More is Less: The Political Economy of the MiFID Revision
More is Less: The Political Economy of the MiFID Revision
diplomová práce (OBHÁJENO)

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Trvalý odkaz
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/90937Identifikátory
SIS: 179260
Kolekce
- Kvalifikační práce [18345]
Autor
Vedoucí práce
Oponent práce
Schwarz, Jiří
Fakulta / součást
Fakulta sociálních věd
Obor
Mezinárodní ekonomická a politická studia
Katedra / ústav / klinika
Institut ekonomických studií
Datum obhajoby
12. 9. 2017
Nakladatel
Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních vědJazyk
Angličtina
Známka
Výborně
Klíčová slova (česky)
Finanční sektor, finanční instituce, finanční regulace, institucionální politická ekonomieKlíčová slova (anglicky)
Financial sector, financial institutions, financial regulation, institutional political economyThe thesis titled "More is Less: The Political Economy of the MiFID Revision" aims to reveal to what extent different preferences of individual Member States on EU financial regulation affect the increase in complexity of financial legislative acts, concretely MiFID II. Using three theoretical building-blocks in a classical framework of political economy, we argue that divergence of member states is inherent to their different capitalist environments (Varieties of Capitalism). Aligning these differences with the common, harmonized regime can create costs and cause market disadvantages. Therefore, Member States try to push for as similar legislation to their own as possible, to minimize the costs. The result is a disproportionately long legislative act, that was crafted in a way to satisfy individual preferences of Member States, through discretionary provisions, exemptions and other. We also investigate how much harmonization the original MiFID established, asking if some provision became less complicated in MiFID II, owing to gradual convergence of Member State regimes.
The thesis titled "More is Less: The Political Economy of the MiFID Revision" aims to reveal to what extent different preferences of individual Member States on EU financial regulation affect the increase in complexity of financial legislative acts, concretely MiFID II. Using three theoretical building-blocks in a classical framework of political economy, we argue that divergence of member states is inherent to their different capitalist environments (Varieties of Capitalism). Aligning these differences with the common, harmonized regime can create costs and cause market disadvantages. Therefore, Member States try to push for as similar legislation to their own as possible, to minimize the costs. The result is a disproportionately long legislative act, that was crafted in a way to satisfy individual preferences of Member States, through discretionary provisions, exemptions and other. We also investigate how much harmonization the original MiFID established, asking if some provision became less complicated in MiFID II, owing to gradual convergence of Member State regimes.