

The purpose of this paper is to look at the notion of analyticity in Gottlob Frege from several perspectives. The basic point of view is Frege's notion of the analytic itself, in its definition vis-à-vis Kant, as found especially in the *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, but also in his *Begriffsschrift* and elsewhere. Here, not only the clarification of the terms used between Frege and Kant (and possibly others) should play a role, but also questions of association, such as Frege's alleged realism about mathematical concepts (which, it seems, he does not have to put up with the analyticity of mathematics), as well as the status of certain principles, such as Hume's principle or Grundgesetz V, which Frege had to add to his "analytic" mathematics in order to grasp number conceptually. Other aspects are facultative and involve questions of the further development of mathematics, specifically in an axiomatic direction, in which Kant's view of mathematics is challenged on the one hand when he responds, among other things, to the discovery of alternative geometries as something that cannot be based simply on intuition, and supported on the other when he understands mathematics as a matter of playing with symbols in space and time.