

The present essay aims to elucidate Merleau-Ponty's attitude towards science in his early published works. Being a phenomenologist, he refuses to understand science as a tool to discover general natural laws valid once for all and for everyone which are supposedly to be found in the reality inaccessible to our so called naive experience. However, he esteems the gestalt psychology because in his eyes this scientific field finds its conceptions on the lived-world without mistaking these very conceptions as only reality when compared the lived-world itself. We aim to apprehend Merleau-Ponty's attitude relative to these two types of scientific approach as a dialogue through which he establishes his own thinking. The research starts with Husserl's discovery of the lived-world, or, in other words, of the original soil of our experience preceding all philosophical reflexion as well as all scientific construction. This effort ought to help us with understanding the reasons of Merleau-Ponty's critique of causal thinking and realistic science. In the next step, we will present the notions of "behavior" and "form" used in the framework of gestalt psychology. This elucidation will gradually lead us to the outlines of the manner in which Merleau-Ponty extends this psychological concept to the field of philosophy. Last of all, we will uncover the way in which he corrects own achievements of his first book in the *Phenomenology of perception*.