the better US ones. It was a deliberate act to profoundly deepen its alignment with the US against China. In the words of IR theory, Australia has shifted

from hedging to a balancing strategy, as the threat posed by the rising power of China and its revisionism became very real.

### 4.3 Further development after signing of AUKUS

Chinese imminent response to AUKUS was to label it “*extremely irresponsible*.” China also stated that the pact “*seriously undermines regional peace and intensifies the arms race*.” The official reaction was, diplomatically speaking, strong but measured. But the Chinese press at Mainland China was more direct by calling Australia “*a running dog of the US*,” and condemned Australia for its participation in the “*US-led strategic siege of China*.” (Girard, September 2021).

After the Australian election in May 2022, the Coalition government was replaced by the new Labor government under the leadership of Anthony Albanese. From its onset, the Labor government started to slightly moderate anti-Chinese rhetoric, but it did not abandon Australia's balancing but rather consolidated it. Structural uncertainty has seemed to disappear from Australia's security perception. (Korolev, 2023: 14) Newly appointed Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong has warned that a potential war between the great powers of the US and China is no longer inconceivable (Mecham, 2022). Moreover, under the Albanese government, the US has continued bolstering its military presence in Australia with the aim of confronting the rising Chinese presence in the region. US B-52 bombers, which are able to carry nuclear weapons, have been permanently stationed in the Tindal airbase, located in the Northern Territory. Malcolm Davis, a defense analyst has stated “*this is not significant in terms of the hardware side of things. It is significant in terms of the strategic importance of the fact that we are now able to more easily support the U.S. in its operations in the region*” (McGuirk, November 2022).

But most significantly, the new Labor government has also been supporting the AUKUS deal by allocating more than 360 billion Australian dollars to it. Chinese academics have seen AUKUS as an unequivocally ‘*anti-China military alliance*’ and a ‘*part of US grand strategy in its intensified rivalry with China*,’ and even as a ‘*critical step by the US to construct an Asia-Pacific NATO*’ (Zhang, 2022).

#### 4.3.1 Opposition to the AUKUS

There were however some oppositions to the AUKUS Pact within the upcoming Labor Party. For example, Former Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating has been heavily opposed to the new Albanese investment into the AUKUS and condemned the whole pact calling it the “*worst international decision*” by a Labor government since the conscription in the First World War. Moreover, he stated that Albanese “*screwed into place the last shkel in the long chain which the Americans have laid out to contain China. We are now part of a containment policy against China*” (ABC News, 15 March 2023).

Finally, in April 2023, the Labor government released the Australia 2023 Defence Strategic Review, in which Chinese threats were directly named and calls for stronger cooperation with the US were presented. This document (and the shift that it represents) has been labelled by Richard Marles, Australian Minister for Defence, as the most important shift in Australia's defence posture in decades (Korolev, 2023: 15).

#### **4.3.2 Future enlargement – JAUKUS?**

Moreover, in April 2024, the representatives of all three states of AUKUS hinted that they were considering including Japan in Pillar II, the part of the security pact that focuses on advanced technology, ranging from artificial intelligence and quantum computing to undersea capabilities and hypersonic weapons. However, it was clear that Japan was not invited to join a so-called 'JAUKUS' as a full member of the security pact, it is argued that it was too early to add a new member as all three original members are already working on highly classified projects and that Japan still has not fully prove it can protect such sensitive data (Sevastopulo, 2024). In May, talks about South Korea joining Pillar II as well were also initiated (Jackson, 2024). Thus, AUKUS may turn into 'Asia Pacific NATO' in the future with the aim to halt the rise of Chinese influence, the same as the original NATO is countering the revisionism of Russia and its allies.

#### **4.4 Conclusion and implications of the formation of AUKUS**

In the view of increasing US-China rivalry, the AUKUS pact is much more than simply favouring US technology before the French one. It is a clear signal and indication that Australia has abandoned its hedging strategy and fully aligned itself to balancing with the US against China. In addition, Australia has actively started to participate in the arms race and move closer to a potential war between the two rivalling great powers.

The establishment of AUKUS and balancing with the US represent a '*Rubicon moment*' for Australian foreign policy, as after more than 20 years of fostering good relationships with both the US and China, Australia has unequivocally decided to align itself with the US (Westcott, 2021). What that effectively meant in the words used by the IR scholar is that Australia has switched from hedging between China and the US to balancing against China.

## 5. ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF AUKUS CREATION

In the previous chapters, this thesis has demonstrated that Australia has been conducting a hedging strategy between the US and China successfully for decades. This hedging strategy was conducted without excessively antagonising either side, so it was viewed in Canberra that Australia could have the best of both worlds without the need to choose one side over the other and thus neither jeopardizing its security position, which is heavily based on the US alliance, nor its economic prosperity, heavily subsidised by Chinese investments. This thesis is following the number of academic studies (such as Bloomfield, 2016; Chan, 2019; Fortier and Massie, 2023; Korolev, 2023; He and Feng 2023; and Wilkins, 2023), which have also confirmed that Australia has been using hedging strategy.

For more than 20 years, it was Canberra's strategic and economic interest to contain hedging strategy between China and the US. This pragmatic approach has benefited the Australian economy while at the same time profiting from a strong and stable alliance with the US. But this thesis argues that by signing the AUKUS security pact in September 2021, Australia has once and for all abandoned its pragmatic hedging approach and instead chose to balance against China together with the US and the UK.

But what has caused such a dramatic U-turn in Australia's foreign policy? In this section, the main reasons and motivations why Australia has abandoned hedging are presented. This section is the practical use of the theoretical and methodological parts of this thesis. There are several reasons, which will be presented.

### 5.1 Structural uncertainty and application of the Balance of Threat

As the struggle between opposing superpowers becomes more escalated, the room for smaller states to navigate their hedging strategy is equally reduced. This is evidenced by the fact that China has been expanding its military might and presence rapidly in the Asia Pacific Area, which provoked a US response, and this greatly clashed with Australia's hedging approach toward both nations without alienation of either of them. This understanding of reasons behind Australian hedging might help to understand why hedging has become much more difficult for states like Vietnam, Philippines, and Indonesia in the area of Southeast Asia (Ciorciari, 2019), but also for Ukraine and Georgian in the post-soviet Area (Smith, 2020).

Australia's shift from hedging to balancing is linked to structural uncertainty. As structural uncertainty started to disappear, so did hedging. This was mostly caused by the immense unprecedented and rapid rise of China as the new superpower. The rise of China will be demonstrated in more detail through Walz's concept of Balance of Threat, which was presented in the theoretical part of this thesis.

### 5.1.1 Aggregated power

The overall power of China will be presented in this section, with an emphasis on the rise of China in the last two decades.

In the 1990s, the US GNP was 16 times higher than the Chinese at that time, but in 2019, China's GNP was almost 70% of the US GNP (Korolev, 2023: 8). Ever since that, the gap has been narrowing. Currently, this power distribution between China and the US is similar to the power distribution between the US and the USSR in the prime time of the Cold War Era (late 1970s) (Ibid: 8-9). China has seen not only purely economic rise but also become much more powerful in terms of military might, as it now has the second-largest military budget in the world after the US (Funaiolo and Hart, 2021). But this is not so surprising as China has the world's largest army, with more than 2 million active military personnel (Hackett, 2021). For those reasons, many US scholars and security experts have started to point out that if backed by Russia, China would be able to challenge US national security interests as much as it has never been seen before by any other power in history. As early as 2018 the US Congressional report stated that the US “*might struggle to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China*” (Korolev, 2023: 9). To put it simply into IR theory terms, around 2018, the Chinese aggregated power altered a long period of US dominance and became capable of threatening US global hegemony.

All these facts have also changed profoundly how both powers have been conducting their foreign policies. China has sought to strengthen its international cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative (**BRI**). The US started with Obama's pivot to Asia and by aligning itself to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which saw the rise of regional and economic cooperation with smaller powers in the Asia Pacific region in order to unite with them against rising Chinese influence.

How did Australia react to these changes? Together with the rise of China, Australia's trade dependence on China has increased drastically over the last two decades. Traditionally, Japan has been Australia's largest trade partner, but China managed to overtake Tokyo in 2009 (Cook, 2016: 45-47). As for 2024, China is by far Australia's largest trading partner, in terms of both imports and exports (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2024). This is making Australia one of the most Chinese-dependent economies in the world (Rogers et al, 2020: 24-25).

### 5.1.2 Proximity

More than 4,000 km are separating mainland China from Australian shores, and ergo until recently, this geographical distance was enough to keep Australia safe. But as the Chinese People's Liberation Army (**PLA**) regularly enhances its military technology and expands its

reach for greater distances, the situation is changing rapidly. China is now also able to severely jeopardize Australia's access to international markets and endanger its energy sources and the flow of international commerce which is vital for Australia. Moreover, the PLA is also developing capabilities that can target Australia's territorial integrity (Shugart, 2021: 3).

The geographical proximity between Australia and China is also narrowing with the creation of the Chinese artificial islands and naval bases in the South China Sea (**SCS**). Australia Defence White Paper of 2016 stated that "*Australia opposes the use of artificial structures in the South China Sea for military purposes*". Australia also opposes the assertion of associated territorial claims and maritime rights that are not in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea' (Australian Government, 2016: 58). In 2021, Beijing enacted a new law empowering the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) to use force against foreign ships for law enforcement purposes. This law allows the CCG to stop foreign countries from constructing buildings or structures on China-claimed land features in its "*jurisdictional waters*" and authorizes them to demolish such structures (Haver, 2021). In response, the United States demonstrated its military commitment to the region by deploying aircraft carriers to the South China Sea for manoeuvres (BBC, 2021). The situation reflects heightened tensions in the contested maritime areas, with both countries asserting their interests and strategic positions.

One of the most possible confrontation issues is of course Taiwan. Beijing is systematically preparing its military to take Taiwan by force and the US on the other hand is actively supporting Taiwan by military and economic cooperation. As was said by the US Government in 2022, the Biden administration sees China as "*America's most consequential geopolitical challenge*" and "*the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it*" (The White House, 2022).

Moreover, "*Australia is particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China's land reclamation activities*". China started to be perceived as capable of projecting significant military power into Australia's northern and western territories, which required a higher-level preparedness for any potential incursion (Korolev, 2023: 10).

In 2018, Australian media informed the public that there had been preliminary discussions between the representatives of China and the island state of Vanuatu about establishing a permanent Chinese military base just 200 kilometres from Australia's coastline (Wroe, 2018). Although this was denied by the Chinese side and no base has been built in Vanuatu so far, the mere possibility alarmed the Coalition government and Canberra hardened its attitude towards China. But in April 2022, China signed a security pact with the Solomon

Islands, and then Prime Minister Scott Morrison was talking about China crossing the red line (Cox, Copper and O'Connor, 2023: 315).

Concerning the proximity, it is also important to mention that Australia has received the largest number of Chinese students in the pre-COVID Era and these students have contributed to the Australian economy with more than 37 billion AUD and also the largest number of Chinese tourists (Cox, Copper and O'Connor, 2023: 312).

But it is not only the geographical proximity that is narrowing and poses a greater threat. As specifically stated in the AUKUS treaty, enhanced cooperation is also expected in the cyberspace area. Cyberspace not only erases the importance of physical distance but also slowly but surely becomes an integral part of the current and especially future forms of warfare. As it is argued by Drew, the emergence and further development of the Internet have reduced the importance of the physical distance between the potential attacker and the target (Drew, 2017). China is active in its cyberspace activities and is not holding back from using them against Australia and other Western allies (Burke, 2021). One example is a hacker attack on the websites of the 2009 Melbourne Film Festival, which invited Uighur activists to a premiere of a film critical to the Chinese government (Levin, 2009).

Canberra's foreign policy started to shift from hedging to balancing precisely because of these developments. As argued by Medcalf, Australia has started to view Chinese actions as a threat to *'the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, and commitment to upholding freedom of navigation and overflight'* (Medcalf, 2015).

### **5.1.3 Offensive Capabilities**


Chinese People's Liberation Army has lately been building a special set of capabilities for an offensive strategy, which could endanger Australia. The most important military projects will be presented below.

China is, for example, massively investing in its capacity for long-range bombers. New aircraft from the H-6 family are upgraded with new engines and avionics and as such, their operation radius is extended greatly with its ability to carry new weapons. The new H-6N bomber is even capable of aerial refuelling. This new generation of bombers thus enables China to reach the whole Australian territory and pose a significant threat to Australian air space security (Shugart, 2021: 12-13; Suci, 2023).

Together with the air forces, China is advancing in the development of a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as IRBMs DF-26. These missiles could be used for various purposes, such as anti-ship or to deter land attack missions. For their complex usage, they are often labelled as crown jewels of the Chinese military (Shugart, 2021: 8-9).

But what is posing the most existential threat to Australia is that China has extended the range in which it can project its capabilities, as evidenced by Figure 1. Moreover, China is remarkably successful in the production of land-based InterContinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launchers, and in 2023, it surpassed the US in the amount of these launchers it possesses (Helfrich, 2023). The pressing concern for Australia is also that these new ballistic missiles are stationed in the newly built military base located on Hainan Island and as such, they can easily reach crucial Australian military bases, such as the Royal Australian Air Force Base Scherger in Queensland and Darwin (Davis, 2021).

In addition, China has significantly advanced its development of hypersonic weapons, which includes the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle that can operate in a range of 1,600 kilometres. Beijing is also in possession of the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, with a range of 2,000 kilometres, and the Starry Sky-2, which is a nuclear-capable hypersonic prototype (Seldin, 2023). All the new developments in ballistic and hypersonic weapons have significantly altered Australia’s security strategy and were one of the crucial reasons why it has decided to join AUKUS.



**Figure 1:** The increasing reach of China’s strike capabilities (Shugart, 2021: 10)

The US responded to these changes in Chinese offensive capabilities by relocating its forces from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific Area, which led to the fact that in 2012, 60% of the US Navy assets were stationed in the Pacific, which disrupted the traditional 50:50 split of assets between Pacific and Atlantic (BBC, 2012).



The last main area of Chinese offensive military development lies in its will to establish powerful global navy forces. Currently, China is building its fourth aircraft carrier, which will transform China into the second largest carrier power just behind the US. It is still unclear whether it will be China's first nuclear-powered surface ship, which would be a significant milestone for the Chinese Navy to reach (Mizokami, 2024). Additionally, China is adding several more state-of-the-art destroyers and cruisers, while producing new naval capabilities such as modern transport ships; amphibious assault ships for the transport of the expanding Chinese Marines; or a new class of nuclear-powered submarines. (Shugart, 2021: 14; Sutton, 2021).

Thus, it is no wonder that in terms of the number of vessels, the People's Liberation Army Navy (**PLAN**) is the largest in the world but is it important to highlight that China is still behind the US in terms of overall tonnage which is a much more accurate indicator of the respective navy military power of a state (Kuper, 2023).

As evidenced by the above-mentioned examples, Chinese intensive offensive capabilities profoundly altered the Australian security position and led to the abandoning of the hedging strategy and signing of the AUKUS treaty.

#### **5.1.4 Offensive Intentions**

The perception of China as a threat is to understand how China sees its role in the world order. As Allison argues, China considers its position entirely superior and believes in Chinese historical and cultural uniqueness (Allison, 2017). This perception hence explains China's current ambition to become not just a regional, but also a global hegemon. This ambition however generates clashes with other regional states. Moreover, China is also described as one of the revisionist states that want to violate the *status quo* and international order and as such, Chinese assertiveness and growth of nationalism are more and more common (Turcsanyi, 2017). The most evident Chinese revisionism can be illustrated by the increase of Chinese actions in the South China Sea (Chubb, 2021). Even though the SCS area is still distant from Australia's shores, given the development of Chinese offensive capabilities and specially building the artificial islands and bases in this area poses a direct threat to Australian security (Werner, 2020).

The public was also concerned about the rapid increase in Chinese acquisitions of Australian land and key industries, as demonstrated for example by the decision of the Northern Territory to rent a part of Port of Darwin to a Chinese company for 99 years (Walsh, 2019). This agreement has initiated a strong backlash from the central government in Canberra and the wide Australian public, as it was considered a security risk for Australia. There have been concerns that the Chinese company has ties to the China government and that this rental agreement would allow China to spy on American soldiers based in Darwin

(Barnes et al, 2015). Despite concerns expressed by the US, the government did not block the agreement. Ever since this purchase, however, the Australian government has blocked many Chinese investments into strategic infrastructures, such as when Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE were completely excluded from the 5G mobile network in 2018 (Rhode, 2019: 5-6).

## **5.2 The power of shared identity and values in making of AUKUS**

Opposite to the ‘material factors’ mentioned above, identity factors for sure have also played a role in the forming of the AUKUS Security Pact. Strong ties, shared identity, same language, common history, and values are indeed important for the formation of any enhanced alliance between states.

As was already presented in the theoretical part, all three countries that have signed the AUKUS treaty – the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia – are part of the Anglosphere. Historically, Australia is strongly linked with the UK and its constitutional and parliament system with the shared monarch and with the US through its security cooperation. Australia is also already a member of several pacts, treaties, and organisations with both countries.

### **5.2.1 ANZUS and US-Australian Special Alliance**

Since 1951, Australia has relied on the US for its security, since the US has replaced the UK as the most important ally of Australia. ANZUS treaty was signed the same year between the US, Australia, and New Zealand, and ever since that Australia has been one of the most loyal US allies. All three ANZUS countries share the same values a democratic political system, a liberal economy, and commitment to the rule of law, and as it was already mentioned, this ideological similarity is affecting the level and depth of the Alliance. The Alliance between Australia and the US is unique for many reasons. Firstly, the US-Australia alliance is deeply institutionalised and multilayered. Secondly, Australia has fought alongside the USA in every major war since the First World War and no other US ally in the world can make such a claim (Wilkins, 2019: 14-15). Australia is described as an “*utterly reliable ally*”, as Australians have fought alongside the US in Vietnam and both Iraq wars when American policy was misguided and ill-informed (Beeson and Bloomfield, 2019: 18).

ANZUS Alliance was from its beginning different from other US security alliances (such as NATO). From its origins, the purpose of ANZUS was to maintain Australian security from Japan, as Japan was the only foreign country ever to attack Australian soil. In addition, Australia has not faced any major threats to its security and thus from the very beginning, its Alliance with the US has regional or even global ambitions (Cha, 2019: 153-162).

### 5.2.2 US-Australian Shared Facilities

Just to prove Australia's unique position in the US alliances, Australia is home to numerous shared facilities established by both allies. As of today, 9 of these are based on Australian soil, with perhaps the most prominent being the Pine Gap Facility near Alice Spring. This facility is the intelligence station facility and a key contributor to the NSA's global interception effort (Tanter, 2013). Together with the North West Cape base, these facilities are a critical part of the US global targeting system (Ibid). This is making Australia a vital ally for most of the counter-terrorism operations. In addition, Australia is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement together with Canada and the UK (Chan, 2019:9-10).

Thus, even though the US-Australia alliance is often viewed just in the traditional term – that it is to provide Australia with a security guarantee and help if attacked and vice versa, in reality, the real value and exceptionality of this Alliance is that Australia has access to US resources, such as intelligence, defence science and advanced weapons system (Dibb, 2003: 2-4). To sum it up, Australia is considered the first along the inner circle of US allies together with the United Kingdom and Canada, as New Zealand was excluded due to its anti-nuclear stance. (Ibid: 5).

Although New Zealand is not actively participating in ANZUS anymore, the pact is not formally cancelled and even though the country stands by rejecting the nuclear armament, according to its Prime Minister, New Zealand supports efforts to stabilise the Pacific region. (O'Brien, 2021).

### 5.2.3 Difference between the ANZUS and AUKUS

Some may ask what is the difference between the AUKUS from ANZUS? Besides the fact that there is no New Zealand in AUKUS, it is once again a trilateral security alliance, but this time with a changed third member and a slightly different mission. The presence of the UK represents a shift in the US thinking as recently the US is aware that is no longer capable of halting the rising China in the Pacific Asia area alone, but with capable partners that will be able to independently control and compete with unpredictable China. The US sent a clear message that Americans want to strengthen their connections, their position as one of the world's superpowers, and their motivation to keep these relationships functional for the future (Corben & Townshend & Patton, 2021).

By establishing AUKUS, Australia restored active cooperation with the US and became open to nuclear power weapons. As such, AUKUS represents a reversal of Australia's anti-nuclear activism (Clayton & Newman 2023, 516). Even though it is only about submarines right now, New Zealand immediately stated they would not allow these submarines to enter their internal waters (Perry, 2023). Moreover, Australia has also faced criticism for breaking

International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards, from Indonesia in particular (Barret & Rompies, 2022).

#### **5.2.4 Domestic Political Factor – Labor vs. Coalition**

Some other important identity and cultural factors might have contributed to the establishment of the AUKUS Security Pact such as domestic political factors. One can argue that the shift from hedging toward balancing started in mid-2010 as in 2013, a Coalition (right-wing government) came to power after Labor governments were the ruling party for 6 years from 2007. Moreover, the AUKUS Security Pact itself was initiated and signed by the Coalition PM Scott Morrison. Together with the fact that historically, it was conservative governments that in 1951 signed the ANZUS Treaty and committed Australian troops to US-initiated wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq it is tempting to view that the whole Alliance with the US was initiated and deepened by just one of the two main political parties of the Australian politics. While it is true that the conservative, right-wing politicians were in general much more prone to champion the Alliance with the US, Labor governments and politicians were also subject to the same constraints arising from Australia's unique strategic culture (Cox, Copper and O'Connor, 2023: 317).

Australian strategic cultures operate on the assumption that the Alliance with the US is the bedrock of Australian society and has wide bipartisan support from both political parties (Cox, Copper and O'Connor, 2023: 316). The same applies to the AUKUS. After the win of Labor in 2023, Anthony Albanese has been coherent in his and Labor government support of the Alliance and AUKUS. In March 2023, Albanese met with Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in San Diego and proclaimed AUKUS as an organisation that promotes security. Moreover, he committed Australia to invest further money to obtain nuclear submarines (Tomazin, 2023).

AUKUS is a clear example of a unique Australian strategic culture when it comes to security, as it combines both typically Australian features – fear of abandonment and the acceptance that Australia is not able to defend itself without the support and protection of powerful allies. (Cox, Copper and O'Connor, 2023: 316). Both of these features are derived from Australian geographical and historical conditions, as Australia is a white-settler colony located on the periphery of a much larger and more populous continent of Asia with emerging powers (Cox, Copper and O'Connor, 2023: 317).

AUKUS can be seen as a guarantee - keeping the US close in uncertain times and a symbol of that closeness, both of which assuage fears of abandonment. However, AUKUS Alliance is also a trade-off, described by Beeson and Wang as “*Australian policymakers have generally traded independence of action and thought for the supposed benefits of security—paid for by participation in*

*every major war of the twentieth century and a supporting role in the longest of the twenty-first?* (Beeson and Wang, 2014: 582). As such, it also comes with certain risks.

That is why Alliances are not always a product of just rational calculations of national interests, as it is often simplified by the theorists of realism. The case of the AUKUS Security cooperation also involves a principal shared value and beliefs and common history. Australia is a classic example of a small power state that has always relied on the support of other great powers, as neutrality and nonalignment have not appealed to Australians as these concepts often appealed to other small nations. In addition to that, there is a lack of belief in international organisations such as the UN to protect states' sovereignty (Dibb, 2003: 3).

### **5.2.5 Risk of Losing Sovereignty**

Especially since 2010, there have been some strong voices arguing that Australia should approach a more independent foreign policy, free from the US influence. This view was expressed by several prominent figures, such as former Australian Prime Ministers Malcolm Frazer and Paul Keating, who were calling for scraping the Alliance with the US altogether (Sharma, 2017: 44-46). One of the most prevailing arguments of the critics of the AUKUS is the fear that by committing Australia more closely to the US and the UK, Australia will lose its sovereignty and will be much more dependable on external support. As Gyngell argues Australia *“cannot operate the submarines alone. The capability they provide is only available to us if we cede a degree - quite a high degree in this case - of Australian sovereignty”*. Moreover, according to him, AUKUS will lead to *“deeper operational integration with the US”* and would give the US a *“veto”* over Australia’s *“most expensive and powerful defence asset”* (Gyngell, 2021).

## **5.3 Conclusion and analysis of AUKUS creation**

This chapter has presented and analysed the prevailing reasons that led Australia to join the AUKUS. Both material and immaterial aspects have been presented. The most important reason is the rise of the threat posed by China as structural uncertainty decreases as confrontation between the China and US intensifies. As was proven by the Balance of Threats concept, China has become a much more powerful and much bigger threat to the security of Australia thanks to its economic and military rise, development of many advanced weapons that are able to operate on a much larger scale and reach Australian soil and with emerging revisionist tendencies that clash with the status quo promoted by Australia. Overall, as structural uncertainty disappears, so thus the hedging that led to the creation of the AUKUS Security Pact. The second hypothesis of this thesis was thus proven true as the main factor for the abandonment of hedging and creation of AUKUS is the disappearance of the structural uncertainty caused by the rise of the threat posed by China to Australia's security.

The analysis has also proven that AUKUS was truly a milestone representing a shift from hedging to balancing and that it was truly a bipartisan decision, favouring security before economic prosperity. Australia has once and for all taken side of the US. It has taken the side of the US against China despite the expected concerns and resistance of the latter and thus no longer faces the strategic dilemma of picking sides between the US and China. In other words, Canberra has transitioned from hedging to balancing. While the degree and pace of transition can still be debated, the fact of the shift happening is noticeable.

Although this thesis is still coherent in its claim that the material factors are the most important factor behind the creation of AUKUS, the profound shared identity, and other aspects have indeed played a role. Only thanks to them the Alliance between all three states is as close and unique. This can be also supported by the fact that states such as Japan and South Korea were 2024 invited to join AUKUS's Pillar II, but not to join the whole pact as those states do not have the same level of mutual trust, shared identity and cultural proximity with the US as Australia and the UK has.

Finally, domestic factors such as political divisions seem to be irrelevant regarding the Labor-Coalition approach toward the AUKUS, as the Alliance with the US, in general, is part of the long strategic culture tradition in Australian politics regardless of political party and support of AUKUS is indeed bipartisan. This is further supported by the fact that other countries in the region, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam have started to shift from hedging to balancing with the US against China as well, regardless of their domestic political divisions. This is to prevent China from fully controlling some disputed areas of the South China Sea. Canada, New Zealand, and Thailand have recently experienced the same shift. This only further supports the second hypothesis, as when states face overwhelming systematic pressure, foreign policy will respond to systemic rather than unit-level (domestic) factors.

## 6. CONCLUSION

The establishment of the AUKUS Security Pact between Australia, the US, and the UK is a Rubicon moment for Australian foreign policy as it represents a significant shift from hedging to balancing with the US against China. By joining AUKUS, Canberra favoured security over its economic growth. Australia has been the closest ally of the US for decades and the Alliance between the US and Australia is unique in its nature. By even deepening the cooperation between these two allies by signing the AUKUS Security Pact together with the US, the Royal Australian Navy will obtain a new class of nuclear submarines. But the US don't share its most significant military technology, such as nuclear submarines and hypersonic weapons, and other advanced military technology, for nothing. Royal Australian Navy, equipped with new weapons, will be able to operate in the wider area for considerably longer term, which might be crucial for any potential conflict between the US and China.

The aim of this thesis was to examine the long-term objectives of Australian foreign policy with an emphasis on the newly created AUKUS Security Pact as well as to introduce a new phenomenon in the IR theory – hedging. This thesis also analysed Australian foreign policy from a (neo)realist and constructivist approach in order to fill in a theoretical gap and explain why middle powers might abandon hedging approach by analysing the Australian example.

Both hypotheses were proven to be true, as **(1)** Australia had been engaging in hedging for more than two decades before signing the AUKUS Security Pact in 2021 by which it shifted toward balancing against China, which was evident from the Chapter 3 . Moreover, from Chapters 4 and 5, it was proven that the **(2)** main factor that contributed to Australia's abandonment of hedging and creation of AUKUS is the disappearance of the structural uncertainty caused by the rise of the threat posed by China to Australia's security.

This thesis concluded that the material factors are the most important behind the creation of AUKUS, as the unparalleled rise of China poses a real threat to Australian security. Because of this, structural uncertainty decreased, and Australia had much less space for conducting its hedging strategy. The decrease of structural uncertainty was proven by the Balance of Threat concept. Aggregated powers, proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions of China were examined in order to explain the new threat represented by the rise of China.

Although this thesis is coherent in its claim that material factors are the most important factor behind the creation of AUKUS, the profound shared identity, cultural affiliation and historic ties between all three founders of AUKUS have indeed played a role. Only thanks to them the Alliance between all three states is as close and unique as it is. Finally, domestic factors such as political divisions seem to be irrelevant regarding the Labor-Coalition

approach toward the AUKUS, as the Alliance with the US, in general, is part of the long strategic culture tradition in Australian politics regardless of political party and support of AUKUS is indeed bipartisan and deeply rooted in Australian foreign policy.

From the theoretical point of view, the general trend that hedging is a feasible approach when the rivalry between two opposing powers is not so severe and heated was proven to be correct also in the Australian case. But as opposing powers and their relative strength become more and more even, and as the struggle between them intensifies, then hedging becomes an unfeasible approach as the middle power caught between them is forced to choose a side. As such, a direct approach is often required with a transition from hedging towards balancing or bandwagoning by joining one great power against the other one. This was represented by the signing of the AUKUS Security Pact in September 2021. Australian shift from hedging to balancing thus constitutes a significant shift in Australian foreign policy, which might have an enormous impact on the whole global balance of power, as it makes the struggle between the US and China much more eruptive with the possibility of open scale conflict growing.

The era of Pax Americana is surely but slowly coming to an end. In recent years, intensification of rivalries between the US and China occurred, as well as between the US and Russia. This decrease in structural uncertainty has profoundly affected behaviour of so-called middle powers in relation to the great powers. IR theorists have argued that middle powers, such as Canada or Australia, have adopted hedging strategies in order to maximize their benefits and utilise as much as possible from the rivalry between the great powers. The general assumption is that the US is in a stronger position than commonly anticipated, as when the competition between the opposing superpowers intensifies, the US's ability to make deep and enhanced security alliances greatly improves in order to sustain a dependable coalition. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been mirrored by potential similar aggression posed by China toward Taiwan. All this has led Washington to bolster its support for Taipei and raise the probability of conflict between China and the US. This is why the creation of AUKUS is so vital for the US and the West and the extension of new members such as Japan and South Korea might be necessary to halt the rise of China.



## 7. LIST OF AUTHORITIES

### A. BOOKS AND CHAPTERS

Churchill, Winston S. *The Second World War: Volume I, The Gathering Storm*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1948.

Elman, Colin. *Introduction: Appraising Balance of Power Theory*, in *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate*, edited by A. Vasquez John, and Colin Elman, 1–22. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.

Glaser, Charles L., *Chapter 2: Realism*, 14-28 in Collins, Alan, ed. *Contemporary Security Studies*. Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Goldsworthy, David. *Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia*, Carlton, Melbourne University Press, 2001.

Gyngell, Allan. *Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World since 1942*. Carlton, Vic: La Trobe University Press, 2017.

He, Kai, and Huiyun Feng. *After Hedging: Hard Choices for the Indo-Pacific States Between the US and China*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009420570>.

Jervis, Robert. *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511811869>.

McDonald, Matt., *Chapter 3: Constructivism*, 55-71, in Williams, Paul D., and McDonald, Matt eds. *Security Studies: An Introduction*. 3rd ed. Third edition. New York: Routledge, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315228358>.

McDowall, Roy Campbell. *Howard's Long March: The Strategic Depiction of China in Howard Government Policy, 1996–2006*. 1st ed. ANU Press, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.22459/HLM.03.2009>.

Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated edition*. The Norton Series in World Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014.

Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Brief ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.

Sheehan, Michael. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*. New York: Routledge, 1996.

Suh, Jae-Jung. *Power, Interest and Identity in Military Alliances*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Thucydides, Rex Warner, Moses I. Finley, and Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Rev. with a new introduction and app. Penguin Classics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985.

Tow, William T. *Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security*. Cambridge Asia-Pacific Studies. Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Vasquez, John. A. *The New Debate of Balancing Power: A Reply to My Critics.*, in *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate*, edited by A. Vasquez John, and Colin Elman, 87-114. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.

Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliances.* Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics.* 1st ed. Boston, Mass: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics.* 19th printing. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

White, Hugh. *Power Shift: Australia's Future between Washington and Beijing.* Quarterly Essays 39. Melbourne: Black Inc, 2010.

Williamson, James A. *Great Britain and the Commonwealth.* London: Adam and Charles Black, 1965.

## B. JOURNAL ARTICLES

Beeson, Mark and Bloomfield, Alan. 'The Trump effect downunder: U.S. allies, Australian strategic culture, and the politics of path dependence', *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 40, no. 3 (2019): 335-361. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1594534>.

Beeson, Mark, and Yong Wang. 'Australia, China, and the U.S. in an Era of Interdependence'. *Asian Survey* vol. 54, no. 3 (1 June 2014): 565–83. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.3.565>.

Bloomfield, Alan. 'To Balance or to Bandwagon? Adjusting to China's Rise during Australia's Rudd–Gillard Era'. *The Pacific Review* 29, no. 2 (14 March 2016): 259–282. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1013497>.

Bozdağlıoğlu, Yucl. 'Constructivism and Identity Formation: An Interactive Approach'. *Review of International Law & Politics*, vol. 3 no. 11, (2007): 121–143. <https://openurl.ebsco.com/EPDB%3Aagcd%3A11%3A3632859/detailv2?sid=ebsco%3Aplink%3AScholar&id=ebsco%3Aagcd%3A28073499&crl=c>.

Carr, Andrew. 'Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* vol. 68, no. 1 (January 2014): 70–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.840264>.

Cha, Victor D. 'Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia.' *International Security* vol. 34, no. 3 (2009): 158-196. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389236>.

Giorciari, John D, and Jürgen Haacke. 'Hedging in International Relations: An Introduction'. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* vol. 19, no. 3 (1 September 2019): 367–74. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz017>.

Giorciari, John D. 'The Variable Effectiveness of Hedging Strategies'. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* vol. 19, no. 3 (1 September 2019): 523–555. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz007>.

Clayton, Kate, and Katherine Newman. 'Settler Colonial Strategic Culture: Australia, AUKUS, and the Anglosphere'. *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 69, no. 3 (September 2023): 503–21. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12941>.

- Cox, Lloyd, Cooper, Danny and Brendon O'Connor. 'The AUKUS Umbrella: Australia-US Relations and Strategic Culture in the Shadow of China's Rise'. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* vol. 78, no. 3 (September 2023): 307–326. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231195631>.
- Dibb, Paul. 'Australia's Alliance with America', *Melbourne Asia Policy Papers* vol. 1, no. 1 (2003): 1-13. <https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2003-05/apo-nid6523.pdf>
- Fortier, Maxandre, and Justin Massie. 'Strategic Hedgers? Australia and Canada's Defence Adaptation to the Global Power Transition'. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* vol. 78, no. 3 (September 2023): 463–478. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231195633>.
- Goh, Evelyn. 'Understanding 'hedging' in Asia-Pacific security' *PacNet* no. 43, *Pacific Forum*, (31<sup>st</sup> of August 2006) [https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0643.pdf](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0643.pdf)
- Golovics, József. 'Contemporary Realism in Theory and Practice. The Case of the Ukrainian Crisis'. *Polgári Szemle* vol. 13, no. 1–3 (2017): 362–369. <https://doi.org/10.24307/psz.2017.0930>.
- Haacke, Jürgen. 'The Concept of Hedging and Its Application to Southeast Asia: A Critique and a Proposal for a Modified Conceptual and Methodological Framework'. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* vol. 19, no. 3 (1 September 2019): 375–417. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz010>.
- Harris, Stuart. 'China–US Relations: A Difficult Balancing Act for Australia?' *Global Change, Peace & Security* vol. 17, no. 3 (October 2005): 227–38. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150500275366>.
- Koga, Kei. 'The Concept of "Hedging" Revisited: The Case of Japan's Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia's Power Shift.' *International Studies Review* vol. 20, no. 4 (2018): 633–660. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix059>.
- Korolev, Alexander. 'Shrinking Room for Hedging: System-Unit Dynamics and Behavior of Smaller Powers'. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* vol. 19, no. 3 (1 September 2019): 419–452. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz011>.
- Korolev, Alexander. 'Transition from Hedging to Balancing in Australia's China Policy: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* vol. 77, no. 5 (2023): 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2274446>.
- Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 'How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States' Alignment Behavior towards China'. *Journal of Contemporary China* vol. 25, no. 100 (3 July 2016): 500–514. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132714>.
- Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 'The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China.' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* vol. 30, no. 2 (2008): 159–85. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41220503>.
- Lai, Yew Meng, and Cheng-Chwee Kuik. 'Structural Sources of Malaysia's South China Sea Policy: Power Uncertainties and Small-State Hedging'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* vol. 75, no. 3 (4 May 2021): 277–304. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1856329>.

Lee, Ji Yun. 'Hedging Strategies of the Middle Powers in East Asian Security: The Cases of South Korea and Malaysia'. *East Asia* vol. 34, no. 1 (March 2017): 23–37. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-016-9264-8>.

Liff, Adam P. 'Whither the Balancers? The Case for a Methodological Reset'. *Security Studies* vol. 25, no. 3 (2 July 2016): 420–59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1195624>.

Lim, Darren J., and Zack Cooper. 'Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia'. *Security Studies* vol. 24, no. 4 (2 October 2015): 696–727. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1103130>.

McDougall, Derek. 'AUKUS: A Commonwealth Perspective'. *The Round Table* vol. 112, no. 6 (2 November 2023): 567–581. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2023.2286841>.

McDougall, Derek. 'Australian Strategies in Response to China's Rise'. *Asian Survey* vol. 54, no. 2 (1 April 2014): 319–342. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.2.319>.

Pan, Guangyi, and Alexander Korolev. 'The Struggle for Certainty: Ontological Security, the Rise of Nationalism, and Australia-China Tensions after COVID-19'. *Journal of Chinese Political Science* vol. 26, no. 1 (March 2021): 115–138. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-020-09710-7>.

Reilly, Benjamin. 'The Return of Values in Australian Foreign Policy'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* vol. 74, no. 2 (3 March 2020): 116–123. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1693503>.

Rhode, Benjamin. 'Australia, Huawei and 5G,' *The International Institute for Strategic Studies*, vol. 25, no. 28, (2019):1-16 Available from: [https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ORF\\_IssueBrief\\_366\\_China-Australia.pdf](https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ORF_IssueBrief_366_China-Australia.pdf).

Rock, Stephen R. 'Risk Theory Reconsidered: American Success and German Failure in the Coercion of Britain, 1890–1914'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* vol. 11, no. 3 (September 1988): 342–64. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398808437346>.

Schweller, Randall L. 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In'. *International Security* vol. 19, no. 1 (1994) 72-107. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539149>.

Shi, Xiaoqin. 'Beyond AUKUS: The Emerging Grand Maritime Alliance'. *China International Strategy Review* vol. 4, no. 2 (December 2022): 248–67. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-022-00123-0>.

Smith, Nicholas Ross. 'When Hedging Goes Wrong: Lessons from Ukraine's Failed Hedge of the EU and Russia'. *Global Policy* vol. 11, no. 5 (November 2020): 588–97. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12862>.

Snyder, Glenn H. 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics'. *World Politics* vol. 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–95. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010183>.

Tanter, Richard 'The US Military Presence in Australia: Asymmetrical Alliance Cooperation and its Alternatives', *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, vol. 11, Issue 45, No. 1 (2013): 1-20. <https://apjif.org/-Richard-Tanter/4025/article.pdf>

Van Nieuwenhuizen, Simone. ‘Australian and People’s Republic of China Government Conceptions of the International Order’. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* vol. 73, no. 2 (4 March 2019): 181–197. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1568386>.

Vucetic, Srdjan. ‘The Anglosphere beyond Security’, *SocArXiv*, 28 June (2018): 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/48r39>.

Walt, Stephen M. ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power’. *International Security* vol. 9, no. 4 (1985): 3. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540>.

Waltz, Kenneth N. ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’. *International Security* vol. 18, no. 2 (1993): 44-79. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/i323303>.

Wendt, Alexander. ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’. *International Organization* vol. 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764>.

Wesley, Michael. ‘The Rich Tradition of Australian Realism’. *Australian Journal of Politics & History* vol. 55, no. 3 (September 2009): 324–34. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2009.1520a.x>.

Wilkins, Thomas. ‘Middle Power Hedging in the Era of Security/Economic Disconnect: Australia, Japan, and the “Special Strategic Partnership”’. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* vol. 23, no. 1 (28 December 2022): 93–127. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcab023>.

Wilkins, Thomas. ‘Re-assessing Australia’s Intra-alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump.’ *Security Challenges* vol. 15, no. 1 (2019): 9-32. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26644515>

### C. GOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENTS AND WEBSITES

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2024. ‘International Trade: Supplementary Information, Calendar Year’. *Australian Bureau of Statistics websites*, 30<sup>th</sup> of April 2024. Available from: <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-trade-supplementary-information-calendar-year/latest-release>

Australian Government, 2003. ‘Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper.’ *Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*. 2003. Available from: <https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-2203648089/view?partId=nla.obj-2204272098#page/n16/mode/1up>  
 Australian Government, 2016. ‘2016 Defence White Paper’. *Australian Government Defence websites*, 2020. Available from: <https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>

Australian Government, 2020. ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’. *Australian Government Defence websites*, 2020. Available from: <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update>

Parliament of Australia., 2021. ‘Transcript of Press Conference: Canberra, ACT: 16 September 2021: AUKUS Security Partnership; Nuclear Submarine Capability; Defence Spending; Attack Class Submarine Program; Naval Shipbuilding Program; People’s Republic of China; ANZUS alliance; Indo-Pacific security; Christian Porter.’ 16<sup>th</sup> of September 2021. Available from: <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2F8179907%22>

The White House, 2021. ‘Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS.’ 15<sup>th</sup> of September 2021. Available from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/15/remarks-by-president-biden-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-johnson-of-the-united-kingdom-announcing-the-creation-of-aucus/>

The White House, 2022. ‘The Indo Pacific Strategy of the United States’. February 2022. Available from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>

Vergun, David. ‘Official says integrated deterrence key to national defense strategy,’ *US Department of Defense*, 6<sup>th</sup> of December 2022. Available from: <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3237769/official-says-integrated-deterrence-key-to-national-defense-strategy/>

### D. NEWSPAPERS, JOURNALS AND MAGAZINES

ABC News. ‘Gillard, Obama detail US troop deployment’. *ABC News websites*, 16<sup>th</sup> November 2011. Available from: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-16/gillard2c-obama-announce-darwin-troop-deployment/3675596>

ABC News. ‘Paul Keating savages AUKUS nuclear submarine deal as Labor's worst since conscription’. *ABC News websites*, 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023. Available from: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-15/paul-keating-anthony-albanese-penny-wong-aucus-nuclear-china/102098142>

Allison, Graham. ‘China vs. America: Managing the Next Clash of Civilizations.’ *Foreign Affairs*, September/October. Available from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ united-states/2017-08-15/china-vs-america>

Barnes et al.. ‘Chinese investment in the Port of Darwin A strategic risk for Australia?’, *ASPI - Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, December 2015. Available from: [https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2017-07/SI101\\_Chinese\\_investment\\_Darwin\\_v2.pdf?Ld8eqhCvcCXtq2bfBaeNmWWr21Wrkuw](https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2017-07/SI101_Chinese_investment_Darwin_v2.pdf?Ld8eqhCvcCXtq2bfBaeNmWWr21Wrkuw)

Barrett, Chris and Karuni Rompies. ‘Indonesia warns of perils of nuclear-powered submarines in submission to the UN.’ *The Sydney Morning Herald websites*. 29<sup>th</sup> of July 2022. Available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indonesia-warns-of-perils-of-nuclear-powered-submarines-in-submission-to-the-un-20220728-p5b5cx.html>

BBC News, ‘China imposes sanctions on US officials’. *BBC News websites*. 24<sup>th</sup> of July 2021. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-18305750>

BBC News, ‘Leon Panetta: US to deploy 60% of navy fleet to Pacific’. *BBC News websites*. 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2012. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57950720>

Burke, Helena. ‘Senator and academic warn of ‘relentless’ cyber attacks from China’. *New.com.au websites*. 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2021. Available from: <https://www.news.com.au/national/politics/senator-and-academic-warn-of-relentless-cyber-attacks-from-china/news-story/32f511b3996f79370d7c8c4a6948d17e>

- Chubb, Andrew. 'Continuity and Change: China's Assertiveness in the South China Sea.' *E International Relations*, vol. 27 January 2021. Available from: <https://www.e-ir.info/2021/01/27/continuity-and-change-chinas-assertiveness-in-the-south-china-sea/>
- Collinson, Elena. 'Australia's Tilt on China.' *Australia-China Relations Institute*. 4<sup>th</sup> of July 2017. Available from: <https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/australias-tilt-china>
- Coorey, Phillip. 'New Partnership with China.' *Financial Review websites*. 18<sup>th</sup> November 2014. Available from: <https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/new-partnership-with-china-20141118-11on2b>
- Corben, Tom, Townshend, Ashley and Susannah Patton. 'AUKUS shows beginnings of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy'. *Nikkei Asia websites*. 1<sup>st</sup> of October 2021. Available from: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/AUKUS-shows-beginnings-of-U.S.-Indo-Pacific-strategy>
- Evans, Gareth. 'Australia Must Hold US to 'No Quid Pro Quo' Guarantee with AUKUS'. *Financial Review*. 23<sup>rd</sup> of September 2021. Available from: <https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/australia-must-hold-us-to-no-quid-pro-quo-guarantee-with-aukus-20210923-p58u3m>
- France24. 'France recalls its ambassadors to US and Australia in submarine deal backlash'. *France24 websites*, 17<sup>th</sup> of September 2021. Available from: <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210917-france-recalls-its-ambassadors-to-us-and-australia-in-submarine-deal-backlash>
- Franklin, Matthew, and Michael Sainsbury. 'Julia Gillard's US-China Balancing act. ', *The Australian websites*, 6<sup>th</sup> April 2011. Available from: <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/julia-gillards-us-china-balancing-act/news-story/512678a4a519f99a668a276098ab7cd8?amp=>
- Galloway, Anthony, and Matthew Knott. 'Joe Biden's Message to Australia for 70 Years of ANZUS.' *The Sydney Morning Herald websites*. 1<sup>st</sup> of September 2021. Available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/easy-mateship-biden-s-message-to-australia-for-70-years-of-anzus-20210901-p58ns8.html>
- Girard, Bonnie. 'China's AUKUS Response Highlights Beijing's Bunker Mentality. ' *The Diplomat websites*. 30<sup>th</sup> September 2021. Available from: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/chinas-aukus-response-highlights-beijings-bunker-mentality/>
- Greber, Jacob. 'Biden Puts Australia and Allies at Centre of China Strategy.' *Financial Review websites*. 4<sup>th</sup> of May 2021. Available from: <https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/biden-puts-australia-andallies-at-centre-of-china-strategy-20210304-p577pk>
- Greene, Andrew, and Xavier La Canna. 'US Military to Send Large Aircraft Contingent to Darwin as Part of Troop Rotation.' *ABC News websites*. 24<sup>th</sup> January 2017. Available from: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-24/us-military-aircraft-marines-darwin-stars-and-stripes-australia/8206768>
- Haver, Zachary. 'China Passes Law Allowing Coastguard to Use Force Against Foreign Vessels'. *Radio Free Asia*. 22<sup>nd</sup> of January 2021. Available from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/coastguard-law-01222021190658.html>

## LIST OF AUTHORITIES

---

Jackson, Lewis. 'South Korea discusses joining part of AUKUS pact with US, UK and Australia'. *Reuters websites*. 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2024. Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/world/south-korea-confirms-talks-aucus-pact-with-us-uk-australia-2024-05-01/>

Levin, Dan. 'Film Festival in the Cross Hairs' *The New York Times*, 9<sup>th</sup> of August 2009. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/movies/10festival.html>

McGuirk, Rod. 'Australia plays down US B-52 bomber plan that angers China'. *AirForceTimes websites*. 3<sup>rd</sup> of November 2022. Available from: <https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/11/03/australia-plays-down-us-b-52-bomber-plan-that-angers-china/>

Meacham, Savannah. 'Australia's foreign minister warns of 'catastrophic' impact of Indo-Pacific war during UN address.' *9News websites*. 24<sup>th</sup> September 2022. Available from: <https://www.9news.com.au/national/australian-foreign-minister-penny-wong-warns-of-impact-of-war-in-indo-pacific-united-nations-speech/e514adc1-9b31-4ed6-8d48-62f4b3cbb324>

Needham, Kristy. 'China not a Cold war Russia, Turnbull Says in Conciliatory Speech.' *The Sydney Morning Herald websites*. 8<sup>th</sup> of August 2018. Available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/china-not-a-cold-war-russia-turnbull-says-in-conciliatory-speech-20180807-p4zw2q.html>

O'Brien, Patricia. 'The AUKUS pact, born in secrecy, will have huge implications for Australia and the region'. *The Conversation websites*. 16<sup>th</sup> September 2021. Available from: <https://theconversation.com/the-aucus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065>

O'Connor, Patrick. 'WikiLeaks cables cast fresh light on coup against former Australian PM Rudd'. *WSWS.org websites*, 8<sup>th</sup> December 2010. Available from: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/12/aust-d08.html>

Perry, Nick. 'New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance means it won't play a role in Australia's submarine plans'. *AP News websites*. 26<sup>th</sup> of July 2023. Available from: <https://apnews.com/article/new-zealand-australia-nuclear-submarines-a53c60ec60a976af0e709b02cf7f5d62>

Roggeveen, Sam. 'What the new Defence White Paper Will say About China.' *The Interpreter websites*. 23<sup>rd</sup> of September 2013. Available from: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-new-defence-whitepaper-will-say-about-china>

Sevastopulo, Demetri. 'US, UK and Australia say Japan could join part of Aucus pact'. *Financial Times*. 8<sup>th</sup> of April 2024. Available from: <https://www.ft.com/content/f93e7d2f-5d60-4f77-88f1-96fc61115378>

Tomazin, Farrah. 'Whatever it takes': Democrats and Republicans unite for AUKUS.' *The Sydney Morning Herald websites*. 15<sup>th</sup> of March 2023. Available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/whatever-it-takes-democrats-and-republicans-unite-for-aucus-20230315-p5csao.html>

Turcsanyi, Richard Q. 'What's Really Behind Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea?' *The Diplomat*, vol. 22 December 2017. Available from: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/whats-really-behind-chinese-assertiveness-in-the-south-china-sea/>



Walsh , Christopher. ‘How and why did the Northern Territory lease the Darwin Port to China, and at what risk?’, *ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)*, 12<sup>th</sup> of March 2019. Available from : <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-12/why-did-northern-territory-sell-darwin-port-to-china-what-risk/10755720>

Werner, Ben. ‘New Air Bases, Baby Cabbage Key to Chinese Long-Term Claims in South China Sea.’ *U.S. Naval Institute News*, 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 2020. Available from: [https://news.usni.org/2020/06/03/new-air-bases-baby-cabbage-key-to-chinese-long-term-claims-on-south-china-sea?fbclid=IwAR0Y2fRhZJBGNaT\\_WzhPzPFGimTWC08-R3jl2S4NoQxoyCG5kmgchmGOoks](https://news.usni.org/2020/06/03/new-air-bases-baby-cabbage-key-to-chinese-long-term-claims-on-south-china-sea?fbclid=IwAR0Y2fRhZJBGNaT_WzhPzPFGimTWC08-R3jl2S4NoQxoyCG5kmgchmGOoks)

Westcott, Ben. ‘Australia’s decades-long balancing act between the US and China is over. It chose Washington.’ *CNN News websites*. 17<sup>th</sup> September 2021. Available from: <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/16/australia/australia-china-us-aucus-submarine-intl-hnk/index.html>

Wroe, David. ‘China eyes Vanuatu military base in plan with global ramifications’. *The Sydney Morning Herald websites*, 9<sup>th</sup> of April 2018. Available from: <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-eyes-vanuatu-military-base-in-plan-with-global-ramifications-20180409-p4z8j9.html>

## E. OTHER SOURCES

Chan, Lai-Ha. ‘Australia’s strategic hedging in the Indo-Pacific: a ‘third way’ beyond either China or the US’. *Australia-China Relations Institute*, 8<sup>th</sup> of April 2019. Available from: <https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/handle/10453/142849>

Cook, Malcolm. ‘Australia and U.S.-China Relations: Bandwagoned and Unbalancing’, *Joint U.S. Korea Academic Studies 2015*, publication on 29<sup>th</sup> of February 29, 2016. Available from: [http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/australia\\_and\\_u.s.-china\\_relations.pdf](http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/australia_and_u.s.-china_relations.pdf)

Davis, Malcolm. ‘Australia must prepare as China’s coercive capabilities draw closer’. *ASPI – Australian Strategic Policy Institute*. 15<sup>th</sup> September 2021. Available from: <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-must-prepare-as-chinas-coercive-capabilities-draw-closer/>

Drew, Jones. ‘Space, Cyber and Changing Notions of War’. *Small Wars Journal*. 30<sup>th</sup> of August 2017. Available from: <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/space-cyber-and-changing-notions-of-war>

Funaiolo, Matthew P. and Brian Hart. ‘Understanding China’s 2021 Defense Budget. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).’ 5<sup>th</sup> of March 2021. Available from: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-chinas-2021-defense-budget>

Gyngell, Allan. ‘Australia signs up to the Anglosphere’. *Open Forum.com.au websites*. 21<sup>st</sup> of September 2021. Available from: <https://www.openforum.com.au/australia-signs-up-to-the-anglosphere/>

Helfrich, Emma. ‘China Now Has More ICBM Launchers Than The United States’. *The War Zone*. 8<sup>th</sup> of February 2023. Available from: <https://www.twz.com/china-now-has-more-icbm-launchers-than-the-united-states>

## LIST OF AUTHORITIES

---

Kuper, Stephen. 'Yes, the US Navy is 'still more powerful' than China, but it is relative'. *Defence Connect*. 22<sup>nd</sup> of August 2023. Available from: <https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/naval/12624-yes-the-us-navy-is-still-more-powerful-than-china-but-it-is-relative>

Medcalf, Rory. 'The Temperature in Canberra as the South China Sea Boils'. *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*. 4<sup>th</sup> of June 2015. Available from: <https://amti.csis.org/the-temperature-in-canberra-as-the-south-china-sea-boils/>

Mizokami, Kyle. 'China Confirms It's Building a 4th Aircraft Carrier—and the Tables Are'. *Popular Mechanics*. 12<sup>th</sup> of March 2024. Available from: <https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a60116121/china-building-a-4th-aircraft-carrier/>

Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Case Number 2013-19. Available from: <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/>

Rogers et al.. 'Breaking the China supply chain: how the 'Five Eyes' can decouple from strategic dependency', *Henry Jackson Society*, May 2020. Available from: <https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Breaking-the-China-Chain.pdf>

Seldin, Jeff. 'US Defense Officials: China Is Leading in Hypersonic Weapons'. *Voice of America News websites*. 10<sup>th</sup> March 2023. Available from: <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-defense-officials-china-is-leading-in-hypersonic-weapons/7000160.html>

Shugart, Thomas. 'Australia and the Growing Reach of China's Military'. *Lowy Institute websites*, 9<sup>th</sup> of August 2021. Available from: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-growing-reach-china-s-military>

Suciu, Peter. 'H-6: The Old Chinese Bomber That Has Transformed Into a Missile Truck'. *The National Interest*. 22<sup>nd</sup> of November 2023. Available from: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/h-6-old-chinese-bomber-has-transformed-missile-truck-207438>

Suri, Navdeep. 'Australia-China Relations: The Great Unravelling,' *ORF Issue Brief No. 366*, June 2020, Observer Research Foundation. Available from: <https://www.orfonline.org/research/australia-china-relations-the-great-unravelling-67204/>

Sutton, Hugh I. 'First Image Of China's New Nuclear Submarine Under Construction'. *Naval News*, 1<sup>st</sup> of February 2021. Available from: <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/02/first-image-of-chinas-new-nuclear-submarine-under-construction/>

Yeung, Man Kwong. K. 'Balancing versus bandwagoning: The strategic dilemma of Australia's China policy' (*Master's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong*). 2016. Available from: [https://commons.ln.edu.hk/pol\\_etd/17/](https://commons.ln.edu.hk/pol_etd/17/)

Zhang, Jian. 'China and AUKUS: Growing Tensions Ahead.' *Australian Institute of International Affairs*. 17<sup>th</sup> of November 2022. Available from: <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/china-and-aucus-growing-tensions-ahead/>.