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MASTER'S THESIS

**“TRACING THE MUMBAI UNDERWORLD AND ITS
TERRORISM NEXUS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY INDIAN SECURITY”**



NAME: MANVI KRISHNAMURTHY

ACADEMIC ADVISOR: DR. ALIAKSEI KAZHARSKI

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DECLARATION

1. I hereby declare that I have composed this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree with my thesis being used for study and scientific purposes.

31st July 2024

Manvi Krishnamurthy

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

GLOSSARY

PREFACE

THESIS STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 HUMBLE BEGINNINGS

2.2 THE BIOGRAPHY OF A MUMBAI GANGSTER

2.3 THE GOOD DON

2.4 A BUDDING POLITICIAN

2.5 THE DAWN OF A DON

2.6 AN INIMICAL PARTNERSHIP

2.7 LIGHTS, CAMERA & GUNSHOTS

2.8 JACK OF ALL TRADES

2.9 SNAKE IN THE GRASS

2.10 THE MANHUNT FOR “INDIA’S MOST WANTED”

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS THEORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME

3.2 SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME

3.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME

3.4 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS

5.1 THE MUMBAI MAFIA- POLICE-POLITICIAN NEXUS

5.2 THE D-COMPANY-ISI-PAKISTAN NEXUS

5.3 THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES

CHAPTER 6: THEMES & CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 7: BIBLIOGRAPHY

GLOSSARY

1. **Allahabadi gang, Kanpuri gang, Rampuri gang, Kashmiri gang & Jaunpuri gang** – Organized crime gangs consisting of members with origins from cities and States across India such as Allahabad, Kanpur, Rampur, Kashmir and Jaunpur respectively.
2. **Bollywood** - It is a popular term used to refer to Hindi cinema. The term denotes the Mumbai-based film industry involved in the production of Hindi-language movies.
3. **Bombay** – The former name for the city of Mumbai in the state of Maharashtra in India, however, both Bombay and Mumbai are interchangeably used by people.
4. **Bookie** - It is an informal term for "bookmaker." Betting is conducted by a bookie typically on sporting events on behalf of clients. Moreover, they also establish odds and distribute winnings on behalf of others.
5. **Benami** - In Hindi, the term translates to "no name" or "without a name". A Benami transaction or Benami property refers to a situation where an individual uses someone else's name or a fictional one instead of their own
6. **BJP** - The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a political party in India that is one of the two main political parties in the country, the other being the Indian National Congress.
7. **Don** – The leader or boss of a mafia gang.
8. **Goonda** - A colloquial term referring to contracted criminals and gangsters in the Indian subcontinent. This word is additionally described and used in laws, which tend to be referred to as Goonda Acts.

9. **Hawala** - A conventional method of money transfer that does not involve physical movement of the money. Hawala is considered unlawful in India if funds generated from such transactions are utilized for money laundering.
10. **Hawks** – The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), also referred to as the Hawks, is the division of the South African Police Service responsible for probing organized crime, economic crime, corruption, and other grave crimes.
11. **Indian Mujahideen (IM)** - An Islamist terrorist organization that is particularly operational in India. Emerged as a branch of the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) which was established by a group of radicalized individuals.
12. **IPS** – The Indian Police Service.
13. **LTTE** - The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was a Tamil insurgent group operating in the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka.
14. **Mandrax** – It is a highly addictive sedative drug.
15. **Marathi** - An Indian language that is primarily spoken by the Marathi people in the state of Maharashtra. Also, it serves as the official language of the State.
16. **Matka** – Also known as matka gambling or satta is a form of lottery and betting. Like hawala, matka gambling is also illegal in India.
17. **Mumbaikar** - A person who was born in or is an inhabitant of the Indian city of Mumbai.
18. **Municipal Corporation** - In India, nearly every city is equipped with a Municipal Corporation, which is under the administrative leadership of a Municipal Commissioner, who serves as the de facto head of the corporation.
19. **MP** - An MP or Member of Parliament in India is an individual who serves in the Indian Parliament. Representing Indian citizens or Indian

States in the Lower House and Upper House of the parliament respectively.

20. **Naxalite** – It refers to various Maoist-oriented and violent insurgent and separatist groups that have periodically operated in India. The term "Naxal" originates from the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal, India.
21. **NSA** – The National Security Advisor is the most senior officer on the National Security Council of India and serves as the principal advisor to the Prime Minister of India on matters of national security policy and international affairs.
22. **Pathans** – Also known as Pashtuns or Pakhtuns, are a pastoral, migratory ethnic group from Eastern Iran. They primarily reside in northwestern Pakistan and southern and eastern Afghanistan.
23. **Proxy** - A person holding authority to act for another.
24. **RDX** - Research Department eXplosive or Royal Demolition eXplosive or hexogen is an organic compound that is widely used as an explosive.
25. **Shiv Sena** - The popular right-wing Marathi regionalist political party in India.
26. **Tamilians** – Also known as Tamils or Tamilar are individuals who are native Tamil speakers and have ancestry that is primarily traceable to the Indian southern state of Tamil Nadu, the union territory of Puducherry, and Sri Lanka.

PREFACE Why a thesis about the Mumbai Underworld?

As per a 2017 news article, the Mumbai police recorded only two underworld-related crimes in 2016. This finding revealed a substantial decline in underworld activity and their perceived lack of significance.

Is it right to dismiss the diminishing importance attributed to the underworld? The response would be a certain no, as significant breakthroughs are yet to be achieved in terms of punishing the underworld members of Mumbai who have been implicated in a wide range of crimes, from petty crimes to the most serious such as terrorism. Law enforcement organizations in India place significant emphasis on apprehending Dawood Ibrahim, the most wanted person in the country. Dawood Ibrahim continues to serve as a strategic asset in Pakistan's terrorism repertoire, enabling the country to execute telling strikes in India. Furthermore, Dawood Ibrahim and his associates remain in a state of relative freedom in Pakistan, The UK, and Dubai. Dawood himself maintains control over his thriving D-Company, which is involved in illicit activities spanning from terrorism to drug trafficking on a global scale. Furthermore, he boasts of an ever-increasing fortune in billions of dollars and, significantly more worrisomely, he is gaining social acceptance, which further complicates India's efforts to establish his guilt for his crimes and hinders the country's prospects of gaining international support for having him prosecuted.

Talks on resolving problems stemming from organized crime in India frequently veer off course. This is largely due to the issue's multifaceted nature and the need to address it at multiple levels.

Besides this, when compared to the gravity of the matter, academic research on organized crime in India is remarkably little. To begin with, a dearth of scholarly literature and empirical study exists regarding organized crime within the Indian context. The majority of theories and research about the phenomenon

are situated within the Western setting. An extensive examination of organized crime in India, encompassing social and criminological perspectives, has yet to be undertaken. It takes considerable time and effort to gather data for a study of organized crime in India. Securing dependable methods of information collection necessitates a gradual progression through judicious trial and error. A great deal depends on how safe it is for researchers to investigate the subject; risk lurks at every turn, from approaching the subjects to be studied to posing questions to them that need to be asked. Even though the Mumbai Underworld in particular and Indian organized crime syndicates in general are an open secret, the matter is approached with great caution making it a risky circumstance for the interviewees and the researcher alike. There are only a select few researchers who manage to get access to interviewing important people affiliated with organized crime syndicates in the country. This could be attributed to several factors, including the fact that establishing contact with the prominent figures of the syndicate is exceedingly difficult, a significant number of other members remain in hiding and prefer to remain anonymous, and others are incarcerated in various prisons throughout the nation. If an opportunity to interview a mafia member arises it is a time-consuming and laborious process. Researchers must navigate through people at different levels to reach the gangsters for interviews. Moreover, the gangsters often withhold significant and pertinent information concerning the subject matter. Also due to the purported involvement of politicians, police, and other high-profile people in the country with the underworld, all efforts are made to preserve the mystery, the alleged involvement, and networks of Indian organized crime. Much of what is known about the organized crime landscape in India is the result of the efforts of journalists and authors who have published numerous works over a long period. The literature review for this thesis relies heavily on the numerous works of a small number of authors, while one is indebted to them for their immense contribution to the subject—by providing insight into organized crime in

India—which is substantial. However, it remains devoid of the varied perspectives and narratives that multiple authors can provide to the subject which would offer a more well-rounded understanding of the issue. This thesis attempts to trace the Mumbai Underworld's vast yet clandestine networks, connections, and the factors that render it virtually indestructible and most importantly under what circumstances did the Mumbai Underworld and crucially, investigate the circumstances and opportunities that propelled the transformation of the Mumbai Underworld from petty criminals to designated global terrorists.

I have presented a compelling argument in favor of investigating the elusive nature of the Mumbai Underworld, this is merely due to my interest in the matter. Furthermore, this particular personal interest played a substantial role in influencing my choice to seek an academic degree in International Security Studies. By its diverse curriculum, this degree has equipped me with a strong foundation in the fundamental theoretical principles that form the core of the discipline of security studies. Throughout the course, multiple subjects have alluded to the fact that organized crime transcends national borders. This is certainly the case with the Mumbai Underworld, whose survival, among other factors, is largely dependent on its global presence. Moreover, individual national efforts have been insufficient ever since crime has become global. It warrants a worldwide response for the same. Underscoring the seriousness and the necessity for further investigation into the Mumbai Underworld.

A personal quest, the necessity for further research, conceptual knowledge, and real-world significance all contribute to the foundation of this thesis.

THESIS STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The exposition for this research paper is established in this chapter. It provides a backdrop for the research theme. The chapter delineates the problems and perspectives of organized crime in India. This chapter concludes by illustrating the pivotal research question this thesis seeks to address.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The second chapter of this study reviews the existing literature on Mumbai Underworld. This chapter not only summarizes existing research to enhance comprehension of the topic but also highlights key information to bolster my argument, and establishes the groundwork for my research.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is an essential component of this thesis. The theoretical framework supports this study. The theories chosen for this thesis are Social embeddedness theory of organized crime, Social network theory of organized crime, Social capital theory of organized crime, and Rational Choice theory. The selected theories provide the structure for the research question, methodology, and findings.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

Research methodology enables the research to be carried out in a methodical, thorough, and objective way. This research utilizes the qualitative research methodology and will focus on crucial data sources- interviews, academic papers, books, news articles, documentaries, and reports. The qualitative research approach is the best fit for the thesis since it is exploratory, enabling more in-depth and complex research. Following this two data analysis

methodologies thematic analysis and narrative analysis are employed to analyze the research findings.

CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS

The purpose of this chapter is to objectively present vital data relevant to the thesis. It entails examining and dissecting the data on the Mumbai Underworld gathered as a result of the methodology applied. This chapter entails three crucial sub-chapters namely – The Mumbai mafia – Police – Politician nexus, The D-Company – ISI – Pakistan nexus, and The influence of other countries.

CHAPTER 6: THEMES & CONCLUSION

This chapter aims to identify recurring themes to demonstrate their significance to the thesis. The second part of the chapter is an account of 21st-century Indian security problems in the light of organized crime, It also outlines the limitations of the thesis and suggests potential directions for future research and what is in the future of Mumbai underworld and D-Company.

CHAPTER 7: BIBLIOGRAPHY

The final chapter of the thesis is comprised of a compilation of sources for all the information cited throughout the thesis.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

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India Decoded Web Stories Morning Brief Podcast Newsblogs Economy Industry Politics ET Explains Company More

Business News > News > Politics > Yakub Memon hanged in 1993 Mumbai blasts case

Yakub Memon hanged in 1993 Mumbai blasts case

By Rahul Tripathi & Krishna Kumar, ET Bureau - Last Updated: Jul 31, 2015, 03:09:00 AM IST

Synopsis
Several conspirators of the 1993 attacks including Dawood Ibrahim, Chhota Shakeel and Memon's elder brother Tiger Memon are still absconding.

This news clipping from a prominent Indian daily reported on the hanging of Yakub Memon, one of several individuals implicated in the 1993 Bombay Blasts, which resulted in the deaths of 257 people and the injuries of thousands more. I wish to draw your attention to the segments of the news piece that are highlighted. It is worth noting that the blasts took place in 1993, and one of the accused was prosecuted in 2015, while the others continue to remain free. The protracted process of 22 years to deliver justice not only exposes shortcomings in the Indian Judiciary but also sheds light on the underbelly of Mumbai- The Mumbai Underworld, which thrived under the watchful eyes of the government and security agencies both domestic and international and managed to evade the severe punishment that the members of the Underworld should have been subjected to years ago.

This appalling fact, in conjunction with the events that transpired in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, refocused attention on the Mumbai

Underworld, which once more spared the masterminds responsible has since left me with the lingering questions of **Why the Mumbai Underworld continued to grow to what it has become today and what are the elements that have rendered it so much power that the members of the underworld are not held accountable for their actions?**

The quest to find answers to these pertinent questions sparked a profound curiosity in me regarding the terrorist attacks that have transpired in India and the subsequent impact they have had on the nation's security landscape.

Although India's external security challenges are not a secret to the international community, they are predominantly influenced by geopolitics and instability in the neighborhood. India's internal security environment is exceedingly complex and difficult, influenced by both domestic and external factors. Historical developments have also had an impact on the country's internal security.

Internal security challenges in India encompass a host of problems such as cross-border infiltration, refugee influx, domestic terrorism, human & drug trafficking, organized crime, interstate disputes, mass protests, and natural disasters¹. Yet none of the security issues have been able to overwhelm India, which is a testament to the country's and its people's resilience. However, it is imperative to reject any sense of complacency; throughout the years, the Indian government has devoted significant effort to addressing these obstacles. The implementation of a meticulously planned approach, judicious policies, agreements that enhance coordination, an emphasis on development and capability building, substantial allocation of resources, and astute diplomacy have all contributed immensely to reducing incidences that disrupt internal peace and security.

¹ "India's Internal Security Challenges."

Before delving into the research question this thesis aims to explore, it is important to provide a background to the issue at hand.

Sharma (1999) provides an in-depth analysis of organized crime in general and its landscape in India specifically in his paper titled "**Organized Crime in India: Problems and Perspectives.**" Core elements of the article that are crucial for fully understanding the essence of the matter are as follows:

1. The term "organized crime" can be misleading as it refers to businesses that provide illegal goods and services, with crime as a necessary byproduct for profitability. Defining organized crime is difficult as its evolution and forms vary by country.
2. When the British East India Company established the Thuggee and Dacoity Department in 1830 marked the emergence of organized crime as a concept in India. Dacoity is a criminal activity that consists of armed bandit groups committing robberies. The term "thuggee" refers to robberies and murders orchestrated by organized gangs.
3. The emergence of modern crime syndicates in India can be traced back to certain State governments implementing prohibition laws on the production and consumption of alcohol. Prohibition was first firmly enforced in the state of Maharashtra, in the 1950s. The regulations had a significant impact in Mumbai, the capital city of the state².
4. Organized crime involves three components: criminal groups, protectors, and specialist support. Criminal organizations exhibit qualities such as continuity, violence, profit goals, membership predicated on shared commonalities, and criminality. Protectors, such as businessmen, attorneys, and corrupt public officials, use their authority to defend the criminal organization. Social support includes businessmen and public figures. Engaging with them glamourizes the criminal enterprise.

² Deuskar, "Organized Crime in India."

5. Though there are numerous laws and prevention strategies concerning organized crime in the nation are amended time and again to accommodate changing circumstances. No comprehensive legislation exists to regulate organized crime in its entirety, encompassing all of its facets and forms.
6. The occurrence and prevalence of organized criminal activities escalated significantly between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s. The 1990s are widely recognized in India as a 'bloody' decade.
7. The types of Organized crime visible in India are drug abuse & trafficking, smuggling, money laundering & Hawala, Terrorism, Narco-terrorism, Light arms proliferation & trafficking, contract killings, kidnapping for ransom, illegal immigration, and prosecution.
8. Among criminal gangs in India, Dawood's gang- D-Company is the most notorious. He is the most powerful on account of his international connections and nationwide networks. His links with terrorist outfits and participation in a multitude of terrorist activities brought organized crime in India back into the spotlight.

Remarkably, the Mumbai Underworld, and D-Company specifically, are synonymous with organized crime in the nation. It is my conviction, that **'deconstructing' the Mumbai Underworld** is essential for addressing the complex issues surrounding organized crime in India.

Through this research paper, I wish to answer the fundamental question of

Why the Mumbai Underworld Network by itself and its terrorism nexus is proving to be so difficult to dismantle? What are the elements that have manifested as the many active but clandestine links of the mafia network and also all those factors that contribute to upholding the structure of the Mumbai Mafia?

The objective of this research is

To explore the elements that have manifested as the many active, but clandestine links of the underworld network that uphold the structure of the Mumbai Underworld.

(NOTE: Though the challenges organized crime poses for 21st-century Indian security have been written about in the conclusion of this thesis. While researching, it came to my notice that with every passing year in the 21st century, the Mumbai mafia's direct threat to Indian security is diminishing, but still the Mumbai mafia is a serious security impediment and needs to be addressed. Having said this the security threats for India today manifest from D-Company's many clandestine criminal-terrorism networks both from within the country and across the globe. The thesis has been refocused to look at the D-Company's global nexus that is staring at the face of 21st-century Indian security.)

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter comprises 10 subchapters, each exploring distinct facets that have shaped the Mumbai mafia throughout the years. The introductory sub-chapter provides a comprehensive account of the origins of the mafia in Mumbai during the 1950s, as well as an exploration of the different gangs that ruled the initial years of the city's underworld. The second sub-chapter is the profile of a typical Mumbai gangster and the attributes required to become a mafia boss. The third sub-chapter depicts a lesser-explored aspect of a Mumbai mobster, one who commanded respect not out of fear, but because of their contributions to the betterment of society. Subsequently, the link between Indian politics and the Mumbai mafia is discussed. While certain gangsters were chosen to be the faces of political parties, others established their very own political parties. From the fifth sub-chapter, the attention shifts to the emergence and rise of Dawood Ibrahim, his criminal gang, his allies, and his enemies. The sub-chapters that follow explore Dawood's three significant sources of revenue, in addition to his conventional criminal operations, which include cricket, Bollywood, and his many diverse businesses spanning from shipping to real estate. The final two subchapters address the making of Dawood Ibrahim, the international terrorist. The subchapters focus on D-Company's involvement in the 1993 blasts, Dawood's connections with ISI and terrorist groups, his flight to Pakistan, and his reemergence with the 26/11 attacks. They also highlight the multiple efforts by the Indian government and agencies, and governments and organizations worldwide to apprehend Dawood and his aides. However, despite these efforts, Dawood³ is a free man today.

³ While it is a norm to employ only the surname of an individual being referenced in subsequent mentions. In this thesis, Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar will be referred to as Dawood in all subsequent references, even though it is his forename, he is commonly known as Dawood. Also, Ibrahim Kaskar is his father's name, which is also shared by his siblings. Therefore, to prevent any misunderstandings regarding the individuals being discussed and to adhere to the popular way of identifying him, the thesis will exclusively use the name Dawood.

2.1 HUMBLE BEGINNINGS

Mumbai (earlier known as Bombay) has long been the financial hub of the country and a land of opportunity. In the early 1950s, young men from rural India arriving in Bombay in large numbers soon understood that education was essential for success in the city. Consequently, some frustrated individuals resorted to engaging in petty crimes as a means of making quick money⁴. In those days, perhaps the easiest crime to commit was approaching late-night travelers or families and robbing their possessions. The criminals became more confident when some of their crimes went unnoticed, which they saw as a successful execution of their method of operation. This spurred other individuals to join their illicit activities⁵. Byculla, a district in Mumbai, was considered the focal point of criminal activities during that period. Residents of Byculla were either Christians or Muslims. In the 1950s, a criminal group called the Allahabadi gang and its leader Nanhe Khan⁶ first appeared in the neighborhood. They encountered opposition by a rival gang from the Christian area of Byculla known as the Johnny gang⁷. The desire to become the dominant gang in the neighborhood led to skirmishes and minor turf battles between the two gangs. The gangs committed street-level crimes like robbery, bootlegging (particularly of alcohol), Matka gambling, and terrorizing local shopkeepers to steal their cash⁸. When the Allahabadi gang graduated from street-level crimes to drug trafficking with the Pathans, it created a vacuum that was quickly filled, leading to increased turf warfare between the two emerging criminal gangs⁹. Intriguingly, none of the territorial disputes between various groups escalated into bloodshed or took on a communal nature. However, in the late 1950s, one

⁴ "Combating Organised Crime: A Case Study of Mumbai City - Sumita Sarkar & Arvind Tiwari."

⁵ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Underworld.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ "Combating Organised Crime: A Case Study of Mumbai City - Sumita Sarkar & Arvind Tiwari."

⁹ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Underworld

prominent gang leader became involved in a personal conflict with his rival. This soon escalated into a communal conflict between the two gangs and led to the downfall of one leader and the eventual collapse of that gang. Before this, Mumbai's crime bosses had never let religious sentiments affect their business dealings¹⁰. Subsequently, new gangs began to diminish the muscle power and influence of the older gangs. However, not every new gang had the charisma or the boldness to achieve great success for instance the Kashmiri, Rampuri, Jaunpuri, and Kanpuri gangs never made it big in the Mumbai Mafia. The Allahabadi gang was once again gaining power as other gangs were either taken down by internal rivalry, rival gangs, or the police¹¹. Byculla was not the sole neighborhood where criminal gangs emerged; in other parts of Bombay, legendary criminals were establishing their influence over the city, scripting a new chapter in Bombay's history.

2.2 THE BIOGRAPHY OF A MUMBAI GANGSTER

In contrast to the widespread perception that gangsters are muscular, well-built individuals endowed with menacing personalities capable of instilling fear, the vast majority of gangsters are ordinary-looking individuals who can blend in with the crowd. Their physique and demeanor are no match to the gravity of the crimes they have committed. V.K. Saraf researched the Mumbai Underworld and created a profile of its members and operations¹². 66.5% of the criminals in the sample studied were aged between 19 and 28 years, while only 6.5% were above 40 years old. While it is commonly thought that criminals are illiterate, 29% completed primary school, 42.5% completed secondary school, and 5% had a college education. Most of them were from a low socioeconomic

¹⁰ Ibid. 10

¹¹ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Underworld.

¹² Saraf, "FORMATION OF CRIMINAL GANGS IN BIG CITIES."

background outside Mumbai, with around 30% coming from outside Maharashtra. The gangs were not organized by religion. A typical Mumbai gangster is a cool-headed schemer, merciless, and unhesitatingly uses terror methods. There is no initiation ceremony, but a hopeful is engaged in a criminal activity to assess his capability. Although little is known about their private lives, the little data that has been collected suggests that many underworld members are womanizers and have unstable personal lives. However, many of them also appear to have normal family relationships and are regarded as average husbands, fathers, and sons within their families. They and their families also lead a very lavish life enjoying the finest things the money acquired through illicit activities has bought them. A small percentage of individuals exit underworld groups, retire, and use their illegally obtained wealth to establish a legal source of income, typically operating at the edges of the law. VK Deuskar has outlined the characteristics of a successful gang leader in the Mumbai Mafia in his research¹³. An underworld boss is very egoistic and selfish and demonstrates remarkable foresight and courage in undertaking risks. If any gang member was suspected of disloyalty, the leaders would not tolerate it and would harshly eliminate the member to set an example for the other members. All the gang leaders have advanced through the ranks by starting with petty crimes, subsequently forming small gangs, and acquiring money. Most of them have the charm and expertise to win over law enforcement authorities such as police, excise, or customs officials through a mix of bribes and threats. Underworld leaders have perfected the use of fear and incentives to achieve peak performance from their gang members. They also provide support for the families of members who are either killed or incarcerated. They are meticulous in concealing their actions to avoid being identified, ensuring their defense system is flawless. Strangely enough, although they may appear to be merciless

¹³ Deuskar, "Organized Crime in India."

criminals, the majority of the criminals demonstrate a belief in a deity and have often been observed to seek forgiveness at places of worship for committing heinous crimes.

2.3 THE GOOD DON

Although most gangsters in the Mumbai Underworld gained an awful reputation, a few dons were revered and respected, surprisingly not due to fear. While they did partake in illegal and criminal activities, they also exhibited an unexpectedly philanthropic side. This dual persona created a complicated legacy for these criminals, as it obscured the conventional distinction between malevolence and benevolence. In addition to their individual prowess, Karim Lala, Vardharajan Mudaliar, and Haji Mastan formed "the most notorious trio" in the history of the Mumbai mafia from the 1960s up to 1980¹⁴. They all arrived from places outside Mumbai with hopes of achieving considerable fortune in the city. Varadharajan Mudaliar, also known as Vardabhai and Haji Mastan, were the only two Tamilian underworld leaders in the history of the Bombay underworld, both originating from Tamil Nadu in Southern India¹⁵. Abdul Karim Khan, popularly known as Karim Lala, a Pathan, migrated to Bombay from Afghanistan in the 1940s¹⁶. They struggled to sustain themselves with their low-paying employment and therefore chose to engage in petty criminal activities as a means of earning a living. Crime during this period increased to include activities such as smuggling, dock theft, prostitution, and black-market transactions¹⁷. In the 1960s, the three allied to smuggle in imported goods, combining their respective strengths; however, they feared betrayal and desired to remain in one another's good books, hence in the early 1970s, the three formed a pact that resulted in the division of Mumbai into three

¹⁴ Bhattacharjee, "Who Was Karim Lala, the Underworld Don That Sanjay Raut Claims Indira Gandhi Used to Meet."

¹⁵ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Underworld

¹⁶ M, "20 Facts About Karim Lala: The Notorious Underworld Don of Mumbai."

¹⁷ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Underworld

parts. They continued to conduct business "in peace" within their respective assigned territories¹⁸.

Very little knowledge exists regarding Haji Mastan's charitable nature, except that he was not a dreaded criminal as he is believed to have never taken a life or fired a gun at anyone¹⁹. Karim Lala was a principled man who adhered to a principle based on loyalty and mutual respect within the criminal community. He invested heavily in community development projects, educational institutions, and charitable organizations. Lala actively advocated harmony among individuals of diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds amidst the city's communal strife²⁰. Karim Lala acquired a strong reputation as a mediator. Over time, he became the most preferred arbitrator for resolving disputes in South Mumbai, a process that proved to be more efficient than settling disputes through court trials²¹. However, Vardabhai had the greatest impact on the community. Mumbai's population rose significantly due to the central government's plan of State-supported industrial development in the decades after the nation's independence. Though expanding industries attracted workers from all over India, The State failed to provide sufficient housing in a deliberate attempt to control the influx of migrants, However, this failed to minimize migration and resulted in a boom of *slum housing* and *squatter settlements*²². Vardabhai had amassed a little wealth and established profitable illegal trading operations in the city's neighborhood Dharavi that attracted individuals, particularly from southern India, who were struggling to make a living in Mumbai until they were involved in Vardabhai's business. When people residing in squatter settlements encountered difficulties obtaining basic necessities, Vardabhai would swiftly procure ration cards, illicit electricity, and

¹⁸ Ibid., 37

¹⁹ Kadam, "The Outlaws of Bombay -EP02 Haji Mastan."

²⁰ M, "20 Facts About Karim Lala: The Notorious Underworld Don of Mumbai."

²¹ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Underworld

²² Sharma, Rediscovering Dharavi.

water supply for them through his position of power, much faster than the local administration²³. Vardabhai and members of his gang, colloquially known as goondas (goons) collaborated closely with local administrators to fill the void left by the absence of a state policy to safeguard the expanding squatter settlements and promote slum development²⁴. It is crucial to note that the local administrators also benefited from working closely with Vardabhai and other criminals by getting hefty hafta (bribe) for completing tasks²⁵. In the late 1980s, another infamous criminal, Arun Gawli rose to prominence in the underworld. He offered support, and security, and even functioned as a judge for the local community. Many people approached him for building permits, ration cards, welfare benefits, and job opportunities²⁶.

2.4 A BUDDING POLITICIAN

The gangsters referred to in the previous section have numerous shared characteristics, one of which is an intense disdain for the system. While underworld dons kept confrontation with political and legal officials to the minimum, some underworld lords who were influential leaders in their neighborhoods were recruited by political parties to enhance the party's popularity and muscle power and in return, the dons were able to further their agendas²⁷. While some gangsters were part of already established political parties, others floated their political organizations based on their ideologies. Haji Mastan always maintained amicable relationships with police and government officials. After being released from prison, he ventured into politics and established a political party in 1980-1981 to protect the interests of the oppressed and Muslim communities²⁸. Shiv Sena, a prominent political

²³ Zaidi, *Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Underworld*

²⁴ Weinstein, "Mumbai's Development Underworlds: Globalization, Organized Crime and Land Development."

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Zaidi, *Byculla to Bangkok*.

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Shankar, "The Undisputed Don of Mumbai—Haji Mastan

organization in Maharashtra, first chose Arun Gawli as their mascot. However, he eventually ended his association with Shiv Sena and established his own party primarily for advancing his personal agenda²⁹. Underworld groups in Mumbai have had longstanding connections to politics, operating on the fringes. With some prominent gangsters making their objectives very clear through their political agendas, brought attention to the Mumbai mafia and further escalated conflicts among underworld rival gangs.

The transition of Mumbai Underworld dons from a heroic figure for some to a globally recognized terrorist began with the arrival of Dawood Ibrahim. It is said that "*The only policeman Karim Lala respected was Head Constable, Havaladar Ibrahim Kaskar*"³⁰. Ibrahim despite being a pauper had never asked Lala for money and never displayed any sort of deference towards him. Karim Lala hosted an extravagant feast to commemorate the birth of Dawood Ibrahim, unaware that he was in actuality celebrating the birth of his future nemesis³¹.

2.5 THE DAWN OF A DON

Dawood Ibrahim, dissatisfied with his family's dismal circumstances, was attracted to a life of crime and power. Before reaching his teenage years, he engaged in street crimes such as petty theft, chain snatching, pickpocketing, and extorting money from shopkeepers³². In the early 1970s Dongri (a neighborhood in Mumbai) Dawood emerged as the leader of a small group of youngsters, which included his older brother Sabir. The gang engaged in petty robberies and scams. Dawood aspired to increase his influence and gradually acquire popularity and power. Dawood and his small group of men initially worked in the gang of Haji Mastan. He found a mentor in Khalid Khan Pacha, a former

²⁹ Vaishnav, "The Case of Arun Gawli Shows How Lawbreakers Become Lawmakers in India."

³⁰ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Underworld

³¹ Ibid., 49

³² Ibid., 52

wrestler turned mobster, who trained Dawood in all the skills and tactics needed to become a formidable gangster³³. Dawood was influenced by *Haji Mastan*, Karim Lala, Vardharajan Mudaliar, and Khalid in terms of the powerplay, money, style, and leadership qualities. Dawood was gaining success while Khalid was experiencing a decline and failed at seeking a lucrative opportunity. Dawood presented a business proposal to his mentor, spotting that leveraging his relationship with Khalid may benefit Dawood's business by establishing a relationship with the Arabs who had a close connection with Khalid³⁴. In the 1970s, the Indian government jailed Mumbai mafia members including Mastan, Lala, Mudaliar, and Gawli under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act and National Security Act, and Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act. Dawood saw this as an opportunity to establish his criminal empire³⁵. Notably, Dawood also endured jail time on many occasions in the early years of his criminal career³⁶. A senior police inspector of the Mumbai police, alarmed by the increasing threat and unrestrained influence of the Pathan gang, sought the assistance of Dawood to suppress the Pathan group's activities. Eventually, with Dawood eliminating every gangster he opposed either on his own or by allying with other gangs, his influence and power expanded quickly. Dawood had established his notorious gang D-Company after they succeeded in removing prominent figures like Haji Mastan and Baashu Dada from the underworld business³⁷. However, the Mumbai mafia gang war took a deadly turn when Dawood's brother Sabir was killed by a member of the Pathan gang³⁸. Originally intended as retaliation for Sabir's death, it escalated into a string of killings involving members from both Dawood's gang and rival gangs. The D-Company, included both new recruits and experienced gangsters, belonging to

³³ Zaidi, Dawood's Mentor.

³⁴ Ibid., 132

³⁵ Ibid., 136

³⁶ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

³⁷ Ibid., 138

³⁸ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

different religions, cultures, and regions of the country to make the gang appear secular and its agenda more appealing and justifiable³⁹. The D-Company consisted of Dawood, Sabir, and some other prominent gangsters *like* Abu Salem, Chhota Shakeel, Tiger Memon, Yakub Memon, Arun Gawli, Bada Rajan, Philips Pandhare, Satish Raje and Chhota Rajan. Internal rivalries frequently emerged inside the D-gang, those who split from the gang proceeded to form their small gangs in opposition to Dawood's, thereby becoming his sworn enemy and subsequent target⁴⁰. Dawood promptly removed any individual from his gang who displayed any indications of disloyalty. Dawood explicitly expressed his desire to become the reigning don of the Mumbai mafia at all costs⁴¹. Dawood was not greatly affected by the numerous arrests he endured or any internal rivalry within the D-Company as he established connections in Dubai and developed friendly relations with some Indian law enforcement authorities, politicians, and other powerful figures in the city and the country. In addition to internal rivalry, the communal riots in Mumbai in 1992 prompted several D-Company members to go their separate ways⁴². By the 1990s there was a cluster of small and big mafia gangs operating from Mumbai, which posed a challenge for Indian law enforcement agencies in their efforts to monitor their operations⁴³. Women in the Mumbai Mafia too, have made significant contributions to the realm of criminal activities. Hasina Parkar, Sapna Didi, Neeta Naik, Reshma and Shabana Memon, Samaira Jumani, Shilpa Zaveri, Rubina Siraj Syed, and Bela Aunty were some of the prominent women in the Mumbai mafia⁴⁴. Some of these feared women were either the mistresses, wives, or relatives of the men in the mafia, while others had

³⁹ Zaidi, Dawood's Mentor.

⁴⁰ Zaidi, Byculla to Bangkok.

⁴¹ Zaidi, Dawood's Mentor

⁴² Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 179.

⁴⁴ Zaidi, Black Friday.

⁴⁵ Zaidi and Borges, Mafia Queens of Mumbai.

autonomously made a name for themselves in the underworld. They were involved in various activities ranging from overseeing prostitution to engaging in drug trafficking, illicit liquor trade, extortion, smuggling, sharpshooting, contract killing, and counterfeiting, and some were even involved in the 1993 Bombay blasts⁴⁶. The women mafia members were recognized for helping the underprivileged, particularly women, by providing them with employment and support. They had a vital role in managing the various businesses of the men in the Mumbai Mafia, along with this they also generated significant revenue and were crucial in expanding and maintaining the Mafia's extensive networks⁴⁷.

2.6 AN INIMICAL PARTNERSHIP

Cricket betting, commonly known as 'match-fixing,' has been widely prevalent in India since the 1990s. However, actual evidence of match-fixing and its connections to the mafia only emerged in 2000 and 2012 during the *Indian Premier League* (cricket league held annually in India)⁴⁸. In the late 1990s, Dawood, who had strong ties and operations in Dubai and Pakistan, was seeking a new business opportunity. Engaging in cricket betting was straightforward and lucrative, requiring only to 'fix' a few cricketers without any bloodshed involved. Match-fixing in the underworld is commonly referred to as a 'white-collar business'⁴⁹. Dawood who had always been a keen follower of the sport, his involvement in betting started with his influence on the Pakistan cricket team, with players occasionally seeking his financial assistance. He has been implicated in controversies in both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka⁵⁰. The D-Company in India merged the local Indian betting markets with its counterparts situated in Pakistan and Dubai⁵¹. Over time, various branches emerged from the

⁴⁶ Lacoste, *Classical Criminology: Mafia Queens of Mumbai Characters*.

⁴⁷ Zaidi and Borges, *Mafia Queens of Mumbai*.

⁴⁸ Puppala, *No Ball*.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 46

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 45

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 67

extensive family tree of *betters* and *fixers*, with Dawood himself being the root of this tree. Although Dawood was not directly involved in match-fixing, he delegated the betting operations to Sharad Shetty, with whom he had a longstanding association. Shetty and other mafia leaders frequently socialized with both Indian and Pakistani cricketers⁵². Shetty exploited his close connection with the cricketers to transform small-time betting into a lucrative chance to make substantial profits and support the hawala networks associated with Dawood's many businesses. Shetty's downfall came when Chhota Rajan, Dawood's aide turned nemesis, orchestrated Shetty's murder. Chhota Rajan benefited significantly from the demise of Shetty, as his match-fixing venture experienced remarkable success⁵³. Shetty's death created a vacuum in Dawood's betting enterprise. The D-gang saw both big financial losses and gains (in millions) over the years⁵⁴. After *Osama Bin Laden's* death in 2011, the D-gang's freedom to operate and manage their businesses overseas was hampered, as the US had initiated efforts to combat the nexus of crime and terrorism in South Asia. As part of this, Dawood's top aides had been identified as significant drug traffickers and were subjected to sanctions. Dawood required immediate cash for various illicit activities such as drugs and weapons, which could only be generated through betting⁵⁵. Dawood chose to oversee the cricket betting business by using bookies to invest money, making the operation appear legitimate and difficult to track⁵⁶. Interestingly all the bets made by these bookies were made easier by mobile phones⁵⁷. Having exhausted all other financing sources, Dawood was left with hawala and cricket as his only remaining options to finance terror. The much-hyped IPL provided the D-gang with the ideal opportunity to amass enormous fortunes. It is important to

⁵² Puppala, No Ball.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 58

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 60

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 62

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 66

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 49

acknowledge that in the absence of the terror financing aspect, match-fixing is an inconsequential offense that exempts the underworld from legal consequences. While previous investigations had examined the connection between match-fixing and terror financing, definitive evidence was not obtained until 2013 due to a major IPL fixing scandal that exposed Dawood's involvement in match-fixing to finance terrorist facilitations⁵⁸. Furthermore, this development provided pathways for Indian law enforcement agencies to carry out investigations into Dawood's other business ventures.

2.7 LIGHTS, CAMERA & GUNSHOTS

For decades, the Mumbai underworld has fancied *Bollywood*, and vice-versa the ensuing plethora of films and off-late TV shows based on ‘*dons*’ have provided a never-ending array of glamorous and glorified representations of the underworld⁵⁹. What began as Karim Lala having amicable relations with the Bollywood fraternity evolved into Haji Mastan marrying a Bollywood starlet, which tactically positioned him within the industry. He created a legal movie-financing business to fund his illegal businesses. This became even more prominent when the Indian government at the time prohibited legal financing for the film industry; Haji Mastan filled this vacuum in funding Bollywood films, and other Mumbai gangsters gradually followed suit⁶⁰. The Indian *film* industry became eligible for bank credit only in 2000; however, the influence of the underworld was by then deeply entrenched in Bollywood. Although the film fraternity has previously flaunted its connections with the Mumbai Mafia on numerous occasions, these associations have also proven to be catastrophic for many. The realm of film financing in India became murkier with the debut of

⁵⁸ Ibid., 64-66

⁵⁹ Busch, “The Rise of the Indian Mafia and Bollywood.”

⁶⁰ Bancroft et al., “Haji Mastan’s Connection with Bollywood.”

Dawood into the industry. Dawood began financing films for the same reason that led him to begin cricket betting. It not only guaranteed connections with renowned and glamorous individuals, particularly the actresses, but also served as an ideal guise to conceal criminal activity, since individuals engaged in a legitimate industry such as "*Bollywood*" do not seem essentially criminal. Mastan, Dawood, and other criminals gradually diversified their illicit activities beyond film financing such as film piracy, counterfeiting, and illegal distribution through using their money and connections in Bollywood⁶¹. Among the most lucrative ventures for the underworld was extorting the elite of Bollywood. Producers and directors were coerced and blackmailed by the Mafia into accepting financing from the underworld, casting specific actors, and producing films on certain genres and subjects, regardless of their will⁶². Dawood Ibrahim and Abu Salem are infamous for aggressively extorting celebrities through violence and intimidation. Dawood and others have aggressively targeted numerous Bollywood personalities and have even resorted to violence, including murder, when their demands were not met. There have been countless Bollywood figures on the Mafia's hit list; whilst some managed to evade being killed, others could not. Two popular incidents brought attention to the *Mafia-Bollywood* nexus. In one, a renowned film producer was shot in public after refusing to collaborate with music directors endorsed by the Mafia. In another, a Bollywood actor was found to be in possession of machine guns that had been provided to him by the Mafia in advance of the 1993 Bombay blasts⁶³. After many years since the incident occurred, the actor was imprisoned for a few years in possession of arms and alleged involvement in the 1993 blasts. However, many of the main orchestrators of the attack are still

⁶¹ Bancroft et al., "Haji Mastan's Connection with Bollywood."

⁶² Busch, "The Rise of the Indian Mafia and Bollywood."

⁶³ Zaidi, *Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia*.

absconding⁶⁴. To date, Bollywood continues to enjoy immense popularity and a desirable public image although the Mafia's shady relationship with the industry is well-publicized. The underworld, which remains deeply entrenched in pockets in the Indian film industry, is exceedingly difficult to uproot due to its intricate network of Dons, corrupt police and ministers, and prominent Bollywood celebrities.

2.8 JACK OF ALL TRADES

Mumbai's rise in organized criminal activities throughout the 1950s was strongly connected to India's macroeconomic policies. The mood of the Indian economy profoundly influenced the business prospects of the mafia. Before 1991, the structure of *Indian economic policy* supported the proliferation of illicit activities and the black market within the country⁶⁵. Not only the Indian economy, but economies of other countries also catalyzed the Mumbai mafia, specifically the D-Company, to seek lucrative business opportunities and partnerships beyond the Indian borders. Intriguingly, the D-Company has been equated to a regional corporation on numerous occasions solely on account of the influence that the group has had on the regional economy, certain nations and the D-Company enjoy reciprocal relations⁶⁶. The success of D-Company's business operations across the globe can be attributed to the demand for goods, technology, and the convenience of international trade and travel⁶⁷. The numerous profitable businesses of the D-Company consist of shipping, exports, real estate, hotels, and restaurants, as well as film distribution and cottage industries. The D-Company had operations in several countries in South and South-Eastern Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, The United States, and

⁶⁴ Busch, "The Rise of the Indian Mafia and Bollywood."

⁶⁵ Bennett, "The Faces of D-Company: An Analysis of the Terror-Crime Nexus."

⁶⁶ Ibid., 6

⁶⁷ Ibid., 6

Australia⁶⁸. Dawood Ibrahim has amassed an enormous net worth of \$6.7 billion US dollars from all of his enterprises combined. Additionally, Dawood invested in personal properties worldwide. One of his many family residences is a complex of five single-story bungalows, designated as the "*White House*" in Karachi⁶⁹, Pakistan. For several years, Dawood named all of his private residences "*The White House*"⁷⁰. Dawood oversaw his expansive empire from his offices in London, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sudan. These businesses not only generated substantial profits but also served as a front for the criminal endeavors of the gang⁷¹. Smuggled gold, goods, and drugs were transported among legitimate commodities via the gang's shipping companies. Numerous hotels and properties have served as venues for mafia networking, in the past, Dawood's paper mill in Pakistan manufactured fake Indian currency to cause economic instability in India. With significant investments in Pakistan's stock exchange and authority over Karachi airport, the D-Company has had the most substantial impact on the economy of Pakistan, compared to any other nation⁷². By floating multiple shell companies, the D-Company established one of the largest money-laundering networks⁷³. Identical to the film industry, D-Company has specifically targeted Mumbai-based business proprietors and builders; some have even been murdered due to inter-gang rivalry⁷⁴. Dawood has also strategically utilized his lawful businesses to advance his terrorist activities. Over the years, Dawood has smuggled terrorists, weapons, and explosives across international borders. The earnings generated by these enterprises were allocated towards financing the operations of terrorist organizations, furnishing them with connections and logistical support⁷⁵. Despite Dawood's ownership

⁶⁸ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

⁶⁹ Abbas, "Dawood Lives in Posh Karachi House."

⁷⁰ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

⁷¹ Glenny, McMafia.

⁷² Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

⁷³ Glenny, McMafia.

⁷⁴ Shaban, "Underworld and the Police in Mumbai."

⁷⁵ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

and control of these enterprises, they were established and registered under the names of his siblings, extended family, and associates to evade suspicion by government authorities, especially in India. This setting worked in the D-Company's favor, as law enforcement agencies encountered significant challenges with tracking the operations and connections among the vastly scattered crime syndicate, D-Company. It is essential to note that the absence of a new major business venture by the gang for nearly a decade has nothing to do with the company reorienting itself; rather, it is because all of the businesses in which D-Company is already established are prosperous and generating significant revenue, enough for them to sustain its activities. In light of Dawood's soaring fortunes, governments throughout the globe have implemented measures to impede its progress. Several properties owned by *Dawood* and his associates have been auctioned off by the Indian government in recent years in compliance with the *Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act* (SAFEMA). Nevertheless, Dawood and his men continue to maintain a strong grip on the real estate market in Mumbai⁷⁶. Indian intelligence agencies have determined that to neutralize the D-Company's networks, it is critical to restrict its global financial activities. likewise, this must be done to make D-Company ineffectual for terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda⁷⁷.

2.9 SNAKE IN THE GRASS

The 1993 bombings in Bombay were a turning point in Indian history; they irrevocably altered the country's security landscape and the understanding of the power of the Mafia in India.

⁷⁶ Shaban, "Underworld and the Police in Mumbai."

⁷⁷ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

Several riots broke out between the Muslim and Hindu communities in the months that followed the *1992 destruction of the Babri Masjid*. Dawood Ibrahim orchestrated the *1993 Bombay bomb blasts* as revenge for the Muslim lives lost in communal rioting⁷⁸. In contrast to the prevailing notion that Dawood's sole motivation for the 1993 bombings was religious extremism. Multiple findings uncovered over the many years since the attack indicate that it transcended religious boundaries⁷⁹ and was significantly influenced by two other crucial factors. To begin with, the bomb blasts served as a means to validate Dawood's macho persona and bolster his ego. This is supported by the fact that while Dawood was largely unbothered by the call for help by Muslims during the communal unrest, some Muslim women sent him bangles (*in the Indian context, giving a man, bangles is considered an insult to his masculinity*). This infuriated Dawood, and it fuelled him to seek revenge⁸⁰. Secondly, Dawood had found a life-long ally in the Inter-Services Intelligence (*ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency*); this presented an ideal opportunity for the ISI to sow discord and wage war against the Indian government. ISI incited some angry Bombay Muslims to commit acts of terrorism for a "greater purpose" by employing the religion card. The Muslim dons of Mumbai enabled ISI's objective to attack India. Dawood and his Muslim gang members provided a ready network for the ISI to execute the deadliest offenses with immediate impunity. In exchange, ISI granted Dawood not only unwavering protection and support but also solidify Dawood's position and influence as a formidable and dangerous figure⁸¹. The 1993 blasts had also shaken the makeup of the D-Company. Non-Muslims, especially Hindu gang members, who perceived the incident as a betrayal and a threat to their faith, all fled to establish their

⁷⁸ Mahadevan, "D-Company and the 1993 Mumbai Bombings: Rethinking a Case of 'crime-Terror' Convergence in South Asia."

⁷⁹ Zaidi, *Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia*.

⁸⁰ Maria, *Let Me Say It Now*.

⁸¹ Zaidi, *Black Friday*.

independent groups and subsequently became Dawood's adversaries⁸². Following the attacks, the *ISI-D-Company* relationship was exposed through the confessions of those apprehended for planting bombs and the evidence of Tiger Memon and his family fleeing to Pakistan on the morning of the blasts. Additionally, Indian authorities discovered US-manufactured timers and Austrian design grenades at the sites of the explosions. The Austrian authorities lent full support to India in establishing Pakistan's involvement in the attacks. However, The United States repeatedly attempted to weaken India's case against ISI's involvement; India viewed this as a betrayal of confidence by The United States in counterterrorism cooperation⁸³. Furthermore, the bombings highlighted the lapses in the internal security of India. Initial signs, including the smuggling of explosives and weapons being ignored and the disregard for tips regarding possible attacks, were made worse by the evidence of cooperation of corrupt police and customs officials, who enabled the 'smooth' orchestration of the bomb blasts throughout the city⁸⁴. This relationship between the Mafia and the law enforcement agencies shows how deeply entrenched the Mafia is in India, whose uprooting will be a mammoth task.

While Dawood's involvement became indisputable to both Indian authorities and Mumbaikars (A person residing or born in Mumbai)⁸⁵ as additional evidence about the attacks began to surface. Dawood was alarmed by the hate mail he received from various religious communities across India and that many of his men were under the radar of Indian law authorities. To remove himself from the mess, Dawood and his associates made public his "great" friendships with Hindus and cited instances of his innocence. When that failed, Dawood utilized his connections within the police and legal professions. For him to

⁸² Zaidi, *Byculla to Bangkok*.

⁸³ Mahadevan, "D-Company and the 1993 Mumbai Bombings: Rethinking a Case of 'crime-Terror' Convergence in South Asia."

⁸⁴ Zaidi, *Black Friday*.

⁸⁵ Maria, *Let Me Say It Now*.

⁸⁶ "What Does Mumbaikar Mean?"

surrender, Dawood had presented the Indian government with specific conditions. However, his demands were not complied with by the Indian government, which many experts believe is the reason Dawood is still free to this day⁸⁷ which will soon prove to be very costly for India. As Dawood found a safe haven in Pakistan and led a lavish lifestyle, others were forced into exile in different parts of the globe, and a small number of individuals were incarcerated, the D-Company appeared to have gone *'quiet'* for several years. However, the 26/11 attacks in India witnessed the reappearance of the *organized crime-terrorism nexus* due to Dawood's participation, solely as a logistics provider for Lashkar-e-Taiba (*LeT*) in the attacks. This is terrifying because terrorist organizations such as *LeT* will attempt to execute chain reaction-style attacks with the assistance and knowledge of an in-country partner like D-Company⁸⁸. Following the tragic 26/11 attacks, international attention began to be drawn to the nexus between *D-Company and ISI-supported terrorist organizations* that assisted in the proliferation of the *Indian Mujahideen*, an issue that India had been attempting to bring to the world's attention since the 1993 Bombay blasts⁸⁹⁹⁰.

2.10 THE MANHUNT FOR “INDIA’S MOST WANTED”

Dawood's inclusion in the 2009 Forbes list of “The World's Most Powerful People” highlights how having unrestrained power and deeming one unaccountable for their crimes can even elevate a fugitive to the ranks of the *50th* most influential individual globally⁹¹. Despite not being in the public eye

⁸⁷ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

⁸⁸ Clarke, “Lashkar-I-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India .”

⁸⁹ Ibid., 30

⁹⁰ Ibid., 46

⁹¹ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

and not having visited India in decades, Dawood succeeded in operating an extensive transnational criminal organization with roots in Mumbai. Dawood's success as a fugitive is not an individual accomplishment but is attributed to the loyalty he enjoys from the 5000-member D-Company and all those people in power who enabled him to operate as he wished⁹². Yet, Dawood has achieved more than just having his name on the Forbes list. He is wanted by multiple countries worldwide for financial offenses, frauds/scams, transnational crimes, and claimed affiliations to criminal gangs and terrorist organizations. It is important to highlight that the international response and efforts to apprehend Dawood and some from the top brass of the D-Company have been underwhelming. After a decade-long struggle, India eventually succeeded in convincing The US about Dawood's crime-terror nexus. In 2003, The US Treasury Department classified Dawood as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Shortly after, The United Nations listed Dawood for his association with Al-Qaeda. The US froze Dawood's assets within the country and prohibited transactions with US nationals. The UN listing mandated all the member countries to implement similar measures⁹³. Unfortunately, not all United Nations members got the memo. In 2020, Pakistan finally acknowledged and included Dawood Ibrahim, 26/11LeT operations chief, Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, and others to its list of terrorists. It imposed an assets freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo following The U.N. Security Council's designations⁹⁴. Since the beginning of 2000, though disheartening in impact, some countries have collaborated with India in their efforts to combat transnational organized crime and counter-terrorism initiatives^{95,96,97}. To combat the activities of D-Company and organized crime in India as a whole, each succeeding Indian government

⁹² Glenny, "India's Most Wanted."

⁹³ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

⁹⁴ Haidar, "Pakistan Puts Dawood Ibrahim, Masood Azhar, Hafiz Saeed, Zaki-Ur-Rahman Lakhvi on Terror List."

⁹⁵ Kumar, Dial D for Don.

⁹⁶ Zaidi, Byculla to Bangkok.

⁹⁷ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

has implemented significant domestic and international initiatives and measures. In most instances, however, attempts to impede its attempts to bring the D-Company to justice were thwarted, or the pursuit lost its rigor, or the government simply failed to seize crucial opportunities⁹⁸. Throughout the years, numerous raids, arrests, and interrogations have been carried out on individuals associated with D-Company by the Indian government. However, Dawood and his top associates remained untouched⁹⁹. Gangsters successfully evading encounters with law enforcement symbolize the Mafia's very own *sophisticated intelligence network*. It is obvious as to why ISI would attempt to undermine India's testimony against Dawood. However, what has never been acceptable or comprehensible is the network of Indians, whether in positions of power or not, shielding the underworld¹⁰⁰¹⁰¹. Investigating this covert network of *influential Indian* personalities in politics, law enforcement, and other domains has proven difficult due to the risk of exposing substantial evidence that might collapse the entire Mafia network¹⁰². The Central Bureau of Investigation (*CBI*), The National Investigation Agency (*NIA*), The Intelligence Bureau (*IB*), and the Research and Analysis Wing (*R&AW*) are the primary law enforcement agencies in India. For years, especially since the 1993 Blasts, they have persistently investigated the issue of the Mumbai Mafia. They have collaborated and continue to with other Indian law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies from other nations, and international organizations to compile exhaustive information on organized crime in India and Dawood Ibrahim's terrorist network¹⁰³. In 2003, the Bharatiya Janata Party (*BJP*)-led coalition government started gathering information on Dawood's global networks. The dossier, known as "*The D Dossier*" to the core government, had information

⁹⁸ Kumar, Dial D for Don.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 81

¹⁰⁰ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

¹⁰¹ Zaidi, Byculla to Bangkok.

¹⁰² "Exclusive: Indian Politicians on Dawood Ibrahim's Frequent Dialler List."

¹⁰³ Kumar, Dial D for Don.

about Dawood's connections with terrorist organizations. Based on this, The US took aggressive action against Dawood¹⁰⁴. Over time, numerous dossiers from different parts of India have been compiled, entailing accounts of Dawood's involvement with various people, governments, businesses, industries, criminal activities, and terrorist groups and attacks¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁶. In 2012, four years after the 26/11 attacks, the sole surviving terrorist, Ajmal Kasab, who was found guilty of more than 80 charges such as acts of terrorism and criminal conspiracy to commit murder was executed by hanging¹⁰⁷. This event revived focus on the necessity to dismantle the *crime-terrorism nexus in India*. Post 26/11 attacks the expeditiousness of India's judicial system was called into question by the victims and the families of victims of the 26/11 attacks and the general populace of the nation. One is left wondering whether a consensual law regulating the punishment of acts of terrorism is ever attainable, given that many condemned Kasab's execution, as they acknowledged the death penalty as the most extreme and inhumane form of punishment¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁹. The effectiveness and objectivity of international organizations and law, as well as their function in overseeing incidents of transnational crimes, are also subjects of scrutiny. Dawood has been on INTERPOL's Red Notice since 1993 following the Bombay bombings¹¹⁰, with his accomplices being added to the list in the subsequent years¹¹¹. Despite multiple legal proceedings against him and the D-Company in India, and discussions about "*India's Most Wanted*" at international forums¹¹², no significant progress has been made. Dawood is an '*enigma*', any news

¹⁰⁴ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

¹⁰⁵ Kumar, Dial D for Don.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 22

¹⁰⁷ Online, "Ajmal Kasab Hanged: Chronology of Events."

¹⁰⁸ "Kasab Execution Represents Indian Death Penalty Backslide."

¹⁰⁹ Khattab, "The ICJ Condemns the Execution of Ajmal Kasab; Calls on India to Immediately Reinstate the Moratorium on Capital Punishment."

¹¹⁰ "View Red Notices."

¹¹¹ "View Red Notices."

¹¹² Mohan, "Dawood Ibrahim Raised by India at UNSC Highlighting Terrorism, Organised Crime."

concerning him still captivates India's complete attention¹¹³. Despite gathering significant data about the man and his criminal organization, he remains a fugitive and operates his business without interruption. After all that we have gathered what is it that has contributed to the persistent rise in the power of Dawood and the D-Company?

This is the point of departure of my research

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

'Gang' and its synonyms have appeared a total of 199 times in the literature review. This indicates that the members of an organized criminal syndicate are essential to its success, regardless of who controls it. Not only gang members but every person and institution that has enabled the mafia to operate according to its own will are crucial to its continued existence and success. Mafia gang members predominantly share akin *aspirations, values, and ambitions*.

Individually, those involved in organized crime make an intentional choice to partake in specific criminal activities, and they are not merely influenced by social associations; rather, they assess the options available and make decisions based on what is in their self-interest. The literature review highlights social networks, social capital, environmental dependence, and the need for power as recurring themes that constitute the core makeup of the Mumbai Mafia. The themes are best explained through the employing of the **Theories of Social Embeddedness, Capital, and Networks of Organized Crime & Rational Choice Theory**

Contrary to the conventional criminal hierarchical structure, the theories of Social Embeddedness, Capital, and Networks of Organized Crime collectively

¹¹³ Kmaneck, "Why Dawood Ibrahim Continues to Be India's Most Wanted."

analyze an evolving and perpetually expanding criminal network¹¹⁴. These are interrelated, the essence of the Social Network Theory lies in Embeddedness, and the Social Capital Theory stems from the social network theory¹¹⁵.

3.1 SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS THEORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Karl Polanyi, an economic historian, stated that the concept of embeddedness emphasizes the diverse conditions under which different types of social action occur and upon which they depend. Although originally designed to investigate the link between society and the economy¹¹⁶, this theory also applies to organized crime, which doesn't operate in social isolation but rather interacts with its social surroundings. Through their work on the Social Embeddedness of Organized Crime, Kleemans and Van de Bunt¹¹⁷ emphasize four critical aspects that must be grasped.

1. Social relations play a significant role in organized crime due to the hostile environments in which criminal organizations operate, which is primarily due to the illegal nature of their operations. Due to the temporal embeddedness of related actors, this mitigates any mistrust that may arise and operate under the shadow of a shared future (temporal embeddedness refers to the duration of the relationship between two actors and how it influences the dynamics between them while coming together to commit a crime- they cooperate better because of common history, the information they have of each other and because both have invested in the relationship). Additionally, temporal embeddedness deters selfish and opportunistic behavior, because they are aware that they are highly likely to encounter one another again in the future. This explains the rationale

¹¹⁴ Kleemans, "Theoretical Perspectives on Organized Crime."

¹¹⁵ "Embeddedness, Social Network Theory and Social Capital Theory: Antecedents and Consequence."

¹¹⁶ Schmidt, "Embeddedness | Definition, Theory & Examples."

¹¹⁷ Kleemans and Van De Bunt, "The Social Embeddedness of Organized Crime."

behind the fact that the primary members of the many gangs in Mumbai were people with whom they held strong ties and shared history, especially family members and friends. Also, weak ties with people emerged from daily life and were developed and sustained on purpose. In the beginning, criminal groups in Mumbai were identified by the localities in which they resided, such as Byculla, Dharavi, and Dongri. The closer criminals reside, the more they share in common their daily activities and the more likely that they forge ties to engage in criminal activities.

2. A factor that is intricately linked to elements such as a shared history and a common neighborhood is ethnic homogeneity. Dons such as Varda Bhai and Haji Mastan, for instance, largely recruited unemployed migrant Tamil laborers as members of their groups. Dawood Ibrahim, in the beginning, had also assembled a modest group of young Konkani Muslim boys. Classifying organized crimes based on common ethnicity might prove highly misleading. Gangs have relied on establishing associations with individuals of different ethnic backgrounds to advance in their criminal activities. Moreover, it began to appear that gangs had fairly easy access to individuals of different ethnicities who were involved in illegal trade and activities. Additionally, as the gang expanded, it started to leverage each other's distribution networks, thereby making the criminal organizations more open.
3. Organized crime has historically been linked to the male population. Women are actively involved in the Mafia as well. In the beginning, they controlled brothels and oversaw certain aspects of the mafia's businesses. It is indisputable that men occupied leadership positions within the Mumbai mafia, as mentioned in the literature review women engaged in prostitution, drug trade, and mafia-owned enterprises. In the context of the 1993 Bombay blasts, some women were primary conspirators.

However, most significantly, women assisted in establishing and maintaining contacts among gangsters and carried out activities to shield illegal activities from law enforcement.

4. Gangs depend exclusively on particular individuals for a variety of resources, even though they continue to conduct business with them to maintain discretion. They are, nonetheless not irreplaceable. Group dynamics may become susceptible to internal rivalry and a gradual decline of reliance on particular resources as time passes. Although certain gangs collapsed due to difficulties, successful gangs such as D-Company utilized their social connections and contacts to establish contact with potential recruits and even other criminal organizations, thereby fostering an entirely new dynamic within the gang. This could explain Dawood's indifference towards any shift in the gang's dynamics, given his desire for the show to continue, even if the players changed¹¹⁸.

The research of Siegel, Zaitch, and Van de Bunt centers on work environments and work relations that foster the growth of organized criminal enterprises. This form of embeddedness presents a variety of avenues through which criminal activities can be carried out and concealed.

The premise of embeddedness as a strategy pertains to how criminal organizations control particular sectors or territories by employing infiltration of local elites, threats of violence, or corruption. They allegedly provide "protection" in return for monetary compensation, but their true nature is extortion. The vast majority of gangsters in the Mumbai underworld rose to prominence through extortion, illicit liquor trade during the prohibition period, and gold smuggling. Furthermore, dons were fast to administer justice to

¹¹⁸ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

troubled locals who received little assistance through legal channels. Government institutions, including customs and police, as well as societal institutions, including politics and labor unions, and sectors of industries, including construction and real estate, also exhibit embeddedness. Numerous anecdotes originating from the Mumbai mafia contain numerous examples of this sort of structural embeddedness. Politicians, businessmen, film personalities, and government officials would often meet with gangsters like Karim Lala, Haji Mastan, and Dawood Ibrahim. Though it is clear that both the parties derive something from each other, it is unknown as to what was discussed and what were the outcomes of such meetings. There is a prevailing belief that the mafia significantly influenced the supervision of agreements and decisions executed by the government apparatus¹¹⁹. Criminal organizations would be unable to exert such influence in the absence of such ingrained embeddedness.

3.2 SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Given that social network is an abstract of social embeddedness¹²⁰, a substantial portion of what is known about social networks of organized crime has already been addressed in the preceding section. The purpose of this section is to examine the Social Network Analysis in the context of organized crime.

Organizational crime is characterized by multiple threads of influence that run through it, both in terms of money and power. Both strong and weak ties are spun off webs of influence. These webs also connected many businesses, social classes, and governmental machinery, which potentially turned them into a corrupting force. These webs of influence are social networks that underpin the social system of organized crime¹²¹. Having said that, social and geographic barriers between nations, economic strata, the underworld,

¹¹⁹ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

¹²⁰ "Embeddedness, Social Network Theory and Social Capital Theory: Antecedents and Consequence."

¹²¹ Mcillwain, "Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach."

and the legitimate world frequently result in many parts of these networks being loosely connected. However, D-Company and other transnational organized crime groups have prevailed over these barriers to gain success. It is essential to acknowledge that social networks are not rigid or static; instead, they are dynamic and fluid, enabling them to evolve, change adapt to, and expand in response to internal and external circumstances and forces. Although these social networks exhibit diverse manifestations across cultures for various reasons, they facilitate cross-cultural interaction and transcend cultural boundaries. Furthermore, these social networks surpass temporal and spatial boundaries, enabling organized criminals to partake in activities that occur on a global level¹²².

According to Bouchard¹²³ for criminals, the boundaries are blurred between individuals involved in their illicit activities and those who are a part of their personal lives. Not all individuals associated with the gangster need to be affiliated with the gang. Interactions between persons from different spheres of life can occur, even among those involved in organized crime. Navigating the ambiguous boundary between criminal and social connections is made easier by applying a network approach. In the mafia, it is typical for family members to join the crime syndicate, while non-family members of the syndicate may be involved in other gangsters' personal and social lives. A network approach can encompass both perspectives. These relationships are multiplex ties - Simply put, these are relationships that have multiple layers these people are neither coworkers nor family/friends; rather, they are both. A study of a crime network in isolation or conjunction with other networks may result in the formation of a generalized "social network". Intriguingly, the greater the number of network contexts that two people share, the closer

¹²² Mcillwain, "Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach."

¹²³ Bouchard, "Collaboration and Boundaries in Organized Crime: A Network Perspective."

Source: Vesna Markovic

Figure 2¹²⁶ serves to emphasize significant excerpts extracted from the dossier meticulously compiled by Indian intelligence agencies concerning *Dawood Ibrahim*. It offers an insight into his family members, who are currently located in *Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Dubai*, due to his notoriety and the hunt for him in India. It additionally discloses the names of corporate entities that are affiliated with the D-gang on an international scale. Additionally, it contains a list of core non-family members of the gang, including their whereabouts and the businesses for which they are responsible. 14 passports issued in Dawood's name and his many aliases are indicative of the ease with which he has transplanted D-Company's numerous offices and enterprises across the globe by leveraging his vast social networks.

The article featuring the selected Figure 3¹²⁷ aptly titled "D-Company looks for a new CEO." The title may mislead readers into believing that the D-Company is a lawful corporate conglomerate, as opposed to a criminal organization. In essence, it describes how Dawood expanded and managed numerous company divisions in the same manner as any business conglomerate. The article provides extensive information regarding which family member oversees which division of the business. Additionally, it enumerates prospective successors of Dawood, including their leadership style, strengths, weaknesses, and the closeness and degree of trust they enjoy with Dawood. Also how the succession plan could alter the gang's makeup and, if implemented in its entirety, the cascading

¹²⁶ Tripathi, "Underworld Gears up for Dawood Ibrahim's Birthday; Chotta Shakeel & Anees Ibrahim Main Organisers of Party."

¹²⁷ Ahuja, "D Company Looks for a New CEO."

effects it would cause on its affiliated networks, as well as any new networks that the successor might establish.




Figure 2: excerpts from the dossier on Dawood Ibrahim

Source: The Economic Times

ALL IN THE FAMILY




Figure 3: D-Company's potential succession plan

Source: *The Week*

Consequently, Bouchard also notes that another boundary exists- between members of the core group and those in the periphery¹²⁸. Gang composition in the 1960s and 1970s under the Mumbai Mafia was relatively small, and a ranking system made it simple to determine the role and membership of each individual. However, as D-Company expanded its influence and networks, and amassed a 5000-member syndicate, not all members knew one another, and nor did all have direct contact with Dawood. Any member located on the periphery was required to traverse through other members on the web who were closer and had direct contact with Dawood. These members of the periphery were not accorded significant importance, and their arrests or disappearances did not affect the organization's core.

¹²⁸ Bouchard, "Collaboration and Boundaries in Organized Crime: A Network Perspective."

Aside from their clandestine nature, criminal organizations adhere to the same management principles as any other goal-oriented network: integrating people, information, and technology (Remember, D-Company exploited the use of mobile phones to effectively operate its cricket-betting business.)

In the opinion of van der Hulst¹²⁹, social networks serve as opportunity structures for accomplishing objectives and can be regarded as a fundamental building block of criminal success. From a technical standpoint, Social Network Analysis (SNA) is one of those tools that help in the systematic discovery of adversary and clandestine networks. Researchers made an effort to reconstruct criminal networks by using data on contacts between offenders. With a few exceptions, the majority of these studies concentrate on the frequency of contacts, while others examine the content of the information and the context of the relationships¹³⁰. SNA serves more as a methodological paradigm than a mere theory, allowing the examination of intricate social structures in a sophisticated manner¹³¹. When examining organized crime, one of the primary objectives of SNA is to identify and interpret patterns of social ties among criminal actors, as well as to determine the influence, benefits, or even weaknesses of the social structure on the operations of criminal networks and actors. SNA is an arithmetic method that employs mathematical computations to analyze relational patterns of nodes (actors) and connections (ties). The structural network parameters that derive from these computations quantify attributes of network activity, social roles, positions, and related social mechanisms such as power and dependence¹³².

¹²⁹ van der Hulst, "Introduction to Social Network Analysis (SNA) as an Investigative Tool."

¹³⁰ Kleemans, "Theoretical Perspectives on Organized Crime."

¹³¹ "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency on JSTOR."

¹³² Wasserman and Faust, "Social Network Analysis."




Figure 4: *visualization of Social Network Analysis of South African arms deal*

Source: Anine Kriegler¹³³

Van der Hurst also details some analytical functions of Social Network Analysis¹³⁴ as an intelligence and law enforcement tool:

- a) Prospective scenario building entails the surveillance, assessment, and forecasting of prospective risks linked to specific individuals or groups. Sophisticated SNA parameters can detect potential risks and threats that might otherwise go undetected.
- b) Moreover, it can assist in the identification of key individuals and central actors within criminal networks, as well as the evaluation or prediction of any possible repercussions that may ensue from the omission of particular actors.

¹³³ Kriegler, "Using Social Network Analysis to Profile Organised Crime."

¹³⁴ van der Hulst, "Introduction to Social Network Analysis (SNA) as an Investigative Tool."

- c) Based on data regarding criminal networks and activities. The positions and responsibilities of the criminal actors can be identified, as well as the key strengths and vulnerabilities of the criminal network. This provides law enforcement agencies with strategic choices to destabilize a criminal network.
- d) Subsets of actors who perform identical roles or names of actors in a database that appear to be aliases can also be identified with the assistance of SNA. In addition, prospective successors of dismissed or eliminated key participants from a network can be identified. Critical actors can be singled out by comparing functions and roles across networks when the information available does not suffice.
- e) Once critical actors and ties within a criminal network have been identified, SNA can help in making tactical assessments regarding the placement of intelligence assets in the most important areas that require surveillance. SNA needs to achieve a little more sophistication to become a potent instrument that can serve as evidence for prosecution.

3.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME

It is well-established that criminal networks depend significantly on social connections, ties, and the capacity to procure the essential resources required to carry out their operations. An additional basis of organizational success is the creation of competitive advantages via social connections that enable the accomplishment of goals that would be unattainable without these advantages¹³⁵. Succinctly put, Social Capital refers to advantages that result from social networks. The theory of social capital posits that individuals who

¹³⁵ Coleman, "Foundations of Social Theory."

possess greater access to valuable social resources exhibit a higher degree of performance success. This claim is valid not only for the ordinary, common citizen but also for criminals and their criminal organizations. Social capital confers strategic advantages due to essentially two factors¹³⁶. To begin with, establishing connections with others grants access to their resources, including but not limited to goodwill, trust, expertise, support, and knowledge. The second factor is that the network structure as a whole, including how actor positions are embedded, offers inherent strategic benefits. Although social capital is often associated with positive connotations, the cost of social transactions is indeed reduced by social capital, thereby facilitating the peaceful resolution of conflicts¹³⁷. , it can also bring about unfavorable results in the context of organized crime. Strong social capital is a critical asset for organized crime. The organizational framework of criminal groups is founded upon social capital. They also cultivate social capital in their efforts to maintain authority over an industry and generate greater profits than they otherwise could¹³⁸. Vardharajan Mudaliar managed to recruit a significant number of migrant Tamilian laborers into his criminal organization¹³⁹: his strong bond, reputation, and popularity to and with the people of the migrant laborer community. Dawood's desire to become involved in organized crime was fueled not only by the potential for wealth and influence but also by the effect of his family's close relationship with Karim Lala and Haji Mastan, which his father in particular fostered¹⁴⁰. The causal relationship between social capital and crime may operate in both directions; crime can influence social capital as well. This makes the relationship between the two complex. Social capital may decrease in response to the occurrence of violent crime. An increase in social capital could

¹³⁶ van der Hulst, "Introduction to Social Network Analysis (SNA) as an Investigative Tool."

¹³⁷ "Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter? On JSTOR."

¹³⁸ Claridge , "Introduction to Social Capital ."

¹³⁹ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

¹⁴⁰ Zaidi, Dawood's Mentor.

result from the establishment of community organizations whose mission is to combat crime¹⁴¹. In a nutshell, the relationship between social capital and organized crime (violence) is multifaceted.

3.4 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

Although people in the general public may perceive criminals of any degree irrational, there are sufficient grounds to suspect that criminals are rational beings, though their actions may indicate otherwise.

According to the rational choice theory, individuals base their decision-making on rational calculations that lead to outcomes that are in their advantageous interests. On the premise of organized crime, this theory posits that leaders and members of transnational criminal organizations are self-interested and will do whatever is required to maximize their gain from any given circumstance¹⁴².

Their objective is to achieve the greatest possible benefit by employing violence, coercion, and corruption.¹⁴³ outlines four basic choices that a criminal must make. The first choice one makes is whether or not to commit a crime; criminals evaluate legitimate and illegitimate opportunities and make the decision that is most advantageous to them. Mostly for criminals, it is rational to choose to offend. Criminals must also make informed choices regarding their targets with the cues and information at their disposal. They evaluate whether the target's value justifies the risk of getting caught. Plus, the regularity of criminal activity is contingent upon a multitude of factors, including the criminal's social network, external influences, financial and other necessities, and their capacity to evade detection efficiently. Nevertheless, criminals can choose the frequency. Alternatively, one could opt to abstain from or persist in

¹⁴¹ "Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter? On JSTOR."

¹⁴² Contegiacomo, "Rational Choice Theory and the Crime-Terror Nexus: How and Why Terrorist and Organized Criminal Groups Are Working Together ."

¹⁴³ Verbora, "16.6 Rational Choice Theory."

criminal activity. There may be obstacles preventing a criminal from committing a crime. Life of crime can be disrupted by both internal and external factors. Internal issues may include age-related challenges and the problem of exhausting the list of targets, while external issues may include marriage, having a family, injury, or disability. However, it is not feasible to apply rational choice theory in a universal and general sense to all criminal activities. The rational choices for each type of crime must be established as independent from all others to comprehend and/or adopt a rational choice theory of crime¹⁴⁴. Mafia gang leaders, being rational actors, take measures to guarantee their confidentiality and safety so that they can effectively manage their lucrative businesses. They employ those tactics to eliminate their rivals and bolster their illicit earnings. They employ these illicit methods to ensure survival and mitigate any potential risks. Engaging in illicit activities such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, film financing, money laundering, and arms dealing can significantly outweigh the potential earnings from operating a lawful enterprise or earning a living wage¹⁴⁵. In light of these financial factors, leading an organized criminal organization can be perceived as a strategy to "maximize utility." Additionally, the mafia's ability to generate millions of dollars in profits in a single day through the operation of their numerous diverse businesses across the globe contributes to their rational choice to engage in illegal activities¹⁴⁶. Organized criminal organizations¹⁴⁶ effectively implement risk management protocols, employ specialists to guarantee confidentiality, and undertake all requisite measures to achieve their goals¹⁴⁷. This reinforces them as strategic, rational players who make rational decisions following their

¹⁴⁴ CORNISH and CLARKE, "UNDERSTANDING CRIME DISPLACEMENT: AN APPLICATION OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY."

¹⁴⁵ Contegiacomo, "Rational Choice Theory and the Crime-Terror Nexus: How and Why Terrorist and Organized Criminal Groups Are Working Together ."

¹⁴⁶ Contegiacomo, "Rational Choice Theory and the Crime-Terror Nexus: How and Why Terrorist and Organized Criminal Groups Are Working Together ."

¹⁴⁷ Shelley and Picarelli, "Methods Not Motives: Implications of the Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism."

specific motivations. Although the motivations behind the Mumbai Mafia's actions are inexplicable, Dawood's crime-terrorism nexus is particularly extreme. The dons of Mumbai were intelligent and rational individuals who carefully weighed the costs and benefits of committing a crime¹⁴⁸. The many tales originating from the Mumbai underworld¹⁴⁹, confirm the claims put forth by rational choice theory. For the longest, mafia gangsters have never allowed religious differences or, to a large extent, personal animosity to influence their criminal dealings. Haji Mastan, Karim Lala, and Dawood pursued relationships exclusively with individuals who possessed financial resources, influence, and the ability to facilitate their criminal progression. Although he is rarely in the public eye, Dawood's actions were motivated by his personal interests, the good for D-Company, his beliefs, and aspirations, upon closer inspection, none of them appeared to be impulsive choices; rather, they were all deliberate, well-informed, and tailored to fulfill his requirements and objectives.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

This thesis aims to examine the factors that have contributed and continue to do so to the establishment and continued growth of the spheres of influence of the Mumbai underworld and its extensive networks. What is it about these factors that have both intentionally and inadvertently hindered the successful dismantling of the Mumbai mafia, especially the D-Company and its subsequent terror nexus?

The research paper adopts a qualitative approach to effectively address the research topic. The Mumbai Mafia has not grown in social isolation but rather is a result of its interactions with its social surroundings, as discussed in the theoretical framework, it will best capture the attitudes and human-behavioral patterns involved in the proliferation of the underworld. Qualitative research

¹⁴⁸ "Rational Choice Theory of Criminology."

¹⁴⁹ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

methods will aid in the comprehension of concepts, opinions, and experiences, thereby facilitating the dissection of the Mumbai Mafia's impenetrable structure. Furthermore, this methodology will facilitate the generation of greater depth and complexity, thereby allowing deviation or access to information that goes beyond the initially set goals of the research. Such information will broaden the scope of comprehension and analysis, as well as reinforce and add to the initial findings. It is an indisputable fact that subjects related to security are not only challenging to investigate but also present potential hazards to researchers. Investigating the Mumbai mafia presents significant challenges, not only due to the security risks associated with its affiliations with terrorist organizations but also primarily due to its tenacious commitment to maintaining anonymity. Over the years, it has managed to restrict access to its inner workings, allowing only a handful of researchers and journalists to enter (*much of it happened to the dismay of the top bosses in the mafia, particularly Dawood*). Upon reviewing the footnotes of the literature, it is evident that only a small number of researchers have successfully analyzed the operations of the widespread and firmly established gangs in the Mumbai Mafia. It is important to emphasize that the majority of them did not study the mafia; instead, their research focused on cricket, real estate, movies, etc. While researching, they uncovered the presence of the Mumbai underworld, especially D-Company, in these domains. Only Hussain Zaidi (if I may say so) has been able to provide crucial information about the mafia right from the origins of the Mumbai mafia from the 1950s to the early 2000s, including anecdotes of the key members. To the events that have shaped the Mumbai underworld into what it is today, His diverse body of work has either laid the groundwork for subsequent research endeavors or has been used to substantiate any new findings made on the subject. Nevertheless, all of their works are important to us and very much appreciated, especially for this research, as they serve as the essential building blocks upon which the research is built. Hussain Zaidi, a former crime reporter

turned author, recounted experiences of being watched and followed during his investigations into the Mumbai Mafia in an interview¹⁵⁰. He also discussed the initial resistance and mistrust he encountered when attempting to interview Dawood Ibrahim. During another interview¹⁵¹, Zaidi emphasized the significance of maintaining objectivity and never losing sight of the truth when writing about the subject, as well as not befriending the subjects to be studied. Being mindful of the aforementioned is crucial so that individuals who are written about are aware that one is merely doing their work without any personal agenda. It is safe to say that even though the fact that the Mumbai mafia is an open secret, the subject is approached with considerable prudence. Conducting firsthand interviews, as previously mentioned, not only poses safety concerns and requires a large sample size with many members either dead, absconding, or reticent, but also is time-consuming, costly, and challenging to identify other accessible subjects. Additionally capitalizing on the proliferation of diverse digital media platforms, an increasing number of seasoned journalists, retired police and law enforcement officials, and others who have interacted with and scrutinized the Mumbai underworld are coming forward to discuss and reflect on it. In pursuit of addressing the research question, *academic papers, interviews, documentaries, news pieces, books and reports curated by governments and law enforcement agencies of India and other nations* will serve as my source material. These interviews will be sourced from a mix of digital media outlets. Video recordings, interview transcripts, and even interview-based podcasts will comprise these interviews. Interviews, news pieces, books, and research papers will help to comprehend, evaluate, and validate findings. Furthermore, reports generated by national governments and law enforcement agencies regarding the activities, connections, and members of

¹⁵⁰ Correspondent and Times, "Author S. Hussain Zaidi Talks about Dawood Ibrahim, Being Kidnapped and His New Book."

¹⁵¹ Singh and Singh, "The Man Who Interviewed Dawood Ibrahim Talks About The Dark Underbelly Of The Mumbai Mafia."

the Mumbai Mafia will be indispensable. This is not only because of their credibility and accuracy but also because of their comprehensive coverage spanning considerable periods. Such reports will aid me in the examination of recurring themes and the formulation of well-informed assessments. To guarantee an extensive spectrum of viewpoints, the interviewees will encompass individuals from commerce, Indian cricket, the Hindi film industry, historians, and academicians, along with journalists and law enforcement authorities from both India and abroad. Furthermore, I shall equip myself with sufficient knowledge regarding the Mumbai organized crime syndicate to become acquainted with various facets of the research subject. Nevertheless, I must maintain objectivity and prevent my preconceived notions from negatively influencing the research. I am acutely aware of the potential concerns regarding the accuracy and quality of the data that may emerge during the interview sourcing process. Consequently, I plan to conduct a thorough background check on the interviewer's and interviewee's prior works to ascertain that the interviews are not the result of any prejudice or ulterior motive. Furthermore, triangulating the gathered data, would not only enhance the validity of the conclusions but also refute some claims made about the subject to help obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the matter and new perspectives from which to analyze a particular aspect. Additionally, it is crucial to note that the majority of the data collection will center on D-Company, key members of the gang, the operations of the criminal syndicate, and Dawood Ibrahim, the central figure. There are multiple factors contributing to this. The Mumbai underworld first gained significant public attention with the 1993 bombings. Furthermore, D-Company's extensive range of legitimate and illegal enterprises, criminal alliances worldwide, and influence in various fields in India, coupled with the public recognition of his criminal activities, prompted numerous nations to acknowledge him and his activities, thereby generating reports on the subject. Furthermore, it was under Dawood's leadership that a vast one-of-a-kind

criminal network out of India was established, which expanded its operations to include terrorism which has prompted instability in the security landscape not only in India but in the South Asian neighborhood. In the context of criminal justice, terrorism, and relations with Pakistan, Dawood continues to be a thorn in the flesh of India. Moreover, Dawood is the poster boy of the mafia in India which would explain why Dawood, his aides, and his criminal endeavors have been a subject of great interest for the works of multiple researchers, academicians, and security experts. Furthermore, as previously stated, the emergence of diverse forms of media and the willingness of numerous individuals familiar with Dawood and D-Company to offer their perspectives on the subject contributed significantly to the body of research. Any literature on the underworld or organized crime in India would be deficient without the inclusion of Dawood. It would not be wrong to say that in India, Dawood has come to be synonymous with the term “underworld.” Following data collection, the subsequent stage in the research entails the analysis of interviews, books, research papers, and reports. To begin with, the conversion of audio and video (interviews & news pieces) to text (notes) is crucial for the identification of valuable unanticipated patterns and to facilitate future reference of the notes. To analyze my research findings, I plan to implement two data analysis methodologies: thematic analysis and narrative analysis. Although thematic analysis and narrative analysis are distinct, they are complementary analytic approaches. A thematic analytical approach is appropriate for investigating this topic as it permits a thorough examination of the data to uncover themes, subjects, and concepts¹⁵². Additionally, it is advantageous when working with large amounts of data and when the research aims to obtain subjective information regarding the Mumbai Mafia. Moreover, thematic analysis is also an optimal approach for evaluating data from organizational and government

¹⁵² Nowell et al., “Thematic Analysis.”

reports. Despite the exclusion of personal experiences, the reports enable the identification of recurring themes and patterns from the published reports chosen to be studied. However, it is imperative to clarify that this study would utilize inductive as well as deductive approaches to thematic analysis. As previously alluded to, an inductive approach permits themes to be identified from the data. Conversely, a deductive approach makes room for approaching the data with preconceived notions of themes that are expected to be discovered therein, predicated on theory or prior knowledge of the subject matter¹⁵³. The narrative analytic approach will enrich the analysis by carrying out a deeper analysis of the “how” and “why.” Although identifying patterns and themes is a cornerstone of both thematic and narrative analysis. Individual experiences and storytelling are focal points of narrative analysis¹⁵⁴. Given the likelihood that each interviewee and author of the selected research papers for this study has come across the Mumbai Mafia on different occasions, it is highly probable that they possess distinct perspectives on the underworld. A variety of external and internal variables influence these individual perceptions. The focus is on how they interpret¹⁵⁵ the factors and the links in the criminal network/terror nexus that have granted immunity to the Mumbai underworld from being dismantled. The degree of emphasis placed on a particular factor by one may or may not be shared by the other. In addition to unearthing diverse perspectives regarding a specific aspect of the underworld and gaining a deeper understanding of the matter, narrative analysis can also reinforce a specific research finding giving it legitimacy and validity. Exploring the mechanisms by which the organized criminal network in Mumbai establishes and sustains connections heavily relies on subjective data. For which it is crucial for the findings and conclusions to not be generalized¹⁵⁶. Underpinning qualitative research, the two analytical

¹⁵³ Caulfield, “How to Do Thematic Analysis | Step-by-Step Guide & Examples.”

¹⁵⁴ Figgou and Pavlopoulos, “Social Psychology: Research Methods.”

¹⁵⁵ Ntinda, “Narrative Research.”

¹⁵⁶ Jansen, “Narrative Analysis Explained Simply (With Examples).”

methodologies, and the research problem is the imperative to reveal human experiences, behaviors, and attitudes. By integrating data collected from interviews, research papers, and reports, and evaluating them through two distinct yet complementary qualitative data-analytic approaches, I will be able to generate more concrete findings to address the research question and also possibly pave new trajectories and open new avenues for any future research on this subject.

CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS

5.1. THE MUMBAI MAFIA-POLICE-POLITICIAN NEXUS

Why bother about enemies outside? when there are many within?

The target here is not Dawood per se, but rather all those individuals in positions of authority who are accountable for the security of the nation. Unfortunately, the influence of the Mumbai Mafia has been shrugged off by the Indian police, politicians, bureaucrats, government officials, and the Indian judiciary system, enabling the underworld, and Dawood in particular, to exercise unchecked power. Mumbai's mafia was so thoroughly embedded in the political, administrative, and commercial establishments of Maharashtra, exhibiting structural embeddedness (Social Embeddedness theory). The mafia was able to significantly influence governmental agencies, thereby manipulating the social environment to weaken the institutions internally and gaining the ability to establish their own regulatory systems. With his wealth and influence, Dawood created an extensive network in India that connected D-Company to government officials, politicians, and police officers, ultimately corrupting them (Social Network Theory). Dawood strategically and rationally (Rational Choice theory) selected collaborators in Indian law enforcement agencies from whom he could obtain the greatest possible advantage in the form of resources, contacts, trust, support, and knowledge (Social Capital theory) to execute the 1993 blasts. It would not be incorrect to state that the Mumbai Mafia, together with Indian politicians and Indian law enforcement, constituted the *triumvirate* that enabled the proliferation of organized crime in the country.

Highlights from the chapter

Mumbai mafia- Indian politician links - Mafia-police-politician network in 1993 blasts – Lack of official investigation into the nexus - Mumbai police encounters - Emergence of the Dawood camp in Mumbai police - Vohra Committee report - Miscalculations by the Indian government - Deficiencies in India’s law enforcement agencies

What began with veteran dons such as Haji Mastan and Arun Gawli transitioning from the criminal underworld to politics when their criminal careers abruptly ended, intensified into a mutually beneficial partnership between the mafia and politics. So strong are the relationships, that certain politicians to date maintain their allegiance to the mafia even though the mafia dons with whom these connections were established have been fugitives for decades now. Real estate, construction, cricket betting, film financing, hawala transactions, oil theft and adulteration, drug and gold smuggling, bootlegging, the stock market, extortion, contract killings, and protection money are all parts of the powerful Mumbai underworld economy. Political parties and their media representatives and fund managers, cannot afford to ignore the underworld’s utility¹⁵⁷. In an interview, veteran crime journalist Sheela Bhatt¹⁵⁸ recalled how, following the publication of her interview with Dawood Ibrahim in the 1980s, she received calls and requests from a variety of individuals—businessmen, and commoners, to name a few—seeking her help in establishing connections with Dawood. This was due to the considerable power and influence that Dawood wielded in various spheres of Mumbai. In contrast to conventional wisdom the establishment of Dawood's extensive networks during the 1980s and early 1990s was predominately due to his influence, work ethic, and ability to

¹⁵⁷ “In India, the Underworld-Politician-Police Nexus Is Clearly Visible – and Visibly Ignored.”

¹⁵⁸ “Bravest Indian Journalist - Sheela Bhatt On Dawood, Haji Mastan & Indian Underworld | TRS हिंदी 231.”

accomplish goals, and not out of fear of him. This might explain one of the reasons for politicians' closeness with the mafia is that the mafia can help them achieve goals that are beyond their reach through their official authority and power.

While the Indian media has often reported on the alleged alliance between politicians and the mafia, It remains unknown as to what are the vested interests of politicians in the underworld. Nevertheless, empirical evidence exists that confirms the existence of a mafia-politician nexus, particularly one between the politicians from Maharashtra and Gujarat and the Mumbai Mafia¹⁵⁹. On specific occasions, the names of highly notable political leaders affiliated with extremely prominent political parties have been mentioned, eliciting considerable curiosity. That said, two crucial arguments must be made. One, the mafia connection does not benefit a single political party; rather, it transcends numerous party lines.

Furthermore, the identities of numerous politicians and party workers who have affiliations with the underworld remain a secret. The first clear instance of a politician-gangster alliance was following the 1993 bombings that targeted prominent locations in Mumbai, including the headquarters of a prominent Maharashtra regionalist political party. A leader who belongs to the same political party endorsed Marathi gangsters Arun Gawli and Amar Naik under the party's policy of sons of soil¹⁶⁰. They were regarded as the party's answer to Dawood. Marathi pride and a blatant aversion towards Dawood were noticeably apparent.

In a shocking turn of events, when GR Khainar, the municipal commissioner of Mumbai during the late 1990s, had begun the deconstruction of Dawood's benami properties, The political leader

¹⁵⁹ "Dawood Ibrahim: Don't Just Go after Pakistan, There Are Enemies Within Who Are Supporting Him."

¹⁶⁰ Zaidi, Byculla to Bangkok.

phoned him to call off the citywide demolition of the properties¹⁶¹. He told Khairnar that anyone who contributes to the party is regarded as a devoted worker of the party and Dawood is one among them therefore, the destruction of his properties shall not be authorized. Interestingly the politician also hosted the renowned Pakistani cricketer Javed Miandad a few years after the 1993 explosions¹⁶². Coincidentally Miandad's son married Dawood's daughter in the same year. The cause for this unexpected shift in perspective regarding Dawood remains unknown also this was not further pursued as no other such instance ever came to be known. However, the politician-mafia nexus gained more attention and concern because of the alleged connection between one politician and Dawood Ibrahim. Former R&AW officer NK Sood has asserted in an interview that the party leader of another prominent regionalist political party of Maharashtra and Dawood allegedly maintain an alliance¹⁶³. Sood further asserts that the politician's frequent remarks in favor of Pakistan are suggestive of his purported association with Dawood. Although the politician had informed the press that the 1993 Bombay bombings comprised 13 explosions, no evidence existed for the 13th explosion, although 12 had been identified. As the 12 explosion sites were predominantly Hindu communities, he was compelled to fabricate the existence of a 13th blast site to avert additional communal unrest¹⁶⁴. Simultaneously, senior advocate Ram Jethmalani was approached by Dawood, and Dawood consented to return to India and undergo trial under specific conditions. when Jethmalani reached out to the politician who also happened to be the Chief Minister of Maharashtra then about Dawood's conditional surrender, He refused to accept the conditions as a

¹⁶¹ Kumar, "When Bal Thackeray Batted for Dawood. Why Did You Not Cry Then?"

¹⁶² Ibid

¹⁶³ "Ex RAW Officer NK Sood Exposes Dawood's Links in Indian Politics."

¹⁶⁴ Anandan, "Sharad Pawar's White Lies: How He Landed in Trouble over Dawood."

result Dawood never returned to India. Many have lauded the politician's foresight as demonstrated in both the situations and his choice to decline the conditional surrender considering the pervasive atmosphere at the time, it is inconceivable what would have transpired had he agreed to the surrender terms¹⁶⁵. Another frequently discussed theory in the media and political circles is that the politician's white lie was intended to deflect attention away from those who were making allegations regarding D-Company's involvement in the blasts and also that the politician, along with many from the top political leadership in Maharashtra at the time, did not want Dawood to return to India or for him to be held guilty of the 1993 bombings for fear that their underworld ties would be exposed¹⁶⁶¹⁶⁷. Furthermore, an official of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation compiled a record of assets found to be owned by Dawood and his family in and around Mumbai. Having initiated the formal procedure to seize the aforementioned assets, the official was removed from his position and posted elsewhere¹⁶⁸. Not only political leaders from Maharashtra and Gujarat across regional and national parties but even other prominent officials from the political class did not want to act against Dawood. In fact, throughout Dawood's reign of supremacy in Dubai, the R&AW units stationed in the Gulf were disrupted and kept in shambles by high-ranking Indian officials¹⁶⁹, one of whom was Ratan Sehgal who was later identified upon investigation to have had an unauthorized engagement with American Diplomats¹⁷⁰. Furthermore, the assertion that Indian political figures were or are part of D-Company's network, irrespective of

¹⁶⁵ Shrivastva and Shrivastva, "Ram Jethmalani Claims He Spoke to Dawood Ibrahim, Says He's Ready for Trial in India but Fears Threat to Li."

¹⁶⁶ "The Underworld Files By Varun Jauhari | Gulshan Kumar | Manya Surve | Dawood Ibrahim | Chhota Rajan."

¹⁶⁷ "Ex RAW Officer NK Sood Exposes Dawood's Links in Indian Politics."

¹⁶⁸ "Newsroom Spotlight: Dawood Ibrahim Calls Indian Politicians."

¹⁶⁹ "Ex RAW Officer NK Sood Exposes Dawood's Links in Indian Politics."

¹⁷⁰ "Jazz, Spies And Videotape."

the degree, is supported by the fact that in 2016 a prominent Indian media outlet obtained ten frequently contacted phone numbers by Dawood for a period of 7 months¹⁷¹. Five of the ten contacted numbers belonged to Indians, and among those five Indian contacts, one could be traced back to a senior political leader of Maharashtra. Two entities emerge. Dawood maintained personal and business interests in India even as late as 2016.

Secondly, why are these Indian contacts being reached, what are their interests concerning Dawood and why is this not being investigated? Given the relative simplicity and feasibility of halting Dawood's ground operations in India and severing any form of assistance, he receives from India, when compared to the alternative which is to attempt to extradite him from Pakistan. The News broadcasting agency forwarded the contact list to the police in hopes of achieving the aforementioned; however, the matter failed to progress, suggesting that past attempts to investigate the Dawood-political nexus were deliberately thwarted. When questioned, the concerned politicians and their parties have consistently and unequivocally denied any affiliation with the mafia, and in some cases, have even denied knowing them¹⁷². Concerning the alleged involvement of politicians, crime journalist Shams Tahir Khan further stated that no investigation was ever conducted into the matter and that any allegations made against them were never deemed sufficiently serious to warrant legal action¹⁷³. As a result, no formal or official report ever identifies these politicians in question and confirms their mafia links, their names have only appeared in the media for the very same reason I have not disclosed their names. Additionally, few have refuted the deep involvement between some accused politicians and the mafia and believe

¹⁷¹ "Newsroom Spotlight: Dawood Ibrahim Calls Indian Politicians."

¹⁷² "Ex RAW Officer NK Sood Exposes Dawood's Links in Indian Politics."

¹⁷³ "Dawood Ibrahim को ठिकाने लगा देते Ajeet Doval, लेकिन...: Padhaku Nitin | Shams Tahir Khan | Podcast."

that it has all been relatively inconsequential. A perspective posits that referencing any instance of collaboration between a politician and a gangster would undermine the credibility and popularity of that political party- this was considered a political mudslinging strategy¹⁷⁴. While it is accurate to say that politicians have occasionally gone to great lengths to prove their opponents' ties to the underworld, this should not detract from the fact that a politician-mafia nexus does exist in the country. There is little doubt that Dawood has received significant support in India. Speaking at an event, Former Mumbai police commissioner MN Singh stated that Dawood Ibrahim gained prominence due to social recognition and backing from politicians and influential individuals. In exchange, politicians perceive that gangsters have influence over society and can be utilized to secure votes¹⁷⁵¹⁷⁶. The crucial questions about who the politicians are, what the extent of their involvement with the mafia, and whether sufficient evidence exists to support the claim, remain unanswered.

It is difficult not to draw a pop-cultural reference to Indian films from the 1980s to the late 1990s, in which the Indian police in the movies frequently arrived either too late to be effective or too early to botch up the situation; the former was more prevalent. This, in my opinion, reflected the effectiveness of the Indian police force specifically the Mumbai Police in the 1980s and 1990s whenever it came to the Mafia. As has been stated numerous times in the literature review, the Mumbai police worked hand in glove with the mafia on numerous occasions for all the wrong reasons. Generations of police officers have had a profound

¹⁷⁴ "The Underworld Files By Varun Jauhari | Gulshan Kumar | Manya Surve | Dawood Ibrahim | Chhota Rajan."

¹⁷⁵ Online correspondent, "Mumbai: Social Recognition Made Dawood Ibrahim Monster, Says Former Top Cop MN Singh."

¹⁷⁶ "Social Recognition Made Dawood Ibrahim Monster, Says Former CP."

understanding of the underworld in Mumbai. As the police, in contrast to the political elite, engage in daily interactions with the community and, as a result, have a closer affiliation with society, hence the presence of a mafia-police nexus is hardly surprising. The documentary *Mumbai Mafia: Police vs the Underworld*¹⁷⁷ presents several intriguing discoveries. During the 1980s and 1990s, gangsters were granted unrestricted freedom to operate and became more powerful than the police to such an extent that people were so terrorized by D-Company that the troubled never approached the police for help. The mafia's terror also claimed the lives of dozens of police officers, who were frequently targeted and attacked. To curb the Mafia's power, former IPS officer and founder of the Anti-Terrorism Squad, A. A. Khan, had cultivated informants to learn more about Dawood and his gang activities. In 1991, a four-hour shootout between a nearly 100-member team of Mumbai police and the ATS, headed by AA Khan, and seven gangsters, led by Maya Dolas, resulted in the deaths of all seven gangsters. Most of this shootout was broadcast live to demonstrate to the public that the police were capable of taking action. This shooting became widely recognized as an 'encounter'. The Bombay police and the Maharashtra government were blamed for the unjustified deaths of numerous innocent citizens during the 1992 rioting. The police were described as being overly aggressive toward citizens, and the state government did not take any action to address the situation. The riots were further exacerbated by Dawood, who provided rioters with weapons to help avenge the Muslim lives lost and to create chaos in the city. The 1993 blasts were the tipping point. While on the one hand, the Bombay blasts exposed every deficiency in the Indian security system. A significant failure has been

¹⁷⁷ "Watch Mumbai Mafia: Police vs The Underworld | Netflix Official Site."

not investigating the mafia-police nexus. In an interview, former Police commissioner of Mumbai, IPS Sivanandhan stated that the seamless execution of the 1993 blasts was facilitated by customs officers and police, who also ensured that packaged RDX explosives from Pakistan arrived at the port in Mumbai undetected and were processed as ordinary cargo. Additionally, they made extensive efforts to place explosives in vehicles and other blast sites. Meanwhile, after the blasts, the Mumbai police had initiated a sincere effort to pursue the members of D-Company and the Mumbai mafia in general to eliminate their reign over the city. A squad of police officers who were fit, reputable, and skilled shooters was assembled, and they were granted *carte blanche*, unlimited power to engage in encounters with any mafia member. This strategy was largely successful due to the dread that was felt by the mafia, which resulted in the surrender of some members, the elimination of key members, and the gradual loss of Dawood's grip on the city as a result of the loss of many of his foot soldiers. In Mumbai, encounter specialists like Pradeep Sharma, Daya Nayak, Ravindra Angre, Aslam Momin, Valentine D'Souza, Vijay Salaskar, and Sachin Vaze to name a few became the poster boys of herodom, and the public was appreciative of their efforts to combat terror and crime in the city. The city had by that time eliminated organized crime to the point that criminals no longer posed an open threat. From one murder by the mafia every third or fourth day, there had been none in months by this time. By 2003, 1200 gangsters had been killed in such encounters. However, everything changed in 2003 when Officer Pradeep Sharma was interviewed by Alex Perry of TIME magazine¹⁷⁸. The credibility of the police force was questioned, and investigations into the encounters commenced. Intriguingly no one from

¹⁷⁸ "Urban Cowboys."

the public, politician, government official, organization, or human rights activist had questioned these encounters until that point. Following this, Officer Pradeep Sharma was the first to be removed from active duty due to the news of a fake encounter entering the discourse. Officer Sharma believed that he was being jailed and framed for an encounter in which he was allegedly not involved. Though all encounter specialists' encounters were initially investigated, only very few were under constant scrutiny. Officer Pradeep Sharma appeared to be the subject of particular attention. As the media reported, it was a period of fall from grace for some encounter specialists.

The media also did not miss an opportunity to glorify the encounter specialists; the tallies of the encounters that the officers engaged in were frequently compared in the media. Hussain Zaidi, the author, expressed the opinion that the specialists seemed to compete with one another to see who had the highest number of hits. Officer AA Khan also added that the act of killing criminals for the alleged purpose of making a record was reprehensible. There is a conviction that there was a more effective/ethical approach to combating organized crime and that permitting police officers complete freedom to handle criminals as they saw suitable was a misuse of power. What stood out to me in the documentary was Alex Perry's observation that gangsters were always armed with AK-47s, while police officers only carried pistols to these encounters. While the multiple encounters always ended with the deaths of the gangsters, in the words of Perry the cops hardly even suffered a scratch.

For the brief period officer Pradeep Sharma was imprisoned, there was a collective sigh of relief among the mafia. In addition, Officer Sharma was dismissed from his position in 2008 over an alleged affiliation with Dawood Ibrahim; After reportedly phone calls with Dawood henchman

Chhota Shakeel had emerged. Also, a dossier was compiled that comprised affidavits from exporters, builders, and businessmen alleging harassment by Officer Sharma¹⁷⁹. However, he was reinstated in 2009. Suspiciously, some of his other peer encounter specialists were also accused of having ties with the mafia either before or after his arrest. Some questions arise,

- a) Was it possible that Officer Pradeep Sharma was being a victim of politics?
- b) Was it possible that one section of the police was attempting to sabotage the reputation of another?
- c) Why was it that the encounter was considered a serious issue only after TIME Magazine (a foreign media) had published an article about it?
- d) Finally, to what extent was Dawood involved in these sudden allegations against the police officers?

In an interview, crime journalist Shams Tahir Khan emphasized that the majority of police encounters during the 1980s and 1990s were conducted against Dawood Ibrahim's enemies, with some encounters taken at his orders¹⁸⁰. In addition, he stated that at one point in time, one section of the Mumbai Police was on Dawood's payroll. Dawood was notorious for caring for police officers in key roles and positions to prevent any interference with his operations¹⁸¹. Officer AA Khan remarked that in the 1990s, certain police officers were under the supervision of their superiors in the force due to their contact with Dawood¹⁸². Dawood's daughter's wedding in Dubai in 2005 provided an ideal opportunity to

¹⁷⁹ Thaver and Modak, "Shootout at Versova: When Gangs & Encounter Specialists Ruled Mumbai."

¹⁸⁰ "Dawood Ibrahim को ठिकाने लगा देते Ajeet Doval, लेकिन...: Padhaku Nitin | Shams Tahir Khan | Podcast."

¹⁸¹ "How Underworld Don Dawood Ibrahim Got under the Skin of the Mumbai Police | Let's Talk Crime."

¹⁸² "Newroom: Botched Operation Dawood Revealed."

capture him. The Intelligence Bureau had devised a plan to bring him to India. After his split from Dawood, Chhota Rajan served as an invaluable informant for Indian law enforcement agencies. Consequently, two of Chhota Rajan's men were receiving training in Delhi for the operation. Even though the operation was kept extremely confidential and was coordinated by NSA Ajit Doval who had just retired as IB's Director earlier that year, the information on the same reached Dawood by a member of the Mumbai police. The operation abruptly fell apart when a squad of top police officers arrived in Delhi to apprehend Rajan's associates (the Mumbai police had been on the lookout for Rajan and his gang members for years)¹⁸³¹⁸⁴. However, in 2015, Indian media gained access to a WikiLeaks cable from August 2005 that was sent from India to Washington. The cable contained information about the unsuccessful operation to apprehend Dawood. In addition, it disclosed that Aslam Momin, a senior inspector and one of the numerous encounter specialists in the Mumbai police, was fired due to his associations with Dawood Ibrahim and his sibling. It also stated that Dawood was made aware of an operation against him, and in response, he instructed Officer Momin to dispatch a police team from Mumbai to Delhi to disrupt the plan¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁶. Dawood and his men would be unable to exert such influence on the Mumbai police in the absence of such entrenched embeddedness. Former IPS Officer Meeran Borwankar stated that the Mumbai police were unaware of NSA Doval's operation for IB even after his retirement and that this was a result of a lack of coordination between the agencies. The notion that the Mumbai police worked for Dawood Ibrahim is entirely

¹⁸³ "Cricket, Sex Aur Dhoka? India's Top Cop on IPL, Dawood & Sexual Harassment of Athletes | Barkha Dutt."

¹⁸⁴ "Dawood Ibrahim को ठिकाने लगा देते Ajeet Doval, लेकिन...: Padhaku Nitin | Shams Tahir Khan | Podcast."

¹⁸⁵ "Wiki Leaks Cable: Aslam Momin Fired For Being In Touch With Dawood."

¹⁸⁶ "WikiLeaks Exposes Dawood's Links With Mumbai Police."

inaccurate¹⁸⁷. While law enforcement agencies' lack of coordination and communication gaps have been a significant vulnerability and to an extent it can be agreed that the Mumbai police were oblivious to the operation and that their plan to apprehend Rajan's men was sincere. However, it is difficult to understand why did they not simply let the operation to nab Dawood continue upon learning about it, and why they persisted in their efforts to arrest the gangsters despite the appeal of NSA Doval for it to not happen. The intentional botching of the operation claim is further bolstered by the statements of the former Union Home Secretary, RK Singh, regarding the failed operation. Singh claimed that certain corrupt police officers were in constant communication with Dawood and that someone among them had learned about the very confidential operation¹⁸⁸. Although, it is unclear who was responsible for tipping off the other. Was Dawood informed of the plan by the police, or was it the other way around?

In September 2015, Chhota Rajan was extradited from Indonesia to India. In media coverage of Chhota Rajan's detention by Indonesian officials. He can be seen and heard telling media that he had experienced harassment from the Mumbai police in the past and accused some Mumbai officers of having connections with Dawood¹⁸⁹. During Rajan's interrogation in India following his deportation. He verified that some Mumbai police officers were on the payroll of Dawood. He had also asserted that a few retired Mumbai Police officers serve as an intermediate between Dawood and senior police officers. Consequently, he had expressed apprehension regarding the likelihood of incarcerating him in a Mumbai jail, as he was concerned that Dawood might attempt to

¹⁸⁷ Vaktania, "Mumbai Police Didn't Botch Ajit Doval's Dawood Execution Plan: Ex-IPS Officer."

¹⁸⁸ "Former Home Secretary RK Singh On India's Attempts To Capture Dawood Ibrahim."

¹⁸⁹ "Some Mumbai Cops Mixed With Dawood Ibrahim: Chhota Rajan."

target him there¹⁹⁰. Interestingly, a few days before Officer Sharma's dismissal in 2008. Chhota Rajan in a telephonic interview with a regional TV channel said that Dawood had benami properties around the country that he managed with the help of the police and that Officer Sharma works for Dawood. He also went on to allege that Officer Sharma has acquired properties valued at crores in the name of Dawood's associates. He is wealthy and asserts that no one can prosecute him because he has bribed everyone, including the Home Ministry and the police department¹⁹¹. It is possible that Chhota Rajan's allegations against Officer Sharma were primarily motivated by his outrage at Officer Sharma for the fake encounter with Rajan's henchman Lakhan Bhaiya. But, One cannot deny that Officer Sharma has been accused of allegedly maintaining connections with the underworld, and also of accumulating wealth through questionable ways¹⁹². In 2017, he successfully nabbed Iqbal Kaskar (Dawood's brother) without the use of guns¹⁹³. Some believe that this was a stunt intended to demonstrate that the encounter officers, particularly Officer Sharma, had reformed¹⁹⁴. Others contend that it was an attempt to demonstrate that he had no affiliations with Dawood. In October of 1993, the former Indian Home Secretary, N. N. Vohra, submitted the Vohra Committee Report¹⁹⁵. It investigated the issue of the criminalization of politics and the ties between criminals, politicians, police, and bureaucrats in the country. The most important elements of the report are as follows:

- a) a potent network had been established as a result of the apparent progression of the activities of the Memon Brothers and Dawood

¹⁹⁰ "Chhota Rajan Names Mumbai Cops on 'Payroll' of Arch Enemy Dawood."

¹⁹¹ "Gangster Chhota Rajan Speaks about Pradeep Sharma."

¹⁹² Ibid

¹⁹³ Desk, "Dawood Ibrahim's Brother Iqbal Kaskar Arrested from Thane in Extortion Case."

¹⁹⁴ "Watch Mumbai Mafia: Police vs The Underworld | Netflix Official Site."

¹⁹⁵ "Vohra Committee Report."

Ibrahim over the years. This was contingent upon the protection of these elements by the officials of the relevant government departments, including Customs, Income Tax, and the Police.

- b) The CBI's 1986 report demonstrated that a nexus existed between criminals, police, politicians, and bureaucrats even then.
- c) In various cities across the nation, the gangs were being granted protection by government functionaries and were patronized by local politicians. The crime syndicates had become a law unto themselves.
- d) The international links of these crime syndicates have infiltrated a variety of economic and financial activities. Over time, the gangs have acquired the financial and muscle power necessary to corrupt government apparatus at all levels.
- e) The money acquired was utilized to establish an extensive network of connections with government functionaries at all levels, police, politicians, media personnel, and strategically significant and located individuals in the non-state sector.
- f) The Mafia was operating a parallel government, which was leading to the state apparatus becoming irrelevant. The criminal justice system's complete inadequacy has rendered the efforts of enforcement agencies ineffective.
- g) Senior political leaders and government officials frequently exert pressure on the field officers of various agencies, apparently at the direction of criminal syndicates or the mafia.
- h) The mafia's nexus with the various government machinery becomes particularly evident when
 - Concerned agencies are pressured to refrain from taking action against offenders or to proceed slowly with

investigations against them. This situation typically occurs during a raid or the commencement of a prosecution.

- Officers of agencies who are corrupt, accused, or even allegedly accused are transferred from sensitive assignments.
- In numerous instances, officers who are perceived as a threat to the syndicate and its extensive networks are also transferred from assignments.

- i) No mechanism is in place specifically designed to collect or compile intelligence regarding the connections that criminal syndicates have established with the government.

The report presented many recommendations and suggestions to assist in the elimination of corrupt elements that maintain the mafia-politicians-police nexus. The committee reached a consensus to establish an independent nodal agency to compile and organize all intelligence related to criminal syndicates and terror networks in India or targeting India. Surprisingly, the Central government chose not to release the complete report to the public. The reason was clear. The committee stated the names of politicians and officials with close ties to organized crime and terror networks in the report annexures. Additionally, these officials were crucial in assisting their operation in India. Consequently, the report was released without annexures¹⁹⁶. A petition challenging this was filed. The Supreme Court ruled that the Vohra Committee Report was comprehensive by itself and that releasing supporting materials would harm the public interest. Instead, it instructed the entity that would evaluate the Committee's findings and possess the

¹⁹⁶ Cause, "Common Cause India | Expert Reports So Far."

authority to prosecute the accused in specially designated tribunals. Governments of all levels have been unable to comply with the Supreme Court's directives, which is not surprising¹⁹⁷.

A persistent issue has been the lack of political will to take stringent action against the mafia and their political patrons and also to implement the many recommendations of the Vohra report. Political interference frequently impedes investigations, resulting in compromised or delayed outcomes¹⁹⁸. In an interview, Shirish Inamdar, the former additional deputy commissioner of Mumbai Police, disclosed the government's selective attitude towards extradition and acquittal of certain gangsters. The then central government declined to proceed with the extradition procedure of Chhota Rajan from Bangkok when it was initiated by the Mumbai Police and did not want to bring him back to India. According to him, the politicians had their own interests in not pursuing Rajan¹⁹⁹. A nexus between the police and politicians in the country also exists, which serves to safeguard the interests of the mafia. In the early years of the mafia, had the courts and police done their work effectively, common people would not have turned to the mafia for relief which in turn contributed to its power and influence²⁰⁰. Meeran Borwankar, a former IPS officer, revealed that the Indian criminal justice system is very lenient, and a corrupt bureaucracy and police have impeded the execution of legal investigations and proceedings against the mafia or any elements

¹⁹⁷ Ibid

¹⁹⁸ Talawar, "Unmasking India's Underworld: Vohra Committee's Insights on Mafia, Corruption, and Nexus between Criminals and Politicians."

¹⁹⁹ Sharma and Sharma, "Mid-Day Turns 40 - Let's Talk: Shirish Inamdar and Bilal Siddiqi."

²⁰⁰ Ranveer Allahbadia, "Bravest Indian Journalist - Sheela Bhatt On Dawood, Haji Mastan & Indian Underworld | TRS हिंदी 231."

that support it²⁰¹. The Mafia has always exhibited no fear of the law, as the gap between the implementation of laws and the execution of them is so wide that the mafia has managed to discover numerous loopholes, exploit vulnerabilities, and evade the law. In reality, prisons in India have evolved into a community for criminals over the years. In the case of the Mumbai Mafia, gangsters such as Dawood Ibrahim and others were able to expand their gangs by interacting with other criminals while incarcerated. Especially for wealthy offenders, the prison system has been ineffective, as all amenities have been made available for them. It is a proven fact that even minor criminals who have been imprisoned have grown into more serious criminals. They have successfully orchestrated criminal operations from inside jails²⁰². During the peak of the Mumbai Mafia, the Mumbai police had a lenient policy, allowing people who had committed murder to be released on bail within 3 months²⁰³. On the other hand, There have been reports indicating that the UK and other European countries frequently reject extradition requests from India due to concerns that the extradited individual may be subjected to poor and unsafe conditions or custodial violence in Indian prisons²⁰⁴. Previous endeavors to execute Dawood or any other member of the Mumbai mafia have mostly failed as a result of miscalculations made by the government and other concerned agencies. Neeraj Kumar, a former Indian Police Service officer, further stated that India's refusal to comply with Dawood's surrender conditions was a mistake. Had

²⁰¹ Raj Shamani, "Dawood, Crime, Underworld, Corruption, Police & Politics - Ex IPS Meeran Chadha | FO 201 Raj Shamani."

²⁰² Aaj Tak Radio, "Dawood Ibrahim को ठिकाने लगा देते Ajeet Doval, लेकिन...: Padhaku Nitin | Shams Tahir Khan | Podcast."

²⁰³ "Watch Mumbai Mafia: Police vs The Underworld | Netflix Official Site."

²⁰⁴ Tirkey, "India's Challenges in Extraditing Fugitives from Foreign Countries."

the matter been pursued and Dawood been brought to India, he could have been prosecuted for his offenses. In addition to this, there is a problem with the organizational structure of law enforcement agencies. The issue of the mafia spans several decades and necessitates officials to be assigned to the same agency for an extended period. This is because over time, they establish connections that provide them with information about the mafia, and they gain the knowledge and experience needed to effectively address the problem. However, the organizational mandate to transfer officers from one post to another, often deliberately, hinders any progress made in pursuing the mafia²⁰⁵. Over time, a laxity emerged, as there appeared to be no discernible threat from Dawood and others, and the mafia was not posing any open danger to society as they had in the 1990s²⁰⁶. Additionally, the gangs are not as active as they used to be, and many of the prominent criminals of the 80s and '90s have aged, which led to a lack of push necessary to pursue them. Though organized crime activities have significantly reduced in the country today, the networks of the most prominent gangsters are still active. The crimes have transformed following the changing times, but they remain as severe as they were in the past. Currently, the mafia's influence is notably evident in Mumbai's real estate market, as well as in the supply of narcotics, arms, and support to terrorist organizations²⁰⁷²⁰⁸.

²⁰⁵ Aaj Tak Radio, "Dawood Ibrahim को ठिकाने लगा देते Ajeet Doval, लेकिन...: Padhaku Nitin | Shams Tahir Khan | Podcast."

²⁰⁶ Ibid

²⁰⁷ BeerBiceps, "Crime World & Police - What Happened In The 1990s In Mumbai | IPS Sivanandhan | The Ranveer Show 161."

²⁰⁸ Middy India, "How Underworld Don Dawood Ibrahim Got under the Skin of the Mumbai Police | Let's Talk Crime."

While the country's corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, and police officers are weeds that must be removed, the genuine efforts of the many individuals in the Indian police force, judiciary, political spheres, and otherwise who have devoted decades to combating the mafia should not be overshadowed by the nexus between the mafia and certain individuals within the country's various governmental apparatus. The Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) has been one of the highly effective mechanisms for addressing the issue of organized crime in the state of Maharashtra²⁰⁹. Under the act, special courts and prosecution laws were established, and trials were concluded within one year of the commission of any offense. This legislation has had a substantial impact on the reduction of criminal activity in the state²¹⁰.

5.2. THE D-COMPANY-ISI-PAKISTAN NEXUS

It was the 1993 Bombay bomb blasts that first shed light on the ISI-D-Company nexus. ISI had assembled Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Memon, and numerous other rival Indian Muslim dons residing in Dubai and Europe along with other international terrorist organizations to execute ISI's operation 'Tehreeke-Inteqaam' - *The initiative of revenge*²¹¹. This illustrates the core of Social Network theory - how ISI through its influence constructed networks connecting D-Company, terrorist outfits, and criminals across the globe. Dawood and ISI strategically designed criminal networks to maximize their efficiency and effectiveness in pursuit of their respective objectives. Dawood had cleverly suggested that the ISI make Memon the hero of the operation and for Dawood to serve

²⁰⁹ "India: Document- Acts and Ordinance Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999."

²¹⁰ BeerBiceps, "Crime World & Police - What Happened In The 1990s In Mumbai | IPS Sivanandhan | The Ranveer Show 161."

²¹¹ Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia.

as a co-conspirator and logistics provider- In the context of Social Capital theory, the 1993 blasts would not have been made possible if Dawood had not provided the ISI with his knowledge of Mumbai and other resources (social capital). The ISI, in turn, provided Dawood with a security guarantee, among other resources to grow (social capital). When looked through the lens of Rational Choice theory it not only highlights his rational thinking to evade the law, as the Indian agencies could never attribute the blasts entirely onto him and his grand strategy to wipe out rivals with little effort as Tiger Memon, a fast-growing smuggler in the city, had to flee the nation after the blasts, leaving Dawood with one less competitor²¹². But also Dawood’s ability to negotiate with the ISI about who would play what role in the blasts, reveals he was not merely a one-time collaborator of the ISI- Going by the Social Embeddedness theory it is evident that Dawood's influence in Pakistan was extensive, as D-Company was deeply rooted in the country. Furthermore, Dawood's ability to recreate the underworld he governed in Mumbai, in Karachi was facilitated by the ISI. It is indisputable that Dawood with an analytical outlook consciously weighed the costs and benefits of engaging with ISI and terrorist outfits.

Highlights from the chapter

D-Company- ISI collaboration – D-Company’s business ventures in Pakistan – Dawood’s criminal-terrorism fusion model – Terrorist funding – Pakistan’s proxy forces – Anti-India activities - Dawood’s extradition to India – Dawood dossier – Dawood, Pakistan’s hero – Action against criminal- terrorism fusion model – Diplomatic obligations – Integrated approach strategy

²¹² Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai - Six Decades of the Mumbai Mafia

The 1993 blasts were neither the first nor the final instance of the Dawood-ISI-Pakistan nexus. The Vohra Committee report highlights the exploitation of the Indian underworld by the Pakistani ISI and its network in the UAE. This exploitation has resulted in not just the 1993 blasts but also acts of sabotage, subversion, and communal strife in several regions of India²¹³. Gilbert King has traced Dawood's connection with the ISI dating as far back as 1991²¹⁴. Besides supplying AK-47s and hand grenades for the 1993 blasts. A significant number of the convicts were granted green channel entry and exit in Pakistan to undergo training by the ISI in the production of bombs using RDX and other explosives. The training arrangements were supervised by Dawood and others²¹⁵. Since then, 33 individuals (absconders) who were convicted for the Bombay explosions, including Dawood Ibrahim, have sought refuge in Pakistan²¹⁶. LeT terrorist Abdul Karim Tunda revealed that in exchange for providing Dawood protection from Indian agencies and the liberty to operate illegal businesses²¹⁷. The ISI would get a 30% share in Dawood's ill-gotten profits and gain access to his extensive networks, which could be exploited in any way that would benefit the ISI²¹⁸. In the aftermath of the gold price collapse and with the ISI overseeing the smuggling routes between the western coast of India and the Gulf nations, particularly the Pakistani waters, the Mumbai underworld's financial interests, particularly those of Dawood, were under threat²¹⁹. Dawood's numerous partners in Dubai were Pakistanis. ISI had reached him through these partners, who subsequently explained to Dawood the necessary

²¹³ "Vohra Committee Report."

²¹⁴ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

²¹⁵ Pti, "Pak, ISI Helped Convicts in 1993 Mumbai Blasts: SC."

²¹⁶ Hussain Zaidi Books, "Dawood Nama | Episode 26 | S. Hussain Zaidi | The Infotainment Series."

²¹⁷ DHNS and DHNS, "Dawood in Pak under ISI Cover, Reveals Tunda."

²¹⁸ Kanal, "Why Does Pakistan Continue to Protect Dawood Ibrahim?"

²¹⁹ ANI News, ""Dawood Ne Mujhe 3 Murder Ke Baare Mein Bataya,"" - Sheela Bhatt."

conditions for him to continue his smuggling activities²²⁰. Pakistan also facilitated the obtaining of passports and citizenships for Dawood and his associates. They were furthermore accommodated in secure upscale residential areas in Pakistan²²¹²²². It is popularly believed that Dawood had orchestrated the 1993 blasts under pressure from the ISI. However, journalist Sheela Bhatt has observed that Dawood has consistently referred to himself as a businessman, and his business interests were of paramount importance to him and the offer made by the ISI was too tempting to refuse²²³. On arriving in Pakistan, Dawood was advised by the ISI to enter the real estate business, which entailed the acquisition of prime properties, often illegally, and the construction of residential apartments and shopping malls in violation of all existing building regulations. Dawood's numerous businesses prospered with ISI's blessings. In tandem with Sahara Constructions, his Sahara Transport maintains a fleet of 1,200 high-end trucks and engages in lucrative business dealings in China and Pakistan. Dawood's tobacco-laced betelnut product is the most popular brand in Pakistan and is also available in the Middle East²²⁴. The LTTE, with the cooperation of D-Company, also expanded its drug trafficking operations into Pakistan. They utilized the port city of Karachi to establish a presence in South Asia and diversify smuggling activities to include humans in addition to narcotics²²⁵. "*Dawood's underworld connections and business ventures are extensive,*" as noted by Lahore-based journalist Amir Mir. Dawood had also sublet his name to franchises in the sectors of drug trafficking

²²⁰ Pti, "Dawood Organised 1993 Blasts under ISI Pressure."

²²¹ Aaj Tak Radio, "Dawood Ibrahim को ठिकाने लगा देते Ajeet Doval, लेकिन...: Padhaku Nitin | Shams Tahir Khan | Podcast."

²²² "Dawood's ISI Links Could Trouble Musharraf."

²²³ Ranveer Allahbadia, "Bravest Indian Journalist - Sheela Bhatt On Dawood, Haji Mastan & Indian Underworld | TRS हिंदी 231."

²²⁴ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

²²⁵ Ibid., 2

and gambling dens in Pakistan, the UAE among other countries²²⁶. Dawood, with the patronage he received, soon transitioned to more profitable businesses, such as *hundi*- a parallel credit system. Additionally, he resumed the operation of his gold and drug smuggling network, which he had abandoned back in Mumbai. Dawood also engaged in match-fixing, with a significant number of Pakistani cricket players on his payroll²²⁷. In addition, ISI had fostered an environment for Dawood that allowed him to assume control of the Karachi underworld. Criminal syndicates and other groups that maintained a monopoly on illicit enterprises in the country were cornered by D-Company²²⁸. The arrival of Dawood in Karachi, particularly since 2001, had also sparked gang wars, similar to those in Mumbai. These gang conflicts were frequently initiated by intelligence agencies to regulate a variety of criminal gangs, the majority of which they maintain for their own interest. At least 82 suspected criminals, were killed in Karachi during the first eight months of 2001. Of which none were investigated. Moreover, it was Dawood's foray into the shipbreaking sector, in which he had major stakes which was most concerning for India. The revenue generated from this business has not only been utilized to smuggle contraband products within India, but Dawood has also smuggled arms, ammunition, explosives, and even terrorists into the country at the behest of the ISI. For years, ISI has been leveraging D-Company's smuggling routes and infrastructure to the fullest through the borders of India, Pakistan, and other neighboring countries²²⁹. ISI makes use of Dawood's hawala networks to finance anti-India activities. The channels were also utilized to provide compensation to the families of killed gangsters,

²²⁶ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

²²⁷ "Dawood's ISI Links Could Trouble Musharraf."

²²⁸ Pti, "Dawood Organised 1993 Blasts under ISI Pressure."

²²⁹ Ibid., 1

finance contract killers, agents, informers, as well as police and jail officials²³⁰. Even though the Dawood-ISI partnership is mutually beneficial, it is ISI that has gained the most out of it. The long-standing hostility between India and Pakistan that spans decades and is caused by an array of issues is a matter that requires no introduction. Dawood, India's most wanted man, is further aggravating the conflict between the two nations by virtue of his connection with Pakistan's ISI.

Author Hussain Zaidi asserts that Dawood has engaged in multiple businesses with prominent Pakistani people and has effectively been conducting Pakistan's economy by proxy (*Dawood has acted on behalf of the Pakistani government in the country's economic matters*)²³¹. In addition, Gilbert King has claimed that Dawood was responsible for bailing out Pakistan's central bank in 2000²³². The D-Company has enabled Al Qaeda's use of its smuggling routes from Afghanistan to Pakistan, while also providing financial support for its diverse operations targeted at destabilizing India's security²³³. In addition, D-Company had also established ties with Lashkar-e-Taiba under the direction of ISI. This collaboration has resulted in LeT's influence in multiple Indian states and accelerated the expansion of the Indian Mujahideen²³⁴. According to a 1996 report by INTERPOL, Anees Trading Company, a shell company operated by Dawood, was enticing young, jobless men with the offer of employment, a greater good/ purpose, and sending them to camps for terrorist training²³⁵. In actuality, there is undisputed proof of the ISI employing criminal syndicates, specifically the D-Company, as hawala routes for funding terrorist organizations in India. An investigation

²³⁰ Pti, "Dawood Organised 1993 Blasts under ISI Pressure."

²³¹ Hussain Zaidi Books, "Dawood Nama | Episode 26 | S. Hussain Zaidi | The Infotainment Series."

²³² Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

²³³ Ibid., 2

²³⁴ Ibid., 2

²³⁵ "Dawood's ISI Links Could Trouble Musharraf."

revealed an intricate network of hawala channels connected to an associate of Dawood. This network was found to have links with the Jammu Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF), the group responsible for the early stages of terrorism in Kashmir²³⁶. Further evidence has pointed to a nexus between ISI, the mafia operating from Dubai and Karachi, and terrorist organizations. A 2010 US Congressional report identified the D-Company to be in a strategic alliance with ISI and they have jointly forged relationships with Islamist extremist organizations such as LeT and Al-Qaeda. The D-Company was appropriately referred to as a *criminal terrorism fusion model* in the report²³⁷. Dawood has not only provided ISI and terrorist groups with his smuggling routes, money laundering, human trafficking, and narcotics routes but also his expertise in a region and country where the ISI and terrorist groups were attempting to gain a foothold²³⁸. Dawood has provided them with insider knowledge about India, foot soldiers, and a well-entrenched influence in the country waiting to be exploited²³⁹. Furthermore, these resources have been deployed to establish sleeper cells throughout South Asia, which has reinforced the presence of Islamist extremism in the region²⁴⁰. It is important to note that the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which were orchestrated by LeT and executed by 10 LeT terrorists who were smuggled to India via a boat and other logistics provided by Dawood, were executed without a hitch, even though Dawood had not stepped foot in the country for over two decades and that the LeT was banned and assets were frozen by Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, respectively. Undoubtedly, Dawood has significantly amplified the capabilities and resilience of these extremist

²³⁶ “Dawood’s ISI Links Could Trouble Musharraf.”

²³⁷ Talwar, “Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm.”


²³⁸ Ibid

²³⁹ BeerBiceps, “Crime World & Police - What Happened In The 1990s In Mumbai | IPS Sivanandhan | The Ranveer Show 161.”

²⁴⁰ Talwar, “Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm.”

organizations by offering them his criminal expertise, financial resources, contacts, and logistical assistance. Apart from this, the underworld has been used by ISI to recruit potential terrorists and gather intelligence. Dawood and his extensive networks in India in particular, have been providing regular assistance to ISI and other Pakistani agencies in the collection of intelligence²⁴¹.

In her research, Vesna Markovic has developed a link chart that visually represents the complex nature of the relationships between organized criminal groups, terrorist/insurgent groups, and various states and state institutions in Pakistan and the degrees to which they are all connected to one another²⁴².



Source: Vesna Markovic

Dawood as a terrorist is a result of a combination of opportunities and circumstances. As noted earlier, Dawood is a shrewd businessman who perceived terrorism as a profitable venture and exploited the political polarization in India and Pakistan to benefit from the conflict- Dawood leveraged terrorism to amass personal fortune and establish high-level

²⁴¹ "Dawood's ISI Links Could Trouble Musharraf."

²⁴² Markovic, "The Contemporary Face of Transnational Criminal Organizations and the Threat They Pose to U.S. National..."

contacts growing his network, which facilitated his diversification into profitable business ventures worldwide. In addition to this, he was granted immunity from the law and a license to exercise unchecked power. Terrorist organizations in turn capitalized on Dawood's clandestine nature, his capability to wage attacks better, and also the political atmosphere that enabled him to operate his businesses as normal and remain scot-free.

State-sponsored terrorism has been one of India's greatest concerns pertaining to Pakistan, as it has served as a strategy for weakening India. But it is Dawood's function as Pakistan's proxy against India, that is most alarming. Furthermore, in 2014, the US Pentagon issued a report affirming that Pakistan was employing proxies to undermine the stability of both Afghanistan and India. The report further adds that “Afghan- and Indian-focused militants continue to operate from Pakistan territory to the detriment of Afghan and Indian regional stability. It was also mentioned that these proxy forces were a precautionary measure to mitigate the risk of diminishing influence in Afghanistan and to counterbalance India's superior military. In 2009, Senator John McCain expressed his concerns regarding the possibility of non-state actors obtaining access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal during the US Senate hearings, months following the 26/11 attacks. Further, he stated that there is a nexus in Pakistan between notorious gangsters such as Dawood Ibrahim and terrorist groups, as well as the black markets that were established to support Pakistan's nuclear program led by A.Q. Khan²⁴³ (*Father of Pakistan's atomic bomb*²⁴⁴). He also added that, although the Pakistani authorities have consistently assured The United States that they have nuclear weapons under strict supervision, there is still cause for concern. It got particularly alarming

²⁴³ “Dawood’s Nexus, AQ Khan’s Black Market Raised Concern That Terrorists May Get Hold of Pak’s Nuclear.”

²⁴⁴ “A. Q. Khan - Nuclear Museum.”

when in 2016, AQ Khan made a highly boastful statement regarding Pakistan's capacity to target India's capital, New Delhi, in a mere 5 minutes²⁴⁵.

During an interview, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, the former foreign secretary of India, underlined Pakistan's persistent support for terrorist infrastructure in efforts to cripple not only Indian security but incidents such as The 26/11 attacks, which targeted India's commercial and financial capital (Mumbai) and the circulation of counterfeit Indian currency notes by Pakistan (to not only fund terrorist activities) highlight how there have also been attempts at derailing and disrupting the Indian economy as well²⁴⁶.

Pakistan's consistent denial of Dawood's presence in the country is the greatest obstacle to the break up of the Dawood-ISI nexus and the perpetual dismantling of the Mumbai underworld. India has repeatedly requested the deportation of Dawood to India, both through direct communication with Pakistan and at international forums, following the 1993 blasts. Along with Dawood, there has also been a request for the extradition of the key perpetrators of the 26/11 attacks. Pakistan's consistent stonewalling on the subject has rendered all attempts fruitless. Specifically in the instance of Dawood, Pakistan has always maintained that he is not present within their territory and/or that India has never requested his extradition²⁴⁷²⁴⁸. Pakistan has been presented with many dossiers compiled by Indian agencies over the years as evidence that Dawood is in Pakistan. These dossiers, which have even run up to over 100 pages, contained a variety of information, including Dawood's numerous residences in Pakistan, call records, his various passport numbers, and a crime sheet that detailed his involvement in the 1993 explosions, several extortion rackets, and

²⁴⁵ "Pakistan Downplays Scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's Boastful Nuclear Remark."

²⁴⁶ TRS Clips, "Dawood Ibrahim's Dark Secrets - Ex-Foreign Secretary Reveals."

²⁴⁷ "India Has Never Requested for Dawood Ibrahim's Extradition: Abdul Basit - India Today."

²⁴⁸ Pti, "No Extradition Request with Foreign Ministry for Dawood Ibrahim, Hafiz Saeed: RTI | Mint."

cases of drug and arms smuggling²⁴⁹. According to RK Singh, Pakistan has not only persistently refused to acknowledge the presence of Dawood in their country, despite ample evidence provided by the dossiers, but has even questioned the authenticity of the dossiers²⁵⁰. An official from the Intelligence Bureau (IB) jested about the dossiers, stating that India is providing Pakistan with information that Pakistan is already aware of. However, the official also emphasized the significance of continuously reminding Pakistan that India is aware of the information they are trying to hide²⁵¹. If anything, India's dossier has alarmed Pakistan. In the year 2015, the D-dossier was made public. ISI relocated Dawood to a safe house in a neighborhood that was encircled by the residences of Pakistan's most influential and distinguished military officials²⁵². The ISI has been supervising the security of Dawood, while a top Pakistani security agency provides a substantial entourage of armed guards for his safety²⁵³. A significant number of Dawood's aides are either Ex-Servicemen or retired or serving personnel from intelligence agencies²⁵⁴. Dawood enjoys not only the support of the ISI and Pakistan army but also the backing of local police and politicians. One example of his influence was demonstrated when Islamabad was desperate to shield him from extradition sought by the Indian government during President Pervez Musharraf's visit to Agra in India in July 2001²⁵⁵. Not only were Indian attempts to investigate the relationship between Dawood and ISI hindered, but similar efforts by some sections in Pakistan were also impeded. When an NGO objected to the unauthorized acquisition of a public park and the illegal construction of a commercial complex in Pakistan by Tiger Memon, they filed a lawsuit against him. However, they had been

²⁴⁹ Nanjappa, "Dawood Ibrahim's Dossier Details: Old Wine a New Bottle."

²⁵⁰ India Today, "Former Home Secretary RK Singh On India's Attempts To Capture Dawood Ibrahim."

²⁵¹ Nanjappa, "Dawood Ibrahim's Dossier Details: Old Wine a New Bottle."

²⁵² India Today, "The Inside Story: Dawood Is Now Pakistan's Damad | Dawood Ibrahim Kasarkar's Life & Terror Trail."

²⁵³ India Today, "Former Home Secretary RK Singh On India's Attempts To Capture Dawood Ibrahim."

²⁵⁴ "Dawood's ISI Links Could Trouble Musharraf."

²⁵⁵ Ibid

directed by the ISI to withdraw the case. In September 2001, a prominent Pakistani journalist, Ghulam Husnain, exposed the nexus between Dawood, the military, and ISI in a news article titled "Portrait of a Don." Following this he was apprehended by ISI agents and held captive for several days before being released. It is believed that the journalist has been so traumatized by the incident that he has refrained from disclosing what had occurred. It is alleged that Daniel Pearl, a journalist who had traveled to Pakistan to research Islamist militants, was abducted and killed by Dawood Ibrahim's network²⁵⁶, and the perpetrator (terrorist) of the murder was/is protected by ISI²⁵⁷. Another issue that has surfaced is Dawood's widespread popularity in Pakistan. During an interview, former president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, expressed that Dawood is held in high esteem in the country. This is because many Pakistanis believe that the 1993 bombings were a justifiable response to the loss of Muslim lives during the 1992-1993 communal riots in India²⁵⁸. In 2003, Dawood was recognized as a specially designated global terrorist by The US Treasury²⁵⁹. In that same year, The United Nations recognized Dawood as a global terror financier²⁶⁰. Subsequently in 2012, The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, named Dawood Ibrahim as a prominent foreign drug trafficker under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Dawood and his aides from D-Company have been named in INTERPOL's Red Notice due to their involvement in the 1993 blasts²⁶¹. Nevertheless, in 2020, Pakistan imposed financial sanctions on Dawood and 88 other terrorist/terror organizations, which included the seizure of all of their properties and the freezing of bank accounts²⁶². This action by Pakistan was taken to escape being blacklisted by

²⁵⁶ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

²⁵⁷ "Daniel Pearl: An Open Case - Committee to Protect Journalists."

²⁵⁸ NDTV, "Dawood Ibrahim Is Held in High Esteem in Pakistan: Musharraf."

²⁵⁹ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

²⁶⁰ "DAWOOD IBRAHIM KASKAR | United Nations Security Council."

²⁶¹ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

²⁶² "Pak Admits Dawood Ibrahim Address As Karachi, Imposes Financial Sanctions."

the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). As already in June 2018, the FATF placed Pakistan on the grey list and requested that the country adopt a plan of action against the terrorist groups²⁶³. However, in a surprising turn of events Pakistan promptly declared that the imposition of financial sanctions on Dawood and others was carried out per legal obligations to fulfill their international commitments, and it should not be interpreted as an admission of Dawood's presence in Pakistan²⁶⁴. However, Pakistan's action is both too little and too late, as Dawood and his crime-terror nexus are so profoundly ingrained that Indian security can be disrupted when and how ISI would like. Another impediment to India's efforts for Pakistan to take action against the crime-terror nexus is the likelihood that the proxy forces are already too powerful and beyond the Pakistan government's control, rendering it impossible for the government to curb them.

What has also been the subject of discussion in recent years is -why India has not taken out Dawood in Pakistan considering India's superior military and intelligence capabilities and a renewed political will to combat organized crime syndicates. In the event that Dawood is executed today without Pakistan's knowledge, there is a belief that the situation would escalate into a significant level of hostility between India and Pakistan²⁶⁵. Additionally, there is concern that it would be a costly diplomatic error, as all diplomatic efforts employed to resolve the Dawood issue so far would be rendered ineffective²⁶⁶. It is also believed that it would be extremely challenging to extract Dawood from Pakistan because it would be considerably difficult to break through the rigorous security barrier that protects him.

²⁶³ Roy, "Islamabad Does U-Turn after Acknowledging Dawood Ibrahim's Presence in Pakistan."

²⁶⁴ Roy, "Pak Says Dawood Name on List Is as per UN, Does Not Mean Admitting He Is There."

²⁶⁵ Defensive Offence, "Ex RAW Officer NK Sood Exposes Dawood's Links in Indian Politics."

²⁶⁶ Ranveer Allahbadia, "Bravest Indian Journalist - Sheela Bhatt On Dawood, Haji Mastan & Indian Underworld | TRS हिंदी 231."

In the midst of all of this, Dawood was once willing to return to India. Although India was unable to capitalize on the opportunity, it undoubtedly raised questions about Dawood's intentions for planning to return. It is widely believed that Dawood's value to Pakistan had significantly diminished largely because the ISI had gained complete control of Dawood's networks and resources, which were now capable of causing harm in India independent of Dawood²⁶⁷²⁶⁸.

Interestingly, there have been numerous media reports regarding Dawood being poisoned, his ill health, or even his death. These have all been revealed to be a hoax. Hussain Zaidi, the author, believes that this is an observational study conducted by Indian agencies to provoke a response from either Dawood's men or Pakistan. They are constantly monitoring for any slip-ups, developments, hints, or leads that India can chase in the pursuit of Dawood. Let alone any hint/clue, even concrete evidence proving Dawood's presence in Pakistan has not resulted in his extradition. As a result, uncertainty regarding Dawood's extradition is understandable. No Indian law enforcement agency is willing to jeopardize its reputation by providing a deadline by which it could definitively capture Dawood. Ajit Doval, the former head of the IB and current NSA, has advocated for an integrated approach incorporating several key strategies- intended to maintain a high level of pressure from all sources, including diplomatic, political, and financial, which would significantly diminish Dawood's ability to endanger India, reduce his influence, and ultimately render it financially unfeasible for Pakistan to maintain him.

²⁶⁷ Mojo Story, "Cricket, Sex Aur Dhoka? India's Top Cop on IPL, Dawood & Sexual Harassment of Athletes | Barkha Dutt."

²⁶⁸ Ranveer Allahbadia, "Bravest Indian Journalist - Sheela Bhatt On Dawood, Haji Mastan & Indian Underworld | TRS हिंदी 231."

5.3 THE INFLUENCE OF *OTHER* COUNTRIES

Even though Dawood has been primarily influential in Pakistan and India, the tentacles of his commercial and criminal endeavors have spread to various regions across the globe. Within the framework of Social Network theory, transnational organized crime groups such as D-Company have enjoyed enormous success away from their origin country because they have been able to overcome social and geographic barriers and make the most strategic use of social networks. On observing one of the critical aspects of Kleemans and Van de Bunt's work on the Social Embeddedness of Organized Crime the emphasis is that the collective objectives of criminal groups and the value the individuals bring are more significant than their common ethnic background. This came to occur more frequently once D-Company formed alliances with individuals from Dubai, The UK, The US, Africa, and other regions. As proposed by Social Capital theory, robust social interactions between D-Company and like-minded criminal partners in countries across the globe facilitate the cultivation of a propensity for criminal activity. It is a two-way exchange between D-Company and its many partners of contacts, resources, knowledge, support, etc. With his extensive criminal-terrorism networks worldwide, it is evident that Dawood diligently and deliberately (Rational Choice theory) cultivated close associations with all those who could provide him with strategic advantages that contact with others may not get him.

Highlights from the chapter

Dawood's business empire in The UK, The US, The UAE, and South Africa – D-Company-politician- crime nexus in South Africa – Extradition treaties – Dubai = safe haven for D-Company

- D-Company in The UK – China shielding Pakistani militancy – The US, both for and against India

Apart from D-Company's drug trafficking and wagering businesses that operate in numerous countries. Shell companies in Dubai and London, are held by middlemen, but owned by the D-Company. These companies acquire ships to dismantle them, and the ships' prices are purposely devalued to avoid import duties. The metal and other scrap are subsequently sold without bills, and earnings are sent to Dubai and London through hawala²⁶⁹. These vessels mostly come from safe havens for smuggling in the Persian Gulf and off the African coast. Veeresh Malik, a marine security expert and author, has observed that the ship-breaking industry is predominantly financed through black money. In 2012, the Central Bureau of Investigation discovered a staggering amount of Rs 150 crore in black money from three shell firms linked to Dawood²⁷⁰.

Dawood's assets in the UK alone are believed to be worth 500 million dollars. Also, it is reported that he has made investments in more than 50 properties in several nations. Dawood boasts a broad portfolio of properties in the United Kingdom, consisting of hotels, mansions, tower blocks, and houses located in the suburbs in the southeastern region of England²⁷¹. Dawood has expanded his commercial ventures into the diamond trading industry in South Africa, Angola, and Russia. In 1994, he established mandrax smuggling networks by pumping mandrax across the borders, ultimately infiltrating South Africa (SA)²⁷².

Furthermore, he has used many passports under various identities to enter and exit the country. Needless to say, Dawood pushed his influence beyond business interests and organized crime and began providing support to Boko Haram for

²⁶⁹ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

²⁷⁰ Ibid

²⁷¹ Pti, "Hotels, Mansions, Houses: Dawood's Vast Assets across UK."

²⁷² Dolley, "'Global Terrorist' Dawood Ibrahim's Lasting Grip on SA."

its operations in Nigeria²⁷³. In South Africa, there has been a long-standing suspicion among police department sources that Dawood has been shielded by state elements during the period of apartheid and even after the country transitioned to democracy and the criminal networks established by Dawood and his associates are still operational in SA. Mohamed Khan, a famous money launderer, laundered money and managed companies for the Gupta Family. (The family's business empire in SA is extensive and encompasses a variety of industries²⁷⁴. They have been linked to state capture and corruption in the country). The family has maintained strong connections with former President Jacob Zuma, and Khan has also hosted the former president at his residence. Khan also met with Dawood in highly securitized and confidential meetings at a hotel in Dubai. Based on this, Khan links Dawood, the Gupta family, and President Zuma, which resulted in rampant corruption and undue influence in the state²⁷⁵. Zahiddmiya Shaikh, a member of D-Company, was wanted by India in 2016 for a double murder. He has been accused of plotting terrorist acts in South Africa to carry them out in India, potentially targeting Prime Minister Modi²⁷⁶. Mandrax Kingpin Vicky Goswami, who is allegedly involved in the mandrax business alongside Dawood, had made allegations stating that the Gupta family has engaged in money laundering activities on behalf of Pakistani money launderer Muhammad Asif Hafeez, who is connected to Dawood. It is said that the US has been targeting Hafeez to get to Dawood²⁷⁷. The 2016 chargesheet against Zahidmiya Shaikh explicitly alleges the presence of a terrorist network that links foreign conspirators in Pakistan, India, and South Africa to incite communal disturbance and spread terror. Despite this, the South African police had turned down India's multiple requests to temporarily detain

²⁷³ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

²⁷⁴ Dolley, "'Gold Mafia' Whistle-Blower Places Wanted Terrorist Dawood Ibrahim in Gupta, Zuma Circles."

²⁷⁵ "The Guptas and Their Links to South Africa's Jacob Zuma."

²⁷⁶ Dolley, "'Global Terrorist' Dawood Ibrahim's Lasting Grip on SA."

²⁷⁷ Ibid

Shaikh²⁷⁸. However, in March 2019, a Hawks²⁷⁹ spokesperson indicated that India's request for Shaikh did not meet the legal prerequisites of South Africa and were instructed to follow the official processes²⁸⁰. While Hafeez is being detained in the UK, Atul and Rajesh Gupta, members of the Gupta family, escaped to Dubai in 2016. Much to the dismay of SA, they were discreetly released by Emirati officials in February 2023, following their arrest in Dubai in June 2022²⁸¹. SA has been actively advocating for their extradition ever since. In an interview, Gareth Newham from the Institute for Security Studies asserted that even if there were technical deficiencies on the part of Indian authorities, the Hawks might have initiated their own investigation using the documents provided to them. The Hawks were nevertheless hindered by the consequences of officers assigned to safeguard those engaged in state capture. This situation demonstrates a lack of political will, as he further explains that political intervention severely weakened these organizations. The state's capacity to respond to extradition requests has been significantly compromised²⁸². It also suggests the extent to which state capture has been cemented in the nation. Dawood occupies a central position in this intricate network that links money launderers, businessmen, mafia, and government officials across international borders. It is anticipated that the pursuit of this matter would result in an inquiry of all individuals and agencies associated with Dawood, which would expose the mafia's active involvement in South Africa's government machinery. This could potentially cause more chaos in the country and add to the extensive list of issues that the government is already tackling²⁸³²⁸⁴. This also explains why

²⁷⁸ Ibid

²⁷⁹ Hawks- The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) is a division of the South African Police Service that specializes in the investigation of organized crime, economic crime, corruption, and other high-level criminal activities.

²⁸⁰ Dolley, "'Gold Mafia' Whistle-Blower Places Wanted Terrorist Dawood Ibrahim in Gupta, Zuma Circles."

²⁸¹ "South Africa: Wealthy Gupta Brothers Arrested in UAE."

²⁸² Dolley, "'Global Terrorist' Dawood Ibrahim's Lasting Grip on SA."

²⁸³ Annielee, "South Africa Needs Political Change to Meet Economic Demands."

²⁸⁴ Investor, "Criminal Mafias Are Taking over South Africa."

authorities choose not to disclose any information regarding D-Company's presence in South Africa, despite the growing body of evidence²⁸⁵.

The Gupta family's decision to escape to Dubai in 2016, when the inquiry into the State Capture matter was initiated, was allegedly coordinated by Dawood, who has a well-established presence in Dubai.

Indian fugitives seeking refuge in certain countries – *circumstantial* or a *strategic choice*? Besides successfully finding partners and favorable business environments to establish the offshoots of his business and mafia operations in these countries, Dawood also strategically chose nations where India and these countries adhere to different legal principles and procedures. Countries that have proven hard to extradite wanted criminals from, make it appealing to the underworld. The UAE is not only Dawood's preferred nation of refuge, but it is also one of the four most preferred nations for Indian fugitives in general. In 2017, The US, The UK, The UAE, and Canada provided refuge to 70% of the 121 Indian fugitives. Even though India has extradition treaties with 18 of the 24 countries where its fugitives are residing, The US, The UK, Canada, and The UAE continue to be among the most preferred nations for Indian fugitives²⁸⁶. The treaties may not be facilitating the process of advancing appeals, as evidenced by the number of pending extradition applications. Regarding this issue, Counter-terrorism Expert Ajay Sahni stated that the evidence and evidentiary criteria in the majority of cases do not meet the standards of that particular country's court system. However, in certain instances, India intentionally misrepresented the cases by

²⁸⁵ Dolley, "'Gold Mafia' Whistle-Blower Places Wanted Terrorist Dawood Ibrahim in Gupta, Zuma Circles."

²⁸⁶ Sharma, "US, UK, Canada, UAE among Most Preferred Nations for Indian Fugitives."

failing to adhere to appropriate procedures²⁸⁷. Moreover, the extradition procedure is impeded by the absence of a proper understanding of the facts and misplaced sympathy for the fugitives by these countries. Dawood fled to Dubai in 1986 after being charged with murder in India. Dawood's multimillion-dollar empire in Dubai is managed by his five brothers and three sisters, according to a 2002 Indian dossier on him. In addition, to gold smuggling and Hawala, The company thrived on extortion, contract murders, kidnappings, drug dealing, and currency counterfeiting. D-Company also operates provision stores and electronic and ready-made garment stores. Besides Dawood and his siblings owning multiple residences in Dubai. As revealed by a tapped telephone call between Dawood and his business agent in Dubai, in 2018 it was revealed that Dawood is also involved in real estate operations, particularly luxury estates. He had made a series of investments under others' names, the real-estate venture is Dawood's principal source of control in the Gulf²⁸⁸. Two notable aspects emerge: firstly, Dawood has successfully managed to refine and optimize his business ventures in Dubai long after he fled the city, miles away from a safe house in Karachi as also evident from information that Dawood's 4 out of 10 most frequently called numbers are made to contacts in The UAE. Secondly, though Dawood is a wanted man for his involvement in the 1993 bombings and links with terrorist outfits, he has been allowed to carry on his commercial activities in Dubai as usual. Dawood's extravagant way of life and safe stay in Dubai was made possible by the backing of ISI and his good rapport with the Emiratis²⁸⁹. Dubai has also served as a meeting

²⁸⁷ Ibid

²⁸⁸ Ojha, "Caught on Tape: How Underworld Don Dawood Ibrahim Manages His Business Empire."

²⁸⁹ "Dawood Ibrahim: The Enigmatic Figure Eluding India's Grasp."

destination for Dawood and his associates across the globe to discuss business, as evidenced by multiple sources, to evade detection by Indian agencies²⁹⁰. Following a crackdown on criminals in Dubai, Dawood was forced to invest illegally earned money in legitimate businesses. This enforcement approach failed because many of his enterprises were mere fronts for his mafia activities that went uninvestigated. Unfortunately, there is virtually no information about Dawood's claimed involvement with the UAE government apparatus other than that he and his accomplices have repeatedly been protected from deportation to India. Dubai has earned the well-deserved reputation of being referred to as the Costa del Crime due to the concentration of gang leaders in the city. The UAE is widely regarded as a sanctuary for criminals, providing a low-risk environment for organizing illegal activities with contacts overseas, as well as a favorable location for networking and striking new business deals²⁹¹. The UAE and India established a formal agreement in 1999 and entered into an extradition treaty in 2000. Subsequently in 2012, the UAE ratified the treaty, which simplified the process of transferring prisoners between the Gulf states and India. Both nations have mutually agreed to extradite fugitives who have committed a crime to the country that has requested their return and where the crime was committed²⁹². It is crucial to note that Pakistan in the past has consistently attempted to prevent the UAE from deporting individuals belonging to the Indian Mujahideen and the D-Company to India²⁹³. Nevertheless, the treaty is a belated action since Dawood had escaped

²⁹⁰ Ojha, "Caught on Tape: How Underworld Don Dawood Ibrahim Manages His Business Empire."

²⁹¹ "A Safe Haven in the Gulf: Balkan Criminals, and Their Money, Are Hiding in the United Arab Emirates | Global Initiative."

²⁹² "Extradition Process Between the UAE and India – Legal Developments."

²⁹³ Philip and Philip, "Why Dubai Is No Longer a Safe Haven for Indian Fugitives."

to Pakistan following the 1993 bombings. Since 2022, the UAE has stepped up its extradition arrangements with other nations in response to being placed on the gray list of the FATF²⁹⁴. The UAE's endeavors to combat money laundering and terrorist funding, along with India's reinvigorated political and diplomatic initiatives and enhanced trust in the ties between the two nations in recent years, have resulted in the extradition of high-profile individuals to India. The list of extradited individuals also includes a key associate of Dawood and other persons affiliated with the D-Company²⁹⁵. While acknowledging that there is still much more that can be accomplished, the efforts undertaken by the UAE represent a significant stride towards dismantling crucial elements of financial backing for D-Company, making Dubai no longer a secure refuge for Indian fugitives.

The United Kingdom has implemented significant measures to diminish the influence of D-Company within the country. Particularly crippling Dawood financially. The UK first levied financial restrictions on Dawood in 2003, which included freezing his assets²⁹⁶. Dawood has been listed on the UK Treasury Department's Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets, which has prohibited him from engaging in financial transactions or services in the UK. Also included in the sanction document were Dawood's 21 aliases and his 3 residences in Pakistan²⁹⁷. In 2015, India provided the UK with a dossier containing information about the several properties owned by Dawood and his associates, which are located across London and its outskirts. In the same year, Indian Enforcement Directorate (ED) officials also traveled to the UK to locate, identify,

²⁹⁴ "Bloomberg - UAE Ramps Up Extradition Pacts in Bid to Fight Dirty Money."

²⁹⁵ Philip and Philip, "Why Dubai Is No Longer a Safe Haven for Indian Fugitives."

²⁹⁶ Sonwalkar, "UK Financial Sanctions on Dawood to Continue."

²⁹⁷ Ians, "Dawood Ibrahim's Properties in UK Seized."

and confiscate Dawood's assets²⁹⁸. In 2017, the UK government seized Dawood's properties, which were valued at 6.7 billion dollars²⁹⁹.

Interestingly the very same year, the UK issued a declaration that Pakistan should seize all of Dawood's properties. According to former police commissioner Neeraj Kumar, the UK's action was intended to send a message to Pakistan that providing Dawood with a safe haven would have repercussions. It was a positive development, as India's diplomatic pressure has not been effective in persuading Pakistan to take action against D-Company. It is possible that international pressure could be leveraged to persuade Pakistan to do so³⁰⁰.

Regardless, the UK continues to be a favorite hiding spot for Indian fugitives. Several of Dawood's aides and key members of his network have continued to reside in the United Kingdom and conduct business and mafia operations on his behalf. Dawood's right-hand man, Iqbal Mirchi, was the mastermind of the Bombay blasts and a narcotics baron. Who is also mentioned in the Vohra report for the patronage he received from the Mumbai Police Narcotics cell³⁰¹. He was subjected to sanctions, arrest warrants issued by the CBI, and even arrested by INTERPOL in 1995³⁰². The very same year, Scotland Yard raided Mirchi's residence and arrested him for drug trafficking and terrorism (1993 blasts). However, to everyone's surprise, when the matter was brought to court, all charges against him were dismissed. The investigation concluded in 1999 due to the absence of any evidence of criminal conduct, even though the Indian and US authorities presented

²⁹⁸ Staff, "Britain Freezes Dawood Ibrahim's Properties Worth \$6.7 Billion: UK Lists His Three Pakistan Addresses."

²⁹⁹ Ibid

³⁰⁰ Kumar and Kumar, "The Noose Does Not Tighten around Dawood Ibrahim, but Pakistan."

³⁰¹ "Vohra Committee Report."

³⁰² Taman, "Iqbal Mirchi's Political Nexus Getting Exposed Even after His Death."

several pieces of evidence³⁰³. Moreover, The Indian government's efforts to extradite Mirchi were turned down by the UK. In 2022, India initiated another extradition attempt in the UK against Mirchi's family in connection with a money laundering case³⁰⁴. Although Mirchi faced charges, the UK granted him indefinite leave to remain in 2001, and he enjoyed an opulent life in the UK until his death in 2013³⁰⁵. In 2018, Jabir Moti, a top lieutenant in D-Company's global criminal network, was arrested for money laundering. Following his arrest, he was subjected to extradition to the US on charges of extortion and drug trafficking, as well as for having direct contact with Dawood. However, after the US withdrew its extradition request, a UK court granted him unconditional bail³⁰⁶. The UK rejected India's extradition request for Tiger Hanif, another of Dawood's close associates who was accused in two bomb blasts in Gujarat(1993), in 2019. Although Hanif's extradition to India was initially ordered in 2012 and he had subsequently lost multiple legal attempts to remain in the UK, his final attempt was successful because the then Home Secretary, Sajid Javid, had blocked his extradition³⁰⁷. Though the decision to not extradite him was said to be justified on the grounds of fairness and adherence to the law since there were arguments made in his favor highlighting the genuine risk of torture if he were to be extradited to India. It was also reported that Sajid Javid, who is of Pakistani origin and has a significant influence among the British Pakistani community, allegedly prevented the extradition as a favor to

³⁰³ Thompson, "At Home with India's Most Wanted Man."

³⁰⁴ Chauhan, "India Sends Extradition Request for Iqbal Mirchi's Wife and Sons to UK."

³⁰⁵ Thompson, "At Home with India's Most Wanted Man."

³⁰⁶ Khanna, "Dawood 'Aide' Jabir Moti to Be Freed from UK Prison."

³⁰⁷ "Pak-Origin UK Minister Blocked Dawood Ibrahim Aide Tiger Hanif's Extradition In 2019: Report."

someone in the community³⁰⁸. Pakistani British national Mumtaz Khan, a highly trusted aide of Dawood, was honored with the MBE (Member of the Order of the British Empire), which is the third-highest civilian award in the United Kingdom in 2022, in recognition of his community service³⁰⁹. However, in press reports around the UK, he was identified as Taz Khan. This name change occurred to divert attention from the fact that Mumtaz Khan had previously committed bank fraud and was even a guarantor for Jabir Moti. Upon further investigation, compelling evidence emerged indicating that Mumtaz Khan plays an active role in managing Dawood's finances in the UK (*note: a top UK bank was on the list of the most frequently contacted numbers by Dawood*) and regularly travels to Karachi to meet with him³¹⁰. It is believed that Mumtaz was awarded this honor because of his close association with notable individuals in both the UK media and the government, disregarding all allegations against him³¹¹. The freezing of Dawood's assets alone is insufficient to effectively address the issue of organized crime. To take down Dawood's expansive criminal network, it is imperative to suppress the influence of Dawood's associates and ensure their prosecution. The extradition deal between the UK and India came into force in 1992, however, only one fugitive has been successfully extradited from the UK to date³¹². The crux of the extradition issue lies in the stringent posture of the British Human Rights Commission. If the British court determines that a person will face capital punishment, torture, or persecution for political reasons upon extradition to India, it will reject the extradition

³⁰⁸ From Our Online Archive and From Our Online Archive, "UK Government Refuses Dawood Ibrahim Aide Hanif Tiger's Extradition to India."

³⁰⁹ Mishra, "Dawood 'Associate' Gets UK's Third Highest Civilian Award - The Sunday Guardian Live."

³¹⁰ Ibid

³¹¹ Mishra, "Dawood 'Associate' Gets UK's Third Highest Civilian Award - The Sunday Guardian Live."

³¹² Tirkey, "India's Challenges in Extraditing Fugitives from Foreign Countries."

request³¹³, as evident in the cases of Iqbal Mirchi and Tiger Hanif. One issue is that the legal systems in India and Britain are very similar because India has kept many laws from the time of British rule. Meaning that many crafty lawyers in both countries have a good understanding of Indian and British law. This similarity has proven advantageous and has been manipulated to benefit the case of an Indian fugitive³¹⁴.

The primary focus of India's security strategy since the 26/11 attacks has been to combat organized crime (D-Company) and terrorism (militant groups) and their subsequent nexus. However, China obstructs India's diplomatic efforts to bring to justice the perpetrators of terror attacks in India. In 2022, China blocked a move by India and the US at the United Nations to blacklist Hafiz Talah Saeed, a key leader of the Pakistan-based militant group LeT and the son of LeT's chief Hafiz Saeed³¹⁵ (*The 26/11 attacks mastermind has been imprisoned in Pakistan since 2019*). Interestingly, the day prior, China had also blocked the listing of Shahid Mahmood, who in 2016 had been identified by the US for assisting in funding LeT and other support networks³¹⁶. Not only LeT, but China had also come to the rescue of another Pakistan-based terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).

A journal article authored by Indian Member of Parliament Shashi Tharoor accurately identifies China as the most significant issue facing India in Pakistan. Maulana Masood Azhar, the founder and Chief of JeM, is accountable for numerous terror attacks on Indian

³¹³ Singh, "Why Indian Fugitive Offenders Take Shelter in Britain?"

³¹⁴ Ibid

³¹⁵ Now, "China Blocks US, India's Proposal at UN to Blacklist Talha Saeed, Son of LeT Chief Hafiz Saeed."

³¹⁶ "China Puts Hold on Proposal by India, US at UN to Blacklist Pakistan-Based LeT Terrorist Hafiz Talah Saeed."

civilians and Indian army bases³¹⁷. Regrettably, in 1999, Azhar and two other terrorists were released from an Indian prison in exchange for passengers on a Pakistani terrorist-hijacked Indian Airlines flight. India has been striving to have Azhar sanctioned under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1267, which would freeze his bank accounts and restrict his travel outside of Pakistan. though 14 of the UNSC's 15 members approved of this sanction, China had vetoed it thrice³¹⁸. This action of China is in direct opposition to its commitment to the global war on terrorism. India accused China of adopting a double standard and escalated the matter on multilateral platforms, urging that the designation of global terrorists not be politicized³¹⁹. In fact, in 2018, China was insistent that Pakistan should move LeT chief Hafiz Saeed, to a West Asian country to live a quiet life. This suggestion was made in response to growing international pressure to take action against him for his involvement in terrorist attacks and activities³²⁰. *But what does China gain out of shielding militants in Pakistan?*

China has consistently been Pakistan's steadfast ally, serving as a valuable balancing force against India. Added to this, Pakistan is a crucial component in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), at the core of which is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This project holds great prestige and is of paramount economic importance for China³²¹, without a doubt Pakistan is indispensable to CPEC's success. In 2017, Pakistan reluctantly placed Hafiz Saeed under house arrest at the behest of China, much to Pakistan's dismay. The rationale

³¹⁷ Tharoor, "India's China Problem in Pakistan."

³¹⁸ Ibid

³¹⁹ "China Puts Hold on Proposal by India, US at UN to Blacklist Pakistan-Based LeT Terrorist Hafiz Talah Saeed."

³²⁰ Zaidi, "Exclusive | China Wants Pakistan to Relocate Hafiz Saeed to a West Asian Country."

³²¹ Tharoor, "India's China Problem in Pakistan."

for the home confinement of Hafiz Saeed was that if he were scot-free he would pose a threat to the relations between India and Pakistan, which China did not desire as it advanced its CPEC ambitions that would be hampered by a heightened India-Pakistan hostility³²². So as long as China has its own interests and objectives in the South Asian neighborhood it will persist in using all necessary measures to maintain Pakistan's satisfaction, even if it means being an enabler of terror. As Indian MP Tharoor writes “*India’s desire to “isolate” Pakistan internationally for its support of terrorism has foundered on China’s great wall of support for Pakistan*”³²³. China's support system for extremist elements in Pakistan must be impaired, as the militants will continue to export Jihad in India by utilizing D-Company's extensive resources as long as China continues to provide support. This implies that, even if China refrains from directly supporting Dawood, it is bolstering Dawood's crime-terror syndicate by enabling terrorist groups.

Former IPS D. Sivanandhan has asserted in an interview that India's global endeavors to dismantle D-Company and its extensive network have been largely unsuccessful due to the lack of concern shown by the West and the US in particular, who perceived India as a third-world country and did not view the problem as a serious one³²⁴. It was only after the ghastly 9/11 attacks that were perpetrated by Al-Qaeda that the US woke up to the brewing issue of organized crime-terror nexus in South Asia. It has been reported that the US has brought this problem onto itself because of its actions in the past. In the 1970s, the

³²² Kugelman, “China, Not America, Likely behind Hafiz Saeed's House Arrest.”

³²³ Tharoor, “India’s China Problem in Pakistan.”

³²⁴ BeerBiceps, “Crime World & Police - What Happened In The 1990s In Mumbai | IPS Sivanandhan | The Ranveer Show 161.”

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) co-opted Pakistan Army and ISI officials to conduct the jihad in Afghanistan on behalf of the US. Subsequently, during the jihad, the National Logistics Cell, the Pakistan army trucking company, transported weapons supplied by the CIA from the Karachi port to Peshawar and Quetta, they then returned with heroin for export³²⁵. Similar to Pakistan, the United States also underestimated the extent and intensity of these proxy forces' influence in the region. The United States committed a strategic error by disregarding Al-Qaeda's invasion of Iraq and underestimating the resilience of Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, the US reliance on Pakistan to assist in the fight against Bin Laden and the Taliban was another strategic error, as it was evident that Pakistan was assisting the Taliban in regrouping, and Bin Laden had been sheltered by Pakistan for years³²⁶. The US's elimination of Bin Laden did not signify the end of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, as the 2010 US Congressional Research report noted that Dawood had been lending his strength to the terrorist organizations to expand their tentacles and continue to disseminate terror³²⁷. The report also asserted that Dawood poses a credible threat to US interests in South Asia. Post the 9/11 attacks the US has spearheaded initiatives and measures to address the issue both independently and in collaboration with other countries and has been pretty relentless in pursuit of bringing to justice Dawood, his key aides, terrorist groups, and anyone involved in D-Company's expansive criminal network. but it is believed that some of its actions otherwise have been counterproductive to its efforts to combat the crime-terror nexus. A month after the 26/11 attacks, Jeremy R

³²⁵ "Dawood's ISI Links Could Trouble Musharraf."

³²⁶ Riedel, "How the United States Enabled Al Qaeda."

³²⁷ Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

Hammond of Foreign Policy Journal wrote in an article that extraditing Dawood to India would pose difficulties for both the ISI and the CIA. The CIA's reluctance to hand over Dawood has been likely due to its long history of association with drug traffickers and recognized terrorists, along with it the US has been consistent in its efforts to conceal or suppress information regarding these connections when exposed to the public³²⁸. This not-so-secret and deadly association can be traced back to the CIA-backed Jihad pursuit to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, during which the drug trade was used to help finance the war. Investigative journalist Wayne Madsen has stated that Dawood has been a CIA asset since his involvement in the Afghan-Soviet war, and has continued to engage in narcotics and arms trafficking activities in the region. He also claimed that the CIA was concerned about Dawood's extradition due to the potential exposure of criminal activities involving senior officials within the agency³²⁹. Confirming the earlier claims, Yoichi Shimatsu, a former editor of the Japan Times wrote that Dawood worked alongside the US to provide financial support to the Mujahideen in the 1980s. Due to his knowledge of covert operations conducted by the US in the region, it would prove costly for the US to extradite Dawood to India³³⁰. In his memoir, former Indian deputy prime minister L K Advani stated that previous attempts to apprehend Dawood were met with a request from the US, on behalf of Pakistan, asking for more time to process Dawood's extradition. It was also communicated that the extradition would happen only under certain conditions and constraints. This is precisely why media in India have described the

³²⁸ "Why the CIA Does Not Want Dawood in Indian Hands."

³²⁹ Ibid

³³⁰ Ibid

US's efforts to have Dawood extradited as unenthusiastic³³¹. On numerous occasions, it has been proposed that India leverage the US's robust relationships with Pakistan and India along with leveraging The US's immense capability and strategic interest in preventing the spread of transnational crime-terrorism fusion models in the region³³². However, it is important to recognize that the US will not take any strong action against Pakistan. This is because, like China, the US has bilateral interests to keep Pakistan content as in the context of Afghanistan the US relies on Pakistan, particularly as a medium to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban³³³. For many years now, the US has been a partner of India in combating terrorism and organized crime, with a particular focus on D-Company and its enormous network. However, it is commonly argued that these efforts were delayed especially when the D-Company-terror nexus could have been brought down in its infancy and when India had flagged the issue as a potential global danger years before the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 attacks have catalyzed the change in the US stance towards this issue. Even though the US has joined the cause late because it suits them now, India must recognize and capitalize on the US's sudden but fervent pursuit to dismantle the mafia-terrorism nexus.

³³¹ Ibid

³³² Talwar, "Dawood Ibrahim, al Qaida, and South Asia: A Brewing Storm."

³³³ Tharoor, "India's China Problem in Pakistan."

CHAPTER 6: THEMES & CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapter, the thesis has relied on a diverse selection of sources, including books, research papers, news articles, interviews, and reports in text, audio, and video formats. This plethora of source materials has enabled a variety of profound viewpoints and insights into decoding the factors that have not only provided a support structure to the mafia's growth but also granted it immunity from being dismantled.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify and interpret recurring patterns of meaning- *themes* uncovered from the data compiled to address the research question.

At the very outset of the findings, it was evident that along with being highly **opportunistic**, the Mumbai mafia has always had **ulterior motives** behind any action of theirs. Gangsters and criminals form **partnerships** and **collaborate** with individuals and organizations with whom they share a **mutual desire and want** to pursue a specific goal. There is ample evidence that the underworld is highly adept at **networking**. Many gangsters expanded their gangs by coming in contact with other gangsters while in prison. These criminals not only established vast criminal networks globally but also made effective use of the contacts and networks of their associates. Adding to this dons like Dawood Ibrahim and others possessed a strong **business acumen** in identifying profitable opportunities, weighing the pros and cons of a situation and a partnership. When the mafia forges associations with others, it is a **give-and-take** relationship, they

always **barter** something, whether it's money, support, networks, resources, etc. The very core and primary objective of organized crime has been **money**. The acquisition of money by the mafia also served as a pathway to **power** and **influence**. The Mumbai mafia's power, influence, and wealth were all the result of **strategic choices**. However, the lucrative environment for illegal businesses fostered by **economic policies and laws** catapulted their success (*for example: the Land Ceiling Act, and Liquor Prohibition Act*) and at once even obstructed their growth (*for example: Liberalization, Privatization, and Globalization (LPG) reforms*). Gangsters further leveraged their wealth, power, and influence to establish contacts with **politicians, police, and other law enforcement personnel**. They then **exploited** these relationships for the mafia's gain, which in turn triggered a perpetual cycle of **corruption** within the branches of the Indian government. Mumbai underworld's influence is so **deeply embedded** in the government machinery that ensured the mafia **protection** from any form of **retribution**, which resulted in criminals having a **disregard for the law**. The 1993 Bombay Blasts and 26/11 attacks undoubtedly altered the security landscape of India and the perception of organized crime in the country. The terror attacks not only underscored the **resilience** of the people of Mumbai but also of D-Company, which was able to preserve its core structure in the face of any internal and external disruptions at any given point in time. The very success of D-Company's **seamless** and **successful execution** of illegal trade deals, match-fixing, and terror attacks has been the elements of **surprise** and **stealth (covert)**. These surprise attacks of terror and the crime-terror nexus in India were largely **unanticipated**, resulting in a **paucity of preparation** in terms of plans, strategies, and mechanisms that would cater to deal effectively with such acts of

crime and terror in the country. The Indian government initially responded to the aftermath of these attacks with strong reactions and swiftly implemented policies to address the situation. However, over time, it developed a **lackadaisical attitude** toward the matter. The reports, academic papers, and news articles have all emphasized that the **lack of political will** in numerous instances impeded and slowed down the progress made in bringing the key members of both Mumbai's organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations to justice. The **poor coordination** among the various Indian security agencies and the various levels of the government also impeded the efforts. Additionally, a **mismatch of values** among concerned authorities entrusted with the responsibility of tackling the problem of organized crime in India contributed to the lackadaisical attitude. Not only in India but in countries around the world, there was a **noticeable unenthusiasm** in efforts and a **value mismatch**. For a long time, there was a **general insensitivity** shown towards the matter and India's concerns. The Mumbai Mafia's rise of power and influence, as well as the effects it had on the security of the South Asian neighborhood, were frequently **rejected/denied** as a major problem. Therefore, when an investigation uncovered a link between an individual/entity and D-Company, the said individual/entity typically **refuted** any such claims of association and **denied** knowing Dawood. Subsequently, resulting in the matter not being pursued further. The **media** has been **indispensable** and been credited for doing what even the Indian agencies could not do much of, as it has helped to expose the dark secrets of the mafia and the underworld's connections to various influential figures in India's politics, government, and other domains that were either hidden from public view or never identified. In certain instances, the media has been **blamed** for providing media coverage

of the mafia, which facilitated the **propagation of fear** among the Indian populace, which was a necessity for Dawood and his crime-terror nexus to thrive. Concurrently, there is a degree of **awareness** and **admission** in India regarding the past mistakes that were made in addressing the issue, as well as the **vulnerabilities** and **areas for improvement** in India's efforts. What also came up constantly was the **absence of required foreign support**, which, when it did arrive, was **delayed** and well after the mafia had established a firm foothold, and no **collective efforts** to address the roots of the problem. The Mumbai mafia has been enabled to exist with impunity and conduct 'business' as normal, as it is perceived by certain foreign actors as a **means** to **undermine India's power** and **position** in both **regional** and **international politics**. The tone and choice of words used to describe the Mumbai mafia problem by the numerous interviewees in the interviews consulted for this thesis indicated a certain **degree of regret** over **missed opportunities** to capture Dawood in particular and **suppressed anger** over the inability to do much about the matter. In the interviews of particularly the former law enforcement officials and news articles what is evident is **uncertainty** regarding the current state of the D-Company's crime-terror nexus and a **lack of clarity** on what should be the ideal way forward to combat this problem. That being said it has been **emphasized** and **unanimously agreed**, for the **need to dismantle** the Mumbai underworld and its many nexus to combat any potential acts of terror and crime in India.

Indian security in the 21st century faces an enormous challenge not only in organized crime but also in the nexus between criminal syndicates and terrorist organizations. India's security situation is further complicated by the

fact that traditional and transnational threats often overlap. D-Company which is transnational in character poses significant threats which exacerbate longstanding traditional security challenges in India's neighborhood. This has hindered the ability to find cooperative solutions to the many security threats that are typical in the region³³⁴. Criminal syndicates have collaborated with Naxalite, North-East insurgency, Hinterland groups, and Kashmir terrorist groups. In the North Eastern states of India, all militant groups have held a parallel government or their impact area. Additionally, terrorist groups in this region serve as hubs for the trafficking of drugs, arms, and humans (*including terrorists*) from one region of the country to another³³⁵. In Kashmir, the mafia-terrorist nexus bolstered by the revenue generated by the mafia's illicit operations and the support of the ISI has been utilized to fund militant activities in the state, thereby exacerbating the environment of hostility and instability³³⁶. Moreover, militant groups by citing a higher purpose provide instruction on Jihad and Indian Mujahideen to young Muslim men from all walks of life in the nation. These individuals are recruited and trained to execute tasks on behalf of terrorist organizations³³⁷. Despite the increasing awareness of homegrown Jihad and the security measures and practices that are in place to address the problem. The news of busted terror plots and the arrest of terror recruits in the country is widely reported. Sea routes and major ports throughout the country serve as crucial bases for the mafia to conduct their smuggling operations. In fact, transnational organized crime in India originated from these ports³³⁸. India is experiencing a growing susceptibility to money laundering activities and is serving as a transit point for drug traffickers and other criminals from the

³³⁴ Lal, "Transnational Security Challenges in India."

³³⁵ Bhattacharya and Sachdev, "Organized Crime a Major Crisis in India and Its Impact on the Internal Security of India."

³³⁶ Ibid

³³⁷ Tankel, "JIHADIST VIOLENCE: THE INDIAN THREAT."

³³⁸ Bhattacharya and Sachdev, "Organized Crime a Major Crisis in India and Its Impact on the Internal Security of India."

Golden Crescent (*Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran and the Golden Triangle (Burma, Thailand, and Laos)*)³³⁹. Money laundering is the common denominator of all other illegal activities, regardless of whether the intention is to generate profits or conceal the true origins of the profits. The mafia strategically exploits political borders in India and capitalizes on the gaps between legal systems to maximize its profits. Money laundering thrives on corruption and the involvement of influential co-conspirators posing a significant risk to India's economic stability³⁴⁰. The clandestine networks that operate at the fringes of the law further threaten the Indian democratic fabric. Keeping up with changing times, Mumbai witnessed a novel form of the underworld, a digital underworld. 1,909 cases of cyber fraud were reported in Mumbai from January to May 2023. Only 200 of these cases have been effectively identified thus far³⁴¹. Mumbai's criminals are involved in a variety of cyber crimes including phishing, online banking fraud, data theft, cyber blackmail, sextortion, online shopping fraud, fraudulent emails, identity theft, and cryptocurrency fraud³⁴². Available data indicates a substantial disparity between the number of reported cases and the rate at which these cyber criminals are being identified, as their location and true identity remain unknown, therefore impeding the detection process. India's critical infrastructure, including power grids, transportation systems, financial sectors, and communication networks, the country of late has also been a target of cyber espionage activities. India's heightened vulnerability to cyber-attacks has the potential to jeopardize public safety and compromise national security³⁴³. A criminality score of 5.75 out of 10 and a resilience score of 5.42 out of 10 in the global organized crime index in 2023³⁴⁴³⁴⁵ is something India

³³⁹ Singh, "TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE."

³⁴⁰ Ibid

³⁴¹ Khan, "Mumbai's Digital Underworld: Cyber Fraud Cases Skyrocketing."

³⁴² Ibid

³⁴³ "India's Cybersecurity Challenge: Threats and Strategies."

³⁴⁴ "When Vocabulary Shapes Perception: Criminal Actors in India | Global Initiative."

³⁴⁵ Global Organized Crime Index : India: 2023 <https://ocindex.net/2023/country/india>

must take cognizance of as through a detrimental process, organized crime erodes the resilience of Indian statehood.

Although the thesis has been written to the best of my knowledge, abilities, and effort. I encountered certain limitations while attempting to effectively address the research question. Primarily, a significant number of interviews used for this study were in various Indian regional languages. Although I am proficient in speaking, reading, and writing Hindi, I can not assert the same for other languages. Added to this, the absence or inaccuracy of subtitles rendered the interviews unusable for gathering essential data. Secondly, it is generally recommended to use materials that are no more than a few years old. Some research papers utilized in the thesis are certainly more than a couple of years old. While they have provided valuable data, they may have been superseded. For instance, VK Saraf's systematic study on the profile of a typical Mumbai Mafia gangster was published in 1995. From 1995 to now, the characteristics of a Mumbai gangster have very likely changed, for which I have been unable to locate any source material confirming the same. Another constraint has been that of opposing points of view. On rare occasions, there were instances where two source materials presented substantially different information regarding a certain incident or subject. Despite my efforts to identify any evident bias, the differing opinions made it difficult for me to draw an interpretation. Though very few sources had discrepancies in their numerical data when compared to the others, the limitation was heightened by a dearth of available sources to cross-check. At specific junctures in the research, there were no alternative sources available to confirm or refute the claims made by one source. News articles and video formats of news interviews often had a

common trend: they frequently presented the same information, albeit in different packaging, without anything new or of more value to add. This thesis has been a sincere attempt to decode the elements that make up the numerous invaluable components of the Mumbai Mafia, specifically D-Company's extensive networks, which have expanded to a great extent since the company's humble beginnings in the poor neighborhood of Dongri in Mumbai.

I have worked to include every pertinent factor, including politics, economy, security, governance, law enforcement, industries, and businesses, not only in India but also globally, to provide a more well-rounded answer to the research query.

Because money has been the primary motivator for D-Company and the Mumbai Underworld as a whole. Dawood was so eager to earn quick money that he was willing to lend his expertise and resources to India's nemesis ISI in exchange for protection, freedom, and the opportunity for Dawood to accumulate as much money and power as possible with no care about India's security. With the aforementioned in mind, the future trajectory of this thesis can exclusively concentrate on the financial aspect of the Mumbai Mafia, which I have come to believe and know continues to operate its financial operations successfully on a global scale. It would be intriguing to investigate the extent to which the Indian economy has been affected by the financial activities of the Mafia and the Converse.

Is the Mumbai Underworld worth investigating further? This might be a question one would ask and very rightly so, especially when it has been reported in the Indian media that D-Company's reign of terror

has been long over³⁴⁶ and there is no visible threat from the mafia on the streets of Mumbai like one would witness up until the early 2000s. It is important to remember that the D-Company can be likened to the Lernaean Hydra, a nine-headed serpent-like creature from Greek mythology. The Hydra would regrow two heads for every head that was chopped. In the same vein, the core of D-Company would not be very affected by the elimination of certain key members of the gang, its sympathizers, its allies, and its numerous terrorist group partners for every member of the network the crime syndicate loses it will find a new one. Having read extensively about the D-Company for this thesis, I believe that the company's significance has diminished and will continue to decrease as time progresses. However, I do not anticipate the company's total demise in the near future.

How the elimination of the top leaders of Al-Qaeda and ISIS has not altered the fundamental essence of these terrorist outfits and they have recruited new leaders. In the same way, there are prospective successors to take over the reins of D-Company after Dawood.

However, as previously stated, Dawood has fulfilled his obligations to militant organizations; however, the seeds of terror have been long sown on Indian soil, the fruits (*terror attacks*) of which the country is still bearing. The D-Company's crime-terror hydra head in India is undoubtedly confirming the Greek belief about the *Hydra*. Despite India's consistent efforts to combat terrorism of one form, it quickly manifests as another.

India continually demonstrated resilience, but still, the tremors of D-Company's many actions in the past can be felt in India's security landscape to date. Not to ignore that the underworld is also adapting to

³⁴⁶ Thaver, "Mumbai: Its Reign of Terror Long over, D-Company Now 'Settles' Land Disputes."

its changing environment and learning from its mistakes, similar to India. This period of quiet from the mafia should not be misinterpreted as a lack of danger; rather, it may be the calm before the storm.

The Underworld continues to be a challenge for India, as demonstrated by India's National Security Strategy of 2023³⁴⁷. This strategy explicitly identified the imperative need for a comprehensive, multifaceted approach to address organized crime and other security threats.

“Lolaus held a torch to the headless tendons of the hydra's neck each time Hercules smashed one of its heads. The serpent's development of replacement heads was impeded by the flames. After the eight mortal heads had been removed and annihilated, Hercules severed the ninth, immortal head eventually emerging victorious”³⁴⁸.

Taking inspiration from this tale from Greek Mythology, There is no doubt that India too needs its very own Lolaus and a torch to fight off its very own Hydra- *Organized Crime and Terrorism*.

³⁴⁷ Sharma, “India's National Security Evolution: Urgent Need for Comprehensive Strategy.”

³⁴⁸ “Hercules' Second Labor: The Lernean Hydra.”

CHAPTER 7: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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