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Geopolitical Imagination and Security Perception in Japan

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Abstrakt

Tato diplomová práce se zabývá japonskou zahraniční a bezpečnostní politikou skrze optiku kritické geopolitiky, konkrétně pojetí „geopolitiky jako kultury" vytvořeného Gearóidem Ó Tuathailem. S využitím tohoto pojetí coby analytického rámce je prozkoumán vývoj japonské zahraniční a bezpečnostní politiky od vzniku moderního japonského státu až po současnost, přičemž jsou adresovány tři hlavní koncepty: (1) zahraničně-politické tradice; (2) geopolitické a geostrategické diskursy; a (3) strategická a geopolitická kultura. Z důvodů užšího tematického zaměření a konsistentnější aplikace konceptu je centrem zájmu jeden specifický prvek japonské zahraniční a bezpečnostní politiky, a sice japonská „námořní identita". Cílem práce je jednak identifikace a charakterizace japonské geopolitické imaginace v průběhu historie a dále pokus určit, zda a jak se námořní identita Japonska vyvíjela ve vztahu k měnící se bezpečnostní politice země.

Abstract

This thesis deals with Japanese foreign and security policy through the optics of critical geopolitics, specifically the "geopolitics as culture" notion developed by Gearóid Ó Tuathail. Using this notion as an analytical framework, the development of Japan´s foreign and security policy from the establishment of a modern Japanese state till present days is analyzed, with three main concepts being addressed: (1) foreign policy traditions; (2) geopolitical and geostrategic discourses; (3) and strategic and geopolitical culture. For reasons of narrowing the topic down and applying the concept more consistently, one specific element of Japanese foreign and security policy is at the centre of attention: Japan´s "maritime identity". The goal of the thesis is to identify and characterize Japan´s geopolitical imagination

throughout history and attempt to determine if and how did Japan´s maritime identity develop with regard to the country´s changing security policy.

Klíčová slova

Japonsko, kritická geopolitika, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, geopolitická imaginace, geopolitická tradice, geopolitická a strategická kultura, praktická, formální a populární geopolitika, námořní identita

Keywords

Japan, critical geopolitics, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, geopolitical imagination, geopolitical tradition, geopolitical and strategic culture, practical, formal and popular geopolitics, maritime identity

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Prohlášení

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V Praze dne 16. května 2014 Petr Sosna

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Projekt diplomové práce

Geopolitical Imagination and Security Perception in Japan

In terms of security and foreign policy, Japan presents a specific and unique country. Following its defeat in World War II and the implementation of a "peace" constitution which forbids the country from maintaining offensive military capabilities and using force to resolve international disputes, Japan embarked on its own way of conduct in international affairs. This approach, which became widely known as the Yoshida Doctrine, rested upon Japan´s restriction from engaging militarily in the international system, leaving its security and defence issues relying on the alliance with the United States, and rather utilizing the country´s economic potential to gain international influence, doing so throughout the entire Cold War period. The change of the international environment following the fall of the USSR and the rise of new security challenges brought up pressures from both within and outside Japan towards becoming a "normal" state.

According to Ichiro Ozawa, the hallmark traits of a "normal nation" are: (1) a willingness to shoulder responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community, irrespective of domestic political difficulties; and (2) cooperation with the international community in remedying worldwide problems affecting the stability of the lives of its people. Applied to Japan´s conditions, this vision would mean that in order to become a "normal" state Japan should be willing to undertake a more active role in contributing to regional and international security, notwithstanding the constitutional limitations (likely Japan should dispose of them), and develop the capabilities to do so. "Normality" in Japan´s case therefore applies mainly to its military, giving Japan the ability to act independently and operate beyond its borders.

Indeed, since the end of the Cold War and especially in the last ten years, Japan has made several steps which indicate an effort to become a "normal" state, such as deployment of the JSDF in missions abroad, the introduction of weapon systems which may be regarded as not-purely-defensive, or enhanced security cooperation with other states than the United States. Nevertheless, the critical step, i.e. the

amendment / revision of the postwar constitution, has not yet been made. As such, it is possible to raise questions whether Japan really intends to become a fully "normal" state, or whether it prefers to take advantage of its current status with only minor modifications, seeing it as the most beneficial option. In other words, what is the actual Japanese perception of itself and the geopolitical environment in which it finds itself, and how does it really perceive "normality" and its own security?

Objectives of Thesis:

This thesis will therefore mainly aim to tackle the issue of "normality" in Japan´s foreign policy conduct, with emphasis on the dimension of security. For this purpose, two phenomena related to Japan´s quest for "normality" will be examined. Firstly, it is the constitutional limitation represented by Article 9. While the article is primarily being approached and examined as a factor which limits Japan´s role in international affairs, and thus often being used as an argument for Japan to legitimize its restrainment from certain types of foreign policy conduct, it is necessary to focus on its political construction. Our aim will therefore be not only to analyze how does the article limit Japan, but also what it allows it to do, what maneuvering space does Japan gain from utilizing the "Article 9 argument" and how does it benefit from it. As such, we shall attempt to determine the strategic utility of Article 9 for Japanese policy. The second issue to which we will pay attention is the phenomenon of *gaiatsu*, i.e. foreign (U.S.) pressure. Similarly to the constitutional limitations, we shall examine the role of the "*gaiatsu* argument" in terms of limiting and expanding Japan´s possibilities for ensuring its own security. Both Article 9 and the *gaiatsu* are the main arguments used by critics and proponents of Japan´s status in international affairs and as such constitute a crucial element of Japan´s perception of "normality" and geopolitical conduct. It is thus necessary to further examine the political construction of both these concepts, focusing on the circumstances of their origin and their strategic utility within the main aspects of Japanese foreign policy behaviour, be it in terms of international political economy or strategic relations in the East Asian region.

Secondly, we will analyze the general impact of the "normality complex" on Japanese geopolitical culture, focusing on how Japan spatializes international

politics, perceives its environment, its position in the system, affects the way other nations view it and eventually what kind of means it employs to safeguard its security and influence. Generally, the aim will be to examine the prevailing geopolitical imagination in Japan in order to determine how the "normality" issue is being perceived by the Japanese and affects their strategic conduct.

As such, the main research question which this thesis will try to answer is:

- How does Japan perceive its geopolitical environment and how does it alter, or wants to alter it? I.e. what is the current dominant geopolitical imagination in Japan?

Subsidiary research questions will be:

- What constitutes "normality"?
- How has the idea of "normality" been used strategically?
- How are "normality" and its possible effects perceived by the Japanese themselves, comparing the popular and practical geopolitics?
- What do Japanese moves towards "normality" signify in terms of Japan´s further security development, comparing official declarations and practice?

Method of Analysis:

The thesis shall be conceptualized as a unique case study, utilizing an empirical-analytical approach with elements of critical discourse analysis. On a theoretical level, to properly examine the phenomenon of geopolitical imagination in Japan, we shall apply a post-structuralist approach with emphasis on critical geopolitics. We shall primarily utilize Gearóid Ó Tuathail´s notions of "geopolitics as structure" and "geopolitics as culture" as a framework for analysis, since both of them concern themselves with discursive and material practices constituting the geopolitics of a nation. In further detail, the notion of "geopolitics as culture" sees geopolitics as an interpretative cultural practice, rather than as an objective recording of the realities of world power. It is a broad practice shared by populations (popular geopolitics) and governments (practical geopolitics). Geopolitics in this perspective is a discourse, an imagination and a grammar, and states have distinctive geopolitical codes, images, visions and traditions. Geopolitical cultures are inevitably shaped by the particular institutional

organization and design of the foreign policy bureaucracies in particular states. How power is distributed in a state, how the foreign policy process works and who gets to make decisions inevitably shapes the geopolitical culture of states. A state´s strategic culture will also condition its broader geopolitical culture and shape how it decides to deploy and employ force to achieve its objectives. The notion of "geopolitics as culture" consists of six concepts, which are interconnected. These are:

1) Geostrategic discourse – Particular discursive speech acts about "national security" and the "strategic interests" of the state.

2) Geopolitical discourse and the discursive process – The crafting and design of a particular spatial account of international affairs by institutions and practitioners of foreign policy.

3) Geopolitical vision and subject – A normative political picture of the world political map and the basic agent shaping global political relations.

4) Geopolitical traditions – Historical schools of foreign policy theory and practice.

5) Geopolitical culture – The culture of knowledge and interpretation of the state as a foreign policy actor in world affairs; institutional setting and communicational culture of foreign policy making.

6) Geographical *imagi-nations* – Location of a national identity in the world; maps of friends and enemies in the world; assertion of territorial borders, national mission and trans-national collective forces in world affairs, inclusions and exclusions.

These concepts will be utilized in detail to analyze the geopolitical imagination in Japan and determine the way in which this country perceives its own security and aims to maintain it. In order to do so, sources of both primary and secondary character will be examined. Official documents (e.g. defence white papers, security strategies, international agreements, studies conducted by governmental think tanks, etc.) will constitute the primary sources for analyzing Japanese geopolitics. These shall be complemented (where the language barrier allows) by the study of political- and military-level speeches and Japanese media. Academic literature will also be heavily utilized, both in order to analyze the background of Japanese

geopolitical practice and to determine the picture about Japanese policy which is being constructed outside of the country itself. With regard to this, the role of Japan scholars and Japan-aimed literature will be assessed in the literature review of the thesis.

Structure of Thesis:

The first part will introduce the theoretical framework and method of analysis offered by critical geopolitics. We shall outline the main principles and ideas of critical geopolitics and their potential utility for analyzing the strategic behaviour and foreign policy conduct of states. Particular focus will be attached to Ó Tuathail´s notions of "geopolitics as structure" and "geopolitics as culture" (with added emphasis on the latter), upon which we will further elaborate the aspects of Japan´s perception of "normality" and its utility for achieving strategic goals in international affairs, mainly the maintenance of security.

The second part will examine Japan´s specific security situation and the issue of "normality." Besides defining the concept of "normality" in detail, we will analyze the origins and background surrounding the Japanese security dilemma, focusing primarily on the two main constituting elements, i.e. the constitutional limitation presented by Article 9 and the external pressure exercised by the U.S. – the *gaiatsu*. Our goal shall be the deconstruction of both these concepts in order to evaluate their strategic utility in Japanese foreign and security policy, determining whether they are indeed factors which present an obstacle for Japan to achieve its goals in the international system, or rather if they serve as instruments actually beneficial to Japan´s security and as such are worth maintaining. Subsequently, the issue of Japan´s necessity for "normality" will be questioned.

The third part of the thesis will deal with concrete issues in Japanese foreign and security policy throughout the post-Cold War period. The main objective will be to evaluate significant changes in Japan´s strategic behaviour, thereby determining the currently dominating geopolitical practices in that country. By using critical geopolitics as a framework for analysis, this will require the assessment of how the systemic structure affects Japanese geopolitical imagination, thereby producing a specific type of visions and discursive practices, which are significantly affected by the Japanese "normality" complex. Eventually,

these imaginations and practices will be evaluated and confronted with Japan´s actual behaviour in international affairs (mainly security and defence). The objective will be to identify the dominant aspects of Japanese geopolitical culture and therefore determine whether Japan is indeed seeking "normality" in international affairs, whether it actually needs it, and if so, what kind of "normality" should it be.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASDF – Air Self-Defence Force

ATSML – Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

BMD – Ballistic Missile Defence

GSDF – Ground Self-Defence Force

IJA – Imperial Japanese Army

IJN – Imperial Japanese Navy

JapFSP – Japanese Foreign Security Policy

JCG – Japan Coast Guard

LDP – Liberal Democratic Party

MSDF – Maritime Self-Defence Force

NDPG – National Defence Programme Guidelines

NDPO – National Defence Programme Outline

NSS – National Security Strategy

ODA – Official Development Assistance

PLAN – People´s Liberation Army Navy

SDF – Self-Defence Forces (Japan)

SLBM – Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SLOC – Sea Lanes of Communication

SSBN – Ballistic Missile Submarine

UN – United Nations

WWII – World War I

Introduction

Ever since its ascension into the international system of modern states during the second half of the 19th century, Japan has been seen in many ways as a specific case among others and as such has presented a grateful object of analysis for scholars in numerous disciplines of academia. In a remarkably short period of time, Japan managed to modernize and develop such an industrial, technological, economical, and military capacity that would place it in a position fairly equal to that of the dominant Western powers of the time, being the only Asian country successfully doing so. Subsequently, Japan would embark upon a path of military expansion, culminating and ending with its defeat in WWII. Following the disastrous outcome of the Pacific War, Japan embarked on a path seemingly radically different from the one it had been practising up until that point.

After the end of the Allied occupation and throughout the Cold War period, Japanese foreign security policy[1] (hereinafter referred to as JapFSP) held signs of bandwagoning and was formulated along the lines of what would become known as the Yoshida Doctrine, a policy strategy centred around economic development and US security guarantees. This approach was largely dependent on the 1947 Constitution, specifically its Article 9 prohibiting the country from maintaining offensive military capabilities and restraining it from solving international disputes via means of force. Within this context, Japan would seek to establish itself as a "peaceful" state. However, the crumbling of the bipolar system and emergence of several new security challenges, as well as requirements, after the end of the Cold War, has been putting Japan´s rather successful post-1945 security posture to the test. Signs exist that Japanese security policy might undergo a significant shift again. While numerous writing exist on the topic from different methodological perspectives, this thesis attempts to address Japanese security policy in a rather unusual, specific way – via the lens of critical geopolitics and the concept of "geopolitics as culture" in particular.

In contrast to the original project of this thesis, several changes have been made concerning its structure and particular focus. Throughout the theoretical and

[1] I use this term as a somewhat broader designation encompassing Japan´s foreign, security, as well as defence policy.

empirical research on the subject of Japan´s geopolitical imagination, it became increasingly clear that the "geopolitics as culture" concept in its entire complexity covers an immensely wide area of interest, even when focusing on the case study of a single state. Since a full grasp of the issue is far beyond the scope and possibilities of this thesis, a narrow and more general approach has been assumed. The primary focus on geopolitical imagination as such has been retained, but for a better evaluation a historical excursion is desirable. As such, rather than focusing on the post-Cold War era exclusively, a more genealogical approach was selected and the period of interest has been expanded to include the entire history of modern Japan (1868-present).

As a consequence, the original primary focus on normality/normalcy and *gaiatsu* was abandoned and the issues are discussed only with general regard to the development of Japan´s security policy. Instead, there is focus on what I label throughout the thesis as Japan´s "maritime identity" – an aspect of JapFSP with a clear geopolitical/geostrategic dimension, which has been present throughout Japan´s entire history. This is done so as to enable the following of Japan´ s security posture and spatial narratives along a specific line throughout the whole thesis. Finally, the concept of "geopolitics as culture" has been adapted into four main levels of interest, providing more efficient and comprehensible usage.

As such, the thesis is conceptualized as unique case study, utilizing an empirical-analytical approach and focusing on the foreign and security policy of a specific state. Its primary goals are: (1) to identify and characterize Japan´s geopolitical imagination throughout history; and (2) attempt to determine whether and how did Japan´s maritime identity develop with regard to the country´s changing security policy. For this purpose, a modified concept of Gearóid Ó Tuathail´s "geopolitics as culture" is utilized as an analytical framework. The operational process is based on the examination and connection of geopolitical (foreign policy) traditions, geopolitical and geostrategic discourses, and geopolitical and strategic culture (refer to Chapter 1.3). From their combination and characterization, I seek to derive the basic elements of Japan´s geopolitical imagination. Since the main empirical data utilized for evaluating both geopolitical imagination and the character of Japan´s maritime identity consist of foreign/security policy narratives,

the thesis makes use of critical discourse analysis as well, particularly in Chapter 4.2.

Structurally, the thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter serves to introduce and explain the theoretical background of critical geopolitics, which is being used as an analytical framework throughout the thesis. The chapter first places critical geopolitics in a general context towards what is usually labelled as “classical” geopolitics. Afterwards, the notion of “geopolitics as culture” is outlined in detail and subsequently adjusted for the practical needs of this thesis. The second chapter provides an overview of the establishment of the modern Japanese state. Focusing on the geographical and political construction of the country, the primary aim here is to explain the circumstances under which the “Meiji Consensus” took shape and became a guideline for Japan´s foreign-political conduct in the following decades. In addition, the formation of Japan´s maritime identity, the primary element of interest, is discussed. Building upon the information provided in the second chapter, the goal of Chapter Three is to review the development of JapFSP during two subsequent historical periods: Japan´s imperial era and the Cold War. Here is where the adapted notion of “geopolitics as culture” comes into play. Each of the historical sections is divided into three sub-sections dealing with the selected concepts of (1) foreign policy traditions, (2) associated geopolitical and geostrategic discourses, and (3) the strategic and geopolitical culture. Chapter Four focuses on the post-Cold War period and is structured along the very same lines as the previous one, but with greater emphasis on the discursive practices. In both chapters, by connecting the foreign policy traditions with the respective discourses, the character of Japan´s strategic and geopolitical culture is derived. At the same time, I seek to highlight those elements which would help to characterize Japan´s geopolitical imagination. The summary of the findings throughout each of the historical periods is subject to Chapter Five, in which the geopolitical imagination of Japan is to be identified and characterized. Japan´s maritime identity is being evaluated continuously throughout the thesis, whenever the situation is appropriate.

Sources of both primary and secondary character were used for this thesis. The theoretical section utilizes primarily writings of scholars in the field of critical

geopolitics. The analytical framework of "geopolitics as culture" is derived from Gearóid Ó Tuathail´s (2004) article on the subject. For the conceptualization of critical geopolitics, articles and monographs by prominent scholars in the field were used (Agnew 2003; Dodds and Sidaway 1994; Hughes 2007; Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998; Ó Tuathail 1999). Derek Gregory´s (1994; 1995; 2004) writings proved to be particularly helpful in the conceptualization of geopolitical imagination, as well as essays by other authors (Dodds 2000; Newman 2000). The empirical part of the thesis operates with both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources are utilized dominantly in the historical chapters. While the amount of English-written literature on Japanese history, foreign policy, and security is extremely vast and diverse in terms of focus and theoretical approach, volumes utilized in this thesis were selected primarily on whether they would provide accounts of foreign policy narratives in the examined period. Among the most useful historical works were those by Pyle (2007), Takeuchi (1980), Graham (2006), and especially Samuels (2003; 2008). Where possible, I also used volumes written directly by the politicians in question (Ishihara 1990; Ozawa 1994). Richard Samuels´s book *Securing Japan* (2008) presents as special case in this thesis, as I explicitly adopt the classification and characterization of foreign policy traditions provided by him, as well as the designation of historical periods associated with it. The book also provided a most useful amount of historic discourse samples. Since I use Samuels´s classification as a departure point for adapting the "geopolitics as culture" concept, this thesis might partially be regarded as building up on his work with critical geopolitics. Chapter Four makes greater use of primary sources, such as governmental documents and speeches. Additionally, visual sources such as maps and photographs are used in that same chapter, which I attempt to interpret appropriately.

Japanese names are written in the traditional Japanese way with surname first.

1. Critical Geopolitics as an Analytical Framework

Geopolitics has presented a nearly indispensable aspect in the study of international relations ever since in 1899 Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjéllen coined the term to refer to the harnessing of geographical knowledge to the aims of specific nation-states (Toal and Agnew cited in Hughes 2007: 978-979). Various geopolitical theories would be developed in the following years and the writings of such figures as Alfred T. Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Nicholas J. Spykman, or Karl Haushofer would become instant classics referenced by foreign policy makers, theoreticians, strategists and academics alike for the decades to come. Despite the broad dismissal of geopolitics as a relevant approach to the study of international affairs after WWII as a result of German *Geopolitik´s* association with Nazi expansionism, geopolitical analysis managed to revive and express itself during the Cold War period, mainly via the writings of foreign policy practitioners such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

However, this "great man" specification of the 20th century geopolitical tradition is idealist in its concentration on "geopolitical thought" at the expense of geopolitical practice and practitioners, as well as tending to be Eurocentric, thus neglecting Russian and Japanese geopolitical thought. In addition, it tends to elide the fundamental questions concerning the specification of "geopolitics" and the relationship of geopoliticians as intellectuals of statecraft to the power relationships characterizing their state, its national culture and its political economy (Ó Tuathail 1999: 110-111). Both the pre-war/wartime theories and their Cold War counterparts are often referred to as "classical geopolitics." Its defining characteristic is their focus on the so-called "permanent realities" of the earth – such as the location of different populations and resources, proximity between states, the topography and climate of neighbouring or imperial territories, and so on – for the strategic purposes of states and other centres of power (Hughes 2007: 979).

1.1 Classical vs. Critical Geopolitics

In an effort to problematise this dominant tradition, a number of writers emerged in the early 1990s who sought to adopt new research perspectives from

which to launch alternative accounts or explanations of phenomena defined as "geopolitical". Building primarily upon and being influenced by the philosophical work of Michel Foucault and the idea of "imaginative geographies" discussed by Edward Said in his work on Orientalism, this project would establish itself under the loose designation of "critical geopolitics" (Dodds and Sidaway 1994: 515). As Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (1998: 6), two of the leading representatives of this effort, explain on the subject: "Classical geopolitics is a form of geopolitical discourse that seeks to repress its own politics and geography, imagining itself as beyond politics and above situated geographies in a transcendent Olympian realm of surveillance and judgement." Dodds and Sidaway (1994: 516) put Foucault´s notion of geography as power/knowledge into a geopolitical context the following way:

> The concepts of power, knowledge, and geopolitics are thereby bound together in a provocative way. What is suggested is that forms of power/knowledge operate geopolitically: a certain spatialisation of knowledge, a demarcation of a field of knowledge, and the establishment of subjects, objects, rituals, and boundaries by which a field (and the world) is to be known.

Thus, from the perspective of critical geopolitics, rather than being an objective recording of the realities of world power, *geopolitics is an interpretative cultural practice*. Such practice is by no means a narrow one confined to formal experts, but rather a broad one shared by both populations and governments. With this sort of insight, works on the subject have assessed that geopolitics is a "discourse", an "imagination" and a "grammar" and that states have distinct geopolitical "codes", "images", "visions" and "traditions" (Ó Tuathail 2004: 75; emphasis in original).

A critical geopolitics approach hence draws attention to three types of geopolitics of nation-states: *practical*, *formal*, and *popular*. "Practical geopolitics" refers to the reasoning, actions and statements of geopolitical figures and other actors engaged in foreign-policy making. "Formal geopolitics" refers to the prescriptions for, and theories of, state conduct and relative power made by intellectuals and institutions dedicated to statecraft. Finally, "popular geopolitics" refers to the ways in which geopolitical claims and scripts are produced and

circulated within popular cultural forms (Hughes 2007: 979). Additionally, there is an interest in *structural* geopolitics (see Figure 1), which is however not centred exclusively on the practices within the nation-state, but rather concerns itself with more global processes and their impact. As such, it can and will be excluded from the analysis present in this work.

Type of Geopolitics	Object of Investigation	Problematic	Research Example
Formal Geopolitics	Geopolitical thought and the geopolitical tradition	Intellectuals, institutions and their political and cultural context	Halford Mackinder, his geopolitical theories and imperialist context
Practical Geopolitics	The everyday practice of statecraft	Practical geopolitical reasoning in foreign policy conceptualization	"Balkanism" and its influence over US foreign policy towards Bosnia
Popular Geopolitics	Popular culture, mass media, and geographical understandings	National identity and the construction of images of other peoples and places	The role of mass media in projecting images of Bosnia into Western livingrooms
Structural Geopolitics	The contemporary geopolitical condition	Global processes, tendencies and contradictions	How globalization, informationalization and risk society condition/transform geopolitical practices

Figure 1: The Types of Geopolitics Studied by Critical Geopolitics

Source: Ó Tuathail (1999: 111)

Despite its increasing usage within IR literature, critical geopolitics has lacked deeper conceptualization which would render it a more universal and useful tool for analysis. In an effort to overcome this gap, Ó Tuathail (2004) suggested conceptualizing critical geopolitics around the key anchoring notions of "geopolitics as structure" and "geopolitics as culture". The former concerns the structures that have generated and characterized the modern world as a historically globalizing political economy and interstate community. The latter concerns the study of geopolitics as a series of dynamic cultures developed within and shared across and interstate society (predominantly the nation-state – the areas of interest here are thus formal, practical and popular geopolitics). For the purpose of this thesis as a case study of a single country, only the latter notion of "geopolitics as culture" will be of analytical interest. It is thus this conceptualization to which we will now turn our attention in further detail.

1.2 Ó Tuathail´s Notion of "Geopolitics as Culture"

As a means of providing more meso and micro level concepts for the study of particular foreign policy traditions and crises, Ó Tuathail (2004: 82-83) argues for the development and elaboration of six concepts anchored around the notion of geopolitics as an interpretative cultural practice. These concepts concern geopolitical culture or the cultural ways in which dominant institutions (mostly states, but also international organizations) make sense of their position in the world and theorize their role within interstate society, rather than considering interstate society as a whole.

1.2.1 Geographical Imagination

The first concept which Ó Tuathail elaborates upon within the notion of "geopolitics as culture" is what he calls "geographical imagination". At first glance, this evokes the "geopolitical imagination" designation used in the title of this thesis and may be reason for questioning regarding the proper usage of terms. Such questioning is indeed in order and it is necessary to clarify the issue first in order to spare the reader of possible confusion later on. As Ó Tuathail (2004: 83) himself points out and shows on concrete examples, the notion of geopolitical imagination differs significantly in usage from author to author and is by no means a universally accepted and defined one (something that applies to all the concepts outlined here anyway). While some authors (e.g. Newman 2000) operate with the notion of *geopolitical* imagination, others (such as Dodds 2000; Gregory 1994, 1995, 2004) refer to the *geographical* imagination(s) of states.

Derek Gregory prominently utilizes the notion of *imaginative geographies*, a term which he borrows from Edward Said and one which he uses interchangeably with that of geographical imaginations (compare Gregory 1994, 1995, and 2004). Indeed, Ó Tuathail himself acknowledges and treats these two designations as equal and interchangeable (2004: 84). It is thus appropriate to clarify how Said (1979: 54) characterizes imaginative geography:

> …this universal practice of designating in one´s mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space beyond "ours" which is "theirs" is a way of

> making geographical distinctions that *can be* entirely arbitrary. I use the word "arbitrary" here because imaginative geography of the "our land-barbarian land" variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for "us" to set up these boundaries in our own minds; "they" become "they" accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from "ours."

Imaginative geographies are thus constructions that fold distance into difference through a series of spatialisations. They work by multiplying partitions and enclosures that serve to demarcate "the same" from "the other," at once constructing and calibrating a gap between the two by the above mentioned designation of familiar and unfamiliar spaces (Gregory 2004: 17). As for the notion of *geopolitical* imagination, David Newman (2000: 302) in his essay on Israeli geopolitics argues the following:

> The geopolitical imagination of the political elites, the residents and citizens, and other groups whose fate is tied up with that of the state, reflect alternative locations within the regional and global setting. The collective imagination of the state, to the extent that it represents the aggregate collective identity of its diverse components, is itself a composition of the individual imaginations of the citizens and residents of that state. … The more internally homogenous is the composition of a state´s population and its alternative identities, the less diverse the geopolitical imaginations. … While the geopolitical imagination of the state may be determined from within, its actual positioning within the regional and global systems is largely determined from without.

However, when speaking of geopolitical imagination in relation to "geopolitics as culture", Ó Tuathail refers to John Agnew´s idea of the "modern geopolitical imagination", which is "a system of visualizing the world with deep historic roots in the European encounter with the world as a whole. It is a constructed view of the world, not a simple spontaneous vision that arises from simply looking out at the world with "common sense". As a system of thought and practice, the modern geopolitical imagination has not existed and does not exist in a material vacuum (Agnew 2003: 6). The modern geopolitical imagination appears to be a concept

standing separately in Ó Tuathail´s framework on the macro/structural-level, functioning as the primary factor shaping the "cultural" geopolitics of a state.[2]

Building around this premise, Ó Tuathail suggests referring to the imaginations within "geopolitics as culture" as *geographical* instead of *geopolitical*, the reason being that they concern a contestation between images of where the state is perceived to be located in the world.[3] Geographical imaginations (or imaginative geographies) are always already geo-political in the philosophical sense of being simultaneously political and geographical. Considering geographical imaginations inevitably draws one into debates over national identity and the specification of the boundaries – conceptual and cartographic – of "the nation". As such, geographical imagination can be defined as "the way in which influential groups in the cultural life of a state define that state and nation within the world". It addresses the primary acts of identification and boundary-formation that population groups within a state engages (see Figure 2). Its study must engage "geographies of the unconscious" and gendered conceptions as a primary foundation of spatial identification and exclusion. Some of the key questions in the exploration of this concept are: How are notions of "self" and "other" assembled? How does a population situate its country within a world of geographical regions and collective identities? How are proximity and distance to other states and regions specified? How are a particular "homeland" defined and a range of "friends" and "enemies" specified? How does a certain image of a nation get specified in these acts of geographical identification (Ó Tuathail 2004: 84)?

This definition of geographical imagination, while being consistent with the way in which Said and Gregory perceive and make use of imaginative geographies, is also strongly reminiscent of how Newman writes about geopolitical imagination. As such, it is reasonable to suggest that the existing literature treats the concepts of geopolitical and geographical imagination as interchangeable and more as a matter of taste for each author. Baring this in mind and considering the fact that the

[2] As such, it might be regarded equal to structural geopolitics (see Figure 1). However, the precise relation between the modern geopolitical imagination and structural geopolitics, as well as the notion of "geopolitics as structure", is not elaborated upon by Ó Tuathail, and thus these terms should not be universally treated as equal or interchangeable (compare Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998; Ó Tuahail 1999; and Ó Tuahail 2004).

[3] Still, in an earlier address of the issue, his usage of "geopolitical imagination" appears to be equal to the "geographical imagination" as specified here. Nevertheless, it is still distinct from the "modern geopolitical imagination" (see Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998; also refer to Figure 4).

"modern geopolitical imagination" is not a subject of interest in this thesis, I shall treat the designations of geopolitical and geographical imaginations/imaginative geographies in a corresponding manner, while using *geopolitical imagination(s)* as an umbrella label for all three of these.



Figure 2: A Critical Theory of Geopolitics as a Set of Representational Practices
Source: Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998: 5)

1.2.2 Geopolitical Culture and Strategic Culture

The second concept of "geopolitical culture" refers to the cultural and organizational processes by which foreign policy is made in states. It perhaps best illustrates the interconnectivity of all the concepts within the "geopolitics as culture" framework, seeing as it is a product of prevalent geographical imaginations, the particular institutional organization and political culture, including strategic culture, of a state, and longstanding geopolitical traditions. Reflecting the broader focus of critical geopolitics as examined earlier, geopolitical culture can be divided into popular, practical and formal manifestations and expressions. An interesting notion here is that of popular geopolitical culture, which concerns prevailing public opinion about the role and mission of a state in foreign affairs, and popular perceptions of the dangers, foreign policy priorities and security challenges facing a state in world affairs. It is also shaped by cultural interpretations of the country´s geographic location within the world of states.

Public opinion surveys and the analysis of the media and cultural products of a particular states society can be used to empirically determine the dimensions of popular geopolitical culture (Ó Tuathail 2004: 84-85). Overall, geopolitical cultures are characterized by a series of competing traditions of interpreting a state´s position in world affairs, and are inevitably shaped by the particular institutional organization and design of the foreign policy bureaucracies in particular states. How power is distributed in a state, how the foreign policy process works and who gets to make decisions, all these factors matter (Ibid.: 87-88).

Before proceeding further, it is also necessary to clarify the concept of strategic culture and the way in which I will address it in the chapters to follow, considering its role in the shaping of geopolitical culture. Within IR literature there is currently a lack of consensus on what strategic culture actually is and how to approach and use it. Alastair Johnston (1995) divides the existing scholarship on the subject into three "generations", each of which has a distinctive approach to the issue.

In the view of the first generation, represented primarily by Colin Gray, strategic culture should be approached both as a shaping context for behaviour and itself as a constituent of that behaviour. It is seen as being "out there" as a source of influence which might "cause" behaviour and/or is socially constructed by both people and institutions which proceed to behave to some degree culturally. It comprises of persistent (not eternal) socially transmittable ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits, of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience. A particular community may well contain more than one strategic culture. These can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded, and culturally translated (Gray 1999: 50-52). Desmond Ball (1993: 44-45) provides a similar, albeit more straightforward account:

> The concept of strategic culture holds that different countries and regions approach the key issues of war, peace and strategy from perspectives which are both quite distinctive and deeply rooted, reflecting their different geostrategic situations, resources, history, military experience and political beliefs. These factors profoundly influence how a country perceives, protects and promotes its interests and values with respect to the threat or use of force.

The second generation builds on the premise that there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper motives for what in fact they do. Strategic culture is seen as a tool of political hegemony in the realm of strategic decision-making, establishing widely available orientations to violence and to ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against putative enemies. There is thus a difference between the declaratory strategy that legitimizes the authority of those in charge of strategic decision-making, and the operational strategy which reflects the specific interests of these decision makers (Johnston 1995: 39; Klein 1988: 136).

Finally, according to Johnston (1995: 46), himself a representative of the third generation, strategic culture is "an integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-standing strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these concepts with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious". As a system of symbols, it comprises of two parts. The first consists of basic assumptions about orderliness of the strategic environment, that is, about the role of war in human affairs (whether it is inevitable or an aberration), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (zero-sum or variable sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force (about the ability to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and the conditions under which applied force is useful). The second part consists of assumptions at a more operational level about what strategic options are the most efficacious for dealing with the threat environment. The essential empirical referent of a strategic culture is a limited, ranked set of grand strategic preferences that is consistent across the objects of analysis and persistent across time. Should preference rankings lack consistency across objects of analysis, then a single strategic culture cannot be said to exist at that point in time. Conversely, if one finds consistency in preference rankings across objects of analysis from formative historical periods up to the

period under examination, a strategic culture can be said to exist and to persist (Johnston 1995: 46-48).[4]

Strategic culture thus possesses a significant geopolitical-cultural dimension. However, its basic perspective is much narrower - in any of the three generations discussed - than that of geopolitical culture. Bearing this in mind, strategic culture should not be treated as simply subordinated to geopolitical culture (or vice versa). It remains a specifically focused element which helps shape the geopolitical culture and as such is reflected in it.

1.2.3 Geopolitical Traditions

The third concept of "geopolitical traditions" represents historical cannons of thought on state identity, foreign policy, and the national interest, which are usually defined in opposition to alternative traditions. Simply put, geopolitical traditions are historical schools of foreign policy theory and practice. Within critical geopolitics the term is usually used to describe histories of formal geopolitical thought, though this approach tends to be too nominalist, neglecting the geopolitics that does not explicitly call itself geopolitics. Notwithstanding, all large states can be said to have well-established geopolitical traditions that go back to the very process of state formation and development. A useful approach is the connection of the place of the state in the world to conceptions of national identity and to a normative geopolitical philosophy, the analysis of which brings us to consideration of the concept of "geopolitical vision" (Ó Tuathail 2004: 88-90).

1.2.4 Geopolitical Visions and Geopolitical Subjects

Geopolitical vision seems to pose the greatest challenge in Ó Tuathail´s framework in terms of definition. Drawing primarily on Kearns´s work, he adopts his conceptualization of geopolitical vision as a "normative picture of the world political map organized around an essentialized subject and naturalized social

[4] Johnston demonstrates the existence of different strategic cultures based on different sets of preferences in China´s strategic tradition. These sets of preferences do not stand as separate but equal strategic cultures (Johnston 1996: 219-220).

relations". For Kearns, geopolitics is a "discourse that describes, explains and promotes particular ways of seeing how territorial powers are formed and experienced". A geopolitical vision is regarded as a normative world picture, "a wish posing as analysis". Elaborating on Kearns´s contrasting of the geopolitical visions of Halford Mackinder, Woodrow Wilson and Lenin, Ó Tuathail considers their works as exemplars of competing geopolitical discourses, which are distinguished by their placement of a different "geopolitical subject" or "basic agent shaping global political and economic relations" at the centre of their account. A prominent feature of this subject is its essentialization and naturalization, with other competing subjects being marginalized or ignored (Ó Tuathail 2004: 90-92).

1.2.5 Geopolitical Discourse and the Discursive Policy Process

Geopolitical discourse is dependent on geographical imaginations, but is not equivalent to them for the focus is on "intellectuals of statecraft". This group can be divided into practical intellectuals of statecraft and formal intellectuals of statecraft in the public sphere. While the former help shape and formulate geopolitical discourse through the foreign policy process, the ideas of the latter help codify foreign policy perspective or challenge them and articulate new geopolitical visions. Ó Tuathail outlines a "grammar of geopolitics" that focuses on how geopolitical discourse specifies what (situation description), where (location specification), who (protagonist definition), why (attribution of causality and blame) and so what (interest enunciation). There exists a process whereby competing geopolitical story-lines get created around foreign policy challenges. This process involves taking a building bloc approach that begins by examining primary classifications and specifications, the emergence of key metaphors and analogies, and the development of relatively coherent story-lines out of the discursive processing of policy challenges and news stories. Such a geopolitical story-line is a "relatively coherent foreign policy narrative and argument about a policy challenge that is defined in debate by competing antagonistic story-lines". These are discursively fashioned from geographical imaginations, traditions, visions and other aspects of geopolitical culture. They help delimit the policy space

within which a certain issue, event or drama is debated. Analysis of the geopolitical discursive process also needs to consider the reception of geopolitical scripts by the foreign policy establishment (or what may be called "geopolitical power ministries") and "geopolitical civil society". The former constitutes the foreign policy state apparatus, whereas geopolitical civil society is most prominently represented by television and print media, as well as established and rising foreign policy "think tanks", who function as producers of knowledge about foreign policy challenges and also as commentators (Ó Tuathail 2004: 93-94). Traditionally, geopolitical discourse was seen as realpolitik foreign policy discourse rather than foreign policy discourse in its totality. This narrower strategic understanding of geopolitics is important as a particular type of foreign policy speech acting, and thus Ó Tuathail suggests it is useful to specify it by means of the concept of "geostrategic discourse" (2004: 95).

1.2.6 Geostrategic Discourses

Geostrategic discourse can be understood as a form of geopolitical discourse that makes explicit strategic claims about the material national security interests of the state across the world map characterized by state competition, threats and dangers. It is a self-defining and self-referential performative discourse, the claims of which are its basis. Geostrategic discourse is institutionalized in national security bureaucracies and preoccupied with scenarios of state competition, war fighting, resource scarcity, pervasive danger and insecurity. It claims a privileged position for itself beyond established foreign politics on the basis of the claim that it addresses transcendent national interests and existential security concerns. It strives to become the dominant centre and lodestar of geopolitical discourse and can be conceived as operating in the same manner as "securitization". As such, what we might call *geo-strategization* is the making of a discursive claim that a particular foreign policy crisis or challenge has the locational and transcendent material national interest qualities that makes it "strategic". Geostrategic interests are a matter of performative speech act claims. These claims will gain adherence or be marginalized, depending upon the particular geopolitical culture and power structure of a state. Summarized, geostrategic discourse is whatever intellectuals

of statecraft and a state power structure makes of it (Ó Tuathail 2004: 95-97; emphasis in original).

Concept	**Definition**	**Related Notions**
Geostrategic discourses	Particular discursive speech acts about "national security," and the "strategic interests" of the state	Strategic culture, securitization – security speech acts; *geo-strategization*; formal geopolitics
Geopolitical discourse and the discursive process	The crafting and design of a particular spatial account of international affairs by institutions, and practitioners of foreign policy	Intellectuals of statecraft, geopolitical civil society; story-lines – foreign policy arguments – and scripts – ways of performing and doing foreign policy
Geopolitical vision and subject	A normative picture of the world political map, and the basic agent shaping global political relations	Naturalization, certain social and geopolitical orders assumed beyond question and part of "nature"
Geopolitical traditions	Historical schools of foreign policy theory and practice	Interpretative foreign policy communities
Geopolitical culture	The culture of knowledge, and interpretation of the state as a foreign policy actor in world affairs; institutional setting and communicational culture of foreign policy making	Geopolitical power complexes and their shaping of the foreign policy process; degrees of geopolitical ignorance and knowledge in a state; popular and practical geopolitics
Geographical imagi-nations	Location of a national identity in the world; maps of friends and enemies in the world; assertion of territorial borders, national mission, and transnational collective forces in world affairs; inclusions and exclusions	Imaginary geography; *self/other*, *us/them* boundary creating practices; national exceptionalism

Figure 3: Concepts for the Study of Geopolitics as Culture

Source: Ó Tuathail (2004: 98)



Figure 4: Geopolitics as Structure – Key Concepts

Source: Ó Tuathail (2004: 98)

1.3 Adjusting the Concepts

A summary of the concepts as well as their interconnection are outlined in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. As these concepts altogether cover an extremely vast area of interest and an individual approach towards each of them would require significant space and focus, I have decided for the purpose of this thesis to narrow the aforementioned classification to and address the "geopolitics as culture" notion on four main levels of interest, three of which will be primarily utilized in Chapters Three and Four.

Firstly, geopolitical traditions will be addressed separately, as they are being used as a departure point for connecting geopolitical and geostrategic discourses and subsequently defining the character of Japan´s geopolitical culture in each specific period of history. Since the way in which I utilize geopolitical traditions is in their "purest" form as schools of foreign policy theory and practice, I shall use the designation of "foreign policy traditions" for them throughout the rest of the text. The second level will deal with geopolitical and geostrategic discourses. While these two concepts will be addressed together, they will not be treated as one equal. Discourses related to Japanese maritime identity are of a clear geostrategic nature, and as such it is necessary to distinguish between them and the more general geopolitical discourses which underpin them. The third level will address geopolitical culture and the strategic culture. As mentioned earlier, it would be inappropriate to treat these two concepts separately, since strategic culture is narrower in focus, yet possesses a significant geopolitical-cultural dimension and constitutes a fundamental element of geopolitical culture. Therefore, these two concepts will be defined in each era based on the connections between foreign policy traditions and geopolitical and geostrategic discourses. Geopolitical imagination, the characterization of which represents the primary objective of this thesis, will be addressed separately as an additional fourth level. Its identification will be based on the character and content of the three previous levels. The way in which geopolitical imagination is perceived is based on the definitions, characteristics and arguments described earlier in this chapter. The concept of geopolitical visions will be excluded from the analysis, as it suffers from a lack of proper conceptualization and appears in some of its aspects to be disseminated amongst the other concepts.

2. Geographical and Political Construction of Modern Japan

"Barbarians from out of the blue! Will they invade, kidnap, kill, then destroy everything? What will become of the sacred Land of the Rising Sun?"
(Blumberg 1985: 13)

The beginning of the establishment of a modern Japanese state (and nation) is generally associated with the arrival of US Navy warships under the command of Commodore Matthew C. Perry to Edo Bay in July 1853. Perry was carrying a fairly simple message for the representatives of the Tokugawa *bakufu* (shogunate): Agree to trade in peace, or suffer the consequences of war (Gordon 2003: 49; Jansen 2002: 277). Perry´s mission not only marked a new step in the United States´ advance into the western Pacific, but it also constituted a crucial point in the formation of a modern Japanese state and nation, initiating the end of the Tokugawa regime and triggering a series of events and process commonly referred to as the Meiji Restoration (sometimes also labelled as "renovation" or "revolution"[5]), culminating in 1868 with the creation of a centralized state and restoration of imperial rule (Pyle 2007: 24). In this chapter, I will briefly address the process of constructing the national identity of a modern Japanese state, as well as the geo-political[6] (and geopolitical) factors which accompanied and/or influenced it. I start off by revisiting the arrival of US ships to Japan and the way in which this event was actually perceived. Subsequently I outline the basic characteristics of Japan´s new foreign policy constellation, one which Richard Samuels (2008) calls the "Meiji Consensus".

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[5] The general Japanese term used to call this social transformation is *Meiji ishin*. *Ishin* can be literally translated as "renewal," "evolution," or "innovation." "Renovation" and "restoration" are the two other English translations widely used. "Restoration" reflects the fact that an important dimension of the social upheaval of the times was the restoration of sovereignty to the emperor, i.e. the restoration of monarchical rule. The term "revolution" was first used to designate the process by Mori Arinori, Japan´s first official representative to the US (Nagai 1985: v-vi). Despite being the rarer of the two terms, Andrew Gordon (2003: 61) makes persuasive use of it in the long run by pointing out that: "… if we compare this situation of 1868 in any aspect – political, economic, social, cultural – to that of just a decade later, the changes are breathtaking and fully merit the term revolution."

[6] The dash in this case implies a combination of geographical and political factors, so as to distinguish it from "geopolitical" as an interpretative cultural practice.

Earlier US narratives (approx. until the 1930s) of Perry´s arrival to Japan portrayed the country and its people as mysterious, distant, and exotic. Japan was a "brooding mystery of somber romance", a nation "inshrouned in the mists of its self-exile" (Hones and Endo 2006: 566). The opening – perhaps overtly melodramatic – quotation comes from Rhoda Blumberg´s (1985) children´s book *Commodore Perry in the Land of the Shogun* and voices the Japanese reaction to the four dark-hulled vessels which entered Edo Bay in 1853. Despite being several decades apart in its origin, it represents the very same example of such American effort to inscribe a certain "otherness" into the image of Japan, doing so not only by describing the Japanese as "different" from their own perspective, but also by portraying the Japanese as perceiving the Americans mutually in an uncertain and potentially hostile fashion. Labels of the American barbarian or alien "other" versus the sacredness of Japanese "ours" are used by Blumberg (1985) with immense frequency. It is fair to point out that such discourse is far from obsolete. Portrayals of Japan as "unique" in a number of ways are largely a defining characteristic of a majority number of English-written academic literature on the subject. To provide an example, Brzezinski (1997: 173-174) claims that:

> Like China, Japan is a nation-state with a deeply ingrained sense of its unique character and special status. Its insular history, even its imperial mythology, has predisposed the highly industrious and disciplined Japanese people to see themselves and endowed with a distinctive and superior way of life, which Japan first defended with splendid isolation, and then, when the world imposed itself in the nineteenth century, by emulating the European empires in seeking to create one of its own on the Asian mainland.

While the Japanese self-perception of "superiority" and "uniqueness" is an element indeed identifiable in the country´s foreign-political discourse up to these days, the actual process through which such identity was inscribed among the Japanese is far less mesmerizing and was in fact a result of pragmatic calculation among the Meiji leaders, who were reacting to the developments in the outside world (see below). The changing reconfiguration of the international (and thus East Asian) order – in this case the collapse of the Sinocentric system and the establishment of the Western imperialist order – triggered a Japanese response.

Whether Japan was ready or not to end its seclusion, it needed to fundamentally alter its foreign policies and domestic institutions to suit the new conditions in its environment. The demands of foreign policy would set Japan´s course (Pyle 2007: 24). As Natsume Soseki observed, Japan´s modern development was an "externally generated" one (*gaihatsuteki no kaika*) with all the painful consequences for Japanese psyche that flowed from that (Natsume cited in Pyle 2006: 398). For the first, yet definitely not the last, time in its modern history Japan would prove itself to be a "reactive state", i.e. one in which the impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure (*gaiatsu*), and where reaction prevails over strategy in the relatively narrow range of cases where the two come into conflict (Calder 1988: 519). In the mid-19th century, this reaction would materialize itself in the "Meiji Consensus" in Japanese politics, one which would mark the beginning of a modern Japanese state.

2.1 The Meiji Consensus

The Meiji Renovation was little more than a coup d´état. A small group of insurgents toppled the Tokugawa *bakufu*, stating to restore direct imperial rule. The islands of Japan were still divided into nearly two hundred relatively autonomous domains, with each maintaining its own treasury and army (Gordon 2003: 61). Sociologist Thorstein Veblen (1994: 249) noted in his observation of Japan´s modernization during the Meiji period: "To the Japanese government, or "state," the country, with its human denizens, is an estate to be husbanded and exploited for the state´s end; which comes near saying, for the prestige of the Mikado government." As hinted above, achieving such prestige (and parity with the West) required the Meiji leaders to construct a common identity among the Japanese people to mobilize them for such effort, since, as many of the Meiji intellectuals realised, there had never been such thing as a Japanese nation. Using the power of the imperial institution, the Meiji State would use native doctrines as a basis for national identity and national morality (Samuels 2003: 34-37). As Karel van Wolferen (1990: 250; 257-258) points out in this matter:

> Only after Japan had come out of its isolation were ideological fragments, old mythology and new patriotic sentiments mixed. … The Meiji oligarchy, in its attempt to mould a state commanding the allegiance of commoners as well as the members of the samurai caste it had just abolished, quite consciously created the new faith to serve political purposes.
>
> ….
>
> Traditional cultural values" were not just relied upon to continue as cultural values usually do, without any helping hand from ministers and bureaucrats, they were "revived". The formal state ideology constructed in the Meiji period, which served the ruling elite until 1945, consisted of fragments of the scholastic defence of Tokugawa warrior rule, to which was added an important emphasis on the unique superiority of the Japanese political culture.

Using a number of tools at their disposal, Japanese nation-builders managed to build a "national essence" (*kokusui*) – the symbolic order that would unite the archipelago and enable Japan to achieve parity with the West. It was the imagination of Meiji leaders determined to catch up with and surpass the West which enabled the growth of a Japanese national identity (Samuels 2003: 32). This widespread belief in "catching up and surpassing" the West helped Japanese elites forge the Meiji era consensus: borrow foreign institutions, learn Western rules, master Western practice. Japanese strategists of the period were realists who fully understood power and who closely calculated its international balance. It was not some abstract ideology that animated them. They were uncomfortable with the condescension of the Western powers and were determined to achieve equality in world councils (Samuels 2008: 15).

Japanese leaders exhorted the nation to "revere the Emperor and expel the barbarian" (*sanno joi*), to "catch up and surpass the West" (*oitsuki oikose*), and to combine "Western technology with the Japanese spirit" (*wakon yosai*). Struggle for technological independence has been a feature of Japanese strategy ever since (Samuels 1991: 47). The slogan "rich nation, strong army" (*fukoku kyohei*) captured the notion that technological and economic strength was the surest means to insulate the national polity against the intrusions of the dangerous world. Autonomy in defence production was also a means to avoid the alliance dilemma of

a client state (Japan), which can be faced by the risk of either entrapment/entanglement or abandonment (Green 1995: 3). This dilemma would remain a crucial aspect of Japan´s post-war foreign and security policy with regard to its alliance with the United States (see Chapters 3.2 and 3.3). A specific outlook on national security also established itself throughout the Meiji period: Japan´s "maritime identity" to which we now turn our attention.

2.1.1 The Formation of Japan´s "Maritime Identity"

The consequences brought upon Japan by the arrival of the American fleet were not purely of political, institutional, or technological character. The general perception of Japan´s surrounding spaces changed fundamentally as well. Japanese geographical knowledge throughout the pre-Meiji period was essentially insular and China-orientated, despite the general awareness of the existence of a large body of water east of Japan. During the country´s period of seclusion (17th – mid-19th century), interest in the world beyond the sea to the east (as well as the Pacific Ocean itself) weakened even further. Even distance from the American continent was seen as more understandable when imagined from a different direction. Rather than laying to the east across the Pacific, America was to be thought of as lying to the west, across Asia and Europe. Maritime geography was of minimal interest to the Japanese throughout that time (Hones and Endo 2006: 570-571). Moreover, two hundred years of isolation meant lack of any strong maritime traditions, which effective evolved in the need to import models and skills from abroad (Graham 2006: 64).

It is appropriate thought to point out that ideas suggesting that Japan should reconceptualise its defensive orientation towards the sea appeared anyway. When observing the exhibition of Japanese military development in the revisionist Yushukan museum, adjacent to the infamous Yasukuni Shrine, one can notice a board informing that the first comprehensive strategic document (if not military doctrine) crafted in Japan was the *Kaikoku Heidan – The Military Defence of a*

Maritime Nation[7] – written by Hayashi Shihei, a Sendai nobleman, in the late 18th century. In it, the author states:

> What is meant by a maritime nation? It is a country not connected to land by any other, but bordered on all sides by the sea. There are defense preparations that are suited to a maritime nation, and that differ in kind from those prescribed in Chinese military works, as well as those traditionally taught in Japan by the various schools…
>
> Military preparation for Japan means a knowledge of the way to repel foreign invaders, a vital consideration at present. The way to do this is by naval warfare; the essential factor in naval warfare is cannons. To be well prepared in these two respects is the true requisite of Japanese defense, unlike the military policies appropriate to such continental countries as China and Tartary. Only when naval warfare has been mastered should land warfare be considered (quoted in Keene 1969: 39-40).

Hayashi´s conceptualization of a maritime nation is a purely geographical one and the security measures which he deems appropriate are based on the belief that since the sea constitutes such nation´s natural and only boundary, a naval force is the natural and essential instrument of defence. Hayashi also articulated concerns about the backwardness of Japanese arms manufacture and the urgent need to protect Japan, and its manufacturers, from foreign domination.

Despite Hayashi´s efforts, it was not until Perry´s arrival and the Meiji reforms that a general change in the Japanese perception of the maritime space was initiated. The newly found national essence as well as the specific perception of the surrounding world managed to find their way into primary and secondary education in Meiji Japan. Geography, along with history, was given an important status. Consequently, geographical knowledge and the way of understanding the world influenced the formation of national identity as Japan developed as a military power (Takagi 1998: 125). Takeuchi observes that Japanese geography textbooks of the pre-colonial period were characterized by two common features:

[7] This is the English translation as it appears at the Yushukan exhibition. Keene (1969: 39) uses the translation *Military Talks for a Maritime Nation*. Another possible translation appearing is *Discussion of the Military Problems of a Maritime Nation* (see http://www.wdl.org/en/item/69/). Richard Samuels (1991: 48) refers to his work as *Treatise on the Affairs of an Insular Country*.

(1) a smaller number of pages dedicated to Asian countries than to Western countries; and (2) references to the economic backwardness, despotism and political subordination of Asian countries. This naturally corresponded with the ideology inspiring Japanese people to make efforts to raise themselves to the level of the economic and cultural development of the Western countries, thus *detaching themselves from their fellow Asians who remained warred in backwardness, both economically and culturally* (Takeuchi 1997: 8; emphasis added). Such ideology would become an essential component of Asianist geopolitical narratives throughout the interwar period (see Chapter 3.1).

Meiji teachings of geography went eventually so far as to describe the Japanese Islands as being "blessed with matchless territories in location and shape" – one that makes Japan the hub of the Asia-Pacific region, playing the role of defending Asia from the Pacific Ocean, and destining the future prosperity of Japan, as well as later the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Takagi 1998: 125; 131).

A point of interest is the fact that while the image of "black ships" (*kurofune*) is commonly associated with Perry´s fleet, this perception was not actually true until the turn of the 20th century, when America and Japan started to regard each other as potential enemies. Until then, the term *kurofune* had been firmly associated in Japanese popular imagination with Japan´s encounters with Russian vessels. Popular depictions of incidents related to Russian "incursion" contributed to a dominant public imagination of the Pacific as a battle space for Russian-Japanese conflict (Hones and Endo 2006: 571-572).

Japan´s maritime surroundings would thereby change from a space of no interest to one in which Japan would encounter the threat coming from mainland Asia. This perception of maritime space as an arena of hostility would persist in the early 20th century, though the designated primary source of threat would change with increasing US military presence in the Pacific. Accordingly, Japanese narratives regarding the Americans´ arrival in 1853 would bear signs of such perception, as well as seeing a dramatic turnaround after WWII (see Chapters 3.1 and 3.2). To counter potential threats coming from the sea, a naval force – the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) – had to be established.

The IJN came into existence with the Meiji Restoration, initially made from a composite force of foreign vessels assembled by the Satsuma clan. The above

mentioned lack of a strong maritime tradition resulted in the need to import modern naval technologies, tactics and strategy from the West, particularly Great Britain, with which Japan formed a certain paternal relationship in this matter (Graham 2006: 69), one that would still be referenced in Japanese geopolitical discourse in the modern era.[8] The geopolitical and naval teachings of A.T. Mahan would also find strong resonance among the IJN officer corps (Asada 2007: 53-73). The Imperial Navy did not serve purely as an instrument of territorial defence however. Euan Graham (2006: 69-70) adequately summarizes the way in which the IJN as a maritime security apparatus became a useful asset for reflecting and representing Meiji Japan´s "rich nation, strong army" identity:

> The Imperial Navy was ideally placed as an institution to fulfil the Meiji ethos, acting as a conduit for foreign learning and technology, strengthening Japan´s defences and enhancing national prestige.

For Meiji Japan, the possession and maintenance of a formidable naval force was plausible not only for basic purposes of territorial defence. The IJN represented the Japanese ability to adopt Western technology (as well as to effectively utilize and produce it) and provided Japan the means through which it could engage in the very same processes of spatial control that were exercised by the European colonial powers and United States. It was an achievement unique to Japan among all the Asian nations of the time. In the decades to follow, Japan would utilize it to pursue its interests in East Asia. Its maritime identity would be not only based on geographical terms, but also on a specific "connection" to the maritime space.

Review of the formation of a modern Japanese state in light of its first major foreign security policy consensus suggests the following: Firstly, Japan would characterize itself as a reactive state, i.e. one responding to external factors rather than actively initiating its own agenda. Secondly, Meiji leaders would develop a sense of Japanese "uniqueness" based on a constructed "national essence", as well as utilizing the subsequent economical/technological success to distinguish itself from the backward Asian "other". Finally, Japan´s maritime identity would be

[8] See Abe´s discourse in Chapter 4.2

formed on both a geographical basis (which would also place it in a “defensive” position vis-à-vis the continent), as well as the changed perception of maritime space from a “blind spot” to a potential source of threats which facilitates foreign incursion to Japan. The Imperial Navy as Japan´s maritime security asset would then fulfil role on two levels: it would serve the basic purpose of territorial defence and at the same time an agent representing the country´s specific security identity.

3. Japan´s Geopolitical Culture(s) and the Development of Japanese Foreign Security Policy

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it serves to provide a historical overview of Japan´s evolving foreign policy discourse and security posture, from the establishment of the modern Japanese state as a result of the Meiji Renovation, up until the end of the Cold War, linking it to and framing it within the concept of "geopolitics as culture" in the process. Secondly, its goal is to draw some preliminary conclusions about Japanese geopolitical imagination, which will be further elaborated upon in Chapters 4 and 5. For convenience´s sake, the chapter is divided into two main sections, each mapping a specific period of Japanese history. The first section covers what I label as "Imperial Japan" – a period starting with the Meiji Japan´s beginning interest in economic and military expansion into the Asian continent and Pacific area in the mid 1880s (Takeuchi 1997: 1), and ending with Japan´s defeat in WWII in 1945. Section Two the covers the Cold War era of bipolar confrontation (1945-1990).

Each of the sections begins with a brief overview of Japan´s general security context in that particular period of history. They subsequently focus on the selected concepts which were explained in detail in Chapter One and are divided into three sub-sections accordingly: (1) geopolitical traditions – here labelled as foreign policy traditions; (2) geopolitical and geostrategic discourses; and (3) strategic culture and geopolitical culture. In all of these sections, particular attention will be paid to aspects which are in some regard related to Japan´s maritime identity, yet the overall focus of this chapter remains largely general in scope and nature. The aim here is to link the foreign policy traditions with relevant geopolitical/geostrategic discourses of the era related to Japan´s maritime identity, use them to characterize Japanese strategic and geopolitical culture in each period, and, subsequently, attempt to derive the main aspects of Japan´s geopolitical imagination.

The classifications and designations used with regard to Japan´s foreign policy traditions are explicitly adapted from Richard Samuels´s (2008) analysis of Japanese foreign-political and grand strategic discourses, which in its

thoroughness and periodical scope presents a convenient point of departure for the examination of other concepts within the "geopolitics as culture" notion. Therefore, whenever the terms "Asianists", "mercantile realists" etc. in this or the following chapters are used, it is done so with explicit reference to the way in which Samuels identifies, characterizes and classifies these particular groups.[9]



Figure 6: Richard Samuels´s "Connecting the Ideological Dots"
Source: Samuels (2008: 14)

As presented in Figure 6, Samuels in his analysis identifies three "consensuses" within Japanese foreign policy thought throughout history: (1) Meiji Japan´s "Rich

[9] Although I refer to other authors´ classifications as well when considered appropriate.

Nation, Strong Army" consensus; (2) Konoe´s "New Order in East Asia", characteristic for Imperial Japan´s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere; and (3) democratic Japan´s "cheap ride" Yoshida Doctrine. A fourth consensus, which Samuels labels as "pivotal Japan´s dual hedge Goldilocks consensus", is supposedly yet to arise. Utilizing his work as a departure point throughout this chapter, I thus make explicitly usage of the three aforementioned consensuses as well. This is done so mainly with regard to the periodical classification of the following paragraphs (as well as Chapter 4), as each of the examined eras can be characterized by one of these consensuses.[10]

3.1 Imperial Japan (1885-1945): Towards the New Order in East Asia

Imperial Japan´s history, beginning with Meiji Japan´s expansion into the Asia-Pacific and ending till its defeat in WWII (1945), is perhaps best characterized by the country´s effort to achieve parity with the West, hence following the national policy set out by the Meiji leaders. This process was to become accompanied by a number of foreign ventures resulting in significant territorial expansion, numerous conflicts with Asian countries and Western powers, and ultimately resulting in Japan´s military and political collapse through defeat in WWII.

3.1.1 Foreign Policy Traditions

As outlined in Chapter 2, the Meiji Consensus presented a powerful guideline for JapFSP and as such the various foreign policy doctrines which characterized Japan´s imperial era did not emerge immediately. Japanese leaders throughout the Meiji period achieved numerous successes on the international stage: the subjugation of Korea to Japanese influence in 1876, victory over China and Russia in 1895 and 1905 respectively, or entering an alliance with Great Britain, the world´s greatest maritime power, in 1902, are just among the most remarkable (Fisher 1950a: 6-8). By the time this first wave of adventure passed, Japanese

[10] The Meiji Consenus was already addressed in Chapter 2, but as a "formative" consensus logically transcends to the Imperial period.

territory had increased to include southern Sakhalin, southern Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula (Samuels 2008: 16-17). The Meiji Consensus had only become frayed by the 1900s. Although parts of it, particularly those concerning industrial development and technology, would be the foundations for policy choices for generations, divergent views on Japanese grand strategy would begin to emerge, forming mainstream and anti-mainstream groups.

The mainstream was composed by nativists and Asianists, who found common ground in nationalism. Feeling threatened by foreign powers, the nativists believed in the inevitability of war – and the inevitability of Japanese victory. Talk of race war and of protecting the Japanese race had become politically correct (Peattie 1975: 37-48; Samuels 2008: 19). The Asianists would eventually become the dominant stream (primarily thanks to the unequal treatment of Japan by Western powers after WWI), and their views ranged from pro-imperial to openly revolutionary, with many of their leading members being in the military (Gordon 2003: 166; Samuels 2008: 19-21).

Opposing this mainstream were the so-called Small and Big Japan liberals (or Small Japanists and Big Japanists). Both groups supported the view of a Japan-dominated Asia, but were opposed to a militarized policy and advocated that Japan should pursue trade and investment, achieving hegemony and security in a different way. Most of these economic internationalists were, in fact, nationalists with an international agenda and pragmatic trade-interest, rather than liberals in any textbook sense (Samuels 2008: 22). Unlike Small Japanists, the Big Japanists accepted the idea that Japan was Asia´s natural leader and as such saw nothing illiberal about defending Japan´s rights on the continent. Small Japanists opposed territorial expansion and colonialism, seeing them as damaging for Japan´s trade interests and moral standing. While they believed that a sovereign China was good for Japan, the Big Japanists were openly imperialist and insisted that Japan had special interests in China. The politically powerful Japanese military, worldwide economic recession, rise of Chinese nationalism, as well as exclusionary immigration laws, anti-miscegenation statutes and racial segregation in the United States eventually undermined the internationalists´ position, with many of them shifting towards Asianism (Samuels 2008: 23-24).

By spring 1932, a new foreign policy consensus was taking shape. Its leader was Prince Konoe Fumimaro, who would become prime minister in 1937. Konoe attracted intellectuals from across the entire spectrum (many would enter the government during his tenure) and maintained excellent relations with leading factions of the army. Eventually, in November 1938, he announced the New Order in East Asia (*Toa Shin Chitsujo*). In August 1940, when the situation in Southeast Asia tempted certain and easy conquest, the predominantly continental New Order was supplanted by the even grander concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Internationalism, liberalism, Asianism, and nativism – the incongruent threads of Japan´s strategic discourse – had converged in a common belief in the integrity of the Japanese nation and were bound together within the unquestioned authority of the Japanese state. In the Konoe Consensus, nationalism and internationalism were not mutually exclusive, as had been the truth. At its core was a belief in the use of force and belief in the inherent justice of the national mission (Pyle 2007: 174-176; Samuels 2008: 27-28).

3.1.2 Geopolitical and Geostrategic Discourses

The Meiji leaders accepted a geopolitical logic that led inexorably toward either empire or subordination, with no middle ground possible. Seeing the non-Western world as being carved up into colonial possessions by the strong states of the West, they decided that Japan had no choice but to secure its independence by emulating the imperialists (Gordon 2003: 122). Thus, in the 1890s Yamagata Aritomo developed his grand strategic doctrine of a "line of sovereignty" (*shukensen*) ringed by a "line of interest" (*riekisen*).[11] Iriye notes that while the former referred to Japanese territory itself, the latter remained an ambiguous, and a tautological, concept prescribing a defence perimeter necessary for the security of the homeland (cited in Tamaki 2012: 195) – giving it flexibility in interpretation. Due to the "line of interest´s" de facto function as a buffer zone, Korea and Manchuria were definitely to be part of it. The wars against China (1895) and Russia (1905)

[11] Regarding Yamagata´s strategic concept, I am using Samuels´s (2008: 16) designation of "lines," also used by Jansen (2002: 437). Tamaki (2012: 195) uses the designation of "cordons," while Gordon (2003: 16) is using the designation of "zones." Furthermore, Gordon refers to the second one as "zone of advantage," rather than "zone of interest."

were waged precisely under Yamagata´s doctrine (Gordon 2003: 116; Samuels 2008: 16). According to Peter Duus, the "line of interest" included the weaker neighbouring countries that might become the object of Western imperialist aggression unless Japan takes steps to pre-empt it (cited in Tamaki 2012: 195). As a consequence, Japanese aggression in Asia was domestically justified as necessary not only for national security, but also for the security of all East Asia. This would construct Asia as an object of desire, as well as a signifier reminding pre-war policy makers of Japan´s purported uniqueness as the sole Asian power capable of standing up to the West (Okamoto 1979: 432; Tamaki 2012: 195).

In 1906, General Tanaka Giichi wrote: "We must disengage ourselves from the restrictions of an island nation to become a state with continental interests" (Pyle 2007: 96). The 1907 "Imperial Defence Strategy" (*Teikoku Kokubo Hoshin)* identified Russia, the United States, and France as potential enemies. The latter two threats were less pressing, and as such being best left for the Imperial Navy. Russia was perceived as the clear and present danger, and it was the Imperial Army which would confront it (Samuels 2008: 16). The plan was inaugurated in as an attempt to codify national threat perceptions and force requirements in a new period of strategic uncertainty. It announced that Japan´s enemy in the Pacific was no longer Russia but the US. President Roosevelt´s dispatch of the "Great White Fleet" to Yokohama later that year and its demonstration of spatial control further confirmed for IJN officers that it was now the Americans who were their main rivals for hegemony in the maritime area. While Perry´s black ships had forced Japan into the Pacific, the Great White Fleet was trying to threaten Japan out of it. Numerous fictional narratives and commentaries about a coming war between the two countries would be published in Japan and America soon after (Asada 2007: 107; Hones and Endo 2006: 572; Graham 2006: 71-72).

When nativists and Asianists entered the discursive debate, they held a "common view" that only alliance between China and Japan, nations that shared "colour and culture", could stave off Western domination of Asia. Asianists espoused a doctrine of "same race, same culture" (*doshu dobun*) but also of "same race, different status". Within their perception, "Asia for the Asians" meant a region

under Japanese control (Samuels 2008: 20). The planners of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere argued that: “We, the Yamato people, the core of construction of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, should always stay above other peoples of other countries and maintain a level of dignity and superiority as the leader figure. So, in terms of actual policies and also execution of them, we should avoid treating ourselves as other peoples…” (Kim 2005: 67-68).

The Japanese view did not only apply to “other Asians”, but primarily Westerners. Yamagata – the godfather of the imperial military and pragmatic architect of Japan´s “cautious expansion in the framework of cooperation with the Western powers” – warned in 1914 that the white race would reunify and resume its offensive in Asia against China and Japan. Ishiwara Kanji called for the expulsion of the white race from continental Asia., convinced that Japan and the United States, for reasons of power interest as well as for reasons of ideology, were destined for a showdown. To prepare for what he called the Final War, it was mandatory that Japan secure its position on the continent, particularly Manchuria and China, to dominate East Asia, its resources and energies. While this was to be achieved preferably through diplomacy, Ishiwara stressed that military preparation should be directed towards potential hostilities with China, as well as Russia, Britain, and the United States (Peattie 1975: 32; 67-71; 165-166; Samuels 2008: 20). Having prominent representatives among the military, the nativist/Asianist discourse was not just racially-based, but also included a significant (geo)strategic element, which was exemplified by both the delineation of zones of interest for JapFSP, as well as a clear identification of the threats to Japanese hegemony and the means to counter them.

Similar narratives were absent on part of the internationalists. Prominent representatives of the Small Japanist tradition, such as Miura Tetsutaro and Ishibashi Tanzan, simply argued for ceasing expansion, abandoning colonies and become a trading state, gaining access to Western markets (Pyle 2007: 95; Samuels 2008: 22-23). The internationalist traditions could thus be considered as largely intellectual constructs, as they lacked the strategic-cultural dimension of the nativist/Asianist traditions that managed to dominate the country´s security policy and shape its representations of the surrounding world.

While the army was focused on confronting Russia in Manchuria and pacifying the nationalists in China, the navy directed its attention southward. The Imperial Navy issued its own strategy in 1935; one designed to control the sea lanes of the South China Sea and to establish the IJN as the stabilizing force in the western Pacific/East Asia. Its preferred national strategy was “defending the north, advancing to the south” (*hokushu nanshin*). However, there was little coordination across the services and no coordinated military strategy whatsoever, even though the IJN was supposed to provide supply for the army in Northeast Asia. Japanese military planners simply expected that the Western powers, and especially the United States, would continue to accept Japanese expansion and “understand Japan´s intentions” (Graham 2006: 64; Peattie 1975: 189-190; Samuels 2008: 28; 215).

With the European colonial powers preoccupied with German aggression, the Cabinet Planning Board concluded in October 1939 that Japan should “bring within our economic sphere areas on the East Asian mainland and in the southern region” (Beasley cited in Graham 2006: 67). In October 1940, Foreign Minister Matsuoka stated: “The construction of a new order in East Asia means the construction of a new order (sic) under which Japan establishes the relationship of common existence and mutual prosperity with the peoples of each and every land in Greater East Asia including the South Seas” (quoted in Fisher 1950b: 179).

As Japan was occupying territories in Asia, traditional geopolitical theories were gaining prominence in the country. After the invasion of Manchuria, German geopolitics was introduced as an up-to-date science to explain the new international order (Fukushima 1997: 408; Takeuchi 1980: 17-18). The social basis of the emergence of Japanese geopolitics in the 1930s was the fact that intellectual circumstances facilitating the rise of an anti-Western ideology and an emphasis on indigenous traditions were brought about by Japan´s isolated position in the sphere of international politics rather than by the demand for the justification of the expansionist policies of imperialist Japan (Takeuchi 1980: 18). Perhaps the most interesting of the geopolitical schools existing in Japan at the time were the Japanese Society for Geopolitics (*Chiseigaku Kyokai*) and the Pacific Society (*Taiheiyo Kyokai*), established in November 1941. Their members

encompassed high-ranking military officers, journalists, politicians, geographers and academics. Both societies were closely connected and their members got together on frequent conferences to discuss geopolitical, strategic and other problems (Spang 2008: 148; Takeuchi 1980: 22).

While economic ties between Japan and Southeast Asia were strengthening, the Japanese awareness of Southeast Asians was such that they did not perceive them as Asian compatriots sharing the tradition of *Toyo* (East), nor were they *Seiyo* (West), but rather as the *Nanyo*. Ideas appealing to the emotional side of the public (such as the advocacy of Japanese Asianism), which may have been effective in insisting on regional cooperation in East Asia, were not persuasive in stressing the inevitable linkage of Greater East Asia (Fukushima 1997: 411-412). Geopolitics however was deemed useful to do so, which is why Japanese intellectuals critical of geopolitics at first changed their attitudes later (Takagi 2006: 51).

An argument concerning the Australasian Sea (the sea around the Sunda Islands), began to attract the keen interest of those wanting to stress the inevitability of cooperation with Southeast Asia, as it pointed out the geographical unity between East and Southeast Asia, and also insisted that the people of these two regions had common ancestors. In so insisting, the people of Southeast Asia were included in the *Toyojin* – the peoples of the East. Eventually, the argument developed into the following: that "Greater East Asia should forge a single community in view of geopolitics, and for this purpose, we should fight to emancipate our "Asian compatriots" from the control of the West and to establish an eternal peace in Asia" (Fukushima 1997: 413). Linkages with Southeast Asia thus found their ground in constructed narratives of Asianist geopolitics.

3.1.3 Strategic and Geopolitical Culture

Assessing Japanese strategic culture from the introduction of the Meiji Consensus throughout its Imperial era is arguably a fairly straightforward task. The Meiji Consensus was structured along the premise that the international environment is essentially a hostile one and that the use of force is a necessary part of foreign-political conduct if one deems to be successful. The geostrategic

discourses of the era represented this accordingly. While the internationalist traditions failed to address this in the interwar era and their views remained on a purely intellectual level, the nativists/Asianists managed to craft a politically strong world view, one which would reflect Japan´s disappointment with their treatment by Western powers, its strategic needs, and the threat perception towards continental Russia and, later, the United States on the high seas. The geopolitical culture of Imperial Japan was thus shaped predominantly by the nativist/Asianist outlook, which in strategic terms shared a similar (albeit racially based) outlook as the Meiji leaders. The Konoe Consensus would adopt the racial underpinning and expand the representations of "self" and "other" to encompass a larger Asian territory.

The Imperial era hence saw the rise of dominance of an Asianist perspective in JapFSP, characterized by a racially-based identity and threat perception directed mainly towards non-Asian powers, with Japan being the only Asian country capable of fending off potential enemies and thus the natural leader. The maritime space remained a potential area of conflict (with the US), but the IJN´s new adherence to sea lane protection would also provide it an economic context and later, with the Konoe Consensus in place, it would serve as a "connecting medium" between Japan and the peoples of the Greater Asia who had not been previously considered "alike".

3.2 Cold War Japan (1945-1990): The Yoshida Doctrine and "Free-Ride Security"

Japan´s defeat in WWII fundamentally changed the circumstances under which the country would operate in the international system. During the immediate post-war years (1945-52), Japan would become subject to processes of demilitarization and democratization under the "supervision" of Allied occupational authorities dominated by the United States. It found itself re-casted in the global, bipolar schism of the Cold War and the corresponding division of Asia into communist and Western-backed blocks, and its territory would be redrawn to the four main

Japanese islands[12], with the 1951 San Francisco peace conference effectively ending the existence of the former empire.

Japan´s post-war security became anchored in two key documents, both of which would shape the country´s security debate in the decades to come: the new Constitution (*kenpo*) adopted in November 1946 and coming into effect in May 1947, and the 1951 Security Treaty between Japan and the United States (*nichibei anzen hosho joyaku*; shortly *ampo*), subsequently revised in 1960. A third additional pillar of Japanese Cold War security policy would be introduced with the establishment of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF; *jieitai*)[13] in 1954 (Hughes 2004: 21-22). It is appropriate to remind ourselves of the character of the post-war Constitution. This document as a whole does not present that much of an issue for Japan´s post-war security, as does its war-renouncing Article 9, which states:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
>
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.[14]

The interpretation of Article 9 has been an issue of divergence in Japanese politics ever since. While its strictest interpretation suggests restrain from any military build-up whatsoever, the ambiguity of the article has proven the interpretation to be extremely flexible, allowing for the creation of a military - the SDF - based on a right of "self-defence" (Chai 1997: 395; Southgate 2003: 1601-1602).[15]

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[12] Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands remained under US administration until 1972.

[13] These are composed by the Ground SDF (GSDF), Maritime SDF (MSDF), and Air SDF (ASDF).

[14] http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed 14.3.2014)

[15] Somewhat ironically, although several groups within Japan would label the Constitution as "US-imposed", the key "In order to accomplish the aims…" amendment was added by the Japanese themselves after revision by a committee led by Ashida Hitoshi. This was done deliberately to open doors to future armament. It was actually the original draft by Gen. MacArthur which was openly restrictive towards the prospects of Japanese rearmament (Dower 1999: 394-396).

3.2.1 Foreign Policy Traditions

In a fashion similar to the interwar period, post-1945 foreign policy traditions in Japan can be divided into two major streams of orientation. The anti-mainstream was formed by revisionists (both "moderate" and neomilitarist) and pacifists, whereas the mainstream, internationalist school of thought was represented by pragmatic mercantile realists.[16] Unlike in the pre-1945 era, it was the internationalists who had the upper hand (Samuels 2008: 29). These groups would eventually agree on a foreign policy consensus crafted by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru; one that would commonly become known as the "Yoshida Doctrine" (*Yoshida ronso*) – a policy based on the pursue of economic recovery while leaving defence measures as much as possible ("free-riding") on the United States.[17]

The Yoshida Doctrine was significantly enhanced by the fact that nativists and neomilitarists, i.e. the dominant foreign policy streams of the interwar period and now the revisionists who hoped to re-establish Japan as a great power, were effectively sidelined by the US Occupation and by popular revulsion. Most of these rightists would however eventually find their way toward the centre, simply as a matter of sheer opportunism. The most extreme ultranationalists became marginalized, but some found common cause with a revisionist group of establishment conservatives, many of whom had also been purged during the Occupation[18] (Samuels 2008: 29-30).

Revisionist politicians later formed the anti-mainstream group of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). They built a powerful alliance with industrialists and together maintained constant pressure on Yoshida and his liberal internationalists.

[16] Samuels uses the terms *pragmatic mercantilist* and *liberal internationalists* interchangeably for the Cold War period. Kenneth Pyle identifies four Cold War-era groups of foreign policy thought on a similar basis: he labels the pacifists as *progressives*, the pragmatic mercantilists as *mercantilists*, the "moderate" revisionists as *liberal realists*, and the neomilitarists as the *new nationalists* (Hirata 2008: 124). Mike Mochizuki (1983/84) echoes this view and labels these groups (in the same order) as *unarmed neutralists*, *political realists*, *military realists*, and *Japanese Gaullists*, respectively. As stated in the introduction of this chapter, I adhere to Samuels´s designation for continuity´s sake.

[17] A significant part of this consensus was also the stabilization of domestic politics for the entire Cold War period with the establishment of the so-called "1955 System" based on the dominance of the conservative LDP.

[18] Many of these nationalists found their new "place under the Sun" in the 1950s, when rearmament of Japan was considered (primarily by the United States, but also by certain groups within Japan), yet again desirable. As a matter of fact, most official plans to rebuild the Japanese military were authored by former officers who served informally as advisors to the Occupation authorities, conservative politicians and industrialists who wanted to get back into the defence business (Ibid.).

During the immediate post-war period, they were led by Ashida Hitoshi, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Hatoyama Ichiro, and later Kishi Nobusuke (Chai 1997: 398). Three of these men would become prime ministers in the following decades – a clear sign of how effectively the Yoshida Consensus functioned. The willingness of these revisionists to adapt was further strengthened by the fact that many of them had been economic bureaucrats in Manchuria or career politicians during the pre-war period. Because of the Occupation-era purges, they had to reinvent themselves as democrats in order to function in the new domestic system. The revisionists favoured a combination of rearmament and conventional alliances. To achieve these, they called for revision of the Constitution´s Article 9, argued that Japan should rebuild its military capabilities, and sought reciprocal security commitment with the United States as a step toward "autonomous defence" (Gordon 2003: 301-302; Samuels 2008: 30).

In this regard the revisionists seemed diametrically opposed to the other anti-mainstream group of the post-war period – the pacifist Japanese Left, which had for the first time become a legitimate political force. This group brought together intellectuals, labour activists, and leftist politicians, who insisted Japan become a "peace nation" (*heiwa kokka*) and categorically opposed the use of force in international affairs. The "peace nation" idea initially comprised both an abstract commitment to peace as the supreme value, and a pragmatic conviction that it was Japan´s unique mission to demonstrate how world peace could be achieved, a mission that fell to Japan as a consequence of its wartime suffering and "natural" pacifist tendencies (Mochizuki 1984: 153; Samuels 2008: 30-31). Thus, while the pacifists followed a diametrically different concept of foreign policy from the revisionist one, the two groups shared the emphasis on a certain kind of uniqueness possessed by Japan as the centre for their ideas. In the revisionist case, this was the traditional character of Japanese society and the state. In the pacifist case, it was Japan´s experience from WWII which "destined" it to promote international peace.

Left-wing socialists, who had opposed the war and suffered under militarism, were the initial champions of pacifism. These were committed pacifists, early enthusiasts of Article 9 and adherents of its strictest interpretation, i.e. one

prohibiting military build-up and not permitting the use of force even in self-defence (Samuels 2008: 31). Their idea would be institutionalized in the Socialist Party´s (the largest opposition party during the Cold War period) "principles of peace", which called for neutralism and opposed rearmament. By the early 1950s, the party pledged support for Article 9 and opposition to rearmament and to the US-Japan Security Treaty, a doctrine it called "unarmed neutrality" (*hibuso churitsu*) (Miyashita 2007: 113; Samuels 2008: 31).

Forming the mainstream school of thought and opposing (even overmatching) the revisionists within the conservative camp were the pragmatic conservative politicians led immediately after 1945 by Yoshida Shigeru and later by his disciples such as Ikeda Hayato, Sato Eisaku, Ohira Masayoshi, and Miyazawa Kiichi (Dower 1979: 318-20). Many of these internationalists were devoted to the emperor and dedicated to seeing Japan re-emerge along the ranks of great nations. In this they shared the goals of the revisionists (Samuels 2008: 31).

Echoing the split between Small and Big Japanism of the interwar period, both groups of post-WWII conservatives differed on questions of foreign policy and national development. Opposite the revisionists´ desire to assure Japan´s security via its own means and by rebuilding the military, the liberal internationalists held the view that economic success and technological autonomy were the prerequisites of national security. An alliance with the US, the world´s ascendant power, was the best means to buy time until the former could be achieved. For this purpose, they rejected military spending in favour of a broader plan for state-led development of the private sector. In security terms, liberal internationalists accepted the alliance with the United States and used it as a shield behind which they could regenerate prosperity. Yoshida appreciated that alliance with the US brought with it access to the international trading system, securing in-flows of natural resources needed to trade its way to prosperity. From the mercantilists´ perspective, Japan would be a merchant state regaining national wealth through maritime trade. Yoshida and his group were pragmatists and would consider further investment in military preparedness only after the return of prosperity (Heginbotham and Samuels 1998: 175-177; Samuels 2008: 32).

Yoshida´s sympathy towards trade meant that (in contrast to the army) he would tacitly support the creation of post-war maritime forces, as the economy was physically dependent on a large merchant fleet, and the fact that the political cost of naval forces operating out of sight was much lower than a ground force stationed in Asia (Graham 2006: 98).

The only dangers they perceived to Japanese prosperity and security were abandonment by America or entanglement in its wars. Highlighting the relevance (and success) of this foreign policy stream in JapFSP is the fact that the pragmatists dominated the cabinets under which all three pillars of Japan´s post-war security apparatus – Article 9, the Security Treaty, and the SDF – were established. Throughout the late 1960s, they also adopted restrictive measurements which further updated Japan´s post-1945 "peaceful" security identity: the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the ban on arms export, the 1% of GDP limit on defence spending and the resolution on the peaceful use of space[19] (Hughes 2004: 35; Samuels 2008: 32).

A crucial factor for the crafting of JapFSP in the 1950s was the way in which the revisionists and the pragmatists contested to find common cause with the pacifists. The former found common ground with them in nationalism. Together they treated US bases-related issues as matters of national sovereignty, which had never really been returned. American presence and extraterritoriality presented constraint on its autonomy. Both groups also expressed concern that US presence invited entanglement and that Japan could become a "battlefield" in future conflicts, for which reason they demanded "independent diplomacy" (*jishu gaiko*). But Yoshida and the pragmatists trumped their intraparty rivals by giving the Left constitutional guarantees that Japan would not again become a great military power. The more that the revisionists demanded an autonomous military (*jieigun*) and an "autonomous defence" (*jishu boei*), the closer the pacifists were drawn to Yoshida´s moderation (Miyashita 2007: 113-114; Samuels 2008: 34-35).

[19] The non-nuclear principles were adopted by the government of Sato Eisaku in 1967 and through them Japan prohibits itself to possess nuclear weapons, produce nuclear weapons, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan (Mochizuki 2007: 304). The ban on arms export was introduced also by Sato´s government the very same year. On its basis, Japan is prohibited to export arms to communist states, countries under UN sanctions and parties to international disputes. The resolution on the peaceful usage of space was passed by the Japanese Diet in May 1969 (Hughes 2004: 35).

Under the existing circumstances, Yoshida managed to fit Article 9 and the US alliance between pacifism and traditional nationalism, keeping the constitutional revision off the agenda and the Socialists out of government.[20] In 1960, while the revisionists were in power, they mishandled the Security Treaty Revision Crisis (*ampo toso*) and Yoshida´s mainstream successors were able to return and prosper by crafting "comprehensive security" – a concept of equal stress on economic and military security - as Japan´s central doctrine (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 84; Samuels 2008: 35; Singh 2010b: 394). Security policy would aim to enhance autonomy, but would centre on trade and international cooperation, and a new consensus would be achieved around a Japan that would be a "non-nuclear, lightly armed, economic superpower". Japan would have a defence capability, but simultaneously be a "peace nation" (Johnson 2004: 178-179, 185; Samuels 2008: 35). As Michael Green notes, from this perspective the Yoshida Doctrine was in fact not a "doctrine", but rather a "compromise" among the advocates of disarmed neutrality, unilateral rearmament, and disarmed economic and technological alliance with the US. All of these groups had to fit under the conservatives´ ideological tent in order to achieve the political stability necessary for economic reconstruction (Green 1995: 26).

3.2.2 Geopolitical and Geostrategic Discourses

The Yoshida Consensus did however encounter struggles en route to its establishment, with the prime one being the new Constitution. The revisionists considered it to be "imposed" by the United States (despite its actual crafting by a Diet commission[21]) and ill-suited to Japan. Article 9 was viewed repugnant and subject to revision. As Samuels (2008: 30) writes:

> Imbued with traditional nationalist (though not ultranationalist) sentiments, they held to an organic vision of Japan as a unique "national polity" (*kokutai*), distinguished primarily by its imperial institution and neo-Confucian values,

[20] It was mainly the fairly unrealistic nature of the Socialists´ pacifist agenda which would lead to their gradual decline (Miyashita 2007: 113-114).
[21] See Dower (1999: 394-396)

> which emphasize unity and sacrifice for the national order. They coupled a muscular notion of national identity with realpolitik beliefs emphasizing the nation´s duty to ensure its own security.

The revisionists´ statements reflected such believes. In 1953, former foreign minister Shigemitsu Mamoru argued that “The people have to retain their self-respect by defending the fatherland through their own efforts”. On a similar note, Kishi Nobusuke stated a year later that “It is not the policy of an independent nation to have troops of a foreign country based on its soil” (Ibid.). Ishihara Shintaro, perhaps the most prominent revisionist in the late Cold War period, would make similar accounts in the 1970s, declaring in parliament that the US nuclear umbrella is a myth and advocating Japan´s acquisition of a nuclear bomb in order to gain international respect (Samuels 2003: 334). In 1989 he would reiterate the argument about the unreliability of US military presence in Japan and the nuclear umbrella, express support for an autonomously acting Japan and denied that Japan was being a “free-rider” within the Alliance. Instead, he praised the country´s superior position in developing advanced technology, claiming that it is actually the US who are dependent on Japan (as they make military use of Japan-developed technology) and advocating usage of the technology card for autonomous conduct in international affairs (going as far as suggesting the sale of missile navigation chips to the Soviet Union). Furthermore, he criticised Japanese decisions on acquiring military equipment as unsuited for Japan and US-imposed (Ishihara 1991: 50-60). Complete autonomy was the primary goal for revisionists in each stage of the Cold War.

The pragmatists, on the other hand, favoured the Constitution´s retention and saw Article 9 useful in two ways: (1) it allowed them to deflect US pressure for the acquisition of military capabilities they judged unnecessary or inimical to Japan´s strategic interests; and (2) it served as an effective means of resisting American demands for Japanese participation in international military operations (Samuels 2008: 32-34). Nothing expresses this viewpoint more appropriately than a quote by Yoshida himself:

> The day [for rearmament] will come naturally when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious (*zuru*), but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the Constitution gives us perfect justification. The politicians who want to amend it are fools (quoted in Pyle 2007: 230).

This new restricted post-war security posture effectively meant lack of any engagement in security affairs throughout the decade. Japan´s perception of its surrounding space would thus start taking more specific shape only with the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960. Its Article 6 stipulates that US forces are allowed to use Japanese bases and areas "for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East".[22] The operative understanding of "the Far East" in this article was geographically defined by the Japanese government that same year as "primarily the region north of the Philippines, as well as Japan and its surrounding area," including South Korea and Taiwan (Hughes 2004: 25-26; Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/02: 171). With such connotation, the spatial delimitation of Japan´s perceived security environment included basically the entire Northeast Asian region. At the same time, the incentive for US engagement would not necessarily have to come from a direct attack on Japan itself.

In addition, differences between the Alliance partners surfaced. Reflecting on Prime Minister Sato´s expression of a disagreement with the US regarding the foreign political approach towards the PRC in the mid-1960s, Ogata Sadako, who would in the 200Os become the "international face" of Japan´s human security agenda[23], pointed out that "not many Japanese regard Communist China as a "Cold War" enemy, nor do they accept the "China-communism-enemy" equation which is so widely held in the United States" (Ogata 1965: 389). This illustrates the specific geopolitical reasoning on Japan´s part. After achieving economic recovery in 1960, the country would gradually embark on an ODA-based policy towards East Asia - ASEAN countries at first and China from the 1980s (Araki 2007: 18-23). Following the dominant mercantilist stream of thought and facing a militaristic past, the

[22] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html (accessed 23.3.2014)

[23] See Hynek (2012a, 2012b).

Japanese perception of Asia would be primarily one of an accessible potential market and a zone of cooperation, not conflict (be it military, political, or ideological – as was the US case[24]).

A more "active" US-Japan alliance would only "surface" in the 1970s. In 1972, Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands were formally returned under Japanese administration. At the same time, the United States was inevitably facing defeat in the Vietnam War and its position in East Asia came under jeopardy. As a result, Washington was continuously developing pressure on Japan to assume a more proactive role within the Alliance. The 1973 oil crisis and an increasing build-up of Soviet naval capabilities in the region throughout the decade played a central role in this process, as one area the US would particularly emphasize was sea lane defence. Using geostrategic reasoning, the United States hinted Tokyo that a major portion of American naval forces need to be redeployed from East Asia to the Persian Gulf region for SLOC protection, and, as such, it would be in Japan´s best interest to assume more duties in the Western Pacific and bolster its ASW capabilities vis-à-vis the growing presence of Soviet submarines in its surrounding waters (Graham 2006: 118; Hughes 2004: 28).

This would also be reflected more generally by Japan´s overly changing threat perception. In formal terms, several key documents and policies were introduced in the late 1970s. The 1977 *Defence of Japan* white paper reflected Japanese reaction to US pressure on boosting SLOC defence. It stipulated that the 1973 oil crisis "shook Japan´s economic and social systems to their very foundations", since national psychology, perceived economic vulnerability and memory of a wartime blockade were considered determining factors in Japan´s economic collapse (Graham 2006: 118-120). In August 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, a non-mainstreamer within the LDP and disciple of Kishi (see Samuels 2003: 334-335; 2008: 44), declared in his speech in Manila that Japan would never become a military power (contributing to regional security economically and diplomatically only), would build up relations of mutual confidence and trust with Southeast Asian countries and would commit itself as an equal partner to building peace and prosperity in the region. These three principles became known as the Fukuda

[24] See Dalby 1990.

Doctrine and paved the way for future enhanced cooperation with Southeast Asia – a partnership based on equality and stability (Kikuchi 2007; Singh 2010b: 394).

The Fukuda Doctrine can be considered as a discursive (and subsequently practical) codification of Japan´s perception of Southeast Asia as a first-class region of geopolitical interest in the late Cold War era and the following decades. Furthermore, it initiated Japan´s continuing engagement in and comprehensive security-guided approach to ensuring navigational safety in these waters. As its 1979 *Comprehensive Report on National Security* stressed:

> It is…important to find ways to ensure the safe passage of tankers through the long transport route passing the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea. Since Japan cannot resort to its own military power to protect tankers in these areas, it must give adequate consideration to alternative policies for this purpose and be willing to support the cost they entail (quoted in Graham 2006: 150).

The 1977 *Defence Guidelines for Cooperation* and the 1978 *National Defence Programme Outline* (NDPO; *taiko*) came next to define Japanese defence policy in a more specific manner. The NDPO confirmed the Far East as Japan´s defence perimeter and was underpinned by the concept of a Standing Defence Force[25] (*kibanteki no boeiryoku koso*). America´s diminishing military commitment and Soviet regional build-up would cause a more moderate stance of Japanese opposition parties on issues of SDF expansion. The Soviet build-up was even considered by the Foreign Ministry to be a reaction to Japan´s 1978 normalization treaty with China and the non-hegemony clause against the USSR. Japanese analysts evaluated the Soviet move as an intention to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into an SSBN bastion.[26] Consequently, the notion of a "military threat from the north" was given popular expression in Japanese books and articles and efforts to revise the *taiko* also appeared (Graham 2006: 139; Tamaki 2012: 188). For the first time

[25] A concept implying that Japan would only maintain a basic necessary force for self-defence.

[26] This outlook bears striking resemblance to the views expressed by Kawamura Sumihiko in his work on increased Chinese naval presence in the South China Sea. The parallel drawn between contemporary Chinese naval expansion and the Soviet naval build-up in the 1970s (particularly with regard to submarines) can be considered a universally present phenomenon among Japanese strategists and scholars (see Chapter 4.2).

since WWII, Japan´s geostrategic discourse shifted towards the continent in a threat-perceiving manner. The measures undertaken in JapFSP were sufficient to signify reaction to the change, yet did not move Japan´s security posture beyond the "peaceful" restrictions.

The "Soviet threat" viewpoint was nonetheless highly reflected in views expressed by high-ranking MSDF officers. Admiral Uchida for example declared that the Soviet Navy presents the utmost threat in East Asia. Oga Ryohei, the MSDF Chief of Staff, in his 1983 work *Shiiren no himitsu* (Sea Lane Secrets) described sea lane security as being composed of two components – an economic one (linked to Japan´s prosperity) and a military one (linked to US global military strategy). One might say that in this way he mirrored the overall concept of "comprehensive security" to which Japan adhered (see below), and adapted it to a more strategic level. Geographically, he claimed, three major SLOCs were crucial to Japanese *economic* security: (1) the sea lane connecting Japan with Southeast Asia and the Middle East; (2) the sea lane connecting Japan to Oceania and Australasia; and (3) the sea lane connecting Japan to North and South America (Graham 2006: 139-141; emphasis added). This classification not only pointed out the importance of the maritime and aerial spaces for Japan´s security, but also classified three main geographical directions in which Japanese security policy would expand and focus on in the post-Cold War (and particularly post-2001) period – the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, Australia, and, traditionally, America.

And yet, the SLOC defence concept came under criticism for having more of a political rather than strategic value. This criticism came from the pacifist party-political and media opinion, as well as other sides. For example, Kaihara Osamu, a National Defence Council official, commented on the futileness of such approach against improved Soviet capabilities in the region. Maeda Tetsuo, an independent defence commentator, claimed that elastic spatial defence of sea lanes gave supporters of an extra-territorial defence role for the MSDF and ASDF the flexibility to arbitrarily redraw the geographical boundaries of Japan´s self-defence zone without directly confronting the proscriptions against overseas dispatch and collective self-defence (Graham 2006: 141-143).

Despite these changing views, none of the prime ministers of that era expressed willingness to expand the SDF´s area of operations or breach the Yoshida Doctrine. The only exception came with Nakasone Yasuhiro taking the office in late 1982. Nakasone supported Japan taking on the mission of completely controlling the straits surrounding Japan (thus preventing Soviet naval incursions in times of emergency), as well as defending the sea lanes and referencing Japan as a "big aircraft carrier" and its "common fate" with the US (Mochizuki 1983/84: 177; Pyle 2007: 272). Although Nakasone did manage to breach some of the post-war restrains[27], he did not succeed in a revision of Japan´s security posture.

3.2.3 Strategic and Geopolitical Culture

Japanese post-war security is thus normally seen in terms of the discontinuity with the pre-war status quo, as empire and militarism gave way to the peaceful expansion of trade within a security framework based on defence linkages with the United States and a system of constitutional and other constraints that have strictly regulated the SDF since their formation in 1954. Immediately after its inception, the Yoshida Doctrine would serve, although unintentionally, as a de facto blueprint for Japanese security and diplomacy during the entire Cold War.

As several authors argue, Japan´s horrific experience with defeat in WWII lead to the development of a culture of anti-militarism (Berger 1993; Katzenstein 1998), or a *domestic* (i.e. focusing on limits to the re-emergence of militaristic tendencies at home, yet still accepting as legitimate a defensive role for a military at home) anti-militaristic security identity (Oros 2008: 5-6). Some also explicitly label Japan´s strategic culture of the post-war period as anti-militaristic (Hughes 2011: 453). However, Japan´s anti-militarism cannot be regarded as "pacifism". As outlined in the previous sections, pacifism as a specific foreign policy tradition did play a role in shaping the post-war consensus, but on its own never actually managed to determine foreign policy outcomes. This is further emphasized by the acceptance of an existing military force in Japan.

[27] He breached some of the restrictive measures of Japan´s post-war security system, namely the restriction on exporting military technology and the 1% GNP ceiling on defence spending (Hughes 2004: 35).

It is plausible to assume that Japan´s post-war strategic culture on a general scale shifted towards anti-militarism, especially in comparison to the imperial era. Between individual foreign policy traditions, the issue became not that much whether to maintain a military force (the exception being the pacifists´ adherence to strict Article 9 interpretation), but rather when (if at all) and how to use it and what should its composition be. By renouncing the country´s right to wage armed conflict and avoiding entanglement in US global adventures, the subsequent Yoshida Consensus allowed for maneuvering space in security-related-matters, while basing the state´s code of conduct on the pursuit of trade.

While the revisionists saw Japan as unique in a traditional organic manner, the pacifists sought to attribute it "natural" pacifist tendencies based on wartime experience. The Pacific transformed from Japan´s maritime frontline of the pre-1945 era to the equivalent of a rear area connecting it commercially with its major import/export markets in North America and Southeast Asia, and militarily linking US bases in the region with those on US soil, thus fitting the mercantilists´ outlook. While the overall geopolitical culture of how Japan as a state should behave in the world changed (especially regarding the use of force), the spatial perception remained in many ways similar. Southeast Asia and China remained at the centre of interest, and the maritime space the medium through which Japan could achieve its strategic goals and project its specific "self" – that of a maritime merchant state seeking access to any potential market available. Revisionists, while assuming power on several times, would be mostly "reformed" and not alternate Japan´s geopolitical culture in any crucial way, as both the institutional setting and dominant political culture (the anti-militarist one) remained at place.

4. The Geopolitical Culture of Post-Cold War Japan (1990-Present): A Search for Normalcy?

The changes which occurred in the international system with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism in Europe are a well known fact. This reshaping of the global order presented significant challenges for Japan as well, especially regarding its foreign and security policy. Suddenly the threat of a potential territorial invasion by Soviet military forces was no longer present and with it the primary justification for US military presence in the Far East. Japan exited the Cold War era economically strong and thus in a specific position within the Alliance. As Ó Tuathail (1992: 976) reminds us on the character of the US-Japan relationship at the time: "In the working process division of labour that had developed between both countries, the USA was the acknowledged geopolitical power, and Japan was the manifestly successful geo-economic power." And yet, Japan was also exiting the Cold War as one of the world´s major military powers (Lind 2004: 93).

The first occasion which presented an opportunity for Japan to redefine its security posture was the Gulf War of 1990-91. Japan, adhering to its status as a "peaceful" nation, did not live up to some expectations and decided not to send military personnel (thus missing the chance to increase the SDF´s future involvement in peace operations[28]) to support Coalition forces. Instead, it would contribute financially to the operation and the subsequent reconstruction of Kuwait, and (hesitantly) send minesweepers to the Gulf (Hynek 2012a: 63). To paraphrase an argument made by David Williams (2007), Japanese policymakers were suddenly facing a responsibility which they were simply not willing to take on.[29] The Yoshida Doctrine proved itself to be too convenient to abandon and Japan´s foreign policy establishment too rigid to adapt quickly.

[28] Japan would only begin to engage in UN peacekeeping operations from 1992 (Singh 2010a: 1-2).
[29] A state of affairs perhaps best exemplified by Ozawa Ichiro, at the time secretary-general of the ruling LDP, rushing into the Prime Minister´s office on the advent of the Gulf War and, to his own shock, finding it completely empty (Williams 2007: 38).

4.1 Foreign Policy Traditions

In light of the new security environment, four streams of foreign policy thought would take shape, with the current foreign and security policy discourse in Japan between them being sorted around two axes. The first is a measure of the value placed on the alliance with the United States. The second axis is the willingness to use force in international affairs (Samuels 2008: 111). Based on these two axes, the four foreign policy traditions currently present in Japan are designated as pacifists, middle-power nationalists, normal nation-alists and neoautonomists.[30]



Figure 5: The New Discourse

Source: Samuels (2007: 128)[31]

Figure 5 functions in a self-explanatory manner here. Pacifists oppose the US alliance as well as the military institution altogether, believing prosperity is the way to autonomy. Opposite stand the neoautonomists who wish to keep a greater distance from the US while building an independent, full-spectrum military that could use force. Normal nation-alists are willing to share the Alliance burden and deploy the SDF, as well as wishing for Japan to become a global power again. For

[30] Alternatively, Hirata (2008) labels the same groups as pacifists, mercantilists, normalists, and nationalists, respectively, and divides them along the lines of proarmament-antiarmament and autonomism-internationalism.

[31] This figure is also reproduced in Samuels (2008: 112) with the addition of NGOs in the "Pacifists" group.

them, military power is the way to prestige. Middle-power internationalists on the other hand, while embracing the US alliance, believe that Japan should keep a low profile in defence (Samuels 2007: 129). These four groups would inherit their basic characteristics and ideas from their Cold War and interwar predecessors (some, like Ishihara, would even prevail intra-periodically). These foreign policy traditions are now engaged in the (re)shaping of Japanese security policy.

4.2 Geopolitical and Geostrategic Discourses

The "normalist" Ozawa Ichiro would emerge as the first potential "reformer" among the Japanese political elite of the post-Cold War era. The term with which his foreign policy ideas would become inextricably associated and which wuld "haunt" Japanese foreign policy discourse since was that of a "normal nation" (*futsu no kuni*). In his view, the hallmark traits of a "normal nation" are: (1) willingness to shoulder responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community, irrespective of domestic political difficulties (and not taking action unwillingly as a result of "international pressure"); and (2) full cooperation with the international community in their effort to build prosperous and stable lives for their people (Ozawa 1994: 94-95). This being said, Ozawa´s view of "normalcy" is primarily linked to becoming an active member of an UN-centric system. Surely enough, Ozawa stated that the only reason for Japan to participate in military activities overseas is to operate in UN peace-maintenance activities. Not only would such activity not violate Article 9, it would fulfil the spirit of the Constitution, especially should the SDF function as a UN reserve army (Ibid.: 119). As one of the world´s advanced democratic nations, it was supposed to be Japan´s responsibility to cooperate with the US and Europe in building a new and stable order to replace the Cold War structure. The US-Japan alliance should continue and adapt, and Japan should not only guarantee its own security, but also prevent disputes in the Asia-Pacific, which is also to be her primary region of interest – with membership in the Asia-Pacific community being a second pillar of Japanese diplomacy next to the "advanced democratic nations" community (Ozawa 1994: 132-134).

Ozawa nevertheless did not manage to revise JapFSP, even though the security environment around Japan would rapidly be changing. In 1994, North Korea began its nuclear weapons programme, effectively sparking the long-lasting issue of WMD proliferation in Northeast Asia. The following year, China would conduct missile tests across the Strait of Taiwan, thereby not only causing the United States to "wave the flag" by sending its fleet into the area, but also touching the delicate issue of Japan´s SLOC security (Hughes 2009a: 27-29). The final "wake-up call" for Japanese policymakers took shape in a North Korean Taepodong-1 missile test in 1998, with the missile flying over Japanese territory in the process. It was this event which would lead to the decision of developing a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system in conjunction with the United States (Hughes 2009b: 297-299).

As a reaction to these developments, Japan and the US adopted new *Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation* in 1997 (sometimes referred to as New Guidelines), replacing those of 1978. The New Guidelines would primarily revise the framework for cooperation between both alliance partners. In geopolitical terms, their most interesting aspect lies in the concept of "Surrounding Areas"/"areas surrounding Japan" (*shuhen chiiki*/*shuhen jiitai*) in which the SDF can operate should a situation arise (Tamaki 2012: 188). As the guidelines themselves point out, the concept is not geographic, but situational.[32] As Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/02: 171) maintain in this context, the revised guidelines extend the scope of the US-Japan security arrangement under the provisions of the 1960 Security Treaty for the maintenance of peace and security in "the Far East" to include "situations in areas surrounding Japan". Whereas the "Far East" designation had been geographically defined by the government (refer to Chapter 3.2.2), the case here is not the same and in situations where rear-area support may be required, the "surrounding areas" are not necessarily limited to East Asia. Former foreign minister Ikeda Yukihiko suggested that "what happens determines the location" (Tamaki 2012: 188). Nonetheless, in 1999 Prime Minister Obuchi claimed that the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and the other side of the globe cannot be conceived of as being covered by the New Guidelines (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/02: 171).

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[32] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html (accessed 17.2.2014)

Tamaki accordingly argues that the Surrounding Areas constitute a recalibration of Japan´s threat perception, while the "peaceful nation" concept as a convenient rhetorical tool remains the predominant language through which contemporary threat perception in Japan is legitimised. The ambiguities of the concept represent the coexistence of change and continuity – a transformation in the way the international environment is seen through a reified perception of "Asia" as Japan´s existential milieu. The emergence of the Surrounding Areas narratives as a situational, rather than a geographical, term signifies a shift in Japan´s threat perception in response to international events, involving an interplay of identity as a historical product on the one hand with the subjective nature of threat perception on the other (Tamaki 2012: 188-189).

The flexibility of Japan´s spatial perception would somewhat prove itself after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 with the US invasion of Afghanistan. Occurring under the administration of Koizumi Junichiro, another normal nation-alist and perhaps the most remarkable Japanese politician since Yoshida´s day, Japan undertook what was arguably its most "radical" shift in post-war security policy. Through adopting the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML), the government dispatched three MSDF warships to the Indian Ocean to provide non-combat support to US military forces as part of the wider "war on terror". This action was fully consistent with the New Guidelines (Hughes 2004: 10; Midford 2003: 333), although it questioned the constitutionality of the SDF more clearly than ever before (Southgate 2003: 1601).

Japan would soon broaden its scope of operations further by establishing maritime security linkages with India and Australia, as well as setting up a naval base in Djibouti to tackle piracy in the region (Hughes 2009a: 90-91). North Korea and China would gradually move to the centre of Japan´s scope of interest as potential challenges. While North Korea would be labelled more explicitly as a short-term security risk, China´s military development would usually be accepted as such concerning the long term (Ibid. 27-31). Other geopolitical concepts would also enter Japanese discourse. Prime Minister Aso Taro would announce a new pillar of Japanese diplomacy in the creation of an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" ranging from Northern Europe, through the Baltic states, Central and South

Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and finally ending in Northeast Asia (MOFA 2007).

The nature of Japan´s maritime identity as codified by the post-war mercantilists would be pertained even in the post-Cold War period. As the 2011 National Defence Programme Guidelines stipulated:

> Japan, with its vast territorial waters, is a trading nation which heavily depends on imports for the supply of foods and resources and on foreign markets. Thus, securing maritime security and international order is essential for the country's prosperity. Moreover, Japan is geographically surrounded by water and has a long coastline and numerous islands. In addition to frequent natural disasters, Japan faces security vulnerabilities resulting from the concentration of industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and from the presence of a large number of key facilities in coastal areas (MOFA 2010: 4).

The second Abe administration (2012 – present) would continue in such rhetoric, perhaps on an even greater level. Abe himself especially has been making extensive use of language which explicitly frames Japan as a "maritime" or "oceanic" nation. His January 2013 speech in Jakarta titled "The Bounty of the Open Seas" is particularly interesting to note. As Abe said: "Japan's national interest lies eternally in keeping Asia's seas unequivocally open, free, and peaceful--in maintaining them as the commons for all the people of the world, where the rule of law is fully realized" (MOFA 2013a). In the very same speech, building upon such premise, he continues: "To achieve these goals, from the second half of the twentieth century through the present day Japan has consistently devoted its energy in two objectives. *In light of our geographic circumstances*, the two objectives are *natural and fundamental imperatives* for Japan, a nation surrounded by ocean and deriving its sustenance from those oceans--a nation that views the safety of the seas as its own safety. Though times may change, these objectives remain immutable" (MOFA 2013a; emphasis added). Here, Abe explicitly framed Japan´s security interests around the notion of space and territory. Moreover, he managed to connect the territorial with the social and political:

> One of these areas where we have concentrated our diplomatic effort is to ally with the United States. America is the world's greatest naval power and

> preeminent economic superpower; Japan is Asia's largest maritime democracy and a liberal capitalist state second only to the United States. It stands to reason that our two nations should be partners (MOFA 2013a).

While stressing the image of America as a nation powerful in the traditionally "hard" notions of security with the dual usage of the term "power" (here in both military and economical terms), Abe framed Japan´s position in the international environment around its character as a free market democracy with a maritime orientation. Such approach bears more than striking resemblance to the narratives applied by followers of the Yoshida Doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s. Apart from using it for framing the necessity of maintaining close ties with the US on both economical and military grounds (thus confirming the pro-US stance on one of the axes defined by Samuels), Abe also utilized the "open seas" narrative with regard to other Asian actors, specifically ASEAN:

> The second of the two vital objectives that have kept shaping the diplomacy of Japan, which *depends on the seas for its safety and prosperity*, is this: strengthening our ties with maritime Asia. … Maritime Asia has since ancient times been a place where civilizations blend with one another. Indonesia is a prime example of Maritime Asia's calm, open nature, which brings about not conflict among different religions and culture, but coexistence. This is something that continues to impress a great many Japanese to this day. … Both Japan and ASEAN are connected with the rest of the world by the broad oceans. I believe we must work together side by side to make our world one of freedom and openness, ruled not by might but by law (MOFA 2013a; emphasis added).

Similarly to the previous quote concerning the United States, Abe makes repeated usage of linking Japan´s maritime orientation towards both military (safety) and economic (prosperity) security, (i.e. comprehensive security). Once again, the maritime space (both in Asia and globally) is conceptualized as a "common ground", a "mutual space" where different nations possessing certain common "noble" qualities (i.e. Maritime Asia as a place of blending and coexistence) are able to share and strive towards common goals.

During a speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in February 2013, Abe continued on a similar note: "… Japan must continue to be a guardian of the global commons, like the maritime commons, open enough to benefit everyone". On the topic of maintaining and strengthening the alliance with America, he added an argument based on the similar notions as quoted above: "The United States, the oldest and the biggest maritime democracy, and Japan, Asia's most experienced and biggest liberal democracy that is also an ocean-goer, are a natural fit. They have been so for many decades, and they will remain so for many more decades to come" (MOFA 2013b). In this case, the "maritime democracy" designation which Abe previously attributed to Japan´s position in Asia was used to describe America´s setting in the world stage. Again, the socio-political identity of a "liberal democracy" and the territorial/spatial identity of a "maritime state" are utilized to codify a specific "natural" connection between the two countries. Not in terms of material interests, but rather in terms of their national character, sharing the same notion of "self".

If maritime space as such managed to serve Abe in formulating specific bounding narratives towards the United States and Southeast Asia, then in the case of UK-Japan relations the prime minister did not hesitate to utilize the IJN and MSDF directly as connecting agents between the two countries:

> Japan learned the A to Z of modern navy entirely from the U.K., and so there is no question that the members of the MSDF themselves should feel very much honoured and accomplished to conduct the joint exercise with the Royal Navy. … This year marks the 400th year since the U.K. and Japan first encountered each other via the seas. … We must not forget that in the Great War, whose centenary since its outbreak we commemorate next year, members of the Imperial Japanese Navy executed extraordinary operational techniques to escort British ships successfully, for which they came to be called "the guardian of the Mediterranean" (Kantei 2013b).

Such language is interesting in that there appears to be a lack of any distinction whatsoever between pre- and post-1945 Japan, more specifically its maritime security institutions. The IJN and the MSDF are treated precisely as representing

one single line of tradition, fulfilling the same role. Moreover, this naval tradition is an establishing factor of relations between two countries. Thus, in this case, the maritime space constitutes a place of connection and one in which once established ties may function under the same principles. As Abe continued:

> So, what, then, is this original relationship between Japan and the U.K.? It is a relationship in which together we uphold maritime security. Now, one hundred years hence, the location has changed to off the coast of Somalia or in the Gulf of Aden, but the U.K. and Japan have returned to being partners who work together to maintain the safety of navigation. … Both our nations live together with the blessings provided by the sea, and we make ocean-going commerce our lifeline. The fact that our nations accord a respect to seamanship that is virtually unmatched anywhere is also because peace on the seas connects directly to our national interests (Kantei 2013b).

Once again, through the construction of maritime space as the origin of peace and prosperity, and by linking it to the "ocean-going" nature of both countries, this narrative establishes the ocean as a space of a common identity and cooperation. The role attributed to the IJN and MSDF is one of spatial control. And yet, this type of control is not about changing the status quo, but instead preserving it. In a similar manner, on the occasion of "Marine Day" in July 2013, Abe linked Japan´s maritime identity directly with the surrounding security environment:

> … the security environment has become increasingly severe, including through provocations surrounding our territorial waters. The peace and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation have their origins in free, open, and peaceful seas. Based on a shift in thinking from "a country protected by the sea" to "a country that protects the sea," Japan is determined to maintain stable sea lanes and defend our maritime interests within our territorial waters and EEZ while also upholding the order of free and open seas on the basis of the rule of law, opposing changes to the status quo predicated by force (Kantei 2013c).

The emphasis placed on the "open seas" as a prerequisite for Japan´s peaceful existence is obvious. The "provocations surrounding our territorial waters" formulation serves as an obvious reference to Chinese aerial and maritime incursions around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The interesting notion here is the stressing of a shift from "protection *by* the sea" to "protection *of* the sea". The geographical space surrounding Japan does hence not constitute a natural safety barrier, but instead should be regarded as a medium in which it is necessary to actively operate and exercise a certain degree of control – a notion which first appeared with the formation of Meiji Japan. Such phrasing would reaffirm necessity for Japan´s proactive stance towards preserving global security, as well as its own (thus reflecting the second axis of Japan´s current security discourse). This stance was confirmed by Abe in October 2013: "In today's international community, no country can maintain its peace and safety by itself. The Abe Administration will proactively contribute to securing peace, stability and prosperity of the world under the banner of proactive contribution to peace, based on a belief in international cooperation" (Kantei 2013f). Additionally, in an address to the SDF that very month, Abe said:

> The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe. North Korea is developing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. And provocations against our sovereignty are being there. This is reality. Facing the reality, we must defend the lives and properties of the Japanese people, as well as our territory, territorial waters, and territorial airspace in a resolute manner. We must also contribute to world peace and stability. The Nation bestows such responsibilities on you (Kantei 2013a).

Here is where Abe directly touches the "severity" of Japan´s security environment. North Korea with its WMD and missile programmes is explicitly labelled as a source of threat, while China´s assertiveness is simply silently implied through the "presence of provocations to sovereignty". This being "reality", i.e. something which is undoubtedly happening (the threat to Japan´s security is there), the role of the SDF is to assure the control of Japanese territorial space in all of its dimensions.

Among the defence reforms being undertaken by the current Japanese administration, special attention has been given to the issue of territorial integrity and off-shore islands defence, particularly with regard to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Tensions regarding the issue arose in autumn 2012, when Ishihara Shintaro - then Governor of Tokyo - announced the intention to purchase the islands, and have been continuing ever since. As a general rule, the geographical focus on Japan´s south-western territories has become a constitutive element in the current administration´s external security discourse, as exemplified by remarks made by Abe and his ministers themselves, but most prominently by the new National Defence Programme Guidelines and National Security Strategy. In each of these key documents, the security environment surrounding Japan has been repeatedly labelled as ”increasingly severe” and including an increasing number of "grey-zone" situations (i.e. neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests), with North Korea presenting the most destabilizing factor with its nuclear and ballistic missiles development. Additionally, China´s increased activities in the airspace and sea area around Japan, including violation of Japan´s territorial waters and breach of airspace, are still regarded as requiring "consideration" and appropriate measures on part of the SDF (Kantei 2013d; Kantei 2013e).

Some of the most recent remarks made by Abe´s administration show little difference from the trend, such as his intended review of Japan´s right on collective self-defence. Under this predicament, Japan cannot use force except in cases where another country launches an organized and planned armed attack on the nation, whether it is on Japanese territory, territorial waters or airspace. The Abe administration plans to change the condition to, "Or an armed attack breaks out in other countries and, thereby, endangers Japan´s existence that is indispensable to protect lives and the rights of the Japanese people." According to several government officials, who have opposed the planned reinterpretation due to the vagueness of the wording "endangers Japan´s existence" (which could, as a result, drastically expand the theatre of operations where the SDF can use force), one case where it might be applied is the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the subsequent suspension of crude oil supplies to Japan – something which would endanger the country´s existence. Another possible scenario is an emergency on

the Korean Peninsula, where a North Korean attack on South Korea or US forces could be judged as eventually leading to a missile attack on US bases in Japan (Asahi Shimbun 2014). Even now do prospects of deliberate expansion of the SDF´s operational area raise concerns.

Considering the focus on offshore defence, the International Federation for Victory over Communism (IFVOC), a Tokyo-based political movement with an exclusive (and for Japan quite unique) interest in security issues presents an interesting example to look at in terms of formal geopolitical reasoning. Its representatives often address the public by delivering speeches, the content of which is usually built around the threats posed by China´s growing military capabilities and North Korea´s missile and WMD programmes. The IFVOC argues for the necessity to revise the Constitution and develop closer security ties and cooperation with the United States and South Korea. The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is often stressed and bases the necessity of an active Japanese approach on the premise that the PLAN is developing its capacities in line with an "island chains strategy" – one according to which the Chinese navy is aiming to develop capabilities to project power beyond the so-called Second Island Chain in the foreseeable future. Unsurprisingly, there has been positive reaction on part of the IFVOC to the reforms being undertaken by the Abe administration in the new NSS and NDPG with regard to offshore defence. To further disseminate its ideas, the IFVOC publishes its own newspaper, the *Shiso Shimbun*, which is also exclusively focused on security-related issues.[33]

The concept of the First and Second Island Chains is one often appearing not only in literature concerning Chinese naval development and strategy, especially its supposed effort to obtain maritime projection / blue-water navy capabilities (see Till 2009: 325-326; Woolley 2005: 195), but also in academic work related to Japanese security on the high seas. As Wirth (2012: 228) notes on the subject: "The construction of island chains by strategic analysts is used to draw lines that would mark barriers or defence perimeters relevant to surface and submarine combatants in the event of military conflict. How precisely these chains would be

[33] The information provided in this paragraph is based on various data available on the IFVOC website (www.ifvoc.org), but primarily on my personal interview with an IFVOC speaker at such described event, which took place in October 2012 at Takadanobaba Station, Tokyo.

relevant in contemporary warfare remains unclear though." A similarly sceptical viewpoint is findable among Japanese naval officers as well (see Koda 2010: 69). Certain scholars appear to adhere to this viewpoint by evaluating the island chains as serving Japanese strategists for the purpose of the conceptual delimitation of a "maritime safety zone" based on the experience of the WWII naval blockade by Allied forces, rather than actual tactical necessities (e.g. Graham 2006; Wirth 2012). As an example of such rhetoric worth mentioning are the views of Kawamura Sumihiko, former Rear Admiral of the MSDF and deputy director of the conservative Okazaki Institute in Tokyo (Mizokami 2011).

Kawamura is hardly a novice when it comes to promoting a specific form of security policy framed around geostrategic reasoning. As Japan´s Defence Attaché to the United States, he played a crucial role in the maintenance of US Navy-MSDF personnel linkages which helped shape the Alliance´s security and defence policy in the late 1970s / early 1980s[34] (Graham 2006: 132). In his 2012 book elaborating on Chinese options for "stealing" the Senkaku Islands[35] (an event which he considers possible), Kawamura utilizes a number of geostrategically crafted maps and cartographical narratives to support his argument and help the reader to "visualize" the existing situation in the region. Among these are those displaying the aforementioned island chains concept. I present some of them for illustration.

The first map portrays the island chains with consideration towards the stationing of PLAN forces on the one side and US-Japanese forces on the other (Figure 6). The "blank" space between both chains evokes a "free" and "safe" area, especially with the US bases on Okinawa and Guam posing as "guardians" of that particular space. By linking US positions in the Western Pacific via these "chains" with the Japanese Islands, the image initiates one´s fantasy that should Chinese forces – at the moment appearing "contained" – "penetrate" these lines, Japan´s security and the access to southward sea lanes would be jeopardized. Here the PLAN fleets are depicted in an even more appealing manner through the usage of black icons of warships.

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[34] One which would take form in the 1978 Guidelines (refer to Chapter 3.2).

[35] The original name of the book is *Senkaku o tori ni kuru chūgoku kaigun no jitsuryoku: jieitai wa ikani tachimukauka*. While no translation from the original Japanese text related to the maps is provided here, the images function well in a fairly self-explanatory manner, especially when one refers to Kawamura´s other remarks on PLAN strategy (see Mizokami 2011).

Figure 6: Main Bases of US/Japanese and Chinese Forces

Source: Kawamura (2012: 28)

The second map then portrays both island chains in their entirety with regard to East Asia, thus highlighting the wider regional implications (Figure 7). Kawamura also links China´s efforts to control the isles with an intention to turn the South China Sea into a "safe haven" for its SLBM-carrying submarines (the First Island Chain in its southern-most portion actually copies the U-shaped line associated with Chinese territorial claims on the entire sea), in order to gain a more favourable position vis-à-vis the US in terms of second-strike capabilities (Mizokami 2011; Yoshida 2012). By this, Kawamura adds yet another strategic dimension to the entire concept, which furthermore reminisces similar allegations made by proponents of MSDF expansion in the late 1970s in response to increasing Soviet submarine presence in the Far East (refer to Chapter 3.2.2). To further emphasize China´s "desire" to break through the "natural" geographical (as well as geo-political) entrapment presented by numerous archipelagos (and states) in the Western Pacific, a reversed map highlighting its supposed embedment in the Asian continent and potentially prohibited access to world oceans is utilized (Figure 8).

Figure 7: The First and Second Island Chains
Source: Kawamura (2012: 61)

Figure 8: A China with Closed Access to the Ocean
Source: Kawamura (2012: 79)

Just like in the case of the IFVOC, the discourse employed by Nakamura is a more assertive one compared to what comes as official government policy – a sign of

how formal geopolitical reasoning in Japan can be diametrically different from the practical one (here in the particular case of a perceived China threat).

4.3 Strategic and Geopolitical Culture

Unlike the Imperial or Cold War period, no consensus has yet appeared among the current foreign policy traditions in Japan. However, several of the normal nation-alist prime ministers (Koizumi and Abe foremost) have managed to push through numerous security initiatives, which might be signalling a turning tide. On the other hand, as mentioned before, an effort of change was accompanied by a sign of continuity. An example would be the deployment of SDF to post-conflict spaces (Iraq, Afghanistan), without the Japanese military managing to establish itself in such role (Hynek 2012a: 62). The MSDF too would play a central role in Japan´s expanding security posture around the globe. It would become a major participant in disaster relief operations worldwide (Engstrom 2013: 42-43) and provide the sea-based platform for Japan´s evolving BMD system (Oros 2008: 152-154). The SDF would not undertake any combat operations. While the perception of the deteriorating security environment was being reflected and as such the normal nation-alists have certainly presented a strategic outlook able to influence the country´s conduct in world affairs, this conduct would still happen under the auspices of the Cold War "peaceful" nation posture.

An interesting element worth mentioning here is the role of Japan´s other maritime security organization – the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG). Richard Samuels (2007/08; 2008: 78-80) has argued that the JCG has been exhibiting potential to become a full-fledged armed force (like its US counterpart); a "fourth branch" of the SDF one might say. This applies to its capabilities (with JCG vessels reaching the same level of size and armament as those of certain nations´ navies, and sometime even decommissioned MSDF destroyers – see Hughes 2009a: 50), not its legal status, as in this regard it is a fundamentally different institution from the MSDF. Not only are they subordinated to different ministries, but the JCG functions solely as a maritime policing agency and is not responsible for national defence. Its issue areas nonetheless include: incursions made by North Korean spy ships,

territorial disputes, piracy and international terrorism, ensuring safety of navigation at sea, protecting and policing the maritime environment, and conducting search and rescue operations (Black 2012: 261-262). Aside from the last one mentioned, all of these tasks fit conveniently within Japan´s perception of the maritime space as the basis of its national security, and under "normal" circumstances would easily fall under MSDF jurisdiction. However, the fact that it is the JCG carrying out such tasks implies how this institution of maritime security functions as a geopolitical agent reproducing Japans persisting "pacifist" security identity. As Black (2012: 277-279) shows on the Japanese response to piracy in the Gulf of Aden, based on designating the JCG with the task (the MSDF would be limited to convoy and surveillance duties), this presents a non-military model emphasizing the build-up of local maritime law enforcement agencies – something with which the JCG had had experience in Southeast Asia. This geographical distribution of such models (towards Southeast Asia and the Middle East) could also be considered as a manifestation of Japan´s ocean-going outlook.

One particular aspect which has not yet been addressed is the popular geopolitics of Japanese geopolitical culture. This element is arguably the least examined component in contemporary JapFSP-related academia and presents a significant challenge.. Existing studies dedicated to Japanese popular culture usually treat it as a fundamental element of Japanese "soft power", introducing the image of Japan as a cultural power (e.g. Otmazgin 2008 and 2012), examine the topic of fantasies of war in cinema (Gerow 2006) or focus on the usage of popular culture by the military (Frühstück 2007 and 2009). As such, while relevant scholarly work on the issue exists, there appears to be lack of framing it within the increasing amount of critical geopolitics literature.

Thus, I will very briefly (and hopefully appropriately) address Japanese popular geopolitics in the form of visual culture. The narrow selection is a direct result of my explicit focus on Japanese maritime identity, as the way the MSDF portrays itself and is portrayed deserves appropriate attention. Two forms of popular visual representations and their effects are usually being considered among texts on popular geopolitics: the lens imagery of television, photography and film, and the drawn imagery of cartoons (Hughes 2007: 983). Here I shall address the former,

specifically in the form of visual representations (both video and photography) utilized by the MSDF on their social media sites. While far from a complex coverage of the issue, my aim is to point out certain characteristics within the contemporary popular representations and narratives related to Japanese maritime tradition and the way in which the study of popular geopolitics of the issue can perhaps contribute to an alternative grasp of the subject. Such aim is certainly relevant, since, as Ó Tuathail (1996: 197) claims, geopolitics has itself become a televisual and entertainmentized phenomenon.

When comparing the individual branches of the Self-Defence Forces, the MSDF has shown to be quite initiative in building its public image. Its PR-related activities can be identified with usage of many socia media, such as Youtube, where it utilizes video imagery, or Facebook, where the images are of photographical nature. Their focuses in terms of content are predominantly similar: the introduction and documentation of the MSDF´s activities and character to the wider Japanese public. The MSDF official Facebook page performs primarily the task of documenting events and activities, such as disaster relief operations, training exercises, fleet reviews, or public events[36]. Several of the images presented there are worthy of notion. As an example, I present two. The first comes from the October 2012 fleet review and is put into contrast with an IJN propaganda poster (Figure 9). Despite being separated by decades in origin from one another, the composition of the images is basically identical: a fleet of vessels in a column formation behind the "rising sun" flag – itself a specific symbol of controversy and continuity, as it is often associated with Japan´s wartime militarism (see Okamura 2008), but yet has been retained in usage by the MSDF (the flag thus being an element of continuation between the two branches).

[36] https://www.facebook.com/JMSDF.PAO.fp?fref=ts (accessed 12,12,2013)

Figure 9: Two Eras, One Narrative. Left: IJN Propaganda Poster (date unknown); Right: Photograph from the 2012 MSDF Fleet Review
Sources: www.bookmice.net[37] and MSDF Official Facebook Page[38]

This brings us to the second image in question, which appeared on the MSDF Facebook page when Tokyo was considered among the candidate cities for the 2020 Summer Olympics (a bid it would eventually win). In this case, crew members of the *Hyūga* helicopter destroyer – a ship some might consider being a sign of a resurging Japanese military - formed the Olympic rings symbol and the "TOKYO" sign to show their support for the capital´s bid. The MSDF in this particular case managed to present its "normal" identity by visually expressing support for an internationally popular sports event which might take place in the country (the socio-political significance of such events is hardly doubtful). As the image shows, the rising sun flag was also utilized to visually represent the MSDF as a supporter of Tokyo´s bid and thus accompanies the Olympic symbols.

[37] http://www.bookmice.net/darkchilde/japan/other/jpos8.jpg (accessed 15.12.2013)
[38]https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.419949768066747.99130.161912430537150&type=1 (accessed 15.12.2013)

Figure 10: The crew of MSDF helicopter destroyer *Hyūga* performing Olympic rings and a "TOKYO" sign in September 2013
Source: MSDF Official Facebook Page[39]

Whereas Figure 9 demonstrates the continuation present in visual propaganda (and symbols) utilized by the Japanese naval forces, Figure 10 illustrates the manner in which visual narratives are being used to promote the "civil" and "normal" nature of the SDF, i.e. its "peaceful" identity. This is done so via connection with the Olympic Games, the prime international sports event and symbol of equality and cooperation. The MSDF Youtube channel functions similarly and contains numerous videos related to the very same type of events, as well as recruitment videos featuring college students and MSDF personnel discussing the "normalcy" of serving in the MSDF.[40] The popular representation of this particular service branch of Japan´s military hence reflects the overall political effort of maintaining a "peaceful" continuity, while at the same time seeking certain type of change. A good example is presented in Figure 10, which combines the logo of a peaceful event and two potential symbols of Japanese militarism and "militarism".

[39] https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.592322127496176.1073741889.161912430537150&type=3 (accessed 10.9.2013)
[40] https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCqcufnRichGBohzClI3DalA (accessed 15.12.2014)

5. Identifying and Linking Japan´s Geopolitical Imagination(s)

The address of foreign policy traditions, geopolitical and geostrategic discourses, and strategic and geopolitical culture in each major period of Japan´s history has provided us with insight on the basis of the country´s geopolitical conduct and perception of the world. This chapter will now seek to evaluate the gathered information in such a way that will help us determine the character of Japan´s geopolitical imagination. Firstly, it is useful to remind ourselves on the definition of geopolitical imagination and the ways to approach it.

As Ó Tuathail (2004: 84) states: "Geographical imagination can be defined as the way in which influential groups in the cultural life of a state define that state and nation within the world. It addresses the primary acts of identification and boundary-formation that population groups within a state engages." Some of the key questions in the exploration of this concept are: How are notions of "self" and "other" assembled? How does a population situate its country within a world of geographical regions and collective identities? How are proximity and distance to other states and regions specified? How are a particular "homeland" defined and a range of "friends" and "enemies" specified? How does a certain image of a nation get specified in these acts of geographical identification?" The most appropriate procedure at this point is to examine each of the four periods individually with the above outlined definition and questions in mind. Based on the findings, I will try to pinpoint the character of Japan´s geopolitical imagination.

The Meiji Consensus brought along with it the construction of a specific national identity, anchoring the notion of a "national essence" in Japanese society. Meiji leaders would revive native doctrines to unite the people in an effort to "catch up and surpass" the West. In order to do so, the Japanese would be educated (literally) to turn towards the progressive West and detach themselves from the Asian countries which were viewed as too backward. Japanese Islands on the other hand were attributed an aura of matchless territory and designated as defending Asia from threats coming from the Pacific. Within this specific outlook, Japan is perceived as an isolated entity in three distinctive ways: (1) *geographically* – not

only is Japan an insular country separated by masses of water, but the islands are also blessed with "matchless territory and shape", attaining thus a "divine" character; (2) *techno-economically* – Japan is significantly ahead in development from the rest of Asia, and as such does not consider itself part of it; at the same time, it is yet to catch up with the West, but will strive to surpass it once it does; and (3) *socio-culturally* – Japan´s "national essence" makes the nation unique compared to others. Each of these three elements can also be considered as a sign of Japanese self-perceived *superiority* or *uniqueness*. Another aspect of this imagination is Japan´s self-delimitation vis-à-vis two political-territorial subjects: *Asia* and the *West*.

During the imperial period, Japan as the only non-colonized Asian country felt that is should position itself against the imperialists, seeing itself as the sole Asian power capable of doing so, and even designating "lines of defence" for that purpose. In the Meiji manner, it also considered Asia as an object of desire; one that would require protection. Russia, France and the US would be considered as enemies. The mainstream nativist and Asianist foreign policy traditions would "enrich" this view with a racial aspect, which on the one hand advocated connection with China, but under Japanese control. Otherwise Japan was to hold a belligerent stance. The Konoe Consensus added and economic dimension to Southeast Asia, advocating common existence and mutual prosperity. While a racial connection was absent, it would be added with geopolitical theories. Geopolitical imagination throughout the imperial era rested on numerous aspects. First, there was once again positioning vis-à-vis two subjects: Asia and the West. However, instead of pure superiority, Japan conceptualized its role towards the continent as a protective one (of course persuasion to do so was rooted precisely in Japan´s self-perceived and/or actual superiority). With the nativist tradition emerging, the perception of continental Asia (or China, respectively) would change to one of racial equality conditioned by political submission. The West would be considered as a hostile community, based on its perception as endangering imperialism. Finally, there was a new region of interest – Southeast Asia – in the case of which perceptions of ethnicity would be *subordinated to material interests* and hidden under the guise of constructed *geopolitical narratives based on a supposed "binding" space*.

The post-war system was one in which neomilitarist and nativist views became sidelined and their representatives had to reinvent themselves as mainstream conservatives. Revisionists saw Japan in a traditional manner as organically unique, whereas pacifists saw it as having “natural” pacifist tendencies based on its wartime experience. Pragmatists gave priority to trade, constructing around it an identity of a merchant state; one without negative views towards anyone and which view every state as a potential accessible market. An approach based on equality and understanding was confirmed by the Fukuda Doctrine. The maritime space was viewed in terms of commerce and an increased focus on SLOC protection was taken. Territorially, China, Southeast Asia and the US were the centres of interest, but from a commercial point of view. Once again, the defining characterization of Japan´s surroundings was based on perceived uniqueness, or rather *special identity*, which differed based on the foreign policy tradition adhering to it, and was built upon a *specific historical experience* – Japan´s defeat for the pacifists, nativist legacy for the revisionists, and the strive for economic recovery for the pragmatists. Unlike the Meiji period, this unique identity would craft the image of a surrounding world that needs to be approached, not detached from. Their view was further shaped by a certain market-preferred perception - as long as a country was willing to participate in trade, it would be treated accordingly as an equal.

Finally, the post-Cold War era is characterized by the coexistence of an effort for change and at the same time continuity of the Cold War posture. Such designation does not clarify much. However, if one takes the maritime identity into consideration, more specific assumptions can be made. There appears to be a mercantilist discourse underpinned by normalist reasoning. The geographical focus is primarily focused on the US and ASEAN as well as other potential actors who represent a similar (and thus amicable) combination of maritime orientation and free-market democracy, or China and Korea as potential threats to territorial integrity, as witnessed from the formal geopolitical representations analyzed in Chapter 4.2. Moreover, recent discourse suggests a shift from protection by the sea to protection of the sea, hinting towards more proactive behaviour in JapFSP.

Each of the four historical periods is distinctive in the way in which Japan has perceived itself and the surrounding world. Based on the character of the international environment, the historical experience and the dominant foreign policy tradition(s), Japan´s geopolitical imagination would produce a different type of geopolitical culture. However, the categories of each imagination would appear at least similar in nature. Territorially, there persists a focus on China, the US and Southeast Asia. Another widespread aspect is a certain sense of unique identity, which can take many forms. Further elaboration on this subject would be required to try and outline a universally applicable schematic of individual elements comprising the geopolitical imagination of a state.

Conclusion

This thesis attempted to introduce a critical geopolitics perspective to the study of Japanese foreign and security policy. Its primary goals were: (1) to identify and characterize Japan´s geopolitical imagination throughout history; and (2) attempt to determine whether and how has this imagination expressed itself with regard to Japan´s maritime identity in the country´s security policy.

In order to achieve the foresaid goal, an adapted version of the concept of "geopolitics as culture" had proven to be useful and efficient in the determination of the characteristics of Japan´s geopolitical imagination. Reviewing the historical development of Japan´s security policy based on the classification of Japanese historical foreign policy traditions as classified by Richard Samuels, and linking them to appropriate selected geopolitical and geostrategic discourses (thereby eliminating the "weak" traditions from the final equation), a characterization of strategic and geopolitical culture was made possible. From a combination of all these three aforementioned elements in play, a general characterization of the geopolitical imagination underpinning each period in Japanese history was attempted. The results show that while the imaginations in each period were different, they often built on the same elements and even shared the same perceptions, which might help in their potential future categorization and generalization.

In order to achieve the second goal, a focus on the discourses related to the maritime identity of Japan was necessary throughout the thesis. Confrontation of the key elements of Japanese security policy in each period with these discourses would show that Japan´s maritime identity has proven to be a flexible geopolitical/geostrategic notion, as it could successfully be adapted to any new security posture produced within each historical era and the maritime security apparatuses were capable of becoming bearers of this particular identity. In Meiji Japan, the Imperial Navy would become the new fighting force in the Pacific, ensuring Japan´s strength and parity with the West. Throughout the imperial era, the Navy would play a rather smaller political role than the Army, but constituted a crucial asset in the practical formation of the New Order in East Asia. Under the Yoshida Doctrine, it was the merchant navy which was the primary geopolitical

agent of mercantilism in the maritime space, but the MSDF would eventually catch up on that role through SLOC defence. The contemporary ambiguity surrounding Japan´s future security posture has been reflected in the maritime domain as well. While MSDF vessels have been deployed for numerous missions and tasks in numerous places, the MSDF (like the entire SDF) is still subject to restrictions or inabilities on part of the government, or intentionally presents itself in a too "peaceful" manner. At the same time, while the Japanese government places increasing emphasis on the peaceful maritime nature of the nation, ideas can be located among former naval officers that suggest a more resolute posture towards the security environment in East Asia. Given so, the answer to the second research question is such that components of Japan´s maritime identity (such as the IJN or MSDF) would conveniently channel and bear the ideas produced by specific geopolitical imaginations, cultures, or dominant traditions of the said time.

Summary

Japanese foreign and security policy underwent major changes over the course of history. In each period since the creation of modern Japan, different schools of foreign policy thought would gain prominence on the political scene and determine the direction of Japan´s security.

Richard Samuels has defined four major schools of foreign policy thought in Japan, whose ideas have persisted, evolved and adapted since the interwar era. Using his classification as a departure point, this thesis takes a look at the evolution of Japanese foreign and security policy through the lens of critical geopolitics, specifically the concept of "geopolitics as culture." Modifying the concept and adapting it to Samuels´s classification, the foreign policy traditions are linked with appropriate geopolitical/geostrategic discourses in order to derive the character of the strategic and geopolitical culture in selected periods of time. Additionally, special attention is being paid to issues related to Japan´s "maritime identity" in an effort to link it to the geopolitical imagination.

The analysis has concluded that in each significant period of history, Japan had a dominant geopolitical imagination characterized by a set of categories, some of which would be consistent of those with an imagination in another period.

Additionally, Japan´s maritime identity was successfully linked to each of the historical perceptions on security, thus showing, that Japanese maritime security institutions were flexible bearers of changing security postures and identities.

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