EU sanctioning behavior in the post-Lisbon era

Abstract

Despite a long history of scholarship about economic sanctions, research about European Union sanctions, specifically EU sanction threats, is more nascent. The institutional changes in the EU changes since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, which gave the European Parliament some increased powers whilst maintaining an intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy, add to this research gap. This thesis thus attempts to answer the question, "What are the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon on the European Parliament's role in sanctions decision-making?" Due to the EP's significant role in the Magnitsky case and its high salience and implications for EU relations with third countries, this study uses the Magnitsky case in the EU to answer this question. It uses an explaining-outcome process-tracing method and finds that some legal changes did not make the EP more assertive in sanctions policy in the Magnitsky case. It does find that the EP 'tested the waters' by forging a greater connection between human rights and external relations. It also finds that the augmentation of the HRVP role led to a more difficult relationship between the EP and the Council in the Magnitsky case.