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The Sublime Revisited

The Kantian Sublime in the Historical Context

Master's Thesis

Supervised by: Prof. Dr. Hans Rainer Sepp

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this Master's thesis is my own work and that the bibliography contains all the literature that I have used in writing the thesis. I declare herewith that I have only used this Master's thesis to gain a master's degree in the universities of the consortium as part of the Erasmus Master Mundus programme „German and French Philosophy in the European Context" (EuroPhilosophy). I also give my consent that this Master's thesis can be accessed by public for the purpose of study in a relevant library of Charles University and via the electronic database of academic degree theses of Charles University in accordance with the copyright law.

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Abstract

The present research explores firstly, the history of the sublime from Longinus to Kant, secondly, it focuses on a close reading of Kant's pre-Critical treatise on the sublime, i.e. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime,* it then brings the latter text in a dialogue with the discourse of sublimity and the theories of major figures in the history of the sublime as far as they have been a source of influence for Kant's pre-Critical account. Finally, it briefly explores the development and transformation of the sublime from *Observations* to the *Analytic of the Sublime* in the *Third Critique,* aiming at showing the contributions the Critical Philosophy has had to Kantian aesthetics. The current literature on the sublime usually undertakes either a historical-chronological approach towards Kant's predecessors, or treats Kantian sublime as the major focal point hence downgrading other theories of sublime preceding that of Kant already by 1764. Accordingly, it proves both illuminating and necessary to try to locate Kantian sublime within the historical context, in order to both find out Kant's specific contributions to the discourse of sublimity and to evaluate other theories of the sublime until the time of Kant. Moreover, another question addressed by this research is the influence and impact of Kant's moral theory for and on his aesthetics. The sublime is a pivotal element of Kantian aesthetics which reveals how Kant's moral theory has developed from 1760s to 1780s, from a theory close to British moral sense theorists to one with a priori grounds, based on Kant's pure practical reason; moreover an analysis of the sublime in the light of its relation to moral feeling helps us view the pre-Critical text not as superficial or peripheral to the *Third Critique*, but as independently crucial to Kant's philosphy.

To answer these issues, we have first explored the history of the sublime as far as it has functioned as a source of inspiration for Kant, i.e. the sublime in Longinus, Boileau, Addison, Shaftesbury and Burke. A brief sketch of Hutcheson also paves the way to address the issue of Kant's moral theory's development. Next, we have explored *Observations* in some detail, bringing it then in a dialogue with the aforementioned accounts in order to explore the novelties of Kantian sublime. In the appendix to this text we have treated the Critical sublime, then compared it with the pre-Critical one. Consequently, we have concluded our research by the contention that Kantian aesthetics is essentially interwoven with Kantian ethics, the developments of the latter of which guiding the development of the former. Moreover, we have come to the understanding that Kantian sublime could be viewed to have more similarities with the Longinian sublime as it is usually thought, and less affinities with Burkean sublime. We have the contention that such an approach provides us with a more comprehensive picture of any aesthetics, especially Kantian aesthetics which goes hand in hand with Kantian ethics for which the developments of the sublime is a very clear example. This will help any future research have a deeper understanding of pre-Critical aesthetics; hence see it for what it is worth.

Keywords: true/false sublime, noble sublime, moral feeling, moral sense theory, mathematically/dynamically sublime

Abstract

Das vorliegende Forschungsprojekt untersucht zunächst die Geschichte des Erhabenen von Longinus bis Kant und schließt zweitens eine konzentrierte und nahe Textanalyse von Kants vorkritischen Text über das Erhabene, z.B. *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen* an. Letzterer wird sodann in einem Dialog mit dem Diskurs des Erhabenen und Theorien der Hauptvertreter in der Geschichte des Erhabenen gebracht, insofern diese Kants vorkritische Position beeinflusst haben. Schlussendlich wird kurz die Entwicklung und Transformation des Erhabenen von *Beobachtungen* zu der *Analyse des Erhabenen* in der *dritten Kritik* nachgezeichnet, um aufzuzeigen, welchen Beitrag die Kritische Philosophie für Kants Ästhetik geleistet hat. Die aktuelle Forschungsliteratur zum Erhabenen zeichnet sich normalerweise entweder durch ein historisch-chronologisches Vorgehen bezüglich Kants Vorgängern aus, oder konzentriert sich hauptsächlich auf das Kantische Erhabene, wodurch andere, Kant bis 1764 vorgängige Theorien des Erhabenen abgewertet werden. Dementsprechend erweist es sich nicht nur als aufschlussreich, sondern auch notwendig, das Erhabene nach Kant im historischen Kontext zu verorten und so einerseits Kants spezifischen Beitrag zum Diskurs des Erhabenen herauszustellen und andererseits andere Theorien bis Kant diesbezüglich zu bewerten. Eine weitere Frage, die sich in dieser Forschungsarbeit stellt, betrifft Einfluss und Wirkung von Kants Moralphilosophie für und auf seine Ästhetik. Das Erhabene ist ein zentrales Element von Kants Ästhetik, das erkennen lässt, wie sich Kants Theorie der Moral beginnend in den 1760er bis in die 1780er von einer Theorie mit größer Nähe zu britischen Vertretern des Moralischen Sinns hin zu einer apriorischen Fundierung entwickelt hat. Hinzu kommt, das seine Analyse des Erhabenen im Licht seiner Relation zum moralischen Gefühl hilfreich ist, um den vorkritischen Text Kants nicht nur als oberflächlich oder peripher im Verhältnis zur *dritten Kritik* zu sehen, sondern in einem davon unabhängigen Sinne als wichtig für Kants Philosophie einzuordnen.

Um diesen Problemstellungen nachzugehen, haben wir zuerst die Geschichte des Erhabenen, insofern sie als Inspirationsquelle für Kant dient, untersucht, z.B. das Erhabene bei Longinus, Boileau, Addison, Shaftesbury und Burke. Die kurze Skizze von Hutcheson ebnet den Weg, um das Thema von der Entwicklung der Kantischen Moraltheorie zu adressieren. Danach haben wir die *Beobachtungen* im Detail analysiert und diese in einen Dialog mit den zuvor angeführten Positionen gebracht, um die Neuerungen bezüglich des Erhabenen bei Kant zu extrapolieren. Schließlich haben wir in diesen Text die kritische Konzeption des Erhabenen mit der vorkritischen verglichen. Infolgedessen schließen wir diese Forschungsarbeit mit der Behauptung, dass die Ästhetik Kants essentiell mit dessen Ethik verwoben ist, wobei die Entwicklung des Letzteren die des Ersteren mit anleitet. Darüber hinaus sind wir zu der Einsicht gekommen, dass das Erhabene nach Kant einerseits mehr mit dem Erhabenen nach Longinus gemein hat, als bisher angenommen wurde, und andererseits weniger mit dem von Burke. Wir behaupten, dass dieser Ansatz ein umfassenderes Bild von jeglicher Ästhetik bietet, besonders im Falle Kants, dessen Ästhetik mit seiner Ethik einhergeht und eben durch die Entwicklung des Erhabenen exemplifiziert wird. Dergestalt kann jede zukünftige Forschung auf ein tieferes Verständnis für die vorkritische Ästhetik aufbauen und somit dessen Wert ermessen.

Abstract

Cette étude examine d'abord l'histoire du sublime de Longinus à Kant. Ensuite, elle se concentre sur une lecture rapprochée du traité précritique de Kant sur le sublime, c'est-à-dire les *Observations sur le sentiment du beau et du sublime*. Nous établirons un dialogue entre ce dernier texte et le discours de la sublimité et les théories des grandes figures dans l'histoire du sublime dans la mesure où ils apparaissent influents sur la conception précritique de Kant. Enfin, nous examinerons brièvement le développement et la transformation du sublime des *Observations* à l'Analytique du sublime dans la *troisième critique*, visant à démontrer les contributions de la Philosophie Critique à l'esthétique kantienne. La littérature actuelle concernant le sublime entreprend habituellement une approche historique et chronologique envers les prédécesseurs de Kant, ou alors elle examine le sublime kantien comme point focal majeur, abaissant ainsi d'autres théories de sublime précédant à celui de Kant en 1764. En conséquence, il s'avère à la fois éclairant et nécessaire d'essayer de situer le sublime kantien dans le contexte historique, afin de découvrir les contributions spécifiques de Kant au discours de la sublimité et d'évaluer d'autres théories du sublime jusqu'à l'époque de Kant. Une autre question abordée dans cette recherche consiste en l'influence et l'impact de la théorie morale de Kant pour et sur son esthétique. Le sublime est un élément central de l'esthétique kantienne. Car cette notion révèle comment la théorie morale de Kant s'est développée entre les années 1760 et 1780, d'une théorie proche des théoriciens du sens moral (*moral sense*) britannique à une conception *a priori*, basé sur la pure raison pratique kantienne. En plus, une analyse du sublime dans l'optique de sa relation avec le sentiment moral nous aidera à réévaluer le texte précritique non pas comme superficiel ou périphérique par rapport à la *troisième critique*, mais comme un fondement inévitable pour la philosophie kantienne toute entière.

Afin d'éclairer ces questions, nous avons d'abord étudié l'histoire du sublime dans la mesure où il fonctionne comme une source d'inspiration pour Kant, à savoir le sublime chez Longinus, Boileau, Addison, Shaftesbury et Burke. Un bref aperçu de Hutcheson ouvre également la voie à la question du développement de la théorie morale de Kant. Ensuite, nous avons examiné les *Observations* en détail, afin d'établir un dialogue entre les conceptions susmentionnées pour faire apparaître les nouveautés du sublime kantien. L'annexe de ce texte concerne le sublime dans la période critique, en le comparant avec le sublime précritique. Nous avons ainsi terminé cette recherche en démontrant que l'esthétique kantienne est essentiellement entrelacée avec l'éthique kantienne, dont les développements orientent le développement de l'esthétique. Finalement, nous verrons que le sublime kantien pourrait être considéré comme ayant plus de similitudes avec le sublime chez Longinus, et moins d'affinités avec le sublime chez Burke. Il nous apparaît qu'une telle approche nous fournit d'une image plus complète de tout discours esthétique, en particulier l'esthétique kantienne qui va de pair avec l'éthique kantienne pour laquelle les développements du sublime s'avèrent un modèle très clair. Tout cela aidera toutes les recherches futures à mieux comprendre l'esthétique précritique.

The heavenly Vault is a girdle from our outworn bodies
Jayhun is a trace from our pellucid tears
Hell is sparks from our profitless vexation.
Heaven is a moment from our tranquil time
Omar Khayyam

Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüt mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: Der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir. Immanuel Kant*, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*

Introduction

What appears at a first glance as the history of the developments of Kantian aesthetics is in fact the history of the struggles of a philosopher who is on his way to construct one of the most complicated and notorious moral philosophies. The current research is aimed at exploring one of the central topics in Kantian aesthetics – both in the pre-Critical and in the Critical philosophy – namely, the Sublime, in order to demonstrate that under the surface of Kantian aesthetics runs the constant current of Kantian ethics. We will try to show that despite fundamental changes, shifts and developments in Kant's philosophy from the pre-Critical to the Critical period, the core concerns remain unchanged for Kant. Hence, a form of consistency is recognizable in Kant's thought. The sublime as a central term of Kantian aesthetics seems to have gone through fundamental changes from the former to the latter period; thus, through demonstrating the similarities and the consistent issues pertaining to the discussion of sublimity we will hope to shed a light on the developments of Kant's moral philosophy too. Although Kant's philosophy overshadows the philosophies of many of his contemporaries as well as some the preceding philosophies, he did not discover or construct his philosophy *ex nihilo*. Accordingly, many Kantian ideas, should be put in a historical context if we are to gain a comprehensive understanding of Kant's contribution to many philosophical topics. The sublime is interestingly enough one of those ideas which clearly shows Kant's debt to his predecessors and explicitly demonstrates Kant's own original contributions to aesthetics. Additionally, the history of the development of Kantian sublime hints at the developments of Kant's moral theory.

The sublime has come to the centre of aesthetic discussions since a few decades ago; thus a rich amount of literature has come to scene on the topic. These include various contributions

on both sides of the pacific. The current research is based on an endeavour to see the literature on the topic extensively, drawing to the viewpoints presented by various commentators and philosophers. From early texts specifically focused on the Kantian sublime like Paul Crowther's *The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art* (1989), and Christine Pries's *Übergänge ohne Brücken: Kants Erhabenes zwischen Kritik und Metaphysik* (1995) to the more recent research such as those of Philip Shaw, *The Sublime* (2006) and Robert Clewis's *The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom* (2009), to historically oriented collections such as Timothy Costelloe's *The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present* (2012) and the co-edited collection by Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley's *Observations and Remarks* (2014), we have tried to explore the current literature in order to shed a light on some issues that these commentators might have seen from other aspects, hence interpreted differently. Our standpoint is an endeavour to bring together both the historical studies of the pre-Kantian theories of the sublime and the Kantian sublime in the context of the developments of Kant's moral theory. Hence, we will not merely present a chronological history of the sublime from Longinus to Kant on the one hand, nor will we only focus on Kantian sublime on the other so that other philosophies will be overshadowed by the latter. Neither do we remain in the field of aesthetics or ethics. These three standpoints are the ones taken by almost all the above-mentioned commentators which – albeit their richness – renders the treatment of the development of Kantian ethics incomplete and partial; focusing either on history or on Kantian sublime.

Our current research tries to attain a fourth standpoint, in order to keep both the historical account of the sublime at the centre of research and simultaneously locate Kantian sublime in this history. Otherwise formulated, we will try to bring Kantian sublime, and specifically the pre-Critical account, into a dialogue with the historical sublime. The connecting thread of the dialogue however, will be Kant's view on moral theory and his struggle with it. Hence, we will address the following questions, (i) what is Kant's pre-Critical treatise, i.e. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime's* (1765) relation to Kant's predecessors who have contribute to the topic? These include, Longinus, Joseph Addison, Lord Shaftesbury and Edmund Burke, (ii) what are Kant's own specific contributions to the discourse of sublimity in light of this historical background? and finally, (iii) how does the relationship between Kant's moral theory in the pre-Critical philosophy – especially his relation to Francis Hutcheson's internal sense theory – and his theory of the sublime help us understand the latter better in the light of the former? Moreover, in Chapter three we will briefly address the question of (iv) the connexion between Kant's pre-Critical sublime and its development into the Critical sublime. In this regard we will try to outline the consequences of the emergence

of transcendental philosophy for Kantian aesthetics, especially in relation to the sublime. We will also try to show how Kant, thanks to his mature theory of morality, goes beyond the Burkean sublime and almost all other accounts.

As a result, the current text is organized around the following hypotheses, (i) the significance of Kantian sublime will only come into light when viewed against the historical background. This approach will minimize the chances of falling into superficial readings of *Observations,* especially the third and fourth sections which are usually dismissed as trivial, marginal and sexually biased on the side of Kant; hence (ii) our second hypothesis is that we as the result of the previous step we will be able to see which elements highly distinguish Kantian pre-Critical sublime from his predecessors and render it original and rich, from this follows the third hypothesis according to which (iii) only by reading Kantian aesthetics in light of Kantian moral philosophy and ethics are we capable of seeing the deeper layer covered with seemingly merely aesthetical concerns. Finally, we might be able to hold to the hypothesis that (iv) there is a certain consistency, a certain constant engagement with fundamental ideas which lies at the basis of both Kant's ethics and aesthetics. This last assumption comes into light when we consider Kant's engagement with one of the crucial elements in moral theory, i.e. feeling and its relation to reason. Our claim would be that an analysis of the formation and developments of the sublime as a key element of Kantian aesthetics helps us understand the above-mentioned challenge in a new fresh light; hence, we will be able to see how Kant's view about morality has affected his views on aesthetics through his philosophical development and what new understanding of his aesthetics this new approach brings about.

The current text is organized in three chapters. In the first chapter we explore the sublime in history before Kant's *Observations*. We begin with the very first text on sublimity, i.e. *Peri Hypsous* composed by a supposedly third century thinker and orator, Longinus. We then briefly deal with the first translation of the text by Nicolas Boileau which after almost thirteen centuries brought the Longinian sublime into the centre of aesthetic debates. In the next step, we explore briefly the theories of Joseph Addison and Shaftesbury, as two figures who inspired the formation of Kant's pre-Critical sublime. A brief remark on Francis Hutcheson also prepares the ground for the moral aspect we will deal with in the second chapter. Finally, we explore the sublime as understood by Edmund Burke, expressed in his *Enquiry* as a text of the composition of which Kant was probably aware by 1764.

In the second chapter, we aim at a close reading of Kant's pre-Critical *Observations* in the first section, hence exploring all four sections of the treatise in order to prepare the ground for the second section which compares and reads the aforementioned treatise with the historical accounts. Hence in the second section of the second chapter we will put Kantian pre-Critical

sublime in a dialogue with the past in order to follow the purposes already mentioned above. Finally, the third chapter deals with the development of Kantian sublime from the pre-Critical to the Critical account found in *Critique of the Power of Judgement: Analytic of the Sublime.* In this part we try to show how Kant's moral theory has affected this later account, in which ways does the latter account stand above the former and in which relation does it stand to the historical sublime, especially the Burkean sublime.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the current research could be viewed as a first step in the log road of a new approach to aesthetics and is naturally far from complete; the mere recognition of this fact could operate as a motivational force for any future research in this field.

Chapter One

The History of Sublime, from Longinus to Burke

Introduction

The history of sublime goes as far back as the first century treatise *Peri Hypsous*. The identity of the real author is still covered with an air of ambiguity; while previously it was attributed to the third century statesman and scholar Cassius Longinus, it is more widely accepted today that the author is the first century rhetorician, philosopher and scholar usually referred to as Pseudo-Longinus. However, this very first treatise about sublimity remained unknown to mainstream philosophies for almost as long as sixteen centuries until its translation by French scholar and literary critic Nicolas Boileau in 1674. Thus, with Boileau's translation the concept of sublimity was brought into centre of attention both in rhetoric and aesthetics enjoying analysis by many seventeenth, eighteenth scholars up until contemporary critics and scholars, ranging from British empiricists to German idealists and post-modern thinkers.

The list of philosophers, critics and scholars who have contributed to the subject of sublimity is long enough to deserve a history of its own; however some names might be indicative of the range of thinkers in this field. Apart from Longinus and Boileau, among British scholars John Dennis (1657–1734) and Edmund Burke with his 1757/1759 *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* are most significant; while Joseph Addison, Gerard, Lord Shaftesbury, Lord Kames and Alison are also among thinkers who have contributed to the subject. Moreover and related to our aims, Kant's early ethics, aesthetics and anthropology – the borders of which are not as distinct in his pre-critical philosophy as the critical one – are influenced by other sources as well, e.g. David Hume and Montesquieu's ideas about nations with whom he was acquainted as is evident from his references to them in *Observations* (Beo 2:247, Obs, 54; Beo 2:253, Obs 58)[1]. Most significantly, it could be argued that Kant's early ethics, demonstrated in *Observations,* is highly influenced by Francis Hutcheson moral sense theory. Since our main focus is on Kant's *Observations,* we shall focus on those thinkers who have influenced Kant specifically in these early texts. Therefore, in this chapter we will explore the ideas of Longinus, Boileau, Shaftesbury, Addison, Hutcheson and Burke, as far they contribute either to the theory of sublime or to Kantian early ethics. Thus our aim in this chapter is to explore historical pre-

[1] In this text the abbreviations Obs and Beo refer to *Observations* and *Beobachtungen,* the page numbers of *Observations* are after Paul Guyer and Patrick Frierson's English translation of the text listed in the treatise, the number in *Beobachtungen* refers to the paragraph number in the German text use by the translators as the reference to their translation.

Kantian roots and sources of the formation of Kant's early aesthetics especially the concept of sublime. We aim at demonstrating pre-Kantian major concerns about the sublime in order to be able to show later how they have been received by Kant. In this regard one hypothesis is our main guide: we wish to argue – beginning with this chapter and proceeding to the next – that albeit being influenced by British scholars, especially Burke and Hutcheson, Kant's theory of the sublime has affinities with Longinian sublime which are stronger than it is usually assumed. Although there are obvious similarities between both Kant's pre-Critical and Critical theory of sublime and both British and French texts on the subject matter – i.e. concerning examples or instances of the sublime, the nature of the experience and etc. – exploring the possible connections between Kant's theory of sublime and Longinus's is worth the effort, as it might shed a light on the former by exploring the ideas of the latter, hence demonstrating why and to what extent Kantian theory distinguishes itself from precedent literature on the topic. In the present chapter we will endeavour at giving a general picture of each figure's theory of the sublime and its respective aspects. We will begin with Longinus's *Peri Hypsous,* and will consider Boileau as the main figure in France, in the next step we will consider British literature as far as it concerns Kant; thus Edmund Burke's *Inquiry* will be our point of focus while other scholars such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Addison and Kames will also be considered.

1.1. Longinus's *Peri Hypsous*

1.1.1. Author, Word, Purpose(s)

The oldest text available to us about sublimity is that of the Greek rhetoric, philosopher, writer and pedagogue Longinus, titled in Greek *Peri Hypsous* and translated in English as *On Sublimity*[2]. As mentioned before, the exact identity of the author is not yet agreed by all scholars, but most take it to be a first century scholar than the third century Cassius Longinus. As Russell argues in his introduction to the English translation of the book, there are some rather strong arguments against the association of the text to Cassius Longinus. In short, the first argument is supported by the last available paragraph of the treatise, in which "the setting and tone of the book" support identifying the philosopher as Cicero (Russell in Longinus 1995, 147). The second, relies on historical facts derived from the text which justifies its

[2] The translation of the title itself is also a source of debate among scholars, as many argue that the more exact equivalent for the Greek *Hypsus* is *Height* rather than Sublime, but this accuracy introduces some difficulties in ascribing the term with natural, artistic phenomena or moral dispositions. For a more in detail discussion, see: Doran, Robert; *The Theory of the Sublime: from Longinus to Kant,* Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 38-40.

attribution to the first century author more plausible[3]. In addition to the identity of the writer which itself gives the text a sort of sublime characteristic, almost one third of the text goes missing, there are six long lacunas – especially one in the end in which the role of emotion was presumably discussed – along with other missing parts at different points (ibid, 148).

Nevertheless, among those texts passed on to our times, it is still one of the most significant texts on rhetoric, considered usually second in row after Aristotle's *Poetics.* It might not be wrong to conclude that Longinus actually established the discourse on sublime, made it an independent subject matter of both rhetoric and to some degree aesthetics which was later developed by Boileau into a permanent discussion for which the latter provided a comprehensive terminology, method, definition and examples (Rayman 2012, 4). The significant issues pertaining to this very first source on the sublime are multi-faceted; thus we shall discuss the purposes of the author for composing the text, the structure of the text, its pivotal themes and its contribution to eighteenth century discussions of the sublime. In the next chapter we will explore the connections between *Peri Hypsous* and Kant's theory of sublime in pursue of our hypothesis that Kantian sublime has much in common to this text.

To begin with the author's purposes we should mention the addressee who is as specified in the text a Roman nobleman, Terentianus, to whom Longinus wishes to teach the art of rhetoric (Longinus 1995, 161). Thus the first and most significant purpose of the text is to teach the pupil how to overwhelm, persuade, and convince an audience even more to "transport them out of themselves" with the art of rhetoric the key element of which is sublimity (ibid, 163). A periphery purpose to this main aim is to provide answers to Caecilius, who presumably had composed a treatise about the sublime but Longinus found it entirely unsatisfactory (ibid, 161).

1.1.2. Sources of Sublimity

Nowhere in *Peri Hypsous* does Longinus define the sublime. In the opening chapter while praising his addressee he mentions that there is no need for a lengthy definition since on the one hand, true sublimity would have its effect on the audience anyway, and on the other "judgment in literature is a fruit of ripe experience" and "what is truly great bears repeated considerations" made by well-versed men of sense (Longinus 1995, 177ff). Hence, the automatic effect on prepared audience abandons the need for an exact definition. However, in

[3] The other argument which identifies the author as Cassius Longinus, a third century scholar still has some supporters, one example of which could be found in: Costelloe, Timothy; *The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present,* Cambridge University Press, 2010 (see, the chapter on Longinus by Malcom Heath)

sections six to eight of the treatise Longinus defines the characteristics of true sublime, already beginning with moral considerations and finally explaining its sources. The crucial yet implicit issue of true/false sublimity is also first introduced in section seven, "the true sublime naturally elevates us…we are filled with joy and pride" (ibid, 179).

The significant aspect of these characterizations is the fact that for Longinus the sublime is, in the last analysis subjective. It is analysed in terms of its effect on the audience – the experience of sublime – and how it is produced – creation of the sublime, hence the pivotal role of Longinus in subjectivism in aesthetics (Doran 2015, 27). Of course, as a rhetorician he gives many hints on how to produce a text or a speech which overwhelms, exalts and persuades the audience – "sublimity is a certain pinnacle and excellence of discourse" (Longinus 1995, 161) – but we will see that for Longinus the technical, stylistic means do not play the main role in producing the experience of sublime. In section eight of the treatise Longinus defines the five sources of true sublimity as follows:

> There are some five most productive sources of the sublime in literature…the first and most powerful is the power of grand conceptions…and the second is the inspiration of the vehement emotion. These two constituents of the sublime are for the most part congenital. But the other three come partly from art, namely the proper construction of figures – these being of course of two kinds, figures of thought and figures of speech – and, over and above these, nobility of language, which again maybe resolved into choice of words and use of metaphor and elaborated diction. The fifth cause of grandeur…is dignified and elevated word-arrangement (ibid, 181)

From this citation it is evident that the sublime, when its creation is intended, has two groups of sources, first and foremost, subjective elements of thought and emotion, second, objective elements dependent on style and language. Since both for our purpose and in Longinus's treatment of the subject matter, the former play a more crucial role, we will remain focused on the former group in what follows. Additionally and in the same positive manner, Longinus provides some characteristics of sublimity the connection of which with the explicit sources will be explored. These characteristics include, "a consummate excellence and distinction of language" which gives "to the greatest poets and prose writers their pre-eminence" (ibid, 163); it is a product of genius which comes at a single stroke not from the whole work (ibid, 165); it produces ecstasy, takes the audience out of themselves and irresistibly controls the audience. Thus by accentuating the element of thought and the role of genius, Longinus is opposing those orators of his time, including Caecilius, who think sublimity and its effect – persuading the public – is merely a matter of elaborate skilful language. In fact it is not wrong to conclude that by opposing such orators of his time, Longinus is providing us with a very modern

understanding of artistic production – in this case sublime creativity – which brings him very close to Kant (see Rayman 2012, Doran 2015). By combining elements of thought, emotion, genius and nature he creates an aesthetic concept of transcendence which could be followed until modern times (Doran 2015, 28f). We will continue with an exploration of these elements in the next section.

1.1.3. Thought and Emotion: Creator and Perceiver

In this section we will explore the first two elements in creating true sublimity both of which could be related to Kantian sublime; the three stylistic elements will only be mentioned in passing. The first and most important element is thought or otherwise formulated, the sublime is essentially related to logos (Doran 2015, 35). Logos for Longinus includes both techné (skill, technique) and noêsis (thought, conception); hence creating the sublime experience in the audience comes both from a natural talent and learnt skills (ibid):

> Natural greatness plays a greater part than all the others…even if it is rather a gift than an acquired quality, we should still do our utmost to train our minds into sympathy with what is noble and impregnate them with lofty thoughts (Longinus 1995, 183ff)

In relation to great thought, Longinus considers three aspects, namely, (i) nobility of mind which has moral and intersubjective connotations; (ii) mimesis or imitation, which means emulation of great masters and (iii) phantasia or imagination which has a different meaning from our contemporary understanding of the word and is more related to capability of the orator to visualize ideas for himself and confer them to his audience; this is the mind's creative power which enables both creator and perceiver transcend the earthly realm of sensibilities (Doran 2015, 58). In addition, great thought in the sense of noêsis has an element of the intellectual capacity of the mind and is rooted in the verb noein or "to think". This element is the essential element of Longinian sublime and is not manifested in a whole work or text, but only consists in single ideas, thoughts that emerge as a result of appropriate use of emotion and *kairos* as the very perfect moment. These thoughts then are capable of elevating the audience and producing an experience of sublime which is associated for Longinus to a form of secular transcendence. Of course an inappropriate use of emotions – which Longinus demonstrates with various examples from Homer's *Odyssey* to Hesiod – can kill the effects of talent, "great genius with the decline of vigour often lapses very easily into nonsense" (Longinus 1995, 197). Nevertheless, without the noble idea, i.e. the naturally given talent, it is almost impossible to gain the sublime effect. Thus, noble-mindedness is the necessary condition but not the sufficient one and will only be completed with the help of imagination

and imitation but the other way round the combination does not work. Finally, noble-mindedness – which leads to true sublimity – is a result of noble moral dispositions; hence in Longinus we can also find a strong connection between moral feeling and the sublime which will be explored later.

Now the other two elements which help the great thought produce the sublime effect are imitation and imagination which are explored in sections 13.2-14 and 15 of *Peri Hypsous*. Since imagination plays a crucial role in Kant's mature theory of sublime, exploring Longinus's understanding of it is also relevant. In section 13 Longinus begins his discussion with an example from Plato's *Republic,* concluding that imitation is also a way to achieve sublimity (ibid, 211):

> From the natural genius of those old writers there flows into the hearts of their admirers as it were the emanation from those holy mouths. Inspired by this, even those who are not easily moved to prophecy share the enthusiasm of these others' grandeur…such borrowing is no theft; it is rather like the reproduction of good character by sculptures or other arts (Longinus 1995, 211ff).

Thus if one lacks natural talent by means of which he/she can acquire noble thoughts, the best way to compensate for this is to expose oneself to examples from old masters, i.e. their elevated thoughts; the reason why Longinus gives various examples from literature throughout the treatise (Doran 2015, 63). Since natural talent is exemplified in the concept of genius, we can infer even at this stage that although genius is an exceptional endowment of nature, one can cultivate his/her nature by means imitation. Moreover, imitation has no negative connotation here; rather it consists in taking the tradition as an example and then trying to find your own way by means of talent. We will see later that this Longinian idea has remarkable resonances in Kantian aesthetics. Imitation in the Longinian sense is an intersubjective relation of the subject with the examples taken from tradition, but at the same time one should surpass it by creating one's own sublime (ibid, 64f). As a result, Longinian conception of imitation leads directly to its opposition which is originality. We might even be justified to conclude from Longinus's discussion in section 13.2-14 that the very subjective strive, the competition to be inspired by the tradition and yet subvert and surpass it can amount to an experience of the sublime in the creator; on the one hand, the creator belongs to a tradition and on the other he/she can only be identified as a "creator" in surpassing the past in form of introducing an original aesthetic experience to his/her contemporary audience. With the notion of creator we necessarily need to proceed to Longinus's notion of imagination or *phantasía.*

Longinus defines Phantasia in section 15 of *Peri Hypsous,* explaining:

> The term *phantasía* is applied in general to an idea which enters the mind from any source and engenders speech…you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your audience. The phantasía means one thing in oratory and another in poetry… the object of the poetical form of it is to enthral, and that of prose to present things vividly (Longinus 1995, 215ff)

In this passage, Longinus carefully distinguishes poetic imagination from one needed for rhetoric, the best instance of the former being Euripides's tragedies. The history of Phantasia is so rich in Greek culture that surpasses the limits of the present research; nevertheless suffices it to mention that the difference in the sense of the word from Greek to modern sense is evident exactly in the above-cited passage according to which phantasia or imagination is the ability of the speaker to influence his audience by enlivening images in their minds. The effect of imagination is oratory, to convey truth and reality; which stands in opposition to the poetic sense of the word (ibid, 223). Of course for Longinus both capacities are ways of obtaining *hypsous* or the sublime effect. Finally, for Longinus, in contrast to Plato for instance, the creative role of imagination is more central, since there is a certain degree of autonomy in imagination which lets it – in the poetic use – not only recreate but also *create* images. It is not until Kant's philosophy that imagination gains the role of an independent faculty, but already there are affinities between Kant and Longinus as the latter's conception of imagination also opens up the space for the modern notion of genius, originality and creativity; a point to be explored in the next section.

Longinus promises an independent discussion about emotion and its relation to the sublime at the end of section three, "we have reserved another place in which to treat of emotional subjects" (Longinus 1995, 171); however, unfortunately the last section of the treatise which considers emotions is one of the big lacunas, completely lost. Thus, we need to refer to other references in the text, where reactions such as enthusiasm, vehement and god-possessed passion are explored, to figure out a theory of emotion in *Peri Hypsous*. Additionally, in sections nine and seventeen Longinus already considers the possibility of sublime experience devoid of emotions. It is possible for two main reasons; first and foremost not all emotions suit sublimity, those feelings like "pity, grief, and fear" though they are emotions, cannot by nature elevate us since they have a low effect[4]; secondly, sublime experience can occur

[4] Whether this Longinian interpretation which remains from his time to modern times, a key feature of the sublime cold be questioned; taken subjectively, these emotions for instance could go through a transformation in the process of aesthetic experience and the very process could bring about a sublime experience. However, Longinus is more concerned with the task of the orator than the artist. For an excellent analysis of enthusiasm as

without pathos or emotion, since in the last analysis Longinus wishes to keep the independence of the former as an experience possible to emerge from great thought (Doran 2015, 73). Longinus's treatment of emotions in tragedy is also specific, we will compare his view with that of Kant in Chapter Two. Now that low emotions are unsuitable, it is also important to consider how and when emotions are used, in section 29, in form of a condensed digression, he asserts that emotions are "as much an element of the sublime, as characterization of charm"; whether they are the latter or the former depends on how and when in the text they are used (Longinus 1995, 257). It is here that the role of stylistic and technical features is highlighted in so far as they can help the orator/author use emotions in the right place to produce the momentary effect of sublime experience and simultaneously overwhelm and elevate, exalt and transcend the audience (ibid, 181ff). Moreover, what connects Longinus to later theories of sublime, is his claim in section ten when comparing Homer with Aristeas, that "the author of Arimaspea…expects these lines to excite terror…Homer, on the other hand instead of dismissing the danger once and for all, depicts sailors as being all the time, with every wave on the very brink of death" (ibid, 203). Thus for Longinus, terror is also a source of sublime experience. This aspect of emotion connects him to Edmund Burke and Kant, who are our main concerns, but also to many other eighteenth century theories of sublime.

1.1.4. Genius, Nature, True/False Sublimity

We begin this section with Longinus's distinction between true and false sublimity, a notion found later in Kant's pre-critical *Observations* and significant of both texts. From the conclusion on true/false sublimity we will move on to the issues of genius, nature and the relation between the sublime and morality.

Longinus does not explicitly talk about true/false sublimity; yet, his discussions in sections three to seven of *Peri Hypsous* certainly imply such distinction. Longinus boldly asserts in the beginning of section three:

> The phrasing is turbid, while the images make for confusion rather than forcefulness. Examine each in the light of day and it gradually sinks from the terrible to the ridiculous. Now seeing that in tragedy, which is essentially a majestic matter and admits of bombast, misplaced timidity is none the less unpardonable…timidity seems one of the hardest faults to guard against…puerility is the exact opposite of grandeur; utterly abject, mean spirited, and in fact the most ignoble of faults…writers fall into this fault through trying to be uncommon and

a significant emotion in relation to the sublime, see: Clewis, Robert, *The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom,* Cambridge University Press, 2009.

> exquisite, and above all to please and founder instead upon the rock of cheap affection (Longinus 1995, 167-171).

Furthermore, Longinus goes on to explain that frigidity, i.e. expressions of unworthy thought and excessive artificial plus *untimely* emotions are also instances of what we call "false"[5] sublimity (ibid, 173-180). All these instances prove that for Longinus two points are most significant; first, that those without critical judgment, experience, in sum less cultured people could be *deceived* by false sublimity; thus an element of understanding and critical thinking is always necessary in distinguishing true sublimity; second, all these instances of false sublimity, for which Longinus has more than few examples, arise from the fact that writers follow the fashion which is "the passion for novelty of thought which is the particular craze of the present day" (ibid, 177ff). For Longinus, true sublimity is one which lasts through time, outlives repeated reading and criticism. Moreover, true sublimity is that which has an element of universality; the judgment about is shared by all people not limited to time or place.

True sublimity also possesses an intersubjective element, i.e. only the genius can create the sublime but it is in its experience by the perceiver that its true sublimity is proven over time[6]. Now the question is, if the truly sublime is everlasting, universal and technically perfect, all of which are external aspects of it, what are the inner characteristics necessary for it? Otherwise formulated: what kind of creator with which dispositions can create true sublimity? This question takes us to the issue of genius, nature and the relation of the sublime and morality.

The very first key feature of Longinus's theory of genius, i.e. creation of the sublime, is the fact that in his account the sublime is the product of *both* nature and techné, a happy union of genius and art. We argue that considering Longinus's definition of true/false sublimity, genius or nature is a necessary element in the creation of sublimity, though it needs skill and art for its perfection; on the contrary though, mere technic does not lead to sublimity, a fact supported by Longinus's final section forty-four where he states that sublime speech could not be misused by technocrats since without positive moral dispositions it is impossible to achieve sublimity. Hence, we will demonstrate that true sublimity is a product of genius which must

[5] The notions of false/true sublimity are taken from Robert Clewis's article, in "Kant's Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide", Cambridge University Press, 2014. However, we will try to go beyond Clewis's analysis and application of the terms.

[6] Heinrich Rombach, e.g., describes such a situation as a "con-creative" one: created both by the experiencing and the experienced. See: Henrich Rombach, *Der Ursprung: Philosophie der Konkreativität von Mensch und Natur*, Rombach Verlagshaus, 1994

essentially and to some extent naturally possess moral dispositions in order to achieve his/her intended sublime effect.

Our above mentioned contention is primarily deduced from the evident fact in section thirty-three of *Peri Hypsous* where Longinus clearly prefers "grandeur flawed in some respects" to "moderate achievement accompanied with perfect soundness and impeccability" (Longinus 1995, 267). His examples are Plato and Lysias between who Longinus prefers Plato since "great excellences should always be voted the first place for the greatness of mind they reveal" (ibid, 269, 275). From this passage we might conclude our contention in the beginning that great thought is the most crucial element in creating sublimity, it is the product of genius, one possessing natural talent and ready to take risks. According to Doran, *megalo* is both the naturally-given talent of the writer and his/her moral nobility of mind; so with Longinus's definition sublimity as a moral characteristic is implicit in the genius and the other way round (Doran 2015, 49). We should accentuate that the talent is given by nature to the genius to have a specific passion for what is great, i.e. great thoughts which we later realize are connected to moral disposition, to transcend the commonplace and to help others be able to do so; the price for such great passion is however minor technical, historical, stylistic or literary mistakes made by the genius (Heath in Costelloe 2012, 23).

Indeed genius is where nature and art really meet. According to Longinus, on the one hand, nature is not completely devoid of method and order – in this sense it is *Mother Nature* which endows the genius with a special talent (Longinus 1995, 167); on the other, one's nature could be cultivated, a point made very early in the first section of *Peri Hypsous*. The astonishing aspect of Longinus's treatise lies exactly in his contention that it is possible to improve the nature, to *learn* to be better[7]. Longinus emphasizes in the second section that genius left alone might be in danger of being a mere impulse, while nature – itself the pivotal element of creation – possesses some order and method, thus learnt method can help the creator find the right moment (kairos) to exercise maximum effect (Heath in Costelloe 2012, 21f). We will have the occasion to compare this view with that of Kant both in the pre-critical and critical period to find out similarities and differences. We should also discuss one persisting question: why is *sublime* capable of such effect? Or otherwise put, what lies in the phenomenology of

[7] This interesting view however, introduces a difficulty to Longinian account which is also present in Kantian account, namely, if imitation is praised as a positive possibility towards the cultivation of one's nature, there is also another side to it: it could be mere imitation, faking the truly sublime which leads to deceiving the audience with false sublimity. Of course this is not the case with the noble sublime since it knows its orientation perfectly, by being inspired by nature and equipped with the correct technique.

sublime which makes it specifically suited for the account of genius, nature and art? In an astonishingly beautiful passage Longinus claims:

> Nature has judged man a creature of no mean or ignoble quality, but, as if she were inviting us to some great gathering, she has called us into life, into the whole universe, there to be spectators of her games and eager competitors; and she therefore from the first breathed into our hearts an unconquerable passion for whatever is great and more divine in ourselves (Longinus 1995, 285ff).

The sublime is best – or it might be argued better suited than beauty – for such an extraordinary gathering of nature, genius and art, since primarily the potentiality for it is endowed by nature and its shock-effect (*kairos*) effect goes hand in hand with the uncommonness of the genius in comparison to others. It is the epitome of human possible experience[8].

It appears that the experience of sublime also has a connection with moral feeling. This point is clarified by Longinus in the very short section forty-four, where he recounts a question posed to him by a philosopher as to the reason for the declination of the sublime. The philosopher himself sees the reason for this decline being a lack of freedom of speech, political situation and the like (ibid, 299f). However, Longinus explains that he sees it due to a decline in morality, asserting "it is the love of money, that insatiable sickness from which we all now suffer, and the love of pleasure, that enslave us…for love of gold is withering sickness and love of pleasure utterly ignoble…they soon breed in our hearts inexorable tyrants, insolence and disorder and shamelessness…their greatness of soul wastes away" (ibid, 303-8).

Therefore, we can conclude from Longinus's view about the decline of sublimity that not external political situation but rather internal moral decline is responsible for the decline of sublimity (Heath in Costelloe 2012, 22). As a result, the importance of cultivating our nature urges: since moral disposition and the lack of it are both internal matters it is up to us, a subjective responsibility to cultivate our natures, develop our capacities and enhance our moral feelings, the potential for which is given to us by nature, so that we can be elevated by the sublime and if a genius with technique be able to create the sublime.

[8] It should be mentioned that Longinus's notion of genius is very close to the Kantian account in the *Third Critique* and radically different from those of the former's time. While many thinkers and authors, like Longinus's opponent Caesilius think of those orators, i.e. their texts as genius who possess technical perfection, Longinus, in a very Kantian fashion, prefers the imperfect genius who possesses great ideas. Moreover, both for Longinus and Kant the genius plays the crucial role in bringing nature and art together. The full comparison of the genius for Kant and Longinus is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text since the former, in contrast to the latter, does not establish a connexion between sublimity and genius, hence the necessity of an independent research on this issue concerning both convergences and divergences.

For the most part of this section we have focused on sublimity in Longinus's *Peri Hypsous* as far as it concerns poetic creation and less rhetoric. Longinus also discussed the other three technical means of creating sublimity in detail; however, since our final aim is to read Kant's theory of sublime in light of his predecessors, we need to limit ourselves to those issues which pertain to the former's theory; hence our discussion of nature, art, genius, great thought and moral disposition which will be continued with Kant.

1.2. The French Sublime: Nicolas Boileau

Sublime as a topic for aesthetics and rhetoric suffers almost thirteen centuries of neglect. The reasons for this disappearance all the way from Longinus to seventeenth century are varied, the most apparent of which is however, the fact that *Peri Hypsous* was not translated and introduced to aesthetic debates for all this time. Moreover, there is almost no discussion of aesthetic topics during this period, not only in the explicit sense of aesthetics as we understand today, but also in a more general sense. Although some Spanish, Italian, and even French translations were made in between twelfth and fourteenth centuries, they were not read or discussed; thus the sublime remained in the shadowy realm of aesthetic experience until Nicolas Boileau Despéreaux (1636-1711), "the lawmaker of poets" published his translation of Longinus's treatise titled in French *Traité du Sublime ou du merveilleux dans le discours* (Martin in Costelloe 2012, 77)[9]. Boileau was an eminent literary critic of his time who had enough influence to bring this very first but not least important ancient treatise to the centre of attention in France. Indeed it would not be an exaggeration if we consider Boileau as the figure who actually made sublimity a key discussion in modern aesthetics. He did so, not only due to his translation of *Peri Hypsous* into French but also due to his introduction to the text. This introduction is taken by some commentators as marginal to Longinus's text, with Robert Doran, Eva Martin and de Bolla we can claim that Boileau's introduction *is* itself an independent theory of sublime, full of novelties and original ideas introduced by Boileau even though inspired by Longinus.

In what follows we will outline in general some crucial contributions of Boileau to the history of sublime, also central to our discussion. In his introduction to the translation, Boileau argues

[9] Éva Madeleine Martin discusses the sublime, in her chapter in Costelloe's collection, in early modern French paintings of seventeenth century as an interdisciplinary concept, and unlike the majority of commentators argues that the reception and interpretation of the sublime in French aesthetics before Boileau is especially important, for a detailed discussion of this topic though, her references in the article are illuminating: Éva Madeleine Martin, "The Prehistory of the Sublime in Early Modern France: An Interdisciplinary Perspective" in *The Sublime from Antiquity to the Present,* Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 77-101

that Longinus's sublime is a matter of transcendence and not just style. Indeed he emphasizes the very novelty of Longinus's treatise; thus in so doing, Boileau emancipates the sublime from the rhetorical conception, introducing it for the first time as a critical concept (Doran 2015, 99). Another important aspect of Boileau's introduction is the connection between *le sublime* and *le merveilleux.* Boileau's title is also clarifying in this regard: *Traité du Sublime, ou le Merveilleux qui frappe dans le Discours* : the sublime is both a critical concept and with the "or" in the title it is separate, independent from merely grand style. The sublime "strikes" us in the text but itself is not an objective feature of the text obtained by method and stylistic means (ibid, 102f). This is indeed the heart of Longinian sublime, that it is contained essentially in a great thought, an overwhelming idea which raises the same experience in the perceiver[10].

It could therefore be concluded that Boileau understood Longinian sublime as a state of mind or disposition which is close to the Italian concept of the marvellous. Moreover, Boileau drops a sharp distinction between *le sublime* and *le style sublime* which could be considered as the epitome of his introduction to Longinus's text. The distinction has two aspects: on the one hand, it emancipates Longinian sublime from a mere rhetorical significance and on the other it introduces sublime as a suitable term for modern aesthetics. The following paragraph at the end of the 1674's preface, inaugurates the modern history of sublime in an effective way:

> Il faut donc savoir que par Sublime, Longin n'entend pas ce que les orateurs appellent le style sublime: mais cet extraordinaire et ce merveilleux qui frappe dans le discours, et qui fait qu'un ouvrage enlève, ravit, transporte. Le style sublime veut toujours de grands mots; mais le Sublime peut se trouver dans une seule pensée, dans une seule figure, dans un seul tour de paroles. Une chose peut être dans le style sublime, et n'être pourtant pas Sublime, c'est-à-dire n'avoir rien d'extraordinaire ni de surprenant.) (from Doran 2015, 111).

At least six features could be distinguished in the above-mentioned paragraph, all of which contribute to the modern notion of sublime. Firstly, he explicitly distinguished Longinus from *the orators*, as a result Longinus is not treating sublime in a mere rhetorical manner, but in a subjective and critical way; Secondly, the sublime is a marvellous happening which takes place in Language, however, it's not a property of or reducible to the words used. Thirdly, Boileau believes that the sublime's effect should be sought in the reader. In other words the reader/listener experiences a sort of transcendence, therefore, "The dual, overwhelming-exalting structure of the sublime is inscribed in the terms enlève, ravit, and transporte, which together are meant to translate Longinus's ekstasis (going-outside-oneself): these terms

[10] The concept of merveilleux in Boileau owes much to Italian poetics of sixteenth and seventeenth century and its key concept of *la meraviglia* which is related to wonder and awe.

connote a kind of violence to which one is subjected (ravir means "to ravish"), but also the idea of being "carried away" (transported) or 'uplifted'" (ibid, 112). A four aspect could be that one should distinguish the sublime from the sublime in style which usually contributes to elaborate phrases or pompous language. On the contrary, the hallmark of the sublime is its simplicity. This point could be traced in Kantian sublime which will be considered later.

The fifth significant element of Boileau's treatment and the epitome of the passage itself is the idea that a text could be written in the sublime style and yet not be sublime in the Longinian sense. This suggests that the sublime style is somehow opposed to true sublimity, "as if true sublimity is never found in the high style, since it lacks the cardinal virtue of simplicity, or that the grand style is a kind of false sublime". Finally, Boileau, like Longinus, believes that true sublimity could often be found in a single idea (dans une seule pensée), whereas amplification always goes with quantity and some degree of redundancy. As a result, Boileau here evokes a concept of aesthetic temporality: sublimity happens in singular moments (*kairos*) in texts (ibid, 114).

Certainly, much more could be said not only about Boileau's role in the discussions and aesthetics of the sublime in general, but also about his specific contributions to French painting in seventeenth century and henceforth. However, since Edmund Burke is more immediately related to our research purpose we should save our attention for an exploration of the latter's theory of sublime.

1.3. The British Sublime

1.3.1. Dennis, Kames, Alison

The eighteenth century deserves the title of the century of taste as well as the century of great philosophies. After Burke's translation of *Peri Hypsous* many philosophers and scholars of eighteenth century, now being preoccupied with issues pertaining to taste, on their way to form modern aesthetics, integrated sublime into their discussions and texts. As mentioned before, the number of texts and figures is more than a few, making it near impossible to address each in a concise research. After Boileau's translation, the most influential figure in Britain is the critique and dramatist John Dennis (1658-1734) who influenced by Longinus, expands the concept of sublimity in terms of its subject matters. In his list of sublime objects one can find various ideas expressed in poetry – like those of Milton – that inaugurate *enthusiasm,* which means intense emotions that include admiration, terror and horror. He also presents a list of these poetic images: gods, demons, hell, spirits and souls of men, miracles, prodigies, enchantments, witchcrafts, thunder, tempests, raging seas, inundations, torrents,

earthquakes, volcanoes, monsters, serpents, lions, tigers, fire, war, pestilence, famine, etc. (Brady 2013, 13f). Dennis advocates an empirical theory of sublimity which would be a source of inspiration for Edmund Burke. Moreover, Lord Kames and Archibald Alison are among influential figures in the discussion of sublimity. Kame's could be distinguished from his predecessors, especially Burke, in his preference of poetry over nature in terms of their sublime effect (ibid, 30). Finally, Alison who published his essay concerning taste in the same year as Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790) is distinguished by his arguments against internal sense theorists such as Hutcheson, claiming that material qualities of objects produce sensations and are incapable of producing aesthetic emotions; this capability is only activated in them when accompanied by imagination.

In this section we are considered with three philosophers mainly, Addison with respect to his influence on Kant's early theory of sublime, Hutcheson and Shaftesbury with respect to their definition of "moral feeling" or "moral sense" which seems to have influenced Kant's early ethics.

1.3.2. Addison, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson

Kant was certainly familiar with the Shaftesbury's *Moralists*, translated into German already by the time of the composition of *Observations* (Gracyk 1986, 204). Although it might be argued that he did not have the same influence of Kant as did Addison and Hutcheson, there are evidences that support Shaftesbury's influence.

A student of John Locke, Shaftesbury was nevertheless more of a neo-Platonist than a Lockean, the traces of which are found in his works. Shaftesbury, only second after Dennis, could be considered as a philosopher who explicitly integrated the sublime into his aesthetic discussions. However, he is also keeping with the Longinian tradition by distinguishing between sublime – reserved for rhetoric and literature – and the grand used for other experiences we associate with sublimity today (Costelloe 2012, 51). However, the Longinian sublime for Shaftesbury seems in a way naïve, primitive and not refined. It is possible to argue that for Shaftesbury there is a difference between *sublime style* (Longinian sublime) which refers merely to a style of writing and *sublimity* (aesthetic sublime) which is characterized by experiences of elevation, transcendence, terror, awe and shock[11] (ibid, 52). In assuming *Three Orders of Beauty,* from the lowest to the highest, Shaftesbury introduces his notion of "internal

[11] This however, does not imply that the latter form of sublimity is absent from Longinus's sublime, as we have already seen in the first section of this chapter.

sense": that which enables the philosopher grasp the principle according to which beauty emerges from the *whole*. This sense is "something imprinted in our minds", hence given by nature. However, the fascinating feature of this sense is that the former sense is an expression of reason, "through which the mind can *contemplate* nature and receive thereby a higher *rational enjoyment*" (ibid). Finally, Shaftesbury highlights the role of the artist in creating beauty, i.e. the *forming power*, which is absent from most discussions before him, with the exception of Longinus. For the philosophical mind to experience this real source of beauty it is necessary to have an experience of rhapsody, elevation and transcendence, all of which amount to descriptions of the experience of sublime. This experience is only possible by being disinterested, i.e. leaving behind personal aims, ends and enjoyments, a notion which finds its best expression in both Kant's *Observations* and Critical philosophy.

Joseph Addison (1672-1719), one of Alp's voyagers of the time and publisher of a widely read magazine *Spectator* is among Kant's sources of his theory of sublime through a translation of *Spectator* into German in 1745; indeed Kant mentions the *Spectator* in the third section of *Observations* (Clewis 2012, 120). Addison himself in certainly indebted to Longinus in distinguishing between "sublime", a notion used by both to describe style, and "grand" or "great" a notion used in modern aesthetics to refer to sublime, i.e. in nature and other artistic fields (Costelloe 2012, 58). However, Addison also departs from Longinus in expanding the notion of sublime to encompass external objects too. The most innovative aspect of his theory is still not this contribution but the role attributed to imagination. For Addison, aesthetic experience is a result of an interplay between an object with certain qualities and the faculty of imagination which is affected by these qualities hence producing a certain pleasure (ibid, 58). Pleasures are also divided into two categories by Addison: Primary pleasures taken from actual view of objects and Secondary pleasures which stem from the activity of mind on ideas by means of comparison, one which is in any case irrelevant to understanding (ibid). This distinction helps Addison include not only stylistic, literary qualities into his discussion of sublimity but also in a very decisive manner, external objects, either artistic or natural. The experience of sublimity could be emerge from both categories. Addison distinguishes the great form the novel (uncommon) and the beautiful – a reminder of both Longinus and Shaftesbury. The great could be either a huge "bulk" or the grandeur of a whole view when considered in one entire piece (Brady 2013, 15). Addison's examples, being novel in their own way, will remain a constant part of the theory of sublime, from Burke to Kant. They include: "a vast uncultivated desert, a huge heaps of mountains, high rocks and precipices, or a wide expanse of waters" (Addison 3:540: 412). In these cases we are faced with a rude magnificence since the object not only fills the imagination but also surpasses its

capacity the result of which is for us an experience of amazement, delight and astonishment (Brady 2013, 16). Addison believes that our imagination indeed *loves* to be in such situation. The secondary pleasure, i.e. those of artistic representations are also a source of such experience, though they always remain inferior to natural phenomena. For Addison – as for Burke – it is evident since in the former everything is ordered and designed, while in the latter things are limitless, unbounded and disordered (ibid, 17). Nevertheless, according to Addison, art has the capacity to transform what is in nature terrible and frightening into a representation which is simultaneously dreadful and pleasing since we are as spectators in a safe position far from actual threat – this would again be taken up by Burke (Gracyk 2012, 223). Finally, Addison clear cut differentiation of the beautiful from the sublime coins a tradition taken up and developed by Burke, reaching its climax in Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment.*

The last but not the least important figure in this triad is Francis Hutcheson whose 1725's *An Enquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* was translated into German in 1762, thus already available to Kant before the publication of *Observations* (Clewis 2012, 120). Albeit Kant's dissatisfaction with moral sense theorists' such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, they had remarkable influence on the formation of Kant's early ethics, hence the relevance of studying Hutcheson as Kant asserts in *Enquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* "Hutcheson and others have, under the name of moral feeling, provided us with a starting point from which to develop some excellent observations" (KEN 2:300). Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that Hutcheson's influence on Kant was not in relation to his theory of sublime, either in the pre-Critical or Critical phase; rather Hutcheson influenced Kant in reference to moral theory as we know Kant was highly interested in the former's notions of "moral sense" and "moral feeling", the in depth impact of which on Kant's theory will be explored in the next chapter. For our present purpose it suffices to say a few words about Hutcheson's *Enquiry.*

Although the text is on the face of it about both beauty and virtue, more than a half of it is devoted to Hutcheson's discussion of beauty, since he holds that it is easier to demonstrate his ideas in relation to taste, make them understood by people – ideas which pertain equally to his theory of virtue – and then make the same arguments about morality (Dickie 1996, 14). Indeed, many ideas are shared by the two discussions. Like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson was also a student of John Locke's philosophy, especially in holding that there are ideas which solely pertain to the mind, emerge from the operations of the mind and are unique to it. These are what Locke calls *reflections.* However, for Hutcheson these internal ideas are of an entirely different nature. The latter associates the term "internal sense" with an innate, internal power to respond with pleasure to perceptions provided by external senses (ibid, 7). It is evident that

this internal sense plays no cognitive role; rather it merely produces pleasure; however, it is the same line of argumentation which leads to the formation of "moral sense" in Hutcheson's theory of morals. From his theory of the internal sense of beauty however, Hutcheson concludes that, first and foremost there exists such a thing as an internal sense, secondly, both the external and internal senses are natural and function necessarily, i.e. independently of our *will,* and thirdly, both senses have their separate pleasures (ibid, 8). We will see later that when such contentions are brought into the realm of morality and then are taken as the grounding of moral actions, Hutcheson's theory is faced with serious problems, in reference to which Kant has claimed in his *Enquiry* that Hutcheson and others have tried their best but have failed. The references to Hutcheson and Kant's endeavour to solve his problems are evident in Kant's *Observations* which will be discussed at length in the next chapter.

1.4. Edmund Burke: *A Philosophical Enquiry*

1.4.1. General Exposition

Edmund Burke (1729-1797), born in Dublin, a graduate of Trinity college and a political figure was also an influential figure in the literary scene of Britain; having given up his legal studies in 1755 in pursuit of a career in literature he published his sole text on aesthetics *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Beautiful and the Sublime* in 1757 a second edition of which appeared in 1759 the same year as Burke began his professional political career as Private Secretary to Hamilton, the Irish Chief Secretary. As Adam Phillips observes in his introduction to *Enquiry*, in order for a young man like Burke to obtain a position in aesthetic and literary debates of his time, the sublime was a fashionable, heated subject matter to delve into (Philipps in Burke 1998, x)[12].

Although Burke owes a big deal not only to British scholars such as Francis Hutcheson, Joseph Addison and John Dennis, but also to Longinus – much more than it might seem on the face of it – his extensive, vast and detailed treatment of sublimity, accompanied by many genuine, novel ideas place Burke among the crucial figures in the history of sublime, indispensable from any study of the subject. Burke's treatment of the sublime is lengthy and detailed but also seemingly marginal in comparison to Kant's critical period *Analytic of the Sublime;*

[12] It should be noted that the notion of aesthetics entered the English thought after the introduction of Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790); thus here we are using a term in an almost inappropriate place since it leads to reducing Burke's approach to the narrow sense of aesthetics we have today. If we keep this point in mind, there would be no problem with using the term for our purpose. For an excellent study of the development of aesthetics in eighteenth century and the emergence of modern aesthetics, see: Dickie, George; *The Century of Taste: The Philosophical Odyssey of Taste in Eighteenth Century,* Oxford University Press, 1996

however, it is not only Kant that overshadows Burke's text, the text's own intrinsic tensions and paradoxes in dealing with the sublime, Burke's counter-revolutionary views and implicit support of a form of bourgeois sublimity, a political yet aesthetic approach, all these confront Burke with obstacles which are not easy to overcome. In what follows, we will provide a general account of Burke's *Enquiry* before exploring some key ideas in his theory of sublimity.

According to Rodolphe Gasché in his recent article, Burke's *Enquiry* declares "an open revolt against neo-classical principles", thus distinguishing itself from his predecessors (Gasché in Costelloe 2012, 24). Indeed, one significant aspect of Burke's sublime is the important role of ambiguity and mixed feelings in the experience of sublimity which put him in opposition to neo-classical principles of art both in Britain and France. An illuminating starting point for both Burke's sublimity and his general approach is the *Introduction to Taste* which was added to the second 1759 edition. In the *Introduction* he endeavours to demonstrate why it is important to explore matters of taste separately and what previous thinkers have been ignorant of; while according to his view it is indeed possible to reach a satisfactory level of agreement in these matters (Burke 1998, 12). Burke's *Enquiry* is of an empiricist, sensualistic nature and the very first text where the author distinguishes the realm of aesthetics from other fields of human thought completely and gives it the independence it is worth of. As the *Introduction* seems to have been written by the author as a reply to David Hume[13], it should be noted that for Burke, despite his empiricist approach, the final *standard* of taste is not dependent on exercise, experience or culture; rather it is an interplay between "a perception of primary pleasures of senses, the secondary pleasures of the imagination and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty" (ibid, 22). This very primary idea demonstrates how it might be reasonable to group Burke with Kant and place both in opposition with Hume when it comes to define what constitutes the consequent pleasure or displeasure and the respective judgments of taste.

Interestingly enough, Burke's main assumption is that the groundwork of taste is *common* to all human beings; thus, the standard of taste is possible to find and universalize among men: "the pleasures of all the senses, of the sight and even of the taste, the most ambiguous of the senses, is the same in all, high and low, learned and unlearned" (ibid, 12ff). Additionally, and following what we took as his common line of thought with Kant, he defines taste as: "no more than that faculty, or those faculties of the mind which are affected, or which form a judgment of the works of imagination and the elegant arts" (ibid, 13). Moreover, after a discussion about the respective roles of imagination, senses and the faculty of judgment, an

[13] Burke never mentions Hume directly either as a source of influence or an opponent.

interesting point appears in his discussion about difference and resemblance, where he mentions that the pleasure we take from *difference* is of a negative and indirect nature; this is one of the aspects from which the sublime should be analysed. Finally, a specific feature of Burke's *Enquiry* mentioned by him in the *Introduction* is the fact that his text explores the beautiful and the sublime in terms of passions and privileges the sensory and bodily qualities of the objects regarding these two experiences while drawing a sharp distinction between these two categories of objects and the respective feelings produced by them (Costelleo 2012, 24). After these general remarks we're now in a position to deal with some key aspects of the text.

1.4.2. Part One: Complex Pleasure, Terror, Individual, Society

Burke's *Enquiry* is extensive and detailed, it addresses both the sublime and the beautiful as essentially interconnected; hence focusing on one without the other will not suffice when the whole text is considered (Gasché in Costelloe 2012, 26). However, we will only focus on the sublime in what follows, remarking on the beautiful when it is indispensable. We intend to explore Burke's notion of sublime in relation to the nature of the pleasure, i.e. mixed pleasure, terror and its associative power, and finally the two notions of *self-preservation* and *society.* We will argue that Burke's status as a politician, an author more concerned with politics than pure philosophy or literature eclipses his exploration. Also, we will try to show that both terror and self-preservations are individualistic concepts oriented towards a bourgeois mind-set which deprive Burke's theory from having any moral import whatsoever. Finally, we will mention wherever necessary, Burke's relation to Longinus's *Peri Hypsous,* though as we will see he differs from Longinus radically in some aspects.

Burke's approach towards sublimity is highly sensationalist, empiric and oriented towards psychological and physiological aspects of the sublime. He is never exhausted with bringing hundreds of examples from natural phenomena, visual arts and literature, above all poetry. Though we call it an aesthetics of sublimity today, acknowledging the role the *Enquiry* played – whether known or unknown to its author – in the formation of a modern secular notion of the sublime; nevertheless, Burke himself seems not as interested in the aesthetics of sublime as he seems in its physio-psychological import (Doran 2015, 143f). Burke could be viewed as making a bridge in British aesthetics of sublime, between Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Addison and the ancient sublime introduced by Longinus. However, with an influence by John Baillie he introduces a new dimension to the sublime, namely, that of nature[14]. Although there

[14] For a more in-detail treatment of the matter, especially in connexion to John Baillie, see: Emily Brady, *The Sublime in Modern Philosophy: Aesthetics, Ethics and Nature*, Cambridge University Press, 2013

are instances of nature as sublime in theories of other scholars, it is with Burke that nature obtains a significant status in the experience of sublimity (ibid, 145). Burke's sharp distinction between the beautiful and the sublime is also another specific feature of his theory. Until Burke's time, sublimity was considered as a superlative of the beautiful (ibid, 144); however, with the introduction of the nature as sublime and to demarcate its specific feature Burke needed such opposition in order to proceed to the most essential concept of the whole *Enquiry:* Terror[15].

Dealing with the notion of terror begins necessarily with Burke's notion of "complex pleasure" influenced by John Locke; an idea which is taken up by Kant in his transcendental philosophy and developed to its highest point. According to Burke, all affections and emotions, all states of mind whatsoever can be divided into two basic forms: pleasure or pain (En 2, 30). In contrast to Locke, Burke holds that a mixture of pain and pleasure is also possible, while acknowledging that like the beautiful and the sublime, these feelings are also categorically different, i.e. the removal of one does not necessarily mean the presence of the other (En 3, 31). Burke calls the cessation of pain not pleasure, rather "delight", which is far from actual pleasure (En 4-5, 34f). This will develop into "complex pleasure" when it comes to the sublime, playing the main role in Burke's key point about sublimity: terror. The reason for this insistence on terror is clarified in the following passage from section six of *Enquiry:*

> Most of the ideas which are capable of making a powerful impression on the mind, whether simply of Pain or Pleasure, or of the modifications of those, may be reduced very nearly to these two heads, self-preservation and society; to the ends of one or the other of which all our passions are calculated to answer. The passions which concern self-preservation, turn mostly on *pain* or *danger*. The ideas *of pain, sickness,* and *death,* fill the mind with strong emotions of horror; but *life* and *health,* though they put us in a capacity of being affected with pleasure, they make no such impression by the simple enjoyment. The passions therefore which are conversant about the preservation of the individual, turn chiefly on *pain* and *danger,* and they are the most powerful of all the passions. (En 6, 35f)

Thus according to Burke death is the greatest threat to life, i.e. targets our instinct of self-preservation, and it is accompanied by thoughts of pain and terror. Better put, terror is the consequence of a potential pain which threatens life, as a result it is the strongest passion we could experience. On the other hand, "Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible

[15] Of course it should not be understood as Burke privileges one over the other by such opposition; on the contrary, he could be considered as coining the essential ontological difference between the two concepts, the epitome of which is to be found in Kant's theory of sublimity. Thus, the beautiful and the sublime are categorically different, constructing the dual character of modern aesthetics.

objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the *sublime*" (En 7, 36). Thus the feeling of sublime is connected to terror which itself in related to our natural instinct of self-preservation working itself against death. We might wonder what in this account could be delightful. Burke's theory suffers from an internal tension at this point since primarily he has real pain in mind but then moving towards a more Kantian position, he believes that "when danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible" (En 7, 36). Moreover, in order to have any sort of sublime experience we should take delight, i.e. complex pleasure, in the object, hence this is only possible when Burke shifts his position and begins to consider the *idea* of pain which produces not real danger but a sort of delight (Doran 2015, 149). This argument can partly save Burke, by claiming that a *distance* from real pain and danger is necessary to experience the sublime. However, we might be able to conclude that the whole body of the text never never solves the tension, always going back to real pain or danger[16].

Nonetheless, shifting from real pain to the idea of pain and terror, enables Burke to develop a modern notion of sublime and places him with David Hume, Shaftesbury and Lord Kames among philosophers who began the subjectivist turn in philosophy and aesthetics, though with an empirical basis. Hence Kant was not the first philosopher to begin subjectivist aesthetics. However, there remain key differences regarding the aim, purpose and the use this subjective feeling has for Kant which makes him stand out (Clewis 2012, 116). In any case, for Burke the complex pleasure leads is a feeling of delight, produced by removal of actual pain, the emotional state which lingers when real pain is not present and removed causes a feeling of sublime in the spectator which is the most powerful of all passions (Doran 2015, 151). We should also remark that although all sublime experiences are necessarily experiences of delight, not all delights are necessarily sublime. They are not, since Burke emphasizes the role of distance, i.e. an aesthetic distance is necessary for the experience of sublime to be possible. This idea is for Burke an idealization of pain or terror which does not directly come from physical, real removal of pain but of being at an appropriate distance from the dangerous object or event so that our self-preservation is at the same time satisfied, while taking a delight by the mere sight of danger. Although there remains the crucial question as: how does mere safety from the frightful, dangerous object results in an aesthetic experience of sublime without even being actually afraid? Otherwise formulated, what is the nature of this delight, this experience and where does it lead to? These questions also engage Kant in his *Analysis of the Sublime,* while Burke never provides a clear cut answer to them. Since we will have to

[16] Many examples from Burke's text support this reading; though one significant example is the public who runs to see a real execution instead of a work of art. Moreover, when it comes to arts, Burke explicitly supports reality, considering representation and visual arts as inferior to any reality.

deal with the notion of terror in the next section too, at this point we turn to Burke's views about sympathy and society with the hypothesis that in the last analysis Burke's account of the sublime is individualistic, based on bourgeois principles and except for the case of sympathy it never develops a necessary relation between sublime and moral feeling.

The sublime has a dual position in Burke's theory which produces a tension between his primary association of the sublime with self-preservation and beauty with social feeling. In this connexion Burke introduces the notions of sympathy, imitation and ambition. Burke's reflections on society stems from society's end which is *generation,* i.e. reproduction. However, we should remember that for Burke the strongest passion is still the fear of death, i.e. terror, hence self-preservation inaugurates the most intense experience of human being; on the other hand, social passions are associated with pleasure and beauty, being essentially weaker than the former. Thus we might not be all wrong to conclude that albeit a discussion on sympathy, Burke's *Enquiry* is first and foremost individualistic, privileging the self over society. Moreover, in the case of sympathy Burke refers more to the sublime than the beautiful, keeping the former for imitation and ambition, and in regard to pleasure in artworks and nature (Gasché in Costelloe 2012, 33-6).

Sympathy for Burke is close to our contemporary notion of empathy (Doran 2015, 155). In sections thirteen and fourteen of Part One of *Enquiry* Burke entertains the idea of sympathy, first merely defining it, next elaborating the emotion in case of the distresses of others, his main points according to the text are:

> sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in many respects as he is affected…It is by this principle chiefly that poetry, painting, and other affecting arts, transfuse their passions from one breast to another, and are often capable of grafting a delight on wretchedness, misery, and death itself (En 1.13, 41).

> I am convinced we have a degree of delight, and that no small one, in the real misfortunes and pains of others; for let the affection be what it will in appearance, if it does not make us shun such objects, if on the contrary it induces us to approach them, if it makes us dwell upon them…as our Creator has designed we should be united by the bond of sympathy, he has strengthened that bond by a proportionable delight; and there most where our sympathy is most wanted, in the distresses of others. If this passion was simply painful, we would shun with the greatest care all persons and places that could excite such a passion…The delight we have in such things, hinders us from shunning scenes of misery; and the pain we feel, prompts us to relieve ourselves in relieving those who suffer; and all this antecedent to any reasoning, by an instinct that works us to its own purposes, without our concurrence (En 1.14, 42f).

Burke's main argument in the above cited passages is hence: we do not merely share the other's pain or get an idea of his/her pain thus experiencing some terror or painful situation, we also have a sort of pleasure accompanied with this experience which makes it possible to sympathize with and not run away from misfortunes of others; therefore be prompted to help them. According to Burke, the delight is at our disposition with some divine decision, endowed to us by the Creator. However, apart from being far from the real pain, being sure that it is not *our* pain and being given some inborn sympathy, he does not further clarify why in the first place we should take some delight in the pain of others. Indeed, sympathy is closer to the feeling of sublime, i.e. to the terror or fearful aspect of the phenomena; however, without some delight it is impossible to sympathize with the other.

In an attempt to relate Burke with Longinus on the one hand, and to save so moral aspect for Burke's account of sympathy on the other, Robert Doran has tried to show that Burkean sublime is close to that of Longinus. Of course Doran correctly understands that Burke's use of the notion of sympathy is in order to show real pain and suffering of others can lead to pleasure itself intended to justify Burke's preference of reality over representation which leads to an extensive discussion about arts. However, we might also argue that the conclusion reached by Doran from both the notions of sympathy and ambition are not actually supported by Burke's text. According to Doran, Burke's notion of ambition is "what prods the individual to seek greatness" (Doran 2015, 159). However, this greatness does not possess any intersubjective aspect which could connect it with a moral reading of sympathy, hence no demonstrable connection to Longinus. Moreover, by referring to Longinus's notion of self-transcendence, "inward greatness" and "glorying" in the one and only reference to Longinus in *Enquiry* Doran links both Burke's sublime and Longinus's to an idea of moral feeling for, or moral sympathy with other human beings. However, from Burke's discussion in the second part of *Enquiry* devoted wholly to the sublime, we are justified to infer that Burke's sublime is at best limited to the individual's self-progress without much *actual* concern about misfortunes of others. The sublime along with sympathy are finally political, bourgeois concepts. Of course Burke mentions our will to help others in distress as a consequence of being moved by sympathetic passion at the sight of pain, but nowhere does he formulate any specific, explicit connexion between the sublime and the moral. The next section will demonstrate this fact.

1.4.3. Part Two: Terror and Power, Nature and Arts, God

Burke begins the second part of the *Enquiry* with repeating his definition of the sublime, according to which it is a passion not produced by reasoning, its highest degree is a feeling of astonishment, it is caused by phenomena in *nature* and most significantly, its essential element is horror, fear and terror (En 2.1, 53). In the second section he also continues to distinguish the most important element of sublimity as terror. Burke's account is accompanied with examples from various natural phenomena, the distinguishable feature of which is his disassociation of the sublime with necessarily huge, large in scale, or vast in size phenomena. Indeed according to Burke anything could be sublime, once it raises some feeling of fear or terror in us.

This aspect of Burke's view is however double-sided; on the one hand, he has integrated nature – and not merely literature or art – into an essential part of his theory of sublime and moreover, nature not as far as it is merely *objectively* sublime, but as it affects the subject irrespective of its size or vastness. On the other hand however, there is a negative aspect to such treatment, namely, such essential, fundamental bond between the sublime and terror is an emphasis on Burke's concept of *self-preservation* which paves the way for an individualistic physco-physiological account of aesthetic experience; in this case, the sublime. Thus we might still be left with this question: why is the experience of sublime limited to terror, pain and danger? What consequences would this account have for aesthetical, anthropological and psychological account of the experience of sublime? It is almost evident from what follows that Burke is not as concerned with such matters as he is with the empirical aspects of his subject matter.

The idea that terror lies at the heart of sublimity is supported in sections three and four where Burke provides numerous examples from natural phenomena, political realm and works of art, mainly those of literature. His contention that what we call sublime should have an element of ambiguity, obscurity – in the very physical sense of the word – and poetry is in this regard better suited for our purpose than any other art; all these serve his core claim that the experience of sublime is that of horror and terror. Moreover, his reason is also partly empirical and partly teleological, "I think there are reasons in nature why the obscure idea, when properly conveyed, should be more affecting than the clear. It is our ignorance of things that causes all our admiration, and chiefly excites our passions" (En 2.4, 57). Of course this could also be viewed as anticipating Kant's definition of the sublime and the role of the faculty of imagination where encountering sublimity it is possible to apprehend (Auffassung) the parts but impossible to comprehend (Zusammenfassung) them. However, Burke does not have the

same purpose as Kant; rather by claiming that a lack of knowledge and ignorance, as a result of which our understanding diminishes, leads to the realization of the sublime power. Thus we could argue that Burke is paving his way into the fifth section where he explores the notion of power which is according to our reading a secular and more political viewpoint.

Apart from the *Introduction,* the fifth section of part two is the longest addition to Burke's second edition of 1759, discussing power it is also a source of inspiration to Kant in his discussion of the Dynamically Sublime, though with different aims. According to Burke, power is essentially linked with terror which directly suggests an idea of damage to us. Burke's argument is that we are "naturally pursue" pleasure, but whatever strives to have some destructive, painful effect on us must necessarily have the *power* to exercise its will (En 2.5, 60). Moreover, since the highest pain is much stronger than the highest pleasure, then power is necessary to *control* the individual, to have some terrifying effect on her/him. Indeed Burke claims, "power derives all its sublimity from the terror with which it is generally accompanied" (ibid). Burke's examples which supplement this argument are from nature when it exhibits real danger to us; the sublime is always limitless, has no conformity to our will, frightening and unreasonable. However, there is another side to Burke's examples in connexion to power: those pertaining to political power. According to Burke, it is natural to be timid, frightened and bend in face of power. This argument puts Burke on the one hand, far from any possibility of entertaining a fundamental relation between sublimity and moral feeling – in sense of the feeling being directed towards others in general, subsuming one's own happiness to the other and the society – thus further supporting our argument against Doran's reading of Burke; on the other hand, it is indicative of Burke's anti-revolutionary ideas especially about the French revolution. However, this aspect is not our main point of focus, hence we proceed to a few remarks on the introduction of the role of God in Burke's sublime.

The task of giving a role to God was definitely difficult for Burke since he had to maintain his rather secular-empirical perspective and still give a role to God as the creator of nature (Doran 2015, 165). According to Burke in the fifth section it is indeed possible for nature to invoke the idea of religion in us and a fusion is possible between Christian religion and the secular-empirical perspective. In this regard, Burke needs to show that the idea of Christian God is compatible with his notion of sublimity as an experience of terror. Yet he has to avoid falling into anti-Christian stance (ibid, 166). Burke's solution is thus as follows: in contemplating the idea of God, we are most concerned with his power as it exceeds all our capabilities; hence imagining ourselves under the *power* of God we realize the minuteness of our nature in comparison to him and we are exalted, overpowered and overwhelmed by it, hence an

experience of sublime (En 2.5, 62f). Burke supports his argument by claiming that, firstly, there are examples from holy texts where the sublimity of Deity is associated with overwhelming natural phenomena; secondly, by the contention that terror is more immediate than other features of God such as his wisdom, justice and goodness which demand some reflection on our part (En 2.6, 64). Thus he emphasizes the dominating-overpowering aspect over the elevating-exalting effect which brings his theory even closer to an empirical, sensationalist account at the same time with damaging political consequences.

In the proceeding sections of this part, Burke goes into inexhaustible detail about senses, colours, measurements, light and darkness and even to bodily exercise and physical difficulty, to sounds and silence all in service of, in our reading, relating sublime to self-preservation, terror and power both from an empirical, individualist point of view.

As a short conclusion to this rather long section, we might be able to conclude that Burke's text is immersed in a constant tension between a literary account and a cultural-social one, between an empirical approach and an aesthetic one, between one bound and limited to natural causes and one extending to aesthetic experience, or as Doran sees it between a physiological analysis and a socio-political one based on the bourgeois-individualist appropriation of the aristocratic mindset in the sublime (Doran 2015, 169). However, this tension itself places Burke at the bottleneck of the discourse of sublimity: he completes the cycle of sublimity by decisively incorporating natural sublime into a theory previously mostly considered with literary texts and rhetoric. Moreover, he coins some major difficulties met by later theories especially that of Kant, e.g. the problem of accounting for a proper aesthetic notion of the complex pleasure of sublime in face of physical danger. Burke thus accumulates previous theories into his extensive, detailed analysis, at the same time considers the history of sublime in terms of Longinus's contributions to the field, thereby preparing the field for the emergence of Kant's grand theory of sublimity which will be our topic in the next chapters of this research.

Chapter Two

Kant's *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*

Introduction

In 1764 Kant published a treatise written in 1763, almost simultaneously with two other works, *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* and *Essay on the Maladies of the Head.* He had just turned forty, was in the middle of his life and was offered a professorship in rhetoric and poetics which he renounced; his enormous critical project had not yet begun, his writing was more stylish and playful, flexible and to many, more understandable. All these characteristics, along with Kant's own personal air in these years is to be found in an amazing way in *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* and the *Remarks* which he added to his own copy of the treatise but never published. The text had not until recently come to the centre of attention in Kantian studies which renders it even more worthy of attention as one which can cast an illuminating light on the development of the philosopher's thought. However, there are two consequences to this new attention, one in a retrospective regard, the other in a futuristic one: according to the latter, the text could be taken as an indication of a dramatic change in Kant's views about the beautiful, the sublime and aesthetics in comparison to the critical period; on the other hand concerning the former, it could be read as revealing to us a Kant being influenced by British aesthetic debates of his time, mainly those of Edmund Burke and David Hume; a Kant with more affinities to empiricism and empirical treatment of philosophical matters.

In the present chapter we would argue that these views, although offer their respective merits, are still not satisfactory regarding Kant's overall philosophical project. *Observations* and its respective *Remarks* could be viewed in a broader horizon in order to provide a more comprehensible picture of both Kant's aesthetics and ethics. In our study of the abovementioned texts we are led by two main hypotheses the latter of which supports the argument of the former. These are respectively: First and foremost, as some commentators argue, Kant did not strictly go through a fundamental shift in his thoughts regarding aesthetics and its epistemological role; precisely as such fundamental shift did not happen in his ethics and an analysis of these two texts demonstrate how consistency but only deepening of the main ideas in one field supports the consistency found in the other. Secondly, Kant is not pre-eminently and fundamentally concerned with aesthetics in the sense of a philosophy of art regarding individual arts – such as the one found in Hegel's, Shelling's or Schopenhauer's

philosophy – and this is no weakness of his philosophy but rather shows how far our expectations are allowed to go; moreover it explains some alleged shortcomings in his main text on the subject, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790). Both these hypotheses are supported by the fact that although Kant's mature moral philosophy is to be found in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and the second Critique, still traces of the mature theory are more than few in his early writings and the best place to look for such signs is in *Observations* and *Remarks*. Indeed it should be accentuated that supporting the latter views does not mean that we could discern a unified consistency in Kant's ideas regarding aesthetics and especially the sublime from the pre-critical period all through the end of his career; rather we will try to demonstrate that despite changes, corrections and developments, one can distinguish the presence of some key ideas which connect the Kant of the pre-critical to the critical one like chains in a row. A denial of fundamental changes and developments from the pre-critical to the critical philosophy will undermine the very senses of these phases of the philosopher's thought. Thus, all we could claim is that there is good evidence of the presence of critical philosophy's main ideas in the pre-critical one, regarding both Kant's aesthetics and ethics[17]. Although as mentioned before *Observations* has the air of a fanciful stylish text, we will try to go beyond its rhetorical stylish surface and by viewing it both from a retrospective viewpoint and a futuristic one aimed at the *third Critique,* show that Kant's critical project is in some respects present even at this early stage or at least his main concerns are evident; concerns which are not primarily aesthetical or oriented towards art.

We will try to consider, as far as possible, the recent literature about the subject and conflicting views presented by different commentators and Kant scholars both in the continent and outside it. Moreover, a constant reference to Kant's influences and sources of inspiration along with the same constant view on his major critical texts will help us locate this text in Kant's philosophy more clearly. Finally, it should be mentioned that we are contented that regarding the specific subject matter of the sublime, Kant's views, known or unknown to himself, go back more to Longinus and his ancient treatise, *Peri Hypsous,* than to Kant's more immediate predecessors such as Burke, Addison, Hume and Hutcheson; though he has clear affinities with the latter group, he still shares Longinus's core ideas regarding the sublime. In the present chapter we will begin each section with a detailed outline of the main ideas and views of each part of *Observations,* we then proceed to analyse the relation of these ideas with other theories

[17] There is still the question as to whether *Observations* provides any valuable material about Kant's aesthetics or is it primarily a work on ethics and anthropology. Some commentators like Paul Guyer support the latter view while other more recent readings such as that of Robert Doran support the former. In this research we acknowledge the contributions of Doran's view, we are contended that Guyer's reading is closer to Kant's own text.

to which Kant has probably drawn. In this respect we will focus on philosophers and thinkers that we considered in the first chapter. Thus we will see how and to what extent figures such as Addison, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Burke have influenced Kant's ideas in *Observations.* Moreover, we will try to show, although Longinian sublime was not a primary source for Kant – we have almost no historical evidence that he read it either in German or French – strong elements and lines of thought do link the eighteenth century treatise to the first century text. Hence we will aim at showing that despite common emphasis on the influence of Burke and other British thinkers, there is much that connects Kant to Longinus; thus the latter is in no sense outdated in comparison with or irrelevant to Kantian sublime.

2.1. Structure and Themes

2.1.1. Sections One and Two: Sublimity and Moral Feeling

Before locating *Observations* in its historical context, we shall provide an overview of the structure and main themes of the text to facilitate future analysis. As it was mentioned before, *Observations* was written almost in the middle of Kant's life when the most significant event was his rejection of a position in rhetoric and poetry; an age which he later considered as the earliest time for one to develop a fixed character (Guyer & Frierson 2011, xi: *from the introduction to Observations and Remarks*). On the one hand he was engaged with current philosophical debates in Germany such as those of Wolffians and Mendelssohn while showing interest in *Popularphilosophie* of his time, and on the other he was well acquainted with British philosophers such as Edmund Burke and David Hume to whose works he brings multiple references. It is also known from his remark on *Spectator,* a magazine published by Joseph Addison that he had knowledge of what the latter was doing. Since the mutual influences of these figures is the topic of the next section, it suffices to mention that this turmoil of philosophical debates demonstrates itself that although Kant had no reason to reject the position on the face of it, his rejection of it hints to the fact that metaphysics was gaining an increasing importance and his more empirical, *Popularphilosophical* concerns were becoming less important to him (ibid, xii). *Observation* clearly shows this tension and itself stands as the epitome of Kant's more popular writings addressed at a more general public. Finally, more than being a text on aesthetics, which could be inferred from the title, the text is primarily concerned with ethics, moral theory and anthropology (Clewis in Shell and Velkley 2014, 121). We should bear this point in mind when developing our aesthetic expectations from this early text.

Observation's title itself is also telling: for one thing it has undeniable similarities to Edmund Burke's *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* (1757, second edition 1759) which along with other evidence – Mendelssohn had made a personal translation of the text – prove that although Kant might have not read Burke's text, he was surely acquainted with it and its themes, the analysis of which will be provided in the next section.

The *Observations* is divided into four sections; the first section deals with the feelings of the beautiful and the sublime and objects which produce the experience of these feelings in the spectator. The second section extends the ideas of the first section about the nature of the feeling of sublime and the beautiful to human beings; Kant also divides sublime into three different types each corresponding to some human characteristics. Moreover, the connection between the feeling of sublime and moral feeling is elaborated in this section while at the same time Kant moves towards the more anthropological concerns of the treatise. The third section deals with the qualities of the beautiful and the sublime in men and women. This section provides a rich amount of material for research about Kant's views on gender and feminist interpretations of these views. However, for our purposes it suffices to note at this stage that not much surprisingly, Kant devotes the major part of his discussion to women rather than men; a view which fades in the light of his critical ethics (Cohen in Shell and Velkley 2014, 153). The fourth and last section deals with a division of different nations according to their possession of the qualities of the sublime and the beautiful. From a contemporary point of view this last section is a catastrophe of racism, one which does not change until the end of Kant's life. However, this section when read in its historical context becomes less surprising. In what follows we will consider each section in turn while focusing on the first two sections since the two latter ones are of great interest for anthropological and gender studies about Kant and have been the subjects of such researches for long[18].

Kant begins the first section with the assertion that he is dealing with his subject matter "more with the eyes of an observer than of the philosopher" (*Beo* 2:207, Obs 13). This already points to the more playful and stylistic style of the text in comparison to other works from the same period and also the critical period. This might also explain why he has chosen *Observation (Beobachtung)* for the title instead of *Inquiry (Untersuchung),* which is considered as a more in depth and speculative study of any subject matter. Also in the very first sentence Kant claims that "the sentiments of gratification and vexation" of any type arise from the subjective feeling and are not produced by some objective feature (ibid). This contention remains

[18] Provide a list or some examples of these studies for those interested in them

unchanged throughout *Observations* and also all later works. Moreover, as we shall see later this contention implies by no means a rejection or ignorance of the object of pleasure or displeasure; rather it is a question of *grounding* the pleasure or displeasure.

By rejecting crude pleasures which will find their refined form of *the agreeable* in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* Kant moves on to introduce his main subject matter which he defines as a finer feeling; itself divided into *the sublime* and *the beautiful* (Beo 2:208, Obs 14). He presents examples for these feelings which is already common of the discussion of sublimity prior to him; these include "the sight of a mountain whose snow-covered peaks arise above the clouds… the depiction of the kingdom of hell by Milton…by contrast the prospect of meadows strewn with flowers, Homer's depiction of the girdle of Venus" (Beo 2:208, Obs 14f). From these examples and also the ones that follow almost immediately we might be able to draw three primary conclusions: firstly, the sublime – and consequently the beautiful – is a feeling (Gefühl) in the sense of a kind of disposition which enables one to be affected by such objects. Thus, it is a subjectively produced experience though dependent on the objects producing it. This is no rejection of the objective aspect but only a grounding of the source of the feeling in the subject. Secondly, by associating the sublime with "lofty sentiments, of friendship, of contempt for the world" and asserting that when one has the feeling for the sublime his air is "serious, sometimes even rigid and astonished", Kant could be implying the relation between the feeling of the sublime and moral feeling; such attribution is absent at least at this stage from Kant's account of the beautiful. All these associations are directly or indirectly related to moral feeling though here with no clear cut distinction. Thirdly, as it will be argued in the next chapters, here also Kant does not restrict the possibility of the experience of the sublime only to natural objects; rather he provides examples both from natural phenomena and works of art.

The most important idea of the first section however, could be characterized as a division of the sublime into three types. If it is accompanied by "some dread" then it is *the terrifying sublime,* if with "melancholy" then it is *the noble sublime* and finally if "with beauty spread over a sublime prospect" it is *the magnificent sublime* (Beo 2:209, Obs 16). Robert Clewis divides these into what he calls true and false sublimity with the noble sublime being the true sublime and the other two, the false (Clewis in Shell and Velkley 2014, 122ff). This distinction helps us distinguish what for Kant will ultimately prove as playing a key role in the discussion of sublimity both here and in the *Third Critique.* It also shows how Kant departs from Burke's sublime. While he provides examples of the terrifying sublime – presumably for pedagogical reasons or as influenced by the tradition of the discussion coming down to him – the treatise proves later that the noble sublime is the one and only form worthy of consideration when

assuming Kant's more general project which is, according to our hypothesis, an ethical one. We will elaborate this point more deeply when discussing the second section.

The second section of *Observations,* titled *On the Qualities of the Sublime and the Beautiful in Human Beings in General* might well be called the most significant one in relation to our subject matter. After an opening section about the quality of the feeling for the sublime and a division of it into three types, Kant continues to apply these ideas on human beings. In this respect, the second section constitutes the heart of his discussion which according to our reading is mainly directed towards connecting the sublime and its experience to moral feeling and dispositions of human beings; however here presented from an anthropological and pragmatic point of view. The relation between the sublime and the moral goes, as Clewis rightly notices, in two directions; on the one hand, Kant analyzes the sublime as it can be moral, i.e. the moral aspect of the experience of sublime, and on the other, he considers the sublime aspect of moral dispositions. In this regard moral feeling is equal to dignity – indeed true moral feeling is equal to true, i.e. noble, sublime – and this feeling evokes the feeling of sublimity (Clewis 2009, 13). We shall try to elucidate these movements in the second section, while referring to Kant's distinction between true and false sublimity and the relation between the sublime and nature as a guide for our analysis.

The first two paragraphs are instances of the second movement: where Kant considers the sublime/beautiful character of moral dispositions, such as "truthfulness and honesty is simple and noble…an unselfish urge to serve is noble…friendship has primarily the character of the sublime" (Beo 2:211-12, Obs 18f). A striking example which follows is both an instance of Kant bringing examples from literature and blossoms of what will develop into his mature theory of sublimity in the *Third Critique*:

> In my opinion, **tragedy** is distinguished from **comedy** primarily in the fact that in the former it is the feeling for the **sublime** while in the latter it is the feeling for the **beautiful** that is touched. In the former there is displayed magnanimous sacrifice for the well-being of another, bold resolve in the face of danger, and proven fidelity. There love is melancholic, tender, and full of esteem; the misfortune of others stirs sympathetic sentiments in the bosom of the onlooker and allows his magnanimous heart to beat for the need of others. He is gently moved and feels the dignity of his own nature. Comedy, in contrast, represents intrigues, marvelous entanglements and clever people who know how to wriggle out of them, fools who let themselves be deceived, jests and ridiculous characters. Here love is not so grave, it is merry and intimate. Yet as in other cases, here too the noble can be united with the beautiful to a certain degree. (Beo 2:212, Obs 19)

From the passage cited above it is clear that what counts in the second movement for Kant as crucial is what he calls the *noble sublime* which is ultimately the one and only form of true sublimity. Moreover, this type of sublimity in moral characteristics is necessarily bound to *the other;* as it is clear, Kant never developed a clear cut theory of intersubjectivity; however his concern with "the well-being of another" is clearly a positive step toward his later formulations of the categorical imperative in *Groundwork* and the *Second Critique*[19]. According to Kant, an action, i.e. the disposition leading to an action, is truly sublime and worthy of the name when it is undertaken apart from self-oriented concerns or inclinations and *for* the other. Respectively, according to the distinction between true/false sublimity all other forms of the sublime except for the noble sublime which is found in actions done at least free of inclinations, for the well-being of others and based on universal principles, are examples of false sublimity, i.e. they have no *genuine* moral worth, though some kind of worth. Of course we should bear in mind that at this stage unfortunately Kant has not yet made a clear distinction between a principle for action and the moral feeling, nor a clear distinction between the moral law as the objective binding ground for action and the moral feeling of respect (Clewis 2012, 130). Finally, at this stage there is still no clear difference between the moral feeling of respect and the aesthetic feeling of sublime; though we shall see albeit their differences, these feelings also converge. However, his examples provide us with signs and hints on what will become of his later formulations:

> Subduing one's passions by means of principles is sublime…among moral qualities, true virtue alone is sublime (Beo 2:215, Obs 22) If, general affection towards humankind has become your principle, to which you always subject your actions, then your love towards the one in need remains, but it is now, from a higher standpoint, placed in its proper relationship to your duty as a whole. The universal affection is a ground for participating in his ill-fortune, but at the same time it is also a ground of justice, in accordance with whose precept you must now forbear this action. Now as soon as this feeling is raised to its proper universality, it is sublime, but also colder (Beo 2:216, Obs 23).

Although Kant was not the first philosopher to introduce the distinction between true and false sublimity – Lord Kames, John Baillie, James Beattie, and Longinus had made such a distinction before him – his almost implicit distinction and his favouring of the instances of true sublimity in the last analysis are illuminating examples of the hypothesis that despite the empirical character of this treatise on the face of it, in essence, it is sufficiently close to Kant's

[19] It is even argued that there is indeed an account of intersubjectivity in Kant's philosophy; see:

critical philosophy so as to instead of calling for a fundamental shift in the philosopher's thoughts we would be able to talk about an expansion and deepening of the main ideas. In what follows we will provide a table of Kant's division of true/false sublimity and the moral characteristics associated with it in order to clarify the above mentioned points. It should be noted that the following table is based on Robert Clewis's distinction between true and false sublimity, though we have tried to provide a more comprehensive picture of the subject matter.

Type	**Examples In Art**	**Examples In Nature**	**Sublime as it can be Moral**	**Sublime aspect of Moral Dispositions**	**Temperament**	**Feeling**	**Moral Worth**	**Degenerated Form**	**Frequency in Human Beings**
Noble Sublime	Tragedy/ Virgil's hero/Egyptian	Long duration of Time past/great height	Melancholic character/serious gratification/ Steadfastness /Acting upon	True Virtue, Truthfulness, honesty, friendship, bold resolve in face of	Melancholy	Melancholy, feeling for the beauty and dignity of human nature	Genuine, True moral worth	obstinacy, dejection, piety	Very rare
Magnificent Sublime	Comedy, cheerfulness,	Masterful blueprint of nature,	Good-heartedness, loveable motivation	Sexual love with esteem, sympathy, complaisance	Sanguine (when it's only beautiful:	Moral sympathy, complaisance, in mere beauty: honour	Adopted, not genuine moral worth With beauty	Ridiculous, dandy character, fop and etc.	Almost common
Terrifying Sublime	Homer's hero (Epic literature) Milton		Mathematical calculations of…	Crusades, ancient knighthood, monkish virtues	Phlegmatic		Simulacrum of virtue	Grotesquery Fantast and crank character adventurous	Very common

Table 2.1: *Division of the sublime according to section two of Observations*

Having this table in mind we are now in a position to explore the contents of the second section more in detail. Although Kant does take the magnificent and terrifying sublime into account, going through extensive discussions of how they could appear in human character and how they are associated with different moral disposition, it is clear that whatever turn the discussion takes, he always comes back to the issue of the noble sublime. It might not be incorrect to conclude that the other two forms are only discussed in order to highlight the importance and significance of the noble sublime; and the latter, in order to highlight the importance of its

moral import. Thus, we might be justified to conclude from the second section that Kant is primarily concerned with the moral aspect of the sublime, i.e. how far it can help arise the moral feeling in us, while at the same time considering the sublime aspect of moral feelings in order both to support the former contention and to move towards the more anthropological sections three and four. Moreover, he relates the noble (genuine) sublime with understanding at two points (Beo 2:215, Obs 22). Although as a result of critical philosophy the sublime will later be associated with reason instead of understanding, the potential epistemological role it is capable of playing in relation to human being's moral life is remarkable even in this early text. The genuine sublime might not be a sufficient ground for one to *act* morally but it can prepare one. We shall consider this point more in detail after exploring the relation between the sublime and the moral more in detail, about which the following remarks from the second section are worth exploring:

> True virtue can only be grafted upon principles and it will become the more sublime and noble the more general they [principles] are. These principles are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and that extends much further than to the special grounds of sympathy and complaisance. I believe that I can bring all this together if I say that it is the **feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature** (Beo 2:217, Obs 24). Sympathy and complaisance are grounds for beautiful actions that would perhaps all be suffocated by the preponderance of a cruder self-interest, but as we have seen they are not immediate grounds of virtue, although since they are ennobled by their kinship with it they also bear its name. Hence I can call them **adopted virtues**, but that which rest on principles **genuine virtue.** The former are beautiful and charming, the latter alone is sublime and worthy of honor. (Beo 2:217f, Obs 24f).

Both from this citation, the table of true/false sublimity above and the counter-situations brought forth by Kant in this section after each claim about the noble sublime, we might arrive to the understanding that only that form of conduct is considered sublime which, primarily is based on principles and preferably on the most general universal ones, this type of conduct thus has genuine virtue which stands in opposition with all other types as adopted virtues and simulacrum of virtue; once more not regarding the epistemological role they play in practical life, rather in respect of their *moral worth* or *moral value* which according to our reading has the highest importance for Kant despite other discussions in favour of other aspects.

According to some commentators the moral feeling at this stage, is very close to empirical British understanding of the subject for Kant and still has the motivational power (Clewis 2012, 129). While this reading is correct, Kant's specific understanding of the moral feeling still has its own merits. Although it is a feeling which grounds the principles for action, it is

still a special kind of feeling which is far from sympathetic sentiments felt immediately and linked to inclinations or immediate motives; rather it is a feeling which in its outer expression become *cold,* it is a respect for all humanity – though not the moral law – and it is not primarily beautiful but worthy of honour, hence not fundamentally far from the critical notion though lacking the critical demarcation.

Despite Kant's intelligent differentiation of the true and false sublimity on grounds of their moral significance, there are still problems in Kant's account which are only possible to be solved in light of the critical philosophy. These problems have been recognized by many commentators in one or another way[20]. In sum, the most important one is to ground moral actions on a feeling which is not exactly the feeling of respect for the moral law presented in the critical philosophy. Moreover, Kant nowhere explains how and why this feeling is and should be universal – an attempt which stands at the heart of the *Third Critique* – moreover; with the discussions of the next two sections one is justified to conclude that it is not universal since it is dependent on the temperament – table 2.1 – and other factors such as gender, nationality and even age.

Giving all these critiques their due, we might still be able to argue that one source of difficulty is the assortment found in *Observations*. While in the critical philosophy Kant clearly categorizes and differentiates key concepts such as the agreeable/the beautiful/the sublime, objective conformity of actions to the moral law and subjective feeling of respect for them, sentiments from feeling of respect for the moral law and the like, the problem with *Observations* seems not to lie in Kant's incapability of executing such analysis but rather his different aim which are more anthropological, oriented at a larger audience and at the service of providing a picture of humanity in nature in which "the different groups unite themselves in a painting of the magnificent expression, where in the midst of great variety unity shines forth, and the whole of moral nature displays beauty and dignity" (Beo 2:227, Obs 34).

Finally, Kant's distinction between true and false sublimity and its degenerated forms could be read as two ways of conduct in general in the former of which the moral value has primacy and in the latter the outer instrumental consequences of the object or an action (Clewis 2012, 134). In this regard the examples and cases of false sublimity or its degenerated forms could be illuminating:

> Providence has further placed in us a certain feeling which is fine and moves us, or which can also balance cruder self-interest and vulgar sensuality. This is the **feeling for honor** and its consequence, **shame**. The opinion that others may have of our value and their judgment of our

[20] Abaci, Clewis, Guyer, Crowther (bring exact references in the end)

> actions is a motivation of great weight, which can coax us into many sacrifices…out of a delusion that is very useful although in itself very facile, as if the judgment of others determined the worth of ourselves and our actions. What happens from this impulse is not in the least virtuous (Simulacrum of Virtue) (Beo 2:218, Obs 25). In the degenerate form of this character [melancholic], seriousness inclines to dejection, piety to zealotry, the fervor for freedom to enthusiasm…In case of perversion of his feeling and lack of a cheerful reason he succumbs to the **adventurous**: inspirations, apparitions, temptations. If the understanding is even weaker, he hits upon **grotesqueries**: portentous dreams, presentiments, and wondrous omens. He is in danger of becoming a **fantast** or a **crank** (Beo 2:222, Obs 28f).

We might be able to conclude that the source of difficulty here, in cases of false sublimity, lies in the fact that the false ones, though possess no genuine worth, then possess *some* worth, they are in one sense, nature's alternatives or means to motivate human beings which lack moral disposition otherwise to action. This leaves room for many critiques of Kant, including his understanding of principle as based on a feeling while it seems to be simultaneously universal and contingent; however such aspects like the dependence of virtue on principles – whatever they might be – anticipates Kant's critical philosophy in one way or the other (Guyer 2007, 34). Kant's critical philosophy especially *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Critique of Practical Reason* and indeed *Critique of the power of judgment* are aimed partly at solving issues which emerge in this early text while at the same time making room for moral behavior within the limits of natural determination, which could be evaluated as a success within Kant's own philosophical frame. In the next section we will consider the third and fourth section of *Observations* in order to see how the ideas and themes of the first two sections are applied to sexes and nations from Kant's pragmatic anthropological point of view.

2.1.2. Sections Three and Four: Sublimity, Gender, Nations

Kant devotes a considerable amount of the *Observations* to what could be called an anthropological study of the two sexes and different nations regarding the sublime and the beautiful. While the fourth section is not without historical background, the third section as far as it associates the sublime and the beautiful to men and women, attempting at a moral analysis of both is genuine and novel to Kant (Cohen in Shell & Velkley 2014, 150). We will try to sketch out each section in turn, though we must avoid the notorious anthropological discussions related to each since these two sections do not address our main topic at least directly.

Kant begins his discussion of the characteristics of men and women by claiming that women are distinguished by their beauty and men by sublimity, though "one expects that each sex will unite both, but in such a way that in women all other merits should only be united so as to emphasize the character of the **beautiful**, … while by contrast among the male qualities the **sublime** should clearly stand out as the criterion of his kind" (Beo 2:228, Obs 35). Whatever Kant would say and could say about the social and ontological status of women, the conclusion from this bold assertion is inevitable that for him women are inferior to men, not only socially but essentially. What supports this reading is the argument provided in the section according to which true sublime, i.e. genuine virtue is only found in one type of the sublime which is the noble sublime; thus those moral dispositions which have true moral worth are associated with noble sublime in character and are in fact considered sublime. Now as Kant proceeds in the third section he describes women as possessing beautiful nobility which is specific to them. Although Kant sees this as the ideal, unproblematic status of women, one might be able to conclude still that in its epitome, the so called "fair sex" is inferior to the male sex both regarding her ability to understand and to act morally.

Some commentators like Guyer attempt at a defence of Kant by stating that his account of women is both descriptive *and* normative, hence arguing:

> Unless one keeps both descriptive and normative dimensions of Kant's distinction in mind, Kant's account might seem to preclude virtue in women. Kant says both "It is difficult for me to believe that the fair sex is capable of principles" (Beo 2:232) and "true virtue can only be grafted upon principles" (2:217). This might require, as Jean Rumsey claims, that "women. . . are in Kant's view less than. . . full moral agents." But such attention to the merely descriptive aspect of Kant's distinction misses Kant's insistence in *Observations* that women *are* capable of virtue, but "The virtue of the woman is a **beautiful virtue**" (2:231) (Guyer and Frierson 2012, Introduction, xxx).

Despite such arguments, Kant's own text both in *Observations* and in his latest work on the issue, *Anthropology,* tell us otherwise. The most important problem with Kant's account lies not in his supressing women from a social standpoint; rather it lies in the fact that he considers it as *natural*, hence impossible to alter or develop. In the very first page of third section he write:

> All education and instruction must keep this before it, and likewise all effort to promote the ethical perfection of the one or the other, unless one would make unrecognizable the charming difference that nature sought to establish between the two human genders. For it is here not enough to represent that one has human beings before one: one must also not forget that these

> human beings are not all of the same sort (Beo 2:228, Obs 35). Providence has implanted goodly and benevolent sentiments in their bosom (Beo 2:232, Obs 39).

From these citations it is evident that Kant considers these characteristics given to both men and women by nature. Thus although one might try to cultivate each in one way or another, it is not suited for her and "might as well also wear a beard" (Beo 2:230, Obs 37). Although, Guyer still tries to solve the issue by insisting on the special virtue of women which is beautiful virtue, this reading as he himself later implies is not in conformity with Kant's text, nor here nor in his later writings where Kant seriously takes sides with the rational side, hence true virtue and sublime which is characteristic of men (Guyer and Frierson 2012, Introduction xxxi). As a result, Kant misogyny is no surprise and evident from various claims in his text, ranging from "…deep reflection is not well suited for women…laborious learnings..." (Beo 2:229, Obs 36) to "feeling for paintings of expression and for music, not in so far as it expresses art but in so far as it expresses sentiment" (Beo 2:231, Obs 38) is only suited for women, which demonstrates their lesser ability not only regarding morality but also understanding and knowledge. At best they have sympathy, good-heartedness and beautiful virtue – which indeed should be at the service of enticing men into marriage – which as we have seen in the previous section is far from genuine moral worth and respectively genuine virtue (Beo 2:242, Obs 49; Beo 2:231, Obs 39). Of course as Guyer also mentions in his introduction to the English translation of *Observations* such positioning is not free of personal judgment and refers to Kant's private life in 1760s[21].

In an article on these sections of *Observations* Alix Cohen brings forth an interesting argument which is both worth noting and supports our inference that the main problem with Kant's account at this point in regarding these characteristics as *natural.* Cohen believes that in *Observations* Kant implies that nature plays an indirect role to compensate for human being's moral deficiencies so as to help the species survive and continue reproducing. In this sense, we are not able to tell from the appearance of human being's conduct if it is motivated by true moral principles or merely adopted virtues such as sympathy or worse, by simulacrum of virtue, i.e. love of honour. This point, indeed according to our reading of Cohen's argument, is most clear in case of women's moral conduct:

> Because they are incapable of acting on principles, nature is left with the task of compensating for their inability through the natural inclination for beautiful things. In this sense, women are

[21] For more information on these biographical issues, see: Zammito, John, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology,* University of Chicago Press, 2002

> really amoral creatures, and most of their weaknesses are mere "beautiful faults" (Beo 2:232, Obs 43) because they have no moral color, they are easily forgiven (Cohen 2012, 153)

Thus women's moral behavior is a good example that at least at this stage nature is at work in preparing us to at least seem to act morally, hence the critical philosophy's rather radical elimination of the agency of empirical world in the realm of reason, hence morality, is almost absent here. Moreover, it points to the fact that moral *judgment* is impossible from the appearance of actions since we do not know if they stem from true moral principles or mere adopted or simulacrum of virtues and this is due to the fact that nature is at work in this case.

Finally, Kant could enjoy one endorsement regarding his treatment of women despite all criticisms. In *Observations* 2:236 to 2:238 Kant considers the facial or physical beauty of women as it is related to their moral virtue. In this aspect, we can conclude that in the last analysis what counts as the beauty of a woman for Kant is not her physical appearance – though he finds it important from other aspects – but rather her virtuous conduct since moral quality is more beautifying than the appearance.

The fourth and last section of *Observations* explores different nations "in so far as they rest upon the different feeling of the sublime and the beautiful". Like the third section, since this last section too does not address our subject matter directly, we will only outline the main themes and arguments present in the literature regarding these themes. Of course in debates on Kant's views regarding geography, its relations to history and race, this section can be very instructive. In the *Announcement of the program of lectures for the winter semester* of 1765-1766 Kant writes:

> The natural progress of human knowledge is as follows: first of all, the understanding develops by using experience to arrive at intuitive judgments, and by their means to attain to concepts. Firstly, the understanding must be brought to maturity and its growth expedited by exercising it in empirical judgments and focusing its attention on what it can learn by comparing the impressions which are furnished by the senses. (Ann 2:305-6, Guyer&Frierson 2012, 251ff)

This claim could show us Kant's approach in the fourth section of *Observations* quite clearly. Kant is not aiming at providing us with an anthropology of nations based on concepts and derived from reason; rather he is taking even a more empirical approach than the first two sections towards European and Non-European nations. He begins his discussion by dividing European nations into five groups according to their possession of either beautiful or sublime disposition, the former itself divided into two sub-groups, the latter into the second section's infamous division of noble/magnificent/terrifying sublime (Beo 2:243, Obs 50):

> Among the peoples of our part of the world the **Italians** and the **French** are, in my opinion, those who most distinguish themselves in the feeling of the **beautiful**, but the **Germans**, the **English**, and the **Spaniards** those who are most distinguished from all others in the feeling of the **sublime** (Beo 2:243, Obs 50).

Kant continues to distinguish Italians with the feeling of the beautiful when it is touching and has a trace of sublime, the French with the same feeling but when it is joyful and cherishing, the English with noble, the Germans with magnificent and the Spanish with terrifying sublime (ibid, 2:244). He devotes extensive discussion to the outer expression of these national characteristics according to beautiful/sublime criteria, providing his reader with anthropological remarks which also touch on geography. Surprisingly he also considers artistic achievements of these nations according to their beautiful or sublime dispositions in which seemingly the Italians are honoured as masters of music and plastic arts, the English as those of rhetoric and poetry, though the latter should according to the preference of the sublime disposition to the beautiful one be privileged[22]. Kant's reason for such passing could be that they "can confirm the taste of nations that we have imputed to them" (Beo 2:244, Obs 51). Though immediately in the next paragraph he asserts that "the characters of the minds of the peoples are most evident in that in them which is moral" (Beo 2:245, Obs 51). However, from the discussion offered afterwards we could conclude that what he has in mind is once again the outer expressed moral behaviour of these nations and not their internal moral disposition. The Dutch, however, in Kant's view possess neither beautiful nor sublime character and are not worth considering (Beo 2:244, Obs 51). Apart from the catastrophic consequences this division has for Kant as an anthropologist, this remark might have a small hint about what will become the differentiation between mechanical arts and beautiful arts in the *Third Critique* where Kant decisively sides with the latter and the exploration of which is beyond the scope of the present research.

Before dealing with an outline of problems arising from Kant's division of nations, it should be mentioned that in this context Kant not only considers European nations but also non-Europeans including Asians and North-Americans. This discussion has no precedence in Kant's anthropological or geographical discussions (Louden in Shelly&Velkley 2014, 204) and in it each Asian nation is similar to a European one, thus Arabs are the Spaniards, the Persians the French and the Japanese, the Englishmen of Asia, while seemingly the only place

[22] This could be a sprout of what emerges later in *Critique of the Power of Judgment* as Kant's hierarchy of arts in which poetry gains the highest rank as the closest art to understanding and one which contributes most to cognition in general. Although a justified comparison of the discussion needs an independent research. For more information about Kant's hierarchy of arts, see:

left for Germans is taken by North-Americans (Beo 2:252, Obs 58). Finally, Kant supports his stance in this section with references to Hume and Montesquieu the former of which has specifically been influential on Kant's devastating views about black people or as he calls them, "negroes" (Beo 2:253, Obs 58).

We are now in a position to outline some difficulties and specific features of the fourth section of *Observations*. First, this is the closest section to Kant's anthropology whereas the first section is the closest to his aesthetics. As Paul Guyer also mentions in his notes to the English translation of the treatise, "Differences between the sexes would remain a constant theme in Kant's anthropology, from his first lectures in 1772-73 to his final handbook, *Anthropology*" (Obs 35, footnote). All through Kant's early lectures in anthropology at the university of Köinsberg to his latest work, Kant pursues a popular purpose in anthropology and that is to teach the wider public how to live, how to encounter people of various cultures and what to expect from them – as it has been mentioned in the opening phrases of our discussion of the fourth section (Louden 2012, 199f). Thus these lectures are aimed to provide students with pragmatic knowledge of the world in terms of how they can generally find their way in it. However, the first problem arises immediately from what commentators such as Louden take to some extent innocent, while others such as Guyer and Kuehn with whom we are in agreement, take as serious problems[23]. The problem could be reformulated as: what knowledge will the student obtain of the world when it is already a biased viewpoint of one thinker? Even if such a knowledge is possible, is it a legitimate one? Moreover, how could such a limited and narrow criteria as the beautiful and sublime characteristics of nations serve as a general guide of conduct? Thus, we believe it is more reasonable to accept Guyer's interpretation, rather than that of Louden, according to which in the last analysis Kant's discussion in the fourth section has not much to offer even considering Kant's own purposes. They have not much to offer since Kant chooses a strange narrow criteria to analyze nations. Nevertheless, we can credit Kant with having something of an innocent aim in mind: to present human being in its cultural, political and geographical diversity. Kant is not at least intending in the first place to gather all humanity in its diversity under one name: rationality as understood by Enlightenment. However, this is only on the face of matters as his thoughts about anthropology throughout his life seems to prove otherwise[24].

[23] Guyer, Paul, "Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant's Moral Philosophy", Inquiry 50, 446-464
Kuehn, Manfred, *Kant, A Biography,* Cambridge University Press, 2001

[24] We are not yet in a position to explore this aspect in detail and it stands unfortunately beyond the scope of this research.

Finally, in the closing passage of the last section Kant suddenly introduces an amazing idea regarding cosmopolitan education, asserting "the as yet undiscovered secret of education should be torn away from the ancient delusion in order early to raise the moral feeling in the breast of every young citizen of the world into an active sentiment, so that all delicacy should not merely amount to the fleeting and idle gratification of judging with more or less taste that which goes on outside of us" (Beo 2:255, Obs 62), so that it would be possible that proper taste could be returned to our world. This could be seen as a future project of Kant in anthropology where he addresses *every* man and woman and takes them as capable of improving as an individual regardless of their nationality, as a Weltbürger. However, in this text at least Kant in accentuating the inherent differences between nations, though in a rather inappropriate way which gives way to negative interpretations of Kant's otherwise positive intentions.

So far we have tried to clarify in a concise way the four sections of Kant's pre-critical treatise *Observations,* a text which has been paid attention to in secondary literature only recently and about which there is still room for comprehensive research. As far as the scope of our research goes however, we will mostly focus on the first and sections of the text while the latter two are not directly related to our topic. In the next section we will briefly explore the relation between *Observations* and the literature about sublimity which precedes it. We will demonstrate in which relation does the text stand with British aesthetics of eighteenth century, the ancient treatise by Longinus and French literature of the sublime.

2.2. *Observations* in the Light of History

In this section we will introduce two conceptions of the experience of sublimity in order to explore the relation of each philosopher from chapter one to Kant's *Observations.* These are respectively the *positive sublime* and the *negative sublime.* By the former we understand an experience which is constructive, encouraging, elevating and directed towards moral disposition and/or cognitive possibilities, i.e. an experience which is more than mere bodily, physical or psychological affections. By the latter we understand an experience emphasizing fear, terror, pain, a destructive experience which is discouraging, normative, overpowering and limited to pleasure or displeasure. This dichotomy should help us locate Kant's *Observation* in history of the sublime while also supporting our hypothesis that for Kant we are dealing with an essential preoccupation with moral theory for which the experience of sublime is a manifestation or expression to help symbolize the moral principle which remains otherwise difficult to show. We will show that Kant's search for subjective universality of

morality brings him close to Longinus's subjective sublime, while distancing him from Burke. Moreover, though in the discussion of sublimity Kant has no connexion with Francis Hutcheson, the former's debts to and objections towards the latter help us understand the main philosophical considerations of Kant which shed a light not only on his aesthetics but are also important for the genesis of his ethics. According to Herman van Erp: "A feeling for beauty makes us, also according to Kant, receptive to moral feelings, but this psychological process presupposes the consciousness of moral duty. Therefore, Kant believes that the process is rather in the reverse direction, 'that the development of moral ideas and the cultivation of moral feeling is the true propaedeutic for laying the foundations for good taste' (last sentence of the first part of the *CPJ*)" (van Erp in Loose 2011, 35).

2.2.1. Kant and Longinus

The influence of Longinus on Kant – either in the pre-Critical or in the Critical theories – is not obvious. Kant never mentions Longinus or *Peri Hypsous* directly in any of his texts, neither much is to be found in the literature about Kant's sources in the discussion of sublimity relating him to Longinus while most commentators emphasize on the influence of British moral sense theorists and sometimes German sources. However, the Greek/German version of *Peri Hypsous* was available already by 1737 and a second edition emerged in 1742; so it was *possible* for Kant to have access to Longinian treatise (Doran 2015, 176). Moreover, we also know that Kant was in a constant dialogue with the philosophical debates of his time, among which the writings of Moses Mendelssohn were significant. Mendelssohn's treatise on the sublime itself is primarily concerned with Longinian sublime and not the immediate source of Edmund Burke (ibid). Finally, since Kant was teaching Baumgarten and one of the latter's pupils Georg Friedrich Meier mentions Longinus in his 1757 treatise, it is *possible*, and of course not certain, that Kant was aware of *Peri Hypsous*. In order to see the similarities between Kantian sublimity and Longinian theory we need to set aside those reading which treat Longinian sublime as a merely rhetorical issue[25]. Thus in contrast to the common view which emphasizes the roles of Burke, Shaftesbury and Addison, we will also highlight the similarities between Longinian sublimity and Kantian theory.

[25] In his book titled *The British Aesthetic Tradition* (2013) Timothy Costelloe, like many commentators, holds that Longinian sublime is a matter of sublime style which is far from aesthetic sublime which is an experience of elevation, transcendence, awe and fear. These commentators are persuaded by the fact that other scholars in the tradition such as Shaftesbury and Dennis use *grand* or *great* to refer to aesthetic sublime and *sublime* is reserved for the tradition of Longinus (Costelloe 2013, 18f). However, we could argue that the remaining text from Longinus does not limit sublimity to the style.

The first similarity between Kant and Longinus refers to their aims and purposes in composing a treatise on the sublime. Both thinkers had pedagogical aims in mind. Kant wrote *Observations,* especially the third and fourth chapters as a guideline for his students as well as ordinary people to find their ways in the world; to know how to react to people and what to expect from them when encountering them. Longinus also addresses his young pupil Terenrianus in order to teach him how to produce great texts with sublime effects which "transport the audience out of themselves" (Longinus 1995, 162). These pedagogical approaches are only seen in Kant's treatise and Longinus' which brings them closer to each other than to Kant's more immediate predecessors.

Secondly, both philosophers divide the sublime into true and false sublime. False sublimity for Longinus is associated with frigidity, using misplaced emotion and most importantly, triviality of the mind (ibid, 167-171). The cause of such false sublimity is the orator's passion for fashion and a lack of noble-mindedness. Thus, although great thoughts are the crucial source of sublimity, not every great thought is capable of being called sublime and the production of sublime; only those thoughts are capable of doing so which are found is noble characters. In the seventh section Longinus shows what he means by truly sublime, by defining what a noble character is. First and foremost such character is defined by "contempt for" wealth, position, reputation and sovereignty. As a result, true sublimity for Longinus is associated with moral dispositions which gives much "food for thought" (ibid, 179). Kant also considers the terrifying sublime and the magnificent to be mere instances of false sublimity. For Kant the one and only form of true sublime is the noble sublime which is bound to moral feeling, is achieved by subsuming one's inclinations and desires under general principles and is impossible without possession of a moral character. We could hence conclude that for both philosophers the distinction between true/false sublime hints at the moral aspect of sublimity not on the side of the perceiver of a work or in an encounter with nature but as a moral disposition; for Longinus in the creator and for Kant in any human being who is worthy of being called a morally good person[26]. From this division we can address the relation between sublime and morality in both philosophers.

In section nine of *Peri Hypsous* Longinus holds that in order to achieve true sublimity, "we should do our utmost to train our minds into sympathy with what is noble…impregnate them with lofty thoughts", since "sublimity is the echo of a noble mind" (ibid, 185ff). Additionally, by recounting his discussion with a philosopher about the reasons for a decline in sublime

[26] This direction is indeed only found in *Observations* while in the *Third Critique* and in the dynamically sublime we encounter the other possibility, i.e. of naming a natural phenomenon sublime once it produces an experience in the perceiver which encourages moral feeling, or hints at the moral side of humanity.

characters in his time, Longinus claims that the philosopher is wrong to search for these reasons in a lack of freedom of speech or democracy. Longinus's alternative is that "love of money, conceit, swagger and luxury" have led to a lack of sublimity: a decline in subjective morality (ibid, 298). According to Longinus in a society where one could be "bribed for verdict", i.e. there is a lack of morality, there is no space for the sublime to flourish. As we have seen the Kantian noble sublime in *Observations* also implies the sovereignty of moral dispositions and subordinating one's inclinations to the greater good of others, in form of principles, is the highest achievable sublimity. For Longinus too sublimity demands transcendence of personal pleasures. Thus according to Rayman, "This view, anticipating Kant, demonstrates that for Longinus, as for Kant, sublimity's relationship to pleasure and the affects consists in the drive to master them, and thereby to transcend the limits of human existence. In this respect, Longinus provides just the dominating, transcendent relationship to the affects called for by the Kantian critical account" (Rayman 2012, 7). So, fifteen centuries before the British sense moralists, Longinus provides the first account of sublimity according to which *transcendence* form personal inclinations and earthly desires, i.e. for Kant subordination of one's desires to principle, is the essential condition for sublimity. Moreover, Like Kant, Longinus mentions the interplay of order and disorder, imagination and reason, and that morality depends on the struggle between these mental powers and is in contrast to an excess of passions [27]. Elevation, transcendence of earthly and mortal desires is the key similarity of Kantian and Longinian sublime, but also points to their radical difference. While for Kant the transcendence is either – in pre-Critical *Observations* – aimed at subordinating one's desires to the well-being of other human beings, hence giving morality an objective universality, or – in Critical account – towards one's own reason which leads to our moral capacities, hence giving morality a subjective universality; in Longinian account it is hardly possible to talk about any form of universality; at best the assertion in section thirty-five might be seen as a primary form of *objective* universality based on natural endowment: "nature has judges man a creature of no mean or ignoble quality, but, as if she were inviting us to some great gathering, she has called us into life… to have a passion for whatever is great" (Longinus 1995, 276ff). Although it is plausible to view Kant's pre-Critical view closer to that of Longinus, since according to Rayman Kant's pre-Critical account and Longinus' both share

[27] Rayman also argues that Longinus' discussion of the tension between imagination and reason prepares the framework for Kantian Critical sublime,; however, given Kant's fundamentally different understanding of both faculties and their respective different roles, in comparison to Longinus' general account, such a deep relationship between Kant and Longinus seems infeasible. For Rayman's discussion, see: Joschua Rayman; *Kant on Sublimity and Morality,* University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 2012

holding to an ethics of virtue which entails the sublime experience of transcendence (Rayman 2012, 9)[28].

Moreover, as Kant explicitly asserts in the opening sentence of his treatise, he sees the sublime as a subjective feeling, an experience the source of which lies in the subject and not objective attributions. Longinus in a similar way views sublimity as a subjective experience, created by the genius orator, transferred to the perceiver. As we have seen Longinus defines five sources of sublime in sections eight of *Peri Hypsous,* among which the first element, i.e. grandeur in thought, a noble original idea is the most important element and other technical elements do not obtain sublimity without the former – more evidence was provided by the fact that in the closing section Longinus holds the sublime discourse could not be misused by technocrats – hence the strong subjectivism of Longinian sublime. For both Longinus and Kant, the sublime is not dependent on an objective attribute of the text, a natural phenomenon or a work of art; rather on the subject's transcendence of her/his earthly inclinations. However, it is hardly possible to argue for a subjective *universality* in Longinian sublime since he also attaches an important role the expertise.

Although as mentioned before both Longinus and Kant follow pedagogical aims, Kant is concerned with such an aim in the last two sections while according to our reading fundamentally he follows his moral theory's considerations in every step and is more preoccupied with defining the status of moral feeling and grounding morality as binding and universal; it appears that the sublime more readily serves the latter purpose in *Observations.* On the other hand, Longinus is concerned with teaching his pupil how to effectuate power on his audience and impress them, for which the sublime is much more suited than the beautiful. Moreover, if Kant, following the tradition, provides examples both from nature and art, Longinus constrains sublimity to art and specifically to literary art and rhetoric; hence the source of many misunderstandings that there is no space for an aesthetic sublime in Longinus (Costelloe 2013, 20).

The similarities between Longinian sublime and the Kantian one serve to demonstrate, primarily, that Kant is also in a dialogue with the former, i.e. sublime as understood by Longinus and not as deeply indebted to Burkean sublime as is usually thought. Secondly, it reveals that both philosophers pursue aims other than aesthetic ones at the heart of their account, Longinus has the pedagogical aim of training his pupil and defining the criteria for achieving literary sublime which is also related to morality but not as fundamentally as

[28] Even in this regard Longinus commits an error which Kant tries to avoid: grounding virtue in natural functions which renders it utterly heteronomous, incapable of being morally relevant. Indeed, such a natural functionality is morally neutral.

Kantian sublime; Kant also has a pedagogical aim *but* more seriously than Longinus, a moral project the pursuit of which is discernable from *Observations* already. The connecting thread of Kant and Longinus however, which differentiates both from British accounts of sublimity is their emphasis on transcendence with moral import, towards becoming morally better human beings.

2.2.2. Kant, Addison, Shaftesbury

Shaftesbury's influence on Kant should be viewed in the more general context of Kant's interest in British moral sense theories in 1760s and while as mentioned before the former's *The Moralists* was translated into German before *Observations* was composed, there is still no direct reference to Shaftesbury by Kant (see Chapter One, 1.3.2.). In any case the pivotal idea in Shaftesbury's account, which along with Burke, could have influenced Kant is the notion of *disinterestedness,* which integrates in the aesthetic experience not only the fact that it is an expression of reason but also the more crucial criteria that we should have no interest in the possession, personal use or enjoyment of what we experience so that it could be called an aesthetic experience (Costelloe 2013, 19). For Shaftesbury the experience of beauty is a function of rational contemplation, which means it does not stem from mere sensual gratification but from contemplation – a view which is elaborated in a brilliant way in Kant *Third Critique* (ibid). Finally, Shaftesbury is also among those figures who have contributed to the independence of aesthetics and aesthetic experience, while at the same time seeing aesthetic value as comparable to moral value, a view which we argue is shared with Kant.

Joseph Addison's *Spectator* is specifically mentioned in the *third section* of *Observations,* so Kant's familiarity with this journal is clear (Beo 2:233, Obs 40). Having already mentioned Addison's contributions to the field in the first chapter we only need to mention here that according to our proposed dichotomy Addison could be considered as one of the philosophers to understand the experience of sublime is the positive, constructive way. Not only does he distinguish clearly and fundamentally the sublime from the beautiful, but also he assumes the former experience to have a positive nature. Similar to Kant's understanding Addison holds that through an encounter with the sublime in form of natural phenomena we experience a certain liberation from perceptual limitations, which leads into an exciting feeling of self-transcendence (Crowther 1989, 7). Moreover, as Crowther mentions, the rather exaggerated emphasis on the influence of Burke has overshadowed those of Addison, while many of Kant's examples, ideas and themes are directly found in the latter's *Spectator,* a point equally mentioned by Clewis's more recent study of *Observations* (Clewis in Velkley and Shell 2014,

120). Finally, in an interesting and novel equation Addison equates imagination with sight leading to his contention that wild, natural beauty is greater source of beauty and sublimity than art (Costelloe 2013, 44). This view, still positively constructive, expands the Longinian concept of the sublime limited to art in the latter to nature, while at the same time probably influencing Kant in his preference of natural sublimity over artistic sublimity both in *Observations* and in the *Third Critique* in form of the dynamically sublime. In the next section we will deal with Burke's account and its influence on Kantian sublime keeping Hutcheson for the last part of this chapter, since we are contended that, firstly, the influence of Burke is probably not as deep as most commentators assume; secondly, the influence of Hutcheson is crucial to assume to understand which path Kantian moral philosophy was taking in 1760s and onwards and in clarifying our hypothesis that at the heart of Kant's aesthetics lies an immanent substrate of moral preoccupations.

2.2.3. Kant and Burke: the Observer vs. the Inquirer

The relation between Edmund Burke's *Enquiry* and Kant's *Observations* is complex and multifaceted; the same relation is all the same important regarding Kant's *Third Critique.* In this section we will briefly show the similarities and differences between both philosophers' understanding of sublime with hints on Kant's *Third Critique* without which Kant's relation to Burke remains incomplete. We also keep with the contention that Burke's relation to Kant's fundamental considerations is not as deep and strong as most commentators think. In agreement with Dieter Henrich we will argue in the next section that the influence of Hutcheson is pivotal both to Kant's aesthetics and his moral theory.

The similarities between Kant and Burke are not more than a few and on the surface. Both philosophers have anthropological, psychological and empirical purposes: Burke focuses on objects and qualities which lead to an experience of sublimity and Kant enumerating sublime objects in the first section of *Observations.* Moreover, both philosophers distinguish the sublime from the beautiful sharply, and develop a theory which also at the same time shows them as interrelated and complementary. Burke explains the sublime in relation to self-preservation and sexual inclination; Kant also uses beauty and sublimity to talk about gender and nationality claiming that aesthetic feeling are rooted in more basic sexual inclinations (Clewis in Velkley&Shell 2012, 121). Another significant similarity is the crucial role of terror for both philosophers, though for Kant it becomes more explicit only in the *Third Critique.* For both Burke and Kant – especially in his dynamical sublime – the sublime is simultaneously terrifying and respectable, it is a complex feeling of pleasure, or what Kant

later formulates as negative pleasure (van Erp in Loose 2011, 18). Additionally, both authors find the possibility of the experience of sublime both in nature and in art; though for Burke as it appears it will be limited to poetry in arts and for Kant in the formulation of the *Third Critique* nature seemingly plays a more important role. Finally, Burke asserts that in the experience of the sublime "the mind is so entirely filled with its object that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it" (Burke 1998, 53); Kant in a similar way holds sublime as an intense sensory experience which has some aspects in common with an affect (Clewis 2009, 178).

We are now in a position to mention the differences between the Kantian sublime and the Burkean approach. Some of these divergences stem directly from two essentially different philosophical projects for a full view of which we also need to take the *Third Critique*'s account into consideration. With the hypothesis that Kant final purposes and philosophical motives did not alter significantly from the pre-Critical to the Critical philosophy, we might be justified to view Kant's differences with Burke in the light of both *Observations* and where necessary the *Third Critique.*

To begin with, Kant's style in *Observations* is informal, comfortable, descriptive and literal; indeed *Observations* was one of the most popular texts by Kant. By contrast, Burke's *Enquiry* is more serious, detailed, filled with numerous examples, exploring the subject matter in a more systematic way in comparison to *Observations* (Clewis in Velkley&Shell 2014, 121). One of the most crucial difference is rooted on the different purposes each philosopher has in mind: Burke's *Enquiry* is written by a young politician in search of a position in the world of literature; so Burke is preoccupied with the question of the sublime/the beautiful for their own sake, as far as they served his engagement with aesthetics and at best as the sublime specially served his political views (see Chapter One, 1.4.). Kant on the contrary is not interested in the sublime or the beautiful *per se.* His final aim and the substratum of his philosophy is to ground morality on an unquestionable, subjectively universal basis. Though this aim is not explicit in the pre-Critical philosophy, already Kant's *Remarks* hint at this aim, this constant preoccupation. As a result of this difference, we realize another one: if Burke is stopped at terror by arguing that our natural instinct of self-preservation leads to fearing any danger or pain which threatens life thus the terror emerging from such fear is accompanied with the experience so intense as the sublime and since we have some *distance* from the source of real danger then it is accompanied by some sort of delight but that is all; Kant, especially in the *Third Critique*, begins with terror but also moves on forward from it towards associating the negative pleasure, i.e. Burkean delight, with the feeling of respect that comes from realizing the superiority of our faculty of reason over any sensory affection, i.e. our being as individuals

with a moral vocation (Costelloe 2013, 72). Burke explains the feeling of delight at best by referring to contraction of nerves hence going through endless explanations of the effects of darkness, light, sudden change of each and the like (see Burke 1998, Part Four); while Kant already in *Observations* refers to moral feeling, approaches moral sense theorists and paves his towards the mature formulation of morality.

Burke held that any object causing fear or terror could be a source of sublimity; thus his examples include both objects of grand magnitude or size and small ones (ibid). For Kant in the *Third Critique* especially, all these endless examples fall into two categories of mathematically and dynamically sublime. The reason again being different aims: Kant is concerned with what follows the moment, the *kairos,* of our encounter with the sublime, so with what happens after this experience, the Kantian sublime is an experience on the move. As Herman van Erp puts it, in Kant's mature philosophy:

> For Burke, the wild and threatening ocean is an excellent example of sublimity, but Kant opposes: . . . the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous presentation. Thus the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be called sublime (van Erp in Loose 2011, 18)

Another significant difference to point is the philosophers' divergent views on anthropology and politics. In Burke's theory of sublime, one can trace an intrinsic tension between, on the one hand, his view of the sublime in nature and art as a radical event, and on the other, as an exercise of power. Burke was an anti-revolutionary who was effectively against the French revolution, advocating instead a more conservative political standpoint. This is evident from his analysis of power and how one should bow to power, in this case political power. The sublime for Burke remains an individualistic experience which is at the service of self-preservation, but when it comes to the social dimension there is almost nothing by Burke. On the contrary, Kant does no entertain a political point of view and when he does he is absolutely a supporter of the French revolution. Indeed, Kant provides an anthropological approach – which is in relation to national characteristics problematic – however, at the heart of Kant's account, there is the hope for every individual regardless of nationality or gender to become a Weltbürger (world citizen) and develop his/her moral dispositions as much as possible. Moreover, this difference also hints at the fact that for Kant, in contrast to Burke, and in his Transcendental Philosophy, the experience of sublime is simultaneously an emotional and an intellectual one (Shapshay in Levinson 2014, 87). Thus the subject's oscillation between pain and pleasure which leads to negative pleasure is finally resolved by interference of reason

which promotes the moral aspect which transcends any sensory limitation. The transcendence for Kant is a moral experience while for Burke on the contrary, it is limited to self-preservation and a closed individual world.

Finally, the notion of sympathy is indicative of an important divergence between Kant and Burke. Even already in *Observations* sympathy, along with pity, complaisance and benevolence are only *adoptive* virtues; hence, they do not possess original moral worth because they are not based on principles. This strive for a subjective universality is completely absent from Burke's account. The latter does in nowhere distinguish between true/false sublimity and is not entertaining any moral aspect in relation to the sublime. Thus we can conclude, based on our previously mentioned dichotomy, that Burke is the representative of a negative sublime, in this sense devoid of any connection with morality, limited to physiological aspects and destructive (Clewis 2009, 38). Already in 1760s Kant is the exact opposite. His implicit notions of true/false sublimity, explicated in the three forms of the sublime, explain his first and foremost philosophical engagement: ethics, and in that an a priori ground for it. Thus for Kant the *true* sublime, that which is worth considering, is one with moral import, oriented towards others, essentially accompanied by subordinating one's desires and inclinations under principles of morality which are concerned with society. Hence, Kant stands in sharp contrast to Burke's notion of self-preservation albeit he affirms in the case of the dynamically sublime that one needs to be at a safe distance, but he does not remain limited to this stage.

There are still other differences, minor in comparison to those we have mentioned so far. Burke includes a discussion of God and his power in the experience of the sublime which is totally absent from Kant's discussion both in *Observations* and the *Third Critique.* For Burke ambiguity and obscurity are crucial to the creation of terror, thus to the experience of sublime; yet for Kant – as evident from the common example of representation of heaven and hell – what is sublime in the representation is not the ambiguity but the clear difference between a morally good and a morally bad life which is symbolized in the ideas of heaven and hell (van Erp in Loose 2011, 20).

In conclusion, Burke presents a rather negative sublime which encompasses the transition from fear to delight as a result of discovering that we are in a safe position. For Kant, the notion of sublime both in *Observations* and in the *Third Critique* is more positive; especially achieved in the latter work "by emphasizing the resemblance between the feeling of sublimity and the feeling of respect for the moral law" (ibid, 26).

2.2.4. Kant's Encounter with Hutcheson

So far we have explored possible connections between Kant's *Observations* and the ideas of his predecessors. However, with the exception of Longinus based on our reading, these relations are mostly based on aesthetics. If we delve deeper into *Observations* and *Remarks*, then behind the surface of aesthetics emerges Kant's engagement with ethics; hence our early hypothesis that these texts reveal invaluable information about the formation of Kantian moral philosophy. In this regard, we should certainly understand the moral problems Kant was dealing with at the time; these problems are rooted both in Kant's engagement with British moral sense theorists and in Kant's criticism of Wolffians. In what follows we will begin with Kant's critique of Hutcheson's "internal sense" theory, then we will try to show in which respects all through his philosophical life Kant felt himself indebted to Hutcheson. We will then refer to excerpts from *Observations* and *Remarks* where this engagement is implicitly present. Finally, we will try to demonstrate in which ways Kant's early moral theory and its consequent mature form are important for understanding Kant's *Analytic of Sublime,* mentioned only briefly in this text. We agree both with those scholars who see Kant's philosophical path as not taking any sudden shift but as a constant extension and deepening of ideas and we will also be able to say with Birgit Recki that, "there is always a systematic place for feeling, i.e. morality, in Kantian aesthetics" (Recki in Loose 2011, 43), all the way from 1760s to the end.

According to Paul Crowther[29] Kant's approach towards the sublime and the beautiful in *Observations* is highly indebted to Hutcheson's "internal sense" theory. Indeed, in the very first section of *Observations* Kant defines the feeling associated to both as follows:

There is still a feeling of a finer sort, thus named either because one can enjoy it longer without surfeit and exhaustion, or because it presupposes, so to speak, a susceptibility of the soul which at the same time makes it fit for virtuous impulses, or because it is a sign of talents and excellences of the intellect (Obs 14, Beo 2:208).

With this, Kant certainly shows signs of a connexion with Hutcheson's internal sense and moral feeling, since the feeling of the sublime and the beautiful is immediately related to virtue; however, there is a mention of *intellect* which motivates us to push further the analysis of Kant's relation to Hutcheson in order to see how high this/his debt is. According to Hutcheson, judging an act as "good" is based on three factors: we must possess unselfish "kind affections" so that we can simultaneously wish the happiness and well-being of others and

[29]for a full discussion, refer to: Crowther, Paul; *The Kantian Sublime from Morality to Art,* 1989, Oxford University Press.

take pleasure in these too. But since these affections alone are mere inner tendencies not leading to moral judgment, Hutcheson introduces a new feeling, the "moral sense" which renders the notion of "good" meaningful. However, still another element is needed for morally good actions in order to address the correct objects. Hutcheson gives this role to reason which gives direction, clarity and universality to the otherwise blind affections. The ultimate aim here is "the general happiness and well-being of humanity itself" (Henrich in Höffe&Ameriks 2009, 33f). This position, in the words of Patrick Frierson could be called demanding "objective universality" for morals; otherwise put, holding to a form consequentialism and at best "shallow anticonsequentialism", both of which ground moral worth one way or another in the consequences or purposes of our actions. This means basing moral evaluations not directly on consequences of particular acts but rather indirectly on "the good consequences for others or everyone" (Frierson in Velkley&Shell 2014, 64). Kant could be said to have the same position in *Observations* – and even in the Prize Essay - by asserting:

> if general affection towards humankind has become your principle…then your love towards the one in need remains, but from a higher standpoint, placed in its proper relationship to your duty as a whole…as soon as this feeling is raised to its proper universality it is sublime, but also colder… a consciousness of a feeling lives in every human breast and that extends much further than to the special grounds of sympathy and complaisance. I believe that I can bring all this together if I say that it is the **feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature** (Obs 23f, Beo 2:216-17).

Although from the excerpt above it is clear that Kant has common grounds with Hutcheson in referring to an objective universality and a feeling bestowed to every human being, we will see that he still has strict objections towards this approach. The signs of these objections are already present here. True that from early 1760s to 1770s Kant was constantly preoccupied with evaluating the theories of Wolffians, Crusius and Mendelssohn on the German side and moral sentimentalists such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson on the British; however Hutcheson remained in the centre of Kant's focus both by being criticized and praised.

Kant's objections towards Hutcheson's theory are concerned with four aspects of the latter: its universality, binding character, transcendental grounding and the content of ethical consciousness. In sum, Kant's objection could be clarified in the following manner. Regarding universality, Kant holds that feeling, i.e. "kind affections" are highly personal, come in degrees, their power of influence is based on their intensity and their value in terms of moral worth is relative (Henrich in Höffe&Ameriks 2009, 35). The traces of this objection are present in *Observations* as Kant asserts that "true virtue can only be grafted upon principles, and it will become the more sublime the more general they are" (Obs 24, Beo 2:217); hence

Kant implicitly realizes that *kind affections* could not be universalized in a proper way, but we need principles which are general. The problem lies however in the fact that in *Observations* Kant still searches for the principles in the realm of feelings. Certainly, Kant knows that Hutcheson does not claim the above-mentioned contentions, but he also shows that the notion of "moral sense" is susceptible of producing problems and cannot solve the issue of universality, hence his hints in *Observations* to the truly sublime as a state in which all personal inclinations are subordinated under the most general principle which should be in relation to our "duty as a whole". The nature of this duty is still obscure.

From the first objection Kant can also deduce that feeling, as understood by Hutcheson, is no ground for obligation either. The good, in its weakest form has a binding character which does not accord with mere feeling, but does have common grounds with knowing, i.e. reason, which is capable of defining morality as something more than a psychological process (Henrich in Höffe&Ameriks 2009, 36f). Kant's own mention of *intellect* in *Observations,* cited earlier, and his emphasis on the truly sublime as based on principles to which we "always subject our actions" *and* as closely related to moral worth might be viewed as signs of his understanding of the issue in question. But why should Hutcheson not have realized the crucial role of knowing? To put straightforward, his Lockean understanding of reason which limits it to theoretical reason did not allow him to think of deducing the highest principle of morality from anything related to reason. Kant's third objection addresses the transcendental grounding of Hutcheson's theory as the latter was unsatisfied with mere feeling and incapable of grounding morality in reason seeks its transcendental grounding in a God who – in his view – wants both happiness and furtherance of his creatures' life. Obviously Kant could never accept such grounding, based on a merely factual "arrangement" of the soul's faculties by God; hence a total heteronomy of morality (ibid, 39). However, from *Observations* again it is evident that Kant himself was still not in possession of any other satisfactory grounding, always going back to the superiority of true virtue, true sublimity and respect for dignity of human nature in general in contrast to false sublimity as worthless, but not being able to present a transcendental argument. Finally, regarding the fourth objection we can admit that while Kant is in search of a formal universality already in 1765, he understands Hutcheson's universality as one of a material nature, since it is grounded on the presence of "kind affections", i.e. feelings and is only universalized in the form of wanting the maximum happiness for all human beings. It is true that Kant was influenced by Hutcheson in the *Prize Essay* and himself adopted a form of objective universality in *Observations* as we have seen above, but already in 1763 he was sure of two necessities for his moral theory: obligation and universality; none of which could be grounded in feeling, nor deduced from pure theoretical reason in a

satisfactory way. Nonetheless, he was convinced that the absolutely binding character of the good is indicative of the role of reason, but he still needed to take the final step and discover "pure practical reason".

Although for Kant's transcendental philosophy Hutcheson's "internal sense" is almost completely irrelevant, the latter still has the merit of having found the pedestal for the monumental Kantian moral philosophy's column in that he distinguished the "undiminished reality of moral consciousness" in its own right and as something impossible of being justified by theoretical reason or mere feeling. When on the occasion, Hutcheson is forced to face oppositions by nonempirical opponents, he becomes even more interesting for Kant. Hutcheson reminded Kant of Aristotle and Plato's faculty of *the will* but he himself could not benefit from it in grounding morality by relating it to any form of reason due to his Lockean presumptions. Hutcheson realizes the problems stemming from feeling and that this feeling is in any case different from bodily feeling, but he has no way around it, exactly the aspect from which Kant criticizes him: having introduced a whole new feeling, a sense to solve the problem. Thus Kant needs to put Hutcheson behind – there is no reference to the latter from 1770 onwards – to find the groundings of morality. By *Remarks* he seems to know that universalization of any kind of affection whatsoever is incapable of having any *motivational* power for a moral act, a contention still not present in *Observations* (Crowther 1989, 66). It was only in 1770 that he could finally replace feeling by a complicated reference to contradiction in realm of moral acts, freedom and autonomy of the will, all of which culminate in 1785's *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.*

In *Remarks* we already encounter Kant's mature moral idea, formulated as: the will is good when it can regard itself "in consensus with the universal will" (Re 164, Bem 20:145). He also hints at the central problem in Hutcheson's internal sense theory:

"Thus, it is to be asked whether we feel pleasure immediately in the well-being of others or whether the immediate appetite actually lies in the possible exercise of our power to promote it. Both are possible, but which is real[?]" (Re 163, Bem 20:144).

Thus by the time of the composition of *Remarks* and even before, with the *Prize Essay*, Kant is aware of the categorically binding character of morality but he still does not possess the *principum diudicationis* with which he could give substantial content to the theory. However, from *Observations* we might be able to conclude that in the tension between feeling, i.e. moral sense, as a basis for morality and pure reason, Kant is ready to take the last step by making divisions which otherwise seem almost irrelevant. Kant criticizes Hutcheson for supporting "kind affections" and thereby forgetting the important role of justice in any moral theory. This

fact could be seen in his distinction between the truly sublime on the one hand and beauty and false sublimity on the other. The former can only have moral worth since it is based on *principles* which are general and stem from, admittedly, a feeling, *but* a feeling *for the beauty and dignity of human nature,* the former of which is important to Kant and has the merit of at least referring to subjectively possible principles based on respect – unfortunately here not for the moral law but for humanity in general – but in any case not dependent on an external element like a benevolent God.

Moreover, Kant's distinction between *genuine virtues* and *adopted virtues* in *Observations* could be taken as early signs of his mature formal moral theory which still has the element of feeling. The genuine virtues are given to the *righteous* person and not merely *lovable* ones; it is a form of respect and not a kind affection and does not address happiness directly, but *acting upon principles* is what makes a person worthy of esteem (Beo 2:220-21, Obs 27f). Thus, although it is for Kant still a feeling, it is categorically different from sympathy, benevolence and kind affection which are adopted virtues having *some* worth but not *genuine* worth; anticipating the distinction between acting *from* duty but also *with* inclinations. Finally, Kant's notion of the feeling of the truly sublime is closer to respect than to love or affections. He calls the epitome of sublime character as a person who acts out of "universal respect", for whom "true virtue is grafted only upon principles and will become the more sublime, the more general it is" (Obs 23f, Beo 2:215-16). All these anticipate Kant's departure from Hutcheson's internal sense theory as the basis of morality.

This movement is what motivates Kant's final moral theory which brings a fundamental shift in moral philosophy and which helps the formation of a key role for judgment in Kant's thought and finally of aesthetics. Kant's *Observations* in our reading is not primarily a text on aesthetics, but an exercise in ethics – and for the last two parts in anthropology. The sublime is for Kant an expression of a truly virtues character's necessities than a mere aesthetic concept and Kant's struggle with Hutcheson can make sense of this contention. We might be able to argue that Kant did not merely write the treatise to follow the *fashion* but was looking for a way between feeling (emotions) and theoretical reason to base his moral theory, and judgments of the sublime and the beautiful were suitable fields for such an exercise. From here it is only one step ahead to find the formulation of the *categorical imperative* which accompanied with the *Second Critique* will finally give Kant a feeling which has a priori grounds at the same time and is based on "pure practical reason" with which he can later talk about aesthetics and the faculty of judgment.

Chapter Three

Sublime in *Critique of the Power of Judgement*

Introduction

Kant's engagement with the sublime and the beautiful did not end with *Observations;* indeed the more elaborated treatment of the subject matter is to be found in Kant's 1790 *Critique of the Power of Judgment* in the *Analytic of the Sublime.* In this brief chapter we are not aiming at analysing the above-mentioned section thoroughly; rather we take a more modest aim at showing how and why does Kant end up with only two forms of the sublime: the mathematically sublime and the dynamically sublime. Otherwise formulated, what motivates this dichotomy? The answer is obviously complex, but our question addresses the history of the sublime, seeking to find out how various forms of sublime experience are limited in the *Third Critique* to the mathematically/dynamically sublime. We will try to sketch briefly the differences between the 1760's account and the Critical sublime, while pointing to the fundamental differences of the latter with the sublime as understood by all Kant's predecessors. This difference is certainly rooted in Kant's different philosophical project, his purposes and his presuppositions. Firstly, we will explore the *Analytic of the Sublime* in the *Third Critique,* then we will compare it with *Observations* and other accounts of sublimity.

3.1. The Analytic of the Sublime

With the memory of *Observations* in mind, we are quite justified to expect an extended discussion of the sublime in Kant's major work on aesthetics, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790). However, one is disappointed to find out the contrary: in the *Analytic of the Sublime* Kant clearly announces that it is "a mere appendage to the aesthetic judgement of the purposiveness of nature"[30] (Kant 2007, 77, 244). In fact, it is not because Kant has lost interest in the sublime by 1790; on the contrary he still finds it essential to establish a relation between aesthetics and ethic. But the problem is that the sublime does not exactly fit into the Critical Philosophy; more specifically it is a tremendously complex matter in connexion to Kant's notion of *purposiveness of nature* and *the reflective judgment.* The sublime is not purposive without a purpose like the beautiful; rather it is *counterpurposive* in relation to our imagination's capabilities. Indeed with the sublime there is no longer anything like a positive, harmonizing, constructive relation between freedom and nature (Allison 2001, 306). Finally,

[30] einen bloßen Anhang zur ästhetischen Beurteilung der Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur (KU A77, 167)

not only in contrast to the structure of the beautiful, the sublime is divided into the Mathematically/Dynamically sublime, but also the former is analysed in respect of quality and quantity, the latter only relation, none is analysed from all four aspects which beauty is. However, both types of sublimity are going to join to reveal to us an aspect of the relation between ethics and aesthetics which beauty is incapable of, by awakening in us not our harmony *with* nature but our superiority *over* nature (Kant 2007, 77f, 244).

We begin our exposition where Kant himself begins, by a comparison of the sublime with the beautiful in the *Analytic of the Sublime* in §23-24. The sublime and the beautiful have five points of convergence, (i) both are liked on their own account, i.e. the liking for both is disinterested, (ii) both are reflective judgments, in contrast to determinative judgements which are concerned with specific concepts, (iii) form (ii) follows that both are in some way related to concepts but such reference is *indeterminate*, (iv) again since no determinate concept is involved, both judgements stem from a mere presentation (imagination) which is either in connexion with reason or with understanding, and (v) finally, both are singular judgements which yet claim universality, i.e. subjective universality albeit no determinate concept present (ibid, 75, 244).

Despite the similarities, the sublime differs in the Critical account, like the pre-Critical one, from the beautiful in many respects. If the beautiful is concerned with the *boundedness (Begrenzung)* in the form of an object, which means it must be grasped as a whole in one intuition, the sublime in the contrary could also be found in formless objects, though this limitlessness should be capable of being though of by reason as a totality (ibid). Moreover, while the beautiful exhibits an indeterminate concept of understanding (Verstand), the sublime is connected to an indeterminate concept of reason (Vernunft); thus as pointed above we have two types of one judgement, i.e. reflective judgement (ibid). It follows, as Kant mentions, that the sublime is concerned with *quantity* while the beautiful has to do with *quality*. Finally, the feeling of the beautiful is that of pleasure rising from the harmony of faculties, while the feeling of the sublime could be described as displeasure, or disliking of the object which is then followed by a certain pleasure. In the encounter with the sublime we are "repelled" (abgestoßen) by the object and this is the reason why it is called – in a tone reminding of Burke – a *negative pleasure* (ibid, 76, 245). However, the most crucial difference between the two is in terms of purposiveness. As mentioned in passing, the beautiful seems to favour the harmony of our cognitive faculties since it is attributed to an object with a certain form and easily makes the from intuition to concepts – indeterminate as they are but of understanding – possible; the sublime on the other hand, is possible to be found in formless or boundless objects which makes it *counterpurposive* for reflective judgement but it still stimulates us by

evoking a certain kind of liking thus it should possess some kind of purposiveness which makes it account even more complex for Kant to integrate into the critique of taste (Allison 2001, 310). All through the *Analytic of the Sublime* Kant follows one major idea in solving the problem: the sublime, exiled from the realm of sensibility, should have to do with *ideas of reason,* should only be found in our *minds*. Hence, we are not wrong if we conclude that in the *Third Critique*'s account, the sublime and the beautiful are of differenet natures, i.e. they are ontologically[31] different which amounts to their different epistemological roles.

We shall now turn to the exposition of the mathematically sublime as presented in §25 to §27 of the *Analytic of the Sublime.* On his way to define the mathematically sublime, Kant goes through three various versions of a definition, the last one of which seems to be the most satisfying for him. These are respectively, (i) "*Sublime* is the name given to what is *absolutely great*" (Kant 2007, 78, 248), (ii) "*that is sublime in comparison with which all else is small*" (ibid, 80, 250) and finally (iii) "*The sublime is that*, *the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of the senses*" (ibid, 81, 250)[32]. Of course Kant comes to the last definition only after an in-detail analysis of what we empirically call great (groß) and its difference with the *absolutely great* which is not based on any empirical measurement, the full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this text. Thus, we will only refer to some key aspects of these analyses for the final definition of the mathematically sublime. In any case, we should bear in mind that disinterestedness, universality and a consciousness of a subjective purposiveness are the guidelines of the Kantian sublime.

By differentiating between the simply great (schlechtweg Groß) and the absolutely great (schlechthin Groß), i.e. the sublime, Kant endeavours to show that what we call sublime is so called since there is no empirical comparison possible for it. Otherwise formulated, if it could be compared to anything, it could never be sublime. However, the latter still needs a standard to be capable of claiming universality, such standard is, according to Kant, only to be found in the thing itself, i.e. the sublime calls forth attending to its inherent greatness (Allison 2001, 314). But the question still remains intact: if there is nothing out there, in nature, to call

[31] As it is clear from our discussion, in the case of beauty the object itself is liked, since it is purposive, while in the case of the sublime, the object is disliked and what is liked instead is our mental vocation, hence the two feelings are ontologically different. This also shows the tension between the sublime and reflective judgement since the former troubles the self-legislating aspect of the latter, hence Kant's need to find another form of purposiveness which concerns the purposes of reason (Kant 2007, 79, 246).

[32] (i) "Erhaben nennen wir das, was schlechthin groß ist", (ii) " Erhaben ist das, mit welchem in Vergleichung alles andere klein ist ", (iii) " Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken zu können ein Vermögen des Gemüts beweist, das jeden Maßtab der Sinne übertrifft "(Kant, 2015, 169-172).

sublime in an empirical process, where does sublimity really lie? Or, what motivates us to declare something as sublime in relation to itself?

In an endeavour to solve this problem, with the presupposition that the form of the object is already *counterpurposive,* Kant goes back to the transcendental subject to find the source of our experience of the sublime in our faculties, i.e. imagination and reason. Kant's reasoning in short is as follows: in an encounter with the sublime our imagination strives towards infinity, it is pleasurable for imagination to assume something always greater which shows to it its capacity of expansion, however, this endeavour towards infinity necessarily finds itself facing an essential demand by reason, "absolute totality" (Kant 2007, 81, 250). This encounter is inevitable because otherwise the absolutely great must be part of an even greater totality. Additionally, this encounter is futile on the side of imagination as it is impossible for it to strive *ad infinitum.* This engenders the feeling of displeasure. On the other hand, we realize the existence of a supersensible faculty (übersinnliches Vermögen) in ourselves. Hence, what we call sublime is in fact the attunement of mind (Geistesstimmung), or our mental state in the aforementioned experience (ibid). The essential elements for understanding Kant's position are, (i) to consider *magnitude* as an aesthetic concept in this context and not a mathematical, empirical concept, (ii) to assume a possibility of formlessness in respect to the sublime, (iii) to hold that despite the apparent *counterpurposiveness* of such experience, there is another higher form of *purposiveness* involved, (iv) form the previous assumption it follows that we need to take judgements of the sublime as reflective judgements, subjective and capable of claiming universality. Only under these conditions can we make sense of what follows the *Analytic of the Sublime.*

According to Kant, the two acts of imagination, apprehension (Auffassung) and comprehension (Zusammenfassung) lie at the heart of our experience of sublimity. The former refers to the ability of the imagination in grasping parts of the object of experience, the latter to its capability in holding together or bringing into one intuition what it has experience so far. In the case of the sublime, our imagination reaches a point where it has so many partial apprehensions that it is impossible for it to comprehend them (ibid, 82, 252). This failure is the source of the feeling of displeasure, which is then followed by pleasure of another nature. For the sake of pleasure, we necessarily need a kind of *purposiveness.* Reason's demand for totality should serve as our point of departure here which gives us an intellectual pleasure, and a consequence of which is that this satisfaction is sought by reason in imagination, i.e. reason demands that imagination by way of an aesthetical comprehension produces such satisfaction. Hence, everything is ready for explaining the experience of sublime, but instead of doing so, Kant "emphasizes the importance of a preliminary conclusion, namely, that *to be able even to*

think the infinite as a whole indicates a mental power that surpasses any standard of sense" (Allison 2001, 320)[33]. Kant's conclusion thus, is that if reason *can* demand totality, so our mind should be equipped with a *supersensible* capacity; hence, we can easily think of the possibility of such a totality demanded by reason, though it could never be sensibly given. Now in the experience sublime the case is that though no theoretical aim is achieved, the mere engagement with it brings about "a broadening of the mind that from another (the practical) point of view feels itself empowered to pass beyond the narrow confines of sensibility" (Kant 2007, 85, 255). With a reference to Kant's third definition of the mathematically sublime, it seems plausible to think of nature as sublime in those instances where an idea of *infinity* is thinkable. Although there is nothing truly infinite in nature, some natural phenomena – along with artistic ones such as St. Peter's – are capable of appearing *as if* they are infinite, hence engendering our awareness of the aforementioned capacity. This late harmony of imagination and reason is what constitutes the especial purposiveness of the sublime.

As mentioned before, Kant goes through all this rather phenomenological account of our experience of the sublime in order to connect it with morality. The way he does so, could be traced back to the role of reason explained above. According to Kant's account, reason is indeed the key element in both the experience of the sublime and in moral judgements. However, these are distinct vocations of the faculty of reason. With the sublime, Kant claims, "disposition of the mind conformable to that which the influence of definite (practical) ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it" (ibid, 86, 256)[34]. If practical ideas produce a feeling it is the moral feeling. However, Kant claims that the feeling produced by the sublime is *conformable* with such feelings and not the feeling itself, i.e. not a motive for undertaking any action. This feeling is analogous to moral feeling and in this way it is purposive for the mind (Allison 2001, 324). We might be able to see the experience of the sublime as one preparing us to be more sensitive and receptive to moral feeling, hence as one promoting the possibilities of acting according to morality but not as *grounds* for moral action. All this is possible, only because the sublime is not purposive for pure theoretical reason; rather it is purposive for practical reason, but since it is an aesthetic experience dealing with indeterminate concepts – not an ethical experience engaged with determinate concept of the good – its purposiveness is for pure practical reason as a whole. Hence the analogy and not identity between sublime and moral feeling. If the sublime is in any connexion to practical

[33] The reasons for such a change of route could be found explained in, Allison, Henry E., *Kant's Theory of Taste: a Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement,* Cambridge University Press, 2001

[34] ‚so bezieht *sich* dasselbe Vermögen in Beurteilung eines Dinges als erhabenen auf die Vernunft, um zu deren Ideen (unbestimmt welchen) subjektiv übereinzustimmen, d.i. eine Gemütsstimmung hervorzubringen, welche derjenigen gemäß und mit ihr verträglich ist, die der Einfluß bestimmter Ideen (praktischer) auf das Gefühl bewirken würde' (Kant 2015, 179).

reason, Kant would necessarily need to talk about the *moral law* in this relation too which indeed he does in §27 (Kant 2007, 87f, 257)[35].

Kant defines respect as, "The feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea *that is a law for us*" (Kant 2007, 86, 257)[36]. The failure in this definition refers to the inability of imagination to grasp the totality demanded by reason in one intuition, but of course there is another aspect to this law of reason. Kant tells us that by realizing the limits of imagination we also realize that the feeling of respect is directed towards ourselves and in that towards our own supersensible capacities which enable us be able to merely *think* of the infinite, though not grasping it (ibid). Moreover, we need to mention how in Kant's view the respect of *the idea of humanity in ourselves* is subrepted and turned into respect for the natural object. The crucial point is that Kant has emphasized from the beginning that he considers "aesthetic" object, so its representation to the subject. Taken in this sense we are justified to see that though we respect the supersensible in ourselves, only *certain* objects are capable of engendering such a feeling (Allison 2001, 326).

Finally, Kant connects *the idea of humanity in ourselves* as the object of respect with *the rational vocation of our cognitive faculties* as the source of such a feeling of respect; by realizing the former we also realize the superiority of our pure theoretical reason aesthetically and then we are guided towards the object of this respect which is ourselves *as autonomous moral agents* (ibid). Thus the experience of the mathematically sublime is close to our moral feeling by hinting at the respect for the supersensible in ourselves; while at the same time both begin with displeasure and end in pleasure. However, we should always remember that this is merely an analogy and the feeling of respect evoked by the sublime can never *make* us act morally.

Kant begins his discussion of the dynamically sublime by differentiating between *power* and *dominance*, hence asserting that "*Might* is a power which is superior to great hindrances. It is termed *dominion* if it is also superior to the resistance of that which itself possesses might. Nature considered in an aesthetic judgement as might that has no dominion over us, is *dynamically sublime*" (Kant 2007, 90, 260)[37]. The key feature of Kant's definition – and his

[35] It should be mentioned and remembered, that in the present context where there are references to morality or moral theory, we are referring to Kant's mature moral philosophy as primarily formulated in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and later developed in *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788).

[36] Das Gefühl der Unangemessenheit unseres Vermögens zur Erreichung einer Idee, dir für uns Gesetz ist, ist Achtung (Kant 2015, 180).

[37] Macht ist ein Vermögen, welches großen Hindernissen überlegen ist. Eben dieselbe heißt Gewalt, wenn sie auch dem Widerstande dessen, was selbst Macht besitzt, überlegen ist. Die Natur, im ästhetischen Urteile als Macht, die über uns keine Gewalt hat, betrachtet, ist dynamisch-erhaben (Kant 2015, 184).

point of divergence from Burkean sublime – is the emphasis on the fact that we are not *really* frightened by nature, i.e. no matter how terrifying it appears, we are always above nature, though the representation could be thought of as evoking fear. However, and in agreement with Burke, the crucial difference between the dynamically sublime and the mathematically sublime is the association of the former with fear which necessitates an aesthetic "distance" from the natural object in question. It might be possible to formulate the issue as with the dynamically sublime there is always a hint at the tension between the subjects physical aspect (body) and the natural phenomenon in terms of fear which is absent from the experience of mathematically sublime: "If we are to judge nature as dynamically sublime, it must be represented as a source of fear" (ibid)[38].

In a rather different phenomenological experience from mathematically sublime, in the dynamically sublime we have two simultaneous feelings, firstly the object seems overpowering and dangerous to us and secondly, the experience should lead us to feel our superiority over the object in the same aesthetic judgement (ibid, 91, 260). In order to explain this phenomenon, Kant goes back to the subject as a natural being versus the subject as a moral being (Allison 2001, 329). Indeed as Kant puts the issue, in the experience of the dynamically sublime we must feel ourselves "as independent of nature, and discovers a pre-eminence above nature that is the foundation of a self-preservation of quite another kind from that which may be assailed and brought into danger by external nature" (Kant 2007, 92, 261)[39]. While in the mathematically sublime we become aware of our intellectual superiority over the sensible phenomenon, in a more radical way, in the dynamically sublime we become aware of our independence and superiority as individuals from and over the entire nature, be it our own or an object in nature. This will more readily serve Kant's aims at connecting sublimity with morality as we will see. This connexion is already present in Kant's example of our endorsement of a warrior since we find in him/her a character who values something more than physical existence and personal desires (ibid, 93, 262).

Before concerning the specific moral aspects of the account of sublimity in the *Analytic of the Sublime*, and before comparing it with the pre-Critical treatise, *Observations,* we need to make a few remarks on §29 of the Critical account in order to see Kant's treatment of the modality of the sublime, i.e. how to ground the demand for agreement of everyone for these judgements. On the face of it, we have an easier task ahead, sine contrary to the deduction of judgements of beauty, in the case of judgements of sublime we do not need to find a ground outside the

[38] Wenn von uns die Narue dynamisch als erhaben beurteilt werden soll, so muß sie als Frucht erregend vorgestellt werden (ibid).
[39] 186 quote

Analytic, but the Analytic itself proves that the latter judgements are grounded in the disposition of moral feeling which we can take as present in all subjects, hence the subjective condition is already at our disposal (ibid, 94f, 264). However, Kant complicates the situation by demanding a "far higher degree of culture" (ibid) both regarding the aesthetic judgement and the cognitive faculties. The tension between this demand and what Kant previously claimed that everyone, even the commonest judge, can experience the sublime, might be resolved by assuming that there are two levels of aesthetic appreciation at work. The first level is the general level accessible even to "the savage", as Kant puts it, which engenders a rather ambiguous feeling of transcending earthly concerns and the presence of *some* supersensible capacity in ourselves; the second level however, comes as a result of culture and experience which makes possible the aesthetic appreciation of not only the apparent example of the warrior but also glaciered mountains and in the first sight totally repelling natural phenomena.

However, in order to avoid the misunderstanding that he takes judgements of the sublime to be culturally *determined* according to the latter claim mentioned above, Kant claims:

> Rather is it in human nature that its foundations are laid, and, in fact, in that which, at once with common understanding, we may expect everyone to possess and may require of them, namely, a native capacity for the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e. for moral feeling (ibid, 95, 265)[40].

Kant's claim seems to be that, since if we ever want to consider a person as a moral agent, we must simply assume his/her disposition of moral feeling, and since judgements of sublimity are grounded in this disposition, then the latter judgements are necessary and subjectively universal.

Having explored some aspects of Kant's account of the mathematically and dynamically sublime in the *Analytic of the Sublime* we are now in a position to compare it with the pre-Critical theory of sublimity, as well as the theory of sublime as put forth by Kant's predecessors. In this regard we will mainly consider Longinus and Burke while pointing in terms of the moral connotations and aspects to Hutcheson. Moreover, we will keep Kant's ideas in the *General Remark,* the relationship between the sublime and arts along with the connexion between the sublime experience and morality for the abovementioned comparison. Finally, it should be mentioned that there are various aspects to Kant's exposition of the sublime which were not explored in this text; these include the in-depth relation between the sublime and the beautiful, the relation between the sublime and the account of the aesthetic

[40] sondern *es hat seine* Grundlage in der menschlichen Natur, und zwar demjenigen, was man mit dem gesunden Verstande zugleich jedermann ansinnen und von ihm fordern kann, nämlich in der Anlage zum Gefühl für (praktische) Ideen, d.i. *zu dem* moralischen (Kant 2015, 190).

ideas and genius which follows immediately after and etc. These issues demand an analysis of their own which is beyond the scope of the present text.

3.2. The Critical Sublime vs. *Observations* and Pre-Kantian Sublime

The Kant of 1790 is in many respects fundamentally different from the philosopher of 1760s. From the composition of *Observations* to the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* many things have changed. What has remained unchanged though is Kant's interest in feelings and a place for them in moral theory; though he now understands under feelings in respect of morality a concept totally different, hence a concept with a different status (Recki in Loose 2011, 43). This is also apparent from Kant's contention that there is always a systematic place for feelings in aesthetics, hence what Recki calls an aesthetics of morals (Recki 2001, 187). Since the differences between the sublime of 1764 and the one in the *Third Critique* are more illuminating, we will provide a gist of the similarities in order to explore the former more in detail.

Firstly, the *Third Critique* like *Observations* deals with both the sublime and the beautiful viewing them not as opposites but as complimentary experiences which are ontologically different. Their difference is of course much more elaborated in the former text. Secondly, Kant sees an indispensable relationship between both beauty and sublimity with moral feelings in both texts, while in the *Third Critique* like *Observations* he emphasizes the connexion between the sublime and moral feeling. In both texts the relationship between sublimity and moral feeling outweighs that of beauty and morality, since the former relation is based on the feeling of respect while the latter is based on the feeling of love which could be subject to contingency (Kant 2007, 102, 271). Finally, we still could discern an implicit differentiation of the true sublimity from false sublimity, the evidences of which are to be found in the *General Remark,* though the borders between these two types of sublimity are much more implicit and vague here. The case of enthusiasm could serve as an example, Kant asserts:

> The idea of the good connected with affect is *enthusiasm*. This state of mind appears to be sublime: so much so that there is a common saying that nothing great can be achieved without it. But now every affect is blind either as to the choice of its end, or, supposing this has been furnished by reason, in the way it is effected…On this account it cannot merit any delight on the part of reason. Yet, from an aesthetic point of view, enthusiasm is sublime….But (as seems strange) even *freedom from affect* in a mind that strenuously follows its unswerving principles

> is sublime, and that, too, in a manner vastly superior, because it has at the same time the delight of pure reason on its side. Such a stamp of mind is alone called noble (ibid, 102, 272).

Although the sharp distinction between noble sublime and terrifying sublime or magnificent are no more present in the Critical account, still Kant implicitly privileges any form of sublimity which is connected to moral principles and moral feelings, hence to reason; though in the critical account he has already overcome the obstacle of moral feeling, thus the previous tensions have no place. The case of true/false sublimity would also be elaborated in what follows, namely as exploration of the differences between the theory of sublimity in *Observations* and in *Analytic of the Sublime.* Kant's relationship to Burke, Hutcheson and Longinus will also be dealt with in this context.

To begin with the differences, the first and most evident difference is the exclusion of any anthropological account from the *Third Critique.* Here there is no analysis of the sublime in relation to the two sexes or nationalities. The reasons for such elimination do not concern a loss of interest on Kant's side about anthropology – a fact that could be seen from the publication of *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1796/97) – indeed Kant kept an enduring interest in anthropological issues, considered them as an important part of philosophy, taught courses on the topic through his academic career and evidently his ideas on the subject matter did not change much through the years from 1764 to 1796. Thus, the reason for the omission of the topic should be sought in the different purposes of the two texts. While *Observations* is written "with the eyes of an observer", has pedagogical aims and is addressed to a greater public of readers, the *Third Critique* is an essential pivot of Kant's Transcendental Philosophy. It is supposed to bridge the gulf between nature and freedom, i.e. the *First* and the *Second* Critique. Hence, it seeks the a priori conditions of our power of judgement which distances it from *Observations*.

The second difference could concern the objects which are appropriate for producing the feeling of the sublime. In the *Third Critique* Kant is in possession of a much more elaborate phenomenology of both the sublime and the beautiful. Partly drawing to Burkean sublime which is essentially accompanied with terror or fear, but also developing the former's view into a transcendental account, Kant now emphasizes the difference between the beautiful and the sublime more in terms of pleasure with the former and initial, sensory displeasure for the latter – in this respect Kant is again indebted to Burke. This new approach leads to Kant's emphasis in the *Third Critique* that the sublime is truly found in *crude nature,* hence the downgrading of his pre-Critical examples from art in general. Indeed, Kant is trying to keep the purity of the judgement of the sublime too by trying to confine it to nature (Allison 2001, 337). Of course there are still examples like St. Peter's, Egyptian Pyramids but,

> These examples, which were probably chosen because of their familiarity as illustrations of the sublime, are *not* to be taken as paradigmatic, since the sublime is to be sought instead in crude nature, where one's liking can more easily remain uncontaminated by any thought of purpose…. Kant does not deny a place to the sublime in fine art, though, in contrast to most of contemporaries and, indeed, the whole tradition stemming from Longinus, he certainly tends to minimalize it (ibid)

So, in breaking with the British tradition coming down from Longinus in this respect, Kant does not eliminate fine art as a candidate for evoking the feeling of sublime, but tries to minimize it. However, from Kant's discussion in §52 where he considers the combination of various arts one can find an affinity with Longinus in that for Kant sublimity in fine art, like Longinus, is a product of both a noble, great idea and the mode or style of expression (Kant 2007, 154, 326). Indeed, Kant's citation of the inscription on the Temple of Isis reinforces the understanding that when it comes to fine art, Kant like Longinus is mostly concerned with an elevated or "high" style (ibid, 145, 317).

The third fundamental difference between the two texts stems from Kant's totally different understanding of *moral feeling*. We shall first show how he connects the sublime with this feeling in the *Analytic of the Sublime* to help the differences come into light. The most evident change from 1760s to 1790s in Kant's philosophy is Kant's discovery of *pure practical reason* which makes possible the formation of a philosophy of morals which has a priori basis and is based on a principle of reason in its practical vocation. Already in 1765 Kant was dealing with the shortcomings of British moral sense theories, he was aware of the obstacles on the way of the moral theory of Hutcheson and even in *Remarks* he had provided a primary formulation of his later categorical imperative. However, without pure practical reason the project could not be completed or its claims justified. The missing link between feeling and reason, hence, the necessary element for incorporating feeling in a theory of morality while maintaining its autonomy, was *respect for the moral law,* a notion formulated in *Groundwork* of 1785. With this notion, we can think of reason as motivation through a feeling which is "created unaided" (Recki in Loose 2011, 45). The moral law, however, has a *negative* effect on our sensuality, since it demands the subordination of all personal, sensual inclination and desires under the absolute obligation of moral law. Hence already the *pain* brought about by the moral law anticipates its affinities with the feeling of sublime; additionally, both experiences lead to a subsequent pleasure. The situation of Kantian philosophy after this development is described by Recki as:

> Due to his analysis of respect for the law, in which Kant qualified the moral feeling as an emotional and, at the same time, rational motive for rational actions, the theoretical situation

> is all of a sudden entirely different. Suddenly, Kant has a feeling caused by reason at his disposal, which gives him the nice opportunity to also apply the idea elsewhere (ibid, 48).

With these remarks we can already see the possible connexions of the sublime and moral feeling; an issue taken further in what follows. More readily than the beautiful, the sublime is grounded on the assumption that we possess a moral disposition, hence, potentially we are able to act morally. The recognition of the possession of a higher faculty than mere sensibility and the potential capability to stand higher than any natural phenomena in virtue of our disposition of reason construct a close connexion between the sublime and moral feeling. On the other hand, in accordance with the pre-Critical account, Kant considers some moral characteristics as themselves worthy of being deemed sublime (Allison 2001, 341).

Whereas in *Observations* the boundaries between the feeling of the sublime and moral feeling are not sharply clear and the noble sublime seems to be identical to moral feeling, in the Critical account by virtue of a clear cut theory of morality, Kant is able to show that the feeling of the sublime is *analogous* to and not identical with moral feeling, i.e. the feeling of respect for the moral law. This sharp distinction enables Kant to keep both the realm of aesthetic and judgements of taste independent, and to establish a connexion between this realm and morality by way of analogy. In any case, even the most intense experience of sublimity is not capable of motivating us to act; were this the case then moral theory would not have been based on reason alone and would lose its autonomy. However, by way of such connexion the core idea of reason finds a way to be at least represented; a representation which is bound to a certain object or image but is rendered possible thanks to a mutual *ground,* i.e. the feeling (Recki in Loose 2011, 50).

Moreover, while in the pre-Critical account Kant did not have any notion like prefect/imperfect duties, he was incapable of ascribing an important role to beauty in relation to morality, hence it was only the noble sublime which could be related to *genuine virtue* while beauty along with other forms of sublimity could merely amount to *adopted virtues* or *simulacrum of virtue*. The case is not the same in the Critical account, sine after having developed the notions of perfect/imperfect duties, he is capable of ascribing a more significant role to beauty in relation to morality, albeit the sublime still possesses a higher place:

> Since both such love and such esteem (or respect) are essential and irreducible elements of the moral life for Kant, the preparatory role played by each remains distinct. This distinctness and its foundation in the nature of morality is best expressed in an important *Reflexion* in which Kant states that while the cultivation of the feelings for both the beautiful and the sublime in nature is a preparation for moral feeling, the former functions with respect to imperfect and the latter with respect to perfect duties (R992 15: 437) (Allison 2011, 342)

The rather ambiguous and imperfect account of *Observations* in connecting sublimity with acting upon principles which also suffered from grounding morality – following Hutcheson and British moral sense theorists – on feelings is now fully developed in the *Analytic of the Sublime*. Here both the mathematically and the dynamically sublime represent our relation to perfect duties – the latter more evidently show this – since both experiences are phenomenologically displeasing and are followed by a subsequent pleasure only thanks to the entrance of reason into the game. In order to perform perfect duties, we need to overcome our inclinations and desires, in short we need to gain control of our sensuous nature. This experience is in itself painful and displeasing. In the case of the sublime – dynamically sublime specifically – we also experience an initial displeasure by encountering a natural power which overpowers us and can potentially be a danger to us. However, in both cases there is an ultimate feeling of pleasure by virtue of realizing our supersensible capacities, our possession of the power of reason and more our possession of pure practical reason. The difference between the two experiences however remains, while the sublime only *aesthetically* prepares us or reminds us of what duty practically *demands*. As Allison puts it, "the sublime puts us in touch (albeit merely aesthetically) with our "higher self"; and, as such, it may help to clear the ground, as it were, for genuine moral feeling" (ibid, 344). The sublime being *counterpurposive* to our senses, hints at the higher purposiveness present in all of us as autonomous moral agents. The notions of purposiveness in nature and any definition of aesthetic judgement as independent from empirical grounds, i.e. possessing a priori grounds are absent from the pre-Critical philosophy and hence amount to the rather ambiguous relation between the sublime and moral feeling and in addition to that they lead to Kant's categorization of various forms of sublimity as true/false sublime implicitly and terrifying/noble sublime and magnificent explicitly.

As a result, in the Critical account the terrifying sublime becomes the dynamical sublime, the noble sublime transforms into what could be called "the moral sublime" – a term introduced without any precedence in the *General Remark* – and the magnificent sublime turns into the combination of the sublime and the beautiful in works of fine art (Clewis in Velkley&Shell 2014, 142). At this point the transformation of the terrifying sublime to the dynamically sublime helps us elucidate how Kant goes beyond the Burkean sublime.

Kant explicitly compares his account of the sublime with that of Burke at the end of the *General Remark,* asserting:

> As psychological observations these analyses of our mental phenomena are extremely fine, and supply a wealth of material for the favourite investigations of empirical anthropology…. But if we attribute the delight in the object wholly and entirely to the gratification which it

> affords through charm or emotion, then we must not expect from *anyone else* agreement with the aesthetic judgement passed by *us*…. Hence if the import of the judgement of taste, where we appraise it as a judgement entitled to require the concurrence of everyone, cannot be *egoistic*, but must necessarily, from its inner nature, be allowed a *pluralistic* validity, i.e. on account of what taste itself is, and not on account of the examples which others give of their taste, then it must found upon some *a priori* principle…and no amount of prying into the empirical laws of the changes that go on within the mind can succeed in establishing such a principle. For these laws only yield a knowledge of how we do judge, but they do not give us a command as to how we ought to judge, and, what is more, such a command as is *unconditioned* (Kant 2007, 107f, 277-8).

We have provided a rather long citation by Kant since it captures in a very clear way the reason why Kant goes beyond Burke's sublime. While in the pre-Critical account the terrifying sublime was very close to the Burkean sublime; in the Critical account the dynamically sublime is important not for its empirical effects or any sensory consequences, rather it is crucial because it starts where the Burkean sublime comes to an end: after the moment of being terrified. The Burkean sublime is limited to a bodily experience which has almost no moral import – as mentioned before Burke's account of sympathy is still highly individualistic (see Chapter 2 of the present text). The Burkean sublime is confined to a feeling of *self-preservation* which is closed to the individual subject's strong desire of life; thus it is an empirical and psychological account. However, even from the pre-Critical account the terrifying sublime is not *as important as* the noble sublime for Kant. Thus although he takes the relationship between the sublime, power and terror (fear) from Burke, he uses this interrelation for another purpose: as we have already seen for connecting the experience of sublime with moral feeling. It is more than evident that for Burke there is no moral feeling present in the experience of sublimity; and when there is, it is an incomplete and almost poor account of sympathy. But Kant draws to Burke's definition since he is concerned with connecting the sublime with natural phenomena for reasons already mentioned earlier in this text; hence, the terrifying sublime takes an explicitly Burkean sense only to surpass it by connecting the experience produced by it to moral feeling, i.e. our recognition of the presence of a higher faculty in ourselves. The magnificent is clearly unsuitable for such a connexion. Finally Kant's development beyond Hutcheson's internal sense theory is already evident from our exposition here and in the previous chapter. Evading any repetition it suffices to mention that the critical account of moral feeling and solving its problems by moral sense theory, finally helps Kant discover the fact that aesthetic feeling can also possess an a priori character. Moreover, with the specifically Kantian account of moral feeling it is possible to see that the feeling of respect and the feeling of sublime both possess the same structure of experience,

i.e. both have the contrary feelings of initial displeasure and consequential pleasure (Recki in Loose 2011, 51). The analytic of the sublime succeeds in demonstrating in an aesthetic manner the highest principle of morality, namely, respect for the moral law; "the feeling of the sublime as the feeling of our possessing a pure and self-sufficient reason is centred around the same reason that, through the moral law, infuses the moral respect within us" (ibid).

The sublime in the *Third Critique* of course could also be analysed in relation to Kant's account of the genius, aesthetic ideas and in its relation to the beautiful; however, the last part of the present text is indeed an introduction to the various possible readings of the Critical sublime, hence it has no claim about being comprehensive.

Conclusion

In this text we have tried to explore one the one hand, the history of the sublime from Longinus to Kant, on the other and more importantly, we have focused on Kant's pre-Critical treatise, *Observations,* in order to both explore the text itself and to locate it in the discourse of the sublime. Finally, we have concisely explored the transformation of the Kantian sublime from the pre-Critical to the Critical account explained in the *Third Critique* in the *Analytic of the Sublime.*

We began by asking questions pertaining to the importance of *Observations* and its similarities and differences with other accounts of sublimity with which Kant was supposedly familiar. In this regard we have provided a brief study of the account of sublime in Longinus's treatise, *Peri Hypsous,* as the first text devoted wholly to the discussion of the sublime; then we tried to sketch out the developments of the discourse in British aesthetics; so we explored the theories of sublime by Addison, Shaftesbury and Burke, while we mentioned briefly, Kames, Denis and Alison. Moreover, we also explained Hutcheson's moral sense theory which shows our purpose to answer the second question, namely, what differentiates Kant's pre-Critical text from those of others. In the first part of chapter two, by viewing *Observations* not merely as a text in aesthetics or anthropology but also as a text with ethical significances, we tried to show that the significance of this text is that it demonstrates how Kant is struggling in 1760s with moral sense theory as proposed by Hutcheson in order to find a space both for feeling and reason in morality, yet at the same time keeping the binding, a priori characteristic of the highest moral principle. In this regard we showed that Kant's division of the sublime into three different types, namely the *terrifying sublime, the magnificent* and *the noble sublime,* giving privilege to the third form as indicative of true virtue, hence an implicit division of the sublime into "true" and "false" sublime hints at the essentially moral significance of an

aesthetic experience which is in this case the experience of the sublime. This aspect of Kant's treatise is only understandable once we try to move beyond the surface of anthropological discussion and the categorization of nationalities and focus mainly on the first two parts and those moments in the text where Kant shows his sympathies with the moral theory of Hutcheson but also demonstrates a certain dissatisfaction with the latter – the abovementioned division of the sublime is itself a prove to this tension towards Hutchesonian ethics in Kant's thought. To close the discussion of *Observations* itself, we tried to show at the end of the first part of chapter one that sections three and four of the treatise could be viewed as representing Kant's pedagogical aims in composing the text; hence we can see the other side of an otherwise highly biased discussion. On the other hand, it could be concluded that these sections bring into light the dangers of falling prey to such a biased view about women or nationalities even for a great mind like Kant, the consequence of which was the downgrading of the whole treatise for a long time in the literature.

Moreover, in the second part of chapter two, by reading *Observations* against other theories of the sublime, especially the Burkean theory, we demonstrated how Kant effectively tries to surpass these theories. Accordingly, in contrast to the common view shared by a major part of the literature on the sublime, we came to the contention that by ascribing a pivotal role to moral feeling as the criteria for distinguishing true/false sublimity Kant establishes a rather anti-Burkean sublime. Of course we showed that there are similarities between the two philosophers' accounts in terms of examples of sublimity or association of the sublime with terror and power; nevertheless their totally different purposes and aims for dealing with the sublime leads to an overpowering of differences rather than similarities. Finally, reading the text against the background of Kant's reception of Hutcheson's moral sense theory – the characteristic of which was admitting the latter's theory as recognizing the problem correctly but not being able to solve it – helped us support our hypothesis in the beginning of this text according to which there is a constant engagement with ethics and questions of morality running beneath the surface of Kant's aesthetics, even in this pre-Critical text. We thus might be able to conclude that despite fundamental shifts in Kant's philosophy from the pre-Critical to the Critical philosophy, the road taken by the sublime and moral theory shows us how Kant was constantly and unchangeably engaged with the same issues in practical philosophy all through his career. In this regard, we sided with Dieter Henrich and those Kant's commentators who support an ever-developing, ever-deepening but also unchanging course in Kant's thought in ethics which brings back the same questions to the philosopher in many periods of his life. Finally, it should be mentioned that a comparison of *Observations* with Longinus's *Peri Hypsous* enable us to conclude at this stage, that Longinus has more affinities

with Kant than it is usually thought by simultaneously holding to the experience of the sublime as a totally subjective experience and as essentially related to morality.

In the third chapter we sketched the Critical account in brief; exploring both the mathematically and the dynamically sublime we tried to show the changes and transformations Kantian sublime has gone through in three decades. Moreover, we concluded that Kant's discovery and development of critical moral theory as explored in *Groundwork* and the *Second Critique* solves the tension of true/false sublimity; hence there is no need for such a division in the *Analytic of the Sublime* since the problem of moral feeling is solved. The new mathematically and dynamically sublime – the latter especially found merely in nature, thus Kant's emphasis on limiting the sublime to natural phenomena – are both related to our recognition of possessing higher faculties. The experience of the sublime in the *Third Critique* is structurally analogous to our experience towards moral law: in both cases we have an initial displeasure which is followed by a consequential pleasure. In the case of the sublime the play of the faculties of imagination and reason produces this experience and in the case of moral acts, the binding character of the moral law and the demand of pure practical reason for respecting it leads to an *analogous* experience. We can also mention again our emphasis on the fact that these experiences are not identical but merely analogous. The sublime does not make us act or order us to take action, it only hints at the presence of the higher faculties which can issue such an order. It presents to us what it looks like to act morally. Finally, in this last chapter too we demonstrated the differences and similarities between Kantian and Burkean sublime. We also hinted at the affinities between Kant and Longinus regarding the *Third Critique's* sublime.

The sublime has been the subject of numerous studies in the past few decades; these range from historical studies to philosophical treatments of the subject to merely aesthetical approaches. On the other hand, our study is limited by its questions, hypotheses and aims. Even within these limitations it cannot and should not claim to be comprehensive. There are various aspects which still provide rich grounds for research. The relationship between the experience of sublime and religious transcendence, sublime and gender studies, and the interrelation of sublime, genius and nature are only a few in this regard. The Kantian sublime itself is still rich with material to discover; an interesting example for such diverse possibilities are interpretations of some contemporary philosophers and thinkers like Lyotard and Richir. The future of our research is also illuminated by this first step towards more profound reading of the Kantian sublime which could take a different approach to shed a new light on other aspects of both Kant's aesthetics and ethics.

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