UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

EVANGELICKÁ TEOLOGICKÁ FAKULTA
INSTITUT EKUMENICKÝCH STUDIÍ

BAKALÁŘSKÁ PRÁCE

"Is it Rational to Believe in God?"

Epistemology, Metaphysics and Method in Works of Bernard Lonergan

Vypracoval: Svatopluk Nevrkla

Vedoucí Práce: Doc. Ivana Noble, PhD.

Studijní program: Teologie křesťanských tradic

PROHLAŠUJI, ŽE JSEM TUTO BAKALÁŘSKOU PRÁCI NAPSAL SAMOSTATNĚ
A VÝHRADNĚ S POUŽITÍM CITOVANÝCH PRAMENŮ:

V praze dne 30. června 2006

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

"Credo Quia Absurdum Est"

Tertullian

"Credo Ut Intelligam"

Augustin

CONTENTS

ANOTACE

Cílem této práce je ukázat souvislost mezi různými pojetími Boha a metafyzickými předpoklady, která tato pojetí zakládají. Toto bude činěno se speciální pozorností věnovanou filosofickému dílu Bernarda Lonergana. Ukážu Lonerganův způsob řešení problémů týkajících se předpokladů scholastického porozumění Bohu.

V úvodu shrnu důvody, které mě vedly k napsání této práce, její cíle a užité metody.

V první kapitole stručně představím vybrané důkazy Boží existence a jejich metafyzické předpoklady. Dále bude představena osvícenecká kritika metafyziky a její důsledky pro metafyzické důkazy Boha.

V druhé kapitole představím historické pozadí vzniku díla moderního Kanadského Jezuitského teologa Bernarda Josefa Francise Lonergana a cíle tohoto díla, a popíšu jak Lonerganovy pojmy úsudku a sebe-potvrzení.

V třetí kapitole popíši Lonerganovu metafyziku, založenou na těchto pojmech a zkonfrontuji ji s kritikou z kruhů postmoderní, hermeneutické a analytické filosofie.

V závěru vyzdvihnu Lonerganův přínos proti předchozím zmíněným přístupům.

ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate interrelatedness between various concepts of God and metaphysical assumptions from which they have been derived. This will be done with special attention paid to philosophical work of Bernard Lonergan. On Lonergan's case I will show his solution of problematic presuppositions of scholastic understanding of God.

In introduction I will summarize reasons that made me to choose this topic, goals of the thesis and methods I will use.

First chapter will be dedicated to brief introduction of selected proofs of God's existence and their metaphysical premises on which they rest. Enlightenment critique of metaphysics will be described and its consequences for metaphysical proofs demonstrated.

Second chapter will introduce context and goals of works of modern Canadian Jesuit theologian Bernard Joseph Francis Lonergan and his concepts of judgement and self-affirmation.

Third chapter will be concerned with description of Lonergan's metaphysics and finally with some criticism of Lonergan's approach from perspective of post-modern, hermeneutic, and linguistic philosophies.

In conclusion I will confront Lonergan's results with older philosophies mentioned.

1. INTRODUCTION

Anyone aware of current situation of religiosity in Europe will confirm, that Christian religion exercises only little influence on public life and religions overall are considered private matter of little importance for public. Influence of churches and organized religions on public domains like education, health-care, social-care, economy and politics is minimal in Europe.

Now it would be obviously mistaken to identify religiosity with belief in God and this belief with rational acknowledgment of God's existence, but this aspect of secularization, which is fading of credibility of theism as the only rational worldview was, if not direct perquisite of this evolution then its quite interesting result.

It is then natural to ask: How did once overly accepted worldview happen to be now only one alternative of many on imaginary market of worldviews? Is it really reasonable to believe in God? And what would that mean?[1]

This is what I was thinking about while reading Lonergan's book Insight: Study of human understanding. Lonergan made really serious effort to rethink Christian theology so that it could be considered rational under modern criteria. Part of this was his argumentation for rationality of belief in God's existence.

But is this concept of rationality acceptable for us now, when we have moved to post-modern understanding of the world? And do people in post-modern society care for some 'rationality of discourses'?

Should they just accept post-modern relativism of opinions and worldviews, resign on claim of Christianity to universalism, close themselves into their own ghetto of beliefs and rituals and from inside of its walls carelessly tolerate (ignore) all other alternatives as equal?

Or should they seek to restore ancient worldview as the only possible and convert all heretics and non-believers on one true faith?

Or should they try to critically reflect their own faith in light of its tradition and contemporary culture, to reach such understanding of both so that they could initiate dialogue with people of other beliefs? How should they do that?

Answer to these questions is far beyond possibilities of my thesis however I hope one quite fundamental question will be presented in here, that is: In what sense can be belief in God or theology considered rational.

---

[1] See Radim Beránek, *Whoever seeks the truth is seeking God* (Bachelor thesis on IES, 2005), pp. 3-4.

So I will not present Lonergan's nor Tracy's arguments for importance of theological method, nor present Lonergan's results in hermeneutic problems of interpretation, dogma, church, or religious pluralism, nor will I show Lonergan's detailed description of intelligent insight in science and common sense.

The main aim of this work the will be to show how scientific method can be used in building of metaphysics and theology.

As Bernard Lonergan's makes very precise and sophisticated attempt to build bridge between European culture of his times and philosophy, which he believes, represents Christian beliefs in rational way, in order that the horizons of medieval and modern philosophy and theology could meet in fruitful dialogue I will attempt to show what methods he chose.

The method I employed in my work was mainly analytical reading of Lonergan's text, tracing back suppositions and origins of his arguments and then confronting them with their critiques.

2. PROBLEMS OF PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

2.1. SELECTED PROOFS OF GODS EXISTENCE

One who claims belief in God's existence can be rationally justified will usually attempt to support this claim by suggesting some kind of demonstration of God's existence himself. Such demonstrations usually vary according to philosophical premises engaged, but also according to the method they employ and the exact formulation at which they aim.

To understand this thesis properly it is vital that reader understood the difference between deductive and inductive reasoning. Deduction, basically, is process of deriving particular propositions from universal, while induction is derivation of universal propositions from particular. These of course are completely different endeavours.

While deductive proofs, being formalized and described in logic, lead to propositions which are necessarily true provided all premises are true, this certainty is paid by triviality of such conclusions. The necessary truth of the conclusion is provided only because it is contained in the premises which have been granted as true already.

This must not always be obvious at the beginning as deductive proofs can be really complex. Mathematics, which can be hardly considered as trivial science even by the brightest minds, serves us as an example, as it is purely deductive science in nature.

However premises still imply conclusions purely by rules of meaning, language, or by nature of things, or their forms or essences, or whatever is your ontology.

On the other hand inductive reasoning, so common in science, leads from particular and less interesting propositions towards their generalizations. In this sense induction really enriches our understanding of world of facts, not just world of meanings.

However the problem is that generalization over incomplete set of particular cases will never be certain as still some cases may appear which will falsify our observations. Thus from any number of observations that 'Swan A is white', 'Swan B is white', 'Swan C is white' (and so on) we can never conclude that all swans are necessarily white unless we make sure we have already seen all swans.[2]

It follows from this argument is also impossible to make any absolutely certain prediction about future on basis of our knowledge of present and past, no matter what regularity and laws we have

---

[2] This important problem is stumbling block of empirical and positivistic theories of knowledge. Problems of induction have been studied in particular in logical positivism. See Carnap's and Popper's solution in Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005)

observed in it as future events still haven't been observed. This will become more obvious after introduction of philosophy of David Hume.

None of these approaches, neither deductive, nor inductive, is without its own problems as we have observed, so the question arises, which method to choose to demonstrate God's existence. If we choose induction, we can never reach universal and certain knowledge about God's existence and such proof need not to be accepted by someone who is not wiling to believe in God, as he may doubt we have generalized correctly.

If we choose deduction, we can persuade someone, provided he is intelligent and has full insight in terms, but only in the case he is willing to accept some even stronger premises.

The medieval way was mainly the deductive one, usually with each proof using different premises.

Such is for example famous Anselm's ontological proof of God's existence, who attempts at deducing God's necessary actual existence from his existence in mind as pure idea. Thomas Aquinas mentions this argument of Anselm Proslogion in his Summa Theologiae:

"Now, once we understand the meaning of the word 'God' it follows that God exists. For the word means: 'that than which nothing greater cannot be meant'. So as existence in thought and fact is greater than existence in thought alone, and since once we understand the word 'God', he exists in thought he must also exist in fact. It is therefore self-evident that there is a God."[3]

How should we understand these self-evident propositions?

Thomas Aquinas holds proposition is self-evident if we perceive its truth immediately upon perceiving the meaning of its terms: characteristic, according to Aristotle, of first principles of demonstration. For example, when we know what wholes and parts are, we know at once that wholes are always bigger than their parts.[4]

The important question is: How do we know meaning of terms? Of course, meanings of terms are being described in definitions. But what is it that is being described? Are definitions really descriptions, approximating some original meaning, which is already there, or are they origins of meaning of terms, which are fixed only by such linguistic convention?

---

[3] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae (Ia 2),* Blackfriars (1963), p.5
Interesting article about this proof and his other explications, as well as list of relevant literature can be found in:
Raclavský Jiří, *Ontologické důkazy analyticky*, (Religio 8, II, 2000), pp. 169-182.
available on-line: http://www.phil.muni.cz/~raclavsk/texty/ontologicke_dukazy_analyticky.html
[4] It is interesting that studies of mathematician Georg Cantor have shown that this proposition, which Aquinas gives as an example of self-evident proposition is not even generally valid. While it is true for finite sets, it does not hold for infinite ones because for some infinite sets we know to pick their part, which is infinite as well and even the same size as the whole set. See Petr Vopěnka, *Vyprávění o Kráse Novobarokní Matematiky* (Práh, 2004), pp. 293-294

If meaning of terms is simply being constructed in definitions and rules of meaning, such as axioms of logic, any propositions would be self-evident simply because we have customarily agreed that they will be.

But Aristotle believed in objective existence of essences of things which are only described in ours definitions. For him logic, rather than being concerned with meaning of concepts, studies procedures of human thought which is always somehow thought about reality.

Thus part of Aristotle's logic is also study of ontological categories of things, which already exist before our conceptualization of essences of things with our language.[5]

This philosophical position is often referred to as realism, although terminology may differ in different works. When using term 'realism' in I will always mean philosophy, which teaches that our intellectual categorization of world already mirrors its immanent structure, which is in some sense already real.

So understanding first principles is based on fundamental insight, more then on knowing what meaning we decided to assign to certain terms. Bernard Lonergan shows mathematics as an example; for him insight (concretely in empirical residue) is prior to any formal definitions.[6]

Therefore it makes sense to ask whether meaning of some terms is evident and it is proper if Aquinas quotes Boethius opinion that some notions are self-evident only to the learned or if he writes that common terms are evident to all.[7]

But then the question of self-evidence of Existence of God becomes non-trivial. The question which immediately comes into ours mind is: Do we really understand the word 'God'?

Aquinas, therefore, recognizes two kinds of self-evidence. Something which is self-evident in itself, can be sometimes self-evident even to us and sometimes not. Because propositions are self-evident when the predicate forms part of what the subject means.

But what is to be this subject or have this predicate might not be evident to some people under realistic understanding. So Aquinas concludes:

"I maintain then that the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident in itself, for, as we shall see later, its subject and predicate are identical, since God is his own existence. But, because what is to be God is not evident to us, the proposition is not self-evident to us, and needs to be made evident."[8]

Therefore Aquinas denies we have any knowledge God exists from considering meaning of his name and refuses Anselm's argument for self-evidence of God's existence.[9]

---

[5] Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume I* (Image Books, 1993), Chapter XXVIII (p. 208)
[6] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight a Study of Human understanding* (Longmans, 1958), Chapter X, 7-8 (p. 311)
[7] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae (Ia 2),* p. 7
[8] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae (Ia 2),* p. 7
[9] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae (Ia 2),* pp. 7-9

Thomas Aquinas chooses different strategy of demonstration of God's existence, and so he distinguishes two kinds of proofs: One from cause and one from effect.[10]

Thomas Aquinas writes:

"Now any effect of a cause demonstrates that that cause exists, in cases where the effect is better known to us, since effects are dependent upon causes, and can only occur if the causes already exist. From effects evident to us, therefore, we can demonstrate what in itself is not evident to us, namely, that God exists."[11]

To show an example: To argue from cause is similar as to argue from thing's essential nature to its properties.[12] We need to have definition describing essential nature of things to be able to argue from cause. Suppose we have definition of bachelor as an unmarried man. Then we can demonstrate all bachelors are man and all bachelors are unmarried.

Contrary, if we argue from effect to cause, we can't start with definition of what the cause is, but we can start with knowledge that it is. For example if we find pope was murdered we can demonstrate that 'the murderer of pope' exists.

However 'the murderer of pope' is not definition of according person, but pure name given to him by us, because definition has to describe essential properties and being murderer of pope is purely accidental.[13]

If we want to prove that God is, we simply cannot use definition of God's essence (because question on nature of God comes after the question of his existence), but only names, which we give to God by his effects.[14]

In Lonergan's terms we use nominal definition of God instead of explanatory definition. In nominal definition we introduce meaning of definiendum in explanatory we approximate it.[15]

Gerard Hughes therefore writes:

"The conclusion of the cosmological arguments in Aquinas is similarly modest: that there must exist whatever it is that causally explains the existence of the things we experience, which we call 'God.'"[16]

Detailed analysis of proofs provided by Thomas Aquinas is unnecessary I believe. However we must notice problem immanent in all of these proofs, that is presupposition that all that exists requires some causal explanation and that it has some necessarily.

---

[10] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae (Ia 2),* p. 9; See also Gerard J. Hughes, The Nature of God (Routledge, 1995), p. 35
[11] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae (Ia 2),* p. 11
[12] See McDermott's comments 'b' and 'c' on pages 10-11
[13] Gerard Hughes uses example of epilepsy - Gerhard J. Hughes, The Nature of God (Routledge, 1995), pp. 35-36
[14] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae (Ia 2),* p. 13
[15] Lonergan's understanding of definition can be studied in: Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 7-13
[16] Gerard J. Hughes, *The Nature of God* (Routledge, 1995), p. 36

We only need to notice, that even when Thomas Aquinas uses deduction in his proofs as was common in scholastic tradition, his premises can be understood as conclusions of Aristotle's induction based on observation of nature. He obviously questions possibility of usefulness of self-evident propositions in such proofs and chooses as his premises propositions, which are all but trivial logical tautologies.

Of all possible critiques of this argument we will consider only the one introduced by David Hume in next chapter, which undermines major premise of its argument, which is belief in causality, rather then others, which accept this way of reasoning, but rather weaken minor premises or deny correctness of the argument as whole, like materialistic one.[17]

Again all five ways of demonstrating God's existence of Aquinas are based on philosophy of Aristotle, concretely on his metaphysics and are therefore called metaphysical.[18]

We have seen realism stands in background of Aristotle's metaphysics. However not every medieval philosophers were realists, some stood on positions of nominalism. Nominalistic philosophers believed that universals (nouns describing some universal attribute such as for example "white-ness" or "horse-ness") are pure names invented by humans.

Although exposure of nominalistic philosophy of Willem Occham might be interesting and his scepticism towards proofs of God is of certain relevance to our topic, there is no place to pay more attention to it unfortunately.

Neither can we discuss philosophy of renaissance, although rise of scientific thought in this period (especially Francis Bacon's works on science or Galileo's distinction of primary and secondary qualities) would bring quite helpful Insight.

These topics can be studied in Copleston's history of philosophy volumes II, III.

Another proof of God's existence which is noteworthy is that of René Descartes. Also René Descartes tried to prove God's existence deductively with exclusion of any premises, which would presuppose some facts of external world.

Descartes preoccupation with mathematics likely inspired him to searching of philosophical method, which would lead to absolutely certain conclusions acceptable for anyone reasonable. Therefore he claimed to subdue all knowledge from tradition and authorities under his doubt, but even question his own senses as well in order to rebuild all philosophy deductively from some self-evident principles.

---

[17] For examples of materialistic or positivistic critiques see appropriate chapters in Copleston.
[18] Aristotle's understanding of causation can be found in Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume I* (Image Books, 1993), p. 288

One thing that Descartes found indubitable was actual presence of his doubting, therefore he concluded that it is indubitable that he doubts and therefore he is. Once Descartes affirmed existence of thinking, he could ask for origin of ideas we find in our thought.

These are produced by innate faculties of our reason, which make us create specific ideas on each occasion we are confronted with some experience. Among them is also idea of God, which is so perfect that it couldn't have been created by imperfect being, therefore its origin must be in perfect being itself.

Such is in brief Descartes version of proof of God's existence, which he needs prior proof of reality of material objects and possibility of science.[19]

Descartes philosophical position, which stands on belief that our reason contains innate ideas, which allow us to affirm and understand world, is called rationalism. Tradition of rationalism was also that of philosophers like W.G. Leibniz, B. Spinoza, Ch. Wolff, or N. Malebranche who are also mentioned here, because of their influence on philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which will be particularly important for our endeavour.

Now we can clearly see Descartes' and Anselm's deductive proofs require acceptance of such premises, that they imply God's existence already or something even stronger, such as that we can have clear idea of what or who God is plus principle that to have idea of God is to affirm God's existence already.

On the other hand premises of Aquinas' and Aristotle's proof are to be affirmed on the base of our correct understanding of empirical world, which is somehow problematic as David Hume will further reveal.

However, there is some notable common feature to deductive and inductive proofs, that is that nature of God is usually considered of such specific nature and importance, that such proof of God's existence stands in very heart of related philosophy either as one of its foundation or as its most desired conclusion.

God's existence is hardly ever being proved in any philosophical work as some marginal side product of main philosophical argument.

Anselm and Aquinas were both medieval theologians so their concern with God is evident, though Anselm's proof is part of his prayer, unlike Aquinas' whose is part of complex and important theological and philosophical work. In case of Descartes and rationalists it seems they need God as only to cover their ignorance or support their philosophy by his authority, anyway it is also crucial for them to prove his existence first.

---

[19] Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume IV* (Image Books, 1993), pp. 66-85

Next chapter will be concerned with the enlightenment critique of possibility to proof God's existence, mainly directed at the metaphysical argument of Thomas Aquinas. Arguments of Anselm and rationalists will not be studied in here, because their little relevance to theology of Bernard Lonergan and, in my opinion, their little relevance to theology at all. Because of deductive nature of these proofs, their study can be interesting logical exercise, but they can hardly enrich ones understanding of God.

2.2. HUME'S CRITICISM OF CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY

Now I will concentrate on this particular critique of Aristotelian metaphysics, having in mind other philosophical movements and historical events had its influence on fading of medieval worldview as well, but cannot be studied in detail in this thesis.

In previous chapter we could have observed arguments of Aquinas are often based on certain understanding of cause-effect relations based on Aristotle. However Aristotle's concepts of cause and causality have been seriously questioned by Scotch philosopher David Hume and his philosophy of sceptical empiricism.

For empirical philosophy in general all our knowledge comes primarily from our senses. We are not bestowed with any innate ideas as rationalistic philosophers believed.[20]

How do we then create ours ideas of things from experience? And what in fact our ideas are? David Hume compares thoughts (or ideas) to sensual impressions and at first he distinguishes between them only by greater liveliness of the impressions.[21]

We can see ideas are pictured as memories or imaginations, rather then abstracted concepts in Hume's philosophy. Further Hume observes the imagination of man seems to be unrestricted to realm of experience, but he immediately explains this fact likewise:

"But though are thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more that the faculty of compounding, transporting, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted."[22]

So according to Hume even idea of God is product of augmentation of our ideas of goodness and wisdom.[23]

But is it possible to say something in general about these principles which we use in creating compound ideas of simple ones? Hume observes:

"Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other:

---

[20] For more details on concepts of rationalism and empiricism see Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume IV* (Image Books, 1993), Introduction (p. 15)
[21] David Hume, *An enquiry concerning human understanding (Section II)*, The Open Court Publishing (1971), p.16
[22] David Hume, p. 17
[23] David Hume, p. 18

a certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehend in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind."[24]

Hume's elaboration of this idea is following:

"To me, there appear to be only principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect."[25]

Let us now concentrate on Hume's description of cause and effect, which will particularly interest us. For Hume doctrine of causation is of special importance as it is the only relation which does not depend upon the mere ideas and can inform us of existences of objects, which we do not see or feel. So origin of this idea cannot be found in any particular qualities of any object, but rather in relations between objects.[26]

According to Hume, the relations of contiguity and succession are essential to the relation of causality, but most important is the idea of necessary connection between two spatially and temporally contiguous events from which one precedes the other one.[27]

How is it then that this idea of necessarily connection arises? Hume's opinion is that we are able to perceive only relations of contingency and succession of events and not even several instances of the same perception repeated can give rise to new idea of necessary connection.[28] However he observes:

"But upon farther enquiry I find, that the repetition is not in every particular the same, but produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin'd by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object."[29]

So due to Hume it is only by custom we arrive at the idea of necessary connection and of causality. Hume further shows up inefficiency of other philosophical strategies to discover idea of necessary connection in things themselves. First he observes:

"I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are all nearly synonymous; and therefore 'tis an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest."[30]

---

[24] David Hume, pp. 22-23
[25] David Hume, p. 23
[26] David Hume, p. 201
[27] David Hume, pp. 202-204
[28] David Hume, pp. 211-212
[29] David Hume, p. 212
[30] David Hume, p. 213

So Hume argues, if one accepts his principle that origin of all ideas lies in experience he will have to admit there is nothing which could hint towards existence of necessary connection in it as he will be unable to deliver any instance of such observation.[31]

Hume farther discards any other attempts to explain efficacy out of substantial form of bodies, their accidents or qualities, matter or form and their various combinations.[32] Hume also makes interesting note on Cartesians. As they believed they were perfectly acquainted with essence of matter (which is extensionality), they could not infer that it is endowed with any efficacy as extensions implies only mobility, not actual motion, so they have concluded this motion must lie in some deity.

But if we accept premise that each idea must be derived from some impression, then even the idea of deity would have to have the same origin. So if there is no impression that would hint at existence of efficacy, it is impossible to discover it in deity as well.[33]

We have so far observed how Hume questions basic principle, which Aquinas uses in all his arguments, which is that all things must have some cause of their existence. Hume writes:

"'Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of its existence. This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded. 'Tis supposed to be founded on intuition, and to be one of those maxims, which tho' they may be deny'd with the lips, 'tis impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of."[34]

However Hume finds this 'intuitive' justification unsatisfactory and demands proof of such principle. But this cannot be delivered from experience as we can never infer from particular (though numerous) cases of contingence and succession of events to anything like efficiency. Hume concludes:

"We can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, or new modification of existence, without shewing at the same time the impossibility there is, that any thing can ever begin exist without some productive principle. And where the latter proposition cannot be prov'd, we must despair of ever being able to prove the former."[35]

---

[31] David Hume, pp. 213-214
[32] David Hume, p. 215
[33] David Hume, pp. 216-217
[34] David Hume, pp. 206
[35] David Hume, pp. 207

In light of this critique we can see that Aquinas proves of God's existence from notion of his own nature or nature of cause-effect relations includes non-sensual elements.

In general, all attempts to prove any metaphysical theorems from some innate knowledge or pure reason alone are based on doubtful principles, as Hume believes.

However Hume's philosophy would lead to absolute scepticism. Do we really have to base all our knowledge on immediate sensual impressions only? If so, how could science be possible with its inductive reasoning, generalization and prediction?

2.3. KANT'S CRITICISM OF REALISTIC METAPHYSICS

Most significant answer to Hume's scepticism can be probably found in works of philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant's philosophical background was in rationalism. He studied university at his birthplace in Königsberg and there was introduced into philosophy of Leibniz, interpreted by Christian Wolff. Kant studied logics and metaphysics at Wolff's pupil Martin Knutzen and also familiarized himself with Newtonian physics.[36]

Later Kant encounters Hume's philosophy and accepts his criticism of metaphysics. He describes this encounter as awakening from dogmatic slumber and under Hume's influence Kant becomes sceptical towards classical metaphysics and its proofs of God as well. However he is not willing to accept all of Hume's sceptical conclusions.[37]

As Copleston observes, Kant will write his critique of pure reason partially in order to save Newtonian physics from Hume's critique of concept of causality and will try to show, how scientific knowledge is possible and why it can provide us with universal truths.[38]

Ours concern will be to demonstrate, how Kant answers Hume's denial of causality and saves Newtonian physics. Basically Kant's main objection to Hume would be Hume's claim that all our knowledge comes from senses alone.

Of course, our knowledge comes from senses, Kant would say, but it is always presented to us in certain constant forms of our reason already.

Thus appearances always happen in space and time, but we cannot say we experience space and time, only that space and time is form of all our appearances.[39]

Therefore we may have some concepts, which come from pure reason alone, but it would be mistaken to imagine, that they denote any transcendental entities, independent of experience, as classical metaphysicians did. Therefore Kant undertakes this important philosophical task to investigate categories and operations of pure reason itself, in order to discover its limits in the first place, but also to show, how any purely rational knowledge (in mathematics, science or metaphysics) is possible. These were goals of Kant's 'Critique of pure reason'. Copleston summarizes content of this book likewise:

---

[36] Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume VII* (Image Books, 1993), pp. 180-181
[37] Kant's own critiques of metaphysics and his efforts to classify religious propositions as moral (valid in world of thing-in-themselves) and separate them from scientific propositions, which are concerned with interpretations of facts (valid in world of things-for-us) is not can be studied in Copleston VII, XIII-XV and his *Prolegomena* and *Critique of Practical Reason*.
[38] Frederick Copleston, pp. 186-187
[39] Frederick Copleston, pp. 198

"In this famous work Kant treats mathematical and scientific knowledge and endeavours to justify the objectivity of this knowledge in face of the empiricism of David Hume. He does this by proposing his 'Copernican revolution', that is, the theory that objects conform to the mind rather than the other way round. Because the structure of human sensibility and human mind is constant, objects will always appear to us in certain ways. We are thus enabled to make universal scientific judgements which hold good not only for actual but also for possible experience. The Newtonian science is thus theoretically justified despite the dissolvent tendencies of empiricism."[40]

Here Kant follows Leibniz's terminology, when he argues there are some a priori concepts, concepts which are not derived from particular experience.

Here I would like to remind once more, that already David Hume observed, that people form similar concepts (or compound ideas), independent of their languages and cultures, although he failed to explain this phenomenon.

This observance might have been behind classical rationalistic belief that people are bestowed with some innate ideas, which is theory empiricist have criticized. Kant sides with empiricists in this point, judging this crude idea as product of dogmatic metaphysics.

Copleston stresses Kant's belief, that dogmatic metaphysics assumed that reason can apply a priori concepts and principles to apprehend supersensible realities and things in themselves. But these a priori concepts are rather derived from procedures of pure reason alone then just innate.[41]

Now of course, Kant holds that certain truths, which cannot be derived from experience, are simply a priori truths. Copleston writes:

"Now why should Kant think that it is possible for there to be any a priori knowledge at all? The answer is that he was convinced that there evidently is such knowledge. He agreed with David Hume that we cannot derive necessity and strict universality from experience. It follows, therefore, that 'necessity and strict universality are sure marks of a priori knowledge and are inseparably connected with one another'."[42]

Therefore all a priori sentences are universally valid, as their truth is strictly independent of any state of the world, distinguishable in experience.

Kant's claim that there is some a priori knowledge possible wouldn't be such challenge for empiricists, if Kant would not hold at the same time this a priori knowledge can possibly be even synthetic.

---

[40] Frederick Copleston, p. 207
[41] Frederick Copleston, pp. 212-213
[42] Frederick Copleston, p. 217

While analytical propositions are true only because their predicates are already contained in their subjects (like in proposition: 'All bachelors are man.'), predicate of synthetic proposition denotes 'something new' for their subject (like in proposition: 'All bachelors are happy.'). But although not all synthetic propositions are a priori, some of them are. That is example of ours well known proposition: 'Everything that exists must have its cause'.[43]

We can see Kant's effort to justify existence of some form of self-evident propositions, which wouldn't be necessarily true only on basis of meanings of terms.

Now, as Copleston rightly observes, this claim is unacceptable for logicians, empiricists and positivists as for them all a priori knowledge is analytical.[44]

In most radical view of Wittgenstein's Tractatus analytical propositions are always only trivial tautologies. If they are independent of any sensual knowledge, and true under any conditions in every state of the world, they can bring us no information on what the actual state of the world currently is.[45]

However it must be said here that logicians usually employ term 'analytical' in much broader sense than Kant ever did.

While Kant still might have classified as analytical only those propositions, which could be transformed into tautologies by substituting explicit definitions of terms, David Hilbert came up with concept of implicit definitions, which enlarged concept of analytical propositions as well.[46]

Little example of mathematics will help us illustrate real difference between these theories:

For Kant (unlike for Leibniz, for whose mathematical and geometrical propositions were in fact analytical), axioms of Euclidean geometry are synthetic a priori truths indeed, because they express insight into nature of space[47].

Due to later development of mathematical works like those of David Hilbert on geometry, Giussepe Peano on arithmetics or Gottlob Frege on logics, formalization of mathematical knowledge seemed suddenly fully possible.

For David Hilbert, contrary, axioms of any geometry have nothing to do with real points and lines, but only with formal "points" and "lines", which can be understood only in the sense described in these axioms and therefore are implicitly defined by them. These axioms then

---

[43] Frederick Copleston, pp. 218-220
[44] Frederick Copleston, pp. 221
[45] Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume VIII* (Image Books, 1993), pp. 495-496. For more detail see Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Routledge, 1960); Translated by C.K. Ogden
[46] Bernard Lonergan recognizes nominal and explanatory definitions. While nominal definition defines correct usage of names and requires insight in use of language, explanatory contains something further that should be added in a postulate and requires insight into term itself.
Implicit definitions are then explanatory definitions without nominal definitions. (Lonergan, Insight, pp. 10-13)
[47] Frederick Copleston, pp. 222

constitute meaning of these primitive (explicitly undefined) terms such as points and lines, rather then approximate them. Such axioms are in fact analytical tautologies, rather then fundamental synthetic a priori truths.[48]

However aside Russell's logicism and Hilbert's formalism (which can also be found in works of early Wittgenstein) there also exist different philosophies of mathematics, like Brouwer's intuitionism, which is almost Kantian in its nature.[49]

Also Hilbert's belief all mathematical truths can be formalized in first order logics suffered serious blow from Kurt Gödel's famous proof of incompleteness of arithmetic, showing we can never formalize all arithmetical truths, so Kant's doctrines of mathematics are not that outdated as some would like to believe.[50]

To summarize - for Kant, unlike for Hume, there are two sources of our knowledge, ours sensibility (Sinnlichkeit), and thought (Verstand). The second of them is source of a priori knowledge.[51]

Thought here is rather meant as our intelligence, which somehow automatically categorizes our experience into given categories. Reason in classical meaning of the term, as faculty of logical and scientific classification of observed facts and created concepts: Vernunft.[52]

However there are some problems with this limitation of knowable world to that presented to us by our senses and thought, as suddenly question for what lies outside its boundaries arises. Kant does not despair about this division and rather places all 'useful' metaphysical entities, like freedom in it.[53]

There is in fact place for transcendental ideas, as freedom, God, soul, or world, as science of physics is only concerned with world as it is presented to us. Here we can observe that law of causality is valid, but there is no way to conclude it is valid in real world. As blind man can never observe colours, we can never experience anything outside space and time and outside of causal framework. Such is for example case of above mentioned freedom.

Indeed, if all we perceive is already filtered and sorted by our intellectual capacities, we can never know how things in themselves in fact are, we can only make science of things for us.

---

[48] Problems related to this paradigmatic change in mathematics and Hilbert's programme are described in article: Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005), Chapter VI
[49] Frederick Copleston, pp. 244-245
[50] Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005), Chapter VI; Bernard Lonergan makes interesting use of this proof in introduction to Insight on page XXV.
[51] Frederick Copleston, pp. 229
[52] Frederick Copleston, pp. 230
[53] Frederick Copleston, pp. 232

There is then phenomenal world of things for us and noumenal world of things as they are in themselves.[54]

Although Kant stayed faithful to his critique of metaphysics and held that nothing reasonable can be said of this world, other then what can be postulated by practical reason, this division was still problematic for other philosophers, like Nietzsche who was unsatisfied with this whole division of noumenal and phenomenal world and things-for-us and things-in-themselves. [55]

Also we may have doubts about Kant's preoccupation with Newtonian physics in particular. Paradigm of mechanistic determinism, employed in Newtonian physics, is quite narrow for nowadays science, which mainly operates with probabilistic models, not to speak of common sense judgements at all. Hume's scepticism would one leave in doubts, whether coming home and finding windows smashed, smoke in the air and water of the floor would mean there has been a fire.[56] For such ordinary questions Kant's philosophy offers no answers.

---

[54] Frederick Copleston, pp. 233
[55] Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995); Comparative studies of concept of things in works of Kant's, Nietzsche's and Lonergan would be fruitful and interesting I believe, but it is far beyond scope of this thesis.
[56] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 281-283

3. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF BERNARD LONERGAN
3.1. MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY IN MODERNISTIC FRAMEWORK

In previous chapter we could have seen problems arising with modern philosophy and its focus on abilities of human reason itself. Under closer examinations of nature of knowledge and procedures of human mind arriving at some, it became evident that naïve speculations about eternal principles of universe are ungrounded in knowledge accessible to us and that every firm philosophy must begin with investigation of its own boundaries first.

However this must not always lead to absolute scepticism of Hume. We could have seen Hume in general acknowledged there might be some common procedures how people do create ideas from impressions and even believed these might be quite universal, although he didn't investigate them much thoroughly and in fact didn't find more fitting explanation for those most universal and important of them then 'custom'.

This is where Kant advances Hume's philosophy by taking seriously his claim that our ideas are compounded of impressions, however partially acknowledging some metaphysical claims as reasonable, after investigating procedures of ours reason which perform this compounding. Unfortunately Kant's own opinions were too much based on paradigm of Newtonian physics with its classical laws of mechanics. This way did Kant arrive at quite narrow understanding of knowledge, according to which most of common reason judgements, but even majority of those employed in nowadays science, would seem unjustified.

David Tracy acknowledges Kant's genius in criticizing naïve ideal of pure reason in work of Christian Wolff and Scholasticism, but marks it as half-hearted due to this sentimentality for old understanding of sciences.[57]

In fact, this philosophical movement was accompanied by parallel transformation of ideal of scientific knowledge. David Tracy notes:

"The medieval ideal, in fact, remained "cognito certa per causas" (with its attendant insistence upon universality, necessity, certainty and Aristotelian metaphysical causality). The contemporary ideal on the other hand is significantly different: it aims at "the complete explanation of all data (i.e. including those in process) in terms of their mutual intelligible relationships" (with its attendant insistence upon development, probability, pluralism of methods and expansion of possible expressions of causality)."[58]

---

[57] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 92-93
[58] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 84; Following five pages (85-90) are used for description of eight most important shifts.

It is obvious then, how pre-modern image of science Kant wanted to achieve, when he strived to defend a priori status for some synthetic propositions of physics, which would ensure them absolute certainty and universality.

Now of course we may ask, how precisely are methodologies of different modern sciences derived from some unifying idea of scientific enterprise, and how is this idea grounded in our cognitional activities. What do we do, when we do science in modern meaning of that word? What operations do we perform and what is nature of ours conclusions? Is it possible to give some clear definition of science, to distinguish it from pseudo-sciences and other endeavours of human mind? If scholastic theology was based on medieval ideal of science, is it possible to build modern theology on modern ideal of science?

These issues are, at least implicitly, discussed in works of Bernard Lonergan. As Lonergan was a theologian, his primary concern was in theology. His first theological works 'Gratia Operans' and 'Verbum' were concerned with recovery of theoretic horizon of the medieval period in theology in context of catholic revival of scholasticism and Thomism.[59]

However his later studies of contemporary mathematics and empirical sciences forced him to re-examine and restructure old ideals of Aristotle and his studies of philosophy after Aquinas revealed to him importance of human interiority as the only appropriate and solid foundation of all metaphysics and epistemology.[60]

Thus Bernard Lonergan recognized importance of this shift in ideal of science and tried to build his theology on it, in the same fashion as classical medieval theology was based on medieval ideal.[61]

To face Hume's scepticism Lonergan followed Kant's way of analyzing human consciousness as source of knowledge, but already with modern scientific ideal in his mind. Tracy writes:

"And just as Kant attempted to defend the possibility of the Newtonian system against Hume's attack, so too Lonergan in Insight's initial phase will be concerned to defend not any particular system but the scientific ideal itself through a critical examination of its actual performance in contemporary empirical scientific methods."[62]

[59] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), Chapters I-III, pp. 22-23
[60] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 91
[61] For see some problematic issues of this attitude see Gerard Watson's article *A note on Lonergan and a Greek conception of science* in Patrick Corcoran (S.M.), *Looking at Lonergan's method* (Talbot Press, 1975), Chp. IV
[62] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 96

In second phase Lonergan's will introduce his own concept of critical interiority on which this universal methodology of science is based and from the very same notion he will demonstrate how metaphysics are possible and how should Aristotelian metaphysical terms be understood within this frame.

Lonergan argues how important it is to study mechanisms of human knowing to arrive at any reasonable and modern scientific methodology. In his 'Method in Theology' he observes three possible approaches to understanding of general method.

It is possible to understand general method 'more as an art than as science', or identify it with method of the most successful science at the time, or finally third approach, which Lonergan undertakes, to uncover notion of scientific method from procedures of human mind. In them he can discern of transcendental method that is a basic pattern of operations employed in any cognitional enterprise.[63]

We may illustrate differences of these three approaches on history of philosophy. Understanding scientific methodology as art of interpretation, or explaining it evolutionary, pragmatically, or customarily is way of empiricism. As no scientific method can obviously provide us with certain knowledge, they are, from purely logical point of view, all equally unjustified.

Medieval philosophers believed that it was possible to reach certain universal knowledge only by logical deduction from self-evident principles. However self-evidence was poor excuse for David Hume, who asked for justification by experience.

But this requirement ended up with his suspicion towards evidence of universal propositions as they simply cannot be logically deduced from any number of particular observations and thus they cannot be absolutely verified without knowledge of all instances from universe of discourse on which they apply.

Correct conclusion that pure logic can never substitute scientific methodology is unavoidable, even when no other tool then logic can ensure us with absolute certainty of ours conclusions and so it is necessary to resign on claim for absolute certainty of propositions which we want to keep justified. Bertrand Russell, for example, was aware of this problem and acknowledged that empiricism itself is insufficient for good epistemology.[64]

---

[63] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 3-4

[64] Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume VI* (Image Books, 1993), p. 266, also Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume VIII* (Image Books, 1993), pp. 455-460, For more details see chapters on Russell, Carnap in Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005), Chapter III, IV

Another approach is in identification of reasonableness with method of some particular and successful science as was physic for Kant, sociology for Comte or evolutionary biology for Spencer.[65]

This may not seem as the worst solution, if only temporary and bit discriminating towards other sciences, if belief that some particular science is in such perfect correlation with our reason that it can provide us with a priori propositions, wouldn't lead towards horrors of dogmatic ideologies. This, of course, leads why Lonergan's refusal of synthetic a priori judgements. In his critical comparison with Kantian analysis Lonergan refuses Kant's attempt to propose universal and necessary synthetic judgements in order to transcend Hume's experiential atomism.

Lonergan holds such judgements can be only affirmations of analytic propositions, which are without any relevance to central context of judgements we name knowledge. Lonergan's own emphasis lies on judgements of facts instead, which are true increments in knowledge for him and which contribute to transition from mere analytic propositions to analytic principles. That is to universal and necessary judgements whose terms and relations are existential in the sense that they occur in judgements of fact.[66]

These attempts only end up with some particular science being promoted on place which was previously owned by metaphysics as its formulations obtain place of eternal truths of human reason and its methods become the methods of reasoning.

Marx's historicism may serve as an example for this idealistic reduction. Hegel's influence on Marx was major despite Marx's materialistic critique of Hegel's idealism and so Marx's own philosophy could be classified as ideology under his own criteria.[67]

Tracy points out that Lonergan refuses any form of reductionism, idealistic Kantian reduction which reduces knowledge on explicability in categories and forms of our reason, as much as positivistic, which reduces knowledge on positive facts.[68]

To distinguish intelligent methodical enquiry from rational affirmation Bernard Lonergan divides human consciousness into four levels. These are: Empirical level, intellectual level, rational level and responsible level.[69]

On these levels we perform certain operations, first experiencing (seeing, hearing, touching, smelling), then creating intelligent interpretations of perceived data through insight (inquiring,

[65] Spencer in Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume VIII* (Image Books, 1993), pp. 121-145, Comte in Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume IX* (Image Books, 1993), pp. 74-131 for particular information see pp. 86-88.
[66] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 340
[67] Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy - Volume VII* (Image Books, 1993), pp. 330-334, Important and far reaching critique of Marxism can be found K. R. Popper, *Bída Historicismu* (OIKOYMENH, 1994)
[68] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 126-127
[69] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 9

imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating), then rationally judging these insights and theories based on sets of insights (reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating) and finally deciding and acting on base of ours knowledge (deciding, speaking, writing).[70]

Operations on higher level presuppose existence of lower levels so all our mind processes are indeed revolving around experience, but this doesn't mean experience is source of all of our knowledge.[71]

For how could we understand and possibly judge what is being said about understanding and judgement, if we had no idea of meaning of these concepts? If all our ideas had to be derived from what is experienced only, we could have never formed ideas of experiencing or judging and could do no meaningful epistemology.

Following these objections we could have asked David Hume: "from what sensations did you derive ideas of your philosophy?"[72]

We have seen Kant has acknowledged thought as a second source of ours knowledge, but it was always thought of some experience. Lonergan follows the same pattern, when he shows, that when we experience, there is not only experienced present, but also at the same time act of experiencing. He writes:

"Again, whenever any of the operations are performed, the subject is aware of himself operating, present to himself operating, experiencing himself operating."[73]

In his book 'Insight: A Study of Human Understanding' Lonergan works out philosophical premises of such position. Structure of this book is made in pedagogical way; faithful to its content Lonergan follows the very same procedure in which the insight is generated, that is from particular insights to higher viewpoints, via induction.

Instead of introducing general formulations and deducing particular consequences of them, Lonergan proceeds from particular features towards more universal synthesis.

However ours concern is different then full understanding of all Lonergan's notions and so ours exposure will have to be different. We are following metaphysical arguments for God's existence of Thomas Aquinas. We have shown Hume's critique of metaphysics undermines its premises. However later we have seen other problems with Hume's philosophy, which are narrowing of what is to be affirmed on domain of pure empirical presentations, which resulted in exclusion of pure speculative knowledge and doubting not only all common sense judgements, but even

---

[70] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 6
[71] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 14-15
[72] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 20-21
[73] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 8

scientific judgements as well and in the end mostly philosophical judgements, on which even Hume's own philosophy was based.

Therefore we have shown intelligent (scientific) enquiry is possible and desirable even for the cost it can provide us only with contingent truths, according to this new scientific ideal.

We will therefore leave out majority of first part of Insight, in which Lonergan describes his own understanding of what nature of this new scientific ideal is. We will begin already with his reformulation of what can be reasonably affirmed. Therefore Lonergan's own notions of insight, intelligence, things, description, explanation, classical laws, statistical laws, common sense, scientific enquiry and inference, schemes of recurrence, higher viewpoints, definitions, empirical residues, frames of reference and emergent probability, patterns of experience and bias (individual, group, dramatic and general) will be leaved unexplained and reader will be directed to Lonergan's own book or very useful introduction in Tracy chapter 5.

Our concern will be mainly Lonrgan's concept of judgement and affirmation which will enable him affirmation of consciousness as specific source of knowledge in self-affirmation and such source of knowledge will provide him with notions of being and truth derived from knowledge on nature of cognitional processes, on which Lonergan's new metaphysics will be based.

3.2. TURN TO SUBJECTIVITY - NOTION OF JUDGEMENT

Now we have seen Lonergan distinguishes between intelligent enquiry and formulations of insights on level of intelligent consciousness and affirmation or denial of these formulations on level of rational consciousness.

On intelligent level we ask questions like 'What is it?', 'Why?', 'How often?' and we answer them with formulations of insights into unity-identity-whole, or correlations, laws, systems or ideal frequencies of empirical data. On rational levels we do not ask questions about empirical presentations, but already about these formulations. These questions are 'Is it true?', 'Is it so?' or 'Is it verified?' These questions may be answered with simple 'Yes' or 'No'.[74]

We have already discussed importance of this distinction against any reductions of questions for truth, to questions for intelligence by idealists or positivists, as Tracy observed. Question 'Is this insight true?' simply cannot be answered by showing it is 'scientific' or ideologically correct.

But how do we then judge propositions? What cognitional capacities we employ?

Lonergan describes general nature of prospective judgements as virtually unconditioned. That means there always are conditions for any judgements to be fulfilled, but these conditions are fulfilled and there exists link between these conditions and the conditioned. There are:

The conditioned, the link between conditioned and its conditions and finally the fulfilment of these conditions.[75]

Now Lonergan describes several kinds of judgement:

"In formal inference the link is provided by the hypothetical premise, if the antecedent, then the consequent. The fulfilment is the minor premise.

In judgements of correctness of insights, the link is that the insight is correct if there are no further, pertinent questions, and the fulfilment lies in the self-correcting process of learning reaching its familiarity and mastery.

In judgements of fact the link is the correct insight or set of insights and the fulfilment lies in the present and/or remembered data.

In generalizations the link is the cognitional law that similars are similarly understood and the fulfilment lies in such similarity that further, pertinent questions no more arise in the general case than in the correctly understood particular case.

---

[74] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 271-273
[75] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), p. 280

In probable judgements the link is that insights are correct when there are no further pertinent questions and the fulfilment is some approximation of the self-correcting process of learning to its limit of familiarity and mastery.

In analytic propositions the link lies in rules of meaning that generate propositions out of partial terms of meaning and the fulfilment is supplied by the meanings or definitions of terms.

Analytic propositions become analytic principles when their terms are existential; and terms are existential when they occur in definitive factual judgements.

Provisional analytic principles are analytic propositions whose terms are probably existential.

Serially analytic principles are the analytic propositions from which follow the ranges of systems of which some in some fashion exist."[76]

These statements deserve little explanation.

First it is interesting that Lonergan implicitly distinguishes affirmation of formal inferences from affirmation of analytical proposition. Analytical proposition is affirmed on base of its semantics (meanings of terms of which it is constituted), but affirmation of correctness of judgement does not require insight into its validity, which is based on semantics of logical terms, but is taken from purely syntactical point of view. Before affirming the conditioned also both link between conditioned and conditions (major premise) and conditions (minor premise) have to be judged and affirmed.[77]

Second is his distinction of analytical propositions and analytical principles. As partial terms of meaning can be produced almost indefinitely by definitions and rules of meaning provide a principle of selection of these partial terms to form analytical propositions, these can be made in indefinite numbers. Lonergan agrees with analytical philosophers here. These propositions are in fact tautologies that bring no substantial increment in knowledge.

However he recalls Aquinas who would hardly accept as term of meaning whatever and who demanded that proper terms of meaning were selected by wisdom. Thus Lonergan comes up with notion of analytical principles, which are about 'something existential'.[78]

Thus example of analytical proposition would be 'All silver unicorns are silver', example of analytic principle would be 'All bachelors are unmarried'.

Further he comes up with term of provisional analytic principles, which could be analytical but their partial terms of meaning are not clearly defined. This happens as common sense is

---

[76] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 315-316
[77] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 280-281
[78] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 306-307, p. 407

concerned with particular and is suspicious towards clear definitions and empirical science often assigns terms only probable meaning and revises it several times.[79]

Now interesting example of such proposition is 'Whale is a fish.' For what is meaning of the term 'whale'? In common sense it might be something like 'the great fish which lives in sea' as suggests Czech word 'Velryba'. So proposition 'Great fish living in sea is a fish' is clearly analytical. But as scientists often resign meaning of common terms, they have resigned term fish so it would fit well in Linne's taxonomy. So inside Linne's taxonomy whale is mammal and the whole proposition is not only synthetic, but also false.[80]

Lonergan further comes up with term of serially analytic principles, whose terms are serially existential. This is clearly example of mathematical propositions, as indeed not all analytical propositions are mathematical premises and not all sets of definitions, postulates and theorems are members of mathematical series. In fact the mathematical series begin with explanation of empirical residues and proceed to their grasping through higher viewpoints.[81]

So did science moved form pure geometry of proportions, towards study of natural numbers, integers, real and complex numbers, sets, functions, operations, cardinal and ordinal numbers, universal algebra, logical calculi and so on[82].

This is clearly compromise solution of already presented Kantian philosophy of mathematics. Mathematics is analytical science indeed using deductive methods, though their motivation is clearly empirical and growth of mathematical knowledge proceeds inductively in dialectical movement.

---

[79] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 307-309
[80] Frege distinguishes between "Bedeutung" (meaning) of the term and its "Sinn" (sense) for this purpose. Carnap later comes with concepts of extension and intension of terms.
Frege gives an example "Morningstar is evening star". Both these terms denote Venus so the proposition "Venus is Venus" would be tautological, but the intension of terms "Morningstar" and "Evening star" is different so it contains some non-trivial information.
These theories of meaning are developed with interesting precision in school of transparent intensional logic (See Pavel Materna, *Svět pojmů a logika* (Filosofia, 2000))
Lonergan's understanding of meaning of terms somehow blurs this distinction and identifies meaning of the term with its sense as we will see later.
Beside semantic theories of meaning, which contain some 'platonic' element, there of course are also syntactic or pragmatic ones, as is case of later Wittgenstein. For more information see Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005), Chapters II-VI
[81] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 310-315; Vopěnka's account of development of mathematics is almost analogous.
[82] Lonergan's studies of mathematics and science were crucial to his understanding of understanding indeed, as noted before. Lonergan's concept of insight, which is described in first part of the *Insight* and which couldn't be described here in detail, is based on examples of mathematics and science.
Lonergan's account of work of intelligence is similar to Jean Piaget's, who describes development of intelligence on example of mathematics. There is obvious parallel between growth of cognitional mathematical structures in mind of subject and historical development in field of mathematics.

More problematic are theories of affirmation of correct insight, generalization and analogy, probability and common sense as this is where correct interpretation is required.

We need to clarify importance of the self-correcting process in order to understand how any mistakes in these judgements may be eliminated.

Concerning the affirmation of correctness of judgement, this can be done, when ours insight is invulnerable and no other pertinent question can possibly arise. But how do we know it is the case?

Lonergan acknowledges it is not enough to say there are no further pertinent questions when no further pertinent questions occur to me. This can be only result of lack of concentration (possibly caused by sort of bias) on this particular question and leaping towards other questions in rash judgement.

There is simply no mechanism to recognize mature judgement and to strike balance between rashness and indecision because, as Lonergan says, if it was the case, people of good judgement could be produced at will and indefinitely.

However there is possibility to allow our intellectual curiosity to accumulate more insights of the same domain and in doing so break the vicious circle of ignorance and individual bias. Moreover, according to Lonergan, this self-correcting process has its limit.[83]

The same goes for judgements from analogies and generalizations, which are based on insight that 'A is to be understood similarly to B'. People don't need to be taught to generalize. They only need to learn to build their generalizations on certain grounds.

In department of science this is the case of probable judgements, as their validity is being verified by converging series of experiments and founded by self-correcting process in science.[84]

In case of common sense in general, the self-correcting process of learning is carried on through tradition, families, culture, education and all kinds of authorities. These institutions then serve to overcoming of individual bias and although even these institutions might be biased with group or general bias, their bias can be solved in course of history through self-correcting process as will be argued later.[85]

In my opinion this cognitional optimism shared with Lonergan by third force psychology is cornerstone of his philosophical premises. Lonergan presupposes people that are capable of overcoming their biases and asking for truth alone in state of unrestricted desire to know.

---

[83] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 284-285
[84] Problem with induction is irrelevant as scientists don't aspire for certain but probable knowledge. If all relevant cases were known, Lonergan writes, what would then generalization consist of?
[85] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 287-304

Moreover, he also presupposes that human intelligence in general tends to some unique and clear defined truths. This is the place where Lonergan's philosophy is vulnerable to all types of post-modernist attacks as we will see in concluding chapter.

Lonergan of course provides more detailed description of these mechanisms of self-correcting process in a similar way Hegel did. He mentions logic and dialectics as two forces involved in transformation of our knowledge.

While logic has more static and ordering function and its conclusions never exceed what has been already affirmed, dialectic brings radical change in understanding of what is there to be known and in horizon of knower as it tends toward higher viewpoints.[86]

We can already summarize this Bernard Lonergan's account of judgement and point out its radical improvements towards post-Kantian philosophies. We have seen importance of Lonergan's distinction between questions of judgement from questions for intelligence.

So even when intelligent and rational operations are distinguished, affirmation of proposition is explained as intrinsic act of just another level of human consciousness, which doubts once already reached insights and brings the whole cognitional process in another level.

On rational level it is 'Yes' or 'No' we seek. However this is not 'Yes' of certainty, which is to be pronounced only after reaching clear evidence for what is to be affirmed, which leaves no place for doubts. It is rather 'Yes' of rational confirmation and responsible commitment, which can, and in fact must, be pronounced, when no other doubts can possibly arise in man of good judgement.

Thus such affirmation fits in context of modern scientific ideal, with its concern with probable and revisable intelligent understanding of all data, rather then in medieval ideal of possession of truths, which are eternal, unchangeable and necessary.

Still, even when our current affirmation can be partial and further insights will provoke other questions and ours judgements will consequently have to be revised, Lonergan believes it is truth we appropriate in such affirmations and that major mistakes are excluded.

Thus we will see later when we introduce Lonergan's concept of truth, that truth for Lonergan is exactly what can be rationally affirmed.

Lonergan indeed perfects Kant's Copernican turn towards interiority. For medieval scholars begun with some concept of what objective reality is, then came up with concept of truth as correspondence between propositions and facts which constituted such reality and then they have

---

[86] Bernard Morergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 276-277

analyzed these propositions through logic and determined whether such correspondence appears or not.[87]

Now Lonergan's way is quite opposite. He asks what judgements are usually being understood as correct, he comes up with concept of truth which is appropriated with such judgements and then identifies being with that what is to be known by pure disinterested desire to know.

Lonergan's understanding is different and Tracy compares it to pragmatic concept of truth of Charles Sanders Pierce.[88]

Lonergan establishes his notion of truth as limit of dialectical method as we will see to the end of chapter on Lonergan's metaphysics. First, however, he must establish some domain of discourse, which can provide source for any metaphysical knowledge, constitutive for what Lonergan calls transcendental method.

This domain is to be reached through subject's self-affirmation.

---

[87] This is, as we will see later, approach of logical atomism as well, which is, I believe, reason that some proponents of neo-Thomism (J.M. Bochenski for example) became interested in this tradition.

[88] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 131, Further theories of truth (coherence, correspondence) can be studied in Petr Kolář, *Pravda a Fakt,* Filosofia (2002)

3.3. SELF-AFFIRMATION AS PERQUISITE OF METAPHYSICS

We have already seen we need acknowledging other sources of knowledge then only pure sensations of experience, in order to be able to arrive at some reasonable epistemology or cognitional theory.

For any cognitional theory is description of processes of our knowing and so is any epistemology description of nature of knowledge, and its relation to human behaviour and values.

Therefore there must be some data to be described in these theories otherwise all philosophies of knowledge, including Hume's empiricism, would be vain speculations themselves.

What is needed of explanation is how intelligence can understand itself as well and how can judgement affirm it affirms and basically how knowledge about knowing is possible. That is described in Lonergan's doctrine of self-affirmation.

Centrality of this doctrine understanding of Lonergan's metaphysics is crucial. Tracy writes:

"By means of that self-affirmation, moreover, the chapter provides the essential breakthrough needed to allow the "envelopment and confinement" of the metaphysical position which will follow. In terms of the dominant interest of this work, it explicates the basic method (intelligent and rational activity itself) which penetrates and underlies all the particularized methods of the various sciences (empirical and human, and in a distinct but related way, philosophical)."[89]

Lonergan's metaphysics then rest on transcendental method founded in basic operations of our knowing. To illustrate this by Lonergan's own words:

"Again, transcendental method is coincident with a notable part of what has been considered philosophy, but it is not any philosophy or all philosophy. Very precisely, it is a heightening of consciousness that brings to light our conscious and intentional operations and thereby leads to the answers to three basic questions. What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? The first answer is cognitional theory. The second is an epistemology. The third is a metaphysics where, however, the metaphysics is transcendental, an integration of heuristic structures, and not some categorial speculation that reveals that all is water, or matter, or spirit, or process, or what have you."[90]

However Lonergan's motivation for self-affirmation is other then Descartes as Lonergan has no reason to doubt sensual experience. For Lonergan, as well as for empirics, is phenomenal really

---

[89] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 133
[90] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 25

real and asking if what we perceive is real would be as asking if what we perceive is what we perceive. There is no metaphysical world of platonic ideas prior to any cognitional activity, which should serve us as measure for 'reality' of our impressions.

The sensual illusions Descartes is concerned about are matter of wrong interpretation, rather then wrong perception. It is our interpretation that has to be doubted and not our senses. So where Descartes begins with rational speculation and via dubious and tautological deduction arrives at its own necessary affirmation: 'Cogito ergo sum' Lonergan, quite contrary, begins with facts of perception, understanding, reflecting and affirms self-affirmation as pure matter of fact.[91]

But affirmation of this fact is not to be reached by any inward look or introspection as this is but obscure analogy with sense perception and consciousness is nothing to be 'gazed upon', but rather unity-identity-whole of three differentiated levels.[92]

However Descartes intuition is basically aiming in right direction as it is only through raising this doubting question, 'Am I a Knower?', or 'Is my understanding of understanding correct?' that self-affirmation is possible. By raising this question I already receive affirmative answer, but not as deduction from content of this question, but by matter of fact these questions have been raised.[93]

But although one cannot know he is necessarily knower, but only he is a knower as matter of a fact, contrary it is not the case. One can necessarily know he can't know he is not a knower. One simply cannot know he is not a knower, for that would presuppose knowing. Therefore this question has some element of necessity included in it.[94]

But do we need to ask this question at all? Why do we need to affirm intelligent and rational consciousness and could not only limit ourselves to observation and description of intelligent and rational behaviour as would be case of behaviouristic materialism?

This would not be enough as questions for epistemology still arise and there is big difference between answering them intelligently and parroting answers.[95]

Materialism provides sufficient ontology as it explains all events from properties of matter, but still it cannot answer questions 'How do you know this cup is there?' and 'How do you know that you know this cup is there?' and questions which ask about knowledge in general.

---

[91] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 319-320, 336-339 see also David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 134
[92] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 135-136
[93] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 138
[94] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), p. 329
[95] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), p. 328. To understand difference between understanding the question (thought not knowing the answer) and being able to produce the answer, one must consider difference between calculators and mathematicians or visit internet pages of ALICE foundations.

Materialistic epistemology is impossible as much as empiristic one as it simply denies existence of source of epistemological knowledge.

Materialistic ontology, then, presupposes intelligibility out there (unlike empiricist one, which is much more consequential and rigorous in matters of matter), but fails to explain it when it is so fast to get rid of old theological concepts.

On the other hand materialists need not to affirm these conscious activities in order to affirm presence of their contents. We need not to affirm ourselves in order to be able to do common sense judgements or even physics or mathematics as Descartes believed.

However, we need self-affirmation in order to arrive at some well-grounded philosophy though.

4. LONERGAN'S METAPHYSICS

4.1. POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS

Now we can show how Lonergan attempts to step out from subjective fact of self-affirmation towards his theories of being and objectivity.

On Lonergan's own contrast analysis with Kant and relativism, we can once again observe how all knowledge is in Lonergan's understanding grounded in particular facts, which appear in our judgements.

First difference then is that Kant asked for a priori conditions of the possibility of knowing an object in sense of experiencing it, while Lonergan asks rather for conditions of occurrence of judgement of fact.

Second is Kant's difference between things-for-us (phenomenon) and things-in-themselves (noumenon). This distinction has its origin in already mentioned distinction of primary and secondary qualities as was case of Galileo. Lonergan holds that the difference rather lies in distinction between two kinds of cognitional activities which are description and explanation, described in first part of the book.

The third difference, particularly important for us and therefore already described is between Kant's insisting on a priori necessary judgements.

The fourth concerns immediate grounds of judgement. For Kant it was given by proper use of a priori categories, fabricating intelligent interpretations on base of sensual data. These played important role later post-Kantian idealism. But for Lonergan concepts and theories are matter of intelligent consciousness and judgement rests on another level, which is, as we have seen, more dynamic and open to errors and corrections as well.

The fifth is Kantian analysis of consciousness. We have already seen Kant's distinction of empirical and intelligent consciousness ('Sinnlichkeit' and 'Verstand'), however rational consciousness is missing here. Therefore it is impossible to reach behind the categories of 'Verstand' to their source and they can be only postulated.

That gives Kant's categories obscure inflexibility and opens grounds for Fichte and Hegel to ask questions for their historical development.

Lonergan notes that orthodox Kantians would probably charge him of psychologism (justifying truthfulness of propositions on basis of operations of consciousness) and answers this criticism

with correct observation that without judgements of fact one cannot get beyond pure analytical propositions.[96]

While Lonergan's claim is definitely correct, still he can justify analogies, generalizations and common sense only using psychological terms. Whether it is good or bad will be ours concern later.

Second contrast is drawn between Lonergan's analysis and that of relativists.

Relativists refute empiricism and correctly insist that human knowing cannot be accounted by the level of presentations alone, but that there is also level of intelligence. However they fail to see level of rationality, which only can provide us with affirmative answers.

So the relativist yield for complete explanation of all data as precondition of any judgement is unjustified, as Lonergan makes it clear. The judgement is only virtually unconditioned, so any Moreover, the old anti-relativist paradox appears. It is unsure whether everything is unsure. If relativists have doubts about everything, they should in first place doubt their own theory. [97]

As has been advertised, Lonergan identifies being with object of pure unrestricted desire to know. That is rather unrestricted, spontaneous, all-pervasive notion. Tracy makes it rather clear how important this turn is.[98]

We can see realism of Lonergan on his claim being is unrestricted indeed, because by asking whether something does not lie outside we already put it in.[99]

This is rather realistic approach of Parmenides as under this definition all unicorns, cardinal numbers, biggest primes and golden mountains are included, still what can be known about these things differs radically and so does differ radically their ontological status. Therefore Lonergan brings up medieval notion of essence to draw distinction between different things despite their common feature, which is notion of being pervading notions of all of them.[100]

But what is then status of all different ontologies and how is it possible there are so many?

It is because partial judgements of facts differ so much and that is why we arrive at different theories on which they aim. If we will occupy ourselves mainly with move of bodies, we will soon arrive at materialism. Contrary if we will study operations of human mind idealism will provide us with more sufficient background. We choose our ontologies in order to justify our

---

[96] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 339-342
[97] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 342-347
[98] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 144-148, also Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 348-359
[99] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 351-352
[100] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 359-364

intelligent enterprise as we believe nothing intelligent can be said about nothing. This is case of materialism, empiricism, idealism, phenomenalism and others.[101]

All ontological theories are then derived from ours ways of interpretation of data, rather providing some axiomatic background for them, from which ours interpretations can be deduced. Lonergan gives rather long list of different approaches.[102]

In similar fashion Lonergan's notion of objectivity is formed. Tracy shows its contrast to naïve realist belief objectivity can be attained by intuitive seeing and idealists belief that objectivity is ensured by brilliance of our minds, which provide us with fruitful symbols and interpretations of sensual data via ours categories, although the "really real" (noumenal) can never be reached in this way.

However for critical realists, as Tracy categorizes Lonergan, intellect is far more dynamic, complex and structured. Therefore objectivity is being revealed by the very dynamism of intellect itself as it is precisely what is intended by intelligent activity.

Therefore beside obvious experiential objectivity of given, which is surely unquestionable and indubitable (here lies contrast with rationalism) there is also normative objectivity on level of intelligence (here lies contrast with empiricism), which is resulting in absolute objectivity of judgement.[103]

This normative objectivity stands on exclusion of all possible biases which result in rashness of judgement, wishful thinking or other kinds of subjective deformations of knowledge. Only by ensuring of pureness of desire to know we can reach objectivity, as only pure desire can be trusted that it naturally intends towards objective truths. It is only on normative objectivity of pure desire to know on which or logic and method can be based.

However there are some less obvious, therefore even more dangerous biases as is uncritical praise of some particular philosophy or science.

Any praises for Medieval Philosophy or Modern Science must be refuted (here we can see Lonergan's distance from some inclinations of Neo-Thomism and positivism). Once again any belief or propaganda cannot replace logic and method as is case of dogmatism or crude idealism, nor can pragmatic utilitarism.[104]

So Tracy ones again highlights difference of Lonergan's approach compared to empiricism, idealism or rationalism.[105]

---

[101] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 360-361
[102] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 364-374
[103] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 144-148
[104] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 380-381
[105] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 150-151

4.2. METHOD, EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS

Now difference of Lonergan's approach to metaphysics, in contrast with classical medieval realist one, might be finally explained.

Already in chapter about judgement we have seen correctness of ours judgements cannot be measured by any references to naively conceived reality out there, but is rather grounded in operations of our intellect itself. Previous chapter revealed that these are notion of being and objectivity (and concept of truth as well, as we will later see), which are constructed on basis of our cognitional processes, which are given a priori, and not the other way round.[106]

Lonergan observes classifies these two radically opposite approaches dialectically as position and counter-position. Tracy summarizes his account likewise:

"For Lonergan, then, every philosophical position will be a basic "position" if: first, the notion of "reality" in the system is the concrete universe of being as intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed; second, if the subject's notion of knowledge is grounded in an affirmation of his intelligent and rational consciousness; third, if his notion of objectivity is constructed upon an intelligent inquiry and critical reflection as a heuristic and structured performance.

On the other hand, every basic counter-position will depart from one or more of these positions. Its notion of the "real" may be merely a subdivision of the "already-out-there-now-real". Its notion of the subject's knowledge of himself as subject does not demand rational self-affirmation but is content with some prior existential state. Its notion of objectivity is conceived, in the final analysis, not on the basis of the nature of intellect but on the basis of senses. It becomes the property, therefore, not of the intelligent and rational desire to know but of some vital anticipation, extroversion or satisfaction."[107]

Now history of philosophy can be understood as dialectic movement of positions and counter-positions, which bring important inverse insights into already established positions. Therefore there exists continuous and radical movement towards higher viewpoints, which may confuse non-philosophers, seeing how radically different and logically incompatible philosophies have been produced.[108]

---

[106] See N.D. O'Donoughe's (O.D.C.) article *Lonergan's notion of being in relation to his method* Patrick Corcoran (S.M.), *Looking at Lonergan's method* (Talbot Press, 1975), Chp. III

[107] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 152, Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), p. 388

[108] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 385-387, Philosophies of Hobbes and Hume are classified as counter-positions to Cartesianism further on page 389.

But it is precisely this movement which is central to philosophy in contrast with science. As David Tracy writes the reason is that scientific method is prior to that work and independent of particular scientific results, whereas philosophical method is coincident with philosophical work.[109]

That is why any objections that philosophers do not accumulate knowledge on achievements of previous philosophers and solve the same problems over and over again are misguided. Goal of any philosophical position is providing basic ground for any cognitional enterprise in describing transcendental method, and this description of what is to be known is traditionally called metaphysics.

Tracy summarizes Lonergan in following way: Metaphysics therefore provide heuristically structured anticipation of what is to be known and so it is the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.[110]

There of course is difference between immanent metaphysics and metaphysics explicitly formulated. Tracy's description is following:

"First everyone engaged in intelligent interpretation of the world uses canons and methods which are grounded in common sense and his polymorphic horizon. Second, in need of some kind of systematization (symbolic or scientific) he arrives at dialectic disarray of positions and counter-positions. Finally he succeeds at arriving at genuine metaphysics. So everyone has his metaphysics latent, problematic or explicit."[111]

The problem of course is making these metaphysics explicit, which is possible only through self-affirmation. Through self-affirmation only we are able to reflect on immanent structures in our knowing and avoid biases of common sense and dangerous traps of ideological misuse of science.[112]

Even sceptic like David Hume had some latent metaphysics, otherwise he would be unable to philosophise about his experience at all, as we have already mentioned.[113]

Tracy further notes that this movement into explicit metaphysics provided interesting result of verifying of traditional metaphysical categories (potency, form, act) as the structural contents isomorphic to the cognitional acts, experience, understanding and judgement.[114]

---

[109] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 158-163
[110] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 154, Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), p. 392
[111] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), pp.153-154, Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 390-394
[112] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 156-167
[113] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 139

But Lonergan does not deny his realism here. Although he holds metaphysics can only be formulated on basis of study of cognitional operations of enquiring self-affirmed subject, rather then being simply observed in "real-out-there", he believes there is some natural isomorphism between structure of knowing and structure of the known.[115]

Lonergan further gives brief account of dialectical development of distinct metaphysical methods. He mentions deductive methods of mediaeval age. It is either possible to begin deduction with some set of abstract primitive propositions, both universal and necessary, which were believed to be self-evident, but these are again only analytical propositions valid in every possible world (There is only need to restrict God's omnipotence to the principle of non-contradiction and the concept of possible world suddenly looses its somehow mystical taste of unreality).[116]

The alternative would be concrete deduction, which would take as premises some concrete judgements of fact and lead to analytical principles instead.[117]

But these deductions can possibly lead to some limited scientific, or better say purely descriptive, knowledge as in logical positivism (also called neo-positivism or logical empiricism), but hardly to some metaphysics.[118]

propositions turned back against all philosophies of Vienna circle.

Once again, replacing metaphysics with such system of concrete deductions was goal of logical positivism and even when philosophical justification of this endeavour was metaphysical in some sense of the word, this particular endeavour surely wasn't.[119]

Lonergan mentions many metaphysics like monism, emanationism, optimism, or mechanic determinism, which relied on method of concrete deduction, however there were still some implicit synthetic a priori propositions employed.

Lonergan mentions Kant's attempt of defending possibility of such synthetic a priori statements (leading to transcendental form of deduction), but rightly refuses it and all deductive methods in metaphysics at all.[120]

---

[114] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 157, Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), Chapter XV, pp. 431-487
[115] This idea is first mentioned on Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), p. 399, but is worked out in chapter XVI. pp. 488-529
[116] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 402-403
[117] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), p. 404
[118] Similar problems as in case of Hume's empiricism appear in positivism and logical positivism. Critique of Carnap's principle of empirical verification as criteria of meaningfulness of propositions turned back against all philosophies of Vienna circle.
See Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005), Chapter IV
[119] See Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005), Chapters III, IV
[120] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 404-408

Lonergan however excludes even Descartes method of universal doubt. Descartes, as we have seen, was suspicious to any concrete judgements of facts (which rest on invulnerable insights based on the fact that further relevant questions do not arise) and common sense and scientific judgements as well.

But indubitable is surely something else then certain, as indubitability is impossibility of any further questions to arise.[121] There follows bunch of problems:

Such approach obscures meaning of all judgements as terms of reality, knowledge, objectivity is obscured, while it does not exclude me suppositions and analytical propositions on the other hand as they are not opened to doubts. Moreover such method cannot lead to self-affirmation, which is matter of fact as we have seen. Further any justification of practising universal doubt would have to be doubted first.[122]

But Lonergan believes universal doubt was practised more successfully by Hume, and even more successfully by some existentialists and logical positivists (neo-positivists) as Descartes aim was not literal application of this principle, but its use for clearing grounds for his own original and universe embracing philosophy.[123]

Lonergan's criticism of empiricism was already hinted many times here, but he gives it more detailed account in his contrast analysis. The problem of empiricism is with its insistence on observing the significant, while what can be observed is only datum and significance comes as product of intelligence. Lonergans clarification between objectivity and the "real-out-there" in dialectic of positions and counter-positions is developed here once again, while cognitional theories of philosopher's from Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Malebranche, Berkley, Hume, to Kant and Husserl are discussed from this perspective.[124] This list is very illuminating in understanding Lonergan's position but I believe not necessary to include.

Lonergan also refutes common-sense eclecticism as superficial and biased approach missing goal of philosophy at all.[125]

What is certainly relevant is Lonergan's contrast analysis with Hegelian dialectics. Lonergan mentions his indebtness to Hegel's discovery of philosophy of dialectic as description of its own process of development through positions and counter-positions.

---

[121] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), p. 408
[122] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 409-410
[123] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), p. 411
[124] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 411-416
[125] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 416-421

But he refuses its conceptualist, closed, necessitarian and immanental nature in contrast to his own intellectualist, open, factual and normative version. In his version dialectic deals not with determinate and fixed conceptual contents, but rather with heuristic anticipation, it is also not being governed by simple law of triangulation but being moved by successive accumulation of insights.[126]

Ending contrast analysis is concerned with relation of scientific method and philosophy, but this has been already discussed here in Tracy's interpretation and the same arguments as for common-sense eclecticism may be applied to certain degree even to this method.[127]

Lonergan's own metaphysical method is closest to some variation of Hegel's dialectics as he shows in chapter called metaphysics as dialectics. Here Lonergan uses dialectical method for study of development of consciousness. Concepts of myth, mystery, allegory, interpretation and truth are considered here.

We only need to notice that Lonergan's notion of truth, surprisingly, has nothing to do with some kind of correspondence between propositions and some version of the "real-out-there", but the truth is what is being anticipated by dialectical chain of higher viewpoints.[128] Lonergan's own version of correspondence theory rather rests in his belief in isomorphism of what is achieved in this process of knowing and what is to be known as we have already seen before.

These particular theological results of Lonergan's method are not important for topic of this work and can be studied in more detail in Lonergan's Method in theology, where Lonergan applies his transcendental method of metaphysics to study hermeneutical problems such as problem interpretation, history, pluralism, religious doctrines and dogma, as well systematic theology and church.

There are also to be found applications of Lonergan's Insight chapter on ethics, concerning such problems as values, good, freedom, decision, liberation and conversion, which are also of no special relevance for us.

Paradoxically even last chapters of Insight concerned with general transcendence (God) and special transcendence (evil) where Lonergan shows his own modification of Aquinas' proof of God's existence and importance of belief need not be studied here.[129]

---

[126] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 421-423
[127] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 423-430
[128] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 530-594 (notion of truth in particular on pp. 549-563)
[129] In short, Lonerngan follows scholastic tradition and identifies god with being, which as he believes, is an important and integral notion of heuristic anticipation. This looks like pantheism, but if we realize that being itself is transcendent notion in Lonergan's understanding, ultimate object of all that is to be known, we can deduce that God will ever transcend of real we will ever arrive at (be it matter, spirit or some other essence).

For it was not topic of this work to analyse these proofs as that would be far too ambitious task indeed, but rather their metaphysical background. There can be found plenty literature concerning concept of God in Aquinas, for study of Lonergan's proof of God's existence Tracy mentions Lonergan's own unpublished lecture.

So far we have seen that Lonergan's philosophy and theology is based on turn towards self and interiority and on shift from necessary universal propositions towards inductively based intelligent interpretations of common-sense, science and metaphysics.

Therefore Lonergan's proof of God is inductive as that of Thomas Aquinas, with the small exception that it does not pretend to be based on deduction from self-evident principles of metaphysics, in order to be necessary and universal, but is satisfied with their verification through affirmation in self-correcting process of knowing.

Therefore Lonergan rather shows it is intelligent to belief in God under certain understanding of intelligence, taken from common sense and empirical science, rather then showing God's existence is absolutely necessary.

However there are still some problems even with this weaker, effort which I will mention now in concluding chapter.

4.3. POSTMODERN CRITICISM OF LONERGAN

Now there are several directions from which could Lonergan's philosophy be criticized.

First, by his turn toward subject and its interiority, Lonergan could be easily charged of psychologism as we have seen.

For realists and empirics there have always been some external criteria, by which truth of any propositions should be judged, however difficult it was to constitute what this criteria exactly consist of.

For Lonergan, on the other hand, the judgement's correctness is not measured by comparison to somehow pre-conceived reality, but by possibility of occurrence of further questions. This does respect that what we conceive as reality is always based on some set of our judgements, which we objectify, but simple identification of reality with object of unrestricted desire to know is problematic somehow neglects non-intelligible part of the reality.

True, Lonergan holds that what is reality we only slowly become to understand in continuous accumulation of insights, as it consists not only of the known, but also of the known unknown and even of the unknown unknown in Tracy's words, but is still something knowable and to be known.[130]

Not that I would like to plead for some mystical obscurantism and give some big relevance to non-intelligible phenomena (I agree with Lonergan's opinion such principally non-intelligible phenomena would be truly non-existent), however the question of what exactly is the nature of knowledge and human intelligence comes to the foreground here.

Despite his detailed analysis of performance of intelligence in common-sense and science we may have serious doubts whether Lonergan really succeeded to reveal some universal core of intelligence, whether he truly discovered some set of operations immanent in all intelligent human cognitive activity, which he calls transcendental method.

Lonergan did overcome rigidity of Kant's categories and replaced it with dynamic structure of intellect. However he kept Kant's belief there are some universally applicable criteria to judge what is intelligent insight. Such criteria then could be applied to judge for example scientific generalizations or moral claims as more or less truthful. But in my opinion he is not justified to make this conclusion.

---

[130] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 145, further examples pp. 110, 126, 147

For whole Lonergan's metaphysics and his transcendental method are based on one concrete understanding of human intelligence which is based on the aforementioned modern paradigm of science.

Now of course questions may arise about selection of such paradigm. Is paradigm of knowledge in modern science and mathematics applicable for theology and philosophy as well? Or do these disciplines require different approaches?

Still, if we accept paradigm of modern sciences as adequate, that paradigm can be understood as nothing definite, as itself may be later subject to radical changes, as Thomas Kuhn in his famous "Structure of scientific revolutions" shows.

Proponents of post-modern paradigm would say such paradigm shift already happened, though there is no general consensus on it. Moreover, post-modernists are in general suspicious to any attempts to find some universal intelligence, which would lead to universal concept of truth.[131] A. C. Thiselton summarizes postmodernism as follows:

"The postmodern self follows Nietzsche and Freud in viewing claims to truth largely as devices which serve to legitimate power-interests. […] In matters of race, class, gender and professional guilds, however, the gloves are off. For what counts as true for one group is often disparaged as a manipulative disguise to legitimate power-claims by another group. If different groups choose to adopt different criteria of truth to determine what counts as true, or even what counts as meaningful truth-claim, rational argument and dialogue become undermined by recurring appeals to what one group counts as axioms, but seem far from axiomatic for another."[132]

We can see the general attack on the belief there are some universal criteria of meaning and truth on which people with different social backgrounds could agree. Are there some common criteria of meaning and truth?

Bernard Lonergan was quite satisfied with his own self-examination through self-affirmation and presupposed isomorphism between his own structure of knowing and the known to confirm such claim.[133]

One may point out that Bernard Lonergan's intelligence was first formed by his own studies of philosophy and modern science so that, in the end, he could discover what he believed to be the

---

[131] On problems of Lonergan's understanding of science see article *Lonergan and method in natural sciences* by Mary Hesse in Patrick Corcoran (S.M.), *Looking at Lonergan's method* (Talbot Press, 1975), Chp. V

[132] Anthony C. Thiselton, *Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self* (T&T Clark, 1995), pp. 12-13

[133] Lonergan explicitly writes that metaphysics is a personal achievement: Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 396-399

intelligent core of all the approaches he chose as sources for forming of idea what is intelligent endeavour (mathematics, physics and scholastic) in the first place.

But does Lonergan's theological, philosophical and scientific background justify him to claim he discovered some universal ideal of correct intelligent thought even for, say, Buddhist farmer in Laos?

Lonergan surely knew of cultural and educational influences on common sense, he mentioned them in his chapters VI and VII of his book in detail however he still believed there are some criteria to recognize what is biased in them and what shall be removed by further dialectical development and he often used psychological argumentation here.

There are some ambiguities in Lonergan's understanding of understanding and intelligence and introspection can hardly give us any certain information whether there is an invariant structure of intelligence or not.[134]

Lonergan's approach, I believe, is indeed rooted in psychologism, which is problematic. What are common procedures of intelligence and what insights are correct cannot be simply studied by examination of my own performance or even by my own interpretation of performances of scientists as this already presupposes we classify them as intelligent.

For example laws of meaning and logic can never be discovered by any self-examination as these are not being laws of thought, but laws of argumentation which is always interpersonal objective public speech act. Objectivity of meaning and logic was subject of controversy between Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl.[135]

The only way to study what is common in human thought then is to study its manifestation in language and meaning, which is something, I believe, Lonergan underestimates. Lonergan's understanding of language is as something that reflexes some inner meaning we have in our heads prior to any form of communication.[136]

Similar objection, concerning Lonergan's use of word 'meaning' can be found in reflection of Lonergan's method in article of Wolfhart Pannenberg. For Lonergan, as Pannenberg observes, meaning is constituted as correlate of 'act' that somebody 'means'. Panneberg writes:

---

[134] See article *Knowledge, Understanding and Reality – Some Questions Concerning Lonergan's Philosophy* by Patrick J. McGrath in Patrick Corcoran (S.M.), *Looking at Lonergan's method* (Talbot Press, 1975), Chapter II
[135] Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005), Chapter II pp. 64-67
[136] To understand this problem one needs to compare Lonergan's concepts of meaning and language in his *Method* with critics of such approaches in Fergus Kerr, *Theology after Wittgenstein,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). Much what Kerr writes here of modern theologians (Rahner in particular), can be applied on Lonergan as well.
One can compare first remarks of Wittgenstein's investigations with Augustine's confessions (chapter VIII) himself.
For Lonergan's definition of meaning see: Bernard Lonergan, *Insight Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967), pp. 304-305

"It then can be said, then, that in contrast to theory of meaning as reference, which prevails in logical positivism and in linguistic semantics, and to the theory of meaning of contextuality which the later Wittgenstein and hermeneutical philosophy have in common, Lonergan follows the theory of meaning as intentionality which can be traced back to E. Husserl. […] Especially, there are positions – Wittgensteins and hermeneutical philosophy – which take meaning to be dependent on a given context of language and/or behaviour and experience."[137]

Thiselton shows Pannenberg's discovery of importance of tradition and history in constituting of meaning and subjects self-understanding.[138]

Here, I also believe, even somehow rigid theories of meaning of logical positivism offer more appropriate account then Lonergan's.

Again, although logical positivists first assigned meaning only to terms obtainable by descriptive and ostensive definitions and propositions which could be reduced on primitive ones and verified by direct correspondence with some version of real, Rudolf Carnap later adopted opposite extreme of formalism in allowing any construction of meanings in conceptual frames, provided they will be public.[139]

This minimal criterion of publicity and communicability of meanings is lacking psychologisms and naïve generalization about intelligence is being made on little ground.

Pannenberg already mentioned more suitable solutions. I would only add also K. R. Popper's replacement of neo-positivistic criterion of verifiability by his criterion of falsifibility, which offers another reasonable approach, I personally favour.[140]

Here we obtain so desired openness of meaning towards new discoveries, while we need not to postulate uniform nature of self. So Popper and Panneberg show us that meaning constituted by reflection must not always be rigid meaning of closed metaphysical system.

If there is no uniform rational self to be studied by introspection, providing us with universal meanings, but meaning in language is being constituted by historical realities, we really have to turn our attention to language. Thiselton mentions Wittgenstein in this context:

"At first sight Wittgenstein appears to corroborate the postmodern perspective. He writes, 'Don't say "There must be something common" … Look and see whether there is.' He refuses to speak of the

---

[137] Wolfhart Pannenberg, *History and Meaning in Bernard Lonergan's Approach to Theological Method* in Patrick Corcoran (S.M.) *Looking at Lonergan's method* (Talbot Press, 1975)
[138] Anthony C. Thiselton, *Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self* (T&T Clark, 1995), pp. 150-152
[139] Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005), pp. 95-122
[140] See Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Hutchinson, 1968) or Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005), pp. 115-117

'essence' of language, or meaning, or of truth. What counts as 'meaning', as 'thinking', or as 'true', depends on the nature of the situation that gives rise to a specific agenda of questions. Even a primitive theory of meaning works for a small model-language-game, as in the example of a list of instructions from 'Wittgenstein's builders'."[141]

But later he shows that Wittgenstein believed the common background of all language games can be found in common practical activities of humankind:

"Wittgensitein's appeal in many cases to 'the common behaviour of humankind', and in other cases to identifiable behaviour in the public domain within given traditions or contexts provides what in the Blue Book he calls the 'backing for the paper currency of language."[142]

Thiselton applies this even on theological and religious discourse:

"Meaning in theological or religious discourse, I have elsewhere argued, depends on how stretches of language draw their currency from regular, observable patterns of behaviour in life."[143]

That is certainly one direction in which contemporary theology may proceed and importance of liturgical and biblical sciences is obvious under this observation.

---

[141] Anthony C. Thiselton, *Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self* (T&T Clark, 1995), p. 33
[142] Anthony C. Thiselton, *Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self* (T&T Clark, 1995), p. 35
[143] Anthony C. Thiselton, *Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self* (T&T Clark, 1995), p. 38, More on Wittgensteins importance for postmodern theology can be found in Fergus Kerr, *Theology after Wittgenstein,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986)

5. CONCLUSION

However despite all these problems Lonergan certainly was major figure in modern theology with far reaching influence. I will not attempt to summarize them here - it has been done with great rigour and precision by Lonergan's own pupil David Tracy in his "The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan". There is also great number of various resources on internet produced by Lonerganian society.

Importance of some paradigmatic shifts in modern Catholic theology, to which Lonergan contributed is described in David Tracy's and Hans Küng's Paradigm change in Theology. Lonergan's influence on Tracy and his contribution to modern catholic theology along with Rahner, with whom he is often compared can be studied in bachelor work of my colleague Radim Beránek.

Instead I will attempt to summarize whole argument of this thesis, scope of which is far more limited indeed.

At the beginning we have seen examples of medieval paradigm in scholastic theology. This paradigm was based on Aristotle's metaphysics, claiming certainty and universality for its conclusion.

This realistic approach was much undermined by Hume's critique and not Kant's solution of problems postulated by Hume is quite evasive.

Lonergan radicalized Kant's turn towards subject in his philosophy and so he, as he believed, could base his metaphysics on knowledge of his own cognitional operations available through self-affirmation.

Therefore, according to Lonergan, our insight grants us not with correct interpretations of realities (such as causal explanation of nature), however we are able to exercise insight into insight, which will reveal these invariant structures of knowing, illuminating our progress in dialectical movement towards truth of better interpretations.

God, then, is integral transcendent heuristic notion, object of our desire to know, whose existence must be affirmed, if we want to justify meaning of intelligent approach to the world.

We can see shift from old scholastic understanding of God copies here the shift from old ideal of science. Lonergan moves away from "medieval" God as necessary being, whose existence can be proved by deductive methods, and brings up concept of God which can be rationally affirmed.

Although Lonergan's conclusion such universal core of intelligence exists may seem hasty under postmodernist criticism, there is still some hope human minds are not separate islands and that various people can share their own intelligent interpretations through dialogue.

Such hope, however, cannot be simply postulated and must be arrived by careful examination of human language.

It still makes sense to raise claims for existence for source of ultimate good, truth and meaning, in my opinion, but this is to be looked for in Wittgensteins common patterns of life.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

[1] Augustin, *Confessions* (Penguin, 1961); Translation and introduction by R.S. Pine-Coffin

[2] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (Blackfiars, 1963); Translated, edited, introduced and commented by Timothy McDermot (O.P.)

[3] Radim Beránek, *Whoever seeks the truth is seeking God: A Study of the Concept of Truth in Theology of David Tracy* (Bachelor thesis on IES, 2005)

[4] Isaiah Berlin, *The Age of Enlightenment* (New York: New American Library, 1956)

[5] Rudolf Carnap, *Problémy Jazyka Vědy* (Svoboda, 1968); Translated and edited by Karel Berka and Ladislav Tondl

[6] Frederick Copleston (S.J.), *Aquinas* (Penguin, 1955)

[7-14] Frederick Copleston (S.J.), *A history of philosophy - Volume I-IX* (Image Books, 1993)

[15] Patrick Corcoran (S.M.), *Looking at Lonergan's method* (Talbot Press, 1975)

[16] René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Meditations* (The Liberal Arts Press, 1960); Translated by Laurence J. Lafleur

[17] David Ford, *The Modern Theologians* (Blackwell, 1998)

[18] Jean Grondin, *Úvod do Hermeneutiky* (OIKOYMENH, 1997) Translated by Pavel Kouba and Břetislav Horyna

[19] Gerard J. Hughes (S.J.), *The Nature of God* (Routledge, 1995)

[20] David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Open Court, 1966); Edited and introduced by Eugene Freeman

[21] Immanuel Kant, *Kritika Čistého Rozumu* (OIKOYMENH, 2001); Translated by Jaromír Loužil, Jiří Chotaš and Ivan Chvatík

[22] Immanuel Kant, *Kritika Praktického Rozumu* (Svoboda, 1996); Translated by Jaromír Loužil, epilogue by Jan Patočka

[23] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena ke každé příští metafyzice, jež se bude moci stát vědou* (Svoboda - Libertas, 1992); Translated by Jiří Navrátil and Jaroslav Kohout

[24] Fergus Kerr, *Theology after Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986)

[25] Petr Kolář, *Pravda a Fakt* (Filosofia, 2002)

[26] Hans Kung, David Tracy, *Paradigm change in theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark LTD, 1989)

[27] Thomas S. Kuhn, *Struktura Vědeckých Revolucí* (OIKOYMENH, 1997) Translated by Tomáš Jeníček

[28] Isaac Kramnick, *The Portable Enlightenment Reader* (Penguin Books, 1995)

[29] Bernard J.F. Lonergan (S.J.), *Insight a Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1967)

[30] Bernard J.F. Lonergan (S.J.), *Method in Theology* (University of Toronto press, 1999)

[31] Pavel Materna, *Svět pojmů a logika* (Filosofia, 2000))

[32] Jaroslav Peregrin, *Kapitoly z analytické filosofie* (Filosofia: Praha, 2005)

[33] Jean Piaget, *Psychologie Inteligence* (Státní Pedagogické Nakladatelství, 1966) Translated by František Jiránek

[34] Karl R. Popper, *Bída Historicismu* (OIKOYMENH, 1994) Translated by Jana Odehnalová

[35] Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Hutchinson, 1968)

[36] Jiří Raclavský, *Ontologické důkazy analyticky*, (Religio 8, II, 2000) available online: http://www.phil.muni.cz/~raclavsk/texty/ontologicke_dukazy_analyticky.html

[37] Bertrand Russell, *Logika, Jazyk, Věda* (Svoboda, 1967) Translated by Karel Berka and Ladislav Tondl; Introduction by Karel Berka

[38] Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995)

[39] Hans Joachim Störig, *Malé dějiny Filosofie* (Karmelitánské Nakladatelství, 2000); Translated by Miroslav Petříček, Petr Rezek, Karel Šprunk; Bibliography by Jiří Dvořák

[40] Jan Sokol, *Mistr Eckhart a středověká mystika* (Vyšehrad, 2000)

[41] Anthony C. Thiselton, *Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self* (T&T Clark, 1995)

[42] Anthony C. Thiselton, *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* (ZondervanPublishingHouse, 1992)

[43] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (Herder & Herder, 1970)

[44] Petr Vopěnka, *Meditace o Základech Vědy* (Práh, 2001)

[45] Petr Vopěnka, *Úhelný Kámen Evropské Vzdělanosti a Moci* (Práh, 2000)

[46] Petr Vopěnka, *Vyprávění o Kráse Novobarokní Matematiky* (Práh, 2004)

[47] Max Weber, *Sociologie náboženství* (Vyšehrad, 1998); Translated by Jan Škoda; Introduction by Miloš Havelka

[48] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (BlackWell, 1967); Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe

[49] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Routledge, 1960); Translated by C.K. Ogden

[50] LATIN AND GREEK PHRASES available on-line: http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/2948/fraselat.html)